Cuba: Issues for the 112th Congress
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
January 28, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41617
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Cuba: Issues for the 112th Congress
Summary
Cuba remains a one-party communist state with a poor record on human rights. The country’s
political succession in 2006 from the long-ruling Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl was
characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. The government of Raúl Castro implemented
limited economic policy changes in 2008 and 2009, and in September 2010 began a significant
series of reforms to reduce the public sector and increase private enterprise. Few observers expect
the government to ease its tight control over the political system, although it has reduced the
number of political prisoners over the past several years, including the release of more than 50
since July 2010 after talks with the Cuban Catholic Church.
Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy has consisted largely of isolating Cuba through economic
sanctions. A second policy component has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people,
including U.S.-sponsored broadcasting and support for human rights activists. In light of Fidel
Castro’s departure as head of government, many observers called for a reexamination of policy.
Two broad approaches toward Cuba have been at the center of debate. The first would maintain
the dual-track policy of isolating the Cuban government while providing support to the Cuban
people. The second is aimed at changing attitudes in the Cuban government and society through
increased engagement. The Obama Administration has lifted restrictions on family travel and
remittances; eased restrictions on telecommunications links with Cuba; restarted semi-annual
migration talks; and recently announced further easing of restrictions on educational and religious
travel and non-family remittances. The Administration has criticized the government’s repression
of dissidents, but it welcomed Cuba’s July 2010 announcement of a prisoner release as a positive
sign. The Administration also has called for the release of a U.S. government subcontractor
imprisoned since December 2009.
The 111th Congress took action on several measures that included provisions related to Cuba. In
March 2009, Congress approved three provisions in the FY2009 omnibus appropriations measure
(P.L. 111-8) that eased sanctions on family travel, travel for the marketing of agricultural and
medical goods, and payment terms for U.S. agricultural exports. In December 2009, Congress
included a provision in the FY2010 omnibus appropriations legislation (P.L. 111-117) that eased
payment terms for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba during FY2010 by defining the term
“payment of cash in advance” more broadly. While Congress did not complete action on any of
the FY2011 appropriations measures, it did approve a series of short-term continuing resolutions
(P.L. 111-242, as amended), the last of which provided funding for federal agencies through
March 4, 2011 under conditions provided in enacted FY2010 appropriations measures. This
extended the more restrictive “payment of cash in advance provision” and also continued Cuba
broadcasting and democracy funding. Numerous other initiatives were introduced, but not
considered, several of which would have eased sanctions on Cuba in various ways.
Congressional interest on Cuba is likely to continue in the 112th Congress, focused on a number
of issues, including U.S. sanctions, the human rights situation, Cuba’s imprisonment of a U.S.
government subcontractor, the status of Cuba’s economic reforms, and its offshore oil
development. For additional information, see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on
Travel and Remittances and CRS Report R41522, Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development: Background
and U.S. Policy Considerations.
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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Cuba’s Political and Economic Situation ..................................................................................... 3
Brief Historical Background.................................................................................................. 3
Political Conditions............................................................................................................... 4
Human Rights ................................................................................................................. 6
Economic Conditions .......................................................................................................... 11
Economic Changes Under Raúl Castro.......................................................................... 13
Cuba’s Foreign Relations .................................................................................................... 15
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba .......................................................................................................... 17
Background on U.S.-Cuban Relations ................................................................................. 17
Clinton Administration’s Easing of Sanctions ................................................................ 18
Bush Administration’s Tightening of Sanctions ............................................................. 18
Debate on the Direction of U.S. Policy ................................................................................ 19
Obama Administration Policy.............................................................................................. 20
Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations ................................................................................................. 23
U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances ....................................................................... 23
U.S. Agricultural Exports and Sanctions.............................................................................. 25
Trademark Sanction ............................................................................................................ 27
Anti-Drug Cooperation ....................................................................................................... 28
Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development....................................................................................... 30
Terrorism Issues.................................................................................................................. 31
U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights...................................................... 33
Oversight of U.S. Democracy Assistance to Cuba.......................................................... 34
December 2009 Detainment of American Subcontractor................................................ 35
Radio and TV Marti ............................................................................................................ 36
Migration Issues.................................................................................................................. 39
1994 and 1995 Migration Accords................................................................................. 39
Coast Guard Interdictions.............................................................................................. 40
Migration Talks............................................................................................................. 41
Legislative Initiatives in the 112th Congress............................................................................... 43
Legislation in the 111th Congress ............................................................................................... 43
Approved Measures ............................................................................................................ 43
Additional Considered Measures with Cuba Provisions ....................................................... 45
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Cuba ................................................................................................................ 2
Figure 2. Cuba: Real GDP Growth (%), 2004 - 2010 ................................................................. 12
Figure 3. Cuban Exports by Country of Destination, 2009 ......................................................... 15
Figure 4. Cuban Imports by Country of Origin, 2009................................................................. 16
Figure 5. U.S. Exports to Cuba, 2001-2009 ............................................................................... 26
Figure 6. Maritime Interdiction of Cubans, FY2002-FY2010..................................................... 40
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Appendixes
Appendix A. Selected Executive Branch Reports and WebPages................................................ 48
Appendix B. CRS and GAO Reports......................................................................................... 49
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 51
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 51
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Cuba: Issues for the 112th Congress
Introduction
Political and economic developments in Cuba and U.S. policy toward the island nation, located
just 90 miles from the United States, have been significant congressional concerns for many
years. Since the end of the Cold War, Congress has played an active role in shaping U.S. policy
toward Cuba, first with the enactment of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-484, Title
XVII) and then with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114).
Both of these measures strengthened U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba that had first been
imposed in the early 1960s, but the measures also provided roadmaps for a normalization of
relations dependent upon significant political and economic changes in Cuba. A decade ago,
Congress modified its sanctions-based policy toward Cuba somewhat when it enacted the Trade
Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) allowing for
U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba that led to the United States becoming a major source for
Cuba’s food imports.
Over the past decade, much of the debate over U.S. policy in Congress has focused on U.S.
sanctions, especially over U.S. restrictions on travel to Cuba. The George W. Bush Administration
initially liberalized U.S. family travel to Cuba in 2003, but subsequently tightened restrictions on
family and other categories of travel in 2004 because of Cuba’s crackdown on political dissidents.
In 2009, Congress took legislative action in an appropriations measure (P.L. 111-8) to ease
restrictions on family travel and travel for the marketing of agricultural exports, marking the first
congressional action easing Cuba sanctions in almost a decade. The Obama Administration took
further action in April 2009 by lifting all restrictions on family travel and on cash remittances by
family members to their relatives in Cuba and restarting semi-annual migration talks that had
been curtailed in 2004. In January 2011, the Administration announced that it would be further
easing restrictions on educational and religious travel to Cuba and on non-family remittances, and
it would also expand the number of eligible airports in the United States authorized to serve
licensed charter flights to and from Cuba.
This report is divided into three major sections analyzing Cuba’s political and economic situation,
U.S. policy toward Cuba, and selected issues in U.S.-Cuban relations. The first section on the
political and economic situation includes a brief historical background, a discussion of the human
rights situation and political prisoners, and an examination of economic policy changes that have
occurred to date under Raúl Castro. The second section on U.S. policy provides a broad overview
of U.S. policy historically through the George W. Bush Administration and then provides a brief
discussion of the broad debate on the direction of U.S. policy toward Cuba. Policy under the
Obama Administration is then examined in more detail. The third section analyzes many of the
key issues in U.S.-Cuban relations that have been at the forefront of the U.S. policy debate on
Cuba and have often been the subject of legislative initiatives. These include: U.S. restrictions on
travel, remittances, and agricultural exports to Cuba; a sanction that denies protection for certain
Cuban trademarks; the status of anti-drug cooperation with Cuba; the status of Cuba’s offshore
development and implications for disaster response preparedness; terrorism issues, especially in
consideration of Cuba remaining on the State Department’s state sponsors of terrorism list; U.S.
funding for democracy and human rights projects; U.S. government-sponsored broadcasting to
Cuba (Radio and TV Martí); and migration issues.
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Figure 1. Map of Cuba
Source: CRS.
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Cuba: Issues for the 112th Congress
Cuba’s Political and Economic Situation
Brief Historical Background1
Cuba did not become an independent nation until 1902. From its discovery by Columbus in 1492
until the Spanish-American War in 1898, Cuba was a Spanish colony. In the 19th century, the
country became a major sugar producer with slaves from Africa arriving in increasing numbers to
work the sugar plantations. The drive for independence from Spain grew stronger in the second
half of the 19th century, but it only came about after the United States entered the conflict when
the USS Maine sank in Havana Harbor after an explosion of undetermined origin. In the
aftermath of the Spanish-American War, the United States ruled Cuba for four years until Cuba
was granted its independence in 1902. Nevertheless, the United States still retained the right to
intervene in Cuba to preserve Cuban independence and maintain stability in accordance with the
Platt Amendment2 that became part of the Cuban Constitution of 1901. The United States
subsequently intervened militarily three times between 1906 and 1921 to restore order, but in
1934, the Platt Amendment was repealed.
Cuba’s political system as an independent nation was often dominated by authoritarian figures.
Gerardo Machado (1925-1933), who served two terms as president, became increasingly
dictatorial until he was ousted by the military. A short-lived reformist government gave way to a
series of governments that were dominated behind the scenes by military leader Fulgencio Batista
until he was elected president in 1940. Batista was voted out of office in 1944 and was followed
by two successive presidents in a democratic era that ultimately became characterized by
corruption and increasing political violence. Batista seized power in a bloodless coup in 1952 and
his rule progressed into a brutal dictatorship. This fueled popular unrest and set the stage for Fidel
Castro’s rise to power.
Castro led an unsuccessful attack on military barracks in Santiago, Cuba, on July 26, 1953. He
was jailed, but subsequently freed and went into exile in Mexico where he formed the 26th of July
Movement. Castro returned to Cuba in 1956 with the goal of overthrowing the Batista
dictatorship. His revolutionary movement was based in the Sierra Maestra and joined with other
resistance groups seeking Batista’s ouster. Batista ultimately fled the country on January 1, 1959,
leading to more than 45 years of rule under Fidel Castro until he stepped down from power
provisionally in July 2006 because of poor health.
While Castro had promised a return to democratic constitutional rule when he first took power, he
instead moved to consolidate his rule, repress dissent, and imprison or execute thousands of
opponents. Under the new revolutionary government, Castro’s supporters gradually displaced
members of less radical groups. Castro moved toward close relations with the Soviet Union while
1 Portions of this background are drawn from U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Cuba,” March 2010. For
further background, see: Cuba, A Country Study, ed. Rex A. Hudson, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002); “Country Profile: Cuba,” Federal Research Division,
Library of Congress, September 2006, available at: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Cuba.pdf; Cuba, A Short
History, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge University Press, 1993); and Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom,
(New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971).
2 U.S. Senator Orville Platt introduced an amendment to an army appropriation bill that was approved by both houses
and enacted into law in 1901.
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relations with the United States deteriorated rapidly as the Cuban government expropriated U.S.
properties (see “Background on U.S.-Cuban Relations” below). In April 1961, Castro declared
that the Cuban revolution was socialist, and in December 1961, he proclaimed himself to be a
Marxist-Leninist. Over the next 30 years, Cuba was a close ally of the Soviet Union and
depended on it for significant assistance until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
From 1959 until 1976, Castro ruled by decree. In 1976, however, the Cuban government enacted
a new Constitution setting forth the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) as the leading force in state
and society, with power centered in a Political Bureau headed by Fidel Castro. Cuba’s
Constitution also outlined national, provincial, and local governmental structures. Since then,
legislative authority has been vested in a National Assembly of People’s Power that meets twice
annually for brief periods. When the Assembly is not in session, a Council of State, elected by the
Assembly, acts on its behalf. According to Cuba’s Constitution, the president of the Council of
State is the country’s head of state and government. Executive power in Cuba is vested in a
Council of Ministers, also headed by the country’s head of state and government, that is, the
president of the Council of State.
Fidel Castro served as head of state and government through his position as president of the
Council of State from 1976 until February 2008. While he had provisionally stepped down from
power in July 2006 because of poor health, Fidel still officially retained his position as head of
state and government. National Assembly elections were held on January 20, 2008 and Fidel
Castro was once again among the candidates elected to the now 614-member legislative body.
(As in the past, voters were only offered a single slate of candidates.) On February 24, 2008, the
new Assembly was scheduled to select from among its ranks the members of the Council of State
and its president. Many observers had speculated that because of his poor health, Fidel would
choose not to be reelected as president of the Council of State, which would confirm his official
departure from heading the Cuban government. Statements from Castro himself in December
2007 hinted at his potential retirement. That proved true on February 19, 2008, when Fidel
announced that he would not accept the position as president of the Council of State, essentially
confirming his departure as titular head of the Cuban government.
Political Conditions
After Fidel stepped down from power, Cuba’s political succession from Fidel to Raúl Castro was
characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. After two and one half years of provisionally
serving as president, Raúl Castro officially became Cuba’s President on February 24, 2008 when
Cuba’s legislature selected him as president of the 31-member Council of State.3
For many years, Raúl, as first vice president of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers,
had been the officially designated successor and was slated to become head of state with Fidel’s
departure. Raúl also had served as Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) since the
beginning of the Cuban revolution. When Fidel stepped down from power in 2006, he signed a
proclamation that ceded political power to Raúl on a provisional basis, including the positions of
first secretary of the Cuban Communist Party, commander in chief of the FAR, and president of
3 For more on Cuba’s political succession, see CRS Report RS22742, Cuba’s Political Succession: From Fidel to Raúl
Castro. For background discussion of potential Cuban political scenarios envisioned in the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s
stepping down from power in 2006, see CRS Report RL33622, Cuba’s Future Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy
Approaches.
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the Council of State. Despite the change in government in February 2008, Fidel still holds the
official title of first secretary of the PCC, although Raúl as provisional first secretary is essentially
leading the party.
While it was not a surprise to observers for Raúl to succeed his brother Fidel officially as head of
government, the selection of José Ramón Machado Ventura as the Council of State’s first vice
president in February 2008 was a surprise. Born in 1930, Machado is a physician by training and
is part of the older generation of so-called históricos of the 1959 Cuban revolution along with the
Castro brothers (Fidel Castro was born on August 13, 1926, while Raúl Castro was born on June
3, 1931). He has been described as a hard-line communist party ideologue, and reportedly has
been a close friend and confident of Raúl for many years.4 Machado’s position is significant
because it makes him the official successor to Raúl, according to the Cuban Constitution. Many
observers had expected that Carlos Lage, one of five other vice presidents on the Council of State,
would have been chose as first vice president. Born in 1951, Lage was responsible for Cuba’s
economic reforms in the 1990s and represented a younger generation of Cuban leaders.
Several key military officers and confidants of Raúl also became members of the Council of
State, increasing the role of the military in the government. General Julio Casas Regueiro, who
already was on the Council, became one of its five vice presidents. Most significantly, Casas, who
had been first vice minister in the FAR, was selected by Raúl as the country’s new minister of the
FAR, officially replacing Raúl in that position. Casas also is chairman of GAESA (Grupo de
Administracion Empresarial, S.A.), the Cuban military’s holding company for its extensive
business operations.5
In March 2009, Raúl orchestrated a government shake-up that combined four ministries into two
and ousted a dozen high-ranking officials, most notably including Foreign Minister Felipe Pérez
Roque, Council of Ministers Secretary Carlos Lage, and Minister of Economy and Planning José
Luis Rodriguez García. The streamlining combined the portfolios of food and fishing into one
ministry and the foreign investment and trade portfolios into another ministry. Changes in the
bureaucracy had been anticipated since February 2008 when Raúl Castro vowed to make the
government smaller and more efficient, but the ouster of both Felipe Pérez Roque and Carlos
Lage, who lost all their government and party positions, caught many observers by surprise. Pérez
Roque was replaced by career diplomat Bruno Rodriguez Parrilla, who served for eight years
(1995-2003) as Cuba’s U.N. Ambassador and most recently as vice foreign minister. Carlos Lage,
who most significantly lost his position as a vice president of the Council of State, was replaced
by military General José Amado Guerra, who had worked for Raúl Castro as secretary of the
FAR.
What was unexpected about the simultaneous ouster of both Pérez Roque and Lage was that they
represented different tendencies within Cuba’s communist political system. Pérez Roque, a
former private secretary to Fidel, was known as a hardliner, while Carlos Lage, who was
responsible for Cuba’s limited economic reforms in the 1990s, was viewed as a potential
economic reformer. Some observers maintain that the ouster of both Pérez Roque and Lage was a
move by Raúl to replace so-called Fidelistas with his own supporters. Fidel, however, wrote in
one of his reflections in the Cuban press that both officials had been seduced by ambitions for
4 Daniel Dombey, Richard Lapper, and Andrew Ward, “A Family Business, Cuban-Americans Look Beyond the
Havana Handover,” Financial Times, February 27, 2008.
5 Pablo Bachelet, “New Cuban Leader Adds Military Loyalists to Team,” Miami Herald, February 25, 2008.
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power, and that a majority of the other officials who were replaced by Raúl had not originally
been appointed by Fidel.6 Along these lines, a number of observers maintain that the ouster of
Pérez Roque and Lage had more to do with removing potential contenders for power in a post-
Castro Cuba. What appears clear from the government shake-up is that Raúl Castro began putting
his mark on the Cuban government bureaucracy. Some observers contend that Raúl was moving
forward with his pledge to make the government more efficient. According to this view, ideology
did not play a role in the appointments, and several of those brought in as ministers were
relatively unknown technocrats.7 The new appointments also continued the trend toward bringing
more military officials into the government.
While Raúl began implementing some limited economic reforms in 2008 and announced more
significant reforms in September 2010 (see “Economic Changes Under Raúl Castro” below),
there has been no change to his government’s tight control over the political system and few
observers expect there to be, with the government backed up by a strong security apparatus. Some
observers point to the significantly reduced number of political prisoners over the past several
years as evidence of a lessening of repression, but while human rights activists have welcomed
the change, some maintain that the overall situation has not improved, with the government
resorting to short term detentions and other forms of intimidation.
Originally, the Cuban Communist Party’s sixth congress was expected to be held at the end of
2009 (the last was held in 1997), but the party postponed it, with Raúl Castro maintaining that
additional and extensive preparation was needed for the meeting. Observers maintain that Cuba’s
poor economic situation prompted the postponement of the congress.
In early November 2010, however, Raúl Castro announced that the sixth party congress would be
held in April 2011. The President maintained that the congress would concentrate on the
economy, with decisions on updating the Cuban economic model, and outlining the economic and
social policy of the party and the revolution. While some analysts had speculated that Fidel
Castro would be officially replaced as head of the party during the congress, and that it was likely
that some members of the PCC’s Political Bureau (Politburo) would be replaced, Raúl Castro
maintained that decisions regarding the party’s leadership would be postponed until the end of
2011 when a separate party conference would be held.
Human Rights
Cuba has a poor record on human rights, with the government sharply restricting freedoms of
expression, association, assembly, movement, and other basic rights since the early years of the
Cuban revolution. It has cracked down on dissent, arrested human rights activists and
independent journalists, and staged demonstrations against critics. Some observers anticipated a
relaxation of the government’s oppressive tactics in the aftermath of the January 1998 visit of
Pope John Paul II, but government attacks against human rights activists and other dissidents
continued. (See the text box on “Human Rights Reporting on Cuba” for links to reports from
Human Rights Watch, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the State Department,
6 According to Fidel Castro, “The sweetness of power for which they had made no sacrifice awoke in them ambitions
that led them to an unworthy role. The external enemy was filled with illusions about them.” See Reflections of Fidel,
“Healthy Changes within the Council of Ministers,” from CubaDebate as translated by Granma International, March 3,
2009.
7 Frances Robles, “Cuban Government Undergoes Massive Restructuring,” Miami Herald, March 3, 2009.
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Amnesty International, and the Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National
Reconciliation.)
Cuba signed two U.N. human rights treaties in 2008: the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Some
considered this a positive step, but others maintain that the Cuban government has not taken any
significant action to guarantee civil and political freedoms. In March 2008, the Cuban
government did lift the ban on Cubans staying at tourist hotels. Although few Cubans will be able
to afford the cost of staying in such hotels, the move was symbolically significant and ended the
practices of what critics had dubbed “tourism apartheid.”
While Cuban authorities have continued to stifle dissent and repress freedoms, Cuban pro-
democracy and human rights activists continue to call attention to the country’s poor human
rights record and many have been recognized over the years by the international community for
their efforts.
A human rights group known as the Ladies in White (Damas de Blanco) was formed in April
2003 by the wives, mothers, daughters, sisters, and aunts of the members of the “group of 75”
dissidents arrested a month earlier in Cuba’s human rights crackdown.8 The group conducts
peaceful protests calling for the unconditional release of political prisoners. Dressed in white, its
members attend Mass each Sunday at St. Rita’s Church in Havana and then walk silently through
the streets to a nearby park. In April 2008, 10 members of the Ladies in White were physically
removed from a park near the Plaza of the Revolution in Havana when they demanded the release
of their husbands and the other members of the “group of 75” still imprisoned. The group held
protests during the third week of March 2010 to commemorate the March 2003 crackdown.
Cuban security forces and government-orchestrated mobs forcefully broke up the protests on
March 16 and 17, while protests on other days were subject to verbal abuse by mobs. In April, the
Ladies in White were prevented from conducting their weekly protests by government-
orchestrated mobs. Through the intercession of Roman Catholic Cardinal Jaime Ortega, the
Cuban government ended the harassment in early May 2010 and allowed the Ladies in White to
continue with their weekly marches.
Cuban Internet blogger Yoaní Sánchez has received considerable international attention since late
2007 for her website, Generación Y, which includes commentary critical of the Cuban
government. In May 2008, Sánchez was awarded Spain’s Ortega y Gasset award for digital
journalism, but the Cuban government did not provide her with an exit permit allowing her to
travel to Spain to accept the award. (Sánchez’s website is available at http://www.desdecuba.com/
generaciony/). On November 6, 2009, Sánchez and two other bloggers, Orlando Luis Pardo and
Claudia Cadelo, were intercepted by state security agents while walking on a Havana street on
their way to participate in a march against violence. Sánchez and Pardo were beaten in the
assault. The Department of State issued a statement deploring the assault, and expressed its deep
concern to the Cuban government for the incident.
Political Prisoners
The Cuban government conducted a severe crackdown in March 2003 (often referred to as the
Primavera Negra, or Black Spring) and imprisoned 75 democracy activists, including
8 The website of the Damas de Blanco is available at http://www.damasdeblanco.com/.
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independent journalists and librarians and leaders of independent labor unions and opposition
parties. Until mid-2010, a majority of the “group of 75” political prisoners remained incarcerated,
but the Cuban Catholic Church held talks with the Cuban government in July 2010 that led to the
promise of their release. Since then, the government has released 57 political prisoners overall,
with all but one traveling to exile in Spain; 11 of the “group of 75” remain imprisoned and upon
their release want to stay in Cuba or travel to the United States. Human rights groups estimate
that today there are about 100 political prisoners remaining – down from just over 200 at the
beginning of 2010.
Human Rights Reporting on Cuba
Human Rights Watch issued a report in November 2009 criticizing Cuba’s human rights record under the
government of Raúl Castro. According to the report, Raúl has kept Cuba’s repressive machinery in place, with scores
of political prisoners languishing in jail and the use of “draconian laws and sham trials to incarcerate scores more who
have dared to exercise their fundamental freedoms.” In particular, the report noted that the Cuban government has
relied on a “dangerousness” provision of the Cuban criminal code that allows the state to imprison individuals before
they have committed a crime. (“New Castro, Same Cuba: Political Prisoners in the Post-Fidel Era,” Human Rights
Watch, November 2009, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/11/18/new-castro-same-cuba.)
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights maintained in its 2009 annual human rights report that “for
decades, the restrictions to political rights, freedom of expression, and dissemination of thought have created a
permanent and systematic situation whereby the human rights of Cuba’s inhabitants are infringed” and that “the lack
of independence of the judiciary has further aggravated this situation.” (Annual Report of the IACHR 2009, December
30, 2009, Cuba section in Chapter IV available at: http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2009eng/Chap.IV.b.eng.htm.)
According to the State Department’s human rights report for 2009, issued in March 2010, the Cuban government
continued to commit numerous serious abuses during the year. Among the human rights problems cited in the State
Department report were “beatings and abuse of prisoners and detainees, harsh and life-threatening prison conditions,
including denial of medical care; harassment, beatings, and threats against political opponents by government-recruited
mobs, police, and state security officials acting with impunity; arbitrary arrest and detention of human rights advocates
and members of independent professional organizations; and denial of fair trial…” (See the report, available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/wha/136108.htm.)
Amnesty International published a report in June 2010, which concluded that the Cuban government “continues to
resort to repressive tactics and criminal proceedings to restrict and punish the free expression of opinions.”
According to the report, Cuba’s laws severely restrict the legitimate exercise of free expression in violation of
international human rights standards while the judiciary, which lacks impartiality and independence, is complicit in the
repression of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The report called on Cuba to make changes to its laws and
practices restricting freedom of expression, end the harassment of dissidents, ratify the U.N. human rights treaties
that it signed in 2008, and al ow U.N. and OAS human rights officials access to visit Cuba with unfettered access to al
individuals and groups of civil society. (Amnesty International, Restrictions on Freedom of Expression in Cuba, June 2010,
available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR25/005/2010/en.)
The independent Havana-based Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation (CCDHRN)
documented in a July 2010 report that Cuba held at least 167 political prisoners, down from the 201 prisoners
documented in January 2010. The figures reflected a continuing decline from previous years when the commission
estimated at least 205 prisoners at the beginning of 2009, 283 prisoners at the beginning of 2007, and 333 at the
beginning of 2006. Despite the reduction in the number of prisoners, the commission maintained in its report that the
government has adopted lower-profile tactics of political repression against human rights activists over the past
several years, including arbitrary short-term detentions and other forms of harassment or intimidation. The
commission estimated that there were thousands of people imprisoned under the charge of “social dangerousness,”
which allows detention of those who authorities think will commit a crime. (Comisión Cubana de Derechos Humanos
y Reconciliación Nacional, “Informe Semestral (Enero-Junio de 2010), La Habana ,” July 5, 2010, available at:
http://cubadata.blogspot.com/2010/07/informe-sobre-la-situacion-de-derechos.html.)
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The death of imprisoned Cuban dissident Orlando Zapata Tamayo on February 23, 2010, after an
83-day hunger strike focused increased U.S. and world attention on the plight of Cuba’s political
prisoners. Zapata, who was 42 years old at the time of his death, was arrested on March 20, 2003,
while taking part in a hunger strike to demand the release of political prisoner Oscar Biscet. He
was a member of the Alternative Republican Movement and the National Civic Resistance
Committee. Zapata was not counted among the “group of 75” political prisoners arrested in 2003,
but in January 2004, Amnesty International declared that he was a prisoner of conscience. In May
2004, Zapata was sentenced to three years in prison for “disrespect, public disorder, and
resistance,” but he was subsequently tried on further charges and was serving a total sentence of
36 years.9
U.S. officials maintained that Zapata’s death highlighted the injustice of Cuba’s holding political
prisoners and called for their immediate release.10 President Obama issued a statement on March
24, 2010, expressing deep concern about the human rights situation in Cuba, including the death
of Zapata, the repression of the Ladies in White, and increased harassment of those who dare to
express support for their fellow Cuban citizens. The President called for the end of repression, the
immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners, and respect for the basic rights of
the Cuban people. On March 18, 2010, the Senate approved S.Con.Res. 54 (Nelson, FL), which
recognized Zapata’s life and called for a continued focus on the promotion of internationally
recognized human rights in Cuba.
Zapata’ s death also prompted considerable criticism from human rights organizations and other
countries. Amnesty International expressed strong criticism of the death of Zapata, which it
maintained was an “indictment of the continuing repression of political dissidents in Cuba.” It
called for Cuba to invite international human rights experts to visit Cuba to verify respect for
human rights.11 The European Parliament condemned the death of Zapata and called for the
“immediate and unconditional release of political prisoners,” and even Spain, which had been
lobbying the European Union for a relaxation of its common policy on Cuba, urged the release of
Cuban political prisoners. Chile and Costa Rica also criticized Cuba for Zapata’s death, and
Mexico expressed concern for the health of Cuban dissidents. President Raúl Castro said that he
regretted Zapata’s death, but he also maintained that no one has been tortured or murdered in
Cuba.12
Zapata’s death prompted protests by other dissidents, and several dissidents vowed to undertake
hunger strikes. Cuban dissident Guillermo Fariñas began a hunger strike on February 24, 2010,
calling for the release of 26 political prisoners who were reported to be in ill health. Fariñas had
undertaken numerous other hunger strikes over the years, but he developed complications and a
blood clot that drove him to near death before he ended the strike on July 8, 2010, when the
Cuban government, after talks with the Cuban Catholic Church, announced that it would release
52 political prisoners.
9 Amnesty International, “Death of Cuban Prisoner of Conscience on Hunger Strike Must Herald Change,” February
24, 2010, and “Cuba: Newly Declared Prisoners of Conscience,” January 29, 2004.
10 U.S. Department of State, Philip J. Crowley, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Public Affairs, “Death of Cuban
Dissident Orlando Zapata Tamayo,” February 24, 2010.
11 Amnesty International, “Death of Cuban Prisoner of Conscience on Hunger Strike Must Herald Change,” February
24, 2010.
12 “Cuba: Raúl Castro ‘Regrets’ Political Prisoner Death, Blames United States,” CubaDebate, Havana (Open Source
Center) February 24, 2010; Tracy Wilkinson, “Castro ‘Lamenting’ Dissident’s Death,” Los Angeles Times, February
25, 2010; Juan O. Tamayo, “Raúl Castro: Hunger Striker’s Death ‘Lamentable,’” Miami Herald, February 25, 2010.
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The Cuban Catholic Church has played a key role in the release of political prisoners since May
2010. On May 19, 2010, Cardinal Jaime Ortega, Archbishop of Havana, and Archbishop Dionisio
Garcia from Santiago met with President Castro, the first such meeting to take place since Raúl
officially took over the presidency from his brother. The Church leaders described the meeting as
positive, and said that discussion included the status of imprisoned dissidents. By the end of June
2010, the government released seven political prisoners and began transferring a number of other
political prisoners to facilities closer to their homes.
On July 7, 2010, Cardinal Ortega met again with President Castro along with visiting Spanish
Foreign Minister Miguel Ángel Moratinos and Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez. After
the meeting, Cuba’s Catholic Church announced that Cuban authorities would free 52 political
prisoners within three to four months from those remaining of the “group of 75” imprisoned
during Cuba’s Black Spring of March 2003. A press release from the Archdiocese of Havana
announcing the release was printed in the Cuban daily Granma.13 Since October 2010, the
Catholic Church has announced that additional prisoners were being released beyond the 52
announced in July. As noted above, by late December 2010, a total of 57 political prisoners had
been released, with 56 agreeing to go to Spain and 1 released on humanitarian parole to remain in
Cuba.14 This included 41 of the 52 prisoners that the government agreed in July to release.
According to Cardinal Ortega, some of the remaining 11 political prisoners want to stay in Cuba
and some want to travel to the United States. In early January 2011, Cardinal Ortega maintained
that he expected the remaining 11 would be released in the coming months.15
While human rights organizations viewed positively the announcement in July that 52 political
prisoners would be released, some qualified their statements. Amnesty International called for the
dissidents’ immediate release instead of waiting three to four months. Human Rights Watch called
for the release of all remaining political prisoners as well as the dismantling of Cuba’s
authoritarian laws and practices. 16
Upon hearing of the Church’s announcement of the prisoner release, Secretary of State Clinton
said that it was “a positive sign” and that the United States welcomed it.17 The State Department
subsequently issued a statement welcoming the announcement by Cardinal Ortega that the
prisoners would be released, and lauding the efforts of the Cuban Catholic Church, Spain, and
others who have worked toward the release of Cuba’s prisoners of conscience. The State
Department maintained that “this is a positive development that we hope will represent a step
towards increased respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba,” while also
calling for the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners. The State
Department also stated that “all those released from prison should be free to decide for
themselves whether to remain in Cuba or travel to another country.”18 Some Members of
Congress also expressed concern that the political prisoners were being exiled to Spain, and that
13 “Prensa Latina Informó, Arzobispado de La Habana, Nota de Prensa,” Granma, July 8, 2010.
14Arzobispado de La Habana, Nota de Prensa, December 23, 2010. This and previous press releases of the Archdiocese
of Havana regarding the release of political prisoners are available at: http://www.palabranueva.net/.
15 “Cardinal Expects More Dissidents To Be Released in Cuba,” EFE News Service, January 2, 2011.
16 Amnesty International, “Cuba Urged to Immediately Release All Prisoners of Conscience,” July 8, 2010; and Human
Rights Watch, “Cuba: Release of Dissidents Still Leaves Scores in Prison,” July 8, 2010.
17 “Secretary of State Clinton Holds Media Availability with Jordan Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh,” CQ Newsmaker
Transcripts, July 8, 2010.
18 U.S. Department of State, “Release of Cuban Political Prisoners,” Press Release, July 13, 2010.
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there remained thousands of more prisoners in Cuba incarcerated on the charge of
“dangerousness” before they committed any crime.
Economic Conditions
Cuba’s economy is largely state-controlled, with the government owning most means of
production and employing about 82% of the labor force. Key sectors of the economy that
generate foreign exchange include the export of professional services (largely medical personnel
to Venezuela); tourism, which has grown significantly since the mid-1990s, with 2.42 million
tourists visiting Cuba in 2009; nickel and cobalt mining, with the Canadian mining company
Sherritt International involved in a joint investment project; and a biotechnology and
pharmaceutical sector that supplies the domestic healthcare system and has fostered a significant
export industry. Remittances from relatives living abroad, especially from the United States, have
also become a significant source of hard currency, with more than $1 billion reportedly sent to
Cuba in 2009.The once-dominant sugar industry has declined significantly over the past 20 years;
in 1990, Cuba produced 8.4 million tons of sugar while in 2009 it produced just 1.1 million tons,
with the majority consumed domestically and most of the remainder exported to China. 19
As noted above, after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Russian financial assistance to
Cuba practically ended, and as a result, Cuba experienced severe economic deterioration from
1989-1993, with estimates of economic decline ranging from 35% to 50%. Since then, however,
there has been considerable improvement. From 1994-2000, as Cuba moved forward with some
limited market-oriented economic reforms, economic growth averaged 3.7% annually.
Economic growth was especially strong in the 2004-2008 period (see Figure 2) registering an
impressive 11.2% in 2005 (despite widespread damage caused by Hurricanes Dennis and Wilma),
12.1% in 2006, and 7.3% in 2007 before slowing to 4.1% in 2008.20 The economy benefitted
from the growth of the tourism, nickel, and oil sectors, and support from Venezuela and China in
terms of investment commitments and credit lines. Cuba also benefits from a preferential oil
agreement with Venezuela, which provides Cuba with more than 90,000 barrels of oil a day. The
market value of Venezuela’s oil to Cuba reportedly amounted to over $2 billion annually in 2006
and 2007, and over $3 billion in 2008, which Cuba pays for at least in part through medical and
other services provided to Venezuela.21
Since 2009, however, Cuba’s economic growth has slowed, to 1.4% in 2009 and an estimated
1.5% in 2010.22 The global financial crisis has had a negative effect on the Cuban economy
because of lower world prices for nickel and a reduction in tourism from Canada and Europe.
Cuba was also still recovering from the devastation wrought by Hurricanes Gustav and Ike in
2008, particularly in the agricultural sector. As a result of the economic downturn, the
19 Information and statistics were drawn from several sources: U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Cuba,”
March 25, 2010; Economist Intelligence Unit, “Cuba Country Profile,” 2008, and “Cuba Country Report,” December
2010; Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas, “Anuario Estadística de Cuba, 2009”; Marc Frank, “Cuba’s Sugar Harvest Gets
Underway,” Reuters News, December 8, 2010; and “Factbox: Cubans Get Ready for Private Sector Expansion,”
Reuters News, September 23, 2010.
20 “Cuba Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, January 2011.
21 Jorge R. Piñon, “Cuba – 2008 Petroleum Supply Demand Analysis,” Center for Hemispheric Policy, University of
Miami, July 6, 2009.
22 “Cuba Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, January 2011.
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government announced austerity measures in 2009 that included energy rationing and cutbacks in
transportation and some food programs.
Over the years, Cuba has expressed pride for the nation’s accomplishments in health and
education. According to the U.N. Development Program’s 2010 Human Development Report, life
expectancy in Cuba in 2007 was 78.8 years and adult literacy was estimated at almost 100%.
Cuba has also boasted a 2010 infant mortality rate of 4.5 per 1,000 live births (compared to 7 per
1,000 in the United States).23 In terms of its per capita income level, the World Bank estimates
that Cuba’s per capita income level is in the upper-middle-income range (between $3,856 -
$11,905), higher than nine other countries in the Americas.24
Figure 2. Cuba: Real GDP Growth (%), 2004 - 2010
14
12.1
11.2
12
10
7.3
8
5.8
6
4.1
4
1.4
1.5
2
0
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
When Cuba’s economic slide began in 1989, the government showed little willingness to adopt
any significant market-oriented economic reforms, but in 1993, faced with unprecedented
economic decline, Cuba began to change policy direction. Beginning in 1993, Cubans were
allowed to own and use U.S. dollars and to shop at dollar-only shops previously limited to tourists
and diplomats. Self-employment was authorized in more than 100 occupations in 1993, most in
the service sector, and by 1996 that figure had grown to more than 150 occupations. Also in 1993,
the government divided large state farms into smaller, more autonomous, agricultural
cooperatives (Basic Units of Cooperative Production, UBPCs). It opened agricultural markets in
1994, where farmers could sell part of their produce on the open market, and it also permitted
artisan markets for the sale of handicrafts. In 1995, the government allowed private food catering,
including home restaurants (paladares), in effect legalizing activities that were already taking
place, and approved a new foreign investment law that allows fully owned investments by
foreigners in all sectors of the economy with the exception of defense, health, and education. In
1996, it authorized the establishment of free trade zones with tariff reductions typical of such
23 José A. De la Osa, “Cuba Reduces Infant Mortality Rate to 4.5,” Granma, January 1, 2011.
24 World Bank, World Development Report 2010, October 2010, p. 377.
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zones. In 1997, the government enacted legislation to reform the banking system and established
a new Central Bank (BCC) to operate as an autonomous and independent entity.
After Cuba began to recover from its economic decline, the government began to backtrack on
some of its reform efforts. Regulations and new taxes made it extremely difficult for many of the
nation’s self-employed. Some home restaurants were forced to close because of the new
regulations. In 2004, the Cuban government limited the use of dollars by state companies for any
services or products not considered part of their core business. Some analysts viewed the measure
as an effort to turn back the clock on economic reform measures.25 Also in 2004, Fidel Castro
announced that U.S. dollars no longer would be used in entities that at the time accepted dollars
(such as stores, restaurants, and hotels). Instead, dollars had to be exchanged for “convertible
pesos,” with a 10% surcharge for the exchange.
Economic Changes Under Raúl Castro
When Raúl Castro assumed provisional power in July 2006, there was some expectation that the
government would be more open to economic policy changes, and a debate about potential
economic reforms reemerged in Cuba. On July 26, 2007, in a speech commemorating Cuba’s
revolutionary anniversary, Raúl Castro acknowledged that Cuban salaries were insufficient to
satisfy needs, and maintained that structural changes were necessary in order to increase
efficiency and production. In the aftermath of the speech, Cuban public expectations for
economic reform increased as thousands of officially sanctioned meetings were held in
workplaces and local PCC branches around the country where Cubans were encouraged to air
their views and discuss the future direction of the country. Complaints focused on low salaries
and housing and transportation problems, and some participants advocated legalization of more
private businesses.26
After Raúl Castro officially assumed the presidency in 2008, his government announced a series
of economic changes. In his first speech as president in February 2008, Raúl promised to make
the government smaller and more efficient, to review the potential revaluation of the Cuban peso,
and to eliminate excessive bans and regulations that curb productivity.27 In March, the
government announced that it would lift restrictions on the sales of consumer products such as
computers, microwaves, and DVD and video players as well as on the use of cell phones.
The government also announced that it would begin revamping the state’s wage system by
removing the limit that a state worker can earn. This was an effort to boost productivity and to
deal with one of Cuba’s major economic problems: how to raise wages to a level where basic
human needs can be satisfied. The promised revamp of the wage system, however, has been
delayed. The problem of low wages in Cuba is closely related to another major economic
challenge in Cuba: how to unify the two official currencies circulating in the country—the Cuban
convertible peso (CUC) and the Cuban peso, which trade at about 24 to 1 CUC. Most people are
paid in Cuban pesos, and the minimum monthly wage in Cuba is about 225 pesos (about $9 U.S.
25 Larry Luxner, “New Decree Limits Dollar Transactions as Cuba Tightens Controls Once Again,” CubaNews, April
2004.
26 Frances Robles, “Cubans Urged to Vent Views,” Miami Herald, October 2, 2007.
27 “Cuba: Full Text of Raúl Castro’s National Assembly Address,” Cubavisión, Havana (as translated by Open Source
Center) February 24, 2008.
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dollars28), but for increasing amounts of consumer goods, convertible pesos are used. Cubans
with access to foreign remittances or who work in jobs that give them access to convertible pesos
are far better off than those Cubans who do not have such access.
A significant reform effort under Raúl Castro has focused on the agricultural sector, a vital issue
because Cuba reportedly imports some two-thirds of its food needs.29 In an effort to boost food
production, the government began in 2008 to give farmers more discretion over how to use their
land and what supplies to buy. The government also began a program of turning idle land into
productive use through a land grant program, whereby private farmers and cooperatives can apply
for land. Despite these efforts, it has been reported in 2010 that overall food production is
significantly below targets, and shortages of some basic agricultural products have been reported
in Havana and elsewhere. Continued problems in the agricultural sector focus on an entrenched
system whereby famers depend on the state for fuel, pesticides, fertilizers and other resources in
exchange for 70%-80% of what they produce. The government’s inability to provide enough
resources to farmers has hampered production, and its domination of the distribution process has
hampered the delivery of products to market.30
At the beginning of 2010, there was a hint of forthcoming changes when Cuban Minister of
Economy and Planning Marino Murillo reportedly said in January 2010 that “the gigantic
paternalist state can no longer be, because there is no longer any way to maintain it.”31 In April
2010, the Cuban government began a pilot project turning over some state-run barber shops and
hair salons to their employees.
Since September 2010, the Cuban government has announced a series of potentially significant
reforms designed to reduce the public sector and increase private enterprise. On September 13,
2010, the government announced that by the end of March 2011 it would identify half a million
state workers that would be laid off, with most expected to find work in the expanding private
sector. The layoffs, which began in early January 2011, reportedly will affect all public sector
employees, including in the public service and state-owned enterprises. Over the next five years,
a total of 1.2 million state employees would be cut (out of about 4.3 million state workers).32 On
September 24, the government announced an expansion of self-employment, identifying 178
categories of work allowed with 83 of those allowing small businesses to hire non-family
members.33 The self-employment categories cover a wide range of employment from “carpenters,
gardeners, artisans, and animal trainers to small businesses such as home-based bed and
breakfasts, rental property, restaurants, pizzerias, and snack shops.”34 New tax provisions would
generate income for the government and include a new sales tax and social security tax.35 As
noted above, Cuba’s Communist Party has plans to hold its sixth congress in April 2011, which
will focus on making changes to Cuba’s economic model.
28 U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2007, Cuba,” March 11, 2008.
29 Helen Popper, “Cuban Farm Reforms Sow Seeds of Enterprise,” Reuters News, December 17, 2009.
30 Marc Frank, “Havana Food Production Plummets Despite Reforms,” Reuters News, March 3, 2010.
31 Marc Frank, “Cuban Economy Minister Pushes for Less State Role,” Reuters News, March 8, 2010.
32 “Cuba Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, October 2010.
33 Juan O. Tamayo, “Cuba Unveils Plan to Overcome Its Economic Crisis,” Miami Herald, September 25, 2010.
34 Marc Frank, “Raúl Castro’s Shock Therapy for Cuban Economy,” ABC News, November 8, 2010.
35 Ibid.
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Cuba’s Foreign Relations
During the Cold War, Cuba had extensive relations with and support from the Soviet Union, with
billions of dollars in annual subsidies to sustain the Cuban economy. This subsidy system helped
fund an activist foreign policy and support for guerrilla movements and revolutionary
governments abroad in Latin America and Africa. With an end to the Cold War, the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, and the loss of Soviet financial support, Cuba was forced to abandon its
revolutionary activities abroad.
As its economy reeled from the loss of Soviet support, Cuba was forced to open up its economy
and economic relations with countries worldwide, and developed significant trade and investment
linkages with Canada, Spain, other European countries, and China. In recent years, Venezuela—
under populist President Hugo Chávez—has become a significant source of support for
subsidized oil imports and investment for Cuba. In 2009, Cuba’s main trading partners included
Venezuela, China, Spain, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, Vietnam, and even the United
States (for agricultural exports to Cuba). (See Figure 3 and Figure 4 for Cuba’s major trading
partners in terms of exports and imports). Relations with Russia have also recently intensified,
with the November 2008 visit of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to Havana, the visit of
several Russian warships to Cuba in December 2008, and Raúl Castro’s visit to Russia in January
2009. Chinese President Hu Jintao also visited Cuba in November 2008, signing a dozen
agreements. China recently agreed to invest in upgrading an oil refinery. In Cuba’s offshore oil
sector, a consortium led by the Spanish oil company Repsol is planning to drill an exploratory
well in 2011 and a number of state-owned foreign oil companies have concessions to explore
offshore for oil.
Figure 3. Cuban Exports by Country of Destination, 2009
Others
Venezuela
30%
19%
Brazil
2%
China
18%
Russia
3% Spain
Canada
5%
Netherlands
15%
8%
Source: República de Cuba, Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas, Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 2009.
With El Salvador’s restoration of relations with Cuba in June 2009, all Latin American nations
now have official diplomatic relations with Cuba. Cuba has increasingly become more engaged in
Latin America beyond the already close relations with Venezuela. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio
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Lula da Silva visited Cuba twice in 2008, and Cuba seems especially interested in expanding
relations with Brazil. Cuba became a full member of the 23 member Rio Group of Latin
American and Caribbean nations in November 2008. Raúl Castro made his first foreign trip as
president in December 2008, when he traveled to Venezuela, and then to Bahia, Brazil, where he
attended the Latin American and Caribbean Integration and Development Summit, a regional
initiative of President Lula.36
Cuba is an active participant in international forums, including the United Nations and the
controversial United Nations Human Rights Council. Since 1991, the U.N. General Assembly has
approved a resolution each year criticizing the U.S. economic embargo and urging the United
States to lift it. Cuba also has received support over the years from the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), both of which have offices in Havana. Cuba was a founding member of
the World Trade Organization, but it is not a member of the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank, or the Inter-American Development Bank. Cuba hosted the 14th summit of the Non-
aligned Movement (NAM) in 2006, and held the Secretary Generalship of the NAM until its July
2009 summit in Egypt. Cuba is a member of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas,
(ALBA), a Venezuelan-led integration and cooperation scheme founded as an alternative to U.S.
efforts to negotiate a region-wide Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).
Figure 4. Cuban Imports by Country of Origin, 2009
Others
Germany
19%
Venezuela
Vietnam
3%
30%
3%
Canada
3%
Mexico
3%
China
Italy
13%
4%
Spain
United States
Brazil
8%
8%
6%
Source: República de Cuba, Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas, Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 2009.
Cuba was excluded from participation in the OAS in 1962 because of its identification with
Marxism-Leninism, but in early June 2009, the OAS overturned the 1962 resolution in a move
that could eventually lead to Cuba’s reentry into the regional organization in accordance with the
practices, purposes, and principles of the OAS. While the Cuban government welcomed the OAS
vote to overturn the 1962 resolution, it asserted that it would not return to the OAS. (For further
36 “Cuba: Bringing Cuba in from the Cold,” Latin American Regional Report, Caribbean & Central America,
December 2008.
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background, see a section on “Cuba and the OAS” in CRS Report R40193, Cuba: Issues for the
111th Congress.)
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
Background on U.S.-Cuban Relations37
In the early 1960s, U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated sharply when Fidel Castro began to build a
repressive communist dictatorship and moved his country toward close relations with the Soviet
Union. The often tense and hostile nature of the U.S.-Cuban relationship is illustrated by such
events and actions as U.S. covert operations to overthrow the Castro government culminating in
the ill-fated April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion; the October 1962 missile crisis in which the United
States confronted the Soviet Union over its attempt to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba;
Cuban support for guerrilla insurgencies and military support for revolutionary governments in
Africa and the Western Hemisphere; the 1980 exodus of around 125,000 Cubans to the United
States in the so-called Mariel boatlift; the 1994 exodus of more than 30,000 Cubans who were
interdicted and housed at U.S. facilities in Guantanamo and Panama; and the February 1996
shootdown by Cuban fighter jets of two U.S. civilian planes operated by the Cuban American
group Brothers to the Rescue, which resulted in the death of four U.S. crew members.
Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the island nation
through comprehensive economic sanctions, including an embargo on trade and financial
transactions. The Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), first issued by the Treasury
Department in July 1963, lay out a comprehensive set of economic sanctions against Cuba,
including a prohibition on most financial transactions with Cuba and a freeze of Cuban
government assets in the United States. The CACR have been amended many times over the
years to reflect changes in policy, and remain in force today.
These sanctions were made stronger with the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 (P.L. 102-
484, Title XVII) and with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-
114), the latter often referred to as the Helms/Burton legislation. The CDA prohibits U.S.
subsidiaries from engaging in trade with Cuba and prohibits entry into the United States for any
sea-borne vessel to load or unload freight if it has been involved in trade with Cuba within the
previous 180 days. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, enacted in the aftermath of
Cuba’s shooting down of two U.S. civilian planes in February 1996, combines a variety of
measures to increase pressure on Cuba and provides for a plan to assist Cuba once it begins the
transition to democracy. Most significantly, the law codified the Cuban embargo, including all
restrictions under the CACR. This provision is especially noteworthy because of its long-lasting
effect on U.S. policy options toward Cuba. The executive branch is circumscribed in lifting or
substantially loosening the economic embargo without congressional concurrence until certain
democratic conditions are met, although the CACR includes licensing authority that provides the
executive branch with some administrative flexibility (e.g., travel-related restrictions in the
CACR have been eased and tightened on numerous occasions). Another significant sanction in
the law is a provision in Title III that holds any person or government that traffics in U.S.
37 For further background on U.S. policy, see some of the archived CRS reports on Cuba listed in Appendix B of this
report, including CRS Report RL30386, Cuba-U.S. Relations: Chronology of Key Events 1959-1999.
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property confiscated by the Cuban government liable for monetary damages in U.S. federal court.
Acting under provisions of the law, however, Presidents Clinton, Bush and now Obama have
suspended the implementation of Title III at six-month intervals.
In addition to sanctions, another component of U.S. policy, a so-called second track, consists of
support measures for the Cuban people. This includes U.S. private humanitarian donations,
medical exports to Cuba under the terms of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, U.S. government
support for democracy-building efforts, and U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to
Cuba. In addition, the 106th Congress approved the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export
Enhancement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) that allows for agricultural exports to Cuba,
albeit with restrictions on financing such exports. This has led to the United States becoming
Cuba’s largest supplier of food and agricultural products since 2002.
Clinton Administration’s Easing of Sanctions
The Clinton Administration made several changes to U.S. policy in the aftermath of Pope John
Paul II’s 1998 visit to Cuba, which were intended to bolster U.S. support for the Cuban people.
These included the resumption of direct flights to Cuba (which had been curtailed after the
February 1996 shootdown of two U.S. civilian planes), the resumption of cash remittances by
U.S. nationals and residents for the support of close relatives in Cuba (which had been curtailed
in August 1994 in response to the migration crisis with Cuba), and the streamlining of procedures
for the commercial sale of medicines and medical supplies and equipment to Cuba.
In January 1999, President Clinton announced several additional measures to support the Cuban
people. These included a broadening of cash remittances to Cuba, so that all U.S. residents (not
just those with close relatives in Cuba) could send remittances to Cuba; an expansion of direct
passenger charter flights to Cuba from additional U.S. cities other than Miami (direct flights later
in the year began from Los Angeles and New York); and an expansion of people-to-people
contact by loosening restrictions on travel to Cuba for certain categories of travelers, such as
professional researchers and those involved in a wide range of educational, religious, and sports
activities.
Bush Administration’s Tightening of Sanctions
The George W. Bush Administration essentially continued the two-track U.S. policy of isolating
Cuba through economic sanctions while supporting the Cuban people through a variety of
measures. However, within this policy framework, the Administration emphasized stronger
enforcement of economic sanctions and further tightened restrictions on travel, remittances, and
humanitarian gift parcels to Cuba. The Administration established an interagency Commission for
Assistance to a Free Cuba in late 2003 tasked with identifying means to help the Cuban people
bring about an expeditious end of the dictatorship” and to consider “the requirements for United
States assistance to a post-dictatorship Cuba.”38 In issuing its first report in May 2004, the
Commission made recommendations to tighten restrictions on family visits and other categories
of travel and on private humanitarian assistance in the form of remittances and gift parcels.39 The
Administration subsequently issued these tightened restrictions in June 2004, while in February
38 U.S. Department of State, “Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba,” White House Fact Sheet, December 8, 2003.
39 See the Commission’s May 2004 report, available at: http://2005-2009.cafc.gov/rpt/2004/c18166.htm
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2005, it tightened restrictions on payment terms for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba. The
Commission issued a second and final report in July 2006 that made recommendations to hasten
political change in Cuba toward a democratic transition and led to a substantial increase in U.S.
funding to support democracy and human rights efforts in Cuba.40
The Bush Administration continued to emphasize a continuation of the sanctions-based approach
toward Cuba pending political change in Cuba. When Raúl Castro officially became head of state
in February 2008, then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice issued a statement urging “the Cuban
government to begin a process of peaceful, democratic change by releasing all political prisoners,
respecting human rights, and creating a clear pathway towards free and fair elections.”41 In
remarks on Cuba policy in March 2008, President Bush maintained that in order to improve U.S.-
Cuban relations, “what needs to change is not the United States; what needs to change is Cuba.”
The President asserted that Cuba “must release all political prisoners ... have respect for human
rights in word and deed, and pave the way for free and fair elections.”42
Debate on the Direction of U.S. Policy
Over the years, although U.S. policymakers have agreed on the overall objectives of U.S. policy
toward Cuba—to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island—there have
been several schools of thought about how to achieve those objectives. Some have advocated a
policy of keeping maximum pressure on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted, while
continuing efforts to support the Cuban people. Others argue for an approach, sometimes referred
to as constructive engagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they believe are hurting
the Cuban people, and move toward engaging Cuba in dialogue. Still others call for a swift
normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations by lifting the U.S. embargo. Legislative initiatives
introduced over the past decade have reflected these three policy approaches.
Dating back to 2000, there have been significant efforts in Congress to ease U.S. sanctions, with,
one or both houses at times approving amendments to appropriations measures that would have
eased U.S. sanctions on Cuba. Until March 2009, these provisions were stripped out of final
enacted measures, in part because of presidential veto threats.
In light of Fidel Castro’s departure as head of government, many observers called for a
reexamination of U.S. policy toward Cuba. In this new context, two broad policy approaches have
been advanced to contend with political change in Cuba: a status-quo approach that would
maintain the U.S. dual-track policy of isolating the Cuban government while providing support to
the Cuban people; and an approach aimed at influencing the attitudes of the Cuban government
and Cuban society through increased contact and engagement.
In general, those who advocate easing U.S. sanctions on Cuba make several policy arguments.
They assert that if the United States moderated its policy toward Cuba—through increased travel,
trade, and diplomatic dialogue—then the seeds of reform would be planted, which would
stimulate and strengthen forces for peaceful change on the island. They stress the importance to
40 See the Commission’s July 2006 report, available at: http://www.cafc.gov/documents/organization/68166.pdf
41 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “Statement on Cuba’s Transition,” February 24,
2008.
42 White House, “President Bush Delivers Remarks on Cuba,” March 7, 2008.
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the United States of avoiding violent change in Cuba, with the prospect of a mass exodus to the
United States and the potential of involving the United States in a civil war scenario. They argue
that since the demise of Cuba’s communist government does not appear imminent, even without
Fidel Castro at the helm, the United States should espouse a more pragmatic approach in trying to
induce change in Cuba. Supporters of changing policy also point to broad international support
for lifting the U.S. embargo, to the missed opportunities for U.S. businesses because of the
unilateral nature of the embargo, and to the increased suffering of the Cuban people because of
the embargo. Proponents of change also argue that the United States should be consistent in its
policies with the world’s few remaining communist governments, including China and Vietnam,
and also maintain that moderating policy will help advance human rights.
On the other side, opponents of changing U.S. policy maintain that the current two-track policy of
isolating Cuba, but reaching out to the Cuban people through measures of support, is the best
means for realizing political change in Cuba. They point out that the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 sets forth the steps that Cuba needs to take in order for the
United States to normalize relations. They argue that softening U.S. policy at this time without
concrete Cuban reforms would boost the Castro government, politically and economically, and
facilitate the survival of the communist regime. Opponents of softening U.S. policy argue that the
United States should stay the course in its commitment to democracy and human rights in Cuba,
and that sustained sanctions can work. Opponents of loosening U.S. sanctions further argue that
Cuba’s failed economic policies, not the U.S. embargo, are the causes of Cuba’s difficult living
conditions.
Obama Administration Policy
During its first two years, the Obama Administration lifted restrictions on travel and remittance to
Cuba for Cuban Americans, moved to reengage Cuba on migration and other bilateral issues, and
more recently announced further steps to ease restrictions on purposeful travel and non-family
remittances. The Administration continued to express concern about the human rights situation in
Cuba, especially after the death of imprisoned hunger striker Orlando Zapata Tamayo in February
2010 and the harassment of the Ladies in White human rights organization, but the
Administration also welcomed the Cuban government’s release of political prisoners beginning in
mid-2010 after talks with the Cuban Catholic Church. A key impediment to improved relations
has been Cuba’s detention of U.S Agency for International Development (USAID) subcontractor
Alan Gross since early December 2009.
During the 2008 electoral campaign, President Obama had pledged to lift restrictions on family
travel to Cuba as well as restrictions on Cuban Americans sending remittances to Cuba. At the
same time, he also pledged to maintain the embargo as a source of leverage to bring about change
in Cuba. However, Obama also asserted that if the Cuban government takes significant steps
toward democracy, beginning with the freeing of all political prisoners, then the United States
would take steps to normalize relations and ease the embargo. He also maintained that, after
careful preparation, his Administration would pursue direct diplomacy with Cuba without
preconditions, but only when there is an opportunity to advance U.S. interests and advance the
cause of freedom for the Cuban people.43
43 “Remarks of Senator Barack Obama, Renewing U.S. Leadership in the Americas,” May 23, 2008, and “Renewing
U.S. Leadership in the Americas,” Factsheet, June 6, 2008, BarackObama.com.
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In April 2009, just before the fifth Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, the Obama
Administration announced several significant measures to ease U.S. sanctions on Cuba. The
President announced that all restrictions on family travel and on remittances to family members in
Cuba would be lifted. This superseded the action taken by Congress in March that had essentially
reverted family travel restrictions to as they were in 2004 before they were tightened. The
Administration also announced that measures would be taken to increase telecommunications
links with Cuba and to expand the scope of eligible humanitarian donations through gift parcels.44
At the Summit of the Americas, President Obama maintained that “the United States seeks a new
beginning with Cuba.” While recognizing that it will take time to “overcome decades of
mistrust,” the President said “there are critical steps we can take toward a new day.” He stated
that he was prepared to have his Administration “engage with the Cuban government on a wide
range of issues—from drugs, migration, and economic issues, to human rights, free speech, and
democratic reform.”45 The President maintained that he was “not interested in talking just for the
sake of talking,” but said he believed that U.S.-Cuban relations could move in a new direction.
In the aftermath of the Summit, there appeared to be some momentum toward improved relations.
In June 2009, the State Department turned off the electronic billboard at the U.S. Interests Section
in Havana that had been had been set up in 2006 and had featured news and pro-democracy
messages that irked the Cuban government. Earlier in the year, the Cuban government had taken
down anti-U.S. billboards around the U.S. mission. In July 2009, Cuba and the United States also
restarted the semi-annual migration talks that had been suspended by the United States in 2004.
To date, four rounds of talks have been held and have included issues beyond migration issues
(For more details, see “Migration Talks” below.) In September 2009, the United States and Cuba
held talks in Havana on resuming direct mail service between the two countries that included
discussion on issues related to the transportation, quality, and security of mail service.46
In late 2009, however, relations took a turn for the worse when Alan Gross, an American
subcontractor working on USAID-funded Cuba democracy projects in Cuba was arrested in
Havana in December. Members of Congress have raised considerable concern about Mr. Gross’s
detention. State Department officials have continued to raise the issue with Cuban government
and the State Department maintains that his continued detention is “a major impediment to
advancing the dialogue between our two countries.”47 (For more details, see “December 2009
Detainment of American Subcontractor.”)
The Obama Administration expressed significant concern about the poor human rights situation in
the first half of 2010. In the semi-annual migration talks in February, U.S. officials urged Cuban
officials to provide imprisoned hunger striker Orlando Zapata Tamayo with all necessary medical
care. After Zapata’s death, U.S. officials called attention to the more than 200 political prisoners
44 White House, “Fact Sheet: Reaching Out to the Cuban People,” April 13, 2009.
45 White House, “Remarks by the President At the Summit of the Americas Opening Ceremony,” April 17, 2009.
46 Since the early 1960s, mail to and from Cuba has arrived via third countries, which results in extensive delays in mail
between the two countries. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-484, Title XVII, Section 1705(f)) has a
provision requiring the U.S. Postal Service to take necessary actions to provide direct mail service to and from Cuba,
including, in the absence of common carrier service between the 2 countries, the use of charter service providers. Past
U.S. attempts to negotiate such service were rejected by Cuba, reportedly because Cuba wanted the issue to be part of a
larger normalization of commercial air traffic. Both the Clinton and Bush Administrations had called for negotiations to
restore direct mail service.
47 U.S. Department of State, “One Year Continued Incarceration of Alan Gross,” Philip J. Crowley, Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Pubic Affairs, December 3, 2010.
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held by Cuba and called for their immediate release.48 As noted above, President Obama issued a
statement on March 24, 2010, expressing deep concern about the human rights situation in Cuba,
including the death of Zapata, and the repression of the Ladies in White. He asserted that these
events underscore that “Cuban authorities continue to respond to the aspirations of the Cuban
people with a clenched fist.” The President called for the end of repression, the immediate and
unconditional release of all political prisoners, and respect for the basic rights of the Cuban
people. The President noted that he has taken steps during the year to reach out to the Cuban
people and to signal his desire to seek a new era in relations with the government of Cuba. He
asserted that he remains “committed to supporting the simple desire of the Cuban people to freely
determine their future and to enjoy the rights and freedoms that define the Americas, and that
should be universal to all human beings.”49
In response to the Cuban Catholic Church’s July 7, 2010, announcement that 52 political
prisoners would be released, Secretary of State Clinton said that it was “a positive sign” and that
the United States welcomed it.50 A subsequent State Department statement maintained that “this is
a positive development that we hope will represent a step towards increased respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba.” In the same statement, the State Department called for
the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners, and maintained that those
released should be able to “decide for themselves whether to remain in Cuba or travel to another
country.”51
There were numerous press reports in August 2010 maintaining that the Obama Administration
would be taking action to ease travel restrictions further and allow all Americans to send
remittances to Cuba. Various reports indicated that the relaxation of the travel regulations would
involve looser restrictions on educational and religious travel as well as other types of people-to-
people travel. The number of charter flights and U.S. cities (beyond Los Angeles, Miami, and
New York) would also reportedly be expanded.52
The Administration ultimately announced these policy changes on January 14, 2011. According to
the White House statement, the measures will: 1) increase purposeful travel to Cuba related to
religious, educational, and journalistic activities; 2) allow any U.S. person to send remittances to
non-family members in Cuba and make it easier for religious institutions to send remittances for
religious activities; and 3) allow all U.S. international airports to provide services to licensed
charter flights to and from Cuba. In most respects, these new measures appear to be similar to
policies that were undertaken by the Clinton Administration in 1999, but were subsequently
curtailed by the Bush Administration in 2003 and 2004. The policy changes were subsequently
enacted through modifications to existing Department of Treasury and Department of Homeland
Security regulations published in the Federal Register on January 28, 2011.
48 U.S. Department of State, Philip J. Crowley, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Public Affairs, “Death of Cuban
Dissident Orlando Zapata Tamayo,” February 24, 2010.
49 White House, “Statement by the President on the Human Rights Situation in Cuba,” March 24, 2010.
50 “Secretary of State Clinton Holds Media Availability with Jordan Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh,” CQ Newsmaker
Transcripts, July 8, 2010.
51 U.S. Department of State, “Release of Cuban Political Prisoners,” Press Release, July 13, 2010.
52 Juan O. Tamayo, “U.S. Could Ease Restrictions on ‘Purposeful’ Visits to Cuba,” Miami Herald, August 7, 2010;
Ginger Thompson, “U.S. Said to Plan Easing Rules for Travel to Cuba,” New York Times, August 17, 2010; Mary Beth
Sheridan, “U.S. Preparing to Expand Travel to Cuba,” Washington Post, August 18, 2010.
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Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations
U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances
Restrictions on travel to Cuba have been a key and often contentious component of U.S. efforts to
isolate the communist government of Fidel Castro for much of the past 40 years. Over time there
have been numerous changes to the restrictions and for five years, from 1977 until 1982, there
were no restrictions on travel. Restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba are part of the
CACR, the overall embargo regulations administered by the Treasury Department’s Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
Under the Bush Administration, enforcement of U.S. restrictions on Cuba travel increased, and
restrictions on travel and on private remittances to Cuba were tightened. In March 2003, the
Administration eliminated travel for people-to-people educational exchanges unrelated to
academic course work. In June 2004, the Administration significantly restricted travel, especially
family travel, and the provision of private humanitarian assistance to Cuba in the form of
remittances and gift parcels.
In March 2009, Congress included two provisions in the FY2009 omnibus appropriations
measure (P.L. 111-8) that eased sanctions on travel to Cuba. As implemented by the Treasury
Department, family travel was allowed once every 12 months to visit a close relative for an
unlimited length of stay, and the limit for daily expenditure allowed by family travelers became
the same as for other authorized travelers to Cuba (State Department maximum per diem rate for
Havana, currently $179 day). The definition of “close relative” was expanded to mean any
individual related to the traveler by blood, marriage, or adoption who is no more than three
generations removed from that person. The omnibus measure also included a provision requiring
a general license for travel related to the marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods to
Cuba.
Going even further, the Obama Administration announced several significant measures to ease
U.S. sanctions on Cuba in April 2009. Fulfilling a campaign pledge, President Obama announced
that all restrictions on family travel and on remittances to family members in Cuba would be
lifted. This significantly superseded the action taken by Congress in March that had essentially
reverted family travel restrictions to as they had been before they were tightened in 2004. Under
the new policy announced by the Administration in April, there are no limitations on the
frequency or duration of family visits, and the 44-pound limitation on accompanied baggage was
removed. Family travelers are now able spend the same as allowed for other travelers, up to $179
per day. With regard to family remittances, the previous limitation of no more than $300 per
quarter was removed with no restriction on the amount or frequency of the remittances.
Authorized travelers are once again authorized to carry up to $3,000 in remittances.53 Regulations
for the above policy changes were issued by the Treasury and Commerce Departments on
September 3, 2009.
On January 14, 2011, the Obama Administration announced a series of changes further easing
restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba that had been rumored in the second half of 2010.
53 White House, “Fact Sheet: Reaching Out to the Cuban People,” April 13, 2009.
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The White House announced that President Obama had directed the Secretaries of State, Treasury,
and Homeland Security to make changes to regulations and policies “in order to continue efforts
reach out to the Cuban people in support of their desire to freely determine their country’s
future.”54 According to the White House announcement, the policy changes would be enacted
through modifications to existing regulations. This occurred on January 28, 2011, when the
Departments of Treasury and Homeland Security published changes to regulations in the Federal
Register.55
The measures: 1) increase purposeful travel to Cuba related to religious, educational, and
journalistic activities; 2) allow any U.S. person to send remittances to non-family members in
Cuba and make it easier for religious institutions to send remittances for religious activities; and
3) allow all U.S. international airports to provide services to licensed charter flights to and from
Cuba. In most respects, these new measures appear to be similar to policies that were undertaken
by the Clinton Administration in 1999, but were subsequently curtailed by the Bush
Administration in 2003 and 2004. An exception is the expansion of airports to service licensed
flights to and from Cuba.
Major arguments made for lifting the Cuba travel ban are that it abridges the rights of ordinary
Americans to travel; it hinders efforts to influence conditions in Cuba and may be aiding Castro
by helping restrict the flow of information; and Americans can travel to other countries with
communist or authoritarian governments. Major arguments in opposition to lifting the Cuba travel
ban are that more American travel would support Castro’s rule by providing his government with
potentially millions of dollars in hard currency; that there are legal provisions allowing travel to
Cuba for humanitarian purposes that are used by thousands of Americans each year; and that the
President should be free to restrict travel for foreign policy reasons.
In the 111th Congress, two House hearings were held on the issue of restrictions on travel to Cuba.
On November 19, 2009, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing entitled “Is it
Time to Lift the Ban on Travel to Cuba?” that featured former U.S. government officials and
other private witnesses. On April 29, 2010, the House Ways and Means Committee,
Subcommittee on Trade, held a hearing on U.S.-Cuba policy that examined whether relaxing
current Cuba travel and trade restrictions would advance U.S. economic objectives, as well as
U.S. political and human rights goals in Cuba. In terms of legislative action beyond the March
2009 easing of family travel and travel for the marketing of U.S. agricultural and medical exports,
the House Agriculture Committee reported out H.R. 4645 (Peterson) on June 30, 2010, a bill that
would have lifted all restrictions on travel to Cuba (and also would have eased restrictions on
payment mechanisms for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba). The House Committee on Foreign
Affairs was scheduled to hold a markup of the bill on September 29, 2010, but postponed its
consideration, and in the aftermath of the November 2010 U.S. legislative elections no further
action was taken. Several other legislative initiatives were introduced that would have eased Cuba
travel restrictions, but no action was taken on any of the measures.
(For additional information, see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and
Remittances.)
54 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Reaching Out to the Cuban People,” January 14, 2011, available at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/14/reaching-out-cuban-people
55 Department of the Treasury, "Cuban Assets Control Regulations," Vol. 76, No. 19 Federal Register 5072-5078,
January 28, 2011; Department of Homeland Security, "Airports of Entry or Departure for Flights to and from Cuba,"
Vol. 76, No. 19 Federal Register 5058-5061, January 28, 2011.
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U.S. Agricultural Exports and Sanctions
U.S. commercial agricultural exports to Cuba have been allowed for several years, but with
numerous restrictions and licensing requirements. The 106th Congress passed the Trade Sanctions
Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 or TSRA (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) that allows for
one-year export licenses for selling agricultural commodities to Cuba, although no U.S.
government assistance, foreign assistance, export assistance, credits, or credit guarantees are
available to finance such exports. TSRA also denies exporters access to U.S. private commercial
financing or credit; all transactions must be conducted in cash in advance or with financing from
third countries. TSRA reiterates the existing ban on importing goods from Cuba but authorizes
travel to Cuba, under a specific license, to conduct business related to the newly allowed
agricultural sales.
Since 2002, the United States has become Cuba’s largest supplier of food and agricultural
products.56 Cuba has purchased over $3.5 billion in agricultural products from the United States
since 2001. After the implementation of TSRA, overall U.S exports to Cuba rose from about $7
million in 2001 to $404 million in 2004 and to a high of $712 million in 2008, far higher than in
previous years, in part because of the rise in food prices and because of Cuba’s increased food
needs in the aftermath of several hurricanes and tropical storms that severely damaged the
country’s agricultural sector. In 2009, U.S. exports to Cuba declined to $533 million, 25% lower
than the previous year.57 (See Figure 5.) The decline was largely related to Cuba’s shortage of
hard currency.58 In 2010, U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba have continued to fall. From January
through November 2010, U.S. exports to Cuba amounted to $347 million, down 29% from the
same period in 2009. Analysts again cite Cuba’s shortage of hard currency as the main reason for
the decline.59
In February 2005, OFAC amended the Cuba embargo regulations to clarify that TSRA’s term of
“payment of cash in advance” means that the payment must be received by the seller or the
seller’s agent prior to the shipment of the goods from the port at which they are loaded. U.S.
agricultural exporters and some Members of Congress strongly objected that the action
constituted a new sanction that violated the intent of TSRA and could jeopardize millions of
dollars in U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba. OFAC Director Robert Werner maintained that the
clarification “conforms to the common understanding of the term in international trade.”60 Facing
congressional pressure, on July 29, 2005, OFAC clarified that, for “payment of cash in advance”
for the commercial sale of U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba, vessels can leave U.S. ports as soon
as a foreign bank confirms receipt of payment from Cuba. OFAC’s action was aimed at ensuring
that the goods would not be vulnerable to seizure for unrelated claims while still at the U.S. port.
Supporters of overturning OFAC’s February 22, 2005, amendment, such as the American Farm
Bureau Federation, reportedly were pleased by the clarification but indicated that they would still
work to overturn the February 2005 rule.61
56 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, Office of Global Analysis, “Cuba’s Food &
Agriculture Situation Report,” March 2008.
57 Global Trade Atlas, which uses Department of Commerce Statistics.
58 Larry Luxner. “Cash-Strapped Cuba Cut U.S. Food Imports by 26% in ’09,” CubaNews, February 2010, p. 2.
59 Juan Tamayo, “Big Drop in U.S. Agricultural Sales to Cuba,” Miami Herald, July 29, 2010.
60 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Testimony of Robert Werner, Director, OFAC, before the House Committee on
Agriculture, March 16, 2005.
61 Christopher S. Rugaber, “Treasury Clarifies Cuba Farm Export Rule, and Baucus Relents on Nominees,”
(continued...)
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Figure 5. U.S. Exports to Cuba, 2001-2009
U.S. $ millions
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Dollars
7.1
145.65
259.13
404.14
369.03
340.47
447.06
711.50
532.78
Source: Adapted by CRS from the Global Trade Atlas, which utilizes Department of Commerce Statistics
In December 2009, Congress took action in the FY2010 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L.
111-117) to define, during FY2010, “payment of cash in advance” as payment before the transfer
of title to, and control of, the exported items to the Cuban purchaser. This overturned OFAC’s
February 2005 clarification that payment had to be received before vessels could leave U.S. ports.
The Administration issued regulations implementing this provision in early March 2010. The
regulations maintained that the definition applied to items delivered by September 30, 2010, or
delivered pursuant to a contract entered into by September 30, 2010, and shipped within 12
months of the signing of the contract.62 For FY2011, the Senate Appropriations Committee had
included a provision in a Financial Services and General Government appropriations measure, S.
3677 (section 621) that would have continued to extend the provision, but Congress did not
complete action on the measure. Nevertheless, Congress approved a series of short-term
continuing resolutions (P.L. 111-242, as amended) the last of which provided funding for federal
agencies through March 4, 2011, under conditions provided in enacted FY2010 appropriations
measures. This included continuation of the “payment of cash in advance” provision.
Several additional legislative initiatives introduced in the 111th Congress would have permanently
made this change, but no action was completed on these measures. As noted, on June 30, 2010,
the House Agriculture Committee reported out H.R. 4645 (Peterson). This legislation, in addition
to addressing travel restrictions, would have permanently changed the definition of “payment of
cash in advance” and would have allowed direct transfers between U.S. and Cuban financial
institutions for payment for products sold to Cuba under TSRA.
Some groups favor further easing restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba. They argue that the
restrictions harm the health and nutrition of the Cuban population. U.S. agribusiness companies
(...continued)
International Trade Reporter, August 4, 2005.
62 Federal Register, March 10, 2010, pp. 10996-10997.
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that support the removal of restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba believe that U.S. farmers
are missing out on a market so close to the United States. Some exporters want to change U.S.
restrictions so that they can sell agriculture and farm equipment to Cuba.63 Agricultural exporters
who support the lifting of the prohibition on financing contend that allowing such financing
would help smaller U.S. companies increase their exports to Cuba more rapidly.64 On July 19,
2007, the U.S. International Trade Commission issued a report, requested by the Senate
Committee on Finance, concluding that the U.S. share of Cuba’s agricultural, fish, and forest
imports would rise from one-third to between one-half and two-thirds if trade restrictions were
lifted. (See the full report available at http://www.usitc.gov/ext_relations/news_release/2007/
er0719ee1.htm.)
Opponents of further easing restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba maintain that U.S. policy
does not deny such sales to Cuba, as evidenced by the large amount of sales since 2001.
Moreover, according to the State Department, since the Cuban Democracy Act was enacted in
1992, the United States has licensed billions of dollars in private humanitarian donations.
Opponents further argue that easing pressure on the Cuban government would in effect be lending
support and extending the duration of the Castro regime. They maintain that the United States
should remain steadfast in its opposition to any easing of pressure on Cuba that could prolong the
Castro regime and its repressive policies. Some agricultural producers that export to Cuba support
continuation of the prohibition on financing for agricultural exports to Cuba because it ensures
that they will be paid.
Trademark Sanction65
For over a decade, the United States has imposed a sanction that denies protection for trademarks
connected with businesses confiscated from their owners by the Cuban government. A provision
in the FY1999 omnibus appropriations measure (Section 211 of Division A, Title II, P.L. 105-277,
signed into law October 21, 1998) prevents the United States from accepting payment for
trademark registrations and renewals from Cuban or foreign nationals that were used in
connection with a business or assets in Cuba that were confiscated, unless the original owner of
the trademark has consented. The provision prohibits U.S. courts from recognizing such
trademarks without the consent of the original owner. The measure was enacted because of a
dispute between the French spirits company, Pernod Ricard, and the Bermuda-based Bacardi Ltd.
Pernod Ricard entered into a joint venture in 1993 with the Cuban government to produce and
export Havana Club rum. Bacardi maintains that it holds the right to the Havana Club name
because in 1995 it entered into an agreement for the Havana Club trademark with the Arechabala
family, who had originally produced the rum until its assets and property were confiscated by the
Cuban government in 1960. Although Pernod Ricard cannot market Havana Club in the United
States because of the trade embargo, it wants to protect its future distribution rights should the
embargo be lifted.
The European Union initiated World Trade Organization dispute settlement proceedings in June
2000, maintaining that the U.S. law violates the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
63 “Ag Groups Split Over Trade With Cuba,” Congress Daily AM, National Journal, February 11, 2003.
64 “Farm Equipment Exports Likely to Face Tough Opposition from White House, Congress,” Cuba Trader, Vol. III,
No. 7, February 17, 2003.
65 For background information, see archived CRS Report RS21764, Restricting Trademark Rights of Cubans: WTO
Decision and Congressional Response, by Margaret Mikyung Lee, March 9, 2004.
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Intellectual Property (TRIPS). In January 2002, the WTO ultimately found that the trademark
sanction violated WTO provisions on national treatment and most-favored-nation obligations in
the TRIPS Agreement.
On March 28, 2002, the United States agreed that it would come into compliance with the WTO
ruling through legislative action by January 3, 2003.66 That deadline was extended several times
since no legislative action had been taken to bring Section 211 into compliance with the WTO
ruling. On July 1, 2005, however, in an EU-U.S. bilateral agreement, the EU agreed that it would
not request authorization to retaliate at that time, but reserved the right to do so at a future date,
and the United States agreed not to block a future EU request.67 On August 3, 2006, the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office announced that Cuba’s Havana Club trademark registration was
“cancelled/expired,” a week after OFAC had denied a Cuban government company the license
that it needed to renew the registration of the trademark.68
Two different approaches have been advocated to bring Section 211 into compliance with the
WTO ruling. Some want a narrow fix in which Section 211 would be amended so that it also
applies to U.S. companies instead of being limited to foreign companies. Advocates of this
approach argue that it would affirm that the United States “will not give effect to a claim or right
to U.S. property if that claim is based on a foreign compensation.”69 Others want Section 211
repealed altogether. They argue that the law endangers over 5,000 trademarks of over 500 U.S.
companies registered in Cuba.70
The House Committee on the Judiciary held a March 3, 2010, hearing on the “Domestic and
International Trademark Implications of HAVANA CLUB and Section 211 of the Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 2009.” (See http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_100303.html.)
Several legislative initiatives were introduced during the 111th Congress reflecting these two
approaches to bring Section 211 into compliance with the WTO ruling, but no action was taken
on these measures. The July 2005 EU-U.S. bilateral agreement, in which the EU agreed not to
retaliate against the United States, but reserved the right to do so at a later date, has reduced
pressure on Congress to take action to comply with the WTO ruling.
Anti-Drug Cooperation
Cuba is not a major producer or consumer of illicit drugs, but its extensive shoreline and
geographic location make it susceptible to narcotics smuggling operations. Drugs that enter the
Cuban market are largely the result of onshore wash-ups from smuggling by high-speed boats
66 “U.S., EU Agree on Deadline for Complying with Section 211 WTO Finding,” Inside U.S. Trade, April 12, 2002.
67 World Trade Organization (WTO), “United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998,
Understanding between the European Communities and the United States,” WT/DC176/16, July 1, 2005; WTO,
Dispute Settlement Body, “Minutes of Meeting, Held in the Centre William Rappard on 20 July 2005,”
WT/DSB/M/194, August 26, 2005; and “Japan, EU Suspend WTO Retaliation Against U.S. in Two Cases,” Inside U.S.
Trade, July 15, 2005;
68 “PTO Cancels Cuban ‘Havana Club’ Mark; Bacardi Set to Sell Rum Under Same Mark,” International Trade Daily,
August 10, 2006.
69 Brian Lehman, testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, hearing on “An Examination of Section 211
of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998,” July 13, 2004.
70 “USA-Engage Joins Cuba Fight,” Cuba Trader, April 1, 2002.
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moving drugs from Jamaica to the Bahamas, Haiti, and the United States or by small aircraft from
clandestine airfields in Jamaica. For a number of years, Cuban officials have expressed concerns
over the use of their waters and airspace for drug transit and about increased domestic drug use.
The Cuban government has taken a number of measures to deal with the drug problem, including
legislation to stiffen penalties for traffickers, increased training for counternarcotics personnel,
and cooperation with a number of countries on anti-drug efforts. According to the State
Department’s March 2010 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Cuba
maintains that it has some 56 judicial assistance agreements and two memoranda of
understanding with other countries related to anti-drug cooperation. For a decade, Cuba’s
Operation Hatchet has focused on maritime and air interdiction and the recovery of narcotics
washed up on Cuban shores. Since 2003, Cuba has aggressively pursued an internal enforcement
and investigation program against its incipient drug market with an effective nationwide drug
prevention and awareness campaign, Operation Popular Shield.
Over the years, there have been varying levels of U.S.-Cuban cooperation on anti-drug efforts. In
1996, Cuban authorities cooperated with the United States in the seizure of 6.6 tons of cocaine
aboard the Miami-bound Limerick, a Honduran-flag ship. Cuba turned over the cocaine to the
United States and cooperated fully in the investigation and subsequent prosecution of two
defendants in the case in the United States. Cooperation has increased since 1999 when U.S. and
Cuban officials met in Havana to discuss ways of improving anti-drug cooperation. Cuba
accepted an upgrading of the communications link between the Cuban Border Guard and the U.S.
Coast Guard as well as the stationing of a U.S. Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Specialist (DIS) at
the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. The Coast Guard official was posted to the U.S. Interests
Section in September 2000, and since that time, coordination has increased.
In the March 2010 INCSR, the State Department reported that some of Cuba’s anti-drug
operations were undertaken in coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard DIS at the U.S. Interests
Section in Havana. It maintained that Cuban authorities have provided the DIS continued access
to Cuban counternarcotics efforts, including providing investigative criminal information, such as
the names of suspects and vessels; debriefings on drug trafficking cases; visits to the Cuban
national canine training center and antidoping laboratory in Havana; tours of Cuban Border
Guard facilities and container x-ray equipment at the Port of Havana; and opportunities to meet
with the chiefs of Cuba’s INTERPOL and Customs offices.
Cuba maintains that it wants to cooperate with the United States to combat drug trafficking, and
on various occasions has called for a bilateral anti-drug cooperation agreement with the United
States.71 In its March 2010 INCSR, the State Department stated that “both nations may gain by
pressing forward with expanded cooperation, especially considering Cuba’s location in the
Caribbean, and the potential for the island and its territorial seas to be utilized for drug
transshipments to the United States.”
71 On March 12, 2002, Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Cuban Interests Section in Washington delivered
three diplomatic notes to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana and the State Department in Washington proposing
agreements on drug interdiction, terrorism, and migration issues. See “Statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
Prominent Drug Trafficker Arrested in our Country,” Information Office, Cuban Interests Section, March 17, 2002;
“Cuba Offers to Sign Anti-Drug Pact,” Miami Herald, April 8, 2006.
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Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development72
Cuba is moving toward development of its offshore oil resources. While the country has proven
oil reserves of just 0.1 billion barrels, the U.S. Geological Survey estimates that offshore reserves
in the North Cuba Basin could contain an additional 4.6 billion barrels of undiscovered
technically recoverable crude oil. The Spanish oil company Repsol, in a consortium with
Norway’s Statoil and India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, is expected to begin offshore
exploratory drilling in 2011, and a number of other companies are considering exploratory
drilling. At present, Cuba has six offshore projects with foreign oil companies while two more
projects are being negotiated. If oil is found, some experts estimate that it would take at least
three to five years before production would begin. While it is unclear whether offshore oil
production could result in Cuba becoming a net oil exporter, it could reduce Cuba’s current
dependence on Venezuela for oil supplies.
In the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, some Members of
Congress and others have expressed concern about Cuba’s development of its deepwater
petroleum reserves so close to the United States. They are concerned about oil spill risks and
about the status of disaster preparedness and coordination with the United States in the event of
an oil spill. Dealing with these challenges is made more difficult because of the longstanding poor
state of relations between Cuba and the United States. If an oil spill did occur in the waters
northwest of Cuba, currents in the Florida Straits could carry the oil to U.S. waters and coastal
areas in Florida, although a number of factors would determine the potential environmental
impact. If significant amounts of oil did reach U.S. waters, marine and coastal resources in
southern Florida could be at risk.
With regard to disaster response coordination, the United States and Cuba are not parties to a
bilateral agreement on oil spills. While U.S. oil spill mitigation companies can be licensed by the
Treasury and Commerce Departments to provide support and equipment in the event of an oil
spill, some energy and policy analysts have called for the Administration to ease regulatory
restrictions on the transfer of U.S. equipment and personnel to Cuba that would be needed to
combat a spill. Some have also called for more formal U.S.-Cuban government cooperation and
planning to minimize potential damage from an oil spill. Similar U.S. cooperation with Mexico
could be a potential model for U.S.-Cuban cooperation, while two multilateral agreements on oil
spills under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization also could provide a
mechanism for some U.S.-Cuban engagement on oil pollution preparedness and response.
Beyond U.S.-Cuban cooperation in anticipation of an oil spill, some U.S. businesses and policy
groups have called for Congress and the Administration to allow U.S. investment in Cuba’s
offshore oil sector, while others oppose any support for the development of Cuba’s offshore oil
reserves. In the 111th Congress, legislative initiatives reflected two contrasting policy approaches
toward Cuba’s development of its offshore oil reserves. One approach, as reflected in S. 774,
H.R. 1918, and S. 1517, would allow for U.S. involvement in Cuba’s offshore oil sector, while a
second approach, as reflected in H.R. 5620, would impose sanctions on foreign companies and
individuals who assist the development of Cuba’s petroleum resources and would not affect
current prohibitions on U.S. firms’ economic dealings with Cuba.
72 For further information, see CRS Report R41522, Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development: Background and U.S. Policy
Considerations, by Neelesh Nerurkar and Mark P. Sullivan.
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Interest in Cuba’s offshore oil development may continue in the 112th Congress, especially if
exploratory drilling begins as anticipated in 2011. To date, one legislative initiative has been
introduced, H.R. 372 (Buchanan), that would amend the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to
authorize the Secretary of the Interior to deny leases and permits to persons who engage in
activities with the government of any foreign country that is subject to any U.S. government
sanction or embargo.
Terrorism Issues73
Cuba was added to the State Department’s list of states sponsoring international terrorism in 1982
(pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979) because of its alleged ties to
international terrorism and support for terrorist groups in Latin America, and it has remained on
the list since that time. Cuba had a long history of supporting revolutionary movements and
governments in Latin America and Africa, but in 1992, Fidel Castro said that his country’s
support for insurgents abroad was a thing of the past. Cuba’s change in policy was in large part
due to the breakup of the Soviet Union, which resulted in the loss of billions of dollars in annual
subsidies to Cuba, and led to substantial Cuban economic decline.
Critics of retaining Cuba on the terrorism list maintain that it is a holdover from the Cold War.
They argue that domestic political considerations keep Cuba on the terrorism list and maintain
that Cuba’s presence on the list diverts U.S. attention from struggles against serious terrorist
threats. Those who support keeping Cuba on the terrorism list argue that there is ample evidence
that Cuba supports terrorism. They point to the government’s history of supporting terrorist acts
and armed insurgencies in Latin America and Africa. They point to the government’s continued
hosting of members of foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice.
The State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2009 report (issued August 5, 2010)
maintained that the Cuban government and its official media publicly condemned acts of
terrorism by al-Qa’ida and its affiliates, but at the same time remained critical of the U.S.
approach to combating international terrorism. The report noted that while Cuba no longer
supports armed struggle in Latin America or elsewhere, that it continued to provide physical safe
haven and ideological support to members of three terrorist organizations—Basque Homeland
and Freedom (ETA ), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and Colombia’s
National Liberation Army (ELN). The report noted that Cuba cooperated with the United States
on a limited number of law enforcement matters, but also pointed out that the Cuban government
continued to permit U.S. fugitives to live legally in Cuba, including convicted murders and
hijackers.
Both the President and Congress have powers to take a country off the state sponsors of terrorism
list. As set forth in Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, a country’s retention on the list
may be rescinded in two ways. The first option is for the President to submit a report to Congress
certifying that there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the
government and that the government is not supporting acts of international terrorism and is
providing assurances that it will not support such acts in the future. The second option is for the
President to submit a report to Congress, at least 45 days in advance justifying the rescission and
certifying that the government has not provided any support for international terrorism during the
73 For background information, see CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, by Mark P.
Sullivan.
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preceding six-months, and has provided assurances that it will not support such acts in the future.
If Congress disagrees with the President’s decision to remove a country from the list, it could
seek to block the rescission through legislation.
Congress also has the power on its own to remove a country from the terrorism list. For example,
legislation introduced on Cuba in the 111th Congress, H.R. 2272 (Rush), included a provision that
would have rescinded the Secretary of State’s determination that Cuba “has repeatedly provided
support for acts of international terrorism.”
Cuba has been the target of various terrorist incidents over the years. In 1976, a Cuban plane was
bombed, killing 73 people. In 1997, there were almost a dozen bombings in the tourist sector in
Havana in which an Italian businessman was killed and several others were injured. Two
Salvadorans were convicted and sentenced to death for the bombings in March 1999 (although
the sentences were commuted in 2010 to 30 years in prison), and three Guatemalans were
sentenced to prison terms ranging from 10-15 years in January 2002 for plans to conduct
bombings in 1998. Cuban officials maintain that Cuban exiles funded the bombings.
In November 2000, four anti-Castro activists were arrested in Panama for a plot to kill Fidel
Castro. One of the accused, Luis Posada Carriles, is also alleged to be involved in the 1976 Cuban
airline bombing and the series of bombings in Havana in 1997 noted above.74 The four stood trial
in March 2004 and were sentenced on weapons charges to prison terms ranging from seven to
eight years. In late August 2004, Panamanian President Mireya Moscoso pardoned the four men
before the end of her presidential term. Three of the men are U.S. citizens and traveled to Florida,
where they received strong support from some in the Cuban American community, while Posada
reportedly traveled to another country.
Posada entered the United States illegally in 2005. In subsequent removal proceedings, an
immigration judge found that Posada could not be removed to Cuba or Venezuela because of
concerns that he would face torture, and he was thereafter permitted to remain in the United
States pending such time as he could be transferred to a different country. Posada subsequently
applied for naturalization to become a U.S. citizen. This application was denied, and criminal
charges were brought against him for allegedly false statements made in his naturalization
application and interview. Although a federal district court dismissed the indictment in 2007, its
ruling was reversed by an appellate court in 2008. In April 2009, the United States filed a
superseding indictment, which included additional criminal charges based on allegedly false
statements made by Posada in immigration removal proceedings concerning his involvement in
the 1997 Havana bombings. His trial originally was set to begin in August 2009, but was
rescheduled three times until it finally began on January 10, 2011.75
On July 7, 2010, Venezuelan authorities extradited to Cuba an alleged Posada associate,
Salvadoran citizen Francisco Chávez Abarca, who was charged with involvement in one of the
1997 bombings in Havana.76 Chávez Abarca had been imprisoned from 2005-2007 in El Salvador
for running a car theft ring, but charges ultimately were dropped, reportedly because of a botched
74 Frances Robles, “An Old Foe of Castro Looks Back on His Fight,” Miami Herald, September 4, 2003.
75 For additional information, see “Background on Luis Posada Carriles,” CRS Congressional Distribution
Memorandum, December 8, 2010, prepared by Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, and Michael
John Garcia, Legislative Attorney. Available from the authors.
76 Christopher Toothaker, “Venezuela Extradites Suspected Terrorist to Cuba to Face Bombing Charges,” AP
Newswire, July 7, 2010.
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investigation, and he was set free. On July 1, 2010, he was arrested in Venezuela upon entering
the county and allegedly confessed to plans to organize protests in Venezuela around the time of
the country’s legislative elections in September 2010.77 In late September 2010, the Cuban
government released Chávez Abarca’s video confessions and reenactment of the bombings, as
well as his alleged association with Luis Posada, in a public information campaign featured in the
Cuban media as well as abroad on social media sites such as YouTube and Facebook.78 According
to Chávez Abarca, Posada recruited him in El Salvador for the Cuba bombings, and paid him
$2,000 for each bomb that went off. Only one of the bombs that Chávez Abarca planted actually
detonated, on April 12, 2007 in the bathroom of a disco at the Melia Cohiba hotel in Havana. In
late December 2011, Chávez Abarca was sentenced to 30 years in prison for his role in the
bombings.
U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights
Since 1996, the United States has provided assistance—primarily through the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), but also through the State Department and the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED)—to increase the flow of information on democracy, human
rights, and free enterprise to Cuba.
USAID’s Cuba program has supported a variety of U.S.-based non-governmental organizations
with the goals of promoting a rapid, peaceful transition to democracy, helping develop civil
society, and building solidarity with Cuba’s human rights activists.79 These efforts are largely
funded through Economic Support Funds (ESF) in the annual foreign operations appropriations
bill. From FY2001-FY2010, Congress appropriated almost $157 million in funding for Cuba
democracy efforts. This included $45.3 million for FY2008, $20 million for FY2009, and $20
million for FY2010.
For FY2009, Congress fully funded the Administration’s $20 million request in ESF to continue
to implement the program recommendations of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba.
According to the request, the funding was aimed at assisting human rights activists, independent
journalists, Afro-Cubans, and women, youth, and student activists. The report to the Senate
Appropriations Committee version of the FY2009 State Department, Foreign Operations, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, S. 3288 (S.Rept. 110-425), recommended fully funding the
Administration’s request for Cuba, but also called for the State Department and USAID to
conduct regular evaluations to ensure the cost effectiveness of the programs. No final action on
the appropriations measure was taken in the 110th Congress, but in the 111th Congress, the
FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8) funded overall foreign operations funding,
including the $20 million for Cuba democracy funding. Two Members of Congress placed a hold
on the assistance until the Administration provided more information on the proposed funding,
but in early June 2010, the hold was lifted and $15 million of the $20 million was released.80
Subsequently in August 2010, USAID notified Congress that it would be obligating $620,000
77 Frances Robles, “Mystery Man in Terror Plots Points at Miami Exiles,” Miami Herald, October 18, 2010.
78 The Cuban government’s video series, entitled Path to Terror, is available on YouTube at: http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=kx7TptU3taQ.
79See USAID’s Cuba program website: http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/country/cuba/.
80 Juan O. Tamayo, “U.S. Funds for Democracy Programs in Cuba Get Green Light,” Miami Herald, June 8, 2010; Ana
Radelat, “Lawmakers Pressure State Department to ‘Decontaminate’ USAID Cuba Program,” CubaNews, June 2010.
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more in FY2009 ESF for Cuba, bringing total FY2009 Cuba funding to $15.620 million. At the
same time, the USAID shifted the remaining $4.380 million originally notified for Cuba to a
humanitarian assistance program for Guatemala.
For FY2010, Congress once again fully funded the Administration’s $20 million ESF request for
Cuba democracy programs in the conference report (H.Rept. 111-366) to the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2010 (H.R. 3288/P.L. 111-117). According to the State Department’s FY2010
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, U.S. assistance programs focus on
providing humanitarian assistance to victims of repression, strengthening civil society, weakening
the information blockade, and helping Cubans to create space for dialogue about democratic
change and reconciliation. Both House-passed H.R. 3081 and Senate Appropriations Committee-
reported S. 1434, the FY2010 State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, recommended full funding of the Administration’s $20 million request.
For FY2011, the Administration once again requested $20 million in ESF to support democracy
and human rights projects. According to the Administration’s request, the assistance focuses on
providing humanitarian assistance to prisoners of conscience and their families, strengthening
civil society, supporting issue-based civic action movements and coalitions, and promoting
fundamental freedoms, especially freedom of expression and freedom of the press. The Senate
version of the State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations measure, S. 3676,
reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 29, 2010 (S.Rept. 111-237), would
have provided that $2 million of the ESF appropriated for Cuba be transferred and merged with
funds for the National Endowment for Democracy for democracy programs in Cuba. The 111th
Congress did not complete action on the FY2011 State Department and Foreign Operations
appropriations measure. Instead, it approved a series of short-term continuing resolutions (P.L.
111-242, as amended), the last of which provided funding for federal agencies through March 4,
2011, generally at FY2010 levels and under conditions provided in enacted FY2010
appropriations measures.
Until FY2008, NED’s democratization assistance for Cuba had been funded largely through the
annual Commerce, Justice, and State (CJS) appropriations measure, but is now funded through
the State Department, Foreign Operations and Related Agencies appropriations measure. NED
funding for Cuba has steadily increased over the past several years: $765,000 in FY2001;
$841,000 in FY2002; $1.14 million in FY2003; and $1.15 million in FY2004. For FY2005, NED
funded 17 Cuba projects with $2.4 million. For FY2006, NED funded 13 projects with almost
$1.5 million, including $0.4 million from State Department ESF. For FY2007, NED funded 12
projects with almost $1.5 million, which included almost $1.4 million funded by the State
Department. For FY2008, NED funded 11 projects with over $1.4 million. In FY2009, NED
funded 10 Cuba projects with about $1.5 million from the State Department.
Oversight of U.S. Democracy Assistance to Cuba
In November 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report examining U.S.
democracy assistance for Cuba from 1996-2005, and concluded that the U.S. program had
significant problems and needed better management and oversight. According to GAO, internal
controls, for both the awarding of Cuba program grants and oversight of grantees, “do not provide
adequate assurance that the funds are being used properly and that grantees are in compliance
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with applicable law and regulations.”81 Investigative news reports on the program maintained that
high shipping costs and lax oversight had diminished its effectiveness.82
GAO issued a second report examining USAID’s Cuba democracy program in November 2008.83
The report lauded the steps that USAID had taken since 2006 to address problems with its Cuba
program and improve oversight of the assistance. These included awarding all grants
competitively since 2006, hiring more staff for the program office since January 2008, and
contracting for financial services in April 2008 to enhance oversight of grantees. The GAO report
also noted that USAID had worked to strengthen program oversight through pre-award and
follow-up reviews, improving grantee internal controls and implementation plans, and providing
guidance and monitoring about permitted types of assistance and cost sharing.
The GAO report also maintained, however, that USAID had not staffed the Cuba program to the
level needed for effective grant oversight. GAO also noted the difficulty of assessing USAID’s
action to improve its Cuba program because most of its actions to improve the program were only
taken recently. Procurement reviews completed in August 2008 by the new financial services
contractor identified internal control, financial management, and procurement weaknesses at three
grantees. GAO recommended that USAID (1) ensure that its Cuba program office is staffed at the
level that is needed to fully implement planned monitoring activities; and (2) periodically assess
the Cuba program’s overall efforts to address and reduce grantee risks, especially regarding
internal controls, procurement practices, expenditures, and compliance with laws and regulations.
December 2009 Detainment of American Subcontractor
On December 4, 2009, Cuban authorities arrested an American subcontractor, Alan Gross,
working for Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI), a Bethesda-based company that had received a
contract from USAID to help support Cuban civil society organizations. Gross was arrested at
Jose Martí International Airport in Havana when he was planning to leave the country. He
reportedly was distributing communications equipment in Cuba such as cell phones and laptop
computers to Jewish organizations in Cuba.84
High-ranking Cuban official Ricardo Alarcon, the head of Cuba’s National Assembly, asserted on
January 6, 2010, that the contractor was working for American intelligence, but U.S. officials
strongly denied the accusation.85 A State Department spokesman maintained that the contractor
“is not associated with our intelligence services” and noted that “Cuba has a history of
mischaracterizing what Americans and NGOs in Cuba are doing.”86 According to a statement by
81 U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Democracy Assistance for Cuba Needs Better Management and
Oversight, GAO-07-147, November 2006.
82 Oscar Corral, “Federal Program to Help Democracy in Cuba Falls Short of Mark,” Miami Herald, November 14,
2006, and “Is U.S. Aid Reaching Castro Foes?” Miami Herald, November 15, 2006.
83 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Foreign Assistance: Continued Efforts Needed to Strengthen USAID’s
Oversight of U.S. Democracy Assistance for Cuba, GAO-09-165, November 2008.
84 William Booth and Mary Beth Sheridan, “Cuba Detains Contractor for U.S. Government; American Was Handing
Out Mobile Phones, Laptops to Activists,” Washington Post, December 12, 2009; Ginger Thompson and Marc Lacey,
“Contractor Jailed in Cuba Was Aiding Religious Groups,” New York Times, January 13, 2010; and Mary Beth
Sheridan and William Booth, “U.S. Detainee Was Aiding Jewish Groups in Cuba,” Washington Post, January 13, 2010.
85 William Booth, “Contractor is U.S. Secret Agent, Cuban Legislator Says,” Washington Post, January 7, 2010.
86 “State Department Holds Regular News Briefing,” CQ Newsmaker Transcripts, January 7, 2010.
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DAI, “the detained subcontractor was not working for any intelligence service … he was working
with a peaceful, non-dissident civic group—a religious and cultural group recognized by the
Cuban government—to improve its ability to communicate with its members across the island
and overseas.”87
Numerous U.S. officials have raised the issue of Alan Gross’s detention with the Cuban
government, including at the semi-annual bilateral migration talks, and have called for his release.
In March 2010, some 40 House Members called for Mr. Gross’s release in a letter to the Cuban
government, warning that improved relations between the United States and Cuba will not be
possible until he is released.88 The letter maintained that Mr. Gross’s work in Cuba with the
Jewish community “emanated from his desire to make a positive impact for others of faith on the
island.” It expressed concern for Mr. Gross’s health and the deteriorating health of his elderly
mother. A number of other Members and Senators have also called for Mr. Gross’s immediate
release. On June 17, 2010, Secretary of State Clinton met with family members of Mr. Gross, and
issued a statement expressing deep concern about his welfare and poor health. The Secretary
maintained that his continued detention “is harming U.S.-Cuba relations,” and that his release
would be viewed favorably.89 In September 2010, Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs met with Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez in New York to
encourage the release of Mr. Gross.90
As noted above, in early December 2010, on the one-year anniversary of Mr. Gross’s detention,
the State Department again issued a statement calling for his release, and maintaining that “the
continued detention of Alan Gross is a major impediment to advancing the dialogue between our
two countries.”91 At the fourth round of migration talks held on January 12, 2011 in Havana, the
U.S. delegation again raised the issue and called for Mr. Gross’s immediate release. The head of
the U.S. team at the talks, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere
Roberta Jacobson, subsequently met with Gross on January 13. Subsequent press reports
maintained that a senior State Department official was “cautiously optimistic” that Gross would
be released.92
Radio and TV Marti
U.S.-government sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba—Radio and TV Martí—
began in 1985 and 1990 respectively. According to the Broadcasting Board of Governors FY2011
Budget Request, Radio and TV Martí are dedicated to providing a reliable source of news and
information that is accurate, objective, and credible. The request maintains that the two programs
87 Frances Robles, “U.S. Says Contractor Arrested in Cuba is No Spy,” Miami Herald, January 8, 2010; and
Development Alternatives Inc. “Updated Statement from DAI President and CEO Dr. James Boomgard Regarding
Detainee in Cuba,” January 7, 2010.
88 “Congressmen urge Cuba to Release Jailed U.S. Aid Worker Who Helped Jewish Community,” States News Service,
March 24, 2010.
89 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Continued Incarceration of Alan Gross,” June
17, 2010.
90 U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, October 18, 2010; and Juan O. Tamayo, “Cuba, U.S. Talk on Jailed
American,” Miami Herald, October 19, 2010.
91 U.S. Department of State, “One Year Continued Incarceration of Alan Gross,” Philip J. Crowley, Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Pubic Affairs, December 3, 2010.
92 Esteban Israel, “U.S. Hopeful Citizen Held in Cuba to be Tried, Freed,” Reuters News, January 13, 2011.
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support the right of the Cuban people to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through
any media, regardless of frontiers.
Until October 1999, U.S.-government funded international broadcasting programs had been a
primary function of the United States Information Agency (USIA). When USIA was abolished
and its functions were merged into the Department of State at the beginning of FY2000, the
Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) became an independent agency that included such
entities as the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free
Asia, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB), which manages Radio and TV Marti. OCB is
headquartered in Miami, FL, and operates under the BBG’s International Broadcasting Bureau
(IBB). Legislation in the 104th Congress (P.L. 104-134) required the relocation of OCB from
Washington, DC, to south Florida. The move began in 1996 and was completed in 1998.
Radio Martí broadcasts on short and medium wave (AM) channels for 24 hours six days per
week, and for 18 hours one day per week utilizing transmission facilities in Marathon, FL, and
Greenville, NC, according to the BBG. It also transmits to Cuba 24 hours daily through Hispasat
satellite television and the internet.
TV Martí programming has been broadcast through multiple transmission methods over the
years. From its beginning in 1990 until July 2005, it was broadcast via an aerostat (blimp) from
facilities in Cudjoe Key, Florida for four and one-half hours daily, but the aerostat was destroyed
by Hurricane Dennis. From mid-2004 until 2006, TV Martí programming was transmitted for
several hours once a week via an airborne platform known as Commando Solo operated by the
Department of Defense utilizing a C-130 aircraft. In August 2006, OCB began to use contracted
private aircraft to transmit pre-recorded TV Martí broadcasts six days weekly, and by late October
2006 the OCB inaugurated an aircraft-broadcasting platform known as AeroMartí with the
capability of transmitting live broadcasts. OCB currently uses two privately contracted airplanes
for AeroMartí to transmit broadcasts two and one-half hours for five days weekly. Broadcasts are
also transmitted via the internet and satellite television.
From FY1984 through FY2010, about $660 million was spent for broadcasting to Cuba. In recent
years, funding amounted to $33.4 million in FY2008, an estimated $34.8 million in FY2009, and
an estimated $30.5 million in FY2010.
For FY2011, the BBG requested $29.179 million for Cuba broadcasting, about $1 million less
than that appropriated in FY2010. Staffing would remain the same at 136 positions. The Senate
version of the State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations measure, S. 3676,
reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 29, 2010 (S.Rept. 111-237),
recommended $28.789 million for broadcasting to Cuba ($390,000 less than the request of
$29.179 million). In the report to the bill, the committee also stated that it did not support closing
the Greenville Station in North Carolina that transmits the Cuba broadcasts, expanding TV
Martí’s transmission on DirecTV, or expanding and renovating the TV Martí studio until the
Broadcasting Board of Governors submits a multi-year strategic plan for broadcasting to Cuba.
The 111th Congress did not complete action on the FY2011 State Department and Foreign
Operations appropriations measure. Instead, it approved a series of short-term continuing
resolutions (P.L. 111-242, as amended), the last of which provided funding for federal agencies
through March 4, 2011, generally at FY2010 levels and under conditions provided in enacted
FY2010 appropriations measures.
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Both Radio and TV Martí have at times been the focus of controversies, including questions
about adherence to broadcast standards. There have been various attempts over the years to cut
funding for the programs, especially for TV Martí, which has not had much of an audience
because of Cuban jamming efforts. In December 2006, press reports alleged significant problems
in the OCB’s operations, with claims of cronyism, patronage, and bias in its coverage.93 In
February 2007, the former director of TV Martí programming pled guilty in U.S. federal court to
receiving more than $100,000 in kickbacks over a three-year period from a vendor receiving
OCB contracts.94
Over the years, there have been various government studies and audits of the OCB, including
investigations by the GAO, by a 1994 congressionally-established Advisory Panel on Radio and
TV Martí, by the State Department Office Inspector General (OIG) in 1999, and by the combined
State Department/BBG Office Inspector General in 2003 and 2007.95
In July 2008, GAO issued a report that criticized the IBB’s and OCB’s practices in awarding two
contracts to Radio Mambí and TV Azteca as lacking discipline required to ensure transparency
and accountability. According to GAO, the approach for awarding the Radio Mambí and TV
Azteca contracts did not reflect sound business practices.96
In January 2009, GAO issued a report asserting that the best available research suggests that
Radio and TV Martí’s audience is small, and cited telephone surveys since 2003 showing that less
than 2% of respondents reported tuning in to Radio or TV Martí during the past week. With
regard to TV Martí viewership, according to the report, all of the IBB’s telephone surveys since
2003 show that less than 1% of respondents said that they had watched TV Martí during the past
week. According to the GAO report, the IBB surveys show that there was no increase in reported
TV Martí viewership following the beginning of AeroMartí and DirecTV satellite broadcasting in
2006.The GAO report also cited concerns with adherence to relevant domestic laws and
international standards, including the domestic dissemination of OCB programming,
inappropriate advertisements during OCB programming, and TV Martí’s interference with Cuban
broadcasts.97 GAO testified on its report in a hearing held by the House Subcommittee on
93 Oscar Corral, “Radio, TV Martí Face Another Government Audit,” Miami Herald, December 18, 2006, and
“Problems Dog Broadcaster,” Miami Herald, December 19, 2006.
94 Jay Weaver, “TV Martí Executive Admits Taking Kickbacks,” Miami Herald, February 14, 2007.
95 See the following reports and audits: U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Broadcasts to Cuba, TV Marti Surveys
are Flawed, GAO/NSIAD-90-252, August 1990; U.S. GAO, TV Marti, Costs and Compliance with Broadcast
Standards and International Agreements, GAO/NSIAD-92-199, May 1992; U.S. GAO, Letter to Hon. Howard L.
Berman and Hon. John F. Kerry regarding Radio Marti broadcast standards, GAO/NSIAD-93-126R, February 17,
1993; Advisory Panel on Radio and TV Marti, Report of the Advisory Panel on Radio and TV Marti, Three Volumes,
March 1994; U.S. GAO, Radio Marti, Program Review Processes Need Strengthening, GAO/NSIAD-94-265,
September 1994; U.S. GAO, U.S. Information Agency, Issues Related to Reinvention Planning in the Office of Cuba
Broadcasting, GAO/NSIAD-96-110, May 1996; U.S. Department of State, Office of the Inspector General, Review of
Polices and Procedures for Ensuring that Radio Marti Broadcasts Adhere to Applicable Requirements, 99-IB-010,
June 1999; U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General, Review of
the Effectiveness and Implementation of Office of Cuba Broadcasting’s New Program Initiatives, Report No. IBO-A-
03-01, January 2003, and Report of Inspection, Office of Cuba Broadcasting, Report No. ISP-IB 07-35, June 2007.
96 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Broadcasting to Cuba, Weaknesses in Contracting Practices Reduced
Visibility into Selected Award Decisions,” GAO-08-764, July 2008.
97 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Broadcasting to Cuba, Actions Are Needed to Improve Strategy and
Operations, GAO-09-127, January 2009.
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International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
on June 17, 2009.
In April 2010, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee majority issued a staff report that
concluded that Radio and TV Martí “continue to fail in their efforts to influence Cuban society,
politics, and policy.” The report cited problems with adherence to broadcast standards, audience
size, and Cuban government jamming. Among its recommendation, the report called for the IBB
to move the Office of Cuba Broadcasting back to Washington and integrate it fully into the Voice
of America.98
Migration Issues
1994 and 1995 Migration Accords
Cuba and the United States reached two migration accords in 1994 and 1995 designed to stem the
mass exodus of Cubans attempting to reach the United States by boat. On the minds of U.S.
policymakers was the 1980 Mariel boatlift in which 125,000 Cubans fled to the United States
with the approval of Cuban officials. In response to Fidel Castro’s threat to unleash another
Mariel, U.S. officials reiterated U.S. resolve not to allow another exodus. Amid escalating
numbers of fleeing Cubans, on August 19, 1994, President Clinton abruptly changed U.S.
migration policy, under which Cubans attempting to flee their homeland were allowed into the
United States, and announced that the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy would take Cubans rescued at
sea to the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Despite the change in policy, Cubans
continued fleeing in large numbers.
As a result, in early September 1994, Cuba and the United States began talks that culminated in a
September 9, 1994, bilateral agreement to stem the flow of Cubans fleeing to the United States by
boat. In the agreement, the United States and Cuba agreed to facilitate safe, legal, and orderly
Cuban migration to the United States, consistent with a 1984 migration agreement. The United
States agreed to ensure that total legal Cuban migration to the United States would be a minimum
of 20,000 each year, not including immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. In a change of policy, the
United States agreed to discontinue the practice of granting parole to all Cuban migrants who
reach the United States, while Cuba agreed to take measures to prevent unsafe departures from
Cuba.
In May 1995, the United States reached another accord with Cuba under which the United States
would parole the more than 30,000 Cubans housed at Guantanamo into the United States, but
would intercept future Cuban migrants attempting to enter the United States by sea and would
return them to Cuba. The two countries would cooperate jointly in the effort. Both countries also
pledged to ensure that no action would be taken against those migrants returned to Cuba as a
consequence of their attempt to immigrate illegally. On January 31, 1996, the Department of
Defense announced that the last of some 32,000 Cubans intercepted at sea and housed at
Guantanamo had left the U.S. Naval Station, most having been paroled into the United States.
98 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Cuba: Immediate Action Is Needed To Ensure the
Survivability of Radio and TV Marti, committee print, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., April 29, 2010, S.Prt. 111-46
(Washington: GPO, 2010).
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Coast Guard Interdictions
Since the 1995 migration accord, the U.S. Coast Guard has interdicted thousands of Cubans at sea
and returned them to their country, while those deemed at risk for persecution have been
transferred to Guantanamo and then found asylum in a third country or eventually the United
States. Those Cubans who reach shore are allowed to apply for permanent resident status in one
year, pursuant to the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-732). In short, most interdictions,
even in U.S. coastal waters, results in a return to Cuba, while those Cubans who touch shore are
allowed to stay in the United States. This so-called “wet foot/dry foot” policy has been criticized
by some as encouraging Cubans to risk their lives in order to make it to the United States and as
encouraging alien smuggling. Others maintain that U.S. policy should welcome those migrants
fleeing communist Cuba whether or not they are able to make it to land.
Figure 6. Maritime Interdiction of Cubans, FY2002-FY2010
3500
3000
2,712
2,810
2,868
2500
2,199
2000
1555
1500
1225
1000
799
666
422
500
0
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Source: CRS presentation of United States Coast Guard data. United States Coast Guard, Alien Migrant
Interdiction, “Coast Guard Migrant Interdictions – Fiscal Year 1982-Present,” January 4, 2011, available at:
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/FlowStats/FY.asp
In recent years, the number of Cubans interdicted at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard rose from 666 in
FY2002 to a high of 2,868 in FY2007. In subsequent years, maritime interdictions declined
significantly to 422 by FY2010.99 (See Figure 6.) Major reasons for the decline in migrant
interdictions from Cuba are reported to include the U.S. economic downturn, more efficient
coastal patrolling, and more aggressive prosecution of migrant smugglers.100 In October 2008,
Mexico and Cuba negotiated a migration accord in an attempt to curb the irregular flow of
migrants through Mexico.101
99 U.S. Coast Guard, Alien Migrant Interdiction, Coast Guard Office of Law Enforcement, “Total Interdictions, Fiscal
Year 1982 to Present,” January 4, 2011.
100 Alfonso Chardy and Juan Tamayo, “Exodus of Cubans Sharing,” Miami Herald, October 6, 2010.
101 Diego Cevallos, “Migration: More and More Cubans Entering U.S. Through Mexico,” Inter Press Service News
Agency, June 17, 2008.
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U.S. prosecution against migrant smugglers in Florida has increased in recent years with
numerous convictions. There have been several violent incidents in which Cuban migrants have
brandished weapons or in which Coast Guard officials have used force to prevent Cubans from
reaching shore. In late December 2007, a Coast Guard official in Florida called on the local
Cuban American community to denounce the smuggling and stop financing the trips that are
leading to more deaths at sea.102 In July 2010, three Cuban nationals (two living in Florida and
one in Mexico) were charged in a U.S. federal court in Tampa with conspiracy, kidnapping, and
extortion involving the abduction of Cuban migrants in Mexico.103 The Cuban government also
has taken forceful action, including prison sentences of up to three years against those engaging
in alien smuggling.
Migration Talks
Semi-annual U.S.-Cuban talks alternating between Cuba and the United States had been held
regularly on the implementation of the 1994 and 1995 migration accords until they were
suspended after the State Department cancelled the 20th round of talks scheduled for January
2004. At the time, the State Department maintained that Cuba refused to discuss five issues
identified by the United States: (1) Cuba’s issuance of exit permits for all qualified migrants; (2)
Cuba’s cooperation in holding a new registration for an immigrant lottery; (3) the need for a
deeper Cuban port used by the U.S. Coast Guard for the repatriation of Cubans interdicted at sea;
(4) Cuba’s responsibility to permit U.S. diplomats to travel to monitor returned migrants; and (5)
Cuba’s obligation to accept the return of Cuban nationals determined to be inadmissible to the
United States.104 In response to the cancellation of the talks, Cuban officials maintained that the
U.S. decision was irresponsible and that Cuba was prepared to discuss all of the issues raised by
the United States.105
Under the Obama Administration, Cuba and the United States agreed to restart the biannual
migration talks (in addition to talks on direct mail service), and since mid-2009, there have been
four rounds of talks. For the first three rounds, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Western Hemisphere Affairs Craig Kelly headed the U.S. team while Deputy Foreign Minister
Dagoberto Rodriguez led the Cuba team. The first round was held on July 14, 2009, in New York
City. The State Department outlined its four objectives in the talks: ensuring that the U.S.
Interests Section in Havana is able to operate effectively; gaining access to a deep-water port for
the safe return of Cuban migrants picked up at sea; ensuring that U.S. diplomats are able to
monitor the welfare of those Cubans who are sent back to the island; and gaining Cuban
government acceptance of Cubans who are excluded from the United States because they have
committed crimes.106 Cuba reportedly proposed a new immigration agreement and more effective
cooperation to combat alien smuggling, and also made known its opposition to the so-called “wet
foot/dry foot policy.”107
102 Laura Morales, “Exiles Urged to Stem Tide of Cubans,” Miami Herald, December 29, 2007.
103 Alfonso Chardy, “Cubans from Miami Charged in Migrant-Abduction Case,” Miami Herald, July 10, 2010.
104 U.S. Department of State. State Department Regular Briefing, Richard Boucher. January 7, 2004.
105 “Migration Talks Cancelled,” Miami Herald, January 8, 2004.
106 William Gibson, “U.S. to Cuba: Take Back Criminals,” South Florida Sun-Sentinel, July 15, 2009.
107 “Migration Talks with Cuba Put Off to February,” Washington Post, December 4, 2009.
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The second round of talks were held on February 19, 2010, in Havana. According to the
Department of State, “engaging in these talks underscores our interest in pursuing constructive
discussions with the government of Cuba to advance U.S. interests of mutual concern.” It
maintained that the United States views the talks “as an avenue to achieve practical, positive
results that contribute to the full implementation of the [Migration] Accords and to the safety of
citizens of both countries.”108 Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained that the meeting
took place in an atmosphere of respect and included discussion of some aspects of a new draft
migration accord proposed by Cuba at the in the July 2009 round of talks.109 Cuba also reportedly
raised the issue of improving and expanding the Cuban Interests Section in Washington. During
the talks, U.S. officials urged Cuban officials to provide political prisoner Orlando Zapata
Tamayo all necessary medical care, and also raised the case of USAID subcontractor Alan Gross
detained in Cuba since early December 2009 and called for his release.
The third round of talks was held on June 18, 2010, in Washington, DC. In addition to migration
issues, the U.S. team separately raised the case of Alan Gross and called for his immediate
release. A day before the meeting, Secretary of State Clinton met with family members of Alan
Gross and issued a statement expressing deep concern about his welfare and poor health and
maintaining that his “continued detention … is harming U.S.-Cuba relations.”110
A fourth round of migration talks took place in Havana on January 12, 2011, with the U.S. side
led by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Roberta Jacobson
and the Cuban side again led by Deputy Foreign Minister Dagoberto Rodríguez. The State
Department maintained that the talks were productive covering a broad range of topics of mutual
interest, including the importance of continued U.S. commitment to promote safe, legal, and
orderly migration.111 The Cuban delegation maintained the meeting recognized the significant
reduction in risky illegal departures from Cuba because of efforts by both countries to deal with
migrant smuggling and illegal migration. Dagoberto Rodríguez maintained that “it was a fruitful
exchange aimed at moving on to the establishment of more effective mechanisms of cooperation
to combat illegal migrant smuggling.”112 The U.S. delegation again raised the issue of the
continued detention of Alan Gross and called for his immediate release. Roberta Jacobson
subsequently met with Gross on January 13. As noted above, subsequent press reports maintained
that a senior State Department official was “cautiously optimistic” that Gross would be released.
For additional information on migration issues, see CRS Report R40566, Cuban Migration to the
United States: Policy and Trends, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
108 U.S. Department of State, “Cuba Migration Talks,” February 19, 2010.
109 “Statement by the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” IPR Strategic Information Database, February 22, 2010.
110 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Continued Incarceration of Alan Gross,”
June 17, 2010.
111 U.S. Department of State, “Cuba Migration Talks,” Press Statement, January 12, 2011, and “Daily Press Briefing,”
January 13, 2011.
112 Cuban Interest Section, “Press Release Issued by the Cuban Delegation to the Round of Migration Talks Between
Cuba and the United States,” Havana, January 12, 2011.
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Legislative Initiatives in the 112th Congress
H.R. 255 (Serrano). Would lift the trade embargo on Cuba. Introduced January 7, 2011; referred
to Committee on Foreign Affairs, Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, Financial Services,
Judiciary, Oversight and Government Reform, and Agriculture.
H.R. 256 (Serrano). Would waive certain prohibitions with respect to nationals of Cuba coming
to the United States to play organized professional baseball. Introduced January 7, 2011; referred
to Committees on Foreign Affairs and Judiciary.
H.R. 372 (Buchanan). Would amend the Outer Continental Shelf Act to authorize the Secretary
of the Interior to deny leases and permits to persons who engage in activities with the government
of any foreign country that is subject to any sanction or an embargo established by the U.S.
government. Introduced January 20, 2011; referred to the Committee on Natural Resources.
H.R. 380 (Lee.) Would provide that no funds made available to the Department of the Treasury
may be used to implement, administer, or enforce regulations to require specific licenses for
travel-related transactions directly related to educational activities in Cuba; referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Legislation in the 111th Congress
Approved Measures
P.L. 111-8 (H.R. 1105). Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009. Introduced February 23, 2009;
House passed (245-178) February 25, 2009; Senate passed (voice vote) March 10, 2009; signed
into law March 11, 2009. Division D, Financial Services and General Government Appropriations
Act, 2009, has three provisions intended to ease U.S. sanctions on Cuba. These three provisions,
explained below, were identical to provisions in the S. 3260, the Senate version of the Financial
Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2009, in the 110th Congress. In addition,
the Joint Explanatory Statement to the bill requires the Department of the Treasury to prepare a
report within 90 days on the steps that it is taking to assess OFAC’s allocation of resources for
investigating and penalizing violations of the Cuba embargo with respect to the numerous other
sanctions programs it administers. As part of the report, the Treasury Department is directed to
provide detailed information on OFAC’s Cuba-related licensing on its enforcement of the Cuba
embargo.
Section 620 of Division D amends the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of
2000 (TSRA) to require the Secretary of the Treasury to issue regulations for travel to, from, or
within Cuba under a general license for the marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods,
meaning that there would be no requirement to obtain special permission from OFAC. Such travel
currently requires a specific license from OFAC, issued on a case by case basis.
Section 621 of Division D prohibits funds from being used to administer, implement, or enforce
family travel restrictions that were imposed by the Bush Administration in June 2004. Those 2004
restrictions allowed family travel only to visit immediate family (grandparents, grandchildren,
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parents, siblings, spouses, and children) once every three years for a period not to exceed 14 days.
Under the 2004 restrictions, a specific license was required from OFAC for such travel, and the
authorized amount that family travelers could spend while in Cuba was limited to $50 a day.
Section 622 of Division D prohibits funds in the Act from being used to administer, implement, or
enforce an amendment to the Cuban embargo regulations on February 25, 2005, requiring that
U.S. agricultural exporters using the “payment of cash in advance’” payment mechanism for
selling their goods to Cuba must be paid in cash for their goods before the goods leave U.S. ports.
Prior to the February 2005 change, the practice was for U.S. agricultural exporters to be paid in
cash for their goods (as required under the TSRA), but before the actual delivery of the goods to
Cuba.
Division H (Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
2009) has two provisions related to Cuba. Section 7005 prohibits foreign assistance to the
government of Cuba. Section 7015(f) provides that no funds appropriated for foreign assistance
shall be obligated or expended for Cuba except as provided through the regular notification
procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.
P.L. 111-117 (H.R. 3288). Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010. Introduced July 22, 2009, as
the Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
2010. House passed July 23, 2009. Senate passed with an amendment September 17, 2009. The
conference report to the measure, H.Rept. 111-366 filed December 8, 2009, became the vehicle
for the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, which consisted of six appropriations bills. The
House agreed to the conference on December 10, 2009, while the Senate agreed on December 13,
2009. The President signed the measure into law on December 16, 2009.
As signed into law, the measure has several Cuba provisions. Division C, Financial Services and
General Government Appropriations Act, 2010, has a clarifying provision in section 619 relating
to the issue of “payment of cash in advance” for U.S. exports to Cuba during FY2010 under the
Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000. The provision defines the term to
mean “payment before the transfer of title to, and control of, the exported items to the Cuban
purchaser.”
Division F, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
2010, has several Cuba provisions. Section 7007 continues the general prohibition against foreign
assistance to the government of Cuba. Section 7015(f) continues the requirement that no funds for
foreign assistance shall be obligated or expended for Cuba except as provided through the regular
notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations. With regard to Cuba broadcasting,
the conference report provides $30.474 million for Radio and TV Martí (almost $2 million less
than the Administration’s request) with not more than $5.5 million for non-salary and benefits
expenses for TV Martí. The conference report also has two reporting requirements on Cuba
broadcasting: the first from the BBG within 90 days providing a multi-year strategic plan for
broadcasting to Cuba; and the second, from the GAO within 90 days of the submission of the
BBG report, providing an assessment of the strategic plan. With regard to Cuba democracy
programs, the conference report fully funds the Administration’s request for $20 million in ESF.
S.Res. 149 (Martinez). Expresses solidarity with the writers, journalists, and librarians of Cuba
on World Press Freedom Day and calling for the immediate release of citizens of Cuba
imprisoned for exercising rights associated with freedom of the press. Introduced and approved
by Unanimous Consent on May 14, 2009.
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S.Con.Res. 54 (Nelson, Bill). Recognizes the life of Orlando Zapata Tamayo, who died on
February 23, 2010, in the custody of the Cuban government, and calls for a continued focus on
the promotion of internationally recognized human rights in Cuba. Introduced March 10, 2010.
S.Amdt. 3552 (Nelson, Bill), which noted that the Department of State reports that the Cuban
government has not granted prison visits to the International Committee of the Red Cross,
Amnesty International, or Human Rights Watch since 1988, was agreed to by Unanimous
Consent on March 18, 2010. S.Con.Res. 54 subsequently agreed to by Unanimous Consent on
March 18, 2010.
Additional Considered Measures with Cuba Provisions
The following measures that received consideration, but were not enacted, contained various
provisions on Cuba. For a complete listing of legislative initiatives on Cuba in the 111th Congress,
see CRS Report R40193, Cuba: Issues for the 111th Congress.
H.R. 2410 (Berman). Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2010 and FY2011. Introduced
May 14, 2009. Reported by House Committee on Foreign Affairs June 4, 2009 (H.Rept. 111-136).
House passed (235-187) June 10, 2009. Authorizes funding for radio and television broadcasting
to Cuba within the International Broadcasting Operations account. During June 10, 2009, floor
consideration, the House defeated H.Amdt. 182 (Ros-Lehtinen) by a vote of 205-224 that would
have required the Secretary of State to withhold funds from the U.S. contribution to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) an amount equal to nuclear technical cooperation
provided by the IAEA in 2007 to Iran, Syria, Sudan, and Cuba.
H.R. 2647 (Skelton)/S. 1390 (Levin). National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010. House
passed June 25, 2009. Senate passed July 23, 2009, with an amendment substituting the language
of S. 1390. During July 22, 2009, consideration of S. 1390, the Senate approved S.Amdt. 1535
(Martinez), which required a report from the Director of National Intelligence on potential Cuban
activities related to drug trafficking, clandestine activities in the United States, research and
development for biological weapons production, and Cuba’s relations with Iran, North Korea,
Venezuela and several other countries. That provision became Section 1222 of the Senate version
of H.R. 2647. The House version of the bill did not include a similar provision, and the provision
was not included in the conference report (H.Rept. 111-288) filed on October 7, 2009.
H.R. 3081 (Lowey)/S. 1434 (Leahy). FY2010 State Department, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs Appropriations. H.R. 3081 Introduced and reported (H.Rept. 111-187) June 26,
2009. House approved July 9, 2009, by a vote of 318-106. S. 1434 introduced and reported
(S.Rept. 111-44) July 9, 2009. In both bills, section 7007 would continue the prohibition against
direct funding for the government of Cuba, and section 7015(f) would continue the requirement
that no assistance shall be obligated or expended for assistance for Cuba except as provided
through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations. The reports to
both bills would also fully fund the Administration’s request of $20 million in ESF for Cuba
democracy programs.
With regard to Cuba broadcasting, H.R. 3081 would fully fund the Administration’s request for
$32.474 million, while S. 1434 would prohibit funding for TV Martí broadcasts to Cuba and
provide just $17.474 million for Cuba broadcasting, $15 million less than the request. The Senate
bill, in section 7092(c), would require a report from the Secretary of State within 90 days on
various aspects of Cuba broadcasting.
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With regard to anti-drug cooperation with Cuba, S. 1434 would, in section 7092, provide $1
million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance for
preliminary work by the State Department or other entity designated by the Secretary of State to
establish cooperation with appropriate agencies of the government of Cuba on counternarcotics
matters, including matters relating to cooperation, coordination, and mutual assistance in the
interdiction of illicit drugs being transported through Cuban airspace or over Cuba waters. The
amount shall not be available if the Secretary of State certifies that Cuba does not have in place
appropriate procedures to protect against the loss of innocent life in the air and on the ground in
connection with the interdiction of illegal drugs, and there is credible evidence of involvement of
the government of Cuba in drug trafficking during the preceding 10 years. H.R. 3081 does not
have a similar provision.
For final action, see Division F of P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010,
described above, which included provisions on foreign aid, Cuba broadcasting, and Cuba
democracy funding. The omnibus measure did not include any language on drug cooperation with
Cuba.
H.R. 3170 (Serrano)/S. 1432 (Durbin). FY2010 Financial Services and General Government
Appropriations. H.R. 3170 introduced and reported (H.Rept. 111-202) July 10, 2009. House
approved (219-208) July 16, 2009. S. 1432 introduced and reported (S.Rept. 111-43) July 9,
2009. Both bills have a provision (section 618 in the House bill and section 617 in the Senate bill)
that provides that the term “payment of cash in advance” as used in the Trade Sanctions Reform
and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 shall be interpreted as payment before the transfer of title
to, and control of, the exported items to the Cuban purchaser.
For final action, see Division C of P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010,
described above, which included the “payment of cash in advance” provision in section 619.
H.R. 4645 (Peterson)/S. 3112 (Klobuchar). Travel Restriction Reform and Export Enhancement
Act. Removes obstacles to legal sales of U.S. agricultural commodities to Cuba and ends travel
restrictions on all Americans to Cuba. Section 2 would lift all restrictions on travel to Cuba and
prohibit the President from regulating or prohibiting such travel except under certain
circumstances. Section 3 would define the term “payment of cash in advance” for U.S.
agricultural sales to Cuba under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of
2000 (TSRA) as the payment by the purchaser and the receipt of such payment by the seller prior
to transfer of title of such commodity or product to the purchaser and the release of control of
such commodity or product to the purchaser. Section 4 would authorize direct transfers between
Cuban and U.S. financial institutions executed in payment for a product authorized for sale under
TSRA. H.R. 4645 introduced February 23, 2010; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs, and
in addition to the Committees on Agriculture and Financial Services. House Agriculture
Committee ordered reported (25-20) June 30, 2010; reported September 29, 2010 (H.Rept. 111-
653, Part I). S. 3112 introduced March 15, 2010; referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
S. 3454 (Levin). National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011. Introduced and reported by the
Senate Committee on Armed Services on June 4, 2010 (S.Rept. 111-201). Section 1236 would
require a report (in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex) within 180 days from
the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the
Secretary of State, on: a description of any connections between the government of Cuba and
drug trafficking organizations in the Western Hemisphere; a description of any economic,
intelligence or other support provided to Cuba by the governments of Bolivia, Ecuador, or
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Venezuela; a description of any agreements or other arrangements between Cuba and the
governments currently on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; and a description of any
activities by Cuba to develop any biological or cyber warfare capabilities, including any
collaboration with other countries in the Western Hemisphere. The Senate did not complete action
on the bill. The House-passed version of the defense authorization bill, H.R. 5136 (Skelton), did
not include a similar provision.
S. 3676 (Leahy). FY2011 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act. Introduced and reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations on July
29, 2010 (S.Rept. 111-237). Section 7007 would continue a general prohibition against direct
assistance for Cuba. Section 7015(f) would continue the requirement that no funds for foreign
assistance shall be obligated or expended for assistance to Cuba except as provided through the
regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations. Section 7034(g)(6) provides
that of the ESF appropriated for several countries including Cuba, $12.5 million shall be
transferred and merged with funds for the National Endowment for Democracy to be allocated for
democracy programs. The committee report clarifies that $2 million in ESF appropriated for Cuba
would be transferred to the National Endowment for Democracy. In the report to the bill, the
committee also recommends $28.789 million for broadcasting to Cuba ($390,000 less than the
request of $29.179 million). In the report, the committee also states that it does not support
closing the Greenville Station, expanding TV Martí’s transmission on DirecTV, or the request to
expand and renovate the TV Martí studio until the Broadcasting Board of Governors submits a
multi-year strategic plan for broadcasting to Cuba. The Senate did not complete action on the
measure, but the 111th Congress approved a series of short-term continuing resolutions (P.L. 111-
242, as amended), the last of which provided funding for federal agencies through March 4, 2011,
generally at FY2010 levels and under conditions provided in enacted FY2010 appropriations
measures.
S. 3677 (Durbin). FY2011 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act.
Introduced and reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations on July 29, 2010 (S.Rept.
111-238). Section 621 would continue to define during fiscal year 2011 “payment of cash in
advance” under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 as payment
before the transfer of title to, and control of, the exported items to the Cuban purchaser. This
would extend a similar provision for fiscal year 2010 that appeared in the FY2010 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117, Division C, Section 619). The Senate did not complete action
on the measure, but the 111th Congress approved a series of short-term continuing resolutions
(P.L. 111-242, as amended), the last of which provided funding for federal agencies through
March 4, 2011, generally at FY2010 levels and under conditions provided in enacted FY2010
appropriations measures.
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Appendix A. Selected Executive Branch Reports and
WebPages
Background Note, Cuba, State Department
Date: March 25, 2010, State Department
Full Text: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2011, Annex: Regional
Perspectives (pp. 687-688 of pdf), State Department
Date: March 10, 2010
Full Text: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/137937.pdf
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2009, Cuba, State Department
Date: March 11, 2010
Full Text: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/wha/136108.htm
Country Reports on Terrorism 2009 (State Sponsors of Terrorism chapter), State Department
Date: August 5, 2010
Full Text: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140889.htm
Cuba Country Page, State Department
Full Text: http://www.state.gov/p/wha/ci/cu/
Cuba Country Page, U.S Agency for International Development
Full Text: http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/country/cuba/
Cuba Sanctions, Treasury Department
Full Text: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/pages/cuba.aspx
Cuba: What You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions Against Cuba, Treasury Department,
Office of Foreign Assets Control
Date: September 3, 2009
Full Text: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cuba.pdf.
International Religious Freedom Report 2010, Cuba, State Department
Date: November 17, 2010
Full Text: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148748.htm
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2010, Vol. I (Cuba, pp. 236-239 of pdf),
State Department
Date: March 1, 2010
Full Text: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/138548.pdf
Trafficking in Persons Report 2010 (Cuba, pp. 127-128 of pdf), State Department
Date: June 2010
Full Text: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/142979.pdf
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Appendix B. CRS and GAO Reports
Active CRS Reports Discussing Cuba
CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report R40566, Cuban Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends, by Ruth Ellen
Wasem.
CRS Report R41522, Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development: Background and U.S. Policy
Considerations, by Neelesh Nerurkar and Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report R40139, Closing the Guantanamo Detention Center: Legal Issues, by Michael John
Garcia et al.
CRS Report R40754, Guantanamo Detention Center: Legislative Activity in the 111th Congress,
by Michael John Garcia.
CRS Report R41340, Financial Services and General Government (FSGG): FY2011
Appropriations, coordinated by Garrett Hatch.
CRS Report R40801, Financial Services and General Government (FSGG): FY2010
Appropriations, coordinated by Garrett Hatch.
CRS Report RL34523, Financial Services and General Government (FSGG): FY2009
Appropriations, coordinated by Garrett Hatch.
CRS Report RL32826, The Medical Device Approval Process and Related Legislative Issues, by
Erin D. Williams.
CRS Report RL33200, Trafficking in Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean, by Clare
Ribando Seelke.
CRS Report RL32014, WTO Dispute Settlement: Status of U.S. Compliance in Pending Cases, by
Jeanne J. Grimmett.
Archived CRS Reports
CRS Report RS20450, The Case of Elian Gonzalez: Legal Basics, by Larry M. Eig.
CRS Report RL33622, Cuba’s Future Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy Approaches, by Mark
P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RS22742, Cuba’s Political Succession: From Fidel to Raúl Castro, by Mark P.
Sullivan.
CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report R40193, Cuba: Issues for the 111th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
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CRS Report RL33819, Cuba: Issues for the 110th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RL32730, Cuba: Issues for the 109th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RL31740, Cuba: Issues for the 108th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RL30806, Cuba: Issues for the 107th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan and Maureen
Taft-Morales.
CRS Report RL30628, Cuba: Issues and Legislation In the 106th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan
and Maureen Taft-Morales.
CRS Report RL30386, Cuba-U.S. Relations: Chronology of Key Events 1959-1999, by Mark P.
Sullivan.
CRS Report RL33499, Exempting Food and Agriculture Products from U.S. Economic Sanctions:
Status and Implementation, by Remy Jurenas.
CRS Report RS22094, Lawsuits Against State Supporters of Terrorism: An Overview, by Jennifer
K. Elsea.
CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by Jennifer K.
Elsea.
CRS Report 94-636, Radio and Television Broadcasting to Cuba: Background and Issues
Through 1994, by Susan B. Epstein and Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RS21764, Restricting Trademark Rights of Cubans: WTO Decision and
Congressional Response, by Margaret Mikyung Lee.
Selected GAO Reports
Broadcasting to Cuba: Actions are Needed to Improve Strategy and Operations, U.S.
Government Accountability Office, January 2009, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09127.pdf.
Broadcasting to Cuba: Observations Regarding TV Martí's Strategy and Operations,
Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director International Affairs and Trade before the
Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Government Accountability Office, June 17, 2009,
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09758t.pdf.
Foreign Assistance: Continued Efforts Needed to Strengthen USAID's Oversight of U.S.
Democracy Assistance for Cuba, U.S. Government Accountability Office, November 2008,
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09165.pdf.
Foreign Assistance: U.S. Democracy Assistance for Cuba Needs Better Management and
Oversight, U.S. Government Accountability Office, November 2006,
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07147.pdf.
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U.S. Embargo on Cuba: Recent Regulatory Changes and Potential Presidential or
Congressional Actions, U.S. Government Accountability Office, September 17, 2009,
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09951r.pdf.
Author Contact Information
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
msullivan@crs.loc.gov, 7-7689
Acknowledgments
Susan G. Chesser, Information Research Specialist, produced the statistical figures presented in this report,
and contributed to the appendices.
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