



Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments

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Summary

Since 2000, the U.S. military has been building up forward-deployed forces on the westernmost U.S. territory of Guam to increase U.S. presence, deterrence, and power projection for possible responses to crises and disasters, counter-terrorism, and contingencies in support of South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, or elsewhere in Asia. Since 2006, three joint exercises based at Guam called “Valiant Shield” have boosted U.S. military readiness in the Asian-Pacific region. The defense buildup on Guam has been moderate. China still has concerns about Guam’s buildup, suspecting it to be directed against China. There has been concern that China could target Guam with missiles. Nonetheless, Guam’s role increased in engaging China’s military.

In 2006, the United States and Japan agreed on a “Roadmap” to strengthen their alliance, including a buildup on Guam to cost \$10.3 billion, with Japan contributing 60%. Primary goals were to start the related construction on Guam by 2010 and to complete relocation of about 8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. In Tokyo on February 17, 2009, the Secretary of State signed the bilateral “Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents From Okinawa to Guam” that reaffirmed the “Roadmap” of May 1, 2006. The two governments agreed that of the estimated \$10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development for the relocation, Japan will provide \$6.09 billion, including up to \$2.8 billion in direct cash contributions (in FY2008 dollars). The United States committed to fund \$3.18 billion plus \$1 billion for a road for a total of \$4.18 billion.

However, completion of the marines’ relocation by 2014 seems unlikely. In September 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) became the ruling party. This political change raised uncertainty as Japan sought to re-negotiate the agreement, even while the United States sought its implementation. The dispute over the location on Okinawa of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) to replace the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma raised implications for the relocation of marines from Okinawa to Guam. In January 2010, Japan promised to decide by May on the location of the FRF. Then, North Korea’s attack on South Korea’s naval ship *Cheonan* in March, and China’s deployment of its Navy near Okinawa which confronted Japan’s forces in April, catalyzed Japan to resolve the dispute in favor of stronger deterrence in alliance with the United States. On May 28, the Secretaries of Defense and State and their counterparts in Japan issued a “2+2” Joint Statement, in which they reaffirmed the 2006 Roadmap and the 2009 Agreement. In September 2010, the Navy and Army issued a Record of Decision that deferred some decisions for Guam. Nonetheless, despite the dispute over the FRF on Okinawa, Japan has funded in its defense budgets for direct contributions as well as loans for the marines’ relocation to Guam.

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2010 (enacted as P.L. 111-84 on October 28, 2009) authorized the first substantial incremental funding for the relocation of marines from Okinawa to Guam, but conditioned upon the Defense Department’s submission to Congress of a Guam Master Plan. Congress authorized a total amount (including for Defense-wide, Army, Navy, and Air Force) of almost \$733 million. The NDAA for FY2011, H.R. 6523 as passed in the House and Senate in December 2010, contained provisions related to realignment on Guam, but with concern about insufficient information from the Defense Department, including a master plan for new construction. Updated as warranted, this CRS Report discusses major developments and policy issues. (On appropriations for military construction, see CRS Report R41345, *Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies: FY2011 Appropriations*.)

Contents

Strategic Significance of Guam for Defense Buildup 1

Force Relocations and Deployments from the U.S. Mainland 1

U.S. Force Relocations from Japan..... 3

 Agreement 3

 Budgets 5

Concerns and Issues for Congress 5

 Rationales 5

 Concerns 6

 Alliances 8

 China 9

 Legislation 10

Tables

Table 1. Illustrative Sailing Distances and Time..... 6

Contacts

Author Contact Information 11

Strategic Significance of Guam for Defense Buildup

Guam is a U.S. territory long valued as strategically significant to U.S. forward deployments in the Western Pacific. In the Pacific Ocean, Hawaii is about 2,400 miles west of California, and Guam is about 3,800 miles further west of Hawaii. Guam has two important U.S. military bases: Apra Naval Base and Andersen Air Force Base. The island, three times the size of Washington, DC, is home to about 171,000 residents. As the Defense Department has faced increased tension on the Korean peninsula and requirements to fight the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Pacific Command (PACOM), since 2000, has built up air and naval forces on Guam to boost U.S. deterrence and power projection in Asia. Concerns include crisis response, counter-terrorism, and contingencies in the Pacific. The defense buildup on Guam has been moderate.

Visiting Guam in May 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that Guam's buildup will be "one of the largest movements of military assets in decades" and will help to "maintain a robust military presence in a critical part of the world."¹ Under President Obama, Secretary Gates issued the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in February 2010, in which the United States noted the importance of implementing the U.S.-Japan Realignment Roadmap of 2006 that will ensure the deployment of U.S. forces in Japan and transform Guam into a regional security hub. The QDR also announced the development of a new joint Air-Sea Battle Concept, to integrate the air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace forces of the Air Force and Navy to counter challenges to U.S. freedom of action, defeat adversaries with sophisticated anti-access and area-denial capabilities, and improve power projection operations. As part of the Obama Administration's effort to re-engage with Asia and reassure allies and partners in region, Gates participated at an annual Asian-Pacific defense ministers' meeting in June 2010 in Singapore at which he declared that the United States is a Pacific nation and will remain a "power in the Pacific." He highlighted that the South China Sea became an area of "growing concern." He also stated that the defense buildup on Guam is part of a shift in the U.S. defense posture in Asia, a shift to be more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable.² Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn III visited Guam in July and stressed Guam's value, saying "from bases here, our forces can ensure the security of our allies, quickly respond to disaster and humanitarian needs, safeguard the sea lanes that are so vital to the world economy, and address any military provocation that may occur."³ Follow-up questions include how to ensure a powerful presence. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, issued strategic guidance for 2011 that placed priority on U.S. security interests in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Still, he noted an increased focus on the Asian-Pacific region in balancing risks from an aggressive North Korea and a more assertive China and in defending freedom of navigation.

Force Relocations and Deployments from the U.S. Mainland

In 2000, the press reported that the Air Force wanted to base elements of an Air Expeditionary Force in Guam and had sent B-2 stealth bombers to Guam to broaden the range of U.S. options

¹ Donna Miles, "Gates Views Growth Under Way in Guam," *American Forces Press Service*, May 30, 2008.

² Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, speech at Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore, June 5, 2010.

³ Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn III, Remarks at the University of Guam, July 27, 2010.

for possible contingencies involving North Korea. As PACOM's Commander, Admiral Dennis Blair acquired approval to forward deploy air-launched cruise missiles on Guam for the first time in August 2000. The Air Force moved precision munitions to be stockpiled on Guam, including Joint Direct Attack Munitions and Joint Standoff Weapons.⁴

In early 2001, the Navy announced that it would station up to three nuclear attack submarines at Guam, in order to shorten the transit time compared to travel from homeports in Hawaii or California to the western Pacific and to shorten deployments for sailors. The first sub to be based at Guam arrived in October 2002. In July 2007, the *USS Buffalo* joined *USS Houston* and *USS City of Corpus Christi* as the three forward-deployed nuclear-power attack submarines (SSN) permanently based at Guam. The three SSNs based at Guam formed part of the deployment of about 60% of attack submarines in the Pacific by the end of 2009. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2006 called for an adjustment in U.S. force posture, with a greater presence in the Pacific than that in the Atlantic, including at least six aircraft carriers and 60% of submarines in the Pacific. Moreover, in mid-2010, three Ohio-class guided-missile submarines (SSGN), *USS Michigan*, *USS Ohio*, and *USS Florida*, showed their presence in the Pacific and used Guam to support their operations.⁵ However, in 2007, the Navy decided not to homeport the aircraft carrier *USS Carl Vinson* at Guam. Nonetheless, by 2008, the Navy planned for a transient berth in Apra Harbor to support an aircraft carrier for up to three times a year, each visit for up to three weeks.⁶ The QDR of 2010 called for maintaining a force structure of 10-11 aircraft carriers.

In 2002, the Commander of Pacific Air Forces publicly detailed his request for basing aircraft in Guam. In addition to munition stockpiles and jet fuel, he reportedly requested F-22 stealth fighters, 767 tankers, C-17 transports, bombers, and Global Hawk reconnaissance drones.⁷ In March 2003, after a new Air Expeditionary Wing was activated at Guam's Andersen Air Force Base, B-1 and B-52 bombers deployed temporarily on a rotational basis from air bases in Texas and Louisiana as U.S. forces prepared for war against Iraq. Beyond rotation of aircraft, the Air Force began continuous deployment of aircraft into Guam. As part of this build-up, the first B-52 bombers (stationed out of Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota) to deploy to Andersen arrived in February 2004. B-52 bombers can each carry 20 AGM-86C/D conventional air-launched cruise missiles (CALCMs), and these long-range weapons have been fielded at Andersen.⁸ In April 2005, the Commander of Pacific Air Forces said that B-2 stealth bombers started to fly out of Andersen. In April 2005, F-15 fighters temporarily deployed to Andersen from Idaho. An Air Force official said in 2006 that the Air Force planned to station KC-135 tankers on Guam. In May 2007, the Air Force announced the deployment of 18 F-16 fighters to Guam for four months. In

⁴ Thomas Ricks, "For Pentagon, Asia Moving to Forefront," *Washington Post*, May 26, 2000; "Inside the Ring," *Washington Times*, August 25, 2000; Robert Burns, "Air Force Plan Could Place Bombers Closer to Targets," *Seattle Times*, November 30, 2000.

⁵ Christian Bohmfalk, "Navy Decides to Homeport Up to Three Attack Submarines in Guam," *Inside the Navy*, January 29, 2001; Nathan Hodge, "Navy Basing Subs in Guam," *Defense Week*, October 1, 2002; *Navy Newsstand*, July 12, 2007; Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, December 4, 2009; *South China Morning Post*, July 4, 2010.

⁶ Nelson Daranciang, "Senators Hope Naval Presence Will Grow," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, March 31, 2007; Navy Secretary Donald Winter, Report on Department of Defense Planning Efforts for Guam, September 15, 2008.

⁷ Jim Wolf, "U.S. General Urges Warplanes Be Sent to Guam," *Reuters*, August 23, 2002.

⁸ PACOM, "B-1Bs, B-52Hs Arrive in Guam," March 6, 2003; Robert Burns, "Air Force Wants to Put Fighters and Bombers Back on Guam in Pacific," *AP*, January 13, 2004; Michael Sirak, "U.S. Considers Bomber Presence on Guam," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, January 21, 2004; PACOM, "Bomber Deployment to Guam," February 2, 2004; "Bombers Arrive At Andersen," *AFN*; Katie Worth, "B-52 Bombers Arrive," *Pacific Daily News*, February 23, 2004; U.S. Air Force, "AGM-86B/C/D Missiles." There is also the AGM-86B version with a nuclear warhead.

the summer of 2008, several F-22 fighters, based in Alaska since 2007, began deployments to Guam. Also, Andersen Air Force Base first planned to have four to six Global Hawks for an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Strike Task Force by 2009, though the first of three RQ-4 Global Hawks arrived in September 2010.⁹

U.S. Force Relocations from Japan

In May 2006, the United States and Japan signed a detailed “Roadmap” to broaden military cooperation, mostly dealing with changes and additions to U.S. forces in Japan. It provides for the relocation of the headquarters of the III Marine Expeditionary Force and 8,000 U.S. marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. Approximately 7,000 marines would remain on Okinawa. The cost of the relocation was estimated at \$10.27 billion. Of this amount, Japan pledged to contribute \$6.09 billion, including direct financing of facilities and infrastructure on Guam.¹⁰

Agreement

On February 5, 2009, Admiral Timothy Keating, Commander of the Pacific Command (PACOM) told *Reuters* that the transfer of 8,000 marines to Guam might be delayed and cost more, but observers questioned his authority for the statement. Indeed, PACOM clarified the next day that the goals remain to start the related construction by 2010 and to complete relocation by 2014.

Soon after, on February 17, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Tokyo and signed the bilateral “Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents From Okinawa to Guam” that reaffirmed the “Roadmap” of May 1, 2006. The two governments agreed that of the estimated \$10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development for the relocation, Japan would provide \$6.09 billion, including up to \$2.8 billion in direct cash contributions (in FY2008 dollars). The United States committed to fund \$3.18 billion plus about \$1 billion for a road for a total of \$4.18 billion. Under the agreement, about 8,000 personnel from the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and about 9,000 of their dependents would relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014.

In addition to Japan’s financial contribution, the relocation to Guam would be dependent upon Japan’s progress toward completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). In the “Roadmap,” the United States and Japan agreed to replace the Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma with the FRF constructed using landfill and located in another, less populated area of Okinawa (at Camp Schwab). The FRF would be part of an interconnected package that includes

⁹ Martin Matishak, “Hester: Air Force to Bolster Presence in Asia-Pacific Region,” *Inside the Air Force*, April 29, 2005; Natalie Quinata, “Fighter Squadron Arrives on Guam,” *Pacific Daily News*, April 30, 2005; Gregg Kakesako, “U.S. Military to Beef Up Its Presence on Guam,” *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, June 21, 2006; “United States to deploy 18 F-16s to Guam,” *Reuters News*, May 24, 2007; Frank Whitman, “No Big Changes at Andersen Right Away, New 36th Wing Commander Says,” *Stars and Stripes*, November 18, 2006; Audrey McAvoy, “Air Force to Deploy Alaska-based F-22 Raptors to Guam,” *AP*, May 21, 2008, quoting the Commander of Pacific Air Forces, General Carrol Chandler; “Rear Admiral Addresses Business Leaders on Guam’s Military Importance,” *KUAM*, February 25, 2009; Travis Tritten, “Andersen Receives Pacific’s First Global Hawk Drone,” *Stars and Stripes*, September 8, 2010; “USAF Welcomes RQ-4 Global Hawk to Guam Watch,” *Flight International*, September 28-October 4, 2010.

¹⁰ Karl Eiselberg, “Finalized U.S.-Japan Defense Accord Masks Some Deeper Concerns in Security Alliance,” *Daily Report*, May 5, 2006; Linda Sieg, “U.S.-Japan Security Overhaul Gives Tokyo Bigger Role,” *Reuters*, May 16, 2006.

relocation to the FRF, return of MCAS Futenma, transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, and consolidation of facilities and return of land on Okinawa.

In April 2009, the lower house of Japan's parliament, the Diet, voted to approve the bilateral agreement, and the Diet ratified it on May 13, 2009. The next day, the Department of State welcomed the Diet's ratification of the agreement and reiterated the U.S. commitment to the completion of the relocation of 8,000 marines to Guam from Okinawa, host to about 25,000 U.S. military personnel and their dependents.

However, on September 16, 2009, Yukio Hatoyama of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) became Prime Minister. This political change raised uncertainty when Japan sought to re-negotiate the agreement even as the United States sought its implementation. The DPJ had called for the Futenma air station to be relocated outside of Okinawa, with concerns about the impact on the local people and environment. (On Japan's dispute over Futenma, see CRS Report RL33436, *Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress*.) In Tokyo on October 21, Defense Secretary Robert Gates stressed to Japan's Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa the importance of implementing the agreement by "moving forward expeditiously on the roadmap as agreed." Gates said at a news conference that "without the [FRF], there will be no relocation to Guam. And without relocation to Guam, there will be no consolidation of forces and return of land in Okinawa." But by the time of President Obama's visit on November 13, 2009, the two leaders could only announce a "working group" to discuss differences. The U.S. side agreed to discuss the agreement's "implementation," but Japan sought to "review" the agreement. At a meeting in Honolulu on January 12, 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stressed moving on the implementation of the agreement but also acknowledged that the alliance had lots of other business to conduct. She expressed an expectation of a decision on the FRF by May, after Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada conveyed Hatoyama's promise to decide by that time. Visiting Tokyo on January 15, Senator Daniel Inouye said Hatoyama reiterated this promise to decide by May.

Meanwhile, on May 20, 2010, the Republic of Korea (ROK), or South Korea, announced that an international investigation found that an attack on March 26 by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, sank the ROK's naval ship, *Cheonan*, and killed 46 sailors. President Obama condemned that "act of aggression." The crisis provoked by the DPRK catalyzed Japan's resolution of the dispute over the realignment. Moreover, in April, Japan said that China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) deployed ships and submarines near Japan's southern islands of Okinawa and Miyakojima and dangerously confronted Japan's surveillance forces, including pointing guns from a PLAN destroyer at Japan's maritime patrol plane and flying a helicopter in close approach to Japan's destroyer in at least two incidents. The next month, China's maritime survey ship approached and chased away Japan's Coast Guard survey ship in the East China Sea, demanding that Japan's ship stop its surveys. While the crisis with the DPRK involved an attack that sank the ROK's ship and killed its sailors, the PLA's aggressiveness did not result in conflict at that time. Nonetheless, later in July, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and Pacific Security Affairs Wallace Gregson testified to Congress that both the actions by North Korea and China (the PLAN's deployment of a Surface Action Group near Okinawa) prompted Japan's recognition of a vital U.S. role in Japan's deterrence.¹¹

On May 28, 2010, in Tokyo, Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of State Clinton along with their counterparts in Japan issued a "2+2" Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security

¹¹ Before a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, July 27, 2010.

Consultative Committee. Thus, Japan reaffirmed its commitment to implement the 2006 Roadmap and 2009 Agreement on relocation of marines from Okinawa to Guam. The following month, Japan's new Prime Minister Naoto Kan affirmed the agreement.

In July 2010, the U.S. Navy expressed doubts about meeting the original goal of completing the relocation of marines to Guam by 2014,¹² supporting Admiral Keating's assessment in 2009.

Budgets

Nonetheless, despite Japan's dispute over the FRF in Okinawa, Japan has allocated funds in the defense budgets for the marines' relocation and buildup on Guam, including the agreed \$2.8 billion in direct contributions. Japan allocated as direct contributions \$336 million in the 2009 defense budget and \$497 million in the 2010 budget. (Japan's fiscal year covers April 1 to March 31.) In the 2011 defense budget, Japan funded \$176 million for its direct contribution and also \$416 million for loans to be extended by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) to fund the expansion of utilities (such as power, water, and wastewater) on Guam.

Concerns and Issues for Congress

Rationales

One rationale for the military build-up on Guam is its status as a U.S. territory. Thus, the United States is not required to negotiate with sovereign countries on force deployments or face the risks of losing bases or access. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited Guam in November 2003 and expressed support for building up Guam as he considered a new round of base closings.¹³ In contrast, the United States had to close Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines in 1992, and countries like South Korea could restrict the use of U.S. forces based there. U.S. forces based in Guam also do not have to contend with political sensitivities over nuclear powered vessels. Moreover, some countries, including allies, have raised doubts about their support for U.S. forces in a possible conflict between the United States and China.

Another rationale is the expansion of options that Guam offers to the evolving U.S. force structure. As Commander of PACOM, Admiral William Fallon expressed his vision for Guam as a staging area from which ships, aircraft, and troops can "surge" to the Asian theater. He stressed "flexibility," saying "we need to have forces ready to react," and we must have built-in flexibility" to meet emergencies (including disaster relief).¹⁴ In 2004, the Navy held "Summer Pulse 04," its first exercise to increase readiness to "surge" operations in response to a crisis. In June 2006, PACOM held the first "Valiant Shield" exercise that brought three aircraft carriers to waters off Guam. The third "Valiant Shield" exercise occurred in September 2010.

¹² Satoshi Ogawa, "U.S. Government Gives Up on Relocating Marines in Okinawa to Guam by 2014," *Yomiuri*, July 23, 2010.

¹³ James Brooke, "Looking for Friendly Overseas Base, Pentagon Finds it Already Has One," *New York Times*, April 7, 2004.

¹⁴ Richard Halloran, "Guam Seen as Pivotal U.S. Base," *Washington Times*, March 11, 2006.

A third rationale is the need to counter what commanders call the “tyranny of distance.” PACOM, headquartered in Honolulu, has an area of responsibility that encompasses almost 60% of the world’s population, over 50% of the earth’s surface, the Pacific and Indian Oceans, 16 time zones, and five of seven U.S. defense treaties. U.S. forces on Guam are much closer to East Asia, where the United States has alliances with Australia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. The United States also has concerns in Asia about threats to peace and stability in the East China Sea, South China Sea and over terrorist threats in Southeast Asia, humanitarian crises, and security for sea lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly through the Straits of Malacca. Combat aircraft on Guam can reach Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, or the Korean peninsula in two to five hours.¹⁵ Moreover, **Table 1** presents the shorter sailing distance and time from Guam to Manila in East Asia, compared to that from Honolulu, Seattle, and San Diego.

Table 1. Illustrative Sailing Distances and Time

To Manila, from:	Statute miles	Days at 20 knots	Days at 30 knots
Guam	1,724	3.1	2.1
Honolulu	5,482	9.9	6.6
Seattle	6,853	12.4	8.3
San Diego	7,595	13.8	9.2

Notes: Sailing distances in statute miles were calculated using nautical miles reported by “Distances Between Ports,” 2001, published by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. Also, 1 nautical mile equals 1.15 statute miles, and 1 knot equals 1.15 mph.

Concerns

As U.S. forces relocate to Guam, the state of its infrastructure has been of concern to some policymakers. Also, Guam’s political leaders have expressed concerns about the impact of additional deployments on its infrastructure, including utilities, roads, and water supplies. Guam’s location in the Western Pacific also requires construction of protection for U.S. forces and assets against typhoons. In the fall of 2006, PACOM officials briefed Guam on some aspects of an undisclosed draft plan for military expansion, the Integrated Military Development Plan, with possible military projects worth a total of about \$15 billion.¹⁶ In addition, Guam’s size and remoteness and conditions raised more questions about hosting and educating military dependents, training on Guam and with other units in Asia, Hawaii, or the west coast, and costs and time for extended logistical support and travel. Addressing another concern, a former commander of Marine Forces Pacific urged in 2007 that Guam’s buildup include more than infrastructure to develop also human capital, communities, and the environment.¹⁷ In 2009, Wallace Gregson became Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs.

Guam’s higher military profile could increase its potential as an American target for terrorists and adversaries during a possible conflict. China is believed to have deployed ballistic missiles that could target Guam, considered by China as part of the “Second Island Chain” from which it needs to break out of perceived U.S.-led “containment.” China’s missiles that could target forces based

¹⁵ Donna Miles, “Gates Views Massive Growth Under Way in Guam,” *AFPS*, May 30, 2008.

¹⁶ *KUAM News*, September 12, 2006; *Pacific Daily News*, September 13, 2006; *Stars and Stripes*, September 17, 2006.

¹⁷ W. C. “Chip” Gregson, “New Thinking Needed on Pacific Frontier,” *Honolulu Advertiser*, December 7, 2007.

at Guam include the DF-3A (CSS-2) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). China also has developed an extended-range DH-10 ground-launched land-attack cruise missile (LACM) and the world's first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), the DF-21D ASBM, to target aircraft carriers and other ships. While the DF-21D's initial range could be 1,500-2,000 km (930-1240 mi), a more advanced variant could extend the range to 3,000 km and reach Guam.¹⁸ In addition, in 2008 North Korea started to deploy its intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) (Taepodong-X) with a range of about 1,860 miles that could reach Guam, according to South Korea's 2008 Defense White Paper.¹⁹ Any such vulnerabilities could raise Guam's requirements for missile defense.

Moreover, some say that Guam is still too distant from flash points in the Asia and advocate closer cooperation with allies and partners such as Singapore, Australia, the Philippines, and Japan.²⁰ Building up the U.S. presence in those countries could enhance alliances or partnerships, increase interoperability, and reduce costs for the United States. For example, in 2010, Australia proposed that the U.S. military could increase use of this U.S. ally's existing bases.²¹

In July 2010, the U.S. Navy's Joint Guam Program Office issued the Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on implications of the defense buildup on Guam.²² The detailed study estimated a higher population increase than the move of 8,000 marines to Guam. A total of 8,552 Marines plus 630 Army soldiers would form the 9,182 permanent military personnel to relocate to Guam. The total military population on Guam would increase by 30,190 (including 9,182 permanent military personnel, 9,950 dependents, 9,222 transient military personnel, and 1,836 civilian workers). In addition, construction workers and others would mean a total increase in population of about 79,000 at the peak in 2014.

The study also found that Guam cannot accommodate all training for the relocated marines, and the nearby island of Tinian (100 miles away) could help to provide land for their training. There would be a challenge for sustaining operational readiness in training while limiting the time and expense to travel to train. The study found that "the training ranges currently planned for Guam and Tinian only replicate existing individual-skills training capabilities on Okinawa and do not provide for all requisite collective, combined arms, live and maneuver training the Marine Corps forces must meet to sustain core competencies. As with Marine Corps forces currently in Okinawa who must now travel to mainland Japan, other partner nations, and the U.S. to accomplish this requisite core competency training, the Marine Corps forces relocating from Okinawa to Guam would also have to use alternate locations to accomplish requisite core competency training." In addition, the Navy would need a new deep-draft wharf at Apra Harbor to support a transient aircraft carrier. Third, the Army would relocate about 600 military personnel to establish and operate an Air and Missile Defense Task Force (AMDTF).

However, as stated in the Record of Decision on the Final EIS issued two months later, the Navy and Army deferred decisions on a site for the marines' live-fire training range on Guam, a site for

¹⁸ Mark Stokes, "China's Evolving Conventional Strategic Strike Capability," Project 2049, September 14, 2009; Secretary of Defense, "Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010," August 16, 2010.

¹⁹ Sam Kim, "N. Korea Deploys Medium-Range Missiles, Bolsters Special Forces," *Yonhap*, Seoul, February 23, 2009.

²⁰ Thomas Donnelly, "Rebasing, Revisited," American Enterprise Institute, December 2004.

²¹ Phil Stewart, "U.S. Military Moves in Asia Not Aimed At China: Gates," *Reuters*, November 7, 2010.

²² Joint Guam Program Office, "Final Environmental Impact Statement: Guam and CNMI Military Relocation," public release on July 29, 2010. This followed the Draft Environment Impact Statement issued in November 2009.

the transient aircraft carrier berth within Apra Harbor, and construction of an AMDTF on Guam. Also, the Record of Decision used an assumption that construction to support the marines' relocation would start in 2014 and not be complete until 2016 and projected that instead of a peak of an increase of 79,178 people (including military personnel and workers) in Guam in 2014, a "more realistic" projection would see a peak of 59,173 growth in population in 2015. The peak of 10,552 marines on Guam would be reached in 2017 instead of 2014.²³

As another concern, the marines on Guam would need naval assets for transportation for both deployments and exercises. Options include basing in Guam another Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) with amphibious ships of the Navy to transport a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). Another consideration would homeport in Guam the new non-combatant sealift Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV). Since 2001, the III MEF in Okinawa already has experience with using a leased theater support ship called "Westpac Express." The marines used this fast, roll-on/roll-off ship to deploy with helicopters to reinforce Guam's defense after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001.²⁴

Alliances

The Guam Integrated Military Development Plan, parts of which were reported in October 2006, indicated that U.S. Army units withdrawn from South Korea were not likely to be stationed on Guam.²⁵ The Pentagon's restructuring plan reportedly intended to maintain U.S. air power in South Korea, particularly the three squadrons of F-16 fighters based at Osan Air Base. An emphasis on U.S. offshore forces in South Korean security could affect decisions regarding the mix of U.S. forces based on Guam and rotated into Guam from other bases. This might especially be true of heavy bombers, which the Air Force rotates into Guam from bases in the United States. Concerns about maintaining deterrence after U.S. reductions of ground forces might lead PACOM to increase exercises of heavy bombers and/or aircraft carrier strike groups near Korea.²⁶

Under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, U.S. concerns involved possible conflict between China and Japan over their competing claims to the Senkaku islands (called Diaoyu islands by China) in the East China Sea. (Taiwan as the Republic of China also claims the islands as Tiaoyutai.) The United States administered the islands after World War II and turned them over to Japanese administration in 1972. Clinton and Bush Administration officials stated that the Senkakus fall under the scope of the U.S.-Japan alliance. In September 2005, the PLA Navy deployed five naval ships to the disputed area in the East China Sea with competing territorial and oil claims. Under President Obama, after China escalated tension with Japan in wake of a PRC fishing boat's collision with Japan's patrol boats in September 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary Gates explicitly assured Japan of the U.S. position that the Senkakus are covered by the defense treaty. National Security Council (NSC) Senior Director for Asian Affairs Jeff Bader also stated that while the United States takes no position on the sovereign claim over the islands, the U.S.-Japan treaty covers areas administered by Japan, including the Senkakus

²³ "Record of Decision for Guam/Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands Military Relocation," September 2010.

²⁴ Consultations with PACOM in Honolulu in November 2010 and Pentagon in Washington in December 2010.

²⁵ Murayama Kohei, "U.S. to Triple Troops in Guam, but No Earlier Than 2010 for Marines," *Kyodo*, October 3, 2006.

²⁶ Bill Gertz, "More Muscle, With Eye on China," *Washington Times*, April 20, 2006; Robert Burns, "U.S. Air Power in East Asia Has Grown," *Associated Press*, October 11, 2006.

since 1972. The next month in Honolulu, Clinton publicly declared that “the Senkakus fall within the scope of Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.”²⁷

For combined training and engagement with allies and partners, Guam has provided valuable and less constrained airspace and bombing ranges for the air forces of Japan, Thailand, Singapore, South Korea, and Australia. Taiwan has asked to fly to Guam for training, but that is unlikely. Moreover, Taiwan has options for both training and operations (such as humanitarian missions) to fly to Pacific nations like Palau and the Solomon Islands that keep diplomatic ties with Taipei. Taiwan could also assist such countries to improve and extend their runways if needed.

China

China’s civilian and military commentators commonly have suspected that the U.S. defense build-up on Guam partly has been aimed at China, which has threatened to use the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) against Taiwan. U.S. policy on helping Taiwan’s self-defense is governed not by a defense treaty but by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8. Some concerns about the PLA’s accelerated modernization since the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996 also have expanded beyond a focus on Taiwan to include PLA preparations for possible conflicts with the United States, Japan, and others. In Southeast Asia, China claims much of the South China Sea as well as the disputed Spratly and Paracel Islands in that sea as its “sovereign territory.” The PLA has increased attention to Guam and has been building up its submarine force (both nuclear-powered and diesel-electric). In November 2004, the PLA Navy sent a Han-class nuclear attack submarine to waters off Guam before intruding into Japan’s territorial water.²⁸ In 2007, PACOM Commander Admiral Timothy Keating visited Guam and acknowledged that its defense buildup was partly due to concerns about tension over Taiwan and deterrence of North Korea. At the same time, he stressed U.S. transparency, saying the buildup was not “under the cover of darkness.”²⁹ Later, in 2008, Deputy PACOM Commander, Lt. Gen. Dan Leaf (USAF), addressed the question of whether China posed a threat and if China could see Guam as a threat, and he said that while the United States had concerns about China’s military buildup, “that’s not why we’re basing forces in Guam.” He noted that the forces were already based and standing ready in the Pacific, with new adjustments in U.S. posture.³⁰ While in Australia in late 2010 to discuss the alliance, Defense Secretary Gates stated that moves to strengthen the U.S. military presence in Asian-Pacific region have been more about relationships with the rest of Asia than about China.³¹

Under President Obama, the Pentagon issued a QDR in February 2010 that announced the development of a new joint Air-Sea Battle Concept, as noted above. The QDR’s discussion of that concept did not name China. Nevertheless, some analysts discussed the Air-Sea Battle Concept as a way to counter the PLA’s rising capabilities in anti-access and area-denial (to prevent U.S.

²⁷ CRS Report 96-798, *Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute: The U.S. Legal Relationship and Obligations*, by Larry A. Niksch; “U.S.-Japan Treaty Covers Disputed Isles,” *Reuters*, November 28, 1996; Yoichi Funabashi, “Maintain the Armitage Doctrine Quietly,” *Asahi Shimbun*, February 2, 2004; “Clinton Tells Maehara Senkakus Subject to Japan-U.S. Security Pact,” *Kyodo*, September 23, 2010; Defense Department, news briefing with Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, September 23, 2010; White House, press briefing, New York, September 23, 2010; State Department, Joint Press Availability with Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara, Honolulu, October 27, 2010.

²⁸ *Kyodo World Service*, November 16, 2004.

²⁹ Audrey McAvoy, “U.S. Pacific Commander Says Taiwan is Factor in Guam Buildup,” *AP*, April 15, 2007.

³⁰ Interview with Lt. Gen. Dan Leaf, *Asia-Pacific Defense Forum*, 1st Quarter 2008.

³¹ Phil Stewart, “U.S. Military Moves in Asia Not Aimed At China: Gates,” *Reuters*, November 7, 2010.

forces from entering into a theater of operations and to prevent U.S. freedom of action in an area under an adversary's control).³² Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia Michael Schiffer testified to Congress in March 2010 that the implementation of the 2006 Realignment Roadmap would help meet shared security challenges, including the threat posed by North Korea and uncertainty posed by the PLA's "rapid" modernization. In the same month in answer to Senator Daniel Akaka, PACOM Commander Admiral Robert Willard cited the PLA Air Force's fighters and air defense systems for U.S. deployment of F-22 fighters in the Pacific, including at Guam's Andersen Air Force Base.³³

Still, a policy challenge has been to deter any aggression by China as well as to assure it that a U.S. goal is cooperation with this rising power as a "responsible stakeholder." The Commander of Pacific Air Forces said in May 2005 that the PLA's modernization gave him "pause for interest" but did not make a difference in significant force redeployment.³⁴ Also, in 2006, Guam became a focal point for improving the military-to-military relationship with China. To blunt charges that Guam's build-up targeted China, PACOM's Commander, Admiral Fallon, invited PLA observers to the U.S. "Valiant Shield" exercise that brought three aircraft carriers to waters off Guam in June 2006. The PLA Navy sent a Deputy Chief of Staff and specialist in submarine operations to lead the observers, who also boarded an aircraft carrier and visited Guam's air and naval bases. In May 2008, two C-17 transport aircraft flew supplies from Guam to China for earthquake relief.

Legislation

This section covers major legislation related to the defense buildup on Guam. In July 2006, the Senate Appropriations Committee issued a report (S.Rept. 109-286) on the Military Construction and Veteran Affairs Appropriations Act, which expressed concerns about a construction program on Guam estimated to cost \$10.3 billion (with Japan paying 60%) and expectations of a master plan for Guam from the Defense Secretary by December 29, 2006. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2008 (that became P.L. 110-161 on December 26, 2007), the Appropriations Committees decided against a Senate provision that would have required the Defense Secretary to submit the master plan by December 29, 2007 and provided more time for a report by September 15, 2008. In response, the Navy Secretary reported on planning for Guam, with initiatives for the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. Also, he reported that the Pentagon was developing the Guam Joint Military Master Plan.³⁵ The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009 (that became P.L. 110-417 on October 14, 2008), *inter alia*, authorized a total of about \$180 million for Guam's military construction projects, established a Treasury account for all contributions for military realignment and relocations, and required the Defense Secretary to report on military construction projects by February 15 of each year.

On May 7, 2009, days before Japan's Diet ratified the relocation agreement with the United States, Defense Secretary Gates submitted the proposed defense budget for FY2010. As part of

³² Michael McDevitt, "The 2010 QDR and Asia: Messages for the Region," *Asia Pacific Bulletin*, East-West Center, March 11, 2010; Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, "AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept," May 18, 2010; Bruce Rolfsen, "Air Force-Navy Team May Counter China Threat," *Navy Times*, May 23, 2010. For a critical view: Thomas Barnett, "Big-War Thinking in a Small-War Era," *China Security*, November 2010.

³³ Testimonies before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, March 17, 2010; and Senate Armed Services Committee, March 26, 2010.

³⁴ General Paul Hester, interview with *Inside the Air Force*, May 6, 2005.

³⁵ Donald Winter, "Department of Defense Planning Efforts for Guam," September 15, 2008.

the realignment of the Global Defense Posture, he requested \$378 million to start construction in Guam to support the relocation of 8,000 marines from Japan in order to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance. This amount would contribute to the total U.S. cost of \$4.18 billion for the relocation.

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 (H.R. 2647, enacted as P.L. 111-84 on October 28, 2009) authorized the first substantial incremental funding for the relocation of marines from Okinawa to Guam, but conditioned upon the Defense Department's submission to Congress of a Guam Master Plan. Among a number of provisions related to Guam in the legislation and conference report, Congress designated the Deputy Secretary of Defense to lead a Guam Executive Council and coordinate interagency efforts related to Guam. Congress also required a report on training, readiness, and movement requirements for Marine Forces Pacific, with a sense of Congress that expansion of Marine Corps training should not impact the implementation of the U.S.-Japan agreement on relocation from Okinawa to Guam. Congress authorized a total amount (including for Defense-wide, Army, Navy, and Air Force) of almost \$733 million. (On appropriations related to military construction on Guam, see CRS Report R40731, *Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies: FY2010 Appropriations*.)

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011, H.R. 6523 as passed in the House and Senate in December 2010, changed the name of the Guam Executive Council to Guam Oversight Council. Among the provisions related to defense realignment on Guam, Congress required a report from the Defense Secretary on an assessment of the natural and manmade threats to realigned forces on Guam, the facilities needed to support those forces, and required costs. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees stated concern on December 22 that the Defense Department failed to report to Congress the detailed plan for projects for the realignment and that the Navy's Record of Decision of September 2010 deferred key decisions, including on training ranges and amphibious landings for the Marine Corps. The committees recommended that Congress defer authorizations for construction for the relocation on Guam pending additional information including an updated master plan from the Defense Department. (On military construction, see CRS Report R41345, *Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies: FY2011 Appropriations*.)

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