Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
February 7, 2011
Congressional Research Service
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Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks

Summary
Iraq’s political system is increasingly characterized by peaceful competition and formation of
cross-sectarian alliances, although ethnic and sectarian infighting continues, sometimes involving
the questionable use of key levers of power and legal institutions. This infighting—and the belief
that holding political power may mean the difference between life and death for the various
political communities—significantly delayed agreement on a new government that was to be
selected following the March 7, 2010, national elections for the Council of Representatives
(COR, parliament). With U.S. intervention, on November 10, 2010, major ethnic and sectarian
factions agreed on a framework for a new government, breaking the long deadlock. Their
agreement, under which Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki would serve another term, was
implemented in the presentation by him of a broad-based cabinet on December 21, 2010, in
advance of a December 25 constitutional deadline. The participation of all major factions in the
new government, while stabilizing politically, could complicate efforts to pass key outstanding
legislation crucial to attracting foreign investment, such as national hydrocarbon laws. However,
there may be early indications that the new government is acting on long stalled initiatives,
including year long tensions over Kurdish exports of oil.
The difficulty in reaching agreement on a government had multiple causes that could still cause
instability over the long term. With the results certified, a mostly Sunni Arab-supported
“Iraqiyya” slate of former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi unexpectedly gained a plurality of 91 of
the 325 COR seats up for election. Maliki’s State of Law slate won 89, and a rival Shiite coalition
was third with 70, of which about 40 seats are held by supporters of Shiite cleric Moqtada Al
Sadr. The main Kurdish parties, again allied, won 43 seats. On the basis of his first place
showing, Allawi had demanded to be given the first opportunity to form a government. However,
his bloc was unable to win the allegiance of the Shiite blocs, and Iraqiyya reluctantly agreed to
join a government headed again by Maliki. Sunni fears that Maliki and his allies seek to
monopolize power remain, as do the concerns of the Kurds that Maliki will not honor pledges to
resolve Kurd-Arab territorial and financial disputes.
Iran, which exercises major influence over the Shiite factions in Iraq, worked, with some success,
to ensure that pro-Iranian Shiites continue lead the government. However, the inclusion of
Allawi’s bloc in several key posts, and the factional inclusiveness of the new cabinet, indicates
that Iran did not meet all of its objectives. Iran may have hoped to increase its influence in Iraq
after a key ally, Sadr, returned to Iraq on January 5, 2011, following three years of exile for
religious studies in Iran, but Sadr reportedly returned to Iran at the end of January 2011. Although
some Iraqi communities, including Christians, have been targeted by attacks in late 2010 and
early 2011, the overall human rights situation in Iraq appears to remain at levels vastly improved
from those at the height of sectarian conflict (2006-2008).
Questions remain over the political and security situation that will obtain when U.S. forces depart
Iraq at the end of 2011, in keeping with a 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. U.S. forces have
dropped to 50,000, from a 2008 high of 170,000, with the formal end of the U.S. combat mission
on August 31, 2010. Continuing high profile attacks, although sporadic and relatively infrequent,
have caused some experts to question whether security will deteriorate to the point where Iraq
becomes a “failed state” after 2011, unless Iraq requests the continued presence of U.S. forces
after that time. Some question the ability of the U.S. State Department to secure its facilities and
personnel and to carry out its mission on its own, without direct U.S. military participation.
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Contents
Overview of the Political Transition/First Elections ..................................................................... 1
Initial Transition.................................................................................................................... 1
January 30, 2005, Elections for an Interim Government......................................................... 1
Permanent Constitution ......................................................................................................... 2
December 15, 2005, Elections ............................................................................................... 3
Political Reconciliation and Subsequent Elections ....................................................................... 3
The Strengthening of Maliki and the Iraqi Government: 2008-2009....................................... 4
January 31, 2009, Provincial Elections and Implications.................................................. 4
Maliki’s Position In Advance of March 7, 2010, Elections ..................................................... 7
Political Impact of the U.S.-Iraq Security and Strategic Framework Agreements.............. 7
The March 7, 2010, Elections: Coalitions and Political Infighting................................................ 8
Election Law Dispute and Final Provisions ........................................................................... 9
Election Parameters ...................................................................................................... 10
Flashpoint: Disqualification of Some Prominent Sunnis ................................................ 10
Election and Results............................................................................................................ 12
Post-Election Government................................................................................................... 13
Political Resolution....................................................................................................... 14
New Government Takes Shape...................................................................................... 14
Continuing Political Schisms............................................................................................... 16
Sunni Community ......................................................................................................... 16
KRG-Central Government Disputes .............................................................................. 16
The Sadr Faction and Its Position .................................................................................. 18
Related Governance and Regional Issues, and Implications for U.S. Policy ............................... 19
General Human Rights Issues.............................................................................................. 19
Media and Free Expression ........................................................................................... 20
Labor Rights ................................................................................................................. 20
Situation of the Christian Religious Minority ................................................................ 20
Regional Dimension............................................................................................................ 21
Implications for the Wind Down of the U.S. Military Mission ............................................. 22
Other Elections Possible...................................................................................................... 25

Tables
Table 1. Major Coalitions for 2010 National Elections................................................................. 8
Table 2. March 2010 COR Election: Final, Certified Results by Province .................................. 24
Table 3. Recent Democracy Assistance to Iraq........................................................................... 25
Table 4. January 31, 2009, Provincial Election Results (Major Slates) ....................................... 26
Table 5. Election Results (January and December 2005) ............................................................ 27
Table 6. Assessments of the Benchmarks................................................................................... 28

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Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 30

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Overview of the Political Transition/First Elections
Iraq has completed a formal political transition from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein to a
plural polity that encompasses varying sects and ideological and political factions. That transition
has been accomplished through a series of elections that began in 2005, after a one year
occupation period and a subsequent seven month interim period of Iraqi self-governance.
However, disputes continue over the relative claim of each community on power and economic
resources. These disputes permeate almost every issue in Iraq, including security, the terms and
framework for elections, economic decision making, and foreign policy.
Initial Transition
After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003, the United States set up an occupation
structure, reportedly based on concerns that immediate sovereignty would favor major factions
and not produce democracy. In May 2003, President Bush, reportedly seeking strong leadership in
Iraq, named Ambassador L. Paul Bremer to head a “Coalition Provisional Authority” (CPA),
which was recognized by the United Nations as an occupation authority. Bremer discontinued a
tentative political transition process and instead appointed (July 13, 2003) a non-sovereign Iraqi
advisory body, the 25-member “Iraq Governing Council” (IGC). During that year, U.S. and Iraqi
negotiators, advised by a wide range of international officials and experts, drafted a “Transitional
Administrative Law” (TAL, interim constitution), which was promulgated on March 4, 2004.
After about one year of occupation, the United States - following a major debate between the CPA
and various Iraqi factions over the modalities and rapidity of a resumption of Iraqi sovereignty -
handed sovereignty to an appointed Iraqi interim government on June 28, 2004. That date was
two days ahead of the TAL-specified date of June 30, 2004 for the handing over of Iraqi
sovereignty and the end of the occupation period, which also laid out the elections roadmap
discussed below. The interim government was headed by a prime minister, Iyad al-Allawi, leader
of the Iraq National Accord, a secular, non-sectarian faction. Allawi is a Shiite but many INA
leaders were Sunnis, and some of them were formerly members of the Baath Party. The president
of this interim government was Ghazi al-Yawar, a Sunni tribal figure who spent many years in
Saudi Arabia.
January 30, 2005, Elections for an Interim Government
A series of elections in 2005 produced the full-term government structure that is in place today. In
accordance with the dates specified in the TAL, the first post-Saddam election was held on
January 30, 2005. The voting was for a 275-seat transitional National Assembly (which formed an
executive), four-year term provincial councils in all 18 provinces and a Kurdistan regional
assembly (111 seats). The election for the transitional Assembly was conducted according to the
“proportional representation/closed list” election system, in which voters chose among “political
entities” (a party, a coalition of parties, or persons). A total of 111 entities were on the national
ballot, of which nine were multi-party coalitions.
Still restive over their displacement from power in the 2003 U.S. invasion, Sunni Arabs (20% of
the overall population) boycotted, winning only 17 Assembly seats, and only one seat on the 51-
seat Baghdad provincial council. That council was dominated (28 seats) by representatives of the
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), led by Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim. Radical Shiite cleric
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Moqtada Al Sadr, then at odds with U.S. forces, also boycotted, leaving his faction poorly
represented on provincial councils in the Shiite south and in Baghdad. The resulting transitional
government placed Shiites and Kurds in the highest positions—Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK) leader Jalal Talabani was president and Da’wa (Shiite party) leader Ibrahim al-Jafari was
prime minister. Sunnis were Assembly speaker, deputy president, a deputy prime minister, and six
ministers, including defense.
Permanent Constitution
The elected Assembly was to draft a permanent constitution by August 15, 2005, to be put to a
referendum by October 15, 2005, subject to veto by a two-thirds majority of voters in any three
provinces. On May 10, 2005, a 55-member drafting committee was appointed, but with only two
Sunni Arabs (15 Sunnis were later added as full members and 10 as advisors). In August 2005,
the talks produced a draft, providing for a December 31, 2007, deadline to hold a referendum on
whether Kirkuk (Tamim province) would join the Kurdish region (Article 140); designation of
Islam as “a main source” of legislation;1 a 25% electoral goal for women (Article 47); families
choosing which courts to use for family issues (Article 41); making only primary education
mandatory (Article 34); and having Islamic law experts and civil law judges on the federal
supreme court (Article 89). Many women opposed the two latter provisions as giving too much
discretion to male family members. It made all orders of the U.S.-led occupation authority
(Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA) applicable until amended (Article 126), and established a
“Federation Council” (Article 62), a second chamber with size and powers to be determined in
future law (not adopted to date).
The major disputes—still to some extent unresolved—centered on regional versus centralized
power. The draft permitted two or more provinces together to form new autonomous “regions”—
reaffirmed in passage of an October 2006 law on formation of regions. Article 117 allows
“regions” to organize internal security forces, legitimizing the fielding of the Kurds’ peshmerga
militia (allowed by the TAL). Article 109 requires the central government to distribute oil and gas
revenues from “current fields” in proportion to population, and gave regions a role in allocating
revenues from new energy discoveries. Disputes over these concepts continue to hold up passage
of national hydrocarbons legislation. Sunnis dominate areas of Iraq that have few proven oil or
gas deposits, and favor centralized control of oil revenues, whereas the Kurds want to maintain
maximum control of their own burgeoning energy sector.
With contentious provisions unresolved, Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%-85%) to try to
defeat the constitution, prompting a U.S.-mediated agreement (October 11, 2005) providing for a
panel to propose amendments within four months after a post-December 15 election government
took office (Article 137), to be voted on within another two months (under the same rules as the
October 15 referendum). The Sunni provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no”
vote, respectively, but the constitution was adopted because Nineveh province only voted 55%
“no,” missing the threshold for a “no” vote by a two-thirds majority in three provinces.

1 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html.
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December 15, 2005, Elections
The December 15, 2005, elections were for a full-term (four-year) national government (also in
line with the schedule laid out in the TAL). Under the voting mechanism used for that election,
each province contributed a predetermined number of seats to a “Council of Representatives”
(COR)—a formula adopted to attract Sunni participation. Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were
allocated this way, with 45 “compensatory” seats for entities that would have won additional seats
had the constituency been the whole nation. There were 361 political “entities,” including 19
multi-party coalitions, competing in a “closed list” voting system (in which party leaders choose
the persons who will actually sit in the Assembly). As shown in Table 5, voters chose lists
representing their sects and regions, and the Shiites and Kurds again emerged dominant. The
COR was inaugurated on March 16, 2006, but political infighting caused the Shiite bloc “United
Iraqi Alliance” to replace Jafari with another Da’wa figure, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, as prime
minister.
On April 22, 2006, the COR approved Talabani to continue as president. His two deputies are
Adel Abd al-Mahdi (incumbent) of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Tariq al-
Hashimi, leader of the broad Sunni-based coalition called the Accord Front (“Tawafuq”—within
which Hashimi leads the Iraqi Islamic Party). Another Accord figure, the hardline Mahmoud
Mashhadani (National Dialogue Council party), became COR speaker. Maliki won COR approval
of a 37-member cabinet (including two deputy prime ministers) on May 20, 2006. Three key slots
(Defense, Interior, and National Security) were not filled permanently until June 2006, due to
infighting. Of the 37 posts, there were 19 Shiites; nine Sunnis; eight Kurds; and one Christian.
Four were women.
Political Reconciliation and Subsequent Elections
The 2005 elections were, at the time, considered successful by the Bush Administration but did
not resolve the Sunni-Arab grievances over their diminished positions in the power structure.
Some argue that the elections in 2005 worsened the violence by exposing the new-found
subordination of the Sunni Arabs. The Sunni-led insurgency accelerated in the two subsequent
years, in turn prompting the empowerment of Shiite militia factions to counter the insurgency.
The sectarian violence was so serious that many experts, by the end of 2006, were considering the
U.S. mission as failing.
In August 2006, the Administration and Iraq agreed on a series of “benchmarks” that, if adopted
and implemented, might achieve political reconciliation. Under Section 1314 of a FY2007
supplemental appropriation (P.L. 110-28), “progress” on 18 political and security benchmarks—
as assessed in Administration reports due by July 15, 2007, and then September 15, 2007—was
required for the United States to provide $1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Iraq.
President Bush used the waiver provision. The law also mandated an assessment by the GAO, by
September 1, 2007, of the degree to which the benchmarks have been met, as well as an outside
assessment of the Iraqi security forces (ISF).
In early 2007, the United States began a “surge” of about 30,000 additional U.S. forces (bringing
U.S. troop levels to about 170.000 at the height of the surge) intended to blunt insurgent
momentum and take advantage of growing Sunni Arab rejection of extremist groups. As 2008
progressed, citing the achievement of many of the major legislative benchmarks and a dramatic
drop in sectarian violence that was attributed to surge—the Bush Administration asserted that
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political reconciliation was advancing. However, U.S. officials maintained that the extent and
durability of reconciliation would depend on the degree of implementation of adopted laws, on
further compromises among ethnic groups, and on continued attenuated levels of violence. For
Iraq’s performance on the benchmarks, see Table 6.
The Strengthening of Maliki and the Iraqi Government: 2008-2009
The passage of key legislation in 2008 (see chart below) and the continued reductions in violence
accomplished by the U.S. surge and the continued turn of many Sunni militants away from
violence enhanced Maliki’s political position. A March 2008 offensive ordered by Maliki against
the Sadr faction and other militants in Basra and environs (“Operation Charge of the Knights”)
pacified the city and caused many Sunnis and Kurds to see Maliki as less sectarian. This
contributed to a decision in July 2008 by the Accord Front to end its one-year boycott of the
cabinet. Other cabinet vacancies were filled with independents, essentially putting to rest
indicators that major blocs might vote Maliki out of the prime ministership. (In 2007 the Accord
Front, the Sadr faction, and the bloc of former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi pulled out of the
cabinet, leaving it with 13 vacant seats, out of 37 cabinet slots.)
Although Maliki’s growing strength increased the Bush and then Obama Administration’s
optimism for continued stability, Maliki’s strength caused concern among Maliki’s erstwhile
political allies. They saw him as creating or restructuring security organs to report to his office
rather than the Defense or Interior ministries. Through his Office of the Commander-in-Chief, he
took direct command of the National Counter-Terrorism Force (about 10,000 personnel) as well
as the Baghdad Brigade, responsible for security in the capital. In 2008, the Kurds were highly
critical of his formation of government-run “tribal support councils” in northern Iraq, which the
Kurds see as an effort to prevent them from gaining control of disputed territories that they want
to integrate into their Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Other support councils were
created in southern Iraq. As a later example, in February 2010, Maliki’s government reportedly
directed the Iraqi Army’s Fourth Division to cordon a provincial council building in Tikrit to
influence the resolution of a dispute over the Salahuddin provincial council’s ousting of the
former governor of the province.2
January 31, 2009, Provincial Elections and Implications
The political fears of some factions about Maliki’s intentions to consolidate power were evident
in the January 31, 2009, provincial elections. Under a 2008 “provincial powers law,” provincial
councils in Iraq choose the governor and provincial governing administrations in each province,
making them powerful bodies that provide ample opportunity to distribute patronage and guide
provincial politics. (This is a contrast to Afghanistan, where provincial governors are appointed
by the President.) ISCI, which had already been distancing itself from its erstwhile ally, Maliki’s
Da’wa Party, ran under a separate slate in the provincial elections—thus splitting up the formerly
powerful UIA. Ideologically, ISCI favors more power for the provinces and less for the central
government; Maliki prefers centralization.

2 Myers, Steven Lee and Anthony Shadid. “Maliki Faulted On Using Army in Iraqi Politics.” New York Times,
February 11, 2010.
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The provincial elections had originally been planned for October 1, 2008, but were delayed when
Kurdish restiveness over integrating Kirkuk and other disputed territories into the KRG caused a
presidential council veto of the July 22, 2008, election law needed to hold these elections. That
draft provided for equal division of power in Kirkuk (among Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans) until
its status is finally resolved, a proposal strongly opposed by the Kurds. On September 24, 2008,
the COR passed a final election law, providing for the elections by January 31, 2009 and putting
off provincial elections in Kirkuk and the three KRG provinces.3
In the elections, about 14,500 candidates vied for the 440 provincial council seats in the 14 Arab-
dominated provinces of Iraq. About 4,000 of the candidates were women. The average number of
council seats per province was about 30,4 down from a set number of 41 seats per province
(except Baghdad) in the 2005-2009 councils. The Baghdad provincial council has 57 seats. This
yielded an average of more than 30 candidates per council seat. However, the reduction in
number of seats also meant that many incumbents were not reelected.
The provincial elections were conducted on an “open list” basis—voters were able to vote for a
party slate, or for an individual candidate (although they also had to vote for that candidate’s
slate). This procedure encouraged voting for slates and strengthened the ability of political parties
to choose who on their slate will occupy seats allotted for that party. This election system was
widely assessed to favor larger, well-organized parties, because smaller parties might not meet the
vote threshold to obtain any seats on the council in their province.5 This was seen as likely to set
back the hopes of some Iraqis that the elections would weaken the Islamist parties, both Sunni
and Shiite, that have dominated post-Saddam politics.
About 17 million Iraqis (any Iraqi 18 years of age or older) were eligible for the vote, which was
run by the Iraqi Higher Election Commission (IHEC). Pre-election-related violence was minimal,
although five candidates and several election/political workers were killed. There were virtually
no major violent incidents on election day. Turnout was about 51%, somewhat lower than some
expected. Some voters complained of being turned away at polling places because their names
were not on file. Other voters had been displaced by sectarian violence in prior years and were
unable to vote in their new areas of habitation.
The vote totals were finalized on February 19, 2009, and were certified on March 29, 2009.
Within 15 days of that (by April 13, 2009) the provincial councils began to convene under the
auspices of the incumbent provincial governor, and to elect a provincial council chairperson and
deputy chairperson. Within another 30 days after that (by May 12, 2009) the provincial councils
selected (by absolute majority) a provincial governor and deputy governors. The term of the
provincial councils is four years from the date of their first convention.

3 The election law also stripped out provisions in the vetoed version to allot 13 total reserved seats, spanning six
provinces, to minorities. An October 2008 amendment restored six reserved seats for minorities: Christian seats in
Baghdad, Nineveh, and Basra; one seat for Yazidis in Nineveh; one seat for Shabaks in Nineveh; and one seat for the
Sabean sect in Baghdad.
4 Each provincial council has 25 seats plus one seat per each 200,000 residents over 500,000.
5 The threshold for winning a seat is the total number of valid votes divided by the number of seats up for election.
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Outcomes
The fears of Maliki’s opponents were realized when his list (“State of Law Coalition”) was the
clear winner of the provincial elections. His Shiite opponents (his former allies) all ran separate
slates and fared generally poorly. With 28 out of the 57 total seats, the Maliki slate gained
effective control, by itself, of the Baghdad provincial council (displacing ISCI). Da’wa also
emerged very strong in most of the Shiite provinces of the south, including Basra, where it won
an outright majority (20 out of 35 seats).
Although Maliki’s coalition was the clear winner, the subsequent efforts to form provincial
administrations demonstrated that he still needed to strike bargains with rival factions, including
Sadr, ISCI, and even the Sunni list of Saleh al-Mutlaq (National Dialogue Front) that contains
many ex-Baathists. The provincial administrations that took shape are discussed in Table 6. Aside
from the victory of Maliki’s slate, the unexpected strength of secular parties, such as that of
former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi, corroborated the view that voters favored slates committed
to Iraqi nationalism and strong central government.
The apparent big loser in the elections was ISCI, which had been favored because it is well
organized and well funded. ISCI did not win outright in Najaf province, which it previously
dominated and which, because of Najaf’s revered status in Shiism, is considered a center of
political gravity in southern Iraq. It won seven seats there, the same number that was won by the
Maliki slate. ISCI won only 3 seats on the Baghdad province council, down from the 28 it held
previously, and only five in Basra. Some observers believe that the poor showing for ISCI was a
product not only of its call for devolving power out of Baghdad, but also because of its perceived
close ties to Iran, which some Iraqis believe is exercising undue influence on Iraqi politics. Others
say ISCI was perceived as interested in political and economic gain for its supporters.
The Sadr faction, represented mainly in the “Independent Liberals Trend” list, did not come close
to winning outright control of any councils, although it won enough seats in several southern
provinces to, through deal-making, gain senior positions in a few southern provinces. The
showing of the Sadrists was viewed as reflecting voter disillusionment with parties that continue
to field militias—which many Iraqis blame for much of the violence that has plagued Iraq since
the fall of Saddam Hussein.
Another important trend noted in the 2009 provincial elections was the increasing Sunni entry
into the political process. Participating in the provincial elections were Sunni tribal leaders
(“Awakening Councils”) who had recruited the “Sons of Iraq” fighters and who were widely
credited for turning Iraqi Sunnis against Al Qaeda-linked extremists in Iraq. These Sunni tribalists
had largely stayed out of the December 2005 elections because their attention was focused
primarily on the severe violence in the Sunni provinces, particularly Anbar. These tribal figures
were, at the time of the December 2005 election, still intimidated by Al Qaeda in Iraq, which
urged Sunnis to stay completely out of the political process. However, in the 2009 provincial
elections, as the violence ebbed, these Sunni tribalists offered election slates and showed strength
at the expense of the established Sunni parties, particularly the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and the
National Dialogue Council. The main “Iraq Awakening” tribal slate came in first in Anbar
Province. The tribalists benefitted from the decline of the IIP and other mostly urban Sunni
parties, including the National Dialogue Council.
In Diyala Province, hotly contested among Shiite and Sunni Arab and Kurdish slates, the
provincial version of the (Sunni Arab) Accord Front edged out the Kurds for first place, and
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subsequently allied with the Kurds and with ISCI to set up the provincial administration. There
continues to be substantial friction between Sunni and Shiite Arabs in that province, in part
because Sunni militants drove out many Shiites from the province at the height of the civil
conflict during 2005-2007.
Maliki’s Position In Advance of March 7, 2010, Elections
Because of his slate’s strong showing in the 2009 provincial elections, Maliki became the
immediate favorite to retain his position in the March 7, 2010, COR elections. The elected COR
chooses the full-term government, as discussed above. Perceiving Maliki as the likely winner,
Maliki was able to include some political competitors in some provinces, including those
dominated by Sunni Arabs and Sunni tribalists, into his State of Law coalition. However, Sunnis
were not in high positions on his slate, which was still perceived as primarily Shiite.
As 2009 progressed, Maliki’s image as protector of law and order was tarnished by several high-
profile attacks from mid-2009 to the eve of the election. Realizing the potential for security lapses
to reduce his chances to remain prime minister, Maliki ordered several ISF commanders
questioned for lapses in connection with the major bombings in Baghdad on August 20, 2009, in
which almost 100 Iraqis were killed and the Ministry of Finance and of Foreign Affairs were
heavily damaged. The makeshift new Ministry of Finance buildings were attacked again on
December 7, 2009. After this latter bombing, which also resulted in the parliament’s insistence
that it hear Maliki’s explanation of his responses, Maliki replaced the commander of the Baghdad
Brigade. He also attempted to place substantial blame for the lapses on Interior Minister Jawad
Bolani, who headed a rival slate in the elections. (See Table 1 on major slates in the election.)
Additional bombings took place in Baghdad, Diyala Province, Anbar Province, and elsewhere, as
the election approached. Some believe that insurgents conducted these attacks with the intent of
weakening Maliki’s image as a strong leader. Others saw these incidents as an effort by Al Qaeda
in Iraq or other un-reconciled Sunni insurgent groups to reduce Sunni participation in the
elections and/or reignite civil war.
Political Impact of the U.S.-Iraq Security and Strategic Framework Agreements
Maliki derived further political benefit from the U.S. implementation of the U.S.-Iraq “Security
Agreement” (SA, sometimes referred to as the Status of Forces Agreement, or SOFA), and
broader Strategic Framework Agreement that spelled out long term U.S.-Iraq engagement on
political, cultural, educational, and economic issues. The agreements were ratified by the COR on
November 27, 2008, over Sadrist opposition. The pacts took effect January 1, 2009, with the SA
limiting the prerogatives of U.S. troops to operate in Iraq and setting a timetable of December 31,
2011, for a complete U.S. troop withdrawal. President Obama, on February 27, 2009, outlined a
U.S. troop drawdown plan that comports with the major provisions of the agreement. The
President’s plan provided for a drawdown of U.S. combat brigades by the end of August 2010—a
benchmark which was met—with a residual force of 50,000 primarily for training the Iraq
Security Forces, to remain until the end of 2011.
An interim benchmark in the SA was the June 30, 2009, withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from
Iraq’s cities. This was strictly implemented by U.S. forces, to the point where U.S. forces pulled
out of locations in the restive Mosul area and from Sadr City, where General Raymond Odierno
(outgoing top U.S. commander in Iraq) felt U.S. forces should stay. Maliki hailed this interim
milestone as a “victory” and declared it a national holiday.
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The March 7, 2010, Elections: Coalitions and
Political Infighting

As Maliki’s perceived political strength eroded throughout 2009 and early 2010, a sense of open
competition emerged for the election. Politically, the Shiite factions were divided over who would
become the next national leader and were unable to rebuild their UIA alliance for the March 7
elections, despite urging to do so from Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the senior clerical leader in
Iraq. A rival Shiite slate emerged as a competitor to Maliki’s State of Law—the “Iraqi National
Alliance (INA)” was composed of ISCI, Sadr, and other Shiite figures. The INA coalition
believed that each of its component factions would draw support from their individual
constituencies to produce an election majority or clear plurality. Sistani remained completely
neutral in the election, endorsing no slate, but calling on all Iraqis to participate.
On the Sunni Arab side of Iraqi politics, the Iraq National Movement (“Iraqiyya”) of former
transitional Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi had strong appeal. There was also an openly Sunni
slate, leaning Islamist, called the Accordance slate (“Tawaffuq”) led by IIP figures, but it was not
expected to fare well compared to Allawi’s less sectarian bloc. Some Sunni figures joined the
predominantly Shiite slates as part of an effort by the leaders of those blocs to appear non-
sectarian.

Table 1. Major Coalitions for 2010 National Elections
State of Law Coalition
Led by Maliki and his Da’wa Party. Includes Anbar Salvation Front of Shaykh
Hatim al-Dulaymi, which is Sunni, and the Independent Arab Movement of Abd
(slate no. 337)
al-Mutlaq al-Jabbouri. Appealed to Shiite sectarianism during the campaign by
backing the exclusion of candidates with links to outlawed Baath Party. Was
favored in the 2010 election due to strong showing in 2009 provincial elections.
Iraqi National Alliance
Formed in August 2009, was initial y considered the most formidable chal enger
to Maliki’s slate. Consists mainly of his erstwhile Shiite opponents and is
(slate no. 316)
perceived as somewhat more Islamist than the other slates. Includes ISCI, the
Sadrist movement, the Fadilah Party, the Iraqi National Congress of Ahmad
Chalabi, and the National Reform Movement (Da’wa faction) of former Prime
Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari. Possible Prime ministerial candidate from this bloc was
deputy President Adel Abd al-Mahdi, a moderate well respected by U.S. officials.
However, some observers say Chalabi—the key architect of the effort to
exclude candidates with Baathist ties—wanted to replace Maliki. This slate was
considered close to Ayatollah Sistani, but did not receive his formal
endorsement.
Iraqi National Movement
Formed in October 2009. Led by former Prime Minister Iyad al-Al awi (Iraq
National Accord) who is Shi te but his faction appeals to Sunnis, and Sunni leader
(“Iraqiyya”—slate no. 333)
Saleh al-Mutlaq (ex-Baathist who leads Iraq Front for National Dialogue). Backed
by Iraqi Islamic Party leader and Deputy President Tariq Al-Hashimi as well as
other powerful Sunnis, including Usama al-Nujaifi and Rafi al-Issawi. However,
Justice and Accountability Commission (formerly the De-Baathification
Commission) disqualified Mutlaq and another senior candidate on this slate,
Dhafir al Ani, for supporting the outlawed Baath Party. An appeals court affirmed
their disqualification (decision legislatively reversed after the election).
Kurdistan Alliance
Competed again in 2010 as a joint KDP-PUK Kurdish list. However, Kurdish
solidarity was shaken by July 25, 2009, Kurdistan elections in which a breakaway
(slate no. 372)
PUK faction called Change (Gorran) did unexpectedly well. Gorran ran its own
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separate list for the March 2010 elections. However, PUK’s ebbing strength in
the north did not jeopardize Talabani’s continuation as president, although Sunnis
sought that position.
Unity Alliance of Iraq
Led by Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, a moderate Shiite who has a reputation for
political independence. Bolani has not previously been affiliated with the large
(slate no. 348)
Shiite parties such as ISCI and Dawa, and was only briefly affiliated with the
Sadrist faction (which has been strong in Bolani’s home town of Amarah, in
southeastern Iraq). Considered a non-sectarian slate, this list Included Sunni
tribal faction led by Shaykh Ahmad Abu Risha, brother of slain leader of the Sunni
Awakening movement in Anbar. The list included first post-Saddam defense
minister Sadun al-Dulaymi.
Iraqi Accordance
A coalition of Sunni parties, including breakaway factions of the Iraqi Islamic Party
(IIP). Led by Ayad al-Samarrai, speaker of the COR. Viewed as a weak
(slate no. 338)
competitor for Sunni votes against Al awi slate.
Sources: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; various press.

Election Law Dispute and Final Provisions
While coalitions formed to challenge Maliki, disputes emerged over the ground rules for the
election. The holding of the elections required passage of an election law setting out the rules and
parameters of the election. Under the Iraqi constitution, the elections were to held by January 31,
2010, in order to allow 45 days before the March 15, 2010, expiry of the current COR’s term.
Iraq’s election officials had ideally wanted a 90-day time frame between the election law passage
and the election date, in order to facilitate the voter registration process.
Because the provisions of the election law (covering such issues as voter eligibility, whether to
allot quota seats to certain constituencies, the size of the next COR) have the potential to shape
the election outcome, the major Iraqi communities were divided over its substance. These
differences caused the COR to miss almost every self-imposed deadline to pass it. One dispute
was over the election system, with many COR members leaning toward a closed list system
(which gives the slates the power to determine who occupies actual COR seats after the election),
despite a call by Grand Ayatollah Sistani for an open list vote (which allows voters to also vote
for candidates as well as coalition slates). Each province served as a single constituency and a
fixed number of seats for each province (see Table 2, which includes number of COR seats per
province).
There was also a dispute over how to apply the election in disputed Tamim (Kirkuk) province,
where Kurds feared that the election law drafts would cause Kurds to be underrepresented. The
version of the election law passed by the COR on November 8, 2009 (141 out of 195 COR
deputies voting), called for using 2009 food ration lists as representative of voter registration. The
Kurds had sought this provision, facing down the insistence of many COR deputies to use 2005
voter lists, which presumably would contain fewer Kurds. A compromise in that version of the
law allowed for a process to review, for one year, complaints about fraudulent registration, thus
easing Sunni and Shiite Arab fears about an excessive Kurdish vote in Kirkuk.
However, this version guaranteed only a small quota of seats for Iraqis living abroad or who are
displaced—and Sunnis believed they would therefore be undercounted because it was mainly
Sunnis who had fled Iraq. On this basis, one of Iraq’s deputy presidents, Tariq al Hashimi, a Sunni
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Arab, vetoed the law. The veto, on November 18, sent the law back to the COR. A new version
was adopted on November 23, but it was viewed as even less favorable to Sunni Arabs than the
first version, because it eliminated any reserved seats for Iraqis in exile. Hashimi again threatened
a veto, which he was required to exercise within 10 days. As that deadline was about to lapse, the
major factions, reportedly at the urging of U.S. and other diplomats, adopted a new law
(December 6, 2009).
Election Parameters
The compromise version was not vetoed by any member of the presidency council, and provided
for the following:
• Expansion of the size of the COR to 325 total seats. Of these, 310 were allocated
by province, with the constituency sizes ranging from Baghdad’s 68 seats to
Muthanna’s seven. The COR size, in the absence of a recent census, was based
on taking 2005 population figures and addiing 2.8% per year growth. 6 (A new
census was scheduled to begin on October 24, 2010, although on October 2,
2010, Prime Minister Maliki postponed the census until at least December 2010.
The move presumably was intended to allow time for a full term government to
be put in place, which would oversee the census. The census has not begun, as of
January 2011.)
• The remaining 15 seats were to be minority reserved seats (8) and “compensatory
seats” (7)—seats allocated from “leftover” votes; votes for parties and slates that
did not meet a minimum threshold to achieve any seats outright.
• No separate electoral constituency for Iraqis in exile, so Iraqis in exile had their
votes counted in the provinces where these voters originated.
• An open list election system.
• An election date set for March 7, 2010.
Flashpoint: Disqualification of Some Prominent Sunnis
The electoral process since the end of 2005 has, to a large extent, been intended to bring Sunni
Arabs ever further into the political structure and to turn them away from violence and
insurgency. Sunnis boycotted the January 2005 parliamentary and provincial elections and were,
as a result, poorly represented in all governing bodies. Sunni slates, consisting mainly of urban,
educated Sunnis, did participate in the December 2005 parliamentary elections. This represented
an apparent calculation that it would not serve Sunni interests to remain permanently alienated
from the political process.
The Sunni commitment to the political process appeared in some jeopardy in the context of a
major dispute over candidate eligibility for the elections. Although a Sunni boycott of the
elections did not materialize, there was a Sunni Arab perception that the election might be unfair
because of this dispute.

6 Analysis of Iraq expert Reidar Visser. “The Hashemi Veto.” http://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/2009/11/18/the-
hashemi-veto/.
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The acute phase of this political crisis began in January 2010 when the Justice and Accountability
Commission (the successor to the “De-Baathification Commission” that worked since the fall of
Saddam to purge former Baathists from government) invalidated the candidacies of 499
individuals (out of 6,500 candidates running), spanning many different slates, including some
candidates of Maliki’s State of Law list. The Justice and Accountability Commission is headed by
Ali al-Lami, a Shiite who had been in U.S. military custody during 2005-2006 for alleged
assistance to Iranian agents active in Iraq. He is perceived as answerable to or heavily influenced
by Ahmad Chalabi, who had headed the De-Baathification Commission. Both are part of the Iraqi
National Alliance slate and both are Shiites, leading many to believe that the disqualifications
represented an attempt to exclude prominent Sunnis from the vote.
The Justice and Accountability Commission argued that the disqualifications were based on law
and careful evaluation of candidate backgrounds and not based on sect, because many of the
candidates disqualified were Shiites. The IHEC reviewed and backed the invalidations on January
14, 2010. Disqualified candidates had three days to file an appeal in court. Apparently due in part
to entreaties from the U.S. Embassy, Vice President Joseph Biden (during a visit to Iraq on
January 22, 2010) and partner embassies in Iraq—all of which fear a return to instability that
could result from the disqualifications—the appeals court at first ruled that disqualified
candidates could run in the election and clear up questions of Baathist affiliation afterwards.
However, reported pressure by Maliki and other Shiites caused the court to reverse itself on
February 12, 2010, and announce that 145 candidates would be ineligible to run. Twenty-six
candidates who had been barred were reinstated. The remaining approximately 300 disqualified
candidates had already accepted their disqualification and been replaced by other candidates on
their respective slates. The slate most affected by the disqualifications is the Iraq National
Movement slate, because two of its leading candidates, National Dialogue Front party leader
Saleh al-Mutlaq and Dhafir al-Ani, both Sunnis, were barred from running. This caused the slate
to suspend its campaign for three days subsequent (February 12-15).
The slate did not, as a whole, call for a broad boycott and Mutlaq himself dropped his own calls
for boycotting the election. Mutlaq was replaced as a candidate by his brother. The slate
campaigned vigorously, and many Sunnis seemed to react by recommitting to a high turnout
among their community, in order to achieve political results through the election process. It did
not boycott even though, on the night before the election, the De-Baathification Commission
disqualified an additional 55 candidates, mostly from the Allawi slate.
The crisis appeared to prompt the February 16, 2010, comments by outgoing General Ray
Odierno, the top U.S. commander in Iraq (who was replaced as of September 1, 2010, by his
deputy, General Lloyd Austin), that Iran was working through Chalabi and al-Lami to undermine
the legitimacy of the elections. General Odierno specifically asserted that Chalabi is in close
contact with a close Iraqi ally of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, who commands the Qods
Force unit of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).7 The Iraqi, whose name is Jamal
al-Ibrahimi, is a member of the COR. Chalabi’s successful efforts to turn the election into a
campaign centered on excluding ex-Baathists—which Sunnis view as a codeword for their sect—
has caused particular alarm among experts.

7 Gertz, Bill. “Inside the Ring.” Washington Times, February 18, 2010.
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Election and Results
About 85 total coalitions were accredited for the March 7, 2010, election. There were about 6,170
total candidates running on all these slates and, as noted, Iraqis were able to vote for individual
candidates as well as overall slates. Aside from that of Maliki, only a few of the coalitions were
perceived as having major support, and those coalitions are depicted in Table 1. All blocs offered
voters gifts and favors at pre-election rallies, and all available press reports indicate that
campaigning was vibrant and vigorous. Total turnout was about 62%, according to the IHEC.
Turnout was slightly lower in Baghdad because of the multiple insurgent bombings that took
place there just as voting was starting.
The final count was announced on March 26, 2010, by the IHEC. As noted in Table 2 below, the
Iraqiyya slate of Iyad al-Allawi won a plurality of seats, winning a narrow two-seat margin over
Maliki’s State of Law slate. The Iraqi constitution (Article 73) mandates that the COR “bloc with
the largest number” of members gets the first opportunity to form a government. On that basis,
Allawi had demanded to be given the first opportunity to put together a majority coalition and
form a government. However, on March 28, 2010, Iraq’s Supreme Court issued a preliminary
ruling that any group that forms after the election could be deemed to meet that requirement,
laying the groundwork for Allawi to be denied the right to the first opportunity to form a
government.
The vote was to have been certified by April 22, 2010, but factional wrangling delayed this
certification. On March 21, 2010, before the count was final, Prime Minister Maliki issued a
statement, referring to his role as armed forces commander-in-chief, demanding the IHEC
respond to requests from various blocs for a manual recount of all votes. The IHEC responded
that any recount decisions are under its purview and that such a comprehensive recount would
take an extended period of time. Several international observers, including U.N. Special
Representative for Iraq Ad Melkert, indicated that there was no cause, at that point, to suggest
widespread fraud.
However, in response to an appeal by Maliki’s faction, on April 19, an Iraqi court ordered a
recount of votes in Baghdad Province. The recount in the province, which has 68 elected seats,
was completed on May 15, 2010, and did not result in an alteration of seat totals. This followed a
few days after the major factions agreed to put aside any disqualifications of winning candidates
by the Justice and Accountability Commission (see above). With the seat count holding, the way
was set for Iraq’s Supreme Court to certify the results, with the subsequent steps to form a
government to follow.
The final certification came on June 1, 2010, and the following timelines were to apply.
• Fifteen days after certification (by June 15), the new COR was to be seated and
to elect a COR speaker and deputy speaker. (The deadline to convene was met,
although, as noted, the COR did not elect a leadership team and did not meet
again until November 11, 2010.)
• After electing a speaker, but with no deadline, the COR is to choose a president
(by a two-thirds vote). (According to Article 138 of the Iraqi constitution, after
this election, Iraq is to have a president and at least one vice president—the
“presidency council” concept was an interim measure that expired at the end of
the first full term government.)
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• Within another 15 days, the largest COR bloc is tapped by the president to form a
government. (The selection of a president occurred on November 11, 2010, and
Maliki was formally tapped to form a cabinet on November 25, 2010.)
• Within another 30 days, (by December 25), the prime minister-designate (Maliki)
is to present a cabinet to the COR for confirmation (by majority vote).
Post-Election Government
In accordance with timelines established in the Constitution, the newly elected COR did convene
on June 15, 2010. However, the session ended after only 18 minutes and, because of the political
deadlock, it did not elect a COR leadership team. Under Article 52 of the Constitution, the “eldest
member” of the COR (Kurdish legislator Fouad Massoum) became acting COR speaker. During
the period when no new government was formed, the COR remained inactive, with most COR
members in their home provinces, but still collecting their $10,000 per month salaries.
Allawi’s chances of successfully forming a government appeared to suffer a substantial setback in
May 2010 when Maliki’s slate and the rival Shiite INA bloc agreed to an alliance called the
“National Alliance.” However, the alliance was not able to agree to a prime minister selectee,
with the Sadr faction and ISCI opposing Maliki. With no agreement, the COR aborted its second
meeting scheduled for July 27, 2010. On August 3, 2010, the disagreements broke up this putative
alliance.
The various factions made little progress through August 2010, as Maliki insisted he remain
prime minister for another term. Some observers believe that bilateral meetings among bloc
leaders would not resolve the impasse and that only a broad meeting of the four major COR
blocs—Maliki’s bloc; the INA, Allawi’s Iraqiyya, and the Kurdistan Alliance—and discussing all
outstanding issues that face Iraq—would result in an agreement on a government. With the
factional disputes unresolved, Maliki remained prime minister in a caretaker role. Some observers
assert that he continued to govern beyond a caretaker mandate and had little incentive to see a
new government formed.
With the end of the U.S. combat mission on August 31, 2010, approaching, the United States
reportedly stepped up its involvement in political talks. Some discussions were held between
Maliki and Allawi’s bloc on a U.S.-proposed formulas under which Allawi, in return for
supporting Maliki, would head a new council that would have broad powers to rival those of the
prime minister. Alternate proposals had Allawi being given the presidency, although the Kurds
refused to cede that post to another community, fearing loss of leverage on other demands. The
Kurds’ insistence was despite the fact that there would not be a “presidency council” with an
executive veto in the next government—the transitional provision for that power expired after the
first four year government ended. No agreement on the U.S.-backed proposals was announced,
even though there was an expectation that the August 10-September 11, 2010, Ramadan period
would give ample time for the blocs to reach an agreement.
On October 1, 2010, Iraq became a country with the distinction of having gone longer than any
other country without an agreed government following an election. Part of the difficulty forming
a government was the close result, and the dramatic implications of gaining or retaining power in
Iraq, where politics is often seen as a “winner take all” proposition. Others blamed Allawi for the
impasse, claiming that he was insisting on a large, powerful role for himself even though he could
not assemble enough COR votes to achieve a majority there.
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Political Resolution
On October 1, 2010, Maliki, possibly due to Iranian intervention, received the backing of most of
the 40 COR deputies of Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, bringing Maliki within striking distance of
obtaining the necessary votes to obtain another term as prime minister. The United States
reportedly was alarmed at the prospect that Maliki might be able to form a government primarily
on the strength of Sadr’s backing, but, in early November 2010, the United States, Allawi, and
many of the Sunni Arab regional states acquiesced to a second Maliki term. The key question that
remained was whether Maliki, and Iraq’s Kurds—who held the swing vote that could determine
the next government—would agree to form a broad based government that meets the demands of
Iraqiyya for substantial Sunni Arab inclusion. Illustrating the degree to which the Kurds
reclaimed their former role of “kingmakers,” Maliki, Allawi, and other Iraqi leaders met in the
capital of the Kurdistan Regional Government-administered region in Irbil on November 8, 2010,
to continue to negotiate on a new government. (Sadr did not attend the meeting in Irbil, but Iraq
National Alliance leader Ammar Al Hakim did.)
On November 10, 2010, with reported direct intervention by President Obama by phone, Allawi
agreed to direct his bloc to support another Maliki term, to support another term for Kurdish
leader Jalal Talabani as president, and to join the government. In exchange, according to several
press accounts, an Iraqiyya figure would become COR Speaker, another (perhaps Allawi himself)
would chair the enhanced oversight body discussed above, though renamed the “National Council
for Strategic Policies,”8 and a member of the bloc would be named foreign minister. Some
observers praised the agreement as helpful to U.S. policy because an agreement was signed
among major factions, in Baghdad, with Masoud Barzani and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq James
Jeffries attending. The agreement did not specify concessions to the Sadr faction, which observers
viewed as setting back Iran’s policy of supporting Shiite militant factions.
The November 11, 2010, COR session that would implement the agreement was held, and
Iraqiyya figure Usama al-Nujaifi was elected COR speaker, as agreed. However, Allawi and most
of his bloc walked out after three hours over the refusal of the other blocs to readmit the three
members of the Iraqiyya bloc that had been disqualified from running for the COR by the
“Accountability and Justice Commission” (see above on the disqualification crisis). The walkout
raised U.S. and other fears that the agreement might immediately unravel, but the remaining COR
members were sufficient for a quorum and Talabani was re-elected president after two rounds of
voting. Fears were calmed on November 13, 2010, when most of Allawi’s bloc attended the COR
session and continued to implement the settlement agreement; Allawi himself did not attend. On
November 25, 2010, Talabani formally tapped Maliki as the prime minister-designate, giving him
30 days (until December 25) to name and achieve majority COR confirmation for a new cabinet.
New Government Takes Shape9
The stage was set for a new cabinet to be announced after December 19, when Allawi reaffirmed
his intent to join the government. Allawi’s assurance came the same day that the COR voted (with
barely a quorum achieved after a Shiite walkout of the vote) to reinstate to politics the three
senior members of his bloc, including Saleh al-Mutlaq, who had been barred from the March

8 Fadel, Leila and Karen DeYoung. “Iraqi Leaders Crack Political Deadlock.” Washington Post, November 11, 2010.
9 The following information is taken from Iraqi news accounts presented in: http://www.opensource.gov
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2010 election by the Justice and Accountability Commission prior to the March election. (Mutlaq
was subsequently named one of the three deputy prime ministers.) On December 21, 2010, in
advance of the December 25, 2010, deadline, Maliki presented a cabinet to the COR (42 seats,
including the posts of prime minister, three deputy prime ministers, and 38 ministries and
ministers of state) receiving broad approval. However, no permanent appointments were named
for seven ministries—including the three main security ministries: Defense, Interior, and National
Security (intelligence). Still, the government formed was inclusive of all major factions. Among
major outcomes:
• As for the State of Law list, Maliki remained prime minister, and retained the
Defense, Interior, and National Security minister of state posts pending
permanent nominees for those positions. Another member of the list (Dawa
Party), Khudair Al Khuzai, became first deputy president. In addition, the faction
holds seven cabinet posts: Hussein Shahristani, previously the oil minister and a
member of State of Law, was elevated to a deputy prime ministership, with a
focus on the energy sector. Another member of State of Law, Adnan al-Assadi, is
reportedly likely to become interior minister.
• For Iraqiyya, in addition to Mutlaq becoming a deputy prime minister, Tariq al-
Hashimi reportedly remains a deputy presidents (the second deputy).10 The bloc
also obtained 10 ministerial posts. A senior Iraqiyya figure, Rafi al-Issawi
(previously a deputy prime minister), was appointed Finance Minister. Iraqi
figures say that Iraqiyya, possibly former Interior Minister Falah al-Naqib, might
also eventually get the defense minister post.
• For the Iraqi National Alliance, a senior figure, Adel Abdul Mahdi, purportedly
remains one of the three deputy presidents. It also obtained 12 cabinet positions,
parceled out among its various factions. Another, technocrat Abd al Karim
Luaibi, was appointed oil minister. A member of the INA coalition’s Fadila party
faction, Bushra Saleh, became a minister of state without portfolio and is the only
woman in the cabinet. Another Fadila activist was named minister of justice.
• The Sadr faction of the INA was given eight ministries, including: Housing,
Labor and Social Affairs, Ministry of Planning (acting, same as labor minister),
and Tourism and Antiquities. A Sadrist also is one of two deputy COR speakers.
However, these positions are relatively junior within the cabinet and appeared to
represent less influence for the Sadrists than was anticipated when Sadr threw his
backing to Maliki in October. Still, the Sadr faction receive some compensatory
influence in support for one of its members becoming governor of Maysan
Province. Although the Sadr faction may not have emerged as prominent in the
cabinet as was expected, the faction was energized on January 5, 2011, by the
brief return to Iraq, from his studies in Iran, of Moqtada Al Sadr. Some of his
post-return comments and implications of his return are discussed below.
• The Kurdistan Alliance received major posts. Talabani stays as president; and the
third deputy prime minister is Kurdish figure (PUK faction) Rows Shaways, who
has served in various central and KRG positions since the fall of Saddam.
Kurdish (KDP) stalwart Hoshyar Zebari, who has been foreign minister since the

10 Some sources say that Hashimi and another figure, Adel Abdul Mahdi, may not have received permanent
appointments to these second and third deputy presidential posts.
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transition governments that followed the fall of Saddam, remains in position.
However, there is also a minister of state for foreign affairs. Iraqiyya had been
promised the Foreign Ministry in the November 10 agreement but Iraqiyya
agreed to cede that post. A Kurd, Arif Tayfour is second deputy COR speaker.
• An element of continued uncertainty is that the “National Council for Strategic
Policies” concept has not specifically been voted on by the COR. Current
proposals call for the council to include the prime minister, president, their
deputies, and a representative of all major blocs—and for decisions of the council
to be binding on Maliki if they achieve support of 80% of the council members.
However, because it is unclear that these powers will be accorded the council, it
is not certain whether Allawi himself will accept heading the body.

Continuing Political Schisms
Ambassador to Iraq Jim Jeffries testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
February 1, 2011, painting the new government as a success for U.S. foreign policy because it is
inclusive and “focused on power sharing.” However, continuing schisms exist among the various
factions, and all of Iraq’s ethnic communities and sects remain suspicious of the others’ longer
term intentions.
Sunni Community
The disqualification crisis—and the denial to Allawi of the ability to try to form a government
after his bloc won the most seats—leaves unanswered questions about the long term willingness
of Sunni Arabs to work within the political process. Separate from the government formation
process, Sunni Arabs have resented the slow pace with which the Maliki government has
implemented its pledge to fully integrate the “Sons of Iraq” fighters into the Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF). At the peak, there were about 100,000 (80% are Sunni Arab) of these fighters nationwide
cooperated with U.S. forces against Al Qaeda in Iraq and other militants. As of January 2011,
about half of them (about 50,000) have been integrated into the ISF or given the civilian
government jobs they were promised. There have been reports that some Sons of Iraq have been
dropped from payrolls, harassed, arrested, or sidelined—indications that the Maliki government
might want to strangle the program. However, Ambassador Jeffries testified on February 1, 2011,
that no payments difficulties exist at this time.
KRG-Central Government Disputes
The COR elections, by themselves, were not expected to heal KRG-central government disputes.
KRG President Masoud Barzani visited Washington, DC, in January 2010 and, according to
participants in his meetings, discussed with senior officials ways in which the Kurds would
cooperate with Iraq’s Arabs after the election. That was widely interpreted as an Administration
admonition not to establish territorial-related preconditions to join a governing coalition after the
elections. However, KRG Prime Minister Barham Salih said on June 15, 2010, that Kurdish
leaders sought guarantees from Iraq’s Arab leaders that, as a condition of providing Kurdish votes
for any new governing coalition, 19 specific demands (retaining the presidency for one of their
own was one such demand) would be addressed. Although receiving from Maliki only vague
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assurances on their key demands, the main Kurdish factions eventually threw their weight behind
Maliki to continue as prime minister, as discussed below.
KRG-central government differences had been aggravated by the 2009 provincial elections
because Sunni Arabs wrested control of the Nineveh (Mosul) provincial council from the Kurds,
who won control of that council in the 2005 election because of the broad Sunni Arab boycott of
that election. A Sunni list (al-Hadba’a) won a clear plurality of the Nineveh vote and subsequently
took control of the provincial administration there. Al-Hadba’a is composed of hardline Sunni
Arabs who openly oppose Kurdish encroachment in the province and who are committed to the
“Arab and Islamic identity” of the province. A member of the faction, Atheel al-Nufaiji, is the
governor (brother of 2010-2014 COR speaker Usama al-Nujaifi), and the Kurds have prevented
his visitation of areas of Nineveh where the Kurds’ peshmerga militia operates.
In part to prevent outright violence, then top U.S. commander in Iraq General Odierno, in August
2009, developed a plan to partner U.S. forces with peshmerga units (a development without
precedent) and with ISF units in the province to build confidence between the two forces and
reassure Kurdish, Arab, Turkomen, and other residents of the province. Implementation of this
“combined security mechanism” (CSM) began in January 2010 and U.S. officials said on August
16, 2010, that the joint (ISF-U.S-Kurdish) patrols, maintenance of checkpoints and training would
continue until the U.S. pullout at the end of 2011. Fifteen joint checkpoints were established, but,
as of October 2010, the United States had ceased participating at four of them, in concert with the
U.S. change of mission to a non-combat role (Operation New Dawn) on September 1, 2010. As
noted by Ambassador Jeffries and top U.S. commander in Iraq Gen. Lloyd Austin on February 1,
2011, it is possible that a United Nations force, or even NATO, might take over this mediating
and confidence-building role thereafter, although it is not clear that this idea is supported by the
Iraqi factions involved. There is also speculation that some U.S. forces might be asked to remain
after 2011 to continue the CSM.
Another issue remains over the ability of the Kurds to export oil that is discovered and extracted
in the KRG region. Oil exports from the KRG have been suspended since late 2009 over central
government opposition to proposed mechanisms for paying the international investors who are
performing the extraction and exportation. However, Amb. Jeffries testified on February 1, 2011,
that, as a consequence of the formation of a government and greater factional harmony, a
compromise has been reached that will allow the KRG energy exports to resume.
Additional friction was created in the context of the KRG’s parliamentary and presidential
elections on July 25, 2009. The KRG leadership had been planning, during that vote, to conduct a
referendum on a separate KRG constitution. However, the central government asserted that a
KRG constitution would conflict with the publicly adopted national constitution, and that the
KRG draft constitution, adopted by the Kurdish parliament on June 23, 2009, claimed Kurdish
control over disputed territories and oil resources. The KRG did not hold the referendum.
Intra-Kurdish Divisions
Further complicating the political landscape are widening divisions within the Kurdish
community. The KRG elections also, to some extent, shuffled the political landscape. A
breakaway faction of President Talabani’s PUK, called “Change” (“Gorran”), won an
unexpectedly high 25 seats (out of 111) in the Kurdistan national assembly, embarrassing the
PUK and weakening it relative to the KDP. KRG President Masoud Barzani, leader of the KDP,
easily won reelection against weak opposition. Gorran ran its own list in the March 2010
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elections and constituted a significant challenge to the Kurdistan Alliance in Sulaymaniyah
Province, according to election results. As a result, of the 57 COR seats held by Kurds, 14 are
held by parties other than the Kurdistan Alliance. Gorran has 8, the Kurdistan Islamic Union has
4, and the Islamic Group of Kurdistan has 2.
The Sadr Faction and Its Position
As noted above, Sadr was part of the anti-Maliki Shiite coalition (Iraqi National Alliance) for the
March 2010 national elections. On October 17, 2009, the Sadr movement held a “primary”
election to determine who would fill the 329 total candidate slots that will be fielded by the Sadr
movement in the elections (as part of the broader Iraqi National Alliance bloc discussed above).
About 800 total candidates competed for the slots.
After the election, the Sadr faction was extensively involved in bargaining over composition of
the government and, for the first six months after the election, took the stance that Maliki should
be replaced by another Shiite. However, the shift by the faction in late September 2010, including
public outreach to its followers in Iraq as to what would be the implications of supporting
Maliki’s re-selection, was decisive in Maliki’s success in achieving another term as prime
minister. In return, as discussed above, Sadrists now hold several seats in the cabinet Maliki
presented on December 21, 2010 and a Sadrist governor is being installed as a new governor for
Maysan Province, which includes the Sadrist stronghold of Amarah.
The faction was energized when its leader, Moqtada Al Sadr himself, returned to Iraq on January
5, 2011. Upon his return, he gave a speech calling for a full implementation of a planned U.S.
withdrawal by the end of 2011, and issued statements opposing the awarding of Iraqi energy
contracts to American firms. However, he reportedly returned to Iran on January 22, 2011.11
At the same time, there are reports that the Sadrist and offshoot Shiite militias—for now still
disarmed—may be planning to reactivate. If these reports are accurate, they could suggest that the
Shiite militias sense a power vacuum in top leadership and see militia activity as a means to
ensure political influence. In addition, the Sadr faction is said to be using its fundraising ability to
develop charity and employment networks that rival or displace those of the central
government—employing a political model similar to that of Hizballah in Lebanon.12 Some reports
suggest that Sadr’s return to Iran in January 2011, after only a brief return to Iraq, was caused by
pressure exerted on his political associates by a breakaway militia Asa’ib Al Haq (League of the
Righteous).



11 “Iraq Shia Cleric Moqtada Sadr ‘Returns to Iran.” BBC News, January 22, 2011.
12 Healy, Jack. “Cleric’s Anti-U.S. Forces Poised for Gains in Iraq.” New York Times, December 20, 2010.
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Related Governance and Regional Issues, and
Implications for U.S. Policy

U.S. officials, as testified by Ambassador Jeffries on February 1, 2011, see signs that the factional
comity evidenced in the new government will enable the COR to move quickly on long stalled
initiatives. In terms of immediate Iraqi legislative business, the COR is needed to pass the
calendar year 2011 budget. A draft $67 billion budget was submitted to the COR on December 18
and is reportedly under consideration now that the cabinet and COR are both seated. Ambassador
Jeffries points to other signs of progress including resolving the dispute over the de-
Baathification issue and potentially overcoming the roadblocks that have prevented passage of
national hydrocarbon laws, which are needed to encourage foreign investment in Iraq’s relatively
undeveloped energy sector.
On the other hand, some note that efforts to rein in official corruption are failing because no
comprehensive anti-corruption law has been passed. Also not passed are laws on the environment,
those governing other elections, consumer protections, intellectual property rights, building
codes, and a new national flag. Moreover, many Iraqis blamed the long political deadlock, in part,
for the government’s inability to alleviate severe shortages of electricity during Iraq’s
characteristically hot summer. Iraqis who cannot afford their own generators, or to share a
generator with a few other homes, can count on only two hours of power per day. It was in part
the government’s inability to provide basic services, including clean water and sewage services,
that caused small protests in several provinces on February 6, 2011. Some believe the protest
were inspired by the uprising against President Mubarak in Egypt, and the earlier ousting of
Tunisia’s leadership. Possibly seeking to head off any spread of the Middle East unrest into
Iraq—even though Iraq’s leadership is democratically elected—in early February 2011 Maliki
announced a voluntary cut in his salary (from about $350,000 per year to about half that) and
indicated he would not seek a third term when his current term expires in 2014.
Many factions continue to remain wary of Prime Minister Maliki’s long-term intentions. His
indications that he will not seek a third term are likely to reassure some Iraqi leaders who fear that
he might try to stay in office indefinitely and build a regime resembling the authoritarian
structures of Saddam Hussein. However, some Iraqis are likely to view as reinforcing their
suspicions a request by his government that Iraq’s Supreme Court rule that several independent
commissions—including the Independent Higher Election Commission and the anti-corruption
commission—be supervised by the cabinet. The Court ruled in Maliki’s favor on January 23,
2011, although the Court also said in its ruling that the institutions must remain free of political
interference.13
General Human Rights Issues
U.S. and international officials say they expect the 2010-2014 government to make further
progress establishing rule of law and adherence to international standards of human rights. The
State Department’s report on human rights for 2009 released March 11, 2010, repeated the
previous year’s characterizations of Iraq’s human rights record as follows: “Insurgent and
extremist violence, coupled with weak government performance in upholding the rule of law,

13 Ned Parker and Salar Jaff. “Electoral Ruling Riles Maliki’s Rivals.” Los Angeles Times, January 23, 2011.
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resulted in widespread and severe human rights abuses.”14 The State Department report cites a
wide range of human rights problems committed by Iraqi government security and law
enforcement personnel, including: arbitrary or unlawful killings; torture and other cruel
punishments; poor conditions in prison facilities; denial of fair public trials; arbitrary arrest;
arbitrary interference with privacy and home; limits on freedoms of speech, assembly and
association due to sectarianism and extremist threats; lack of protection of stateless persons;
widescale governmental corruption; human trafficking; and limited exercise of labor rights. Many
of these difficulties are likely to be cited in the State Department report for 2010, due out in
February 2011.
Media and Free Expression
While State Department and other reports attribute most of Iraq’s human rights difficulties to the
security situation and factional infighting, apparent curbs on free expression appear independent
of such factors. The State Department human rights report for 2009 noted numerous laws that
restrict press freedoms, and instances in which officials have beaten or intimidated journalists
who try to do their work. In some past cases, Maliki has sued publications that have written
articles alleging corruption or nepotism on his part.
Labor Rights
A 1987 (Saddam era) labor code remains in effect. It virtually rules out independent union
activity. Unions have no legal power to negotiate with employers or protect workers’ rights
through collective bargaining. However, some of the February 2011 street demonstrations
protesting lack of services, although still relatively small, could spark demands for more worker
rights.
Situation of the Christian Religious Minority
In regards to human rights, a major concern is the safety and security of Iraq’s Christian
population, which is concentrated in northern Iraq as well as in Baghdad. Attacks on members of
the community appear to occur in spates. In the run-up to the January 2009 provincial elections,
about 1,000 Christian families reportedly fled the province in October 2008, although Iraqi
officials report that most families returned by December 2008. The issue faded in 2009 but then
resurfaced late in that year when about 10,000 Christians in northern Iraq, fearing bombings and
intimidation, fled the areas near Kirkuk during October-December 2009. On October 31, 2010, a
major attack on Christians occurred when a church in Baghdad was besieged by militants and as
many as 60 worshippers were killed. The siege shook the faith of the Christian community in
their security. Several other attacks appearing to target Iraqi Christians have taken place since.
Partly as a result, Christian celebrations of Christmas 2010 were said to be subdued—following
three years in which Christians had felt confident enough to celebrate that holiday more openly.
Some Iraqi Christians blame all the various attacks on them on Al Qaeda in Iraq, which is still
somewhat strong in Nineveh Province and which associates Christians with the United States.
The U.N. Assistance Mission—Iraq (UNAMI) coordinated humanitarian assistance to the

14 Report is at: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136069.htm

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Christians and others displaced. Previously, some human rights groups alleged Kurdish abuses
against Christians and other minorities in the Nineveh Plain, close to the KRG-controlled region.
Kurdish leaders deny the allegations. The FY2008 consolidated appropriation earmarked $10
million in ESF from previous appropriations to assist the Nineveh Plain Christians. A
supplemental appropriation for 2008 and 2009 (P.L. 110-252) earmarked another $10 million for
this purpose. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-117) made a similar
provision for FY2010.
Before the 2010-2011 rounds of violence against Christians, about 400,000 Christians had left
Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein—a large proportion of the approximately 1 million
Christian population that was there during Saddam’s time. Christian priests have been kidnapped
and killed; the body of Chaldean Catholic archbishop Faraj Rahho was discovered in Mosul on
March 13, 2008, two weeks after his reported kidnapping. An attack on the Yazidis in August
2007, which killed about 500 persons, appeared to reflect the precarious situation for Iraqi
minorities. Even at the height of the U.S. military presence in Iraq, U.S. forces did not
specifically protect Christian sites at all times, partly because Christian leaders do not want to
appear closely allied with the United States.
Regional Dimension
For Iraq’s neighbors as well as for the United States, the stakes in the outcome of the political
process in Iraq have been high. First and foremost, according to most experts, the United States
sought to prevent the emergence of a governing coalition that left Sunni Arabs disillusioned, and
which bolstered the influence of pro-Iranian factions that do or could again wield arms for
political purposes. The key U.S. objectives appear to have been met, in large part because of the
inclusion of senior Iraqiyya figures in high positions and the lower-than-expected profile of
Sadrists in the new cabinet.
However, the sense of ethno-sectarian reconciliation produced by the government that has been
formed could be subject to reversal over the longer term. Iran reportedly was a key broker of the
decision by the Sadrists to support Maliki, raising the potential for Iran to continue to support
Sadrist interests and influence over time. In addition, Iran’s influence was increased by Sadr’s
return to Iraq on January 5, 2011, as noted above, although any benefits were attenuated by the
relative brevity of Sadr’s return (he reportedly went back to Iran by January 20).
The United States also appeared to benefit from the formation of a government that seems able to
integrate with all of Iraq’s neighbors, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Turkey. However, the
degree of acceptance for the new government might depend on how much influence the new
National Council for Strategic Policies has as a counterweight to the power of the prime minister.
Allawi had been favored for prime minister by the Sunni-dominated regional neighbors such as
Saudi Arabia and even by Syria, which is mostly Sunni but allied with Iran. Syria hosted
numerous meetings among faction leaders, although no agreement was reached among them
under Syrian sponsorship.
As a possible indication of greater acceptance of the Iraqi government by Sunni regional states,
Kuwait’s prime minister visited Iraq on January 12, 2011. That was about one month after the
U.N. Security Council on December 15, 2010, passed three resolutions (1956, 1957, and 1958)
that had the net effect of lifting most Saddam-era sanctions on Iraq. On the other hand, Saudi
Arabia has not, to date, opened its embassy in Baghdad, a move the United States has long urged.
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Implications for the Wind Down of the U.S. Military Mission
The U.S. interest in a stable Iraq appears to have been served by the formation of the new Iraqi
government. The long political vacuum, coupled with the drawdown of U.S. forces to 50,000 and
the formal end of the U.S. combat mission on August 31, 2010, was perceived as contributing to
major high profile attacks and a sense of uncertainty and disillusionment on the part of the Iraqi
public. Although overall levels of violence are 90% lower than they were at the height of the
sectarian conflict of 2006-2007, there were several significant politically motivated assassinations
and other violence in the months before the government was formed. For example, a suicide
bombing at an Iraqi Army recruiting station in Baghdad in August 2010 killed nearly 60 Iraqis;
the Islamic State of Iraq, an umbrella group that includes Al Qaeda in Iraq, claimed responsibility.
A wave of approximately 15 bombings across Baghdad on the night of November 2, 2010, killed
at least 60 Iraqis and shook confidence in the ability of the government to protect the population.
A series of major bombings, causing numerous casualties, took place in Tikrit, Diyala province,
Karbala, and other places in January 2011. Motives and suspects of most of the continuing
violence include not only Al Qaeda in Iraq but also Shiite militia forces seeking to assassinate any
Sunnis who have political power.
Although it did not delay the ending of the U.S. combat mission, the continuing violence has
caused some experts to question whether stability will continue after all U.S. forces are to depart
at the end of 2011. That is the date set by the 2009 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement for the complete
withdrawal of U.S. forces, although that agreement could be amended. Some believe that the
reduction in U.S. leverage and influence in Iraq already under way will allow rifts among major
ethnic and sectarian communities to widen to the point where Iraq could still become a “failed
state” after 2011, unless some U.S. troops remain after that time. Retaining U.S. troops in Iraq
beyond 2011 would require the re-negotiation of the U.S.-Iraq “Security Agreement,” which
entered into force on January 1, 2009. However, the prolonged delay in the formation of a
government meant that there has been no counterpart Iraqi team in place to begin such
negotiations. On the other hand, the government has been formed with enough time to renegotiate
amendments to the Security Agreement before its expiry at the end of 2011, if a mutual decision
is reached that substantial numbers of U.S. forces are requested after 2011. It is possible that there
will be a decision not to retain large numbers of U.S. forces, but only to establish a large (1,000
person) military liaison office (Office of Military Cooperation) engaged mostly in training and
assisting Iraq in the use of U.S. arms sold to Iraq, such as combat aircraft. That office would be
under the authority of the U.S. Ambassador. It is not clear whether such an arrangement would
require formal amendment of the security agreement.
As to the politics of any extension of the U.S. presence, Sadr, as noted, is pushing for a complete
U.S. withdrawal by the end of 2011, with no extensions of the Security Agreement or other
arrangements for a continued U.S. military presence in Iraq. Vice President Biden visited Iraq on
January 14, 2011, in part to highlight the successful formation of a government, and said the
United States remains committed to the full withdrawal by the end of 2011.
As U.S. forces draw down, the State Department will transition to the lead U.S. agency in Iraq,
with all attendant responsibilities. There is a vibrant U.S. debate over whether the State
Department, using security contractors, will be able to fully secure its personnel in Iraq if all U.S.
forces were to depart. A staff report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, released January
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31, 2011, expresses substantial skepticism.15 Some believe that there will need to be a substantial
DOD presence in Iraq after 2011, if only to protect U.S. personnel in Iraq. However, the
testimony of Ambassador Jeffries and Gen. Austin before that same Committee on February 1,
2011, expressed substantial confidence that State can handle the assumption of the mission.
No matter the outcome of that debate, State Department officers will continue to promote Iraqi
political reconciliation and peaceful dispute resolution, as well as economic ties, cultural ties,
educational ties, and broader relations under the Strategic Framework Agreement. Table 3
provides information on U.S. assistance to promote Iraqi democracy and peaceful political
competition and consensus building. If Iraq’s major factions have permanently shifted away from
supporting violence and toward peaceful political competition, some might argue that U.S.
funding has contributed to that transition. Others might argue that the change was caused by
numerous factors, such as the improvement of security and rejection of foreign terrorist influence,
and that it is virtually impossible to assess the contribution made by U.S. assistance.

15 Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “Iraq: The Transition From a Military Mission to A Civilian-Led Effort.” S.Prt.
112-3. January 31, 2011.
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Table 2. March 2010 COR Election: Final, Certified Results by Province
Elected Seats in
Province
COR
Results
Baghdad
68
Maliki: 26 seats; Iraqiyya: 24 seats; INA: 17 seats; minority
reserved: 2 seats
Nineveh (Mosul)
31
Iraqiiya: 20; Kurdistan Alliance: 8; INA: 1; Accordance: 1; Unity
(Bolani): 1; minority reserved: 3
Qadisiyah
11
Maliki: 4; INA: 5; Iraqiyya: 2
Muthanna
7
Maliki: 4; INA: 3
Dohuk
10
Kurdistan Alliance: 9; other Kurdish lists: 1; minority reserved:
1
Basra
24
Maliki: 14 ; INA: 7; Iraqiyya: 3
Anbar
14
Iraqiyya: 11; Unity (Bolani): 1; Accordance: 2
Karbala
10
Maliki: 6; INA: 3; Iraqiyya: 1
Wasit
11
Maliki: 5; INA: 4; Iraqiyya: 2
Dhi Qar
18
Maliki: 8; INA: 9; Iraqiyya: 1
Sulaymaniyah
17
Kurdistan Alliance: 8; other Kurds: 9
Kirkuk (Tamim)
12
Iraqiyya: 6; Kurdistan Alliance: 6
Babil
16
Maliki: 8; INA: 5; Iraqiyya: 3
Irbil
14
Kurdistan Alliance: 10; other Kurds: 4
Najaf
12
Maliki: 7; INA: 5
Diyala
13
Iraqiyya: 8; INA: 3; Maliki: 1; Kurdistan Alliance: 1
Salahuddin
12
Iraqiyya: 8; Unity (Bolani): 2; Accordance: 2
Maysan
10
Maliki: 4; INA: 6
Total Seats
325
Iraqiyya: 89 + 2 compensatory = 91
(310 elected + 8
Maliki: 87 + 2 compensatory = 89
minority reserved + 7
compensatory)
INA: 68 + 2 compensatory = 70 (of which about 40 are Sadrist)
Kurdistan Alliance: 42 +1 compensatory = 43
Unity (Bolani): 4
Accordance: 6
other Kurdish: 14
minority reserved: 8
Source: Iraqi Higher Election Commission, March 26, 2010.
Notes: Seat totals are approximate and their exact al ocation may be subject to varying interpretations of Iraqi
law. Total seat numbers include likely al ocations of compensatory seats. Total seats do not add to 325 total
seats in the COR due to some uncertainties in allocations.

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Other Elections Possible
There had been speculation that the March COR elections would be held concurrently with a
referendum on the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. The referendum was to be held by July 31,
2009, but the United States, which views the referendum as unnecessary, supported a delay. In
mid-October 2009, Iraqi parliamentarians quietly shelved the referendum vote by failing to act on
legislation to hold the referendum and focusing instead on the broader election law needed for the
National Assembly elections.16
District and sub-district elections were previously slated for July 31, 2009, as well. However,
those are delayed, and the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon said in a report on
U.N. operations in Iraq, released August 3, 2009, that these elections would likely be held later in
2010, after the National Assembly elections. No date for these elections has been announced,
suggesting a delay beyond 2010.
Several other possible elections in Iraq are as yet unscheduled. If there is a settlement between the
KRG and Baghdad over Kirkuk and other territories, there could be a referendum to ratify any
settlement that is reached. Under Article 140 of the Constitution, a referendum was to be held by
December 31, 2007, but the Kurds have agreed to repeated delays in order to avoid jeopardizing
overall progress in Iraq. Because the three Kurdish-controlled provinces and the disputed
province of Kirkuk did not hold provincial elections with the rest of Iraq on January 31, 2009,
elections are required in those provinces at some point, presumably subsequent to a settlement of
the Kirkuk dispute. Absent such a settlement, observers believe these elections might be held in
the fall of 2010. (For more information on Kurd-Baghdad disputes, see CRS Report RS22079,
The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq, by Kenneth Katzman.)
There could also be a vote on amendments to Iraq’s 2005 constitution if and when the major
factions agree to finalize the recommendations of the constitutional review commission (CRC).
There have been no recent major developments reported that would indicate if and when such a
referendum might be ready.

Table 3. Recent Democracy Assistance to Iraq
(in millions of current US$)

FY2009
FY2010 (est.)
FY2011 (req.)
Rule of Law and Human
46.55 73.50 22.50
Rights
Good Governance
143.64
117.00
90.33
Political
41.00 50.50 30.00
Competition/Consensus-
Building
National Endowment for
3.59 0
0
Democracy

16 Sly, Liz. “Iraqi Push Fades For Referendum on U.S. Troop Pullout.” Los Angeles Times, October 16, 2009.
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Totals 322.31 326.50 175.33
USAID Foreign Assistance Database, July 26, 2010.

Table 4. January 31, 2009, Provincial Election Results (Major Slates)
Baghdad—55 regular seats, plus one
State of Law (Maliki)—38% (28 seats); Independent Liberals Trend (pro-Sadr)—9%
Sabean and one Christian set-aside
(5 seats); Accord Front (Sunni mainstream)—9% (9 seats); Iraq National (Al awi)—
seat
8.6%; Shahid Mihrab and Independent Forces (ISCI)—5.4% (3 seats) ; National
Reform list (of former P.M. Ibrahim al-Jafari)—4.3% (3 seats)
Basra—34 regular seats, plus one
State of Law—37% (20); ISCI—11.6% (5); Sadr—5% (2); Fadhila (previously
Christian seat
dominant in Basra)—3.2% (0); Allawi—3.2% (0); Jafari list—2.5% (0). New Governor
: Shiltagh Abbud (Maliki list); Council chair: Jabbar Amin (Maliki list)
Nineveh—34 regular seats, plus one
Hadbaa—48.4%; Fraternal Nineveh—25.5%; IIP—6.7%; Hadbaa has taken control of
set aside for Shabaks, Yazidis, and
provincial council and administration, excluding the Kurds. Governor is Atheel al-
Christians
Nujaifi of Hadbaa.
Najaf—28 seats
State of Law—16.2% (7); ISCI—14.8% (7); Sadr—12.2% (6); Jafari—7% (2); Al awi—
1.8% (0); Fadhila—1.6% (0). Council chairman: Maliki list
Babil—30 seats
State of Law—12.5% (8); ISCI—8.2% (5); Sadr—6.2% (3); Jafari—4.4% (3); Al awi—
3.4%; Accord Front—2.3% (3); Fadhila—1.3%. New Council chair: Kadim Majid
Tuman (Sadrist)
Diyala—29 seats
Accord Front list—21.1%; Kurdistan Alliance—17.2%; Allawi—9.5%; State of Law—
6 %. New council leans heavily Accord, but allied with Kurds and ISCI.
Muthanna—26 seats
State of Law—10.9% (5); ISCI—9.3% (5); Jafari—6.3% (3); Sadr—5.5% (2); Fadhila—
3.7%.
Anbar—29 seats
Iraq Awakening (Sahawa-Sunni tribals)—18%; National Iraqi Project Gathering
(established Sunni parties, excluding IIP)—17.6%; Al awi—6.6%; Tribes of Iraq—
4.5%.
Maysan—27 seats
State of Law—17.7% (8); ISCI—14.6% (8); Sadr—7; Jafari—8.7% (4); Fadhila—3.2%;
Allawi—2.3%. New Governor: Mohammad al-Sudani (Maliki); Council chair:
Hezbollah Iraq
Dhi Qar—31 seats
State of Law—23.1% (13); pro-Sadr—14.1% (7); ISCI—11.1% (5); Jafari—7.6% (4);
Fadhila—6.1%; Allawi—2.8%. New governor—Maliki list; Council chair: Sadrist
Karbala—27 seats
List of Maj. Gen. Yusuf al-Habbubi (Saddam-era local official)—13.3% (1 seat); State
of Law—8.5% (9); Sadr—6.8% (4); ISCI—6.4% (4); Jafari—2.5% ; Fadhila—2.5%.
Salah Ad Din—28 seats
IIP-led list—14.5%; Al awi—13.9%; Sunni list without IIP—8.7%; State of Law—3.5%;
ISCI—2.9%. New council leans Accord/IIP
Qadissiyah—28 seats
State of Law—23.1% (11); ISCI—11.7% (5); Jafari—8.2% (3); Al awi—8%; Sadr—
6.7% (2); Fadhila—4.1%. New governor: Salim Husayn (Maliki list)
Wasit—28 seats
State of Law—15.3% (13); ISCI—10% (6); Sadr—6% (3); Al awi—4.6%; Fadhila—
2.7%. New governor: Shi te independent; Council chair: ISCI
Source: UNAMI translation of results issued February 2, 2009, by the Independent Higher Election Commission
of Iraq; Vissar, Reidar. The Provincial Elections: The Seat Allocation Is Official and the Coalition-Forming Process
Begins. February 19, 2009.

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Table 5. Election Results (January and December 2005)
Seats
Seats
Bloc/Party
(Jan. 05)
(Dec. 05)
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA, Shiite Islamist). 85 seats after departure of Fadilah (15 seats)
and Sadr faction (28 seats) in 2007. Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq of Abd al-Aziz al-
Hakim has 30; Da’wa Party (25 total: Maliki faction, 12, and Anizi faction, 13);
140 128
independents (30).
Kurdistan Alliance—KDP (24); PUK (22); independents (7)
75
53
Iraqis List (secular, Al awi); added Communist and other mostly Sunni parties for Dec.
40 25
vote.
Iraq Accord Front. Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote. Consists of Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP,
— 44
Tariq al-Hashimi, 26 seats); National Dialogue Council of Khalaf Ulayyan (7); General
People’s Congress of Adnan al-Dulaymi (7); independents (4).
National Iraqi Dialogue Front (Sunni, led by former Baathist Saleh al-Mutlak) Not in Jan.
— 11
2005 vote.
Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd) (votes with Kurdistan Alliance)
2
5
Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote

0
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Al awi list in Dec. vote
5

Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)
3
1
National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Message, Dec) pro-Sadr
3
2
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote
2

Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)
2
0
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)
1

Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)
1
1
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Umar al-Jabburi, Sunni, secular)
1
3
Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)
0
1
Yazidi list (smal Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)

1
Notes: Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200; Eligible voters: 14 million in January election;
15 million in October referendum and December; Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66% (10
million)/December: 75% (12 million).
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Table 6. Assessments of the Benchmarks
July 12,
Subsequent Actions and Assessments—May 2008 Administration report,
2007,
June 2008 GAO report, International Compact with Iraq Review in June
Admin.
GAO
Sept. 14, 2007
2008, and U.S. Embassy Weekly Status Reports
Benchmark
Report
(Sept. 07)
Admin. Report
(and various press sources)
1. Forming Constitutional Review Committee
(S)
unmet
S
CRC filed final report in August 2008 but major issues remain unresolved and require
(CRC) and completing review
satisfactory
achievement of consensus among major faction leaders.
2. Enacting and implementing laws on De-
(U)
unmet
S
“Justice and Accountability Law” passed Jan. 12, 2008. Allows about 30,000 fourth
Baathification
unsatisfact.
ranking Baathists to regain their jobs, and 3,500 Baathists in top three party ranks
would receive pensions. Could allow for judicial prosecution of all ex-Baathists and

bars ex-Saddam security personnel from regaining jobs. As noted, De-Baathification
officials used this law to try to harm the prospects of rivals in March 2010 elections.
3. Enacting and implementing oil laws that
U
unmet
U
Framework and three implementing laws stalled over KRG-central government
ensure equitable distribution of resources
disputes; only framework law has reached COR to date. Revenue being distributed
equitably, and 2009 budget maintains 17% revenue for KRG. Kurds also getting that
share of oil exported from newly producing fields in KRG area. Some U.S.
assessments say factions unlikely to reach agreement on these laws in the near term.
4. Enacting and implementing laws to form
S
partly met
S
Regions law passed October 2006, with relatively low threshold (petition by 33% of
semi-autonomous regions
provincial council members) to start process to form new regions, but main blocs
agreed that law would take effect April 2008. November 2008: petition by 2% of
Basra residents submitted to IHEC (another way to start forming a region) to convert
Basra province into a single province “region. Signatures of 8% more were required
by mid-January 2009; not achieved.
5. Enacting and implementing: (a) a law to
S on (a)
overall
S on (a) and (c)
Draft law stipulating powers of provincial governments adopted February 13, 2008,
establish a higher electoral commission, (b)
and U on
unmet; (a)
took effect April 2008. Implementing election law adopted September 24, 2008,
provincial elections law; (c) a law to specify
the others
met
provided for provincial elections by January 31, 2009. Those elections were held, as
authorities of provincial bodies, and (d) set a
discussed above.
date for provincial elections
6. Enacting and implementing legislation
no rating
unmet
Same as July
Law to amnesty “non-terrorists” among 25,000 Iraq-held detainees passed February
addressing amnesty for former insurgents
13, 2008. Of 23,000 granted amnesty, about 6,300 released to date. 19,000 detainees
held by U.S. have been transferred to Iraqi control under Security Agreement.
7. Enacting and implementing laws on militia
no rating
unmet
Same as July
Basra operation, discussed above, viewed as move against militias. On April 9, 2008,
disarmament
Maliki demanded all militias disband as condition for their parties to participate in
provincial elections. Law on militia demobilization stalled.
8. Establishing political, media, economic, and
S
met
met
No longer applicable; U.S. “surge” has ended and U.S. troop total in Iraq now about
services committee to support U.S. “surge”
50,000, down from about 170,000 at the 2008 height of the surge.
CRS-28


July 12,
Subsequent Actions and Assessments—May 2008 Administration report,
2007,
June 2008 GAO report, International Compact with Iraq Review in June
Admin.
GAO
Sept. 14, 2007
2008, and U.S. Embassy Weekly Status Reports
Benchmark
Report
(Sept. 07)
Admin. Report
(and various press sources)
9. Providing three trained and ready brigades
S
partly met
S
No longer applicable. Eight brigades were assigned to assist the surge when it was in
to support U.S. surge
operation.
10. Providing Iraqi commanders with
U
unmet
S to pursue
No significant change. Still some U.S. concern over the Office of the Commander in
authorities to make decisions, without political
extremists U on
Chief (part of Maliki’s office) control over appointments to the ISF—favoring Shiites.
intervention, to pursue all extremists, including
political
Ssome politically motivated leaders remain in ISF. But, National Police said to include
Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias
interference
more Sunnis in command jobs and rank and file than one year ago. Defense and
Interior ministers filed candidacies for the March 2010 elections, involving them in
national political contest.
11. Ensuring Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
U
unmet
S on military, U
U.S. interpreted Basra operation as effort by Maliki to enforce law even-handedly.
providing even-handed enforcement of law
on police
Tribal support councils not even-handed, and still widespread Iraqi public complaints
of politically-motivated administration of justice.
12. Ensuring that the surge plan in Baghdad will S
partly met
S
No longer applicable with end of surge. Ethno-sectarian violence has fallen sharply in
not provide a safe haven for any outlaw, no
Baghdad.
matter the sect
13. (a) Reducing sectarian violence and (b)
Mixed. S
unmet
same as July 12
Sectarian violence has not re-accelerated. Shiite militias weak.
eliminating militia control of local security
on (a); U
on (b)
14. Establishing Baghdad joint security stations
S
met
S
Over 50 joint security stations operated in Baghdad at the height of U.S. troop surge.
Closed in compliance with June 30, 2009, U.S. pul out from the cities.
15. Increasing ISF units capable of operating
U
unmet
U
ISF expected to secure Iraq by the end of 2011 under the Security Agreement, which
independently
requires U.S. troops to depart. Obama Administration officials say ISF will meet the
challenges. Iraqi Air Force not likely to be able to secure airspace by then and DOD
has approved potential sale to Iraq of F-16s and other major equipment.
16. Ensuring protection of minority parties in
S
met
S
No change. Rights of minority parties protected by Article 37 of constitution.
COR
Minorities given a minimum seat allocated in election law for march vote.
17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in 2007
S
partly met
S
About 63% of the $10 billion 2007 allocation for capital projects was spent.
capital budget for reconstruction.
18. Ensuring that Iraqi authorities not falsely
U
unmet
U
Some governmental recriminations against some ISF officers still observed.
accusing ISF members
Source: Compiled by CRS.
CRS-29

Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks


Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612


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