The U.S.-Japan Alliance
Emma Chanlett-Avery
Specialist in Asian Affairs
January 18, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33740
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

The U.S.-Japan Alliance

Summary
Under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, about 53,000 U.S. troops are stationed in
Japan and have the exclusive use of 89 facilities throughout the archipelago. In exchange for the
bases, the United States guarantees Japan’s security. The alliance has endured over 50 years,
through periods of intense partnership and stretches of political drift. In the past decade, the
relationship has seen both ends of the spectrum. During the first term of the George W. Bush
Administration, converging U.S. and Japanese objectives in confronting North Korea’s nuclear
and missile programs and Japan’s participation in U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
reinforced the notion of the U.S.-Japan alliance as one of the central partnerships of U.S. foreign
policy, particularly in Asia. By 2007, political developments in Japan and diverging policy
approaches to North Korea created some distance in the relationship. After the Democratic Party
of Japan took power in a historical election in September 2009, a disagreement over the
relocation of the Futenma Marine airbase in Okinawa erupted into a public rift that led many to
question the fundamental soundness of the alliance.
Regional developments in 2010, however, appeared to refocus attention in Washington and Tokyo
on the value of the alliance. North Korea’s continued and increasingly aggressive actions, coupled
with a diplomatic crisis after a Chinese trawler rammed a Japanese Coast Guard ship in disputed
waters, drove the allies back together. A new DPJ administration in Tokyo affirmed its intent to
work out U.S. base realignment issues and renewed its financial support for hosting the troops. At
the same time, solidarity grew in confronting North Korea provocations.
After a brief historical review, this report examines the regional environment that Japan and the
United States face in shaping the alliance. While history-related grievances have traditionally
dominated Tokyo’s relations with China and the Korean Peninsula, there are some trends that
indicate a shift in regional relations. Tensions with Beijing over territorial disputes and China’s
growing military capabilities and maritime activities are growing, while Seoul and Tokyo have
developed an increasingly cooperative relationship, even exploring nascent military-to-military
pacts. North Korea continues to provide ample justification for Japanese supporters of developing
a strong missile defense system.
The report then explores the national challenges that frame the alliance, particularly the large
presence of U.S. military bases in the southern prefecture of Okinawa. While the Futenma base
relocation controversy has dominated the debate, Okinawan frustration with the bases has existed
for many years, with outcries spiking in the event of military accidents or crimes committed by
U.S. soldiers. For these reasons, the Futenma relocation plan faces major challenges, despite
Tokyo’s agreement and pledge to implement it.
The report then examines key features of bilateral agreements to upgrade the alliance, with
updates on progress on agreements outside of base realignment and discussion of Japan’s internal
and evolving views on security as reflected in official guidelines. Accomplishments in ballistic
missile defense co-development, strong maritime cooperation, and Japanese contribution to
international missions are outlined, along with some of the unresolved issues that remain. The
report concludes with a discussion of the most prominent operational, budgetary, legal, and
normative constraints that some see as a cap on expanding the alliance’s effectiveness. Despite
the alliance’s sustainment over a half-century, it still faces fundamental challenges, including
political paralysis and increasingly tight fiscal conditions in Tokyo and long-standing
constitutional and societal limits on Japan’s military.
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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Historical Review of the Alliance ................................................................................................ 2
Post-World War II Occupation............................................................................................... 2
Bilateral Alliance Establishment............................................................................................ 2
Post-Cold War Adjustments................................................................................................... 3
Post-9/11 Changes................................................................................................................. 3
U.S.-Japan Relations Under the Obama and DPJ Administrations................................................ 4
Regional Relations and Security Environment ............................................................................. 5
China .................................................................................................................................... 5
South Korea .......................................................................................................................... 6
North Korea .......................................................................................................................... 7
U.S. Military Presence in Japan and Futenma Controversy .......................................................... 7
U.S.-Japan Alliance: Policy and Bilateral Agreements ................................................................. 9
Internal Changes to Japan’s Defense Policy......................................................................... 10
Ballistic Missile Defense..................................................................................................... 11
Efforts to Upgrade Capabilities and Interoperability ............................................................ 12
Strong Maritime Defense Cooperation................................................................................. 12
International Operations and the “Global Commons” .......................................................... 13
Challenges to a More Robust U.S.-Japan Alliance ..................................................................... 14
Political Paralysis in Japan .................................................................................................. 14
Budgetary Pressure ............................................................................................................. 14
Constitutional and Legal Constraints ................................................................................... 15

Figures
Figure 1. Map of U.S. Military Facilities in Japan ....................................................................... 9
Figure 2. Map of Japan and Surrounding Countries ................................................................... 16

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 17

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Introduction
The U.S.-Japan alliance, forged in the U.S. occupation of Japan after its defeat in World War II,
provides a platform for U.S. military readiness in Asia. Under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security, about 53,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Japan and have the exclusive use of 89
facilities throughout the archipelago.1 Okinawa, hosting 37 of the facilities, is the major U.S.
forward logistics base in the Asia-Pacific region.
The U.S.-Japan alliance has endured several geopolitical transitions, at times flourishing and at
other moments seeming adrift. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the organizing principles of
the Cold War became obsolete, forcing the United States and Japan to re-adjust the alliance. The
shock of the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001 ushered in a period of
rejuvenated military ties, raising expectations that Japan would move toward a more forward-
leaning defense posture and shed the pacifist limitations that have at times frustrated U.S. defense
officials. However, the partnership struggled to sustain itself politically in the late 2000s; a
softening of U.S. policy toward North Korea by the George W. Bush Administration dismayed
Tokyo, and political opposition to an Okinawan airbase plan disappointed Washington. As the
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) came to power in September 2009, some observers noted that
Japan may be turning away from the U.S. alliance toward a more Asia-centric policy.
Despite the public flap over the relocation of the Futenma airbase that dominated the relationship
between September 2009 and June 2010, regional conflicts in 2010 appeared to reset the
relationship on more positive footing. As a result of repeated provocations from North Korea and
a confrontation with China over a ship collision in disputed waters, the DPJ seemed to change its
approach to the alliance and re-prioritize strong relations with the United States. The focus of the
alliance appears squarely set on the changing security contours of the region, with an explicit
attention to China’s activities. When the alliance appeared to falter in the face of the Okinawa
dispute, neighboring countries, including Southeast Asian states, voiced concern, suggesting that
the alliance is valued as a stabilizing force region-wide. North Korea’s unpredictable course has
also driven nascent but promising trilateral cooperation with South Korea. Whereas
disagreements over history issues stemming from Japan’s colonial policies and wartime
aggression were prominent in Tokyo’s relations with its neighbors in past years, these concerns,
while still present, have receded somewhat as contemporary threats have surfaced.
Problems remain in the partnership. Although Washington and Tokyo have settled on a plan for
the resolution of the base relocation in Okinawa, many hurdles remain for implementation,
particularly strong local opposition to the base. Japan’s overall limitations and resistance to
engage more expansively in defense cooperation continue to frustrate U.S. military officials.
Japan’s constitution—drafted by U.S. officials during the post-war occupation—explicitly bans
the formation of military forces, though Japan has maintained a “Self-Defense Force” (SDF)
since the 1950s. Over the decades, the United States has generally encouraged Japan to move
toward a more “normal” military posture and contribute more actively to international defense
efforts. Although Japan has sometimes acceded, it remains conservative in its interpretation of the
constitution, including a ban on participation in collective self-defense. More recently, Japan’s
severe fiscal conditions have placed additional pressure on spending decisions to boost Japan’s

1 According to U.S. military figures, about 39,000 U.S. military personnel are stationed onshore and about 14,000
afloat in Japan. Source: U.S. Forces Japan at http://www.usfj.mil/welcome.html.
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capabilities in the face of regional threats. Japan’s constraints on military activities remain in
budgetary, legal, normative, and political terms.
Historical Review of the Alliance
Post-World War II Occupation
Following Japan’s defeat in World War II, the Allied Powers, led by the United States, occupied
the archipelago from 1945-1952. Occupation officials initially set distinct goals of thoroughly
demilitarizing Japan. The Japanese constitution, drafted by U.S. Occupation officials and adopted
by the Japanese legislature in 1947, renounced the use of war in Article 9, stating that “land, sea,
and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.” However, as
confrontation with the Soviet Union grew, the goals of the occupation shifted to building Japan up
as a strategic bulwark against the perceived Communist threat. After the outbreak of the Korean
War in 1950, U.S. officials pressed for the establishment of a Japanese national police force,
which in 1954 became the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Debate about whether the SDF, which
evolved in practice into a well-funded and well-equipped military, violates Article 9 continues
today. Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952 after the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty,
which officially ended the conflict and allocated compensation to Allied victims of Japanese war
crimes.
Bilateral Alliance Establishment
During the Cold War, the United States increasingly viewed Japan as a strategically important ally
to counter the Soviet threat in the Pacific. A Mutual Security Assistance Pact signed in 1952 was
replaced by the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, in which Japan grants the U.S.
military basing rights on its territory in return for a U.S. pledge to protect Japan’s security. Unlike
other defense treaties with allies, this pledge is not mutual: Japan does not extend such a pledge if
the United States is attacked. A military aid program during the 1950’s provided equipment
deemed to be necessary for Japan’s self-defense, and Japan continued to expand the SDF and
contribute more host nation support (HNS) for U.S. forces. Under Prime Minister Shigeru
Yoshida’s leadership (1946-47 and 1948-1954), Japan essentially ceded its foreign policy and
security concerns to the United States and focused on economic development.
The “Yoshida Doctrine” was controversial. Yoshida himself resisted U.S. officials’ push for a full-
scale Japanese rearmament (i.e. the establishment of a full-fledged military in name and in fact).
In addition, many elements of Japanese society rejected the arrangement. For much of the 1950s,
forces on the political right tried unsuccessfully to revise or even abrogate the Constitution’s
Article 9 and portions of the Treaty. When one of their number, Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi,
negotiated a revision to the Treaty in 1960, the political left mobilized opposition to the changes.
Although Kishi rammed the revisions through parliament, hundreds of thousands of protestors
took to the streets in Tokyo, causing the cancellation of a visit by President Dwight Eisenhower
and the resignation of Kishi and his government.
U.S.-Japan defense relations again entered a period of uncertainty because of U.S. President
Richard Nixon’s so-called Guam Doctrine of 1969 (which called on U.S. allies to provide for
their own defense), the normalization of relations between China and the United States, and the
U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. One major irritant was resolved when Prime Minister Eisaku Sato
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and Nixon signed a joint communiqué that returned administrative control of the Okinawa islands
to Japan in 1972, although the United States has continued to maintain large military bases on the
territory. The establishment of the bilateral Security Consultative Committee in 1976 led to
greater defense cooperation, including joint planning for response to an attack on Japan.
Post-Cold War Adjustments
In the post-Cold War period, Japan was criticized by some in the international community for its
failure to provide direct military assistance to the coalition during the Persian Gulf War in 1990-
1991, despite its contribution of over $13 billion toward U.S. military costs and humanitarian
assistance.2 After Japan’s passage of a bill in 1991 to allow for its participation in United Nations
(U.N.) peacekeeping operations, the Japanese Self Defense Forces were dispatched to Cambodia,
Mozambique, East Timor, and the Golan Heights. Tensions over North Korea and the Taiwan
Strait contributed to a revision of the defense guidelines in 1996-1997 by President Clinton and
Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto that granted the U.S. military greater use of Japanese
installations in time of crisis and vaguely referred to a possible, limited Japanese military role in
“situations in areas surrounding Japan.” That was assumed to be referring to potential U.S.
conflicts in the Taiwan Strait and the Korean peninsula, although military officials insisted that
the phrase was “situational” rather than geographic. North Korea’s launch of a long-range
Taepodong missile over Japan in 1998 galvanized political support for undertaking joint research
with the United States on ballistic missile defense.
Post-9/11 Changes
U.S. policy toward East Asia under the Bush Administration took a decidedly pro-Japan approach
from the outset.3 Several senior foreign policy advisors with extensive background in Japan took
their cues from the so-called Armitage-Nye report (the lead authors were Richard Armitage and
Joseph Nye), the final paper produced by a bipartisan study group before the 2000 U.S.
presidential election. The report called for a more equal partnership with Japan and enhanced
defense cooperation in a number of specific areas.
With this orientation in place, Japan’s response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
reinforced the notion of the U.S.-Japan alliance as one of the central partnerships of U.S. foreign
policy, particularly in Asia. Under the leadership of former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, the
Japanese legislature passed anti-terrorism legislation that allowed Japan to dispatch refueling
tankers to the Indian Ocean to support U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan. In February 2004,
Japan sent over 600 military personnel to Iraq to assist in reconstruction activities—the first time
Japan had sent soldiers overseas without an international mandate since World War II.4 The
ground troops were withdrawn in 2006. A Japanese SDF air division remained until 2008, when
U.N. authorization for multinational forces in Iraq expired.

2 “‘Great Japan’ Turns Inward Over Gulf Response,” The Boston Globe. March 26, 1991.
3 For more information on U.S.-Japan relations, see CRS Report RL33436, Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress,
coordinated by Emma Chanlett-Avery.
4 The SDF operated under restrictions in Iraq: no combat unless fired upon and no offensive operations. Protection was
provided by Dutch and Australian forces.
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After a period of rejuvenated defense ties in the first years of the George W. Bush Administration,
expectations of a transformed alliance with a more forward-leaning defense posture from Japan
diminished. Koizumi’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) successors—Shinzo Abe, Yasuo Fukuda,
and Taro Aso—each survived less than a year in office and struggled to govern effectively. Abe
succeeded in upgrading the Defense Agency to a full-fledged ministry, but faltered on his pledges
to create Japanese versions of the National Security Council and to pass a permanent deployment
law to allow the government to dispatch SDF troops without a U.N. resolution. Fukuda, elected in
September 2007, was considered a friend of the alliance, but more cautious in security outlook
than his predecessors. He also faced an empowered opposition party—the Democratic Party of
Japan (DPJ)—that temporarily forced Japan to end its naval deployment of refueling ships to
support U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan. Aso, who served as Foreign Minister in the Abe
Cabinet, was largely unable to pursue a more active military role for Japan due to his precarious
political position.
After Koizumi stepped down, the Bush Administration decided to actively pursue negotiations
with North Korea over its nuclear weapons program. Tokyo lamented that its greatest priority in
the negotiations—resolution of the whereabouts of several Japanese citizens abducted by North
Korea in the 1970s and 1980s—was largely disregarded by Washington. In the final years of the
decade, political paralysis and budgetary constraints in Tokyo, Japan’s minimal progress in
implementing base realignment agreements, Japanese disappointment in Bush’s policy on North
Korea, and a series of smaller concerns over burden-sharing arrangements led to reduced
cooperation and a general sense of unease about the partnership.
U.S.-Japan Relations Under the Obama and DPJ
Administrations

The Obama Administration came into power in 2009 indicating a policy of broad continuity in its
relations with Japan, although some Japanese commentators fretted that Washington’s overtures
to Beijing would marginalize Tokyo. It was changes in leadership in Tokyo, however, that
destabilized the relationship for a period. In the fall of 2009, when the DPJ came into power
under Yukio Hatoyama’s leadership, relations with Washington got off to a rocky start because of
differences over the relocation of the Futenma Marine base (see “U.S. Military Presence in Japan
and Futenma Controversy” section below). Stalemate on the Okinawa agreement had existed for
several years under previous LDP governments, but the more public airing of the dispute raised
concern that the alliance—long described by the United States as the “cornerstone of the U.S.
Asia-Pacific strategy”—was eroding. In addition, the DPJ initially advocated a more Asia-centric
foreign policy, which some observers interpreted as a move away from the United States.
After months of intense deliberation with the United States and within his government, Hatoyama
eventually agreed to move ahead with the relocation. However, the political controversy
surrounding the Futenma issue played a major role in his decision to resign in June 2010. His
successor, Prime Minister Naoto Kan, looked to mend frayed relations and stated that his
administration supported the agreement. In addition, Japan agreed to continue Host Nation
Support (HNS), the funds provided to contribute to the cost of stationing U.S. troops in Japan, at
current levels for the next five years, starting in FY2011.
A series of alarming provocations from North Korea and China’s increased maritime
assertiveness appeared to restore some momentum to the alliance in 2010. (See “Regional
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Relations and Security Environment” section below for details.) North Korea’s aggression drove
Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington closer together, with Beijing isolated in its apparent desire to
shield Pyongyang in international and regional fora. The collision at sea near the disputed
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands of a Chinese fishing vessel and Japanese Coast Guard ship led to a major
diplomatic crisis and further reinforced the sense that the U.S.-Japan alliance remained relevant
and essential. Although many problems remain in the alliance, particularly the lack of resolution
of the Okinawan base issue, the fundamental confidence in its value in both the United States and
Japan appeared to be shored up by these regional developments.
After Japan’s release of new defense guidelines in late 2010, U.S. defense planners were pleased
with some aspects, such as the explicit identification of concern with China’s activities and
pledge to develop more elaborate defense cooperation with several other countries such as
Australia, South Korea, India, and Southeast Asian and NATO states. However, the guidelines did
not indicate a move forward on initiatives like developing a law to facilitate deployment of the
SDF without legislative permission, reinterpreting the constitution to allow for collective self
defense, or, perhaps most importantly, an increase in defense spending to bolster capabilities.
Regional Relations and Security Environment
Historical issues have long dominated Japan’s relationships with its neighbors, and particularly
China and South Korea, who remain resentful of Japan’s occupation and belligerence during the
World War II period and earlier. The DPJ government has indicated a willingness to more
emphatically address Japan’s history of aggression. Both Hatoyama and Kan pledged not to visit
the Yasukuni Shrine, a Shinto shrine that honors Japanese soldiers who died in war, including
several convicted Class A war criminals, thereby removing one of the most damaging obstacles to
Tokyo’s relationship with Beijing and Seoul in the past several years. At the outset of the DPJ’s
rule, relations with Seoul and Beijing improved, with ceremonial visits marked by exceptional
warmth. The relationship with China, however, has chilled significantly, particularly with recent
developments in the East China Sea, while Seoul-Tokyo relations strengthened further. It appears
that tension based on historical conflict may be receding as classic territorial conflicts emerge,
understandable in a region where the power balances are shifting. Whereas history-based
controversy was often sparked by Japan’s symbolic or ceremonial gestures such as shrine visits,
textbooks, and local proclamations of sovereignty over disputed territory, the more recent conflict
appears grounded in physical threats.
China
Sino-Japanese relations warmed in the past few years, in considerable part due to the deepening
economic ties, but have suffered setbacks as historical mistrust and contemporary rivalries
surfaced. An incident in September 2010 in a disputed area of the East China Sea re-ignited long-
standing sovereignty tensions. The Japanese Coast Guard arrested the crew of a Chinese fishing
vessel after the trawler apparently collided with two Coast Guard ships in the areas surrounding
the Senkaku Islands (called the “Diaoyu” Islands by the Chinese). The islands, located between
Taiwan and Okinawa and reportedly rich in energy deposits, are administered by Japan but
claimed by Tokyo, Beijing, and Taipei. After Japan released the crew but kept the captain of the
Chinese ship in custody, Chinese officials reacted vociferously with threats of unspecified
“countermeasures,” the suspension of high-level exchanges and visits, the arrest of four Japanese
nationals suspected of spying in an apparently retaliatory move, and, according to some, a
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temporary halt in the export of rare earth minerals that are essential to Japanese automakers’
operations.
The captain’s release later in the month calmed the hostile rhetoric, but the episode points to some
troubling trends. The historical sensitivity over territorial issues and the potential abundance of
natural resources in the disputed waters are a combustible combination. China’s maritime
activities have become more assertive in recent years, including Chinese naval helicopters
buzzing Japanese destroyers in the East China Sea in April 2010. China’s intense and immediate
escalation of rhetoric in what could have been a more routine matter also disturbed many regional
observers. The incident appeared to play a key role in changing the DPJ’s approach to the U.S.
alliance and may have crystallized a shift in Japan to seeing China as a military threat. Although
Japanese security officials had been deeply concerned about Beijing’s intentions and growing
capabilities for years, the Senkakus dispute may have convinced governing politicians and the
broader public of the need to adjust Japan’s defense posture to counter China.
As the Senkakus dispute played out, the United States reasserted its position that it would not
weigh in on territorial disagreements but that the islands are subject to Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan
security treaty, which stipulates that the United States is bound to protect “the territories under the
Administration of Japan.” This was the clearest statement yet that the United States would honor
its treaty obligations to defend the Senkakus, raising the remote but sobering possibility of a U.S.-
China confrontation over the islands. In general, the U.S.-Japan alliance complicates U.S.-China
relations; Beijing regularly complains about any indication that Japan is strengthening its defense
capabilities, even though some Chinese sources acknowledge the stabilizing role that the U.S.
presence provides in the region.
South Korea
Japan’s relations with South Korea have been on a positive trajectory under South Korean
President Lee Myung-bak, who took power in 2008. The year 2010 marked the 100th anniversary
of Japan’s annexation of the Korean peninsula and subsequent colonial rule. In August 2010, Kan
issued a statement that expressed Japan’s “deep remorse” and “heartfelt apology” for its past
actions. The statement was welcomed by the government in Seoul, although much of the Korean
public remains skeptical about Tokyo’s sincerity. Diplomatically the two nations appear to be
drawing closer together. North Korea’s provocative acts have served to drive closer trilateral
cooperation among the United States, Japan, and South Korea. In the aftermath of North Korea’s
shelling of Yeonpyeong island in November 2010, the South Koreans sent military observers to
participate in joint U.S.-Japan defense exercises for the first time in history and, later, both sides
announced plans to sign an agreement to allow for the exchange of military goods and services
during peacetime operations.
In the past, U.S. officials’ attempts to foster this coordination were often frustrated because of
tension between Seoul and Tokyo. Tokyo’s new activism in pursuing trilateral and bilateral
cooperation with South Korea may have been inspired by a demonstrated strengthening of the
U.S.-South Korean alliance. Some analysts see a sense of competition between the two capitals
that may drive Tokyo to move forward more aggressively on the alliance in order to avoid being
left behind.
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North Korea
North Korea has played a singular role in driving Japan’s security policy, usually pushing
Japanese leaders to pursue and the public to accept a more forward-leaning defense posture. After
the Cold War threat from the Soviets receded, many analysts questioned if the pacifist-leaning
Japanese public would support a sustained military alliance with the United States. The shared
threat from North Korea—particularly acute to the geographically proximate Japanese—appeared
to shore up the alliance in the late 1990s and into the next century. North Korea’s 1998 test of a
Taepodong missile over Japan consolidated support for development of ballistic missile defense
with the United States. The Japanese Coast Guard’s sinking of a North Korean spy ship that had
entered Japan’s exclusive economic zone in 2001 again publicly raised the specter of the threat
from Pyongyang. Perhaps most importantly, the admission by Kim Jong-il in 2002 that North
Korea had abducted several Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s shocked the Japanese public
and led to popular support for a hard-line stance on North Korea, which in turn gave rise to
hawkish political figures such as former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. In 2003, Japan launched its
first spy satellite in order to track North Korean threats without relying on others’ intelligence.
In the past several years, North Korea’s behavior—repeated missile launches, two tests of nuclear
devices, and its alleged sinking of a South Korean warship and artillery attack on Yeonpyeong
island—has continued to drive Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington closer together. In 2010, Japan
attended U.S.-South Korean military exercises as an observer and, months later, the South
Koreans reciprocated by attending U.S.-Japan exercises. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton hosted
her counterparts in a trilateral meeting in December 2010 that demonstrated solidarity among the
three capitals in the face of North Korea’s actions and indicated strong potential for more
effective trilateral coordination in the future.
U.S. Military Presence in Japan and Futenma
Controversy

The reduction of marines on Okinawa seeks to quell the political controversy that has surrounded
the presence of U.S. forces in the southernmost part of Japan for years. Okinawa occupies a
strategically valuable space in the region that would allow for quick deployment to contingencies
on the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Straits, or Southeast Asia. Although the bases-for-security
swap that is the essence of the alliance has proved durable for many decades, the residents of
Okinawa have long voiced grievances over the arrangement. The current controversy reflects a
fundamental tension in the relationship between Okinawa and the central government in Tokyo:
while the country reaps the benefit of the U.S. security guarantee, the Okinawans must bear the
burden of hosting thousands of foreign troops. Though constituting less than 1% of Japan’s land
mass, Okinawa currently hosts 65% of the total U.S. forces in Japan. Although the host cities are
economically dependent on the bases, residents’ grievances include occasional violence by U.S.
troops, noise, petty crime, and environmental degradation stemming from the U.S. presence.
Public outcry against the bases has continued since the 1995 rape of a Japanese schoolgirl by an
American serviceman, and was renewed after a U.S. military helicopter crashed into a crowded
university campus in 2004.
A 2006 agreement between the U.S. and Japanese governments to relocate the Futenma Marine
Air Station from its current location in crowded Ginowan to the less populated area around Camp
Schwab in Nago (near Henoko Bay) is the centerpiece of a planned realignment of U.S. forces in
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Japan. Per the agreement, the redeployment of some units of the III Marine Expeditionary Force
(III MEF), which includes 8,000 U.S. personnel and their dependents, to new facilities in Guam5
would lead to the return of thousands of acres of land to the Japanese. Even before the latest
episode, the challenge of replacing Futenma had dogged alliance managers for years: since 1996,
both sides had worked to implement the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Report,
which called for the return of 12,000 acres of land to the Japanese, provided that appropriate
replacement facilities were arranged. In 2006, Japan agreed to pay around 60% of the $10.3
billion estimated costs. The transfer is contingent upon finding replacement facilities for the
Futenma base.
The fate of the Futenma air station remains unclear. Although the current DPJ government has
officially endorsed the plan to build the replacement facility in Nago, local opposition remains
strong and the central government has limited political capital to push forward with
implementation. In a key gubernatorial election in November 2010, the incumbent Hirokazu
Nakaima was re-elected. Despite earlier supporting the plan, Nakaima opposed the base
relocation during the campaign, though he is seen as more conciliatory to Tokyo than his
opponent was.

5 For more, see CRS Report RS22570, Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments, by Shirley A. Kan.
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Figure 1. Map of U.S. Military Facilities in Japan


U.S.-Japan Alliance: Policy and Bilateral
Agreements

Over the past decade, U.S.-Japan bilateral initiatives reinforced an expanded commitment to
security cooperation by establishing common strategic objectives, outlining major command
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changes, explicitly identifying the stability of the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula as
common priorities in the Pacific region for the first time, and calling on China to make its
military modernization more transparent. These agreements and statements emerged first through
the working-level Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), launched in 2002, and later at the
cabinet level through the Security Consultative Committee (SCC, also known as the “2+2”
meeting), composed of the U.S. Secretaries of Defense and State and their Japanese counterparts.6
The 2005 “2+2” proposals envisage greater integration of the U.S. and Japanese militaries and
outline a new alliance approach both to enhance the defense of Japan and to move beyond
traditional realms of cooperation. Areas specifically mentioned for cooperation include air
defense, ballistic missile defense, counter-proliferation, counterterrorism, maritime security
operations, search and rescue efforts, intelligence and surveillance, humanitarian relief,
reconstruction assistance, peace-keeping, protection of critical infrastructure, response to
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks, mutual logistics support, provision of facilities for
a non-combatant evacuation, and the use of civilian infrastructure for emergency purposes. Joint
efforts in several of these areas have existed for decades, whereas other programs are in their
infancy.
Since the 2+2 agreement was inked in 2005, controversy over the Futenma relocation proposal
has dominated alliance conversations, but other areas have moved forward according to plans. A
U.S. P3 carrier wing is being relocated from Atsugi to the Iwakuni base, where a new airfield is
operational. The transfer of 300 American soldiers from Washington state to Camp Zama to
establish a forward operational headquarters is in progress (though delayed by deployments to the
Middle East), and an Air Self Defense Force facility at Yokota is near completion. A training
relocation program allows U.S. aircraft to conduct training away from crowded base areas to
reduce noise pollution for local residents. Since 2006, a bilateral and joint operations center at
Yokota U.S. Air Base allows for data-sharing and coordination between the Japanese and U.S. air
and missile defense command elements.
Internal Changes to Japan’s Defense Policy
In December 2010, Japan announced that it had adopted a new set of National Defense Program
Guidelines (NDPG). The guidelines report had been due the year before, but was postponed after
the DPJ took power. The 2010 NDPG builds on the 2004 version issued by the Koizumi
government, which retained a self-defense-oriented policy, but called for a more integrated
security strategy and a military that employs “multi-functional flexible defense forces” to deal
with the changing security environment. Both reports emphasize the importance of the U.S.
alliance, and the 2010 iteration explicitly mentions the need to advance cooperation with other
countries, including South Korea, Australia, India, and ASEAN states. Whereas the 2004 version
leaned toward a global perspective that viewed the security of Japan and the region as linked with
international stability, the 2010 guidelines appear to shift the focus back to the Asia-Pacific
region.

6 The SCC released three separate documents: the February 2005 statement set out the common strategic objectives of
the United States and Japan as the rationale for the alliance; the October 2005 “Transformation and Realignment for the
Future” report called for specific command changes; and the May 2006 “Roadmap for Realignment Implementation”
outlined the steps to be undertaken to both strengthen the alliance and reduce the burden of hosting U.S. bases on local
communities.
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The 2010 NDPG lays out a definitive shift away from the Cold War framework, which had called
for strong bulwarks against the Soviets based in the northern areas of Japan, to a focus on the
southwestern islands of the Japanese archipelago, where Japanese forces have encountered
Chinese military activities and incursions. It also explicitly identifies China’s military
modernization and lack of transparency as concerns for the region; this attention to China appears
to permeate many aspects of the report, even as it calls for promoting confidence-building
measures with Beijing. The document outlines a new “dynamic deterrence” concept that
emphasizes operational readiness to enhance deterrence. In terms of equipment, the NDPG lists
the plan to procure new submarines and additional destroyers, while the number of tanks and
artillery will be reduced.
Although the guidelines indicate an evolving security stance, they also display Japan’s resistance
to becoming a “normal” military state. Neither document indicates a move toward reinterpreting
the constitution to allow for collective self defense, let alone revising Article 9. Expectations that
the 2010 guidelines would officially loosen Japan’s ban against exporting arms to facilitate
cooperation in ballistic missile defense were not met, apparently because of political placation of
the Social Democratic Party ahead of a crucial budget vote. Perhaps most significantly, there have
been no indications that Japan intends to increase its defense budget in order to accomplish the
objectives laid out in the document.
Ballistic Missile Defense7
Many analysts see U.S.-Japan efforts on missile defense as perhaps the most robust form of
bilateral cooperation in recent years. In December 2003, Koizumi announced that Japan would
jointly develop and deploy missile defense capabilities with the United States. Japan decided to
acquire upper and lower ballistic missile defense systems, including the sea-based AEGIS combat
system and an SM-3 interceptor missile, equipment similar to and interoperable with U.S. missile
plans. The decision has led to defense industry cooperation between Japanese and American
firms. Co-development milestones established under the DPRI process have been accomplished
on schedule with successful tests of the technology. For example, in December 2007, a Japanese
destroyer successfully intercepted a missile in a test exercise near Hawaii.
With these results, the alliance now faces the question of production, which was scheduled to
begin in FY2010. Differences have emerged over the export of co-developed technology to third
countries in the future, with Japan demanding that the United States receive Japanese consent
prior to any sale. Although Japanese officials earlier provided an exception to Japan’s ban on
exporting arms specifically for the bilateral development scheme, third-country sales could face a
process of obtaining permission from the Japanese cabinet. Although the conflict probably will
not ultimately jeopardize the plan to jointly develop next-generation missile defense, it is
emblematic of how Japanese constraints limit the extent of bilateral cooperation and frustrate
U.S. defense planners, even for technically successful projects.

7 For background on U.S.-Japan missile defense, see CRS Report RL31337, Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Ballistic
Missile Defense: Issues and Prospects
, by Richard P. Cronin.
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Efforts to Upgrade Capabilities and Interoperability
As part of its effort to improve its own capability as well as work more closely with U.S. forces,
Japan has created a joint staff office that puts all the ground, maritime, and air self-defense forces
under a single command. Under the previous organization, a joint command was authorized only
if operations required multiple service participation, which had never occurred in the SDF’s
history. In July 2005, an amendment was made to the law that had established the SDF requiring
Japan’s Joint Chief of Staff to counsel Japan’s defense chief on all SDF operational matters and
that all military orders be given through the JCS in both peacetime and during contingencies. The
need for smoother coordination with the U.S. joint command was one of the primary reasons for
adopting the new organization.8
The 1997 guidelines outlined rear-area support roles that Japanese forces could play to assist U.S.
operations the event of a conflict in areas surrounding Japan. The passage of special legislation
since 2001 has allowed Japanese forces to take on roles in Iraq and in the Indian Ocean under the
category of international peace cooperation activities. Further, SDF participation in operations has
led to substantial interaction and cooperation with U.S. forces, from logistics training in Kuwait
before dispatching to Iraq to working together on disaster relief operations following the
December 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean. Bilateral interoperability was also tested in June-
July 2006 as North Korea was preparing to test-launch a missile. Ballistic missile defense
coordination was carried out again under real threat circumstances during the 2009 North Korean
missile launches.
Strong Maritime Defense Cooperation
The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) have particularly strong capabilities and
defense cooperation with their U.S. counterparts.9 U.S. Navy officials have claimed that they
have a closer daily relationship with the MSDF than with any other navy in the world, with over
100 joint exercises annually. During the Cold War, the U.S. Navy and JMSDF developed strong
combined anti-submarine warfare (ASW) cooperation and played a key role in containing the
Soviet threat in the Pacific. The services developed joint operations in order to protect key sea
lines of communication (SLoCs). The most significant help extended by Japan since 2001 in the
support of U.S. operations has come from the MSDF: deployment of an oil tanker and an Aegis
destroyer in the Indian Ocean in support of the campaign in Afghanistan; the dispatch of several
ships, helicopters, and transport aircraft to assist in disaster relief in the Indian Ocean tsunami;
participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) multinational exercises;10 and the
deployment of MSDF vessels for antipiracy missions off the coast of Somalia. Similar equipment
and shared technology contribute to the strong interoperability between the Japanese and U.S.
militaries.
Operationally, the MSDF faces considerable restrictions. In the past, defense officials have said
that it is not clear constitutionally if the MSDF can go beyond Japanese waters, although recent

8 Noboru Yamaguchi, “U.S. Defense Transformation and Japan’s Defense Policy,” draft of paper prepared for Japan-
U.K. Security Cooperation Conference, June 2006.
9 For a discussion on the strategic thinking of the Japan MSDF, see Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, “Japanese
Maritime Thought: If Not Mahan, Who?” Naval War College Review: Volume 59; Issue 3. July 1, 2006.
10 Japan’s Coast Guard is the lead agency in the PSI, but a 2004 Diet bill allowed the MSDF to take place in later
rounds of the multilateral exercises.
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legislation permitting the antipiracy mission has extended the reach of MSDF operations. Earlier
in the decade, some restrictions were removed in response to two crises in Japan’s waters: the
intrusion of a North Korean spy ship in 2001 and the detection of a Chinese submarine in 2004.
After the North Korean vessel took the MSDF by surprise, an order was put in place that allowed
the MSDF to engage without convening a Japanese Security Council meeting to secure
permission; the order was then invoked in response to the submarine sighting.11 Adjustments to
Japan’s system of military command indicate a trend toward a more streamlined process, but also
highlight the existing gaps in U.S. and Japanese operational doctrine.
Security trends in the region and beyond indicate that Japan will increasingly come to rely on its
maritime defense forces. In addition to the ongoing anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden,
Japan is set to build facilities on Okinotori, the southernmost island in Japan, in order to protect
waters that Japan claims in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The 2010 NDPG also
emphasized the need to boost maritime capabilities while modestly drawing down Ground SDF
equipment and personnel.
The Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) plays an important role in strengthening Japan’s maritime
capabilities. Along with rescue and environmental protection, it includes “securing the safety of
the sea lanes” and “maintaining order in the seas” among its core missions. Because it is not
considered a branch of the military, its budget is not included in the overall defense budget, which
is capped at 1% of GDP. Further, the Coast Guard’s engagement in protection of Japanese waters
and participation in exercises overseas is more politically palatable compared to the MSDF, to
both the Japanese public and to foreign countries.12 Although the U.S. Coast Guard works with its
Japanese counterparts on safety and law enforcement issues, limited communication between the
JCG and the MSDF constrain more integrated alliance cooperation and training.
International Operations and the “Global Commons”
Because of the dispatch of Japanese troops to Iraq, to Indonesia in the wake of the 2004 tsunami,
to Haiti after the 2010 earthquake, and to several U.N. missions around the world, the SDF has
gained experience in peacekeeping, humanitarian relief and reconstruction, anti-piracy, and
disaster relief operations. Some prominent Japanese defense specialists have argued that non-
combat missions—considered more politically acceptable to the Japanese public—are the most
promising areas for development.13 Japan may particularly focus its efforts in these areas towards
Southeast Asia, offering technical assistance and training to military personnel in ASEAN
countries. Japan played a leading role in establishing an information sharing center in Singapore
that will combat piracy threats in the Strait of Malacca shipping lanes.
The SDF has been engaged in counter-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden since March 2009.
Approximately 400 marine and ground personnel are stationed in Djibouti and currently housed
in Camp Lemonier, the large U.S. military base located close to Djibouti’s airport. In April 2010,
the Japanese government announced plans to build its own $40 million facility in Djibouti,
effectively establishing an overseas base for its military. Although this would be Japan’s first

11 “Suspected Chinese Nuclear Sub Triggers Security Alert in Japan,” The Times. November 11, 2004.
12 See Richard J. Samuel, “’New Fighting Power!’ for Japan?” MIT Center for International Studies. September 2007.
13 See Noboru Yamaguchi, “Thoughts about the Japan-U.S. Alliance after the Transformation with a Focus on
International Peace Cooperation Activities,” The National Institute of Defense Studies News. January 2006.
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foreign base since World War II, the move has sparked little controversy among the generally
pacifist Japanese public.
Challenges to a More Robust U.S.-Japan Alliance
Despite the accomplishment of reaching agreement in the “2+2” talks during the mid-2000s, a
variety of challenges remain to upgrade the alliance to the extent envisioned in policy documents.
This section outlines some of Japan’s most prominent political, budgetary, and legal challenges to
fulfill the outlined goals.
Political Paralysis in Japan
Since 2007, Japanese politics has been beset by turmoil. Five men have served as prime minister
during that time, making coherent policy formation in Tokyo difficult and complicating many
aspects of U.S.-Japan relations. The landslide victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in
the August 2009 elections for the Lower House of Japan’s legislature, which brought an end to
the 55-year period of nearly uninterrupted rule by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), brought
promise of a new stability in Tokyo politics. However, the DPJ’s tenure in power has been rocky,
making it difficult for Japan to assert itself internationally and creating problems in U.S.-Japan
relations. After the Upper House elections in July 2010, the DPJ lost control of one chamber of
the Diet (Japan’s legislature), therefore allowing the opposition to block much legislation. With
the ruling government forced to cobble together ad-hoc coalitions on particular legislative
priorities, Tokyo has struggled to advance national security issues that would help to improve the
alliance relationship. Ambitious plans like amending Article 9 of the Japanese constitution,
passing a law that would allow for a more streamlined dispatch of Japanese troops, or altering the
current interpretation of collective self defense are far more difficult to accomplish given the
political gridlock.
Budgetary Pressure
U.S. officials are concerned that Japan will face severe budgetary constraints that will preclude
major alliance development. Japan’s public debt stands at around 200% of its GDP.14 Japanese
leaders are under pressure to stem government spending overall, and many ministries face budget
cuts as part of ongoing fiscal reform. Japan’s defense budget, at $51 billion, is the sixth-largest in
the world.15 Defense spending in Japan has traditionally been capped at 1% of GDP; most leaders
are wary of surpassing that symbolic benchmark, although the cap is not a law. According to U.S.
defense officials, Japan should expect to pay up to $20 billion for the realignment costs alone. If
costs of the troop realignment come from the defense budget, some analysts say that Japan’s
military could face degraded capability because expensive equipment purchases will have to be
forgone. In interviews, U.S. military officials have voiced concerns that the SDF runs the risk of
becoming a “hollow force” because of its insufficient procurement system. Funding is also
needed from the Japanese in order to increase the amount of joint training with U.S. forces.

14 According to the CIA World Factbook, Japan’s public debt stands at 196.4% of GDP (2010 estimate).
15 SIPRI Yearbook 2010. Figures are from 2009.
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Budget pressure is likely to remain high in Japan due to the demographic reality of an aging and
shrinking population with a shortage of workers.
Constitutional and Legal Constraints
Several legal factors could restrict Japan’s ability to cooperate more robustly with the United
States. The most prominent and fundamental is Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, drafted by
American officials during the post-war occupation, that outlaws war as a “sovereign right” of
Japan and prohibits “the right of belligerency.” It stipulates that “land, sea, and air forces, as well
as other war potential will never be maintained.” However, Japan has interpreted this clause to
mean that it can maintain a military for self-defense purposes and, since 1991, has allowed the
SDF to participate in non-combat roles overseas in a number of U.N. peacekeeping missions and
in the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq.
The principle of “collective self-defense” is also considered an obstacle to close defense
cooperation. The term comes from Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which provides that member
nations may exercise the rights of both individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs. The Japanese government maintains that Japan has the sovereign right to engage in
collective self-defense, but a 1960 decision by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau interpreted the
constitution to forbid collective actions because it would require considering the defense of other
countries, not just the safety of Japan itself. Participation in non-combat logistical operations and
rear support of other nations, however, has been considered outside the realm of collective self-
defense. Former Prime Minister Abe had spoken out about the need to reconsider this restriction,
but efforts to alter the interpretation stalled after his resignation in 2007.
During the deployment of Japanese forces to Iraq, the interpretation prevented them from
defending other nations’ troops.16 Some Japanese critics have charged that Japanese Aegis
destroyers should not use their radar in the vicinity of American warships, as they would not be
allowed to respond to an incoming attack on those vessels. As the United States and Japan
increasingly integrate missile defense operation, the ban on collective self-defense also raises
questions about how Japanese commanders will gauge whether American forces or Japan itself is
being targeted. Under the current interpretation, Japanese forces could not respond if the United
States were attacked.

16 SDF members on overseas missions are not permitted to use weapons if unattended Japanese nationals or foreign
troops in a multilateral coalition with Japan come under attack.
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Figure 2. Map of Japan and Surrounding Countries




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Author Contact Information

Emma Chanlett-Avery

Specialist in Asian Affairs
echanlettavery@crs.loc.gov, 7-7748


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