Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
February 8, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21513
CRS Report for Congress
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repared for Members and Committees of Congress

Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy

Summary
Kuwait has been pivotal to nearly two decades of U.S. efforts to reduce a threat posed by Iraq.
After U.S. forces liberated Kuwait from Iraqi invading forces in February 1991, Kuwait was the
central location from which the United States contained Saddam during 1991-2003, and it hosted
the bulk of the U.S.-led force that invaded Iraq in March 2003 to remove Saddam from power. It
is the key route through U.S. troops have been withdrawing from during 2009-2011. Kuwait’s
relations with the current government of Iraq are hampered, in part, by issues not fully resolved
from the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, although a January 12, 2011, visit by the Kuwaiti
Prime Minister appeared to represent a major, at least symbolic, breakthrough. With the strategic
threat from Iraq sharply reduced, Kuwait is cooperating with U.S.-led efforts to contain Iranian
power in the Gulf. At the same time, like the other Gulf monarchy states, Kuwait seeks to
maintain normal economic and political relations with Iran so as not to provoke Iran or cause it to
increase its support to pro-Iranian movements in Kuwait.
Although Kuwait remains a staunch U.S. ally, it is troubled domestically. For the past five years,
wrangling between the elected National Assembly and the ruling Al Sabah family primarily over
the political dominance and alleged corruption of the Al Sabah has brought virtual political
paralysis to Kuwait. In March 2009, the infighting led to the second constitutional dissolution of
the National Assembly in one year, setting up new parliamentary elections on May 16, 2009. That
produced an Assembly that was considered more pro-government, and included four women, the
first to be elected to the Assembly in Kuwait since women were given the vote in 2005. However,
over the subsequent two years, the Assembly has turned against the ruling family, producing two
unsuccessful attempts (the most recent on January 5, 2011) to vote no confidence in Prime
Minister Shaykh Nasser al-Muhammad al-Ahmad Al Sabah.
The political deadlock has prevented breaking long-standing legislative and regulatory logjams
holding up key energy projects, including some projects involving major foreign energy firms.
The political infighting has also tarnished Kuwait’s reputation in the Persian Gulf as a model of
protections of rule of law and human rights as the Al Sabah have turned to increasingly harsh
measures to suppress dissent. These measures have included beatings of demonstrators and
imprisonments of journalists. However, Kuwait’s tradition of vibrant civil society and expression
of opinion led to the resignation of the Interior Minister, held responsible for repressive measures,
on February 7, 2011, in advance of a planned public demonstration.
On other regional issues, the political stalemate in Kuwait has contributed to a tendency among
Kuwaiti leaders to defer to Saudi Arabia and other more active Gulf states. Kuwait has not
attempted to take a leading role in mediating disputes within the Palestinian territories or to try to
determine Iran’s role in Gulf security and political arrangements.

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Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy

Contents
Kuwaiti Government Changes and Political Reform.................................................................... 1
Government-National Assembly Disputes ............................................................................. 1
2008 Crisis and Election ................................................................................................. 3
2009 Election and Further Political Crises ....................................................................... 4
2010-2011 Parliamentary Session: Disputes Expand........................................................ 4
Broader Human Rights Issues ............................................................................................... 6
Status of Press Freedoms................................................................................................. 7
Labor Rights ................................................................................................................... 7
Religious Freedom .......................................................................................................... 7
U.S. Efforts to Promote Democracy and Human Rights ................................................... 8
U.S.-Kuwait Relations and Defense Cooperation......................................................................... 8
Current Defense Relations..................................................................................................... 9
Kuwaiti Foreign Policy Issues ................................................................................................... 10
Iraq..................................................................................................................................... 10
Residual Issues Related to the 1990 Iraqi Invasion ........................................................ 11
Arab-Israeli Dispute............................................................................................................ 12
Iran..................................................................................................................................... 12
Kuwaiti Cooperation Against Islamic Militancy ........................................................................ 13
Kuwaiti Economic Policy.......................................................................................................... 13

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Kuwait ............................................................................................................. 2

Tables
Table 1. Composition of the National Assembly: 2008–2009 ....................................................... 6
Table 2. U.S. Aid to Kuwait and Purposes ................................................................................. 10

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 15

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Kuwaiti Government Changes and Political Reform1
Kuwait’s optimism after the 2003 fall of its nemesis, Saddam Hussein, has soured since the
January 15, 2006, death of Amir (ruler) Jabir Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah. His successor, Shaykh
Sa’ad bin Abdullah Al Sabah, was at the time very ill (he has since died), and a brief succession
dispute among rival branches of the ruling Al Sabah family ensued. It was resolved with Prime
Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah (who is now about 79, the younger brother of
the late Amir) becoming Amir on January 29, 2006. The succession dispute was unprecedented in
Kuwait and the broader Gulf region for the first use of an elected legislature’s constitutional
ability to formally remove a leader. Since then, Kuwait has lurched from one political crisis to the
next, preventing or delaying movement on some key issues.
Although the leadership struggle was resolved, Amir Sabah subsequently abrogated the tacit
agreement to alternate succession between the Jabir and Salem branches of the family by
appointing his half-brother, Shaykh Nawwaf al-Ahmad Al Sabah, age 71 and a member of his
own Jabir branch, as Crown Prince/heir apparent. The Crown Prince post required concurrence of
the National Assembly. The Amir appointed another member of the Jabir branch as Prime
Minister—his nephew, Shaykh Nasser al Muhammad al-Ahmad Al Sabah, age 70. The highest-
ranking member of the Salem branch in the government is Dr. Mohammad Al Sabah, who kept
his foreign minister post and simultaneously is a deputy prime minister.
Tensions between the two branches of the family have since continued to simmer, although the
branches of the family have attempted to maintain solidarity against growing political challenges
from the National Assembly and other elites. The population as a whole remains relatively
affluent compared to those in countries that have experienced serious unrest since early 2011, and
many experts view uprisings such as that in Tunisia and Egypt as unlikely to affect Kuwait to a
similar degree.
Government-National Assembly Disputes
Differences between the government and a coalition of reformist and Islamist deputies in the
elected National Assembly have added to the tensions within the ruling family to produce
political deadlock since Amir Jabir’s death in 2006. Those opposing the government have tended
to seek greater authority for the Assembly and a limitation of the powers of the government—and
by extension, limitations of the political and economic power of the Al Sabah.
The Assembly, established by Kuwait’s November 1962 constitution, is the longest serving all-
elected body among the Gulf monarchies. Fifty seats are elected, and members of the cabinet
serve in it ex-officio. Amirs of Kuwait have, on several occasions (1976-1981, 1986-1992, 2003,
2006, 2008, and 2009), used their constitutional authority to dissolve the Assembly when it
aggressively challenged the government. The Assembly does not confirm cabinet nominees but it
can, by simple majority of elected members, vote no confidence in individual ministers. It can

1 Much of this section is from the State Department’s country report on human rights practices for 2009 (released
March 11, 2010), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136072.htm; the International Religious Freedom
Report
for 2010 (November 17, 2010), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148828.htm; and the Trafficking in
Persons Report for 2010
(June 14, 2010), http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2010/142760.htm.
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vote no confidence in the Prime Minister by voting “inability to cooperate with the
government,”and it can veto government decrees issued during periods of Assembly suspension.
Political parties are still not permitted, but factions can compete as “currents,” “trends,” or
“political societies.” Kuwaitis have a parallel tradition of informal political consultations in
nightly diwaniyyas—social gatherings held by elites of all political ideologies and backgrounds.
There are a growing number of diwaniyyas led by women.
Figure 1. Map of Kuwait

Source: CRS Graphics.
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The post-2006 deadlock has manifested as repeated Assembly suspensions and subsequent
elections, none of which has resolved differences over the fundamental power balances between
the executive and the legislature. Only five months after becoming leader, Amir Sabah suspended
the Assembly in May 2006 when 29 “opposition” members—an alliance of liberals and
Islamists—demanded to question the prime minister over the government’s refusal to endorse a
proposal to reduce the number of electoral districts to five, from the current 25. The opposition
wanted to increase the size of each district so that it would be more difficult to influence the
outcome through alleged “vote buying” or tribal politics. In the June 29, 2006, election, the
opposition, which attracted youth support under the “Orange” banner, won 34 out of the 50 seats.
The election was the first in which women could vote or run, but none of the 27 female
candidates (out of 249) won. The Amir did, however, ultimately accept the opposition’s demand
to reduce the number of electoral districts to five; a law to implement that went into effect.
2008 Crisis and Election
The continuing schisms between the opposition and the government again became irreconcilable
in March 2008 when the Assembly insisted on a second pay raise for state employees, beyond one
granted by the cabinet in February 2008, as a response to spiraling inflation. The government
refused, the cabinet resigned, and the Amir dissolved the Assembly and set new elections for May
17, 2008. With the compression to five electoral districts implemented, Sunni Islamists and
conservative tribal leaders won a total of 24 seats—an increase of four. Their allies - the so-called
“liberals”- won seven seats. Shiites increased their representation by one to a total of five seats.
Pro-government and other independent tribalists held the remaining fourteen seats. As in the 2006
election, none of the 27 women candidates was elected.
Almost immediately after the 2008 elections and related cabinet appointments, Islamists agitated
unsuccessfully against the appointment of two women to the cabinet. The two female cabinet
members were Nuriya al-Sebih, who was reappointed as the education minister (after surviving a
January 2008 no-confidence vote), and Mudhi al-Humoud, a liberal academic, who was
appointed as state minister for two positions: housing affairs and development affairs. Another
woman, Ms. Masouma Mubarak, who was the first female minister ever in Kuwait, had resigned
in September 2007 after some members of parliament blamed her for mismanagement. (Al
Hamoud remains in the cabinet as minister of education and higher education.)
Sunni-Shiite tensions added to the dissension within the Kuwaiti elite. Possibly as a spillover of
sectarian tensions in post-Saddam Iraq, recriminations flared in February 2008 after several Shiite
politicians attended a public ceremony commemorating the killing earlier that month of Lebanese
Hezbollah militant Imad Mughniyah. The minister of public works and municipalities, Fadi Safar,
a Shiite, was detained briefly in March 2008 and questioned over his connection to the Kuwaiti
branch of Hezbollah, but formal charges were not filed.
In November 2008, the cabinet resigned when three Sunni Assembly deputies requested to
question the Prime Minister over corruption allegations and his decision to permit the visit of an
Iranian Shiite cleric who was perceived as having slighted Sunnis. However, on December 1,
2008, the Amir reappointed Shaykh Nasser as Prime Minister, pending formation of a new
cabinet, but he did not suspend the Assembly, hoping to avoid yet another early election. These
Sunni-Shiite tensions have occurred even though the Sabahs have expanded Shiite representation
in the cabinet to at least two ministers, up from one that was customary.
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2009 Election and Further Political Crises
The power struggle between the government and opposition deputies in the Assembly resumed in
March 2009, when the Assembly insisted on questioning the Prime Minister over his management
of the global financial crisis and alleged misuse of public funds. The disputes had held up passage
of a proposed $5 billion fiscal stimulus and financial guarantees program to address economic
weakness and the severe decline in Kuwait’s stock market, which had triggered protests from
investors who lost substantial portions of their portfolios. The suspension enabled the government
to go forward with the stimulus. On March 19, 2009, the Amir accepted the resignation of the
cabinet and again suspended the Assembly. New Assembly elections were required by May 19,
2009, under the constitution (60 days from suspension), and were held on May 16, 2009.
The election—in which turnout was relatively light at about 55% of the 385,000 eligible voters—
produced more than 20 new parliamentarians, including four women - the first females to be
elected to the Assembly since women were given the vote in 2005. They included Masouma
Mubarak, mentioned above (a Shiite), as well as Rola Dashti, who was narrowly defeated in
2006. The other women victors were Aseel al-Awadhi and Salwa al-Jassar, both professors. The
election of the women, and the setback for Sunni Islamists, signaled to some that Kuwaiti voters
wanted a less assertive Assembly that would work with rather than challenge the government.
The results raised hopes that the political crisis would ease.
Perhaps reflecting the strengthened government position, immediately after the election, the Amir
reappointed Shaykh Nasser as prime minister. There had been pre-election speculation that the
Amir would appoint the Crown Prince, Shaykh Nawwaf, as Prime Minister, concurrently. This
move would produce some measure of stability because the Assembly is not able,
constitutionally, to question the Crown Prince. The move would have restored the tradition of
combining the two positions, which had been adhered to until July 2003, when Amir Jabir divided
the two posts.
Observers who said that the 2009 elections would not end the political stalemate proved correct.
In November 2009, Assembly members filed motions to question four ministers, including the
defense minister, for alleged corruption in the arms sale process. The Assembly also demanded to
question Prime Minister Nasser for corruption involving the 2008 elections. On December 8,
2009, the Prime Minister agreed to the questioning, which marked the first time in the Gulf region
that a head of government had been forcibly summoned by an elected body. On December 9,
2009, however, 10 Assembly members filed a motion to remove Interior Minister Shaykh Jabir
Khalid Al Sabah for alleged corruption. A separate motion by 10 members cited the prime
minister for “non-cooperation” with the Assembly, although a majority of members later issued a
statement expressing confidence in the prime minister. Votes on the motions were held on
December 17, 2009, and a new election was avoided when deputies voted 35-13 on a motion to
express confidence in the prime minister.
2010-2011 Parliamentary Session: Disputes Expand
The political deadlock continued through the summer of 2010, although muted by the tradition of
Kuwait’s leaders escaping Kuwait’s searing summer heat to vacation in Europe or other parts of
the Middle East, such as Lebanon. The fall session of parliament was opened on October 26,
2010, by the Amir, and included presentation of the government’s program for the coming year,
delivered by Prime Minister Nasser. In his opening statement, the Amir called for unity and an
end to widening sectarian (Sunni-Shiite) splits. During the opening meetings, the government was
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able to achieve appointment of its allies to key permanent committees, including interior and
defense, and the legal and legislative committee.2
However, opposition deputies resumed their criticism of the government in subsequent days,
threatening to question Interior Minister Jabir (for the third time in two parliamentary sessions)
for his decision to release from custody two Iranian drug traffickers. Some Assembly deputies are
attempting to focus the session to concrete legislative issues, including consideration of draft anti-
corruption and consumer protection bills. Others want to question why the government has been
slow to implement a privatization law passed in the winter-spring 2010 session, but which entered
into force in September 2010.
The tensions that built throughout 2010 grew nearly unsustainable by the end of the year, and
have carried over into 2011. A demonstration by parliamentarians and civil society activists on
December 8, 2010, protesting what they asserted were government attempts to limit National
Assembly powers, was broken up by security forces; several parliamentarians were reportedly
beaten. That incident sparked another call to formally question the Prime Minister on December
28, 2010 (the eighth time he appeared before the Assembly) and a date of January 5, 2011, was
set for a no-confidence motion. Of the 50 elected Assembly members, 22 supported the no-
confidence motion and 25 opposed it, with one abstention, and two not voting.3 Some saw the
vote as indicating that the government is losing support among tribal deputies mainly from the
outer districts of Kuwait City, which are inhabited by generally less affluent, naturalized citizens.4
Some experts assert that the government is increasingly deriving support from Shiite
parliamentarians, who in the past have tended to reliably side with the opposition.
The no-confidence motion by no means resolved the conflict between the government and the
opposition within the Assembly. Oppositionists in the Assembly, supported by youths under a
banner called the “Fifth Fence”—and who might have been inspired by the uprisings in Tunisia
and Egypt—called for the resignation Interior Minister Jabir al-Khalid Al Sabah on the grounds
of “undemocratic practice.” They accuse him of failing to prevent the alleged torturing to death of
a man in custody for illegal liquor sales. February 8, 2011, was set for a public protest—the same
day the Interior Minister was to be questioned by the Assembly. However, in advance of the
questioning, the Minister resigned and was replaced by Shaykh Ahmad al Humud Al Sabah; the
Fifth Fence subsequently postponed the protest until March 8, 2011. Still, in consideration of
Kuwait’s relative affluence and tradition of free expression through editorials and commentary,
very few experts predict a broad popular uprising in Kuwait along the lines of those seen in
January-February 2011 in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere in the Middle East.




2 “Govt Controls Key Assembly Panels.” Kuwait Times, October 27, 2010.
3 “Kuwait’s Prime Minister Survives Parliament Vote.” Al Jazeera TV, January 5, 2011.
4 Kristin Smith Diwan, “Kuwait: Too Much Politics, or Not Enough?,” Foreign Policy online, January 10, 2011.
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Table 1. Composition of the National Assembly: 2008–2009
Ideology/Affiliation
Post-2008 Election
Post-2009 Election
Sunni Islamist (Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi)
24
16
Liberals
7
8
Shiite Islamist
5
5
Independents (includes tribalists, the Popular Action
14 21
bloc of former Speaker Ahmad al-Sadun, and
women). This bloc is considered a base of support
for the government., although some observers say
the government is losing substantial support in it.

Broader Human Rights Issues
On broader human rights issues, the State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices
for 2009,5 released March 11, 2010, reiterates comments in previous reports that the government
limits “freedoms of speech, press, religion, and movement for certain groups,” and that
“government corruption and trafficking in persons remained problems.” While Kuwait’s
constitution enshrines the hereditary monarchy, there has been progress over the past two decades
in extending the franchise for the National Assembly and other elected positions (such as the
Kuwait City municipal council). The extent of the franchise has been a closely watched indicator
of Kuwait’s political liberalization. The government has expanded the electorate gradually, first
by extending the franchise to sons of naturalized Kuwaitis and Kuwaitis naturalized for at least 20
(as opposed to 30) years. The long deadlock on female suffrage began to break in May 2004, after
the government submitted to the Assembly a bill to give women the right to vote and run. (A
government attempt in May 1999 to institute female suffrage by decree was vetoed by the
Assembly.) In May 2005, then Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah pressed the Assembly to adopt the
government bill, which it did on May 16, 2005 (35-23), and which was effective as of the 2006
National Assembly elections.
The State Department report also notes that violence against women, particularly expatriate
women working in domestic service roles, remains a “serious and underreported problem.” A
New York Times report of August 2, 2010, reports difficulties faced by expatriate female domestic
workers in Kuwait, including non-payment of wages, physical or sexual abuse, and withholding
of passports.6 Kuwait was, for the fourth year in a row, designated by the State Department’s
Trafficking in Persons report for 2010 (issued June 14, 2010) as a “Tier Three” (worst level)
country. The Tier Three designation has been maintained because, according to the 2009 report,
Kuwait is “not making sufficient efforts” to comply with minimum standards for the elimination
of trafficking. Non-Gulf Arabs and Asians, and approximately 100,000 stateless residents
(“bidoons”) continue to face discrimination. On October 26, 2010, Prime Minister Nasser said the
government would soon implement a plan to resolve the legal and economic status of the bidoons.


5 State Department human rights report for 2009. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136072.htm.
6 Fahim, Kareem. “Away From Home, Fleeing Domestic Life.” New York Times, August 2, 2010.
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Some Basic Facts
Leadership
Amir: Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah. Crown Prince/heir
apparent: Shaykh Nawwaf al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah. Prime Minister:
Shaykh Nasser al-Muhammad al- Ahmad Al Sabah
Population
About 2.7 milion, of which 1.3 million are non-nationals
GDP (purchasing power parity, PPP)
145.7 billion
Religions
Muslim 85% (Sunni 70%, Shi te 30%); other (Christian, Hindu, Parsi)
15%
Women in senior positions
One minister (Education, Dr. Mudhi al-Hamoud); four in the National
Assembly
Shi tes in senior posts
Two in the cabinet; nine in the National Assembly
GDP per capita (PPP)
$54,100/yr
Oil exports
2.35 million barrels per day (Mbd)


Status of Press Freedoms
Official press censorship ended in 1992, assisting the growth of a vibrant press, but the State
Department report says the government does not always respect the constitutional provisions for
freedom of speech and the press. One case of alleged repression against a journalist and blogger,
Mohammad Abd al Qadir al-Jasem, attracted attention from human rights groups and some
Kuwait parliamentarians. Al-Jasem was arrested in 2009 and then arrested again on May 10,
2010, for allegedly “instigating to overthrow the regime” by slandering the Prime Minister at a
diwaniyah. Supporters say his treatment reflected unwarranted and unconstitutional repression
against a government critic, and Al-Jasem reportedly conducted a hunger strike while in jail. A
Kuwaiti judge ordered his release on bail on June 28, 2010, but he still faces trial.
Labor Rights
The government allows one trade union per occupation, but the only legal trade federation is the
Kuwait Trade Union Federation (KTUF). Foreign workers, with the exception of domestic
workers, are allowed to join unions, and the government has tended not to impede strikes.
Religious Freedom
On religious freedom, the State Department religious freedom report for 2010 (released
November 17, 2010) reported “no change” in the status of respect for religious freedom by the
Kuwaiti government during the reporting period. Shiite Muslims (about 30% of Kuwait’s
population) continue to report official discrimination, including limited access to religious
education and the perceived government unwillingness to permit the building of new Shiite
mosques. Kuwait has seven officially recognized Christian churches. Members of religions not
sanctioned in the Quran—including Baha’i’s, Buddhists, Hindus, and Sikhs—are not allowed to
operate official places of worship, but they are allowed to worship in their homes.

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U.S. Efforts to Promote Democracy and Human Rights
The U.S. Embassy in Kuwait uses various programming tools, including discussions with
Kuwaiti leaders, public diplomacy, and funds from the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI),
to encourage further democratization. However, Kuwait is considered perhaps the furthest along
in the Gulf on democratization, and some believe U.S. policy should concentrate elsewhere in the
Gulf where civil society and public participation are less well established. In Kuwait, MEPI funds
have been used to enhance the capabilities of the media, to promote women’s rights, to support
democracy initiatives, and to provide a broad spectrum of educational opportunities. Several
Kuwaiti organizations, such as the Kuwait Women’s Cultural and Social Society, actively
promote democratization.
U.S.-Kuwait Relations and Defense Cooperation
A U.S. consulate was opened in Kuwait in October 1951; it was elevated to an embassy upon
Kuwait’s independence from Britain in 1961. Kuwait, the first Gulf state to establish relations
with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, was not particularly close to the United States until the Iran-
Iraq war (1980-1988).
Kuwait has been a pivotal partner of the United States through three Gulf wars: the Iran-Iraq War,
the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. In all three cases, Kuwait’s security was
directly at stake, but U.S. officials frequently note that Kuwait went to extraordinary lengths to
support U.S. policy and operations.
As noted, Kuwait and the United States first grew politically and militarily close in the Iran-Iraq
war. Through intimidation, Iran sought to compel Kuwait not to support Iraq in that war. In 1987-
1988, the United States established a U.S. naval escort and tanker reflagging program to protect
Kuwaiti and international shipping from Iranian naval attacks (Operation Earnest Will). During
the period, Iran fired at and struck some Kuwaiti oil facilities, including the Al Ahmadi terminal,
with “Silkworm” surface-to-surface missiles.
Believing Saddam Hussein would reward Kuwait for assisting it financially and logistically
during the Iran-Iraq war, Kuwait’s leaders were exiled and shaken by the August 1990 Iraqi
invasion. Iraq’s public justification was an accusation that Kuwait was overproducing oil and
thereby harming Iraq’s ability to repay its debts and recover economically from the long war with
Iran. However, most experts believe that the invasion was a result of Saddam’s intent to dominate
the Persian Gulf politically and militarily. Kuwait was liberated by the U.S.-led January 16-
February 28, 1991, “Desert Storm” offensive and its government restored to power in Kuwait.
Kuwaiti leaders were highly grateful for the U.S.-led liberation of Kuwait in the 1991 Persian
Gulf War, and signed a 10-year defense pact with the United States on September 19, 1991.
Although the text is classified, the pact reportedly provides for mutual discussions in the event of
a crisis; joint military exercises; U.S. training of Kuwaiti forces; U.S. arms sales; prepositioning
of U.S. military equipment (armor for a U.S. brigade); and U.S. access to Kuwaiti facilities, such
as Ali al-Salem Air Base. 7 A related Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) provides that U.S. forces

7 Hajjar, Sami. U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects. U.S. Army War College, Strategic
Studies Institute. P. 27.
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in Kuwait be subject to U.S. rather than Kuwaiti law. In September 2001, the pact was renewed
for another 10 years.
Kuwait contributed materially to the 1991 war and subsequent containment efforts—it paid
$16.059 billion to offset the costs of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, funded two-thirds of the $51
million per year U.N. budget for the 1991-2003 Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) that
monitored the Iraq-Kuwait border, and contributed about $350 million per year for U.S. military
costs of Kuwait-based Iraq containment operations. This included the 1992-2003 enforcement of
a “no fly zone” over southern Iraq (Operation Southern Watch), involving 1,000 Kuwait-based
U.S. Air Force personnel. Kuwait hosted an additional 5,000 U.S. forces during Operation
Enduring Freedom, which ousted the Taliban from Afghanistan.
Kuwait supported the Bush Administration’s decision to militarily overthrow Saddam Hussein
(Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)). It closed off its entire northern half to secure the U.S.-led
invasion force; allowed U.S. use of two air bases, its international airport, and sea ports; and
provided $266 million in burden sharing support to the combat, including base support, personnel
support, and supplies such as food and fuel. According to Defense Department budget documents,
Kuwait has been contributing about $210 million per year in similar in-kind support to U.S.
operations focused on Iraq. These funds help defray the costs incurred by the approximately
50,000 U.S. military personnel that have rotated in or out of Iraq. In appreciation of Kuwait’s
support to OIF, on April 1, 2004, the Bush Administration designated Kuwait as a “major non-
NATO ally (MNNA),” a designation held by only one other Gulf state (Bahrain).
Current Defense Relations
With the Obama Administration considering Iraq largely stabilized, Kuwait serves as the key exit
route for U.S. troops as they implement President Obama’s February 27, 2009, drawdown plan
that will see U.S. forces in Iraq decline from the 2009 level of 145,000 to about 50,000 (as of
September 1, 2010) and then to zero by the end of 2011. The main U.S. staging facility in Kuwait
is Camp Arifjan and a desert firing range facility, Camp Buehring (Udairi Range); it is at these
locations that equipment from the Iraq battlefield will be cleaned, repaired, and packed up for
return to the United States or stored in regional prepositioning sites. U.S. forces vacated Camp
Doha, the headquarters for U.S. forces in Kuwait during the 1990s, in December 2005.
Although the threat from Iraq is considerably attenuated from the Saddam era, the United States
continues to bolster Kuwait’s defense capabilities, although more so directed against Iran than
against Iraq. U.S. officials say that the U.S.-Kuwait defense relationship, enhanced by the small
amounts of U.S. assistance shown in Table 2 below, has improved the quality of the Kuwaiti
military, particularly the air force. Its military has now nearly regained its pre-Iraq invasion
strength of 17,000. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) officials said in February 2008 they are
establishing in Kuwait a permanent platform for “full spectrum operations” in 27 countries in the
region. Among the objectives is to help Kuwait establish a navy.
U.S. arms sales have sought to enhance Kuwait’s capability. Over the past three years, U.S. sales
to Kuwait have also comported with the overall goals of the “Gulf Security Dialogue” program
designed to contain Iran by enhancing the individual and joint capabilities of the Gulf states.
Kuwait is not eligible to receive U.S. excess defense articles. Major post-1991 Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) include (1) 218 M1A2 tanks at a value of $1.9 billion in 1993 (deliveries completed
in 1998); (2) five Patriot anti-missile fire units, including 25 launchers and 210 Patriot missiles,
valued at about $800 million, in a 1992 sale (delivered by 1998). Some of them were used to
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intercept Iraqi short-range missiles launched at Kuwait in the 2003 war; (3) 1992 sale of 40 FA-
18 combat aircraft (purchase of an additional 10 is under consideration); and (4) September 2002
sale of 16 AH-64 (Apache) helicopters equipped with the Longbow fire-control system, valued at
about $940 million. According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), another
$730 million in purchases were agreed during 2005-2007, including a $20 million deal for 436
TOW anti-tank missiles. A sale to Kuwait of 80 PAC-3 (Patriot) missiles and 60 PAC-2 missiles
and upgrades, valued at about $1.3 billion, was notified to Congress on December 4, 2007. On
September 9, 2008, DSCA notified a sale of 120 AIM-120C-7 Advanced medium Range Air-to-
Air Missiles (AMRAAM), along with equipment and services, with a total value of $178 million.
On August 11, 2010, the Administration notified Congress of another potential Patriot-related
sale—of 209 Patriot “Guidance Enhanced Missile-T (GEM-T) missiles valued at $900 million.
The prime contractor for that system is Raytheon.
Table 2. U.S. Aid to Kuwait and Purposes
(dollars in thousands)
FY2010
FY2011
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
(est)
(request)
International Military Training and
- 19 14 0
10 10
Education (IMET). Permits Kuwait to get
discount for all Kuwait-funded trainees
in U.S., facilitates inter-operability
Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-
628 1,025
-
-
-
-
Mining and Related (NADR).

Kuwaiti Foreign Policy Issues
Kuwait and the United States cooperate on a wide range of regional issues. Virtually all of these
issues were discussed in an April 30, 2010, meeting between Secretary of State Clinton and
visiting Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Dr. Mohammad Al Sabah, according to a joint
press availability. Aside from the issues below, the two discussed the fate of two remaining
Kuwaiti nationals held at the facility at Guantanamo, whom Kuwait wants to repatriate.8
Iraq
Kuwait’s key external concern is the stability of Iraq, and Kuwait has tried to build political ties
to the dominant Iraqi factions in order to ensure there is no repeat of the 1990 invasion or the
Shiite violence that rocked Kuwait in the 1980s. The December 1983 bombings of the U.S. and
French embassies in Kuwait and an attempted assassination of the Amir in May 1985 were
attributed to the Iran-inspired Iraqi Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party. This is the party that Iraqi Prime
Minister Nuri al-Maliki heads, although the party no longer has a militia wing. Seventeen Da’wa

8 Department of State. “Remarks With Kuwaiti Deputy Prime Minister Muhammad Al Sabah After Their Meeting.”
April 30, 2010.
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activists were arrested for these attacks, and Da’wa activists hijacked a Kuwait Airlines plane in
1987. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, Kuwait has built a water line into Iraq, and it ran a
humanitarian operation center (HOC) that gave over $550 million in assistance to Iraqis, in line
with Kuwaiti pledges. A Kuwaiti company, First Kuwaiti General Trading and Contracting, was
lead contractor on the large new U.S. embassy in Iraq.
On April 22, 2008, Kuwait hosted a regional conference on Iraq’s stability, which included the
United States, Iran, and other neighboring countries. On July 18, 2008, Kuwait named its first
ambassador to Iraq since the 1990 Iraqi invasion—Ali al Momen, a retired general. Momen is a
Shiite Muslim, and his appointment signaled Kuwait’s acceptance that Iraq is now dominated
politically by Shiites. The potential for a breakthrough occurred on January 12, 2011, when Prime
Minister Nasser became the first Kuwait Prime Minister to visit Iraq since the August 2, 1990,
invasion. Kuwaiti leaders reportedly appreciated the statement by Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki, a
few days before the visit, that Iraq’s former ambitions against Kuwait “have gone forever and will
never return again…”9
Residual Issues Related to the 1990 Iraqi Invasion
Preventing close relations between Kuwait and Iraq are differences over the lingering after-effects
of the 1990 Iraqi invasion. U.N. officials, as outlined in a July 27, 2009, report by the Secretary
General pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1859 (December 22, 2008),10 and a June 9,
2010, report pursuant to Resolution 1284 (December 17, 1999), attempted to find compromises to
satisfy both sides. Kuwait has been reluctant to drop its insistence on full U.N.-supervised
reparations by Iraq for damages caused from the 1990 invasion. Iraq wants the issue closed out
not only to end its standing as a country under “Chapter 7” U.N. Resolution mandates, but also to
cease the deduction of 5% of all its revenue that is used to pay compensation to the victims of the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. About $25 billion still is owed to Kuwaiti claimants, which, at current
Iraqi revenue rates, could still take many years to pay off. This issue is the crux of U.N.
discussions that Iraq hope would result in an end to Chapter 7 mandates, and some discussions
focused on, as an interim step, reducing the percentage deduction to 1% or 2%. However, the
results were mixed for Iraq on December 15, 2010, when the U.N. Security Council passed three
resolutions—1956, 1957, and 1958. The Resolutions did end most Saddam-era sanctions against
Iraq but continued the reparations process and the 5% automatic revenue deduction to fund the
reparations.
The U.N. resolutions adopted December 15, 2010, did not declare ended the need, under post-
1991 war U.N. resolutions, to resolve the fate of the 605 Kuwaitis missing and presumed dead
from the 1991 war. The cases of 369 Kuwaiti and third-party nationals remain unresolved; the
bodies of over 227 have been found (confirmed by DNA tests) in post-Saddam searches.
According to a June 9, 2010, U.N. report mentioned above, no cases were closed from October
2009 until the June 2010 report. However, the June 9, 2010, report stated that Iraq had expressed
gratitude to Kuwait for a $1 million grant to the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights that is the lead
Iraqi agency trying to determine the fate of the Kuwaitis. In addition, Kuwait’s standpoint, the
unknown whereabouts of the Kuwaiti National Archives, remains unresolved.

9 “No Claim on Sovereign Kuwait, Iraqi Ambitions Gone Forever.” Arab Times (Kuwait). January 9, 2011.
10 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Resolution 1859 (2008). S/2009/385, July 27, 2009.
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There is also a dispute over the share of costs to maintain the markings system of the U.N.-
demarcated border between them. Although this issue is not settled, in July 2010 Kuwait gave
preliminary approval to open a special border crossing into Iraq that would facilitate the work of
international oil companies working in Iraq. Among other residual issues from the Saddam era, in
2004, Kuwait reportedly pledged to forgive a substantial portion of the $25 billion Saddam era
debt, but it has not written off the debt to date.
Arab-Israeli Dispute
After Kuwait’s liberation in 1991, Kuwait’s fear of Saddam Hussein colored its foreign relations.
On the Arab-Israeli dispute, Kuwait was more critical than were the other Gulf states of the late
Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat because he had opposed war to liberate Kuwait. Kuwait expelled
about 450,000 Palestinian workers after liberation. Kuwait has maintained consistent ties to
Hamas, and in March 2006, pledged $7.5 million per month in aid to the then Hamas-led
government. Kuwait supported a Saudi-brokered Fatah-Hamas unity government in March 2007,
which later fractured. At a March 2, 2009, conference in Cairo, Kuwait pledged $200 million for
Gaza reconstruction following the Israel-Hamas war of December 2008-January 2009. On the
other hand, some Kuwaiti journalists criticized the Israeli boarding of a six-ship flotilla that
attempted to run the Israeli blockade of the Hamas-run Gaza Strip in late May 2010.
During 1992-97, Kuwait attended multilateral working group peace talks with Israel—sessions on
arms control, water resources, refugees, and other issues that were begun as part of the “Oslo
Accords process” between Israel and the Palestinians. However, Kuwait did not host any
sessions. In 1994, Kuwait was key in persuading the other Gulf monarchies to cease enforcement
of the secondary (trade with firms that deal with Israel) and tertiary (trade with firms that do
business with blacklisted firms) Arab boycotts of Israel. Still, possibly because it is distracted by
its internal political crises, Kuwait has not, as has Saudi Arabia or Qatar, stepped forward as a
major mediator in intra-Palestinian disputes, nor has it formulated its own proposals for resolving
Israeli-Arab disputes.
Iran
During the rule of Saddam Hussein of Iraq, Kuwait was seen by its Gulf neighbors as too willing
to engage and support Iran as a potential counterweight to Saddam. Kuwait often hosted pro-
Iranian Iraqi Shiite oppositionists against Saddam, even though these same Shiite groups had
conducted attacks in Kuwait in the 1980s. Unlike Bahrain, Kuwait’s leaders did not publicly
accuse Iran of attempting to support Kuwaiti Shiites as a potential internal opposition in Kuwait.
The Amir, in November 2009, publicly endorsed Iran’s right to purely peaceful nuclear energy.
Since Saddam’s fall, Kuwait has taken a slightly harder line against Iran, in conjunction with U.S.
efforts to enact strict international sanctions on Iran to compel it to curb its nuclear program. In
December 2009, Kuwait declined to invite Iran to the GCC summit in Kuwait that month. By
agreement among GCC leaders, it is the host nation for each year’s summit that has the discretion
whether to invite non-GCC leaders to the summit. Qatar angered some Gulf leaders by inviting
Ahmadinejad to the GCC summit in 2007. In May 2010, Kuwait confirmed that it had arrested
some Kuwaiti civil servants and stateless residents for allegedly working on behalf of the Qods
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(Jerusalem) Force of the Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran.11 The Qods Force is the unit that
supports pro-Iranian movements and conducts espionage in neighboring and other foreign
countries. The arrests could suggest that Iran might be looking to Kuwait to exert leverage on the
United States, presumably by positioning Iran to be able to attack U.S. forces withdrawing from
Iraq.
Kuwait also is cooperating with the growing global consensus to sanction Iran. In July 2010, a
U.S. law, P.L. 111-195 (the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of
2010) was enacted that would penalize firms that supply gasoline to Iran. A Kuwaiti gasoline
trading firm, Kuwait’s Independent Petroleum Group, was reported to be a supplier of gasoline to
Iran,12 although the firm has told U.S. officials it is not doing so, as of September 2010;
Kuwaiti Cooperation Against Islamic Militancy
The State Department report on global terrorism for 2009 (released August 5, 2010) credited
Kuwaiti leaders with increased denunciations of terrorism by Kuwaiti leaders and with new steps
against local Sunni extremists that pose a danger to U.S. and Kuwaiti interests. However, the risk
of a terrorist attack in Kuwait remained “high,” according to the report, and there is still a relative
lack of legal provisions that deal specifically with terrorism. On the other hand, a draft law was
submitted to the National Assembly in December 2009 that strengthens laws against terrorism
financing. Some Kuwait-based organizations have proved problematic in the past. On June 13,
2008, the Treasury Department froze the assets of a Kuwaiti charity with alleged links to Al
Qaeda—the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society—under Executive Order 13224.
The report repeats praise for Kuwait’s programs to encourage moderation in Islam in Kuwait, and
for funding an four-year Action Plan of counterterrorism programs. Among plans drawn up by
Kuwait’s Ministry of Interior in October 2009 are programs to prevent smuggling, the counter
radicalization, and a television network to secure vital installations and transportation routes.
Other programs are intended to enhance air and sea port security. The NADR funds shown above
assist Kuwait with counterterrorism efforts, border control, and export controls.
Kuwaiti Economic Policy
The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 caused unrest in Kuwait over falling stock prices and the
effects of lower oil prices. As noted above, executive-legislative disputes delayed passage of
stimulus measures to address the crisis. However, as the crisis has abated, the Assembly has taken
some steps to try to ensure Kuwait’s long term economic health. The body passed legislation,
which took effect September 2010, to privatize major sectors of the Kuwait economy. The
planned privatization of Kuwait Airways is reportedly moving forward as well. However, some
Kuwaitis, particularly those newly naturalized and less affluent than longtime citizens, fear that
privatization will bring higher unemployment. The deflationary financial environment of late
2008 was a contrast with mid-2008; in June 2008, the National Assembly passed a salary increase

11 “Iran Spy Cell Dismantled in Kuwait.” Associated Press, May 6, 2010.
12 http://www.defenddemocracy.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11788115&Itemid=105.
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for public sector employees and approved additional citizens’ benefits to help them cope with the
mounting inflation rate (then estimated at 10.14%.)
The government-Assembly political deadlock also has prevented movement on several major
initiatives, the most prominent of which is Project Kuwait. The project, backed by the Kuwaiti
government, would open Kuwait’s northern oil fields to foreign investment to generate about
500,000 barrels per day of extra production. The Assembly has blocked the $8.5 billion project
for over a decade because of concerns about Kuwait’s sovereignty, and observers say no
compromise is in sight. As far as a project to build a fourth oil refinery, estimated to cost $8
billion, the Assembly blocked the project in 2008 by alleging that the contracts awarded by the
state oil company did not comply with procedures set out by Kuwait’s Central Tenders
Committee, which handles all public sector contracts. It has not advanced.
The 2008 financial crisis, coupled with the political infighting, also caused Kuwait to shelve the
formation of a joint venture with Dow Chemical to form the largest maker of polyethylene. On
December 29, 2008, the government cancelled the venture, which was to have required a Kuwaiti
investment of $7.5 billion by state-run Petrochemical Industries Co. Kuwait and Dow Chemical
had finalized an agreement for the joint venture in November 2008, and Dow Chemical expressed
surprise at Kuwait’s cancellation only four weeks later. Dow had planned to use the proceeds of
the investment to fund its purchase of the Rohm and Haas chemical firm, although that deal
ultimately went through anyway.
The state-owned oil industry still accounts for 75% of government income and 90% of export
earnings. The United States imports about 260,000 barrels per day in crude oil from Kuwait
(about 3% of U.S. oil imports). Kuwait’s proven crude oil reserves are about 95 billion barrels,
enough for about 140 years at current production levels. Total U.S. exports to Kuwait in 2010
were about $2.575 billion, consisting mostly of foods, industrial equipment, and automobiles.
Total U.S. imports from Kuwait in 2010 were about $5 billion. The latest year for which a
product by product breakdown of imports is available is 2009; that year, the United States
imported $3.65 billion worth of crude oil,13 virtually all of the $3.782 billion worth of total
products imported from Kuwait that year.
Like other Gulf states, Kuwait sees peaceful uses of nuclear energy as important to its economy,
although doing so always raises fears among some in the United States, Israel, and elsewhere
about the ultimate intentions of developing a nuclear program. Kuwait is cooperating with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure international oversight of any nuclear
work in Kuwait.
There are ongoing discussions about reviving the project. In 1994, Kuwait became a founding
member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In February 2004, the United States and
Kuwait signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), often viewed as a prelude
to a free trade agreement (FTA), which Kuwait has said it seeks. Kuwait gave $500 million worth
of oil to U.S. states affected by Hurricane Katrina.


13 U.S. Census Bureau: Foreign Trade Statistics. http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics.
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Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612



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