Transportation Security: Issues for the
112th Congress
David Randall Peterman
Analyst in Transportation Policy
Bart Elias
Specialist in Aviation Policy
John Frittelli
Specialist in Transportation Policy
February 1, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33512
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Transportation Security: Issues for the 112th Congress
Summary
The nation’s air, land, and marine transportation systems are designed for accessibility and
efficiency, two characteristics that make them highly vulnerable to terrorist attack. While
hardening the transportation sector from terrorist attack is difficult, measures can be taken to
deter terrorists. The dilemma facing Congress is how best to construct and finance a system of
deterrence, protection, and response that effectively reduces the possibility and consequences of
another terrorist attack without unduly interfering with travel, commerce, and civil liberties.
Aviation security has been a major focus of transportation security policy following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of these attacks, the 107th Congress moved
quickly to pass the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA; P.L. 107-71) creating the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and mandating a federalized workforce of security
screeners to inspect airline passengers and their baggage. The 110th Congress passed legislation to
extend the existing authorization of such sums as may be necessary for TSA’s aviation security
functions through FY2011 (see P.L. 110-53, section 1618). Reauthorization of TSA functions may
be considered in the broader context of a Department of Homeland Security reauthorization bill
during the 112th Congress. Issues likely to arise include deployment of new checkpoint screening
technologies; passenger screening procedures; implementation of the Secure Flight system to
check passenger data against the consolidated terrorist database; air cargo security measures; and
strengthening security of general aviation aircraft and airports.
Bombings of passenger trains in Europe and Asia in the past few years illustrate the vulnerability
of passenger rail systems to terrorist attacks. Passenger rail systems—primarily subway
systems—in the United States carry about five times as many passengers each day as do airlines,
over many thousands of miles of track, serving stations that are designed primarily for easy
access. In 2010, Congress expressed concern about the slow rate at which federal funds for transit
and rail security were being expended. If the 112th Congress revisits the issue, it may consider the
effectiveness of rail and transit security efforts to date, the potential for meaningful security
improvement in this area, and its importance relative to other federal priorities.
Existing law mandates the scanning of all U.S.-bound maritime containers with non-intrusive
inspection equipment at overseas ports of loading by July 2012. This deadline is unlikely to be
met, as foreign countries object to the costs of this screening and are dubious of the benefits. If
Congress considers maritime security, it may examine the usefulness of this mandate, as well as
the threat posed by the many small craft that populate commercial port areas and progress toward
establishing harbor interagency operational centers.
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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Aviation Security ........................................................................................................................ 1
A Risk-Based, Multi-Layered Approach ................................................................................ 2
Passenger Prescreening .........................................................................................................2
Passenger Screening.............................................................................................................. 4
Federalization and Privatization of Airport Screening ............................................................ 5
Baggage Screening................................................................................................................ 6
Air Cargo Security ................................................................................................................ 7
Airport and Aircraft Access Controls ..................................................................................... 8
In-Flight Security Measures .................................................................................................. 9
The Shoulder-Fired Missile Threat ...................................................................................... 10
General Aviation Security.................................................................................................... 10
Transit and Passenger Rail Security........................................................................................... 12
Port and Maritime Security Issues ............................................................................................. 14
Container Scanning Requirement ........................................................................................ 14
Threat Posed by Small Craft................................................................................................ 15
Harbor Operation Centers ................................................................................................... 15
Transportation Worker Identification Credential .................................................................. 15
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 16
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Transportation Security: Issues for the 112th Congress
Introduction
The nation’s air, land, and marine transportation systems are designed for accessibility and
efficiency, two characteristics that make them vulnerable to attack. The difficulty and cost of
protecting the transportation sector from attack raises a core question for policymakers: how
much effort and resources to put toward protecting potential targets versus pursuing and fighting
terrorists. While hardening the transportation sector from terrorist attack is difficult, measures can
be taken to deter terrorists. The focus of this report is how best to construct and finance a system
of deterrence, protection, and response that effectively reduces the possibility and consequences
of another terrorist attack without unduly interfering with travel, commerce, and civil liberties.
For all modes of transportation, one can identify four principal policy objectives that would
support a system of deterrence and protection: (1) ensuring the trustworthiness of the passengers
and the cargo flowing through the system, (2) ensuring the trustworthiness of the transportation
workers who operate and service the vehicles, assist the passengers, or handle the cargo, (3)
ensuring the trustworthiness of the private companies that operate in the system, such as the
carriers, shippers, agents, and brokers, and (4) establishing a perimeter of security around
transportation facilities and vehicles in operation. The first three policy objectives are concerned
with preventing an attack from within a transportation system, such as occurred on September 11,
2001. The concern is that attackers could once again disguise themselves as legitimate passengers
(or shippers or workers) to get in position to launch an attack.
The fourth policy objective is concerned with preventing an attack from outside a transportation
system. For instance, terrorists could ram a bomb-laden speed boat into an oil tanker, as was done
in October 2002 to the French oil tanker Limberg, or they could fire a shoulder-fired missile at an
airplane taking off or landing, as was attempted in November 2002 against an Israeli charter jet in
Mombasa, Kenya. Achieving all four of these objectives is difficult, at best, and in some modes,
is practically impossible. Where limited options exist for preventing an attack, policymakers are
left with evaluating options for minimizing the consequences from an attack, without imposing
unduly burdensome requirements.
Aviation Security1
Aviation security has been a major focus of transportation security policy following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of these attacks, the 107th Congress moved
quickly to pass the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA; P.L. 107-71) creating the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and mandating a federalized workforce of security
screeners to inspect airline passengers and their baggage. The act gave TSA broad authority to
assess vulnerabilities in aviation security and take steps to mitigate these risks. TSA’s role in
aviation security has been the subject of considerable congressional oversight. Particular issues of
interest include
• progress toward meeting the statutory mandate to screen all cargo placed on
passenger airplanes, particularly inbound international shipments;
1 This section was prepared by Bart Elias, Specialist in Aviation Policy.
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• options for screening and securing shipments placed on all-cargo aircraft;
• deployment of new checkpoint screening technologies and associated changes in
passenger screening procedures;
• options for privatizing airport screening operations;
• implementation of the Secure Flight system to check passenger data against the
consolidated terrorist database; and
• options for strengthening security of large general aviation aircraft.
Congress passed legislation in the 110th Congress extending authorization of such sums as may be
necessary for TSA aviation security functions through FY2011 (see the Implementing the 9/11
Commission Recommendations Act of 2007, P.L. 110-53, section 1618). As this authorization is
set to expire, aviation security issues may be examined during the first session of the 112th
Congress, probably in the context of a multiyear TSA reauthorization measure.
A Risk-Based, Multi-Layered Approach
Aviation security policy since September 11, 2001, has consisted of two basic principles: a risk-
based approach for allocating limited security resources to where they are considered most
needed, and a multi-layered strategy that establishes redundancies to thwart a potential terrorist
attack.
The risk-based approach implemented by TSA has been criticized for overemphasizing the
screening of airline passengers rather than focusing on threats in other areas—namely, air cargo
operations; airport access controls; protecting airliners from shoulder-fired missiles; and the
security of general aviation aircraft. In essence, these critics argue that the implementation of
aviation security policy since September 11, 2001, has focused too heavily on protecting aircraft
from past attack scenarios—such as suicide hijackings and luggage bombs carried out by airline
passengers—and has not given enough attention to other potential vulnerabilities.
Given the emphasis on protecting against bombings and suicide hijackings, the multi-layered
concept for aviation security is most apparent in the protection of passenger airliners. Passengers
undergo prescreening to check their names against lists of known and suspected terrorists, then
passengers and their carry-on items are screened and checked baggage is passed through
explosive detection systems (EDS) prior to aircraft boarding. Once onboard, security measures
such as air marshals, hardened cockpit doors, and armed pilots provide added layers of security to
thwart an attempted hijacking. The effectiveness of TSA’s implementation of virtually all of these
security layers has been brought into question at one time or another since its creation.
Passenger Prescreening
Efforts to improve passenger prescreening have been affected by concerns over the adequacy of
measures to protect fliers’ personal information and not infringe upon their civil rights. Critics
have argued that TSA’s ever-expanding vision for prescreening was to include data mining of
commercial and government databases to look for indicators that someone may pose a threat, and
searches of notoriously inaccurate criminal databases. These concerns were spurred by vague
statements issued by TSA as to how it might authenticate passenger identity and check for
possible links to terrorism along with media reports linking passenger prescreening to
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controversial proposals such as the Department of Defense’s Total Information Awareness
program to detect terrorists by mining personal data. This controversy ultimately led TSA to scrap
its proposed enhanced passenger prescreening system, the Computer Assisted Passenger
Prescreening II (CAPPS II), in August 2004, and pursue enhanced prescreening capabilities under
a new system called Secure Flight. While Secure Flight is touted to be a significantly scaled down
approach to prescreening compared to CAPPS II, concerns over data protections and redress
procedures for passengers falsely identified by the system significantly delayed its deployment.
TSA has addressed various concerns over traveler privacy, data retention, and reducing false
positives. On October 28, 2008, it published a final rule detailing the planned operational
implementation of Secure Flight.2 Under this regulation, TSA has phased in use of the Secure
Flight system to check passenger records against the consolidated terrorist database for domestic
flights and, subsequently, for international arrivals and departures. As of November 30, 2010,
TSA indicated that 100% of domestic and international passenger flights were being checked
under its Secure Flight protocols. However, TSA currently does not perform Secure Flight checks
for all overflights that cross through U.S.-controlled airspace but do not land at a U.S. destination.
Watchlist checks of overflights remain an objective pending resolution of various international
agreements. TSA took over responsibility for passenger checks of inbound international arrivals
from U.S. Customs and Border Protection, but overflights would represent a new category of
covered operations encompassing some airlines that do not serve the United States.
Provisions in P.L. 110-53 also required the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish
appeals procedures for passengers misidentified though prescreening processes and establish an
Office of Appeals and Redress charged with implementing a “timely and fair process” for airline
passengers delayed or denied boarding due to suspected misidentifications. DHS has addressed
this mandate by establishing the Travel Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP). DHS TRIP allows
passengers seeking redress, or their designated representatives, to file complaints using either an
online system or by completing and mailing a form. With the Secure Flight system now in place,
the timeliness and effectiveness of handling and resolving complaints received through DHS
TRIP may be a particular issue of interest for congressional oversight during the 112th Congress.
TSA had also implemented a Registered Traveler (RT) program that was intended to expedite
checkpoint screening of frequent fliers who voluntarily submit background information and
biometric identifiers. While TSA had approved RT programs operated by multiple vendors at
several airports nationwide, it was left up to airport operators to determine if they wished to
participate. The airline industry, which once backed this program as a means to reduce hassles for
frequent fliers, came to view the manner in which it was implemented as having limited and
questionable benefits. Airlines have instead pressed for express lanes for their best customers,
including frequent fliers and first class travelers. Also, the use of the RT program as a testbed for
streamlined screening technologies and procedures failed to yield demonstrable benefits.
Because of these perceived shortcomings, coupled with business failures among RT providers, the
initial RT program was halted. While there has been some effort to revamp the RT program, TSA
and industry partners have continually struggled to define the program’s objectives and
implementation. Language in the House-passed TSA Authorization Act considered during the
111th Congress (H.R. 2200) sought to revamp the RT program by reinstating security threat
2 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, “Secure Flight Program: Final
Rule,” 72 Federal Register 64018-64066, October 28, 2008.
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assessments as an integral component, allowing RT providers to conduct private background
checks, and implementing alternative screening procedures for RT members who hold top secret
government security clearances. The bill also would have required TSA to develop a known
traveler credential incorporating biometric data for individuals with government security
clearances including members of the armed services, flight crew certified by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), and law enforcement personnel, and to establish procedures allowing such
individuals to bypass screening checkpoints. Options for making an RT program an effective
component of aviation security may be an area of specific interest for the 112th Congress.
Passenger Screening3
The 9/11 Commission recommended that TSA give priority attention to implementing technology
and procedures for screening passengers and baggage for explosives. This need has been
highlighted by several unsuccessful terrorist acts, including the December 2001 shoe bombing
attempt, the foiled plot to bomb U.S.-bound airliners using liquid explosives uncovered in August
2006, and the attempted bombing of Detroit-bound passenger airliner on December 25, 2009.
During 2010, TSA introduced whole body imaging (WBI) systems at airport checkpoints around
the United States. These systems, which TSA refers to as advanced imaging technology (AIT),
capture an image of what lies underneath an individual’s clothing using one of two technologies:
X-ray backscatter and millimeter wave imaging. The technologies do not specifically identify
explosives, but can reveal concealed items that would not be detected by walkthrough metal
detectors, including explosives and non-metallic weapons. Polling data indicate that about 75%-
80% of Americans support the use of AIT at airport checkpoints.4 However, AIT has met with
objections from groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union, which has urged Congress to
ban the use of whole body imaging technologies as a method for primary screening.5 To allay
some of these concerns, millimeter wave systems used by TSA apply privacy filters that may blur
facial features and sensitive areas. X-ray backscatter systems currently deployed use computer
algorithms to render a “chalk outline” sketch of the individual and discernible concealed items.
There are also concerns about potential human health effects of X-ray backscatter screening,
although TSA contends that the levels of ionizing radiation emitted by approved backscatter
systems are well below levels considered safe for human exposure.
Passengers who object to WBI screening may opt instead for pat-down searches. However, in
2010, pat-down procedures were modified and made more invasive. Additionally, TSA may
require a pat-down if a passenger sets off a walkthrough metal detector alarm or if a WBI image
arouses suspicion. Under current TSA procedures, an individual selected for WBI or a pat-down
must undergo that process, and may not choose to be screened by a walkthrough metal detector or
to exit the screening process and not fly. This situation poses a dilemma for individuals
uncomfortable with both WBI screening and pat-down searches.
3 For further reading on this topic see CRS Report R41502, Changes in Airport Passenger Screening Technologies and
Procedures: Frequently Asked Questions, by Bart Elias, and CRS Report R40543, Airport Passenger Screening:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Bart Elias.
4 See AIT polls at http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/ait/reading.shtm.
5 Statement of Timothy D. Sparapani, ACLU Legislative Counsel, Before the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Technology, Regarding the U.S. Transportation Security Administration’s Physical Screening of Airline
Passengers and Related Cargo Screening, April 4, 2006.
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TSA also has been deploying advanced technology X-ray equipment capable of providing
multiple view angles and automated threat detection capabilities to aid in screening carry-on
items and handheld bottled liquids scanners to screen for liquid explosives. During the 112th
Congress, TSA’s investment and deployment strategies for these technologies is likely to be an
issue of considerable interest.
The use of AIT in particular was addressed in legislation considered during the 111th Congress. A
provision in the House-passed TSA Authorization Act (H.R. 2200) would have prevented TSA
from using WBI systems during routine, primary passenger screening, and would have required
that TSA offer pat-down searches as an alternative to WBI scans for any passengers selected for
secondary screening. The bill would also have prevented TSA from storing, transferring, sharing,
or copying any WBI images once a passenger is cleared for boarding, and would require TSA to
make available information regarding the technology and related privacy policies to any
passenger selected to undergo WBI screening. In contrast, Senator Bennett offered the Securing
Aircraft From Explosives Responsibly: Advanced Imaging Recognition (SAFER AIR) Act of
2010 (S. 3536, 111th Congress), which called for the expeditious deployment of AIT and other
advanced screening technologies for primary screening of aircraft passengers. It too included
provisions to protect privacy, many of which parallel current TSA practices. Representative Paul
introduced the American Traveler Dignity Act of 2010 (H.R. 6416, 111th Congress), which would
have barred TSA, TSA screeners, private airport security screeners, or others involved in the
screening process from claiming immunity from prosecution in a criminal or civil proceeding
arising as the result of whole-body screening or a pat-down search.
Passenger checkpoint efficiency has also been an issue. TSA has struggled to strike a balance
between effectively screening passengers and avoiding undue delays and hassles to travelers.
While passenger wait times at smaller airports are usually less than the stated objective of 10
minutes, average wait times at major airports are typically greater.
Further, audits have concluded that screener performance needs improvement. The DHS Office of
Inspector General found that screener training, screening technology, policies and procedures, and
management and supervision of screening operations all contributed to observed deficiencies in
performance. Covert testing by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found deficiencies
in detecting improvised explosives and incendiary devices concealed on passengers and in their
carry-on items, despite stepped-up secondary screening for explosives.6 In December 2010, media
reports revealed that a man with a loaded pistol in his carry-on bag passed through airport
security undetected and boarded an international flight at Houston Bush Intercontinental Airport.
The incident renewed concerns over the capability of screeners to detect potential threats.7
Federalization and Privatization of Airport Screening
As it debated aviation security immediately following September 11, 2001, Congress considered
whether airport security screening should be conducted by federal employees. At that time,
6 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities Exposed Through Covert Testing of TSA’s
Passenger Screening Process, Statement of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director, Forensic Audits and Special
Investigations, and John W. Cooney, Forensic Audits and Special Investigations Before the Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform, House of Representatives, November 15, 2007.
7 Matthew Mosk, Angela Hill, and Timothy Fleming, “Gaping Holes in Airline Security: Loaded Gun Slips Past TSA
Screeners,” ABC News, December 16, 2010.
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screening operations suffered from high turnover, poor supervision and training, low wages, and a
lack of regulatory oversight. Federalizing the screener workforce was intended to address these
deficiencies. However, while Congress ultimately resolved to federalize the screener workforce at
most airports, ATSA also set up a pilot program using contract screeners at five airports and gave
all airports the option to request private screeners starting November 19, 2004. Most airports have
shown little interest in this option. Some airports may have liability concerns, although language
in the FY2006 Homeland Security Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-90, section 547) indemnifies
airports from liability relating to their decisions to use either private or federal screeners and to
claims of negligence or intentional wrongdoing on the part of screeners, whether federal or
private employees. Few airports have been fully converted to private screening operations, and in
January 2010 TSA announced that it would not further expand the program. However, renewed
congressional interest in expanding private screening suggests that this could be a significant
issue in the 112th Congress.
Baggage Screening
While airports are, for the most part, meeting mandated requirements to inspect all checked bags
with explosive detection system (EDS) equipment, they are struggling to integrate these systems
into baggage handling and sorting facilities. To address these needs, Congress established (in
Vision 100, P.L. 108-176) an Aviation Security Capital Fund with a mandatory funding level of
$250 million annually and a total authorized funding level of $500 million per year through
FY2007. Provisions to expedite and increase funding for in-line baggage screening were included
in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458). However, meeting
funding needs for airport security projects and setting priorities amid budgetary constraints
remain ongoing challenges. Provisions in P.L. 110-53 extended the authority for mandatory
funding of the Aviation Security Capital Fund through 2028, and authorized increased
discretionary funding level of $450 million annually for FY2008 through FY2011 for in-line
baggage screening. The act also required TSA to prioritize airport projects based on risks and
other considerations. Improvement of baggage screening systems remains as a major aviation
security issue for the 112th Congress.
Over $650 million of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5) funding for
aviation security was designated for checked baggage screening projects. Additionally, $778
million was appropriated in FY2010 for EDS and explosives trace detection (ETD) systems
acquisition and installation. Despite these appropriations, TSA still faces outlays for replacing
explosives detection systems purchased a decade ago that are now nearing the end of their
expected service lives, while keeping maintenance costs in check and preparing to handle larger
passenger flows in the future. TSA must balance funding of new screening facilities with payment
to airports that have already completed projects with their own funds under TSA letters of intent
promising reimbursement. TSA authorization legislation passed by the House during the 111th
Congress would have required TSA to establish a process for resolving reimbursement claims for
airports that have incurred eligible costs associated with the construction of in-line baggage
screening systems.
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Air Cargo Security8
The October 2010 discovery of two explosive devices being prepared for loading on overseas
U.S.-bound all-cargo aircraft renewed policy debate over air cargo security measures and
prompted some policymakers to call for comprehensive screening of all air cargo, including
shipments that travel on all-cargo aircraft. U.S. policies and strategies for protecting air cargo
have focused on two main perceived threats: the bombing of a passenger airliner carrying cargo
and the hijacking of a large all-cargo aircraft for use as a weapon to attack a ground target. The
October 2010 incidents highlighted the potential threat of explosives in the all-cargo sector.
The Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53, section
1602) required the screening of all air cargo placed on passenger aircraft by August 2010, using
methods such as X-ray systems, explosives detection systems, explosives trace detection, TSA-
certified canine teams, or physical searches with manifest verification, in a manner that provides a
level of security equivalent to the screening of passenger-checked baggage. These mandates were
opposed by various stakeholders in the air cargo industry who regard these requirements as overly
burdensome and costly.9
TSA has addressed air cargo in the context of supply chains, by delegating authorized screeners to
examine cargo at Certified Cargo Screening Program facilities, such as factories and
consolidation points, coupled with additional measures to insure the security and integrity of
freight screened at off-airport facilities. While TSA maintains that this approach meets the
requirements of the legislation, some Members of Congress have argued that the intent of the
legislation was for TSA to play a more direct role in overseeing screening and for screening to
occur in closer physical proximity to airports. The House-passed TSA authorization bill
considered during the 111th Congress would have required TSA to report on the status of the
Certified Cargo Screening Program. A separate provision would have required TSA to increase
the number of canine teams used for air cargo screening. The bill also would have directed TSA
to establish an air cargo working group, as part of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee
(ASAC), to address air cargo security issues.
Inbound international cargo poses a particular challenge for TSA. While all cargo traveling on
domestic passenger flights is now being screened, full compliance for inbound international
flights may not be achieved until August 2013. A provision in the TSA authorization bill passed
by the House during the 111th Congress would have required the DHS to establish a system to
verify that all inbound international air cargo placed on passenger aircraft be screened for
explosives within two years of enactment. The bill also called for a GAO study of inbound air
cargo screening and quarterly audits detailing the percentage of and rationale for inbound
international air cargo being exempted from screening requirements.
Following the October 2010 incidents, there has been considerable interest in increasing
international cooperation with respect to air cargo security, screening, and inspection methods.
TSA has entered into agreements with the European Union, Canada, and Australia, and is
working with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to draft worldwide standards
for air cargo security. Nonetheless, TSA has limited resources and limited authority to oversee the
8 For further reading on this topic see CRS Report R41515, Screening and Securing Air Cargo: Background and Issues
for Congress, by Bart Elias.
9 “House To Consider Bill Today Requiring Additional Cargo Screening,” Transportation Weekly, Jan. 9, 2007, p. 7.
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security of international air cargo shipments bound for the United States. Consequently, efforts to
improve international cooperation and strengthen TSA’s role in monitoring air cargo security
practices outside the United States are likely to be of particular interest to the 112th Congress.
On November 16, 2010, Representative Markey introduced the Air Cargo Security Act (H.R.
6410, 111th Congress) to require screening of all cargo transported on all-cargo aircraft, including
U.S.-bound international shipments, in a manner commensurate with the screening requirements
for passenger checked baggage. The legislation also includes provisions requiring inspections of
foreign air cargo shipping facilities that handle U.S.-bound flights and formal security training
programs for cargo handlers. On November 17, 2010, Senator Casey introduced a similar
measure (S. 3954, 111th Congress) in the Senate.
Congress has also considered ways to mitigate the effects of an explosive device concealed in air
cargo or in hold baggage. The 9/11 Commission recommended deploying at least one hardened
cargo container on each passenger airliner for carrying suspect cargo. P.L. 110-53 contains a
provision that required the DHS to complete an evaluation of its hardened cargo container pilot
program and, based on this evaluation, to carry out a risk-based deployment of hardened cargo
containers for use on commercial flights. Under this provision, the cost of acquiring, maintaining,
and replacing hardened cargo containers would be provided for by the DHS (see P.L. 110-53,
section 1609). While the pilot program has been completed, no requirement has been imposed for
operational deployment of hardened cargo containers.
TSA regulations require all-cargo operators to protect against unauthorized access to large all-
cargo aircraft. Secured areas of airports have been expanded to include cargo operations areas.
Regulations also impose requirements on freight forwarders that ship by air (referred to as
indirect air carriers) and require background checks and security threat assessments for all
workers with access to air cargo, including an estimated 51,000 off-airport employees of freight
forwarding companies. TSA has established an industry-wide database of known shippers to
allow freight forwarders and airlines to vet cargo shipments.
Airport and Aircraft Access Controls
While ATSA mandated background checks for all workers with unescorted access to passenger
aircraft and secured areas of airports, in some cases airport workers are permitted to bypass
screening checkpoints. Legislation introduced in the 108th Congress called for the physical
screening of all workers with access to aircraft or secured areas. In FY2008 DHS appropriations
(P.L. 110-161), funding was provided to TSA for a pilot program to assess physical screening of
airport employees. Based on the results, TSA has implemented increased random and targeted
screening of airport workers. However, airport workers do not routinely undergo security
screening, except at a few airports like Miami and Orlando. P.L. 110-161 also established civil
penalties for employers that fail to collect airport-issued security badges from employees whose
airport jobs are terminated.
ATSA called for TSA to explore the use of biometrics and other identification technologies for
transport workers and the use of biometrics for airport access controls. It is not anticipated that a
common biometric identifier will be implemented across airports in the United States in a manner
similar to the Transportation Worker Identification Card (TWIC) program for controlling access
to seaports. However, the Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458) required TSA to issue
guidance on the use of biometrics for airport access controls and to verify the identity of law
enforcement officers authorized to carry firearms on passenger airliners. P.L. 110-53 included
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language requiring TSA to report on its progress implementing access control measures for airline
crew members and requires TSA to establish a national registry and biometric access credential
for law enforcement officers authorized to fly armed on commercial passenger aircraft (see
sections 1614 and 1615). During the 111th Congress, a provision in the House-passed TSA
authorization measure (H.R. 2200) would have directed TSA to carry out a demonstration
program to assess the use of biometric identifier access systems for secure and sterile areas of
airports. Many airport operators have expressed interest in the use of biometrics, but several have
stated their reluctance to invest in biometric systems for access control because no standards or
regulatory requirements have been established by TSA.
In-Flight Security Measures
Existing in-flight security measures consist primarily of federal air marshals, armed pilots, and
hardened cockpit doors. The Federal Air Marshal Service was greatly expanded under ATSA and
air marshals are required on all high-risk flights.
Airline pilots may receive training allowing them to serve as armed Federal Flight Deck Officers
(FFDOs) under provisions set forth in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296). Vision
100 (P.L. 108-176) expanded the program to include all-cargo pilots and other flight crew
members such as flight engineers. Congress has maintained funding levels for both the FFDO
program and cabin crew self-defense training at about $25 million annually. While the program
has quietly added many armed pilots as an added layer to protect against hijackings, there are
lingering concerns that the application procedures are too cumbersome and the training site is too
remote to accommodate many pilots interested in participating.
ATSA also mandated the implementation of hardened cockpit doors and stringent controls
regarding access to the flight deck. The Terrorism Prevention Act contained a provision to study
the use of secondary flight deck barriers—a concept United Airlines initially pursued on its own
initiative—to mitigate the vulnerability introduced when a hardened cockpit door is opened in
flight for meal service or when a pilot needs to access the aircraft lavatory. Legislation introduced
in the 110th Congress (see H.R. 3925, 110th Congress) sought to require the installation of
secondary flight deck barriers for both air carrier aircraft that are equipped with hardened cockpit
doors and also for air carrier aircraft without a hardened cockpit door, which includes many large
cargo aircraft that are exempt from the requirements to install such doors.
Options for improving aircraft survivability in the event of bombings have also been discussed in
Congress. P.L. 110-53 (section 1610) included a provision directing the DHS to expedite research
and development of technologies to mitigate the introduction of an explosive device on a
passenger airplane or reduce the damage such a device could cause on the ground or in flight.
Along similar lines, the FAA has issued proposed rulemaking for security considerations in the
design of large jet airliners, including improving systems survivability, cockpit and cabin fire
suppression, improving flight deck barriers, and creating areas onboard where explosives
discovered during flight can be contained to mitigate damage caused by a detonation.10
10 Federal Aviation Administration, “Security Related Considerations in the Design and Operation of Transport
Category Airplanes; Proposed Rule,” 72 Federal Register, 629-639, January 5, 2007.
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The Shoulder-Fired Missile Threat
The threat to civilian aircraft posed by shoulder-fired missiles or other standoff weapons capable
of downing an airliner remains a vexing concern for aviation security specialists and
policymakers, brought into the public policy spotlight by the November 2002 attempted shoot-
down of a chartered Israeli airliner in Mombasa, Kenya. In 2003, then Secretary of State Colin
Powell remarked that there was “no threat more serious to aviation.”11 Since then, Department of
State and military initiatives seeking voluntary reductions of man-portable air defense systems
(MANPADS) stockpiles have reduced worldwide inventories by at least 30,000.12 Despite this
progress, many such weapons may not be accounted for. This threat, combined with the limited
capability to improve security beyond airport perimeters or modify flight paths, leaves civil
aircraft vulnerable, especially overseas in conflict zones and other high risk areas.
The most visible initiative to address the threat was the multiyear Counter-MANPADS (C-
MANPADS) program carried out by the DHS Science & Technology Directorate. The program
concluded in 2009 with extensive operational and live-fire testing along with FAA certification of
systems from two vendors capable of protecting airliners against heat-seeking missiles. The
systems have not been operationally deployed on commercial airliners, however, due largely to
the high acquisition and life-cycle costs of these units. The units do not protect against the full
range of potential missile threats to civil airliners, but do appear to provide effective protection
against heat-seeking MANPADS. The airlines, which continue to face economic difficulties, have
not voluntarily invested in these systems and argue that the costs should be borne, at least in part,
by the federal government. Policy discussions have focused mostly on whether to fund the
acquisition of limited numbers of the units for use by the Civil Reserve Aviation Fleet, which
comprises civilian airliners that can be called up to transport troops and supplies for the military.
Other approaches to protecting aircraft, including ground-based missile countermeasures and
escorts equipped with anti-missile technology, have been considered on a more limited basis, but
these options appear likely to be of limited effectiveness.
At the airport level, improving security and reducing the vulnerability of flight paths to potential
MANPADS attacks continue to pose unique challenges. While major airports have conducted
vulnerability studies, and many have partnered with federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies to reduce vulnerabilities to some degree, these efforts face obstacles because of limited
resources and large geographic areas where aircraft are vulnerable to attack. Vulnerabilities
remain, and any terrorist attempts to exploit those vulnerabilities could quickly escalate the threat
of shoulder-fired missiles to a major national security priority.
General Aviation Security
Security measures for general aviation aircraft have been a particularly controversial subject.
General aviation restrictions are most prevalent in the Washington, DC, area, where the city is
encircled by a 15-mile radius flight restricted zone in which general aviation operations are
significantly limited, and a larger air defense identification zone in which pilots must strictly
adhere to special air traffic control procedures. In August 2005, the DHS implemented a security
plan permitting certain general aviation flights—mostly large charter and corporate operations—
11 Katie Drummond, “Where Have All the MANPADS Gone?” Wired, February 22, 2010.
12 Ibid.
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to resume at Washington Reagan National Airport (DCA), which is located at the center of the
flight restricted area. Operations at smaller general aviation airports located within the 15-mile
flight restricted zone are highly restricted, requiring pilots to undergo background checks and
strictly adhere to special airspace security procedures.
At various times, flight restrictions have also been put in place over New York City, Chicago, and
elsewhere. General aviation pilots have been restricted from flying over certain theme parks and
over stadiums during major sporting events, leading some general aviation advocates to question
whether special interests were using the umbrella of security concerns to curtail unwanted
advertising overflights. Restricted airspace violations have averaged more than 1,000 per year
since the terrorist attacks of 2001, almost half of them around Washington, DC. The FAA reduced
the size of the Washington air defense identification zone to a 30-mile ring in August 2007, but
imposed speed restrictions within that ring, as well as inside a larger 60-mile ring below 18,000
feet. Most small general aviation aircraft are not affected by these speed restrictions, which are
largely designed to aid in early detection of fast-moving aircraft that may pose threats.
About one-quarter of airspace violations have occurred in temporarily restricted airspace around
sites during presidential visits. The scope of restricted airspace around sites visited by the
President has been of particular concern to general aviation operators because the size of these
areas has grown significantly, identifying the boundaries of these temporary restrictions is often
difficult for pilots, and systems for disseminating information regarding the location and effective
times of restrictions are imperfect.
Securing general aviation operations continues to be a significant challenge because of the
diversity of operations, aircraft, and airports. Measures put in place thus far, such as the Airport
Watch program and TSA’s general aviation security guidelines, rely heavily on the vigilance of
pilots to detect and report suspicious activity. Flight training providers are engaged in verifying
citizenship or confirming that background checks have been properly completed by TSA before
providing training to foreign nationals, as mandated under P.L. 108-176. The Terrorism
Prevention Act allows aircraft leasing and charter companies to voluntarily provide TSA with
names of prospective customers for prescreening against the consolidated terrorist watchlist.
Also, the FY2006 DHS appropriations act (P.L. 109-90) required the DHS to assess security
vulnerabilities from general aviation aircraft and identify steps that can be taken to enhance the
security of general aviation aircraft and airports. A provision in P.L. 110-53 requires TSA to
develop and implement a standardized risk assessment program at general aviation airports. The
law also requires international general aviation flights to submit passenger information and
advance flight notification to U.S. Customs and Border Protection prior to entering U.S. airspace.
In October 2008, TSA issued a proposal requiring adoption of security programs by general
aviation reliever airports, which relieve congestion from major commercial airports, and general
aviation airports that regularly serve scheduled commuter and public charter flights.13 Under the
proposal, these airports would be required to designate an airport security coordinator, establish
procedures for law enforcement support and incident management, implement training programs
for law enforcement personnel assigned to the airport, establish procedures for informing the
13 Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration. “Large Aircraft Security Program, Other
Aircraft Operator Security Program, and Airport Operator Security Program; Proposed Rule.” Federal Register,
73(211), October 30, 2008, 64790-64855.
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public regarding airport security matters, and establish systems for maintaining security-related
records of law enforcement response to incidents that occur at the airport.
TSA also proposed to implement a variety of security measures for operators of all general
aviation aircraft weighing more than 12,500 pounds, including privately owned, fractionally
owned, and corporate aircraft.14 These measures were to include fingerprint-based criminal
history records checks for all flight crew members; terrorist watch-list checks of all passengers;
security inspections of aircraft; and biannual security compliance audits. In addition, operators of
all aircraft weighing more than 45,500 kilograms (roughly 100,000 pounds) would have been
required to screen passengers and their accessible property. Similar security measures are already
required for charter operators. After airports and operators of large aircraft objected to the burden
that would be imposed on general aviation operations that were not previously subject to security-
related regulations, congressional interest led TSA to revise its proposal, weighing risk factors
and associated costs and benefits. The House-passed TSA authorization bill in the 111th Congress
would have required TSA to establish a general aviation security working group to address
security issues affecting general aviation. TSA is expected to release a revised regulatory proposal
for general aviation operations in 2011. This may be an issue of particular interest to the 112th
Congress, given the extensive controversy surrounding the 2008 notice of proposed rulemaking.
Transit and Passenger Rail Security15
Bombings of passenger trains in Europe and Asia in the past few years illustrate the vulnerability
of passenger rail systems to terrorist attacks. Passenger rail systems—primarily subway
systems—in the United States carry about five times as many passengers each day as do airlines,
over many thousands of miles of track, serving stations that are designed primarily for easy
access. The increased security efforts around air travel have led to concerns that terrorists may
turn their attention to “softer” targets, such as transit or passenger rail. A key challenge Congress
faces is balancing the desire for increased rail passenger security with the efficient functioning of
transit systems, with the potential costs and damages of an attack, and with other federal
priorities.
The volume of ridership and number of access points make it impractical to subject all rail
passengers to the type of screening all airline passengers undergo. Consequently, transit security
measures tend to emphasize managing the consequences of an attack. Nevertheless, steps can be
taken to reduce the risks, as well as the consequences, of an attack. These include vulnerability
assessments; emergency planning; emergency response training and drilling of transit personnel,
ideally in coordination with police, fire, and emergency medical personnel; increasing the number
of transit security personnel, installing video surveillance equipment in vehicles and stations; and
conducting random inspections of bags, platforms, and trains.
The challenges of securing rail passengers are dwarfed by the challenge of securing bus
passengers. There are some 76,000 buses carrying 19 million passengers each weekday in the
United States. Some transit systems have installed video cameras on their buses, and Congress
has provided grants for security improvements to intercity buses. But the number and operation
characteristics of transit buses make them all but impossible to secure.
14 Ibid.
15 This section prepared by David Randall Peterman, Analyst in Transportation Policy.
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On May 21, 2007 DHS announced completion of a transportation sector-specific plan (along with
the other sector plans) and transportation mode-specific annexes, identifying critical assets,
evaluating the risk to them, and developing measures to protect them. GAO noted that “these
plans are only a first step ... [they] are not required to address how the sector is actually assessing
risk and protecting its most critical assets.”16
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53), passed
by Congress on July 27, 2007, included provisions on passenger rail and transit security. These
included authorizing $3.5 billion for FY2008-FY2011 for grants for public transportation
security, with $840 million for security-related operating expenses and $100 million for research
and development (sections 1406 and 1409); $2 billion for grants for railroad security (section
1513), including $200 million for safety improvements to rail tunnels in New York, Baltimore,
and Washington (section 1515), and $132 million for research and development (section 1518);
and $95 million for grants for over-the-road bus security (sections 1532 and 1535). Public
transportation agencies and railroads considered to be high-risk targets by DHS are required to
have security plans approved by DHS (sections 1405 and 1512).
Other provisions required DHS to conduct a name-based security background check and an
immigration status check on all public transportation and railroad frontline employees (sections
1414 and 1522), and gave DHS the authority to regulate rail and transit employee security
training standards (sections 1408 and 1517).
In a 2009 report, GAO contended: “TSA should conduct a risk assessment for the mass transit
and passenger rail systems that combines the results of threat, vulnerability, and consequence
assessments. Until the overall risk to the entire system is identified through such an assessment,
TSA cannot best determine how and where to target its limited resources to achieve the greatest
security.”17
The Department of Homeland Security provides grants for transit, passenger rail, and freight rail
security under the Urbanized Areas Security Initiative program. Congress provided $150 million
for these grants for FY2005 and again for FY2006, $275 million for FY2007, $400 million for
FY2008 and again for FY2009, and $300 million for FY2010. In 2009 Congress noted that,
according to DHS, about 90% of the FY2006 funding for transit and rail security had not yet been
expended;18 in 2010, appropriators reiterated their concern about the slow pace of spending of
transit and rail security grant funds.19
16 Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure: Challenges Remain in Protecting Key Sectors, GAO-07-
626T, March 20, 2007, p. 5.
17 Government Accountability Office, Transportation Security: Keys Actions Have Been Taken to Enhance Mass
Transit and Passenger Rail Security, But Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Federal Strategy and Programs, GAO-09-
678, June 24, 2009, p. 58.
18 H.Rept. 111-298, Conference report to accompany H.R. 2892, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations
Act, 2010, p. 107.
19 Senate Committee on Appropriations, S.Rept. 111-222 on the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill,
2011, p. 119.
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Transportation Security: Issues for the 112th Congress
Port and Maritime Security Issues20
The bulk of U.S. overseas trade is carried by ships and thus the economic consequences of a
maritime terrorist attack could be significant. A key challenge for U.S. policy makers is
prioritizing maritime security activities among a virtually unlimited number of potential attack
scenarios. There are far more potential attack scenarios than likely ones, and far more than could
be meaningfully addressed with limited counter-terrorism resources. The 112th Congress may
wish to assess four current port security initiatives: the 100% container scanning requirement; the
threat posed by small craft; harbor interagency operational centers; and implementation of a port
worker security card system.
Container Scanning Requirement
Section 1701 of The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L.
110-53) requires that all imported marine containers be scanned by nonintrusive imaging
equipment and radiation detection equipment at a foreign loading port by July 1, 2012, unless the
DHS can demonstrate it is not feasible, in which case the deadline can be extended by two years
on a port by port basis. DHS has indicated that it intends to seek an extension to the 2012
deadline, citing numerous challenges to implementing the 100% scanning requirement at overseas
ports.21 DHS appears to favor pursuing 100% scanning at only selected overseas ports deemed
high risk.22
Meeting the 2012 deadline is unlikely since major U.S. trading partners oppose 100% scanning.
The European Commission has determined that 100% scanning is the wrong approach, favoring a
multilayered risk management approach to inspecting cargo.23 Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) has tested the feasibility of scanning all U.S. bound containers at several overseas ports.24
In a report to Congress, CBP identified and explained numerous operational, technical, logistical,
financial, and diplomatic obstacles encountered during these tests.25 The report includes
communications from host government officials explaining their objections to pursuing 100%
container scanning.26 Singapore decided not to participate in the test27 and Japan has also raised
objections to 100% scanning.28
20 This section was prepared by John Frittelli, Specialist in Transportation Policy.
21 Testimony of Janet Napolitano, Secretary of DHS, before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate, hearing “Transportation Security Challenges Post 9-11,” December 2, 2009.
22 Bureau of National Affairs, Daily Report for Executives, “CBP Focusing on High-Risk Ports for Overseas Scanning;
Two-year Delay Likely,” #55 DER A-3, March 24, 2010.
23 European Commission Staff Working Paper, Secure Trade and 100% Scanning of Containers, February 2010,
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/common/whats_new/sec_2010_131_en.pdf.
24 This test was conducted as per section 231 of the SAFE Port Act (P.L. 109-347).
25 CBP, Report to Congress on Integrated Scanning System Pilots (Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of
2006, Section 231), http://www.apl.com/security/documents/sfi_finalreport.pdf.
26 Ibid, Appendix A.
27 “U.S. Drops Singapore Scan-all,” Journal of Commerce Online, September 3, 2008.
28 “Japan Expresses Concern about U.S. Cargo Scanning Requirement,” Jiji Press English News Service, October 3,
2007.
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Threat Posed by Small Craft
The use of smaller vessels by terrorists to smuggle weapons or themselves onto U.S. shores or to
conduct suicide bombings against larger cargo or passenger ships, as they did to the Navy’s U.S.S.
Cole and to the French oil tanker Limberg, is a concern. There are too many smaller boats for the
Coast Guard to track and recreational boaters oppose tracking because of the cost of transponders
and concerns about privacy.29 Even if small vessels were tracked, there is skepticism whether
there would be sufficient time to thwart an attack since small vessels routinely sail next to
potential targets in a busy harbor environment. Based on a DHS strategy report, it appears the
Coast Guard has no immediate plans to require smaller vessels be outfitted with transponders but
will continue to pursue methods to identify small craft.30
Harbor Operation Centers
Interagency Operation Centers (IOCs) were authorized in the Security and Accountability for
Every Port Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-347, sec. 108). The U.S. Coast Guard is establishing IOCs in
major U.S. ports where federal and local law enforcement agencies can share maritime
intelligence and coordinate responses when the need arises, such as boarding higher risk
vessels.31 The Coast Guard is planning to co-locate these centers with existing Vessel Traffic
Service stations where Coast Guard “watch-standers” track and monitor ship movements in a
harbor for safety. While these command centers appear to be a means by which law enforcement
agencies can “connect the dots” in the maritime environment, Congress has been concerned with
the pace at which the Coast Guard is setting up these centers.
Transportation Worker Identification Credential
On January 25, 2007, TSA and the Coast Guard issued a final rule implementing the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) at U.S. ports.32 Longshoremen, port
truck drivers, merchant mariners, and other workers entering a port must apply for a TWIC card
to obtain unescorted access to port facilities or vessels. The card uses biometric technology for
positive identification and TSA conducts a security threat assessment of each worker before
issuing a card. The security threat assessment uses the same procedures and standards established
by TSA for truck drivers carrying hazardous materials. These standards examine criminal history,
immigration status, mental capacity, and terrorist activity to determine whether a worker poses a
security threat. A worker pays a fee of about $133 to cover the cost of administering the cards.
Port facility operators will be responsible for deploying card readers at the gates to their facilities.
TSA is testing card readers at a handful of ports to determine the best kind of card reader
technology to require. Congress has been concerned with how the TWIC requirement has affected
hiring practices and port and vessel operations.
29 Statement of Margaret Podlich, Boat Owners Association, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Hearing on Maritime Domain Awareness,
December 9, 2009.
30 DHS, Small Vessel Security Strategy, April 2008. For a critical review of this strategy, see DHS OIG, DHS’s
Strategy and Plans to Counter Small Vessel Threats Needs Improvement, September 2009.
31 IOCs were authorized in the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-347, sec. 108).
32 72 Federal Register, 3492 - 3604, January 25, 2007.
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Author Contact Information
David Randall Peterman
John Frittelli
Analyst in Transportation Policy
Specialist in Transportation Policy
dpeterman@crs.loc.gov, 7-3267
jfrittelli@crs.loc.gov, 7-7033
Bart Elias
Specialist in Aviation Policy
belias@crs.loc.gov, 7-7771
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