Intelligence Identities Protection Act
Jennifer K. Elsea
Legislative Attorney
January 28, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21636
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

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Intelligence Identities Protection Act

Summary
Concern that government documents obtained by WikiLeaks and disclosed to several newspapers
could reveal the identities of United States intelligence agents or informants has focused attention
on whether the disclosure or publication of such information could give rise to criminal liability.
This report summarizes the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, P.L. 97-200, enacted by
Congress in 1982 to address the unauthorized disclosure of information that exposes covert U.S.
intelligence agents. The act, as amended, is codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 421-426, and provides
criminal penalties in certain circumstances for intentional, unauthorized disclosure of information
identifying a covert agent, where those making such a disclosure know that the information
disclosed identifies the covert agent as such and that the United States is taking affirmative
measures to conceal the covert agent’s foreign intelligence relationship to the United States. The
act prescribes punishments for disclosing the identities of covert agents with increasing severity
according to the level of access to classified information the offender exploited. Offenders
without authorized access to classified information are subject to punishment only if they
participated in a pattern of activity designed to discover and reveal the identities of covert agents
and have reason to believe that such disclosure will harm U.S. intelligence operations.
The act also provides exceptions and defenses to prosecution, makes provision for extraterritorial
application for offenders who are U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens, includes reporting
requirements to Congress, and sets forth definitions of the terms used in the act. There do not
appear to be any published cases involving prosecutions under this act, despite some high-profile
incidents involving the exposure of U.S. intelligence agents. Although some officials have
expressed concern that the WikiLeaks disclosures could endanger the lives of persons who
provided information to assist U.S. forces in Iraq or Afghanistan or to embassy officials, the
narrowness of the statute makes it an unlikely vehicle for prosecuting anyone responsible for
publishing those names.

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Contents
Background ................................................................................................................................ 2
The Intelligence Identities Protection Act .................................................................................... 2
Prohibitions .......................................................................................................................... 3
First Amendment Implications .............................................................................................. 5
Reporting Requirements........................................................................................................ 6
Relevant Cases............................................................................................................................ 6

Contacts
Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................ 7
Acknowledgments ...................................................................................................................... 7

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oncern that government documents obtained by WikiLeaks and disclosed to several
newspapers could reveal the identities of United States intelligence agents or informants
C has focused attention on whether the disclosure or publication of such information could
give rise to criminal liability. This report provides background and summarizes the Intelligence
Identities Protection Act, P.L. 97-200, enacted by Congress in 1982 to address the unauthorized
disclosure of information that identifies U.S. intelligence agents. The act, as amended, is codified
at 50 U.S.C. §§ 421-426, and provides criminal penalties in certain circumstances for intentional,
unauthorized disclosure of information identifying a “covert agent” by a person who knows that
the information identifies a covert agent as such and that the United States is taking affirmative
measures to conceal the covert agent’s foreign intelligence relationship to the United States.
The act also provides exceptions and defenses to prosecution, makes provision for extraterritorial
application of the law if the offender is a U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien, includes
reporting requirements to Congress, and sets forth definitions of the terms used in the act. There
do not appear to be any published cases involving prosecutions under this act, despite some high-
profile incidents involving the exposure of U.S. intelligence agents. Although some officials have
expressed concern that the WikiLeaks disclosures could endanger the lives of persons who
provided information to assist U.S. forces in Iraq or Afghanistan or to embassy officials,1 the
narrowness of the statute seemingly makes it an unlikely vehicle for prosecuting anyone
responsible for publishing those names. CRS is not aware of any information to suggest that the
WikiLeaks disclosures or publication of leaked information by newspapers has resulted in the
exposure of any covert agents as defined by this statute.2

1 With respect to the Afghan documents, see Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on Meet
the Press, August 1, 2010, transcript available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38487969/ns/meet_the_press-
transcripts/; Elisabeth Bumiller, Gates Found Cost of Leaks Was Limited, NY TIMES, October 17, 2010 (quoting letter
from Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates to Senator Levin from Secretary Gates stating that the release of Afghan
informants’ names could have “potentially dramatic and grievously harmful consequences”). The documents relating to
the Iraq war have reportedly been redacted to withhold the names of informants. See Anna Mulrine, Wikileaks Iraq
Documents not as Damaging as Pentagon Feared—Yet, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, October 25, 2010. After the
release of classified State Department cables began in November 2010, State Department officials likewise predicted
that lives would be jeopardized. Tony Capaccio, Pentagon Alerts House, Senate Panels to New Classified WikiLeaks
Release, BLOOMBERG, November 24, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-24/pentagon-warns-house-
senate-defense-panels-of-more-wikileaks-documents.html (quoting Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs
Elizabeth King). Secretary of State Clinton explained that:
Relations between governments aren’t the only concern created by the publication of this material.
U.S. diplomats meet with local human rights workers, journalists, religious leaders, and others
outside of governments who offer their own candid insights. These conversations also depend on
trust and confidence. For example, if an anti-corruption activist shares information about official
misconduct, or a social worker passes along documentation of sexual violence, revealing that
person’s identity could have serious repercussions: imprisonment, torture, even death.
Remarks to the Press on the Release of Confidential Documents, November 29, 2010, available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/11/152078.htm. Although the cables are reportedly being released in redacted
form to protect identities as deemed necessary by the newspapers, the State Department has begun warning human
rights activists, foreign government officials and businesspeople who are identified in the diplomatic cables that they
may be at risk. See Mark Landler and Scott Shane, U.S. Sends Warning to People Named in Cable Leaks, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 6, 2011.
2 For background related to the WikiLeaks disclosures and information about other criminal prohibitions that may be
implicated, see CRS Report RL33502, Protection of National Security Information, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
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Background
The Intelligence Identities Protection Act was enacted into law as an amendment to the National
Security Act of 1947 in response to concerns of members of the House and Senate Intelligence
Committees and others in Congress “about the systematic effort by a small group of Americans,
including some former intelligence agency employees, to disclose the names of covert
intelligence agents.”3 The Senate Judiciary Committee’s report also discussed the efforts of Philip
Agee, Lewis Wolf, and others to identify and disclose U.S. intelligence officers as part of “a
systematic effort to destroy the ability of [U.S.] intelligence agencies to operate clandestinely,”
and their apparent repercussions.4 Such disclosures preceded and may have contributed to
circumstances resulting in the death or attempted assassination of some Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) officers, expulsion of others from a foreign country following charges of spying,
and impairment of relations with foreign intelligence sources. Two of Agee’s books revealed over
1,000 names of alleged CIA officers. Wolf was co-editor of the “Covert Action Information
Bulletin,” a publication which contained a section entitled “Naming Names.” Wolf claimed to
have revealed the names of over 2,000 CIA officers. He also provided addresses, phone numbers,
license tag numbers, and colors of the automobiles of some alleged intelligence agents.5 These
disclosures set the stage for the consideration and passage of the Intelligence Identities Protection
Act.
The Intelligence Identities Protection Act
The Intelligence Identities Protection Act provides criminal penalties for the intentional,
unauthorized disclosure of information identifying a covert agent with knowledge that the
information identifies a covert agent as such and that the United States is taking affirmative
measures to conceal the covert agent’s foreign intelligence relationship to the United States.
Covert agents include officers and employees of a U.S. intelligence agency6 (including military
officers assigned to an intelligence agency) whose identities as such are classified and who are
serving (or have served within the last five years) outside the United States; as well as a U.S.
citizen residing abroad or a foreign national who acts as an informant,7 agent, or source to an
intelligence agency, and whose relationship with the U.S. government is classified. The act
prescribes punishments for disclosing the identities of covert agents with increasing severity

3 S.Rept. 97-201, at 1, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 145. In this report, the Senate Judiciary Committee reviewed the
legislative history of S. 391 and the companion bill, H.R. 4, and their predecessors beginning with proposals in the 94th
and 95th Congresses. The Congress passed H.R. 4, in lieu of the Senate bill, after amending the House bill to encompass
much of the language of the Senate bill.
4 S.Rept. 97-201, at 1-7, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 145-51. S.Rept. 97-201, 7-10, reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 151-54. See also, H.R. 4, The Intelligence Identities Protection Act: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Legislation of the House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Intelligence Identities
Protection Act of 1981—S. 391: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
5 S.Rept. 97-201, at 7-10, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 151-54.
6 “Intelligence agency” is defined to mean “the Central Intelligence Agency, a foreign intelligence component of the
Department of Defense, or the foreign counterintelligence or foreign counterterrorism components of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.” 50 U.S.C.§ 426(5).
7 “Informant” is defined to mean “any individual who furnishes information to an intelligence agency in the course of a
confidential relationship protecting the identity of such individual from public disclosure.” 50 U.S.C. § 426(6).
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according to the level of access to classified information the offender exploited. Offenders
without authorized access to classified information are subject to punishment only if they
participated in a pattern of activity designed to discover and reveal the identities of covert agents
and have reason to believe that such disclosure will harm U.S. intelligence operations.
Prohibitions
The criminal provisions of the act are contained in 50 U.S.C. § 421, which defines three offenses
according to the offender’s means of acquiring the information at issue:
§ 421. Protection of identities of certain United States undercover intelligence officers,
agents, informants, and sources.
(a) Disclosure of information by persons having or having had access to classified
information that identifies covert agent
Whoever, having or having had authorized access to classified information that identifies a
covert agent, intentionally discloses any information identifying such covert agent to any
individual not authorized to receive classified information, knowing that the information
disclosed so identifies such covert agent and that the United States is taking affirmative
measures to conceal such covert agent’s intelligence relationship to the United States, shall
be fined under Title 18 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
(b) Disclosure of information by persons who learn identify of covert agents as result of
having access to classified information
Whoever, as a result of having authorized access to classified information, learns the identity
of a covert agent and intentionally discloses any information identifying such covert agent to
any individual not authorized to receive classified information, knowing that the information
disclosed so identifies such covert agent and that the United States is taking affirmative
measures to conceal such covert agent’s intelligence relationship to the United States, shall
be fined under Title 18 or imprisoned not more than five years , or both.
(c) Disclosure of information by persons in course of pattern of activities intended to identify
and expose covert agents
Whoever, in the course of a pattern of activities intended to identify and expose covert agents
and with reason to believe that such activities would impair or impede the foreign
intelligence activities of the United States, discloses any information that identifies an
individual as a covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive classified
information, knowing that the information disclosed so identifies such individual and that the
United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal such individual’s classified
intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined under Title 18 or imprisoned not
more than three years, or both.
Each of these offenses is a felony. The applicable maximum fine is $250,000, unless any
pecuniary gain or loss resulted from the offense, in which case the fine may be set at twice the
amount of loss or gain.8 A sentence under § 421 is to be served consecutively with respect to any
other prison sentence.

8 18 U.S.C. § 3571.
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The offenses set forth in 50 U.S.C. § 421 (a), (b), and (c) share some elements in common: (1)
intentional disclosure9 of the identity of a covert agent10 (2) to someone not authorized to receive
classified information, (3) knowing that the information disclosed identifies that agent, and (4)
knowing further that the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal the agent’s
intelligence relationship with the United States.
Subsections 421(a) and (b) contemplate offenses where the perpetrator has or has had authorized
access to classified information, while subsection 421(c) has no similar requirement. Subsection
421(a) applies to an offender who has or previously had access to classified information that
identifies a covert agent. Subsection 421(b) applies to an offender who learns the identity of a
covert agent as a result of having authorized access to classified information in general. In
contrast to these provisions, subsection 421(c) does not require that the perpetrator ever had
authorized access to classified information. Rather, it applies if the perpetrator discloses the
identity of any covert agent (1) in the course of a pattern of activities intended to identify and
expose covert agents, (2) with reason to believe that these activities would impair or impede U.S.
foreign intelligence activities.11 Subsection 426(10) defines a “pattern of activities” as involving
“a series of acts with a common purpose or objective.”
Section 424 establishes extraterritorial jurisdiction for offenses committed overseas only where
the offender is a U.S. citizen or a permanent resident alien.
Under 50 U.S.C. § 422, it is a defense to a prosecution under 50 U.S.C. § 421 that, prior to the
commission of the offense, the United States publicly acknowledged or revealed the intelligence
relationship to the United States of the covert agent involved. In addition, this provision precludes

9 50 U.S.C. § 426 (3) defines “disclose” to mean “to communicate, provide, impart, transmit, transfer, convey, publish,
or otherwise make available.”
10 50 U.S.C. § 426(4) defines “covert agent” to mean:
(A) a present or retired officer or employee of an intelligence agency or a present or retired member
of the armed forces assigned to duty with an intelligence agency—
(i) whose identity as such an officer, employee, or member is classified information, and
(ii) who is serving outside the United States or has within the last five years served outside the
United States; or
(B) a United States citizen whose intelligence relationship to the United States is classified
information, and—
(i) who resides and acts outside the United States as an agent of, or informant or source of
operational assistance to, an intelligence agency, or
(ii) who is at the time of the disclosure acting as an agent of, or informant to, the foreign
counterintelligence or foreign counterterrorism components of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; or
(C) an individual, other than a United States citizen, whose past or present intelligence relationship
to the United States is classified information and who is a present or former agent of, or a present or
former informant or source of operational assistance to, an intelligence agency.
There is an apparent redundancy in the second definition, which pertains to U.S. citizens who are not officers or
employees of the United States, in that the definition of “intelligence agency” already includes the relevant components
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Perhaps this should be interpreted as emphasizing that the person must be
acting as an FBI informant at the time of the disclosure, even if the individual’s relationship with the FBI continues to
be classified.
11 “Foreign intelligence activities” is not defined. It is unclear whether counterintelligence and counterterrorism
activities are included, although counterintelligence and counterterrorism components of the FBI (but not the
Department of Defense) qualify as intelligence agencies whose agents’ identities are protected.
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prosecution of anyone other than the person who made the disclosure of the identity of a covert
agent for a § 421 offense on the grounds of misprision of felony, aiding and abetting, or
conspiracy, unless the elements of subsection 421(c) are satisfied. This would appear to preclude
the prosecution of a recipient of covered information, whether solicited or not, who publishes the
information but has not engaged in a prohibited “pattern of activities” intended to disclose the
names of covert agents. It is not an offense for a person to transmit information directly to either
the House or Senate intelligence committees, nor for a covert agent to disclose his or her own
identity. Under § 425, the act is not to be construed to permit the withholding of information from
Congress or a committee of the House or Senate.
First Amendment Implications
During Congress’s consideration of the measure, much attention was focused on subsection
421(c) and the First Amendment implications if it were employed to prosecute a journalist or
anyone else who might publish the identities of covert agents learned from public sources or
through other lawful activity.12 The Senate Judiciary and the Conference Committee addressed
these concerns at length. Both concluded that the language of the measure would pass
constitutional muster.13 The Conference Committee characterized the goal of the provision as
follows:
The record indicates that the harm this bill seeks to prevent is most likely to result from
disclosure of covert agents’ identities in such a course designed, first, to make an effort at
identifying covert agents and, second, to expose such agents publicly. The gratuitous listing
of agents’ names in certain publications goes far beyond information that might contribute to
informed public debate on foreign policy or foreign intelligence activities. That effort to
identify U.S. intelligence officers and agents in countries throughout the world and to expose
their identities repeatedly ... serves no legitimate purpose. It does not alert to abuses; it does
not further civil liberties; it does not enlighten public debate; and it does not contribute one
iota to the goal of an educated and informed electorate. Instead, it reflects a total disregard
for the consequences that may jeopardize the lives and safety of individuals and damage the
ability of the United States to safeguard the national defense and conduct an effective foreign
policy....
The standard adopted in section [421(c)] applies criminal penalties only in very limited
circumstances to deter those who make it their business to ferret out and publish the
identities of agents. At the same time, it does not affect the First Amendment rights of those
who disclose the identities of agents as an integral part of another enterprise such as news
media reporting of intelligence failures or abuses, academic studies of U.S. government
policies and programs, or a private organization’s enforcement of its internal rules.14
The Conference Committee distinguished between the main purpose of a person engaged in “the
business of ‘naming names,’” whose intent is to identify and expose covert agents, and side
effects of one’s conduct that one “anticipates but allows to occur.” “Those who republish previous
disclosures and critics of U.S. intelligence would all stand beyond the reach of the law if they did

12 H. Conf. Rep. 97-580, at 6-8; reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 170-72.
13 S.Rept. 97-201, at 14-18; reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 158-62; H. Conf. Rep. 97-580, at 7-10; reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 171-75.
14 H. Conf. Rep. 97-580, at 7-8; reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 171-72.
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not engage in a pattern of activities intended to identify and expose covert agents.”15 Despite
these assurances, some commentators have questioned the constitutional sufficiency of subsection
421(c) on First Amendment grounds, finding it overbroad, and questioning the absence of a
specific intent requirement instead of the “reason to believe” standard.16 The courts have yet to
consider the issue.
Reporting Requirements
Section 423 requires the President, after receiving information from the Director of Intelligence,
to report to the House and Senate intelligence committees annually on measures to protect covert
agents, and other relevant information. Such reports are exempt from any publication or
disclosure requirement.
Relevant Cases
To date, there have been no reported cases interpreting the statute, but it did result in one
conviction in 1985 pursuant to a guilty plea.17 Sharon Scranage, a former CIA clerk, pleaded
guilty for providing classified information regarding U.S. intelligence operations in Ghana to a
Ghanaian agent with whom she was romantically involved.18 She was initially sentenced to five
years in prison, but a federal judge reduced her sentence to two years in light of the relatively
lenient treatment received by the Ghanaian agent, who was sentenced to 20 years after pleading
no contest to espionage but was soon thereafter returned to Ghana as part of a spy exchange.19
Other spies whose crimes are known to have resulted in the deaths of covert agents were charged
with more serious offenses under the Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 794, but not under the
Intelligence Identities Protection Act. Aldrich Ames, whose activities resulted in the executions of
10 Soviet sources to the FBI and CIA,20 pleaded guilty to espionage and was sentenced to life
imprisonment. Robert Hanssen, whose work as an FBI “mole” for the Soviet and later Russian
security services resulted in the deaths of at least three covert agents,21 pleaded guilty in 2001 to
multiple counts of espionage and likewise received a life sentence.
In 2003, the Department of Justice opened an investigation to determine whether a violation of
the Intelligence Identities Protection Act had occurred after syndicated columnist Robert Novak

15 H. Conf. Rep. 97-580, at 9-10; reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 173-74.
16 See Note: The Constitutionality of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 727 (1983); Note:
The Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982: An Assessment of the Constitutionality of Section 601(c), 49
BROOKLYN L. REV. 479 (1983).
17 See Richard B. Schmitt, Rare Statute Figures in Rove Case, LA TIMES, July 15, 2005, at A15 (reporting 1985
conviction of Sharon Scranage, a clerk for the CIA in Ghana, for disclosing identities of covert agents).
18 Stephen Engelberg, C.I.A. Clerk and Ghanaian Charged in Espionage Case, NY TIMES, July 12, 1985, at A13.
19 Spying Sentence Reduced, NY TIMES, April 11, 1986, at A15.
20 Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case and Its Implications for U.S. Intelligence, S.Prt. 103-90 at 53
(1994).
21 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of the FBI’s Performance in Deterring,
Detecting, and Investigating Espionage Activities of Robert Hanssen (Unclassified Executive Summary) 9 (2003),
available at http://files.findlaw.com/docviewer/viewer_news.html#http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/hanssen/
hanssen81403rpt.pdf.
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published the name of CIA officer Valerie Plame.22 No charges under § 421 were pursued;23
however, the existence of the provision and its possible breach were held to overcome any
privilege on the part of reporters to refuse to disclose their source to a grand jury.24 I. Lewis
Libby, then Vice President Dick Cheney’s chief of staff, was convicted of obstruction of justice,
perjury, and making a false statement to federal investigators in connection with the incident, and
was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment, two years’ probation, and a $250,000 fine. President
George W. Bush commuted the prison portion of the sentence after Mr. Libby was denied release
on bond pending his appeal.25
In a related case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit interpreted the statute as neither
providing for nor precluding a remedy for a covert agent whose identity is disclosed by a
government employee, but as counseling against the creation of a Bivens26 remedy for such an
agent because permitting a lawsuit “would inevitably require an inquiry into ‘classified
information that may undermine ongoing covert operations.’”27

Author Contact Information

Jennifer K. Elsea

Legislative Attorney
jelsea@crs.loc.gov, 7-5466


Acknowledgments
An earlier version of this report was prepared by Legislative Attorney Elizabeth Bazan.


22 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (recounting background of the
investigation into the leak of Valerie Plame’s identity as an officer of the CIA).
23 It has been speculated that § 421 offense was not charged because Ms. Plame was not a “covert agent” within the
meaning of the act or that the government officials who revealed her identity to reporters did not know that her status as
a CIA officer was classified. See William E. Lee, Deep Background: Journalists, Sources, and the Perils of Leaking, 57
AM. U. L. REV. 1453, 1490-1501 (2007).
24 Id., cert. denied 545 U.S. 1150 (2005).
25 See The President’s Statement, NY TIMES, July 3, 2007, at A15. Mr. Libby later dropped his appeal. Philip Shenon,
Libby Drops His Appeal In Leak Case, NY Times, December 11, 2007 at A27.
26 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, (1971) (creating a private right
of action for a violation of constitutional rights by agents of the government).
27 Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied 129 S.Ct. 2825 (2009).
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