Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
January 5, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
95-1013
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
Summary
After experiencing serious unrest during the late 1990s, Bahrain undertook several steps to
enhance the inclusion of the Shiite majority in governance. However, the Sunni-led government’s
efforts to maintain its tight grip on power stirred new unrest among Bahraini Shiites in advance of
October 23, 2010, parliamentary elections. That election, no matter the outcome, would not have
produced a new executive, but the Shiite population was hoping that winning a majority in the
elected lower house could give it greater authority with which to challenge the ruling Al Khalifa
family. In advance of the elections, the government launched a wave of arrests intended to try to
discredit some of the hardline Shiite leadership as tools of Iran. The crackdown contributed to
increasing Shiite popular protests in advance of the elections. The main Shiite faction, an Islamist
group called “Wifaq” (Accord), won one more seat than it did in the 2006 election but still ended
up short of a majority (18 out of the 40 seats) in the elected lower house.
Underlying the unrest are Bahraini leadership concerns that Iran is supporting Shiite opposition
movements, possibly in an effort to install a Shiite led, pro-Iranian government on the island.
These fears are occasionally reinforced by comments from Iranian editorialists and political
leaders that Bahrain should never have become formally independent of Iran. On the other hand,
Bahrain’s Shiite oppositionists accuse the government of inflating the Iran threat, and the contacts
between Iran and the opposition, to discredit the opposition politically. Bahrain’s rulers have tried
to avoid inviting Iranian aggression, in part by signing energy agreements with Iran and by
allowing Iranian banks and businesses to operate there.
Bahrain has few external security options other than relying on some degree of U.S. security
guarantee. Bahrain has tried to earn that guarantee by hosting U.S. naval headquarters for the
Gulf for over 60 years and by providing facilities and small numbers of personnel for U.S. war
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States has designated Bahrain as a “major non-NATO
ally,” and it provides small amounts of security assistance to Bahrain. On other regional issues
such as the Arab-Israeli dispute, Bahrain has tended to defer to Saudi Arabia or other powers to
take the lead in formulating proposals or representing the position of the Persian Gulf states,
collectively. These areas of strong U.S.-Bahrain cooperation have caused some public criticism of
successive U.S. Administrations, including by some in Congress, for muting criticism of
Bahrain’s treatment of its Shiite majority in the interests of ensuring Bahrain’s cooperation on
security issues.
Bahrain is generally poorer than most of the other Persian Gulf monarchies, in large part because
Bahrain has largely run out of crude oil reserves. It has tried to compensate through
diversification, particularly in the banking sector and some manufacturing. In September 2004,
the United States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement (FTA); legislation implementing it
was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169).
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Contents
The Political Structure, Reform, and Human Rights .................................................................... 1
Post-Charter Elections........................................................................................................... 2
2002 Elections ................................................................................................................ 2
2006 Elections ................................................................................................................ 2
The 2010 National Assembly and Municipal Election...................................................... 3
Broader Issues of Governmental Representation.............................................................. 5
Other Human Rights Issues ................................................................................................... 5
U.S. Efforts to Promote Political Reform and Religious Freedom .................................... 6
U.S.-Bahrain Security and Foreign Policy Relations .................................................................... 7
Cooperation With U.S. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.................................................... 7
U.S. Arms Transfers ........................................................................................................ 8
Anti-Terrorism Cooperation ................................................................................................ 10
Cooperation on Iran ............................................................................................................ 10
Bahrain-Iran Gas Development Deal and Other Economic Ties ..................................... 11
Qatar Territorial Disputes .................................................................................................... 12
Arab-Israeli Issues .............................................................................................................. 12
Economic Issues ....................................................................................................................... 13
Figures
Figure 1. Bahrain ...................................................................................................................... 15
Tables
Table 1. Comparative Composition of Elected COR .................................................................... 5
Table 2. Some Basic Facts About Bahrain ................................................................................. 14
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Bahrain ........................................................................................... 14
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 15
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The Political Structure, Reform, and Human Rights1
The Al Khalifa family, which is Sunni Muslim and generally not as religiously conservative as the
leaders of neighboring Saudi Arabia, has ruled Bahrain since 1783. The Al Khalifa family’s
arrival from the Saudi peninsula to take control ended a century of domination by Persian settlers.
The Al Khalifa subsequently received political protection from Britain, which was the dominant
power in the Gulf until the early 1970s. Bahrain became independent from Britain in August 1971
after a 1970 U.N. survey determined that its inhabitants preferred independence to Iranian
control.
Bahrain is led by King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa (about 66 years old), who succeeded his father,
Shaykh Isa bin Sulman Al Khalifa, upon his death in March 1999. Educated at Sandhurst Military
Academy in Britain, King Hamad was previously commander of the Bahraini Defense Forces
(BDF). His son, Salman bin Hamad, about 49 years old, is Crown Prince. He is U.S.-and U.K.-
educated and is, like the King, considered a proponent of reform and accommodation with
Bahrain’s Shiite majority—about 70% of the 503,000-person citizenry.2 (There are also an
estimated 235,000 expatriates in Bahrain, according to the Central Intelligence Agency’s “World
Factbook.”). About 25% of the population is age 14 or younger.
The King’s uncle (the brother of the late ruler), Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa,
along with hardliners in the royal court and several ministries, are perceived as skeptical of King
Hamad’s reforms. They believe that the concessions that King Hamad has made to the Shiite
majority have cause the Shiites to increase their political demands rather than satisfy them, and
might ultimately jeopardize Al Khalifa rule. Others believe that level of unrest would be far
higher by now had the King’s reforms not been enacted.
The minor political reforms under the current King’s father, Amir Isa - the December 1992
establishment of a 30-member appointed Consultative Council to comment on proposed laws and
its June 1996 expansion to 40 members - did not quiet Shiite (or Sunni) demands for the
restoration of an elected national assembly. An elected assembly was provided for under the 1973
constitution but abolished in August 1975. There was daily anti-government violence during
1994-1998, although the unrest gradually took on a Shiite sectarian character. As Hamad’s first
reform steps after taking over, he changed his title to “King,” rather than “Amir” and implying
more accountability, and held a referendum (February 14, 2002) on a new “National Action
Charter (constitution).”
One reason that the Shiite majority was not satisfied by the National Action Charter was that the
elected Council of Representatives (COR) and the all-appointed Shura (Consultative) Council
were to be of equal size (40 seats each). Together, they constitute a National Assembly
(parliament) that serves as at least a partial check on government power. The COR can propose
1 Much of the information in this section is from State Department reports: 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices (March 11, 2010); the International Religious Freedom Report for 2010 (November 17, 2010); and the
Trafficking in Persons Report for 2010 (June 14, 2010). CRS has no means to independently investigate the human
rights situation in Bahrain or confirm allegations of specific human rights abuses there.
2 The Shiite community in Bahrain consists of the more numerous “Baharna,” who are of Arab ethnicity and descended
from Arab tribes who inhabited the area from pre-Islamic times. Shiites of Persian ethnicity are less numerous, and
arrived in Bahrain over the past 400 years. They speak Persian and generally do not integrate with the Baharna or with
Sunni Arabs.
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(but not actually draft) legislation and both chambers can question ministers, although not in
public session. Nor can they question the Prime Minister. The COR can, by a two-thirds majority,
vote no-confidence against ministers and the Prime Minister and override the King’s veto of
approved legislation, although none of these actions has occurred since the COR was formed. The
King has the authority to dissolve the COR and amend the constitution. The Shura Council is
formally limited to amending draft legislation and, in concert with the COR, reviewing the annual
budget, but these powers do provide the Shura Council with the ability to block action by the
COR. The government has tended to appoint generally more educated and pro-Western members
to the Shura Council, and it is generally more supportive of the government than is the elected
COR. There is no “quota” for females in the National Assembly, as has been included in
democratic constitutions in post-Saddam Iraq and post-Taliban Afghanistan.
The National Assembly has tended to address primarily economic and social issues, and not
national security issues. For example, in May 2010, it voted to ban sale of alcohol to Muslims,
although subject to implementing regulations made by the King, through the government. Other
legislation considered in the Bahraini National Assembly in recent years included bills to combat
cyber crime, regulating the pharmaceutical sector, regulating the press, creating an anti-corruption
body, and establishing a higher council on social security. However, many of these bills stalled in
the 2006-2010 parliament due to lack of consensus.
Post-Charter Elections
Elections have been held every four years since 2002, each time marked by substantial tension
between the government and the Shiite majority.
2002 Elections
The first elections under the Charter were held in October 2002. In the 2002 election, many Shiite
opposition “political societies” (formal parties are banned), including Al Wifaq, (a large faction,
led by Shaykh Ali al-Salman), boycotted the elections on the grounds that setting the COR and
the Shura Council at the same size dilutes popular will. The 2002 boycott lowered turnout (about
52%) and helped Sunnis win two-thirds of the COR seats. Of the 170 total candidates, 6 were
women, but none of the women was elected.
2006 Elections
As was widely expected by experts, Sunni-Shiite tensions escalated again in the run-up to the
November 25, 2006, parliamentary and municipal elections. The tension was aggravated by the
Shiite perception that a once-repressed Shiite majority came to power in Iraq through U.S.-
backed elections and that the Bahraini majority was entitled to a similar result. In the fall of 2006,
some Shiites protested, particularly after allegations - some of which were publicly corroborated
by a government adviser (Salah al-Bandar) in August 2006 in a report to an outside human rights
organization - that the government was adjusting election districts so as to favor Sunni
candidates. It was also alleged that the government issued passports to Sunnis in an attempt to
shift the demographic balance to the Sunnis’ advantage.
In the November 2006 elections, two Shiite opposition blocs, Wifaq (formally, the Al Wifaq
National Islamic Society, also known as the Islamic National Accord Association) and the
National Democratic Action Association, participated, raising voter turnout to 72%. Wifaq is
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avowedly Islamist in political orientation. A harder-line Shiite opposition faction Al Haq
boycotted. The opposition, led by Wifaq, won 17 seats, virtually all those it contested. The Shiite
opposition was therefore the largest single bloc in the COR, but it was short of a majority.
The government was heartened that Sunni Muslims independents won 23 total seats. Of those, 9
were won by secular Sunnis and 14 were won by Islamist Sunnis (7 from the Salafists trend and 7
Muslim Brotherhood members). Only one woman (Latifa al Qaoud, who was unopposed in her
district) won, out of 18 female candidates (down from 31 female candidates in the 2002
elections). As evidence of continued friction, Wifaq boycotted the speakership contest, and
incumbent COR Speaker Khalifa al-Dhahrani was reelected speaker.
The King subsequently named a new Shura Council with 20 Shiites, 19 Sunnis, and one Christian
(a female). Ten women were appointed. However, the Shiites appointed were not all aligned with
opposition factions, and several were considered “pro-government.” Therefore, the Shura Council
was not a bastion of opposition to the government even though Shiites held half of its seats. In a
nod to the increased Shiite strength as a result of the elections, the government appointed a Shiite
(Jawad al-Araidh) as deputy prime minister and another (who is close to Wifaq) as a minister of
state for foreign affairs.
Heightened political tensions continued in between national elections. In December 2008, the
government made numerous arrests of Shiite demonstrators and accused some of being part of a
foreign-inspired “plot” to destabilize Bahrain. Some were accused of undergoing guerrilla or
terrorist training in Syria. On January 26, 2009, the government arrested three leading Shiite
activists, including the wheelchair-bound Dr. Abduljalil Alsingace and Mr. Hassan Mushaima,
both leaders of Al Haq. Alsingace later visited the United States several times to highlight the
human rights situation in Bahrain. They were tried during February-March 2009 but, along with
other Shiite activists, were pardoned and released in April 2009. (As noted below Alsingace was
been arrested again in August 2010.)
The 2010 National Assembly and Municipal Election
The resentments over the 2006 election, and the still unfulfilled demand of Bahrain’s Shiites for
greater political power and an end to economic discrimination, carried over to the 2010 election,
which was held on October 23, 2010. There were only a limited number of international
observers, primarily from various international human rights organizations. Two Bahraini human
rights watchdog groups—the Bahrain Human Rights Society and the Bahrain Transparency
Society—again (for the third time) reached agreement to jointly monitor the 2010 elections.
Municipal elections were held concurrently.
The electorate was about 300,000, voting in 40 districts spread throughout five governorates. As
was the case in the 2006 elections, Shiite oppositionists accused the government of drawing
district boundaries so as to prevent the election of a Shiite majority. Registration of candidates
took place during September 12-16, 2010. About 200 people registered to run, of whom seven
were women. However, one woman withdrew after registering, leaving a field of six female
candidates. Of the six, only one was formally endorsed by a political society, the National
Democratic Action Society (Waad, which means “promise” in Arabic). She is Munira Fakhro, a
prominent Shiite woman who was exiled prior to the political reform process under King Hamad.
In 2006, she narrowly lost to a Sunni Islamist (Minbar, or “platform,” faction).
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If a candidate in a contested district fails to win more than 50% in the first round, a runoff is held
one week later. At least four candidates in districts where there was no opposition were declared
winners by September 28, 2010. One of them was a Wifaq member.
Wifaq, still by far the most prominent Shiite political society, registered candidates. Its leader,
Shaykh Ali Salman, was not a candidate, preferring to continue to lead the faction from the
background. The Al Haq (Movement of Freedom and Democracy) again boycotted, as it did in
2006. In the run-up to the election, the government cracked down on Shiite activitists, particularly
those who supported boycotting the election. For example, on September 4, 2010, 23 Shiite
leaders, were arrested on charges of attempting a violent overthrow of the government. They were
among about 160 Shiites arrested in August and September, under a 2006 anti-terrorism law that
gives the government broad arrest and prosecution powers. Among those arrested was
wheelchair-bound Al Haq leader Dr. Abduljalil Alsingace, arrested August 13, 2010, upon his
return from abroad. Alsingace remains incarcerated and has told his lawyers that he has been
beaten and deprived of sleep. A prominent Shiite cleric, Ayatollah Hussein Mirza al-Najati, said to
be close to the most senior Iraqi cleric Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, had his Bahrain citizenship
revoked on September 20, 2010. Some observers asserted that the government crackdown would
drive Bahraini Shiites to politically support boycotting harder-line movements, such as Al Haq,
and in so doing suppress the election turnout among Shiites. The crackdown did not prompt Wifaq
to reconsider its decision to compete. The crackdown might have helped the government’s
election strategy but it also led to stepped up demonstrations by Shiite youth in Shiite
neighborhoods. The tensions are also widely blamed for resulting in a bombing that damaged four
police cars on September 15, 2010.
Among Sunni political societies, there are two that are considered Islamist. They include Minbar,
mentioned above, which is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Al Asala, which is a
harder line “Salafist” political society. In the 2006-2010 parliament, Asala and Minbar members
held 7 seats each.
2010 Election Results
Despite the p reelection tensions, the election was held without major reports of violence and
produced some unexpected results, including:
• The increase of Wifaq’s representation from 17 seats in the 2006-2010 COR to 18
seats. However, the 18 is still short of a majority.
• The unexpected losses by Sunnis Islamist factions. Minbar and Asala each saw
dramatic reductions in their seats from 2006: Minbar (Muslim Brotherhood)
decreased to 2 seats (from 7) and Asala decreased to 3 seats (from 7). Most of the
seats were picked up by Sunni independents, who won 17 seats, up from 9 in the
2006-2010 parliament. In addition, the secular and ideological Waad won no
seats at all. These results appeared to represent a rejection of Islamist ideology,
and even all ideological candidates, in favor of pragmatists who would address
Bahrain’s economic difficulties.
• The same one woman won who had won in 2006.
• In the municipal elections conducted concurrently, one woman was elected in the
second round – the first woman to be elected to a municipal council.
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In advance of the December 14, 2010, start of the next parliamentary term, the King named the
2010-2014 Shura Council. Thirty of the forty serving Council members were reappointed, leaving
only ten newly appointed members. The Council has four women, substantially fewer than the
2006-2010 Council that had nine women. Among the four, one is Jewish (Nancy Khadouri), out
of a Jewish population in Bahrain of about forty persons, and one is Christian (Hala Qarrisah).
Bahrain has an estimated 1,000 Christians. The Council speaker, Ali al-Salih, was reappointed.
Table 1. Comparative Composition of Elected COR
2006 Lower House
2010 Lower House
Shi te Islamist (Wifaq)
17
18
Sunni Independent (mostly secular)
9
17
Sunni Islamist (Minbar, Muslim
7 2
Brotherhood, moderate Islamist)
Sunni Islamist (Asala, Salafi,
7 3
conservative Islamist
Broader Issues of Governmental Representation
The elections are not the only means by which Bahrainis measure political and social
inclusiveness. The government has sought to include Shiites in government, as well as women,
although some assert that the positions these groups obtain are generally non-critical. The Al
Khalifa family has held onto all strategic ministry positions and about half of all ministerial slots.
In the current cabinet, there are four Shiites (out of 23 cabinet positions) and two female ministers
(Minister of Social Affairs Fatima bint Ahmad al-Balushi and Minister of Information and
Culture Mai bint Muhammad Al Khalifa). A previous female minister of health, Nada Haffadh,
resigned in October 2007 following allegations of corruption in her ministry by conservatives
who oppose women occupying high-ranking positions. Two other women, including the president
of the University of Bahrain, have ministerial rank. In April 2008, Huda Azar Nunu, a female
attorney and the only Jew in the Shura Council, is ambassador to the United States.
Other Human Rights Issues
As noted in U.S. government reports on human rights and religious freedom in Bahrain, many of
the general human rights issues are intimately tied to the power struggle between the Sunni-led
regime and the Shiite majority and are discussed above. Beyond the Sunni-Shiite schism in
Bahrain, State Department reports, such as the human rights report for 2009, note problems for
non-Muslims and for opponents of the government. Bahrain allows freedom of worship for
Christians, Jews, and Hindus although the constitution declares Islam the official religion.
On freedoms for religions other than Islam, the November 17, 2010, State Department report on
international religious freedom, in the section on Bahrain, says that non-Muslims have been able
to practice their religion privately without government interference, and to maintain places of
worship. However, the government requires licenses for churches to operate, and has in the past
threatened to shutter un-licensed churches serving Indian expatriates. The Baha’i faith, declared
blasphemous in Iran and Afghanistan, has been discriminated against in Bahrain. A Baha’i
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congregation was repeatedly denied an official license, although other State Department reports
(human rights reports for 2008 and for 2009) say that the Baha’i community now gathers and
operates openly.
On labor issues, Bahrain has been credited with significant labor reforms, including a 2002 law
granting workers, including non-citizens, the right to form and join unions. The law holds that the
right to strike is a legitimate means for workers to defend their rights and interests, but their right
is restricted in practice, including a prohibition on strikes in the oil and gas, education, and health
sectors. There are about 50 trade unions in Bahrain.
On human trafficking, Bahrain was elevated in the 2008 Trafficking in Persons report to “Tier 2
Watch List,” from Tier 3 in the 2007 report, because it is “making significant efforts” to comply
with the minimum standards for elimination of trafficking, but has not shown results, to date. The
2009 Trafficking in Persons Report (June 16, 2009) kept Bahrain as Tier 2 Watch List, with
explanatory language similar to that of the 2008 report. The 2010 Trafficking in Persons Report
(June 14, 2010) upgraded Bahrain yet again to Tier 2 (dropping the “watch list” designation) on
the grounds that Bahrain is making significant efforts to comply with minimum standards and has
begun making prosecutions under its anti-trafficking statutes.
Another issue is that of executions. Human Rights Watch and other groups assert that Bahrain is
going against the international trend to end execution. In November 2009, Bahrain’s Court of
Cassation upheld the sentencing to death by firing squad of a citizen of Bangladesh. That
sentenced was imposed for a 2005 murder. From 1977 until 2006, there were no executions in
Bahrain. Allegations of torture against Shiite opposition figures are widespread.3
U.S. Efforts to Promote Political Reform and Religious Freedom
According to the State Department, the United States seeks to accelerate political reform in
Bahrain and empower its political societies through several programs, including the “Middle East
Partnership Initiative (MEPI).” Some funds have been used to help build an independent judiciary
and strengthen the COR. Other U.S.-funded programs focus on women’s empowerment, media
training, educational opportunities, and civil society legal reform. MEPI funds have been used to
fund AFL-CIO projects with Bahraini labor organizations, and to help Bahrain implement the
U.S.-Bahrain FTA. In May 2006 Bahrain revoked the visa for the resident program director of the
National Democratic Institute (NDI), and has not allowed the office to reopen. Still, NDI is
conducting programs to enhance parliamentary capabilities through a local NGO. In February
2010, the MEPI office of State Department signed a memorandum of understanding with Bahrain
to promote entrepreneurship there and promote opportunities for trade with U.S. small businesses.
Still, some human rights group and Bahraini activists believe the United States has downplayed
democracy promotion in favor of broader security issues that are discussed later. As an example
of some of the comments that some activists find objectionable, during her December 2010 visit
to Bahrain, Secretary of State Clinton said on December 3, 2010, during a joint press conference
with Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmad Al Khalifa: “...I am impressed by the commitment that
the government has to the democratic path that Bahrain is walking on.”
3 Human Rights Watch. “Bahrain: Torture Redux. “ February 2010.
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According to the State Department’s International Religious Freedom report for 2010 (November
17, 2010), “The U.S. government discusses religious freedom with the [Bahraini] government as
part of its overall policy to promote human rights.” The religious freedom report also noted that
the U.S. government sponsored the visit to the United States of a prominent Sunni cleric, Shaykh
Salah Al-Jowder, to discuss religious freedom and interfaith dialogue.
U.S.-Bahrain Security and Foreign Policy Relations4
A U.S. Embassy in Manama, Bahrain’s capital, opened in September 1971, when the threat level
in the Persian Gulf was perceived as relatively low. Since then, defense issues have become a
central feature of U.S.-Bahrain relations. Although Iraq is no longer a strategic threat to the region
because it cannot project power outside its borders, Iran’s nuclear program is considered a
growing threat to the Persian Gulf states, including Bahrain. There is also the issue of terrorism
and piracy in the Gulf, as exemplified by a July 28, 2010, explosion on a Japanese oil tanker in
that waterway. The explosion is widely suspected to have been a terrorist attack, and a faction
linked to Al Qaeda (Abdullah Azzam Brigades) claimed responsibility.
In large part to keep powerful neighbors in check, Bahrain has long linked its security to the
United States, and U.S. efforts to address threats in Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan have benefitted
from access to Bahraini facilities. In recognition of the relationship, in March 2002, President
Bush (Presidential Determination 2002-10) designated Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally
(MNNA),” a designation that facilitates U.S. arms sales.
February 2008 marked the 60th anniversary of a U.S. naval command presence in Bahrain;
MIDEASTFOR (U.S. Middle East Force), its successor, NAVCENT (naval component of U.S.
Central Command), and the Fifth Fleet (reconstituted in June 1995) have been headquartered
there. The Fifth Fleet headquarters is a command facility that now covers over 100 acres, and
about 2,300 U.S. personnel, mostly Navy, are assigned there.5 Some smaller U.S. ships
(minesweepers) are docked there, but the Fifth Fleet also consists of a Carrier Battle Group, an
Amphibious Ready Group, and various other ships that are afloat or which dock elsewhere in the
region. To further develop the naval command facility (referred to as “Bahrain Island”), recent
appropriations and requests include $54 million for FY2008 (including $19 million for a Special
Operations Forces facility);6 no funds for FY2009; $41.5 million for FY2010 (P.L. 111-117); and
a requested $258 million for FY 2011 for several facilities in Bahrain, including Bahrain Island.
Of that request, $45 million is to expand an apron at Shaykh Isa Air Base.
Cooperation With U.S. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
Bahrain and the United States signed a 10-year defense pact signed on October 28, 1991, seven
months after the war to liberate Kuwait from Iraq, and renewed in October 2001. The pact not
only provides the United States access to Bahrain’s air bases and to pre-position strategic materiel
4 Information in this section obtained from a variety of press reports, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
(DSCA).
5 Unclassified information provided to CRS by the Department of Defense. Figures are as of June 30, 2010.
6 Appropriated in Division 1 of P.L. 110-161.
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(mostly U.S. Air Force munitions), but also requires consultations with Bahrain if its security is
threatened, and it expanded exercises and U.S. training of Bahraini forces.7
The naval headquarters, the U.S. use of which predated the defense pact, has been used to
coordinate the operations of over 20 U.S. warships performing support missions for U.S. and
allied naval operations related to the U.S. military operations ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan.
These ships are also part of Combined Task Force (CTF) 152 that seeks to interdict the movement
of terrorists, arms, or weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related technology and narcotics
across the Arabian Sea. Bahrain has taken a turn in a rotation to command CTF-152. Some of
these operations are part of or offshoots of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan,
which ousted the Taliban after the September 11 attacks. Bahrain allowed the United States to fly
combat missions from its bases (Shaykh Isa Air Base) in both OEF and the war to oust Saddam
Hussein in March-April 2003 (Operation Iraqi Freedom, OIF). During both OEF and OIF,
Bahrain publicly deployed its U.S.-supplied frigate warship (the Subha) to help protect U.S.
ships, and it sent ground and air assets to Kuwait in support of OIF. Bahrain hosted about 4,000
U.S. military personnel during major combat of OEF (October 2001-May 2003).
Bahrain and UAE have been the only Gulf states to deploy their own forces to provide aid to
Afghanistan. In 2009, Bahrain sent 100 police officers to Afghanistan on a two-year tour to help
U.S./NATO-led stabilization operations there.
U.S. forces were in Bahrain well before the September 11 attacks occurred. There were about
1,300 U.S. military personnel in Bahrain during the 1990s to contain Iraq, and Bahrain was part
of the allied coalition that ousted Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, hosting 17,500 troops and 250
combat aircraft at Shaykh Isa Air Base (mentioned above). Bahraini pilots flew strikes over Iraq
during the war, and Iraq fired nine Scud missiles at Bahrain during the war, of which three hit
facilities there. Bahrain hosted the regional headquarters for U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq
during 1991-1998, and the U.S.-led Multinational Interdiction Force (MIF) that enforced a U.N.
embargo on Iraq during 1991-2003.
Bahrain’s participation in OIF came despite domestic opposition in Bahrain to that war. Because
of its limited income, Bahrain has not contributed funds to Iraq reconstruction, but it attended the
“Expanded Neighbors of Iraq” regional conference process which last met in Kuwait on April 22,
2008. That process has been suspended as Iraq has stabilized and the United States has begun the
process of withdrawal, expected to be complete by the end of 2011. On October 16, 2008,
Bahrain’s first post-Saddam ambassador to Iraq (Saleh Ali al-Maliki) presented his credentials in
Baghdad, in line with King Hamad’s pledge to President Bush in March 2008. Some of the other
Gulf states, most notably Saudi Arabia, have still not established a full embassy in Iraq, in part
due to differences between Saudi Arabia and the Shiite led government of Prime Minister Nuri al-
Maliki.
U.S. Arms Transfers
To assist Bahrain’s ability to cooperate with the United States on regional security issues,
Congress and successive Administrations, citing Bahrain’s limited income, have supported
7 Details of the U.S.-Bahrain defense agreement are classified. Some provisions are discussed in Sami Hajjar, U.S.
Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute), March
2002, p. 27.
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military assistance to Bahrain’s small force. The main recipient of such assistance is the relatively
small Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), which has about 13,000 personnel (plus about 1,200
National Guard). It is eligible to receive grant “excess defense articles” (EDA). The United States
transferred the FFG-7 “Perry class” frigate Subha (see above) as EDA in July 1997. In 1996, the
United States gave Bahrain a no-cost five-year lease on 60 M60A3 tanks; title subsequently
passed to Bahrain. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) was suspended for Bahrain in FY1994 but
restarted in appreciation of Bahrain’s support in OEF and OIF. Recent FMF has been provided to
help Bahrain maintain U.S.-origin weapons, to enhance inter-operability with U.S. forces, to
augment Bahrain’s air defenses, to support its F-16 fleet, and to improve counter-terrorism
capabilities.
Some of the U.S. assistance provided to Bahrain, noted in Table 3 below, is to help Bahrain keep
the F-16s sufficiently updated to operate alongside U.S. warplanes. Funds provided under
“Section 1206” of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-163) have been used
to improve Bahrain’s coastal surveillance capabilities and to build up its Special Operations
forces. The Defense Department estimates that, in part due to U.S. assistance, as of FY2008,
about 45% of Bahrain’s forces are fully capable of integrating into a U.S.-led coalition. Making
Bahrain’s forces interoperable with U.S. forces, and helping Bahrain upgrade its U.S.-made F-16s
with improved avionics, and maintain the frigate Subha, are the primary justifications for the
substantial increase in requested assistance to Bahrain for FY2010. The requested funding levels
for FY2011 are roughly the same as FY2010 levels.
Purchases With National Funds
Despite its limited funds (Bahrain’s total government budget was about $5.6 billion in 2008),
Bahrain has purchased some U.S. systems. In 1998, Bahrain purchased 10 U.S.-made F-16Cs
from new production, worth about $390 million. In 1999, the United States sold Bahrain 26
Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) to arm the F-16s, although some
members were concerned that the AMRAAM sale could promote an arms race in the Gulf.
Section 581 of the FY1990 foreign operations appropriation act (P.L. 101-167) made Bahrain the
only Gulf state eligible to receive the STINGER shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile, and the
United States has sold Bahrain about 70 Stingers since 1990. (This authorization has been
repeated in subsequent legislation.) To allay congressional concerns about possible U.S.
promotion of missile proliferation in the region, an August 2000 sale of 30 Army Tactical Missile
Systems (ATACMs, a system of short-range ballistic missiles fired from a multiple rocket
launcher) included an agreement for joint U.S.-Bahraini control of the weapon. Among recent
sales notified to Congress by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) are a sale, worth
up to $42 million, of 180 “Javelin” anti-armor missiles and 60 launch units; a sale, worth up to
$252 million, of nine UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters; a sale, notified August 3, 2007, of six Bell
search and recovery helicopters, valued at about $160 million; and a sale, notified on July 28,
2009, of up to 25 AMRAAMs (Raytheon Missile Systems Corp.) and associated equipment,
valued at about $74 million.
Some of the most recent sales are in accordance with the State Department’s “Gulf Security
Dialogue,” begun in 2006 to counter Iran, and under which a total of about $20 billion worth of
U.S. weapons might be sold to the Gulf monarchy states. Only a small portion of that total sales
volume is reportedly slated for Bahrain.
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Anti-Terrorism Cooperation
The State Department’s report on international terrorism for 2009 (released August 5, 2010)
credits Bahrain for having “actively monitored terrorism suspects” and for achieving convictions
of five men accused of membership of a terrorist organization—the first use of a 2006
counterterrorism law. The report, however, as did the same report of the previous year, notes that
Bahrain has not overcome legal constraints that have sometimes hampered its ability to detain and
prosecute suspected terrorists.
Bahrain also continues to host the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force
(MENA/FATF) secretariat and its Central Bank, Financial Information Unit (within the Central
Bank), and local banks cooperate with U.S. efforts against terrorism financing and money
laundering. As noted by the State Department in the FY2011 budget justification, some of the
U.S. assistance to Bahrain is to facilitate Bahrain’s ability to contribute to U.S.-led counter-piracy
operations in regional waterways, and to provide training to its counter-terrorism institutions.
Cooperation on Iran
As noted previously, Bahrain focuses its foreign policy intently on Iran, which has purportedly
demonstrated an ability to aggravate Bahrain’s domestic turmoil to a greater degree than has any
other regional power. Bahrain perceives Iran as willing and able to support Shiite groups against
Bahrain’s Sunni-dominated government, a concern that was heightened by the Shiite-Sunni
sectarian violence in Iraq during 2006-2008. In December 1981, and then again in June 1996,
Bahrain publicly accused Iran of trying to organize a coup by pro-Iranian Bahraini Shiites (the
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, IFLB).
Bahrain’s fears are amplified by lingering suspicions, sometimes fed by Iranian actions, that Iran
never accepted the results of the 1970 U.N. survey giving Bahrain independence rather than
integration with Iran. Those findings were endorsed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 278,
which was ratified by Iran’s parliament. After these official determinations, Bahrain had
considered the issue closed, after over a century of Persian contestation of Bahraini sovereignty.
Those contests included an effort by Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran in the 1930s to deny Bahrain the
right to grant oil concessions to the United States and Britain.
In recent years, Bahrain’s leadership—and other countries in the region—have reacted strongly
against statements by Iranian editorialists and advisers to Iranian leaders appearing to reassert
Iran’s claim. One such example was a July 2007 Iranian newspaper article reasserting the Iranian
claim to Bahrain. However, that article, along with the Bahraini Crown Prince’s November 3,
2007, comment that Iran is developing a nuclear weapon (Iran claims it is developing only
civilian nuclear power), did not mar the visit of Iranian President Ahmadinejad on November 17,
2007. At the same time, so as not to provide Iran a pretext to pressure Bahrain, Bahrain’s leaders
have sometimes tried to silence voices in Bahrain that publicly attack Iran. An example is the
one-day suspension in 2009 of the newspaper Akhbar al Khaleej (Gulf News) for running an
editorial by a Bahrain Shura Council member who criticized Iranian leaders.
Bahrain has generally supported the U.S. position that Iran is not fully cooperating with U.N.
Security Council requirements to verifiably demonstrate that its nuclear program is not a cover
for a nuclear weapons program. In the joint news conference with Secretary Clinton on December
3, 2010, referenced earlier, the Foreign Minister restated Bahrain’s support for Iran’s right to
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nuclear power for peaceful uses. However, it stated forthright that “when it comes to taking that
[nuclear] power, to developing it into a cycle for weapon grade, that is something that we can
never accept, and we can never live with in this region.”8 Bahrain also regularly invites high-
ranking Iranian officials to the annual International Institute for Security Studies (IISS)
conference in Bahrain called the “Manama Dialogue,” held every December. At times, there have
been expectations that U.S. officials might meet with Iranian officials at the margins of the
conference, although such meetings have not taken place in practice. Iranian officials have
sometimes been known to cancel their travel to the meeting on short notice, particularly if they
sense that the conference will feature U.S. or other criticism of Iran.
Bahrain-Iran Gas Development Deal and Other Economic Ties
One of the ways Bahrain stays engaged with Iran is through discussions of major energy projects
with Iran and by conducting normal trade and banking ties with it. The 2007 Ahmadinejad visit
resulted in a preliminary agreement for Bahrain to buy 1.2 billion cubic feet per day (for 25 years)
of Iranian gas via an undersea pipeline to be built. The deal would have involved a $4 billion
investment by Bahrain to develop Phases 15 and 16 of Iran’s South Pars gas field, which
presumably would be the source of the gas that Bahrain would import.
This deal was suspended after comments in March 2009 by former Iranian parliament speaker Ali
Akbar Nateq Nuri, now an advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader, again referring to Bahrain as Iran’s
14th province. This is a sensitive issue for Bahrain, as discussed above. Iran’s Foreign Ministry
immediately tried to limit any diplomatic damage by asserting respect for Bahrain’s sovereignty
and independence, but some Arab governments sharply criticized the Nateq Nuri comments.
Morocco broke relations with Iran as a response. On October 21, 2009, Bahrain’s Minister of Oil
and Gas Abd al-Husayn Mirza said talks on the deal would “resume soon.”
Bahrain conducts relatively normal trade with Iran and hosts Iranian economic investments. In
March 2008, the U.S. Department of Justice sanctioned Future Bank, headquartered in Bahrain,
because it is controlled and partially owned by Iran’s Bank Melli. The sanctions, under Executive
Order 13382 (anti-proliferation), prevent U.S. citizens from participating in transactions with
Future Bank and require the freezing of any U.S.-based bank assets.
Energy market observers say that Bahrain energy firms might also be supplying gasoline to Iran.
No U.N. Security Council Resolution bars such sales, but a U.S. law signed on July 1, 2010—the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA, P.L. 111-
195)—provides for sanctions against foreign firms that sell more than $1 million worth of
gasoline to Iran. Some energy firms in the Gulf, including in Kuwait, reportedly have become
reticent to continue supplying gasoline to Iran because of the U.S. action, but Bahrain is not
known to have publicly disavowed further gasoline sales to Iran.9
8 Department of State. Transcript of Remarks by Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Al Khalifa. December 3, 2010.
9 CRS conversations with foreign diplomats, including some from the Gulf. July – September 2010.
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Qatar Territorial Disputes10
The United States cooperates closely with both Qatar and Bahrain, which is why the Bahrain-
Qatar territorial dispute was closely watched by U.S. policymakers. The resolution of the dispute
has partly removed these tensions as an issue for U.S. Gulf policy. Qatar, like Bahrain, is a GCC
monarchy; however, their relations have been sometimes acrimonious because of territorial
disputes with roots in the 18th century, when the ruling families of both countries controlled parts
of the Arabian peninsula. Qatar-Bahrain relations have improved since an International Court of
Justice ruled on March 16, 2001, on the disputes. The ICJ ruled in favor of Qatar on some of the
issues, and in favor of Bahrain on others, but the central dispute—over the Hawar Islands—was
decided in favor of Bahrain. Qatar expressed disappointment over the ruling but said it accepted it
as binding, and the two have since muted mutual criticism and cooperated on major regional
issues. The territorial disputes were referred to the ICJ by Qatar in 1991 after clashes in 1986 in
which Qatar landed military personnel on a man-made reef (Fasht al-Dibal) that was in dispute,
and took some Bahrainis prisoner. Saudi mediation in the 1986-1991 period proved fruitless. That
reef was awarded to Qatar in the ICJ ruling. However, the ICJ ruled against Bahrain’s claim to the
town of Zubara on the Qatari mainland, where some members of the Al Khalifa family were long
buried. Two smaller islands, Janan and Hadd Janan, were ruled not part of the Hawar Islands
group and were awarded to Qatar.
Arab-Israeli Issues
On the Arab-Israeli dispute, Bahrain has not been as significant a mediator or broker as have its
larger neighbors in the Gulf or broader Middle East. Bahrain has not taken a leading role in recent
efforts to reconcile Hamas and Fatah to rebuild Palestinian unity, for example. On the other hand,
Bahrain is not inactive on the issue; on October 1, 2009, the foreign minister called for direct
talks with Israel. In the previously cited December 3, 2010, joint press conference with the
Foreign Minister, Secretary of State Clinton expressed appreciation for Bahrain’s support of
Palestinian Authority leaders who are trying to build viable institutions and rule of law in the
Palestinian territories.
Earlier, Bahrain participated in the 1990-1996 multilateral Arab-Israeli talks, and it hosted a
session on the environment (October 1994). Bahrain did not follow Oman and Qatar in
exchanging trade offices with Israel. In September 1994, all GCC states ceased enforcing
secondary and tertiary boycotts of Israel while retaining the ban on direct trade (primary boycott).
In conjunction with the U.S.-Bahrain FTA, Bahrain dropped the primary boycott and closed
boycott-related offices in Bahrain.
Still, the Arab-Israeli dispute always has the potential to become a political issue within Bahrain.
Islamist hardliners in Bahrain have accused the government of trying to “normalize” relations
with Israel, citing the government’s sending a delegate to the November 27, 2007, summit on
Middle East peace in Annapolis, the foreign minister’s meeting with Israeli officials at U.N.
meetings in September 2007, and by proposing (in October 2008) a “regional organization” that
would group Iran, Turkey, Israel, and the Arab states. That proposal has not been implemented to
date. In late October 2009, the elected COR passed a bill making it a crime (punishable by up to
10 See The Estimate. Dossier: The Bahrain-Qatar Border Dispute: The World Court Decision, Part 1 and Part 2. March
23, 2001 and April 6, 2001.
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five years in jail) for Bahrainis to travel to Israel or hold talks with Israelis. The bill, which has
not proceeded to become law (concurrence by the upper house, and acceptance by the King),
apparently was a reaction to a visit by Bahraini officials to Israel in July 2009. The visit was to
obtain the release of five Bahrainis taken prisoner by Israel when it seized a ship bound with
goods for Gaza, which is controlled by Hamas. In June 2010, Sunni and Shiite Islamists in
Bahrain held a demonstration to denounced the Israeli seizure of a ship in a flotilla intended to
run the Israeli blockade of the Hamas-run Gaza Strip.
Economic Issues
Like the other Gulf states, Bahrain was affected by the international financial crisis of 2008-2009,
but perhaps to a lesser extent than the wealthier states of Kuwait, UAE, and Saudi Arabia.
Bahrain did not experience the construction and real estate “bubble” to the degree that this
occurred in, for example, UAE.
Bahrain has the lowest oil and gas reserves of the Gulf monarchy states, estimated respectively at
210 million barrels of oil and 5.3 trillion cubic feet of gas. Some economic statistics are presented
in Table 2. Without the ample oil or gas resources of its neighbors, Bahrain has diversified its
economy by emphasizing banking and financial services (about 25.5% of GDP). At current rates
of production (35,000 barrels per day of crude oil), Bahrain’s onshore oil reserves will be
exhausted in 15 years, but Saudi Arabia shares equally with Bahrain the 300,000 barrels per day
produced from the offshore Abu Safa field. The United States buys virtually no oil from Bahrain;
the major U.S. import from it is aluminum. Aluminum and other manufacturing sectors in
Bahrain account for the existence in Bahrain of a vibrant middle and working class among its
citizens. However, these classes are largely composed of majority Shiite Muslims who are
envious of the “ownership class” mostly of Sunni Muslims.
To encourage further reform and signal U.S. appreciation, the United States and Bahrain signed
an FTA on September 14, 2004. Implementing legislation was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-
169). In 2009, the United States exported $668 million worth of goods to Bahrain, and imported
$463 million in goods from that country. In 2005, total bilateral trade was about $780 million,
suggesting that trade has expanded significantly following the FTA.
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Table 2. Some Basic Facts About Bahrain
Population
About 740,000, of which 503,000 are citizens
Religions
81% Muslim, 9% Christian, 10% other
GDP (purchasing power parity) $28
billion (2009)
Budget
$5.81 billion revenues, $5.86 billion
expenditures (2009)
External Debt
$11 billion (2009)
Inflation Rate
3% (2009)
GDP Real Growth Rate
2.9% in 2009, down from over 6% in 2008
Size of Bahrain Defense Forces (BDF)
About 13,000, plus about 1,200 National
Guard. Some personnel are expatriates,
including other Arab and Pakistani.
Source: CIA, The World Factbook.
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Bahrain
($ in millions)
FY2011
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY2010
Request
FMF
90.0 24.6 18.847
15.593
14.998
3.968 8.0
19.0
19.5
IMET
0.448 0.600
0.649 0.651 0.616 0.622 .661
.700
.700
NADR
1.489
2.761
.776
0.744
.500 1.10 1.5
“Section
1206”
5.3
24.54
4.3
16.2
Notes: IMET = International Military Education and Training Funds, used mainly to enhance BDF military
professionalism and promote U.S. values. NADR = Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-Mining and Related
Programs, used to sustain Bahrain’s counterterrorism capabilities and interdict terrorists. Section 1206 are DOD
funds used to train and equip Bahrain’s special forces, its coastal surveillance and patrol capabilities, and to
develop its counter terrorism assessment capabilities. (Named for a section of the FY2006 Defense
Authorization Act, P.L. 109-163.) FY2008 funds derived from FY2008 supplemental (P.L. 110-252), and the
Consolidated appropriation (P.L. 110-329). FY2009 funds included funding from FY2008 supplemental (P.L. 110-
252) as wel as regular appropriation (P.L. 111-8). FY2010 funds from Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 111-117).
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Figure 1. Bahrain
Source:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ba.html.
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
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