Tajikistan: Recent Developments and
U.S. Interests
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
February 10, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
98-594
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Tajikistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests
Summary
Tajikistan is a significant country in Central Asia by virtue of its geographic location bordering
China and Afghanistan and its ample water and other resources, but it faces ethnic and clan
schisms, deep poverty, poor governance, and other severe challenges. Tajikistan was one of the
poorest of the new states that gained independence at the end of 1991 after the break-up of the
former Soviet Union. The new country was soon plunged into a devastating civil conflict between
competing regional and other interests that lasted until a peace settlement in 1997. Former state
farm chairman Imomaliy Rahmon rose to power during this period and was reelected president
after the peace settlement as part of a power-sharing arrangement. He was reelected in 2006. His
rule has been increasingly authoritarian and has been marked by ongoing human rights abuses,
according to many observers.
The civil war had further set back economic development in the country. The economy recovered
to its Soviet-era level by the early 2000s, and GDP had expanded several times by the late 2000s,
despite setbacks associated with the global economic downturn. Poverty remains widespread,
however, and the infrastructure for healthcare, education, transportation, and energy faces steep
developmental needs, according to some observers. The country continues to face problems of
political integration, perhaps evidenced in part by recent violence in eastern Tajikistan. The
country also faces substantial threats from terrorism and narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan.
The United States has been Tajikistan’s largest bilateral donor, budgeting $778.6 million of aid for
Tajikistan (FREEDOM Support Act and agency budgets) over the period from fiscal year 1992
through fiscal year 2008, mainly for food and other humanitarian needs. Budgeted assistance for
FY2009 was $35.8 million, and estimated assistance was $48.3 million in FY2010. The
Administration requested $47.1 million in foreign assistance for Tajikistan in FY2011 (these
FY2009-FY2011 figures exclude most Defense and Energy Department programs).
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, Tajikistan seemed to be
willing to cooperate with the United States, but hesitated to do so without permission from
Moscow. However, Tajikistan had long supported the Afghan Northern Alliance’s combat against
the Taliban. Perhaps after gauging Russia’s views, Tajikistan soon offered use of Tajik airspace to
U.S. forces, and some coalition forces began to transit through Tajik airspace and airfields. U.S.,
French, and British personnel have used the Dushanbe airport for refueling, and there are some
French troops and some aircraft based at Dushanbe. During a January 2009 visit, the then-
Commander of the U.S. Central Command reached agreement with President Rahmon on the land
transit of goods such as construction materials to support military operations of the International
Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. While most land transport along this Northern
Distribution Network traverses Uzbekistan to final destinations in Afghanistan, Tajikistan serves
as an alternative route for a small percentage of supplies.
Congressional Research Service
Tajikistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests
Contents
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
U.S.-Tajik Relations .................................................................................................................... 1
Overview of U.S. Support for Tajikistan................................................................................ 1
Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Narcotics .................................................... 3
Political Developments ............................................................................................................... 5
Human Rights ............................................................................................................................. 7
Foreign Policy and Defense......................................................................................................... 7
The Tajik Civil War............................................................................................................... 9
The 2010 Attacks .................................................................................................................. 9
Economic Issues ....................................................................................................................... 10
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 11
Congressional Research Service
Tajikistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests
Background
Tajikistan is a significant country in Central
Basic Facts
Asia by virtue of its geographic location
Area and Population: Land area is 55,800 sq. mi.,
bordering China and Afghanistan and its
slightly smaller than Wisconsin. Population is 7.5 million
ample water resources, but it faces ethnic and
(The World Factbook, mid-2010 est.). The Mountainous
Badakhshan Autonomous Region has called for greater
clan schisms, deep poverty, poor governance,
autonomy, which is opposed by the Tajik government.
and other severe challenges. Tajikistan was
one of the poorest of the new states that
Ethnicity: 79.9% of the population is Tajik, 15.3%
Uzbek, 1.1% Russian, 1.1% Kyrgyz (2000 Census). Clan
gained independence at the end of 1991 after
and regional identities include the Khojenti, Kulyabi,
the break-up of the former Soviet Union. The
Garmi, and Pamiri groups.
new country was soon plunged into a
Gross Domestic Product: $13.8 billion; per capita
devastating civil conflict between competing
GDP is about $2,000 (The World Factbook, 2010 est.,
regional and other interests that lasted until a
purchasing power parity).
peace settlement in 1997 (see below, “The
Political Leaders: President: Emomali Rahmon; Prime
Tajik Civil War”). Former state farm chairman
Minister: Oqil Oqilov; Speaker of the National Assembly
Emomali Rahmon rose to power during this
(upper chamber): Mahmadsaid Ubaydul oyev; Speaker of
period and was reelected president after the
the Assembly of Representatives (lower chamber):
peace settlement as part of a power-sharing
Saydullo Khayrulloyev; Foreign Minister: Hamrokhon
Zarifi; Defense Minister: Col. Gen. Sherali Khayrulloyev.
arrangement.
Biography: Rahmon was born in 1952 and trained as an
The civil war had further set back economic
economist. In 1988, he became a state farm director in
Kulyab region. His rise to power was boosted by his links
development in the country. The economy
to the paramilitary leader and ex-convict Sangak Safarov.
recovered to its Soviet-era level by the early
He became chair of the Kulyab regional government in
2000s, and GDP had expanded several times
late 1992, and weeks later was elected chair of the
by the late 2000s, despite setbacks associated
Supreme Soviet and proclaimed head of state. He was
with the global economic downturn. Poverty
popularly elected president in 1994 and reelected in
1999 and 2006.
remains widespread, however, and the
infrastructure for healthcare, education,
transportation, and energy faces steep developmental needs, according to some observers (see
also below, “Economic Issues”).1 The country continues to face problems of political integration,
perhaps evidenced in part by recent violence in eastern Tajikstan (see below, “The 2010
Attacks”). Tajikistan also faces substantial threats from terrorism and narcotics trafficking from
Afghanistan.
U.S.-Tajik Relations
Overview of U.S. Support for Tajikistan
According to the Obama Administration, Tajikistan is “a critical partner to military stabilization
efforts” in Afghanistan and the region. U.S. support for border security, counter-narcotics,
1 “Central Asia: Decay and Decline,” International Crisis Group, February 2, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
1
Tajikistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests
democratization, healthcare, education, and economic growth is “key to improving Tajikistan’s
role as a bulwark against regional threats.”2
State Department officials served as observers at the U.N.-sponsored intra-Tajikistan peace talks
and pledged rebuilding aid, an example of U.S. diplomatic efforts to head off or ease ethnic and
civil tensions in the Eurasian states. The United States also supported the presence of U.N.
military observers in Tajikistan during the 1992-1997 civil war. The United States has been the
major humanitarian and developmental aid donor to facilitate implementation of the Tajik peace
accord and for resettlement of displaced persons. Over the period FY1992-FY2008, the United
States was the largest bilateral donor, budgeting $778.6 million of aid for Tajikistan (FREEDOM
Support Act and agency budgets), mainly for food and other humanitarian needs. The United
States also facilitated the delivery of privately donated commodities. Budgeted assistance for
FY2009 was $35.8 million, and estimated assistance was $48.3 million in FY2010. The
Administration requested $47.1 million in foreign assistance for Tajikistan in FY2011 (FY2009-
FY2011 figures include Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia, Food for Peace, Foreign
Military Financing, Global Health and Child Survival, International Military Education and
Training, and Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs funding). For
FY2011, the Administration appeared to cut economic growth assistance slightly from that of the
previous year.
To look at economic growth assistance provided in FY2010, a Business Environment
Improvement project was carried out to strengthen business-related legal reforms. An Economic
Reform to Enhance Competitiveness project was carried out to assist the Ministries of Economy
and of Finance to develop sound fiscal management of revenues and expenditures. A Regional
Trade Liberalization and Customs project was carried out to assist in developing and
implementing WTO-compliant trade policies and in improving customs procedures. A
Development Credit Authority project provided 50% credit guarantees for up to $5 million in
private lending to Agroinvest Bank of Tajikistan to help attract longer-term capital for agricultural
loans to Tajik producers, agri-business intermediaries, private retailers, wholesalers, and
processors. A Water User Association Support project, which ended in 2010, was carried out to
set up Water User Associations so that farmers could maintain and improve their irrigation and
drainage systems. A Productive Agriculture project was carried out to help farmers access
fertilizers, seeds, equipment, livestock, and technologies to increase production, processing, and
marketing in food-insecure areas in Western Khatlon, around Dushanbe, and the Sughd Region.
In the healthcare area in FY2010, a Health Outreach project was carried out to strengthen
governmental and non-governmental organizations to provide prevention services and increase
awareness to prevent the spread of HIV and tuberculosis among most-at-risk populations. A
Tajikistan Safe Drinking Water Project was carried out to increase access to potable water in rural
communities and provide information on household hygiene. A Tajikistan Maternity and Child
Health project was carried out to hold health discussions with pregnant women, mothers of
children under five, and others and to refer them to maternal and child services; to train staff at
the Department of Health to deliver quality maternal and child health services; and to teach
schoolchildren sanitation and hygiene skills. A STOP Avian Influenza project was carried out to
help the Tajik government and private poultry producers to carry out prevention, bio-security, bio-
safety, and preparedness measures. A Tuberculosis Control Assistance Project was carried out to
help the Tajik government to prevent and control multidrug-resistant tuberculosis. An “I Know”
2 The White House. Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2010, May 12, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
2
Tajikistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests
project was carried out to help businesses bring quality affordable contraceptives into Tajikistan,
facilitate the distribution of contraceptives to rural pharmacies and health centers, train health
providers in modern contraceptive technology, client counseling, and communication skills; and
raise community awareness of the benefits of contraceptive use. A Cross-border Vocational
Education in Badakshan project was carried out by the University of Central Asia to provide
vocational training in Khorog, Tajikistan to citizens from Afghanistan’s Badakshan Region to
improve the quality of skilled labor in the region. A Quality Learning project was carried out to
train teachers to apply modern methodologies in teaching and student assessments and help the
Ministry of Education to develop training modules.
In the democracy area in FY2010, a Community Connections project, which ended in 2010, was
carried out by the American Councils for International Education to organize three-week
specialized training programs in the U.S. for entrepreneurs, religious leaders, local government
officials, non-governmental organizational leaders, and health specialists. A Combating
Trafficking in Persons in Central Asia project, which ended in 2010, was carried out by the
International Organization for Migration.
In the humanitarian area in FY2010, Food for Peace programs were carried out to provide micro
loans in poor rural communities and to train women to process and preserve food. They also
provided small livestock and poultry, training, and veterinary services to expand income-
generation. Another focus of the program was on training health practitioners, repairing and
equipping health centers, providing food rations to pregnant and lactating women as well as
micronutrients and de-worming medication to mothers and children, and training mothers on
breastfeeding, child care, hygiene, food handling, dietary diversification, and disease prevention.
The program also constructed and repaired community water and sewage facilities and trained
villagers in safe water management. The program provided lunches for girls and teachers;
provided children with micronutrient supplements and parasitic medication, school health care,
and screening for vision and hearing difficulties; rehabilitated water and sanitation facilities in
schools; and introduced heath education programs for all grades.3
Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Narcotics
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, Tajikistan seemed to be
willing to cooperate with the United States, but hesitated to do so without permission from
Moscow. However, Tajikistan had long supported the Afghan Northern Alliance’s combat against
the Taliban, so it was predisposed to welcome U.S.-led backing for the Northern Alliance.
Perhaps after gauging Russia’s views, the Tajik Defense Ministry on September 25, 2001, offered
use of Tajik airspace to U.S. forces, and some coalition forces began to transit through Tajik
airspace and airfields. U.S., French, and British personnel have used the Dushanbe airport for
refueling (in 2010, The Military Balance reported that there were 160 French troops based at
Dushanbe and some aircraft), but the airport’s limited capacity precludes wider coalition use.
During a January 2009 visit, the then-Commander of the U.S. Central Command
(USCENTCOM), General David Petraeus, reached agreement with President Rahmon on the land
transit of goods such as construction materials to support military operations of the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.4 While most land transport along this Northern
3 USAID, USAID Programs in Tajikistan in 2010, at http://centralasia.usaid.gov/page.php?page=article-90.
4 U.S. Embassy in Tajikistan, Press Release: U.S. Centcom Commander Visits Tajikistan, January 17, 2009; Press
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
3
Tajikistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests
Distribution Network (NDN) traverses Uzbekistan to final destinations in Afghanistan, Tajikistan
serves as an alternative route for a small percentage of supplies.
The United States has provided $104.2 million in “peace and security” assistance to Tajikistan in
FY1992-FY2008. This assistance has been administered by the Defense, State, and Energy
Departments, and has included Comprehensive Threat Reduction aid, Foreign Military Financing
(FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Non-proliferation, Anti-Terrorism,
De-mining, and Related Programs (NADR), Partnership for Peace aid, counter-narcotics aid, and
transnational crime aid.
The State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism has warned that terrorists
and others are able to exploit Tajikistan’s 870-mile border with Afghanistan to smuggle illicit
goods into and across Tajikistan in part because Tajik border guards and police are stretched thin,
because they lack “appropriate technical equipment, transportation, personnel, and training to
interdict illegal border crossings, detect and analyze hazardous substances effectively and respond
quickly to incursions,” and because “pervasive corruption and low wages [undermine] the
motivation of security force members to interdict smugglers.” Among recent assistance, the
United States has provided communication support to the Tajik Border Guards, built a customs
facility at the Nizhny Pyanj Bridge, refurbished and supplied equipment and training for a
Counter Narcotics-Counterterrorism Analytical Center for the Tajik National Security Committee,
and refurbished three Border Guard Service outposts on the border with Afghanistan. Tajikistan
also hosted the “Regional Cooperation 10” exercise, sponsored by the U.S. Department of
Defense, to focus on strengthen cooperation among Central Asian countries.5 USCENTCOM
announced in 2010 that $10 million would be provided to the Tajik armed forces to set up a
National Training Center near Dushanbe to train military personnel to combat terrorism and drug-
trafficking.6
The State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)
has estimated that between 15% and 30% of heroin and opium from Afghanistan transits
Tajikistan to Russia, China, and Europe. It warns that “geography and economics make Tajikistan
an attractive transit route for illegal narcotics.” Although Tajik police and border guards
confiscate more drug shipments than those in other Central Asian countries, they “apparently are
unwilling or unable to target and prosecute major traffickers.” The United States funds a counter-
narcotics office in the U.S. Embassy in Tajikistan that includes an INL officer. The Drug
Enforcement Agency also has an office in Dushanbe. The Defense Department’s Office of
Defense Cooperation manages USCENTCOM’s counter-narcotics program in Tajikistan. The
embassy’s border and law enforcement working group coordinates the agency programs to train
and equip police and other security-related personnel and to renovate border outposts. INL has
funded a drug liaison office of the Tajik Drug Control Agency in the town of Taloqan, northern
Afghanistan, to detect, investigate, interdict and report on the illegal movement of narcotics into
the Gorno Badakhshan region of Tajikistan. The U.S. is renovating and providing teaching
support to the Ministry of Internal Affairs Academy.7
(...continued)
Briefing by General David Petraeus, Commander, US Central Command, January 17, 2009.
5 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, Chapter 2: South and Central Asia, August 5, 2010.
6 U.S. Central Command, CENTCOM, Tajikistan Expand Security Partnership, Press Release, June 29, 2010, at
http://www.centcom.mil/en/press-releases/centcom-tajikistan-expand-security-partnership.
7 U.S. Department of State, 2010 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 1, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
4
Tajikistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests
Political Developments
Since the end of the civil war in 1997, President Emomali Rahmon has steadily increased his
authoritarian rule and marginalized the opposition. His ambit remains limited, however, by
myriad local warlords. A legislative electoral law was approved in late 1999 calling for a lower
chamber, the Assembly of Representatives (Majlisi Oli), to consist of 63 members (22 elected by
party list and 41 in single-member districts), and an upper legislative chamber, the National
Assembly (Majlisi Milli), to consist of 34 members representing regional interests (25 selected by
indirect voting by local council assemblies, eight appointed by Rahmon, and one reserved for the
former president). Another referendum on changes to the constitution was held in June 2003.
Opposition critics correctly predicted that one of the changes—limiting a president to two seven-
year terms—would permit Rahmon to claim two more terms in office under the “new”
amendment.
There are eight registered parties. The People’s Democratic Party is the ruling party, led by
President Rahmon. Pro-government parties include the Agrarian Party, Democratic Party,
Economic Reform Party, and Socialist Party. The three registered opposition parties are the
Islamic Renaissance Party Social Democratic Party, and the Communist Party. The latter
sometimes allies itself with the People’s Democratic Party.
Five candidates ran in the presidential election in Tajikistan held on November 6, 2006, including
incumbent President Rahmon. All four “challengers” praised Rahmon and campaigned little.
Rahmon officially received 79.3% of 2.88 million votes with a nearly 91% turnout. According to
OSCE observers, the race was slightly improved over the 1999 presidential election but still
lacked “genuine choice and meaningful pluralism,” including because of the dearth of meaningful
debate by the candidates, improbable turnout figures in some precincts, use of administrative
resources, and non-transparent vote-counting.8 A new presidential election is scheduled for 2013.
After the problematic 2005 legislative election, which the OSCE judged as not free and fair, the
OSCE and opposition parties proposed changes to the law on legislative elections. A few were
implemented through administrative means, such as a ban on a member of a family voting for
other family members. Other proposed changes included placing opposition representatives on
electoral commissions, banning officials from servicing on electoral commissions, permitting
non-partisan monitors to observe elections, lowering the threshold of party list votes necessary for
a party to gain legislative seats, eliminating a requirement that candidates possess higher
education, and reducing or eliminating a sizeable election deposit, which some parties claimed
deterred prospective candidates from running. Many of these reforms were introduced in the
legislature but were blocked by the ruling People’s Democratic Party. Some opposition parties
also have complained that it is difficult to campaign during the winter when legislative elections
are held.
Elections to the Assembly of Representatives were held on February 28, 2010. Only the People’s
Democratic Party could afford to register 22 candidates for the 22 party list seats, so the total
number of party list candidates was 73. For the constituency races, 153 candidates registered,
including 83 sponsored by parties and 70 who nominated themselves. Turnout on election day
8 OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Final Report on the 6 November 2006 Presidential
Election in Tajikistan, April 18, 2007.
Congressional Research Service
5
Tajikistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests
was reportedly 3.2 million (87.1%), and the People’s Democratic Party won 54 seats (up from 52
in 2005), the Agrarian Party won 2 seats, the Economic Reform Party won 2 seats, the
Communist Party won 2 seats, the Islamic Renaissance Party won 2 seats, and an independent
candidate won one seat.
An OSCE monitoring mission viewed the campaign and voting as “fail[ing] to meet many key
OSCE commitments.” The monitors raised concerns about the prevalence of officials and
members of the People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan on electoral commissions, the high
electoral deposit (relative to average incomes), electoral commissions organizing and presiding
over “meetings with the voters,” and the requirement that candidates possess a higher education.
The monitors praised the sizeable field of parties and candidates providing voters with different
political programs, but stated that this positive feature of the election was vitiated by credible and
verified reports of local authorities and police violating campaign regulations to the disadvantage
of opposition parties and by the lack of diverse viewpoints in broadcast media. There were
“serious irregularities” in many polling stations observed “which undermined the integrity of the
elections,” including a high incidence of proxy voting (voting for someone else) in about one-half
of the polling stations. Other irregularities involved voting without identification documents,
multiple voting, casting pre-marked ballots, and some cases of ballot-box stuffing. Vote-counting
also was assessed negatively in many of the polling stations visited.9 Observers from the U.S.
Embassy were in agreement with the OSCE monitors, stating that “the vote was beset by
procedural irregularities and fraud.”10
President Rahmon increasingly has used rhetoric associated with Hanafi Sunni Islam and Tajik
nationalism to define his rule. This rhetoric has alienated ethnic and religious minorities,
including ethnic Uzbeks and ethnic Pamiris in Mountainous Badakhshan who practice Ismaili
Shiism. In July 2009, President Rahmon proposed banning the use of Russian as “the language of
interethnic communication” to strengthen the use of Tajik. Some observers suggested that the
proposal would most impact ethnic Uzbeks, who are much more numerous than ethnic Russians.
The terrorist incidents in mid-2010 appeared to heighten views of the Tajik government that the
Islamic Renaissance Party harbored extremists. The party was ordered in August 2010 to cease
holding Friday prayers at its large headquarters compound (a 2009 religion law banned prayers in
unregistered sites), the headquarters was raided by the police in mid-October 2010, a mysterious
fire destroyed part of the compound in late October 2010 that had been used by women for Friday
prayers, and an official of the party was badly beaten by unknown assailants in February 2011.
The government also recently has requested that parents recall children studying at Islamic
religious institutions abroad, detained or harassed many bearded men, banned the wearing of the
hijab by shopkeepers, ordered imams to only use approved sermons, and reportedly closed
several mosques that it claimed had not been legally registered.
9 OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Election Observation Mission, Republic of Tajikistan,
Parliamentary Elections, 28 February 2010, Needs Assessment Mission Report, December 4, 2009, Interim Report No.
1, February 8, 2010; Interim Report No. 2, February 22, 2010; OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final
Report, July 6, 2010.
10 U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, U.S. Embassy Election Observers Note Widespread Fraud and Irregularities
in Parliamentary and Local Races, March 2, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
6
Tajikistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests
Human Rights
According to the State Department’s latest Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, the Tajik
government’s human rights record remained poor in 2009. Human rights problems included the
torture and abuse of detainees by security forces; the harassment of refugees by security forces;
denial of the right to a fair trial; restrictions on freedoms of speech, press, association, and
religion; government harassment of nongovernmental organizations; and violence and
discrimination against women.11 Tajikistan is a major source country for persons trafficked as
forced prostitutes and forced laborers, and the government does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. Although it has made some efforts to
combat trafficking, it continues to compel adults and children to pick cotton during the annual
harvest. For these reasons, the State Department downgraded Tajikistan from “Tier 2” to the “Tier
2 Watch List” in 2008 and the country remained on the watch list in 2009 and 2010.12 In July
2010, cotton from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan was added to a list that requires U.S. government
contractors purchasing products to certify that they have made a good faith effort to determine
whether forced or indentured child labor was used to produce the cotton.13
Assessing Tajikistan’s human rights record in 2010, Human Rights Watch, a non-governmental
organization, has stated that “despite a few small positive steps, Tajik authorities continue to
violate rights affecting areas ranging from elections and media freedoms to religious liberty and
women's rights.” The organization has asserted that Tajik authorities continued suppression of the
press, began enforcing a repressive religious law, and used the judicial system to prosecute human
rights activists and political opponents. The government made a few small steps to protect combat
widespread domestic violence against women.14
Foreign Policy and Defense
In April 2008, President Rahmon stated that Tajikistan was ready to “further expand relations of
cooperation with countries of the West and the East, as well as those of the Islamic world, from
the point of view of our open-door foreign policy.” He pledged that Tajikistan would “expand
constructive collaboration with the United States, the European Union and other countries of the
[anti-terrorist] coalition not only in this important field, but will also pay more attention to
expanding beneficial economic cooperation.” In November 2007, Rahmon explained that
Tajikistan’s “open door” foreign policy—“cooperation with any entity of international relations
which has good intentions and aims towards our country”—might not please certain unnamed
“powerful countries,” but that the policy prevented Tajikistan from becoming a “puppet.” He has
warned that Tajikistan faces a global environment where “the rivalry between different countries
for international markets, resources of raw materials, fuel and energy reserves, and other natural
wealth” is growing, and where arms races are intensifying. He has called instead for “beneficial
11 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009, March 11, 2010.
12 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2010, June 14, 2010.
13 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Office of Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human
Trafficking, The Department of Labor’s List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor, September 3, 2009;
Executive Order 13126, Prohibition of Acquisition of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labor, at
http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/regs/eo13126/main.htm.
14 World Report 2011, Human Rights Watch, January 24, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
7
Tajikistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests
international cooperation to reduce and prevent new global threats and dangers, [such as]
terrorism, extremism, drugs production and trafficking, [and] organized transnational crime.”15
Tajikistan is interested in the political and human rights of approximately seven million ethnic
Tajiks residing in Afghanistan (25% of the population) and over one million in Uzbekistan (4%).
Tajikistan has hosted about 5,000 refugees from Afghanistan, mainly ethnic Tajiks, but reportedly
is somewhat concerned that a greater influx could exacerbate Islamic fundamentalism in the
country. Tajikistan’s relations with Uzbekistan have been problematic, including disagreements
about water-sharing, Uzbek gas supplies, and environmental pollution (see below).
The Tajik armed forces consist of about 8,800 ground, air force-air defense, and mobile (rapid
reaction) troops.16 There also are about 3,800 troops in the Interior Ministry, 1,200 in the National
Guard, and 2,500 in the Emergencies Ministry. The armed forces are underfunded and fractured
by regional clan loyalties that compromise their effectiveness. According to Defense Minister
Sherali Khayrulloyev, a mobile (rapid reaction) force recently was created as a third branch of the
armed forces from subunits of the other branches as “a quality enhancement of combat readiness
and [to ensure] a swift reaction to a change in the situation in the country and region.”17
Tajikistan is a signatory of the Collective Security Treaty (CST) of the CIS (led by Russia). In
2001, CST members approved the creation of regional rapid-deployment military forces that
include a Tajik battalion. Tajikistan also belongs to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO;
an economic and security organization led by China and Russia that also includes Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan). Tajikistan joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace in February 2002.
A 10-year (with options for renewal) Tajik-Russian basing agreement was signed in October 2004
that provides for Russia’s former 201st Motorized Rifle Division to be based at three garrisons
and to have access to three training grounds. Tajikistan also transferred ownership of the Okno
space tracking base (near the town of Nurek) to Russia. In exchange, Russia cancelled a $242
million debt. Russia’s approximately 5,500 contract troops in Tajikistan (many or most of whom
are ethnic Tajik noncommissioned officers and soldiers) constitute its second-largest military
presence abroad, after the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine. Tajikistan assumed control from Russia
over guarding its borders in June 2005, although about 50 Russian border guard advisors and 20
instructors remain. In November 2006, Tajikistan and Russia signed an agreement to hold joint
military training operations. Many Tajik officers receive training at Russian military schools. In
October 2009, visiting President Rahmon reportedly urged President Medvedev to pay rent on
Russia’s base facilities in Tajikistan, but Moscow only agreed to consider the issue when the
current basing agreement comes up for renewal in 2014. Russia reportedly is interested in
obtaining access to Tajikistan’s Ayni airfield, near Dushanbe (modernized with Indian assistance),
but President Rahmon allegedly has requested that Russia pay $125 million in annual rent or
equivalent military assistance.
15 CEDR, November 16, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950361; April 25, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950185; September 8, 2007, Doc.
No. CEP-950171.
16 The Military Balance, February 1, 2010.
17 CEDR, June 14, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-549001.
Congressional Research Service
8
Tajikistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests
The Tajik Civil War
Tajikistan was among the Central Asian republics least prepared and inclined toward
independence when the Soviet Union broke up. In September 1992, a loose coalition of
nationalist, Islamic, and democratic parties and groups tried to take over. Kulyabi and Khojenti
regional elites, assisted by Uzbekistan and Russia, launched a successful counteroffensive that by
the end of 1992 had resulted in 20,000-40,000 casualties and up to 800,000 refugees or displaced
persons. In 1993, the CIS authorized “peacekeeping” in Tajikistan, consisting of Russian and
token Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek troops. After the two sides agreed to a cease-fire, the U.N.
Security Council established a small U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) in
December 1994. In June 1997, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon and then-rebel leader Sayed
Abdullo Nuri signed a comprehensive peace agreement. Benchmarks of the peace process were
largely met, and UNMOT pulled out in May 2000, but Russian troops have remained. Stability in
Tajikistan is fragile. Observers remain concerned about possible secessionism in the northern
Soghd (formerly Leninabad) region and in the eastern Mountainous Badakhshan region, and
tensions between ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks within Tajikistan.
The 2010 Attacks
In late August 2010, over two dozen individuals sentenced as terrorists escaped from prison in
Dushanbe and launched attacks as they travelled to various regions of the country. Many of these
individuals had been opposition fighters during the Tajik civil war and had been arrested in
eastern Tajikistan during government sweeps in 2009. In early September 2010, a suicide car
bombing resulted in over two dozen deaths or injuries among police in the northern city of
Khujand. An obscure terrorist group, Jamaat Ansarullah, supposedly related to the IMU, claimed
responsibility. Some escapees and their allies, allegedly including IMU terrorists, attacked a
military convoy in the Rasht Valley (formerly known as Karotegin) east of Dushanbe on
September 19, 2010, reportedly resulting in dozens of deaths and injuries to government forces,
leading to concerns among some observers that Tajikistan was becoming more unstable.
However, the government has claimed in early 2011 that it has stabilized the situation in eastern
Tajikistan. In early January 2011, the Tajik Interior (police) Ministry reported that its forces had
killed former Tajik opposition fighter Alovuddin Davlatov, alias Ali Bedak, the alleged leader of
one major insurgent group. Rumors are that Abdullo Rakhimov, aka Mullo Abdullo—a former
Tajik opposition paramilitary leader who spurned the peace settlement and travelled to
Afghanistan and Pakistan, where he maintained links with al Qaeda and the Taliban—reentered
Tajikistan in 2009 and remains there in 2011. According to some observers, underlying causes of
the violence may be related to the failure of the Rahmon government to share power and
economic benefits with minority groups and clans, and more immediate causes may be related to
the increasing repressiveness and exclusiveness of the government and the ability of disaffected
populations to obtain countervailing armed support from affines and others abroad.18
18 Lola Olimova and Nargis Hamrabaeva, “Tajik Authorities Struggle to Quell Militants,” Report News: Central Asia,
Institute for War and Peace Reporting, October 4, 2010; Umida Hashimova, “The Islamist Insurgency in Tajikistan,”
Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, October 12, 2010; Tilav Rasulzoda and Parvina Khamidova, “New Militant Force in
Tajikistan?” Report News: Central Asia, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, October 21, 2010; CEDR, January 12,
2011, Doc. No. CEP-950136.
Congressional Research Service
9
Tajikistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests
Economic Issues
Tajikistan’s economic decline reversed in 1997 as the peace accords that ended the civil war took
hold. The Tajik government’s National Development Strategy for 2006-2015 focuses on ending
the country’s transport and communications isolation and enhancing energy and food security.19
The global economic downturn in 2008-2009 depressed prices for Tajik commodity exports
(mainly aluminum and cotton) and reduced worker remittances from Russia and Kazakhstan,
which host most of Tajikistan’s migrant workers. The Tajik currency, the somoni, lost much of its
value relative to stronger currencies, which increased the costs of imported food and other goods.
The NGO International Crisis Group (ICG) warned that the economic downturn subjected the
“desperately poor population [of Tajikistan] to yet more deprivation.... To address the situation,
the international community ... should ensure any assistance reaches those who truly need it,
place issues of governance and corruption at the centre of all contacts with the Tajik government,
and initiate an energetic dialogue with President Rahmon on democratization.”20 The Tajik
government reported that its worker remittances plunged by almost 30% in 2009. The Tajik
economy began to improve in 2010 as world commodity prices increased and improving
economies in Russia and Kazakhstan resulted in an uptick in worker remittances by Tajik migrant
workers.
GDP grew about 5.5% in 2010 and consumer price inflation was 5.8% (The World Factbook est.).
Tajikistan has depended heavily on foreign loans and aid to cover its budget and trade deficits.
Tajikistan’s foreign debt was $1.94 billion in early 2011, with the largest share owed to China’s
Exim Bank, according to the Tajik Finance Ministry. Most small enterprises had been privatized
by 2000, but land and major enterprises remain state-owned. Tajikistan’s aluminum smelter in
Tursunzade, one of the world’s largest, accounts for three-fourths of Tajikistan’s exports. Cotton
and hydro-electricity have been other exports. The agricultural sector employs two-thirds of the
labor force. One million or more Tajiks—up to 50% of the labor force—are labor migrants, and
up to two-thirds of the remaining population lives in poverty. Almost one-fourth of households in
Tajikistan receive some remittances from these workers.21
Uzbekistan began to restrict railway and road transport to and from Tajikistan in February 2010,
reportedly to pressure Tajikistan not to build the Roghun dam on the Vakhsh River and the
Sangtuda-2 hydro-electric power plant on the Vakhsh River that might limit water flows to
Uzbekistan. Reportedly, thousands of railcars and trucks have faced delays, including those
carrying construction materials bound for Afghanistan to support ISAF, materials for building the
Roghun dam, materials from Iran for completing the Sangtuda-2 power plant, fuel and seeds for
Tajik farmers, flour, and materials for road construction in Tajikistan. Uzbekistan also has boosted
tariffs on trucks crossing into Tajikistan. Uzbekistan has rejected Tajik assertions that shipping
delays are political and has claimed that they are caused by increased ISAF rail traffic to
19 State Committee on Investment and State Property Management of the Republic of Tajikistan, National Development
Strategy of the Republic of Tajikistan for the Period to 2015, August 2006, at http://www.gki.tj/en/documents/33/; U.N.
General Assembly, Statement by Мr. Emomali Rahmon, President of the Republic of Tajikistan, at the General Debate
of the 65th session of the U.N General Assembly, September 23, 2010, at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/65/meetings/generaldebate/Portals/1/statements/634208415241718750TJ_en.pdf.
20 ICG. Tajikistan: On the Road to Failure, February 12, 2009.
21 CIA, The World Factbook, at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook; Zarina Ergasheva,
“Tajikistan’s External Debt Up US$265.1 mln in 2010,” Asia-Plus, January 24, 2011; CEDR, August 6, 2010, Doc. No.
CEP-950158.
Congressional Research Service
10
Tajikistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests
Afghanistan, a backup of railcars headed to Turkmenistan, and track repairs. Tajikistan has
repeatedly appealed to the OSCE that Uzbekistan continues to delay rail transit to and from
Tajikistan.22 Uzbekistan also has claimed that Tajikistan’s aluminum plant has caused pollution in
Uzbekistan.
During the winters of 2007-2008 and 2008-2009, severe weather and electricity, gas, and food
shortages led the Tajik government to declare a humanitarian crisis and ask international donors
for assistance. During the winter of 2010-2011, the U.N. World Food Program has warned that
poor harvests and increased food prices in several districts have created urgent food needs that it
continues to monitor.
After Uzbekistan withdrew from the Unified Energy System for Central Asia at the end of 2009,
it refused to permit Tajikistan to transfer electricity to Kazakhstan during the summer of 2010,
resulting in a reported loss of revenues by Tajikistan (and Russian investors). Tajikistan hopes to
complete power lines to Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan to boost energy exports.
Author Contact Information
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
jnichol@crs.loc.gov, 7-2289
22 Konstantin Parshin, “Tajikistan: Repercussions of Tajik-Uzbek Feud May Be Felt All the Way to Afghanistan,”
Eurasianet, April 1, 2010; Konrad Mathesius, “Boxcar Diplomacy Puts Tajik Businesses at Tashkent’s Mercy,”
Eurasianet, August 6, 2010; CEDR, November 18, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950138; November 19, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-
950234 and Doc. No. CEP950214; and December 30, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950116.
Congressional Research Service
11