Gangs in Central America
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
January 3, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL34112
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Gangs in Central America
Summary
Congress has maintained an interest in the effects of gang violence in Central America, and on the
expanding activities of transnational gangs with ties to that region operating in the United States.
The violent Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and its main rival, the “18th Street” gang (also known as
M-18) continue to threaten citizen security and challenge government authority in Central
America. Gang-related violence has been particularly acute in Honduras, El Salvador, and
Guatemala, which have among the highest homicide rates in the world. In recent years,
governments in those countries appeared to move away, at least on a rhetorical level, from
repressive anti-gang strategies. However, continuing gang-related violence prompted El Salvador
to adopt tough new legislation on gangs in September 2010. Guatemala may follow suit.
U.S. officials have expressed concerns about the expanding presence of the MS-13 and M-18 in
cities across the United States, as well as reports that these gangs may be evolving into more
sophisticated transnational criminal enterprises. Between February 2005 and October 2010, U.S.
officials arrested some 3,332 alleged MS-13 members in cities across the United States, many of
whom were subsequently deported. Evidence suggests, however, that previously deported
members of both the MS-13 and the M-18 often reenter the United States illegally.
Several U.S. agencies have been actively engaged on both the law enforcement and preventive
side of dealing with Central American gangs. An inter-agency committee worked together to
develop a U.S. Strategy to Combat Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico, first
announced at a July 2007 U.S.-Central American Integration System (SICA) summit on security
issues. The strategy, which is now being implemented, states that the U.S. government will pursue
coordinated anti-gang activities through five broad areas: diplomacy, repatriation, law
enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention. An April 2010 study by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) recommended that U.S. federal agencies consider strengthening the
aforementioned anti-gang strategy by developing better oversight and measurement tools to guide
its implementation.
In recent years, Congress has increased funding to support anti-gang efforts in Central America.
Between FY2008 and FY2010, Congress appropriated roughly $21 million in global International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds for anti-gang efforts in Central America.
Congress provided additional support in FY2008 and FY2009 for anti-gang efforts in the region
through the Mérida Initiative, a counterdrug and anticrime program for Mexico and Central
America. In the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117), Congress provided $83
million for combating gangs and drug trafficking under a new Central America Regional Security
Initiative (CARSI), splitting Central America from the Mérida Initiative. The Obama
Administration asked for $100 million for CARSI in its FY2011 budget request. In the absence of
FY2011 appropriations legislation, Congress has passed a series of continuing resolutions (P.L.
111-242 as amended) to fund government programs, with the latest extension set to expire on
March 4, 2011. The continuing resolution, as amended, continues funding most foreign aid
programs at the FY2010-enacted level, with some exceptions.
This report describes the gang problem in Central America, discusses country and regional
approaches to deal with the gangs, and analyzes U.S. policy with respect to gangs in Central
America.
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Gangs in Central America
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Background on Violent Crime in Central America ....................................................................... 2
Scope of the Gang Problem in Central America ........................................................................... 3
Defining Gangs..................................................................................................................... 4
Transnational Gangs in Central America................................................................................ 4
Factors Exacerbating the Gang Problem in Central America .................................................. 6
Poverty and a Lack of Educational and Employment Opportunities ................................. 6
Societal Stigmas.............................................................................................................. 7
Role of the Media ........................................................................................................... 7
Anti-gang Law Enforcement Efforts................................................................................ 7
Prisons in Need of Reform .............................................................................................. 8
U.S. Deportations to Central America and the Gang Problem ................................................ 8
Country Anti-Gang Efforts ........................................................................................................ 10
Mano Dura (Heavy-Handed) Anti-Gang Policies ................................................................ 10
What Have Been the Effects of Mano Dura Policies? .......................................................... 11
Alternative Approaches ....................................................................................................... 11
Prospects for Country Prevention and Rehabilitation Efforts................................................ 12
Selected Regional and Multilateral Efforts........................................................................... 13
Central American Integration System (SICA) ................................................................ 13
Organization of American States (OAS) ........................................................................ 13
Inter-American Coalition for the Prevention of Violence (IACPV) ................................ 14
Multilateral Banks and U.N. Assistance......................................................................... 14
U.S. Policy................................................................................................................................ 14
Congressional Interest and Appropriations for Anti-Gang Efforts......................................... 15
Evolution of U.S. International Anti-Gang Efforts ............................................................... 16
State Department........................................................................................................... 17
Department of Justice.................................................................................................... 17
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) ....................................................... 18
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) ................................................... 18
Policy Approaches and Concerns......................................................................................... 19
Tables
Table 1. Estimated Homicide Rates Per 100,000 Inhabitants........................................................ 2
Table 2. U.S. Deportations to Top Receiving Countries: FY2008-FY2010 ................................... 9
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 20
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Gangs in Central America
Introduction
In recent years, analysts and U.S. officials have expressed ongoing concerns about the increasing
rates of violent crimes committed by drug traffickers, organized criminal groups, and gangs in
Central America.1 U.S. concerns about gangs have accelerated as the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13),
a particularly violent group with ties to Central America, has increased its presence and illicit
activities in the United States.2 Policy-makers in countries throughout the region, including in the
United States, are struggling to find the right mix of suppressive and preventive policies to
confront the gang problem. Most agree that a comprehensive, regional approach to gangs is
necessary to prevent further escalation of the problem.
The 112th Congress is likely to maintain an interest in crime and gang violence in Central
America, and in the related activities of Central American gangs in the United States. In recent
years, Congress has considered what level of U.S. assistance is most appropriate to help Central
American countries combat gang activity and what types of programs are most effective in that
effort. Members of Congress have also taken an interest in the effects of U.S. deportations of
individuals with criminal records to Central America on the gang problem, as well as the evolving
relationship between Mexican drug trafficking organizations and the gangs.
Congress has funded anti-gang efforts in Central America through global funds appropriated to
the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
(INCLE), as well as through bilateral and regional programs (see “Congressional Interest and
Appropriations for Anti-Gang Efforts”). In June 2008, Congress increased country and regional
anti-gang assistance by approving initial funding for the Mérida Initiative, an anti-crime and
counterdrug foreign aid package for Mexico and Central America.3 Congress appropriated
additional Mérida funding in the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8). Many
Mérida-related programs in Central America are just getting underway after a number of
implementation delays.4 Beginning in the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-
117), Congress separated Central America from the Merida Initiative and began funding a new
Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). The Obama Administration asked for
$100 million for CARSI in its FY2011 budget request. In the absence of FY2011 appropriations
legislation, Congress has passed a series of continuing resolutions (P.L. 111-242 as amended) to
fund government programs, with the latest extension set to expire on March 4, 2011. The
continuing resolution, as amended, continues funding most foreign aid programs at the FY2010-
enacted level, with some exceptions.
1 The Central American countries include Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and
Panama. This report focuses on the “northern triangle” countries of Central America where the gang problem has been
most acute, which include El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. It refers to the other countries and governments in
the region periodically for comparative purposes.
2 U.S. Department of Justice, National Gang Intelligence Center, National Gang Threat Assessment (NGTA) 2009,
January 2009.
3 For historical information on the Mérida Initiative, see CRS Report R40135, Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central
America: Funding and Policy Issues, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
4 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Mérida Initiative: The United States has Provided Counternarcotics
and Anticrime Support, but Needs Better Performance Measures, 10-837, July 21, 2010,
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10837.pdf.
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This report describes the gang problem in Central America, discusses country and regional
approaches to deal with the gangs, and analyzes U.S. policy with respect to gangs in Central
America. It concludes with a discussion of policy issues that members of Congress may consider
as they exercise oversight over the implementation of the Mérida Initiative and CARSI, with a
particular interest in how agencies are coordinating their various anti-gang efforts.
Background on Violent Crime in Central America
Latin America has among the highest homicide rates in the world, and in recent years homicide
rates in several Central American countries have significantly exceeded the regional average (see
Table 1). According to figures cited in a 2009 U.N. Development Program (UNDP) report, Latin
America’s average homicide rate in 2005 stood at roughly 25 homicides per 100,000 people,
almost three times the world average of 9 homicides per 100,000 people.5 That same year,
average homicide rates per 100,000 people in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras reached
approximately 62, 44, and 37, respectively. Whereas homicide rates in Colombia, historically the
most violent country in Latin America, have fallen in the past few years, homicide rates have
remained at elevated levels in El Salvador, Guatemala, and, to a lesser extent, Belize. Homicide
rates have increased significantly in Honduras. By 2008, the estimated murder rate per 100,000
people stood at roughly 32 in Belize, 52 in El Salvador, 48 in Guatemala, and 58 in Honduras. In
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama, the corresponding figures were 11, 13, and 11, respectively.6
Homicide rates in the region have generally continued to trend upwards since 2008.
Table 1. Estimated Homicide Rates Per 100,000 Inhabitants
(2000-2008)
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Belize
19 25 30 24 27 28 31 30 32
Costa
Rica 6 6 6 7 7 8 8 8 11
El
Salvador 45 40 39 40 49 62 65 57 52
Guatemala 28 30 32 37 38 44 47 45 48
Honduras n/a n/a 69 65 35 37 46 50 58
Nicaragua 9 10 10 12 12 13 13 13 13
Panama 10 10 12 11 10 11 11 13 19
Source: U.N. Development Program, Informe Sobre Desarrollo Humano Para América Central 2009-2010: Abrir
Espacios a la Seguridad Ciudadana y el Desarrol o Humano, October 2009.
Central America—particularly the “northern triangle” countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, and
Honduras—exhibits many risk factors that have been linked to high violent crime rates. For
example, studies have shown that high levels of income inequality are often strong predictors of
5 U.N. Development Program (UNDP), Informe Sobre Desarrollo Humano Para América Central 2009-2010: Abrir
Espacios a la Seguridad Ciudadana y el Desarrollo Humano, October 2009. This report also contains sections on other
types of violent crime in Central America, including rape, kidnapping, assault, and domestic violence.
6 Ibid.
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high violent crime rates.7 Latin America has been among the most unequal regions in terms of
income and levels of social exclusion. The linkage between inequality and high crime rates holds
true in Central America except for the case of El Salvador, a country with relatively low
inequality but high crime rates.8 With the exceptions of Belize and Costa Rica, Central American
countries have also had a long history of armed conflicts and/or dictatorships, which has inhibited
the development of democratic institutions and respect for the rule of law. Protracted armed
conflicts also resulted in the widespread proliferation of illicit firearms in the region, as well as a
cultural tendency to resort to violence as a means of settling disputes.9 Other traits that make
some Central American countries at risk for violent crime include highly urbanized populations,
growing youth populations, and high unemployment rates. Guatemala, Honduras, and El
Salvador, which have large percentages of their populations living in the United States, have
reportedly suffered more from the negative effects of emigration (such as family disintegration
and deportations) than other countries.10
According to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Central American countries are
particularly susceptible to violent crime fueled by drug trafficking and corruption because they
are geographically located between the world’s largest drug producing and drug consuming
countries.11 Stepped up enforcement efforts in Mexico have reportedly led traffickers to use
Central America, particularly Guatemala and Honduras, as a transshipment point for U.S.-bound
Andean cocaine. According to 2008 estimates, 90% of all cocaine entering the United States
flowed through Mexico or its territorial waters, with at least 42% of that cocaine having first
stopped in Central America.12 Low criminal justice capacity, corruption, and an absence of
political will to fight crime in a holistic manner have hindered countries’ abilities to respond to
violent crime. These problems may be most pronounced in Guatemala, a country struggling, with
U.N. assistance, to confront sophisticated organized criminal groups and drug traffickers that
have been aligned with some of the country’s most powerful political, military, and business
actors.13
Scope of the Gang Problem in Central America
In recent years, Central American governments, the media, and some analysts have attributed,
sometimes erroneously, a significant proportion of violent crime in the region to youth gangs or
maras, many of which have ties to the United States.
7 Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman, and Norman Loayza, "Inequality and Violent Crime," Journal of Law and
Economics, August 2001.
8 UNDP, October 2009.
9 Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), Armas Pequeñas y Livianas: Amenaza a la Seguridad
Hemisférica, 2007.
10 UNDP, October 2009.
11 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the
Crossfire, May 2007. See also: Stephen S. Dudley, Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central America:
Transportistas, Mexican Cartels, and Maras, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Working Paper
Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation, May 2010.
12 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Vol. 1, March 2010.
13 Ivan Briscoe, A Criminal Bargain: The State and Security in Guatemala, Fundación Para las Relaciones
Internacionales y El Diálogo Exterior, September 2009.
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Defining Gangs
Academics and other experts on gangs continue to debate the formal definition of the term “gang”
and the types of individuals that should be included in definitions of the term.14 There is general
agreement that most gangs have a name and some sense of identity that can sometimes be
indicated by symbols such as clothing, graffiti, and hand signs that are unique to the gang. Gangs
are thought to be composed of members ranging in age from 12 to 24, but some gang members
are adults well over the age of 24. Typically, gangs have some degree of permanence and
organization and are generally involved in delinquent or criminal activity. Gangs may be involved
in criminal activities ranging from graffiti, vandalism, petty theft, robbery, and assaults to more
serious criminal activities, such as drug trafficking, drug smuggling, money laundering, alien
smuggling, extortion, home invasion, murder, and other violent felonies.
Gangs are generally considered to be distinct from organized criminal organizations because they
typically lack the hierarchical leadership structure, capital, and manpower required to run a
sophisticated criminal enterprise or to penetrate state institutions at high levels. Gangs are
generally more horizontally organized, with lots of small subgroups and no central leadership
setting strategy and enforcing discipline. Although gangs are involved in the street-level
distribution of drugs and in extortion rackets, few gangs or gang members are involved in higher-
level criminal drug distribution enterprises run by drug trafficking organizations, syndicates, or
other sophisticated criminal organizations.
When referring to gangs in Central America, some studies use the term pandillas and maras
interchangeably, while others distinguish between the two.15 Studies that make a distinction
between the two types of Central America gangs generally define pandillas as localized groups
that have long been present in the region, and maras as a more recent phenomenon that has
transnational roots. Some have more recently classified gangs into “first generation” (localized
groups), “second generation” (national groups with some transnational links), and “third
generation” gangs. Those analysts have augured that some gangs in the region may be evolving
into “third generation” gangs that are “internationalized, networked, and complicated structures
that sometimes evolve political aims.”16
Transnational Gangs in Central America
The major gangs operating in Central America with ties to the United States are the “18th Street”
gang (also known as M-18), and their main rival, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13).17 The 18th
Street gang was formed by Mexican youth in the Rampart section of Los Angeles in the 1960s
who were not accepted into existing Hispanic gangs. It was the first Hispanic gang to accept
members from all races and to recruit members from other states. MS-13 was created during the
1980s by Salvadorans in Los Angeles who had fled the country’s civil conflict. Both gangs later
expanded their operations to Central America. This process accelerated after the United States
14 This section was drawn from CRS Report RL33400, Youth Gangs: Background, Legislation, and Issues.
15 See, for example, Demoscopia S.A., Maras y Pandillas: Comunidad y Policía en Centroamérica, October 2007, as
opposed to Dennis Rodgers et al., “Gangs of Central America: Causes, Costs, and Interventions,” Small Arms Survey
Occasional Paper 23, May 2009.
16 John P. Sullivan and Adam Eikus, “Global Cities, Global Gangs,” Open Society Net, December 2, 2009.
17 For the history and evolution of these gangs, see Tom Diaz, No Boundaries: Transnational Latino Gangs and
American Law Enforcement, Ann Arbor, M.I.: University of Michigan Press, 2009.
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began deporting illegal immigrants, many with criminal convictions, back to the region after the
passage of the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996.18
Between 2000 and 2004, an estimated 20,000 criminals were sent back to Central America, many
of whom had spent time in U.S. prisons for drug and/or gang-related offenses. Many contend that
gang-deportees have “exported” a Los Angeles gang culture to Central America and that they
have recruited new members from among the local populations.19
Estimates of the overall number of gang members in Central America vary widely, but the U.S.
Southern Command has placed that figure at around 70,000, a figure also cited by the United
Nations. The gang problem is most severe in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. Estimates of
Central American gang membership by country also vary considerably, but UNODC has cited
country membership totals of some 10,500 in El Salvador, 36,000 in Honduras, and 14,000 in
Guatemala. These figures are compared to 4,500 in Nicaragua, 1385 in Panama, and 2,660 in
Costa Rica.20 Nicaragua has a significant number of gang members, but does not have large
numbers of MS-13 or M-18 members, perhaps due to the fact that Nicaragua has had a much
lower deportation rate from the United States than the “northern triangle” countries.21
While MS-13 and M-18 began as loosely structured street gangs, there is evidence that both
gangs, but particularly the MS-13, have expanded geographically and become more organized
and sophisticated. By early 2008, for example, Salvadoran police had found evidence suggesting
that some MS-13 leaders jailed in El Salvador were ordering retaliatory assassinations of
individuals in Northern Virginia, as well as designing plans to unify their clicas (cliques) with
those in the United States.22 Studies have shown that, as happened in the United States, gang
leaders in Central America are using prisons to recruit new members and to increase the
discipline and cohesion among their existing ranks.23
Press reports and some Central American officials have blamed MS-13 and other gangs for a
large percentage of violent crimes committed in those countries, but some analysts assert that
those claims may be exaggerated. In El Salvador, for example, officials have blamed gangs for a
majority of all murders committed annually, but UNODC has found scant evidence to support
that conclusion.24 Gang experts have argued that, although gangs may be more visible than other
criminal groups, gang violence is only one part of a broad spectrum of violence in Central
America.25 In Guatemala and Honduras, for example, the regions that have the highest murder
rates tend to be those without a significant gang presence, but where organized criminal groups
and narco-traffickers are particularly active.26
18 IRIRA expanded the categories of illegal immigrants subject to deportation and made it more difficult for immigrants
to get relief from removal.
19 Ana Arana, “How the Street Gangs Took Central America,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2005.
20 Testimony of General Bantz J. Craddock, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, March 15, 2005; UNODC, May 2007.
21 Rodgers et al., 2009.
22 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Regional Gang Initiative:
Assessments and Plan of Action, July 1, 2008.
23 Demoscopia S.A, 2007.
24 UNODC, May 2007, op-cit.
25 Testimony of Geoff Thale, Program Director of the Washington Office on Latin America, before the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, June 26, 2007.
26 Washington Office on Latin America and the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), Transnational
(continued...)
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Although the actual percentage of homicides that can be attributed to gangs in Central America
remains controversial, the gangs have been involved in a broad array of other criminal activities.
Those activities include kidnapping; human trafficking; and drug, auto, and weapons smuggling.
Gangs have increasingly been involved in extortions of residents, bus drivers, and business
owners in major cities throughout the region. Failure to pay often results in harassment or
violence by gang members. In 2009, gangs reportedly killed 146 Guatemalan bus drivers. In early
September 2010, the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs in El Salvador jointly organized a three-day
strike in response to new anti-gang legislation that paralyzed the country’s transport system.27
While some studies maintain that ties between Central American gangs and organized criminal
groups have increased, others have downplayed the connection. In the mid-2000s, there had been
some reports of gang activity in migrant smuggling in Mexico, but more recent reports have not
found significant mara activity in Tapachula or Tijuana, two of the Mexican cities most affected
by migration.28 Regional and U.S. authorities have confirmed increasing gang involvement in
drug trafficking, although mostly on a local level. MS-13 members are reportedly being
contracted on an ad-hoc basis by Mexico’s warring DTOs to carry out revenge killings. Some
analysts maintain that the relationship between DTOs and gangs appears to be most developed in
El Salvador and, to a lesser extent, in Honduras, with few DTO-gang connections in Guatemala,
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, or Panama.29
Notably, analysts have found no links between Central American gangs and Al Qaeda or other
terrorist groups.30
Factors Exacerbating the Gang Problem in Central America
Poverty and a Lack of Educational and Employment Opportunities
Several organizations working directly with gang members have asserted that the combination of
poverty, social exclusion, and a lack of educational and job opportunities for at-risk youth are
perpetuating the gang problem. In Honduras, for example, close to 30% of the population is youth
ages 15-24. Those youth have very limited opportunities in a country where some 65% of the
population lives on less than $2 a day and the unemployment rate was 25% in 2005. A 2007
World Bank risk assessment for Honduras states that the country has large numbers of
unemployed youth who are not in school. Unable to develop the skills required for attending a
university or obtaining skilled employment, they provide a ready pool of gang recruits.31 In the
(...continued)
Youth Gangs in Central America, Mexico and the United States, March 2007; UNODC, Crime and Instability: Case
Studies of Transnational Threats, February 2010.
27 “Governments Unite Against Maras; Maras Against Governments,” Latin American Regional Report: Caribbean &
Central America, October 2010.
28 José Miguel Cruz, Rafael Fernández de Castro, and Gema Santamaría Balmaceda, "Political Transitions, Social
Violence, and Gangs: Cases in Central America and Mexico," in Peace and Democratization in Latin America: A
Comparative Perspective , ed. Cynthia Arnson (Washington, D.C. 2011).
29 Dudley, op-cit.
30 Testimony of David Shirk, Professor and Director of the Trans-Border Institute, before the House Appropriations
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice and Science, and Related Appropriations, March 24, 2009.
31 Sara Michel, Elizabeth Utting, and Bob Moquin, Honduras: a Risk Assessment, World Bank, February 2007.
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absence of familial and community support, many marginalized youth have turned to gangs for
social support, a source of livelihood, and protection.
Societal Stigmas
Societal stigmas against gangs and gang-deportees from the United States have made the process
of leaving a gang extremely difficult.32 A State Department report on youth gangs in El Salvador
identifies religious conversion, marriage, enlistment in the military, or enrollment in a substance
abuse rehabilitation program as the few options available for those who seek to leave a gang.
Many organizations that work with former gang members, particularly those with criminal
records, say that offender reentry is a major problem in many countries. Ex-gang members report
that employers are often unwilling to hire them. Tattooed former gang members, especially
returning deportees from the United States who are often native English speakers, have had the
most difficulty finding gainful employment. In El Salvador, several hundred gang members have
gone through complete tattoo removal, a long and expensive process, which many feel is
necessary to better blend into Salvadoran society.33
Role of the Media
Many studies have observed that sensationalist media coverage of the gang phenomenon in
Central America has contributed to a sense of insecurity in the region and may have inadvertently
enhanced the reputation of the gangs portrayed. For example, a 2006 USAID gangs assessment
found that rival gangs in Honduras often compete to see who can portray the most brutal and/or
delinquent activities in order to capture the most media attention. Exaggerated media reports may
have also contributed to the popular perception, which has been backed by some politicians in
Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, that youth gangs are responsible for the majority of
violent crime in those countries. This sentiment, however erroneous, has led many Central
American citizens to support tough law enforcement measures against gangs, hire private security
firms, and, in isolated cases, take vigilante action against suspected youth gang members.34
Anti-gang Law Enforcement Efforts
While tough law enforcement reforms (discussed below in the section “Mano Dura”) initially
proved to be a way for Central American leaders to show that they were cracking down on gangs,
recent studies have cast serious doubts on their effectiveness. In response to law enforcement
roundups of any and all tattooed youth, gangs are now changing their behavior to avoid detection.
Many gang members are hiding or removing their tattoos, changing their dress, and avoiding the
use of hand signals, making them harder to identify and arrest. Studies have also shown that,
32 Demoscopia S.A, 2007.
33 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Issue Paper: Youth Gang Organizations
in El Salvador, June 2007.
34 Testimony of Lainie Reisman before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere, June 26, 2007. The State Department Human Rights Reports covering Guatemala and Honduras for 2009
include references to NGO reports that vigilante torture and even killings of youths have continued to occur. NGOs in
both countries have asserted that these abuses may have been perpetrated by groups that included current and former
members of the security forces.
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largely in response to law enforcement tactics, gangs have developed into more sophisticated
criminal entities, some of which are now running extortion rackets throughout the region.35
Prisons in Need of Reform
The implementation of aggressive anti-gang roundups has overwhelmed prisons in Central
America. Prison conditions in the region are generally harsh, with severe overcrowding,
inadequate sanitation, and staffing shortages. Many facilities that were already teeming with
inmates have been filled beyond their capacities with thousands of suspected gang members,
many of whom have yet to be convicted of any crimes. In El Salvador, for example, as of
December 2009, some 22,101 inmates were being held in prisons designed to hold a maximum of
8,227 people.36
Due to a lack of security within the prisons, gangs are often able to carry out criminal activities
from behind bars, sometimes with assistance from corrupt prison officials. As previously
mentioned, there is evidence that gangs have become larger, better organized, and more cohesive
within the confines of many of the region’s prisons. Some observers have described prisons as
“gangland finishing schools”37 where, rather than being rehabilitated, first-time offenders often
deepen their involvement in illicit gang activities.
Disputes between members of rival gangs, between gang and non-gang inmates, and between
gangs and prison guards regularly occur. Between January and October 2008, the Honduran
Ministry of Security reported 39 inmate deaths, a majority of which occurred as a result of inter-
gang violence. Prisoner abuse and torture is also not uncommon. Some argue that gangs have
responded to “extralegal violence” employed by police and prison guards by waging war on
governments and those suspected of collaborating with them.38
U.S. Deportations to Central America and the Gang Problem
Policymakers in Central America have expressed ongoing concerns that increasing U.S.
deportations of individuals with criminal records are worsening the gang and security problems in
the region.39 The Central American countries of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador have
received the highest numbers of U.S. deportations (after Mexico) for the last several fiscal years.
Despite the large numbers of deportees repatriated to the region, the Central American countries
have typically had a lower percentage of individuals deported on criminal grounds than other top
receiving countries like Jamaica or the Dominican Republic (see Table 2). In FY2009 and
FY2010, however, the percentage of Central Americans deported on criminal grounds increased
35 Demoscopia, S.A., 2007; José Miguel Cruz, “Central American Maras: From Youth Street Gangs to Transnational
Protection Rackets,” Global Crime, November 2010.
36 U.S. Department of State, 2009 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: El Salvador, March 11, 2010.
37 Arana, 2005.
38 José Miguel Cruz, "Responses and the Dark Side of Suppresion of Gangs in Central America," in Government The
Maras and Security Challenges in Central America and the U.S., ed. Tom Bruneau, Lucia Dammert, and Jeanne
Giraldo (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2011) (forthcoming).
39 Kate Joynes et al., “Central America, Mexico and the United States Formulate Shared Strategy to Fight Gang
Violence,” Global Insight Daily Analysis, April 9, 2008.
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significantly. This may be due to increasing efforts by U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) to identify illegal immigrants subject to deportation.
Table 2. U.S. Deportations to Top Receiving Countries: FY2008-FY2010
(Including Annual Percentage of Individuals Deported on Criminal Grounds)
Country
FY2008
% Crim.a FY2009 %
Crim. FY2010 %
Crim.
Mexico
252,010 33.9%
275,217 37.9%
279,687
54.7%
Honduras
29,768 18.9%
27,679 25.1%
25,635
41.5%
Guatemala
28,899 18.6%
30,411 21.4%
31,347
31.3%
El
Salvador
20,975 27.6%
21,157 30.0%
20,830
41.4%
Dom.
Republic 3,783 55.5%
3,850 56.5%
3,853
61.1%
Brazil
3,648 10.8%
3,298 11.6%
3,321
16.3%
Colombia
2,830 39.8%
2,778 40.6%
2,617
49.6%
Ecuador
2,484 23.6%
2,526 25.5%
2,559
29.8%
Nicaragua
2,339 23.5%
2,190 28.1%
1,975
42.4%
Haiti
1,654 25.8%
710 65.9%
344b 39.8%
Jamaica
1,603 78.8%
1,630 76.9%
1,548
79.1%
Source: Prepared by CRS with information provided by the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Office of Detention and Removal. Figures include “removals” (deportations), but not
voluntary departures (returns).
a. Criminal deportees have been convicted of a crime in the United States that makes one removable (i.e.
eligible for deportation) under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Not all individuals who have been
deported on criminal grounds are gang members or violent criminals. Low level drug convictions and some
non-violent offenses may result in a removal on criminal grounds. Non-criminal deportees have been
removed because of a status violation (e.g. being in the country illegally or working without authorization).
b. Deportations to Haiti were halted in the wake of the January 2010 earthquake in that country. For more
information, see CRS Report RS21349, U.S. Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
For the past several years, Central American officials have asked the U.S. government to consider
providing a complete criminal history for each deportee who has been removed on criminal
grounds, including whether or not he or she is a member of a gang. While ICE does not provide a
complete criminal record for deportees, it may provide some information regarding an
individual’s criminal history when specifying why the individual was removed from the United
States. ICE does not indicate gang affiliation unless it is the primary reason why the individual is
being deported. However, law enforcement officials in receiving countries are able to contact the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in order to request a criminal history check on particular
criminal deportees after they have arrived in that country. With support from the Mérida
Initiative, ICE and the FBI have developed a pilot program called the Criminal History
Information Program (CHIP) to provide more information about deportees with criminal
convictions to officials in El Salvador.
The types of support services provided to deportees returning from the United States and other
countries vary widely across Latin America. While a few large and relatively wealthy countries
(such as Colombia and Mexico) have recently established comprehensive deportee reintegration
assistance programs, most countries provide few, if any, services to returning deportees. In
Central America, for example, the few programs that do exist tend to be funded and administered
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by either the Catholic Church, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or the International
Organization for Migration (IOM). The U.S. government does not currently support any deportee
reintegration services programs for adults in Central America, although it has in the past.40
Country Anti-Gang Efforts
Country efforts to deal with gangs and gang-related violence have varied significantly. In general,
governments in the “northern triangle” countries have adopted more aggressive law enforcement
approaches than the other Central American countries. These policies, which will subsequently be
discussed, failed to stave off rising crime rates in the region and had several negative unintended
consequences. As a result, recent studies maintain that governments appear to be moving away
from “enforcement-first” policies towards “second-generation” anti-gang programs. Newer
programs have emphasized, among other things, prevention programs for at-risk youth,
interventions to encourage youth to leave gangs, and the creation of municipal alliances against
crime and violence.41 Some observers predict that El Salvador’s newly enacted law outlawing
gangs like the MS-13 and the 18th Street gang and the financing of their activities will result in a
return to a more repressive approach to gangs in that country. Salvadoran government officials
have discounted those predictions, maintaining that the law is focused on helping police build
anti-gang investigations that will stand up in court.42
Mano Dura (Heavy-Handed) Anti-Gang Policies
Mano Dura is a term used to describe the type of anti-gang policies initially put in place in El
Salvador, Honduras, and, to a lesser extent, Guatemala in response to popular demands and media
pressure for these governments to “do something” about an escalation in gang-related crime.
Mano dura approaches have typically involved incarcerating large numbers of youth (often those
with visible tattoos) for illicit association, and increasing sentences for gang membership and
gang-related crimes. A Mano Dura law passed by El Salvador’s Congress in 2003 was
subsequently declared unconstitutional, but was followed by a Super Mano Dura package of anti-
gang reforms in July 2004. These reforms enhanced police power to search and arrest suspected
gang members and stiffened penalties for convicted gang members, although they provided some
protections for minors accused of gang-related crimes. Similarly, in July 2003, Honduras enacted
a penal code amendment that made maras illegal and established sentences of up to 12 years in
prison for gang membership. Changes in legislation were accompanied by the increasing use of
joint military and police patrols to arrest gang suspects. Guatemala introduced similar legislation
in 2003, but the legislation never passed. Instead, the Guatemalan government has launched
periodic law enforcement operations to round up suspected gang members.
40 Testimony of Maureen Achieng, Chief of Mission for the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Haiti
before the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, July 24, 2007. Although the U.S. government is not
currently funding deportee reintegration programs for adults in Central America, it is providing small amounts of
funding to IOM to assist unaccompanied minors who have been returned to El Salvador and Nicaragua. CRS phone
interview with State Department official, December 2, 2010.
41 Rodgers et al., May 2009.
42 Alex Renderos, “El Salvador Moves Against Criminal Gangs,” Los Angeles Times, September 4, 2010. CRS
interview with officials from El Salvador’s National Civilian Police, December 7, 2010.
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What Have Been the Effects of Mano Dura Policies?
Mano Dura reforms initially proved to be a way for Central American leaders to show that they
were getting tough on gangs and crime, despite objections from human rights groups about their
potential infringements on civil liberties and human rights. Early public reactions to the tough
anti-gang reforms enacted in El Salvador and Honduras were extremely positive, supported by
media coverage demonizing the activities of tattooed youth gang members. Tony Saca was
elected to the presidency of El Salvador largely on the basis of his promises to further crack down
on gangs and crime. Mano Dura enabled police to arrest large numbers of suspected gang
members, including some 14,000 youth in El Salvador between mid-2004 and late 2005. In
addition, according to Salvadoran officials, even though many suspects were eventually released,
gang detainees provided law enforcement officials with invaluable sources of intelligence
information that those officials have since used to design better anti-gang strategies.43
Despite the early apparent benefits of Mano Dura policies, effects on gangs and crime have been
largely disappointing. Most youth arrested under mano dura provisions have been subsequently
released for lack of evidence that they committed any crime. Salvadoran police estimated that
more than 10,000 of 14,000 suspected gang members arrested in 2005 were later released.44 Some
youth who were wrongly arrested for gang involvement have been recruited into the gang life
while in prison. Gang roundups exacerbated prison overcrowding, and inter-gang violence within
the prisons has resulted in several inmate deaths. There have been credible reports that
extrajudicial youth killings by vigilante groups have continued since mano dura went into effect,
including alleged assassinations of gang suspects and gang deportees from the United States.
Finally, in response to mano dura, gangs have changed their behavior to avoid detection.
Alternative Approaches
Although their efforts have received considerably less international attention than those of El
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, other Central American countries have developed a variety
of programs to deal with the gang problem. In Panama, the Ministry of Social Development, in
coordination with other government entities and several NGOs, administers gang prevention
programs, as well as a program to provide job training and rehabilitation services to former gang
members. In 2006, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) approved a $22.7 million loan
to Panama to fund that and other programs aimed at preventing youth violence in four of the
country’s largest municipalities. Nicaragua has adopted a national youth crime prevention
strategy that, at least on an official level, includes the active involvement of the police in
preventive and rehabilitative efforts and focuses on family, school, and community
interventions.45 With support from other countries and NGOs, the Nicaraguan National Police’s
Juvenile Affairs Division runs at least two anti-gang activities a month. The Ministry of the
Interior is administering a five-year program, which is supported by funding from the IDB, to
target at-risk youth in 11 different municipalities. While less is known about Costa Rica’s gang
43 U.S. Department of State, INL, Regional Gang Initiative Assessments and Plan of Action, July 1, 2008.
44 “Most of 14,000 Gang Members Arrested in El Salvador Were Released,” EFE News Service, December 27, 2005.
45 Some studies have described a disconnect between the Nicaraguan government’s official rhetoric in support of non-
repressive approaches to youth violence and the excessive use of force that some low-ranking police officials have used
against youth in Nicaragua. Those studies are summarized in: Peter Peetz, "Youth Violence in Central America:
Discourses and Policies," Youth Society, October 11, 2010.
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prevention efforts, the country has generally tended to favor a “preventive and rehabilitation-
oriented approach.”46
Prospects for Country Prevention and Rehabilitation Efforts
In the last few years, Central American leaders, including those from the northern triangle
countries, appear to have moved, at least on a rhetorical level, towards more comprehensive anti-
gang approaches. In mid-December 2007, then-Salvadoran President Tony Saca opened a summit
of the Central America Integration System by stating that the gang problem had shown the
importance of coordinated anti-crime efforts, with the most important element of those efforts
being prevention.47 All of the Central American countries have created institutional bodies to
design and coordinate crime prevention strategies and have units within their national police
forces engaged in prevention efforts. In general, however, government-sponsored gang prevention
programs have tended, with some exceptions, to be small-scale, ad-hoc, and underfunded.
Governments have been even less involved in sponsoring rehabilitation programs for individuals
seeking to leave gangs, with most reintegration programs funded by church groups or NGOs.
Central American government officials have generally cited budgetary limitations and competing
concerns, such as drug trafficking, as major factors limiting their ability to implement more
extensive prevention and rehabilitation programs. Experts have asserted, however, that it is
important for governments to offer educational and job opportunities to youth who are willing to
leave gangs before they are tempted to join more sophisticated criminal organizations. It is also
critical, they argue, for intervention efforts to focus on strengthening families of at-risk youth.48
This may be changing, however, as the government of Mauricio Funes in El Salvador has
increased funding for prevention programs to roughly 14% of the Ministry of Security’ budget
(from a historic average of just over 1%).49
Research has shown that successful anti-gang efforts involve governments working in close
collaboration with civil society, the private sector, churches, mayors, and international donors in
order to leverage limited public resources.50 In fact, many successful anti-gang programs have
developed as a result of community-driven efforts to respond to particular problems which are
then supported by capacity-building programs for leaders from those communities. Although
these types of programs may benefit from financial contributions from local and/or national
governments, they may also need non-financial support, including “training, information sharing,
leadership, or simply the provision of a dedicated space for programming or meetings.”51
Country and regional youth violence prevention programs have received significant support from
a variety of international donors, but Central American governments have tended not to take an
active role in ensuring that donor funds are well-coordinated and strategically invested. European
46 Ibid.
47 “Centroamérica Revisa Estrategias Para Luchar Contra Pandillas,” Agence France Presse, December 13, 2007.
48 Kliksberg, 2007.
49 CRS interview with officials from El Salvador’s National Civilian Police, December 7, 2010.
50 USAID Gang Assessment, 2006; José Miguel Cruz, Street Gangs in Central America, San Salvador: UCA Editors,
2007.
51 See the section by Caterina Gowis Roman in Daring to Care: Community-Based Responses to Youth Gang Violence
in Central America and Central American Immigrant Communities in the United States, WOLA, October 2008.
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donors, particularly the European Commission, Spain, and Germany, have been the largest
supporters of prevention programs in Central America. U.S. support for prevention programs has
also increased in recent years, particularly since the creation of an Economic and Social
Development Fund for Central America as part of the Mérida Initiative. However, with the recent
global economic downturn, many of these traditional donors now have less funds to dedicate to
overseas prevention projects. As a result, Central American governments may have to seek new
support for these types of projects from other countries or private entities.
Selected Regional and Multilateral Efforts
Central American Integration System (SICA)
Some analysts maintain that the emergence of gangs as a regional security threat has led to
unprecedented cooperation among the Central American countries. For the last several years,
Central American leaders and officials have regularly met, often accompanied by their U.S. and
Mexican counterparts, to discuss ways to coordinate security and information-sharing on gang
members and other criminal groups. Most of these regional security meetings have been
organized by the Security Commission of the Central American Integration System (SICA).52 The
leaders of the SICA members states and the president-elect of Mexico began developing a
regional security strategy in October 2006, which was subsequently adopted at a summit held in
August 2007.53 The strategy identifies eight threats to regional security, including organized
crime, drug trafficking, deportees with criminal records, gangs, homicide, small arms trafficking,
terrorism, and corruption. In the strategy, the leaders vow to designate transnational gang liaison
offices in each country that will compile and share information, conduct joint investigations, and
establish a regional database on gangs.
Up until recently, however, most regional anti-gang cooperation has occurred on a declarative,
rather than an operational level. At least one youth violence prevention project is now being
implemented by the Secretariat, based in El Salvador, in cooperation with the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID).54 SICA has estimated that the costs to implement its
regional security plan could exceed $953 million, including $60 million for anti-gang efforts.55
SICA is planning to convene a donor’s conference in June 2011 in order to seek support for its
Mexico-Central America security plan. Some observers think that more regional anti-gang
cooperation is possible, but others predict that political differences among Central American
governments and instability in particular countries is likely to inhibit future efforts.
Organization of American States (OAS)
On June 7, 2005, the OAS passed a resolution to hold conferences and workshops on the gang
issue and to urge member states to support the creation of holistic solutions to the gang problem.
52 The Central American Integration System (SICA) is a regional organization with a Secretariat in El Salvador that is
comprised by the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, Belize, and Panama. The Security
Commission was created in 1995 to develop and carry out regional security efforts.
53 A copy of the strategy is available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/93586.htm.
54 USAID, “Press Release: USAID-SICA Regional Youth Alliance Offices Inaugurated,” April 9, 2008.
55 SICA General Secretariat, Fifth Meeting of the Working Group for Drafting Proposals to Finance Central American
Security, May 13-14, 2008.
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In the past four years, the OAS has hosted meetings and conferences on the gang problem in
Latin America and conducted a study on how to define and classify the types of gangs operating
in the region. On June 5, 2007, the OAS General Assembly passed a resolution to promote
hemispheric cooperation in confronting criminal gangs that instructs the General Assembly to
support country anti-gang efforts and the Permanent Council to create a contact group of member
states concerned about the gang issue. On January 12, 2008, the OAS Permanent Council held a
special session devoted to the problem of criminal gangs. The Permanent Council is currently in
the process of developing a Regional Strategy to Promote Inter-American Cooperation in Dealing
with Criminal Gangs.
Inter-American Coalition for the Prevention of Violence (IACPV)
The IACPV is a multilateral group formed in 2000 to promote prevention as a viable way of
addressing crime and violence in Latin America. IACPV member organizations include the OAS,
World Bank, Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB), USAID, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the United Nations. The
IACPV has helped municipalities in Central America develop violence prevention plans,
developed a user-friendly violence indicators document, hosted a major conference on gang
prevention, and provided technical and financial assistance to help form a counterpart
organization within the region, the Central American Coalition for the Prevention of Youth
Violence. The IACPV has been relatively inactive for the past few years.
Multilateral Banks and U.N. Assistance
Several U.N. agencies, the IDB, and, to a lesser extent, the World Bank, have supported violence
reduction programs in Central America. Among the U.N. agencies, UNDP, which maintains a
team of citizen security experts at a regional office in Panama, has taken the lead. UNDP has
supported small arms control; police reform; violence reduction; and disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration programs in Central America. UNDP has conducted research
projects on the costs of violence in particular countries and published a comprehensive regional
study on security challenges facing Central America that will be followed by more specific
country reports. The IDB has executed significant violence reduction loans and grants in each of
the Central American countries. IDB-funded projects have focused on institutional strengthening
and violence prevention, with selected activities in the area of criminal justice and rehabilitation.
The World Bank has introduced crime and violence prevention components into existing Bank-
funded projects in urban areas and produced analytical studies, including a recently completed
regional report on crime and violence.
U.S. Policy
In recent years, Administration officials and members of Congress have expressed ongoing
concerns about gangs and violence in Central America and their spillover effects on the United
States. In September 2009 congressional testimony, FBI Director Robert Mueller stated that
“criminal gangs ... are of increasing concern for domestic and international law enforcement ...
[and that] the MS-13 [in particular] continues to expand its influence in the United States.”56 U.S.
56 Testimony by Robert Mueller, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Department of Justice, before
(continued...)
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officials are striving to coordinate anti-gang initiatives on both the domestic and international
fronts, taking into account their likely impacts on domestic security, on the one hand, and on
foreign relations with the countries of Central America and Mexico, on the other.
Congressional Interest and Appropriations for Anti-Gang Efforts
Congress has expressed increasing concern about the problem of transnational gangs and interest
in the effectiveness of U.S. international anti-gang efforts. In the 110th Congress, interest in the
topic of gangs and violence in Central America included concerns about the unintended
consequences of mano dura policies, the relationship between gangs and drug cartels, and the
effects of U.S. deportation policy on the gang problem. On October 2, 2007, the House passed
H.Res. 564 (Engel) supporting expanded cooperation between the United States and Central
America to combat crime and violence.
During its first session, the 110th Congress also enacted the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations
Act, P.L. 110-161, which included $8 million in global INCLE funding for the State Department
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) anti-gang programs. In
October 2007, the Bush Administration proposed the Mérida Initiative, a new anticrime and
counterdrug program for Mexico and Central America. During its second session, the 110th
Congress considered the proposal, eventually appropriating $60 million for the Central America
portion of the Mérida Initiative in the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-252).
Congress shifted the bulk of Mérida funding for anti-gang programs from law enforcement to
institution building, rule of law, and development programs. It did so partially by earmarking $25
million for the creation of an Economic and Social Development Fund (ESDF) for the region to
be administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
In March 2009, the 111th Congress appropriated another $5 million in global INCLE funding for
INL anti-gang efforts in Central America, as well as $100 million in Mérida funding for the
region in the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8), including $12 million for ESDF
programs, subject to certain human rights conditions.
For FY2010, the Obama Administration requested $7 million in global INCLE funds for INL
anti-gang programs in Central America, as well as $100 million for the Central American portion
of the Mérida Initiative. On December 13, 2009, Congress passed the FY2010 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117), which includes $8 million in global INCLE funds for Central
America and $83 million for a new Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), which
splits Central America from the Mérida Initiative. CARSI funds are subject to the same human
rights conditions as those provided in P.L. 111-8 for Mérida programs. CARSI builds upon
existing programs, both on a bilateral and regional basis. Its five primary goals are to:
1. Create safe streets for the citizens in the region;
2. Disrupt the movement of criminals and contraband within and between the
nations of Central America;
3. Support the development of strong, capable, and accountable Central American
governments;
(...continued)
the Senate Judiciary Committee, September 16, 2009.
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4. Re-establish effective state presence and security in communities at risk; and,
5. Foster enhanced levels of security and rule of law coordination and cooperation
between the nations of the region.57
The Obama Administration requested $100 million for CARSI in its FY2011 budget request: $70
million in Western Hemisphere Regional INCLE funds and $30 million in Western Hemisphere
Regional ESF funds. The Senate Appropriations Committee-reported version of the FY2011
foreign operations measure, S. 3676, would have provided $90 million for security-related
programs in Central America, including $15 million for the ESDF.58 In the absence of FY2011
appropriations legislation, Congress has passed a series of continuing resolutions (P.L. 111-242 as
amended) to fund government programs, with the latest extension set to expire on March 4, 2011.
The continuing resolution, as amended, continues funding most foreign aid programs at the
FY2010-enacted level, with some exceptions.
Evolution of U.S. International Anti-Gang Efforts
For at least the last six years, several U.S. agencies have been actively engaged on both the law
enforcement and preventive side of dealing with Central American gangs. In 2004, the FBI
created an MS-13 Task Force to improve information-sharing and intelligence-gathering among
U.S. and Central American law enforcement officials. In 2005, the Bureau of Immigrations and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) within the Department of Homeland Security created a national anti-
gang initiative called “Operation Community Shield.” In addition to arresting suspected gang
members in the United States, ICE began working more closely with its offices overseas to
coordinate with foreign governments also experiencing gang problems. Since February 2005, ICE
has arrested more than 3,332 suspected MS-13 members in the United States. Also in 2005,
USAID undertook a comprehensive assessment of the gang problem in Central America and
Mexico. In that assessment, USAID found that while a few U.S. programs addressed some
aspects of the gang phenomenon, several new initiatives would be needed in the areas of
prevention, law enforcement, and rehabilitation/reintegration.
Throughout 2005 and 2006, an inter-agency committee worked together to develop a U.S.
Strategy to Combat Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico, which was announced at
a July 2007 U.S.-SICA summit on security issues.59 The strategy acknowledged that, based on
previous U.S. and regional experiences, future anti-gang efforts should be holistic,
comprehensive, and regional in scope. It called for active engagement with governments in the
region, the OAS, and the SICA. The strategy stated that the U.S. government will pursue
coordinated anti-gang activities in five broad areas: diplomacy, repatriation, law enforcement,
capacity enhancement, and prevention. Selected current initiatives by U.S. agencies to implement
the international components of that strategy are discussed below.
57 U.S. Department of State, "The Central American Regional Security Initiative: A Shared Partnership," press release,
August 5, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/scp/fs/2010/145747.htm.
58 In S.Rept. 111-237, the Senate Appropriations Committee continued to refer to U.S. security assistance programs in
Central America as “Mérida Initiative” programs rather than CARSI programs. The Committee included Haiti and the
Dominican Republic among the countries to receive $75 million in INCLE assistance.
59 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Combating Criminal Gangs from Central America and
Mexico,” July 18, 2007.
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In April 2010, the GAO published a report examining (1) the extent to which the federal
government had developed an adequate strategy to combat Central American gangs, and (2) how
well federal agencies had implemented the strategy, coordinated their actions, and assessed their
results.60 According to that report, the U.S. government has developed and implemented an
interagency anti-gang strategy that outlines the threats posed by Central American gangs and the
activities that each federal agency is doing to respond to those threats. However, the GAO
recommended that the strategy be revised to include better coordination mechanisms between the
various implementing agencies and performance measures to evaluate its progress.
State Department
Over the last several years, the State Department has provided training and technical assistance to
law enforcement and corrections officials throughout Central America, sponsored anti-gang
workshops at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA)61 in San Salvador, promoted
regional coordination through SICA, and established a model police precinct in Villanueva,
Guatemala. Initial funds for the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs’ (INL) programs in the region came from $16 million in unspent Andean
Counterdrug Program funds that were reprogrammed in September 2007 to support drug
interdiction operations, anti-gang efforts, and demand reduction initiatives in Central America.
Since FY2008, INL programs have also been funded by a line item in the Foreign Operations
budget designated for “Criminal Youth Gangs.” Funding for this program totaled approximately
$8 million in FY2008, $5 million in FY2009, and $8 million in FY2010.
In January 2008, INL sent a Regional Gang Advisor to El Salvador to coordinate its Central
American gang programs. In July 2008, that advisor produced a detailed assessment of the gang
problem in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala and a work plan focusing on six key areas:
investigative capacity, legal capacity, intelligence capacity, community policing, prevention, and
prisons. Since that time, the Regional Gang Advisor has initiated country and regional prevention
activities, sponsored trainings and technical exchanges for police and prison officers from across
the region, taught an ILEA anti-gang course, and supported community policing programs in
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. INL is also supporting a Regional Corrections Advisor
who is assisting with prison reform programs in the region.
Additionally, the State Department, which coordinates Mérida Initiative/CARSI programs in
Central America, has identified gangs as a critical threat to the region, and allocated resources to
the Department of Justice, ICE, and the U.S. Agency for International Development to enable
those agencies to counter the impact of gangs in the region.
Department of Justice
Within the Department of Justice (DOJ), the FBI is implementing several programs to improve
the capacity of law enforcement in Central America to carry out investigations and share
60 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Combating Gangs: Federal Agencies Have Implemented a Central
American Gang Strategy, but Could Strengthen Oversight and Measurement of Efforts, 10-395, April 23, 2010.
61 The International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) based in San Salvador, El Salvador is one of four regional law
enforcement training academies funded by the State Department’s INL Bureau. The ILEA in San Salvador offers
training and technical assistance to law enforcement officials from throughout Latin America. In 2009, the ILEA
conducted five anti-gang courses.
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intelligence on gang suspects. The Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance,
and Training (OPDAT) has also provided some training on prosecuting gang-related cases to
judicial officials in the region. The deployment of a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosive (ATF) Regional Advisor to San Salvador is enabling ATF to support transnational gang
investigations involving U.S. origin firearms. FBI, OPDAT, and ATF programs are supported by
the Mérida Initiative/CARSI or other State Department funding and are carried out in
collaboration with INL. Recent programs include:
• Central American Fingerprinting Exploitation (CAFÉ): a criminal
file/fingerprint retrieval initiative that has incorporated more than 72,000 finger
prints from gang members from Mexico, El Salvador, Belize, Honduras, and
Guatemala into the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System
since 2006. The data are accessible to Central American police officials.
• Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG) Units: a program that began in El Salvador in
October 2007 involving the creation of vetted police units that work with FBI
agents stationed in San Salvador on investigating gang-related cases. TAG
activities are being expanded into Guatemala and Honduras.
• Central American Law Enforcement Exchange (CALEE): a joint FBI/INL
program that brings law enforcement officials from Central America together
with their counterparts from several large U.S. cities to share information and
intelligence.
• Repatriation-Criminal History Information Program (CHIP): a joint
FBI/ICE program to provide more complete criminal history information on U.S.
deportees to Central American law enforcement officials in receiving countries.
CHIP began in El Salvador in 2010.62
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
In addition to Operation Community Shield, which was previously discussed, ICE recently
formed an anti-gang task force in Honduras to gather intelligence to support gang investigations
in Honduras and in the United States. ICE special agents are also based at other U.S. embassies in
the region, including in Guatemala and El Salvador. ICE has also developed an internet-based
system to facilitate the transmission of travel documents for illegal aliens, including gang
members, who are being deported to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
USAID has provided $2.8 million for a regional anti-gang program cosponsored by SICA, known
as the “Regional Youth Alliance USAID-SICA.” The program, which began in April 2008,
involves (1) the creation of public-private partnerships to support prevention and rehabilitation
programs in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador; (2) an assessment of the juvenile justice
systems in each of those countries followed by efforts to reform those systems; and, (3)
collaborating with SICA to evaluate each of these initiatives and to create and implement new
policy responses. As part of its efforts to sponsor community-based programs, the Regional Youth
62 FBI Press Release, “United Against MS-13; Our Central American Partnerships,” November 10, 2009; CRS phone
Interview with State Department official, December 8, 2010.
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Alliance aims to provide 45 sub-grants to local NGOs in targeted communities, many of which
are offering computer-based job training to at-risk youth. Those sub-grants aim to reach some 300
community leaders and 3,000 youth.
USAID is also implementing country and regional anti-gang programs with support from the
Mérida Initiative Economic and Social Development Fund (ESDF) for Central America that was
created by P.L. 110-252, the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act. With ESDF funding,
USAID is supporting Community Action Fund (CAF) activities that provide at-risk youth in high-
crime communities with basic or secondary education and job training. CAF activities will be
modeled after the Regional Youth Alliance program. USAID is also funding Community Crime
and Gang Prevention Programs (CCGP) that focus on strengthening the role of local governments
in developing citizen security and anti-gang programs. ESDF also supports community policing
activities.
One problem currently being encountered in the region relates to the timely delivery of funds for
anti-gang programs. For instance, many Mérida/CARSI-funded efforts are just getting underway,
as FY2008 supplemental funding did not arrive to most of the USAID Missions in Central
America until August 2009.63 Most programs in Honduras did not commence until early 2010
because of the temporary suspension of U.S. assistance to that country in the wake of President
Manuel Zelaya’s ouster in late June 2009.
Policy Approaches and Concerns
Most policy-makers agree that finding regional solutions to the gang problem is essential. Many
also concur that in order to effectively reduce gang-related crime, a holistic approach to the
problem must be developed that addresses its root social, political, and economic causes. There is
disagreement, however, over the proper level and combination of preventive and suppressive
policies that should be used in Central America to address the gang problem and over what U.S.
agency is best equipped to oversee those efforts.
Debates regarding the relative merits of prevention and suppression methods reemerged when the
110th Congress considered the Bush Administration’s FY2008 supplemental budget request for
the Mérida Initiative. As previously mentioned, Congress increased funding for rule of law,
prevention, and development programs and reduced funding for some police training and
equipment programs as compared to the budget request. It did so by earmarking $25 million in
Economic Support Funds (ESF) for the creation of an Economic and Social Development Fund
(ESDF) for Central America. Congress also increased the amount of funds appropriated to
USAID vis-à-vis INL and other law enforcement agencies by stipulating that of the FY2008 ESF
funds provided, $20 million are to be administered by USAID. The 111th Congress included
another $12 million for the ESDF in the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8) and
$20.5 million in the Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117) to support USAID programs
in violence-prone communities.
Proponents of law enforcement solutions maintain that Central American law enforcement
officials lack the capacity and resources to target gang leaders effectively, share data, and conduct
thorough investigations that lead to successful prosecutions. In addition to supporting specialized
63 GAO, July 21, 2010, op-cit.
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anti-gang units, the Mérida Initiative/CARSI seeks to address these issues by providing funding
for police training to build investigative capacity and communications equipment for police
forces. CARSI does not include funds to support large-scale police reform, even though
corruption within law enforcement is a major obstacle to current anti-gang efforts. It does,
however, aim to improve police-community relations, which have been very poor in many
communities, through support for community policing programs modeled after the successful
U.S.-funded program in Villanueva, Guatemala.
While most U.S. observers argue that the State Department and FBI should take the lead in
assistance to improve law enforcement capacity, others see a possible role for the U.S. Southern
Command in training regional security forces.64 In recent years, the U.S. Southern Command has
taken a leading role in discussing the problem of citizen security in Central America, both within
the U.S. inter-agency community and with Central American officials. Critics of U.S. military
involvement in anti-gang efforts have noted that it is the State Department’s role to provide
security assistance to foreign governments, subject to human rights and democracy concerns.
They have expressed satisfaction that the Mérida Initiative (and now CARSI) emphasizes
regional cooperation by civilian agencies on public security issues through the U.S.-SICA
dialogue, with no explicit role established for the U.S. Southern Command or the region’s
militaries.65
Based on the experiences of cities throughout the United States, proponents of more prevention-
based interventions argue that localities that provide social services to at-risk youth have been
more effective in preventing gang violence than those that have relied only on law enforcement
approaches.66 These findings mirror the results of several studies previously cited in this report
that focus on reducing gang violence in Central America. As a result, human rights groups urged
Congress to include more of an emphasis on prevention and rehabilitation in the Mérida Initiative
than the Bush Administration had originally proposed.67 As previously stated, Congress increased
funding for prevention programs, as well as economic and social development programs, in P.L.
110-252, P.L. 111-8, and P.L. 111-117.
Author Contact Information
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
cseelke@crs.loc.gov, 7-5229
64 The only military component in the Administration’s proposal for Mérida was the $21 million requested in FY2009
to support Enduring Friendship, a Department of Defense program to provide naval equipment to Central American
countries so that they can work with the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy on maritime drug interdiction efforts.
65 U.S. Department of State, Office of Language Services Translating Division, “Not All That is Gold Glitters and Not
All That Glitters is Gold,” by Joel Fyke and Maureen Myer, March 2008, originally published in Foreign Affairs en
Español, Vol. 8, No. 1.
66 “Gang Wars,” Justice Policy Institute, Washington, DC, July 2007.
67 “Memo: The Merida Initiative and Citizen Security in Mexico and Central America,” Washington Office on Latin
America, March 2008.
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