Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
December 29, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL30588
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Summary
Following two high-level policy reviews on Afghanistan in 2009, and another completed in
December 2010, the Obama Administration asserts that it is pursuing a well resourced and
integrated military-civilian strategy intended to pave the way for a gradual transition to Afghan
security leadership to begin in July 2011 and be completed by the end of 2014. The pace of that
transition is to be determined by conditions on the ground. The policy is intended to ensure that
Afghanistan will not again become a base for terrorist attacks against the United States. At the
same time, there appears to be a debate within the Administration and between the United States
and Pakistan over whether the war effort should be widened somewhat to include stepped up
attacks on Afghan militants inside Pakistan. That debate raises the question of the degree to which
Pakistan envisions Afghanistan as part of its strategy to avoid encirclement by or pressure from
Pakistan’s historic rival, India. At the same time, Afghanistan is achieving ever higher degrees of
economic and political integration with its neighbors in Central Asia and the Middle East.
The December 2010 review took into account the effect of the addition of U.S. combat troops to
Afghanistan in 2009 and 2010, intended to create security conditions to expand Afghan
governance and economic development. A total of 51,000 additional U.S. forces were authorized
by the two reviews, which has brought U.S. troop levels to about 98,000 as of September 4, 2010,
with partner forces holding at about 41,000. Until October 2010, there had not been clear
indications that U.S. strategy has shown success, to date. As reflected in the overview of the
Administration review, released December 16, 2010, the top U.S./NATO commander in
Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, and his associates believe that insurgent momentum has
been blunted, although gains remain “fragile and reversible.” One positive sign is that insurgent
commanders are exploring possible surrender terms under which they might reintegrate into
society. Still, U.N. assessments and some outside experts remain pessimistic, asserting that the
insurgents have expanded their presence in northern Afghanistan, and that the Afghan
government is too lacking in capacity or effectiveness to be able to solidify coalition security
gains. Many assess that President Hamid Karzai’s refusal to forcefully confront governmental
corruption has caused a loss of Afghan support for his government, while others note that strong
economic growth and economic development are additional causes for optimism.
In order to try to achieve a strategic breakthrough that might force key insurgent leaders to
negotiate a early political settlement, General Petraeus is attempting to accelerate local security
solutions and experiments similar to those he pursued earlier in Iraq, and to step up the use of air
strikes and special forces operations against Taliban commanders. In order to take advantage of
an apparent new willingness by some insurgent commanders to negotiate, Karzai has named a
broad-based 70-member High Peace Council to oversee negotiations. However, there are major
concerns among Afghanistan’s minorities and among its women that reconciliation could lead to
compromises that erode the freedoms Afghans have enjoyed since 2001.
Through the end of FY2010, the United States has provided over $54.5 billion in assistance to
Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $30 billion has been to equip and train
Afghan forces. (See CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government
Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman.)

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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Contents
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
From Early History to the 19th Century.................................................................................. 1
Early 20th Century and Cold War Era..................................................................................... 1
Geneva Accords (1988) and Soviet Withdrawal ..................................................................... 3
The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban ............................................................. 5
Taliban Rule (September 1996-November 2001) ................................................................... 5
The “Northern Alliance” Congeals .................................................................................. 6
Policy Pre-September 11, 2001.............................................................................................. 7
September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom ................................................. 8
Post-Taliban Nation-Building Efforts .......................................................................................... 9
Post-Taliban Political Transition.......................................................................................... 10
Bonn Agreement ........................................................................................................... 10
Permanent Constitution ................................................................................................. 11
First Post-Taliban Elections in 2004 .............................................................................. 11
Formation of an Elected National Assembly (Parliament) .............................................. 11
2009 Presidential and Provincial Elections .................................................................... 12
September 18, 2010, Parliamentary Elections ................................................................ 13
Other Major Governance Issues .......................................................................................... 13
Anti-Corruption Efforts................................................................................................. 14
Enhancing Local Governance........................................................................................ 14
Human Rights and Democracy ...................................................................................... 15
Narcotics Trafficking/Insurgent Financing..................................................................... 15
Civilian U.S. and International Policy Implementation ........................................................ 17
Security Policy and Force Capacity Building............................................................................. 20
Who are U.S. /NATO Forces Fighting? Taliban, Al Qaeda, and Related Insurgents and
Their Strength .................................................................................................................. 20
Groups: The Taliban (“Quetta Shura Taliban”)............................................................... 21
Al Qaeda/Bin Laden Whereabouts ................................................................................ 22
Hikmatyar Faction ........................................................................................................ 23
Haqqani Faction............................................................................................................ 24
Pakistani Groups ........................................................................................................... 24
The U.S. Military Effort ...................................................................................................... 25
Perception of “Victory” in the First Five Post-Taliban Years .......................................... 25
Perception of Deterioration and Growing Force Levels in 2007 and 2008 ...................... 26
Obama Administration Strategy Reviews and Further Buildup............................................. 27
March 27, 2009, Policy Announcement and Troop Increase, First Command
Change, and McChrystal Assessment ......................................................................... 27
Second High-Level Review and Further Force Increase................................................. 28
McChrystal Replaced by Petraeus ................................................................................. 28
Summary of Current U.S. Strategy as Implemented by General Petraeus ....................... 28
Implementation of Strategy, Early Results, and Doubts.................................................. 31
Security Innovations Under Way ......................................................................................... 33
“Reintegration” and “Reconciliation” With Insurgents................................................... 34
Local Security Experiments: Afghan Provincial Protection Program (APPP) and
Local Defense Initiative ............................................................................................. 37
Reversal of Previous Efforts: DDR and DIAG programs ............................................... 38
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Possible Future Limits on U.S. Operations/Status of Forces Agreement ............................... 39
Long-Term Security Commitment ................................................................................. 39
Alliance Issues: The NATO-Led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and
Operation Enduring Freedom ........................................................................................... 40
Recent Major Contingent Developments ....................................................................... 41
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) ............................................................................. 43
Evolving Civil-Military Concepts at the PRTs ............................................................... 44
Afghan National Security Forces......................................................................................... 44
Afghan National Army.................................................................................................. 45
Afghan Air Force .......................................................................................................... 47
Afghan National Police (ANP) ...................................................................................... 47
Rule of Law/Criminal Justice Sector ............................................................................. 48
U.S. Security Forces Funding/”CERP”.......................................................................... 48
Policy Alternatives/Support for Reduced U.S. Military Involvement.................................... 50
“Counter-Terrorism” Strategy........................................................................................ 51
Legislative Initiatives: Drawdown Plans........................................................................ 51
Concede Parts of Afghanistan to the Taliban.................................................................. 52
Regional Dimension.................................................................................................................. 52
Pakistan/Pakistan-Afghanistan Border................................................................................. 54
Cooperation Against Al Qaeda ...................................................................................... 55
Increased Direct U.S. Action ......................................................................................... 55
Recent History of Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations......................................................... 55
Iran..................................................................................................................................... 56
India ................................................................................................................................... 59
Russia, Central Asian States, and China............................................................................... 59
Russia ........................................................................................................................... 60
Central Asian States ...................................................................................................... 60
China ............................................................................................................................ 61
Persian Gulf States: Saudi Arabia and UAE......................................................................... 62
U.S. and International Aid to Afghanistan and Development Issues ........................................... 63
U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan............................................................................................ 63
Direct Aid and Budget Support to the Afghan Government ............................................ 64
Aid Oversight ............................................................................................................... 64
Aid Authorization: Afghanistan Freedom Support Act ................................................... 64
International Reconstruction Pledges/National Development Strategy ........................... 66
Results of U.S. and International Aid in Key Sectors ........................................................... 67
Electricity Sector........................................................................................................... 68
Agriculture Sector ......................................................................................................... 69
Private Sector-Led Development ......................................................................................... 70
Trade Initiatives/Reconstruction Opportunity Zones ............................................................ 72
Residual Issues from Past Conflicts........................................................................................... 89
Stinger Retrieval ........................................................................................................... 89
Mine Eradication........................................................................................................... 89

Figures
Figure A-1. Map of Afghanistan ................................................................................................ 93
Figure A-2. Map of Afghan Ethnicities ...................................................................................... 94
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Tables
Table 1. Afghanistan Social and Economic Statistics ................................................................... 4
Table 2. U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) ..................................................... 19
Table 3. Background on NATO/ISAF Formation and U.N. Mandate .......................................... 41
Table 4. Operation Enduring Freedom Partner Forces................................................................ 43
Table 5. Major Security-Related Indicators................................................................................ 50
Table 6. Afghan and Regional Facilities Used for
Operations in and Supply Lines to Afghanistan ...................................................................... 53
Table 7. Major Reporting Requirements .................................................................................... 66
Table 8. Major International (Non-U.S.) Pledges to Afghanistan Since January 2002................. 73
Table 9. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998 ........................................................ 74
Table 10. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002....................................................... 75
Table 11. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2003..................................................................... 76
Table 12. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004 .................................................................... 77
Table 13. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2005 .................................................................... 78
Table 14. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2006 .................................................................... 79
Table 15. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2007 .................................................................... 80
Table 16. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2008 .................................................................... 81
Table 17. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2009 .................................................................... 82
Table 18. FY2010 Assistance (Includes Supplemental) .............................................................. 83
Table 19. FY2011 Regular Request ........................................................................................... 84
Table 20. Total Obligations for Major Programs: FY2001-FY2009 ............................................ 85
Table 21. NATO/ISAF Contributing Nations ............................................................................. 86
Table 22. Provincial Reconstruction Teams ............................................................................... 87
Table 23. Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan ...................................................................... 88

Appendixes
Appendix. U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted .................................................................... 91

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 94

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Background
Afghanistan has a history of a high degree of decentralization, and resistance to foreign invasion
and occupation. Some have termed it the “graveyard of empires.”
From Early History to the 19th Century
Alexander the Great conquered what is now Afghanistan in three years (330 B.C.E. to 327
B.C.E), although at significant cost and with significant difficulty, and requiring, among other
steps, marriage to a resident of the conquered territory. From the third to the eighth century, A.D.,
Buddhism was the dominant religion in Afghanistan. At the end of the seventh century, Islam
spread in Afghanistan when Arab invaders from the Umayyad Dynasty defeated the Persian
empire of the Sassanians. In the 10th century, Muslim rulers called Samanids, from Bukhara (in
what is now Uzbekistan), extended their influence into Afghanistan, and the complete conversion
of Afghanistan to Islam occurred during the rule of the Gaznavids in the 11th century. They ruled
over the first vast Islamic empire based in what is now Ghazni province of Afghanistan.
In 1504, Babur, a descendent of the conquerors Tamarlane and Genghis Khan, took control of
Kabul and then moved onto India, establishing the Mughal Empire. (Babur is buried in the Babur
Gardens complex in Kabul, which has been refurbished with the help of the Agha Khan
Foundation.) Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, Afghanistan was fought over by the Mughal
Empire and the Safavid Dynasty of Persia (now Iran), with the Safavids mostly controlling Herat
and western Afghanistan, and the Mughals controlling Kabul and the east. A monarchy ruled by
ethnic Pashtuns was founded in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, who was a senior officer in the
army of Nadir Shah, ruler of Persia, when Nadir Shah was assassinated and Persian control over
Afghanistan weakened.
A strong ruler, Dost Muhammad Khan, emerged in Kabul in 1826 and created concerns among
Britain that the Afghans were threatening Britain’s control of India; that fear led to a British
decision in 1838 to intervene in Afghanistan, setting off the first Anglo-Afghan War (1838-1842).
Nearly all of the 4,500-person British force was killed in that war, which ended with a final
British stand at Gandamack. The second Anglo-Afghan War took place during 1878-1880.
Early 20th Century and Cold War Era
King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) launched attacks on British forces in Afghanistan (Third
Anglo-Afghan War) shortly after taking power and won complete independence from Britain as
recognized in the Treaty of Rawalpindi (August 8, 1919). He was considered a secular
modernizer presiding over a government in which all ethnic minorities participated. He was
succeeded by King Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-1933), and then by King Mohammad Zahir
Shah. Zahir Shah’s reign (1933-1973) is remembered fondly by many older Afghans for
promulgating a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature and promoting
freedoms for women, including dropping a requirement that they cover their face and hair.
However, possibly believing that he could limit Soviet support for Communist factions in
Afghanistan, Zahir Shah also entered into a significant political and arms purchase relationship
with the Soviet Union. The Soviets began to build large infrastructure projects in Afghanistan
during Zahir Shah’s time, such as the north-south Salang Pass/Tunnel and Bagram airfield. He
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also accepted agricultural and other development aid from the United States. In part, the
countryside was secured during the King’s time by local tribal militias called arbokai.
Afghanistan’s slide into instability began in the 1970s when the diametrically opposed
Communist Party and Islamic movements grew in strength. While receiving medical treatment in
Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad Daoud, a military leader who
established a dictatorship with strong state involvement in the economy. Daoud was overthrown
and killed1 in April 1978 by People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA, Communist party)
military officers under the direction of two PDPA (Khalq faction) leaders, Hafizullah Amin and
Nur Mohammad Taraki, in what is called the Saur (April) Revolution. Taraki became president,
but he was displaced in September 1979 by Amin. Both leaders drew their strength from rural
ethnic Pashtuns and tried to impose radical socialist change on a traditional society, in part by
redistributing land and bringing more women into government. The attempt at rapid
modernization sparked rebellion by Islamic parties opposed to such moves. The Soviet Union
sent troops into Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, to prevent a seizure of power by the Islamic
militias, known as the mujahedin (Islamic fighters). Upon their invasion, the Soviets replaced
Amin with another PDPA leader perceived as pliable, Babrak Karmal (Parcham faction of the
PDPA), who was part of the 1978 PDPA takeover but was exiled by Taraki and Amin.
Soviet occupation forces, which numbered about 120,000, were never able to pacify the outlying
areas of the country. The mujahedin benefited from U.S. weapons and assistance, provided
through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in cooperation with Pakistan’s Inter-Service
Intelligence directorate (ISI). The mujahedin were also relatively well organized and coordinated
by seven major parties that in early 1989 formed a Peshawar-based “Afghan Interim
Government” (AIG). The seven party leaders were Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi; Sibghatullah
Mojaddedi; Gulbuddin Hikmatyar; Burhanuddin Rabbani; Yunus Khalis; Abd-i-Rab Rasul
Sayyaf; and Pir Gaylani. Mohammadi and Khalis have died in recent years of natural causes, but
the others are still active in Afghan politics and governance or, in the case of Hikmatyar, fighting
the Afghan government.
The mujahedin weaponry included U.S.-supplied portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft systems
called “Stingers,” which proved highly effective against Soviet aircraft. The United States
decided in 1985 to provide these weapons to the mujahedin after substantial debate within the
Reagan Administration and some in Congress over whether they could be used effectively and
whether doing so would harm broader U.S.-Soviet relations. The mujahedin also hid and stored
weaponry in a large network of natural and manmade tunnels and caves throughout Afghanistan.
Partly because of the effectiveness of the Stinger in shooting down Soviet helicopters and fixed
wing aircraft, the Soviet Union’s losses mounted—about 13,400 Soviet soldiers were killed in the
war, according to Soviet figures—turning Soviet domestic opinion against the war. In 1986, after
the reformist Mikhail Gorbachev became leader, the Soviets replaced Karmal with the director of
Afghan intelligence, Najibullah Ahmedzai (known by his first name). Najibullah was a Ghilzai
Pashtun, and was from the Parcham faction of the PDPA. Some Afghans say that some aspects of
his governing style were admirable, particularly his appointment of a prime minister (Sultan Ali
Keshtmand and others) to handle administrative duties and distribute power.

1 Daoud’s grave was discovered outside Kabul in early 2008. He was reburied in an official ceremony in Kabul in
March 2009.
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Geneva Accords (1988) and Soviet Withdrawal
On April 14, 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the Geneva Accords) requiring
it to withdraw. The withdrawal was completed by February 15, 1989, leaving in place the weak
Najibullah government. A warming of relations moved the United States and Soviet Union to try
for a political settlement to the Afghan conflict, a trend accelerated by the 1991 collapse of the
Soviet Union, which reduced Moscow’s capacity for supporting communist regimes in the Third
World. On September 13, 1991, Moscow and Washington agreed to a joint cutoff of military aid
to the Afghan combatants.
The State Department has said that a total of about $3 billion in economic and covert military
assistance was provided by the U.S. to the Afghan mujahedin from 1980 until the end of the
Soviet occupation in 1989. Press reports say the covert aid program grew from about $20 million
per year in FY1980 to about $300 million per year during FY1986-FY1990.2 The Soviet pullout
decreased the perceived strategic value of Afghanistan, causing a reduction in subsequent covert
funding. As indicated in Table 9, U.S. assistance to Afghanistan remained at relatively low levels
from the time of the Soviet withdrawal, validating the views of many that the United States
largely considered its role in Afghanistan “completed” when Soviets troops left, and there was
little support for a major U.S. effort to rebuild the country. The United States closed its embassy
in Kabul in January 1989, as the Soviet Union was completing its pullout, and it remained so until
the fall of the Taliban in 2001.
With Soviet backing withdrawn, Najibullah rallied the PDPA Army and the party-dominated
paramilitary organization called the Sarandoy, and successfully beat back the first post-Soviet
withdrawal mujahedin offensives. Although Najibullah defied expectations that his government
would immediately collapse after a Soviet withdrawal, military defections continued and his
position weakened in subsequent years. On March 18, 1992, Najibullah publicly agreed to step
down once an interim government was formed. That announcement set off a wave of rebellions
primarily by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders in northern Afghanistan—particularly Abdul
Rashid Dostam, who joined prominent mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud of the Islamic
Society, a largely Tajik party headed by Burhannudin Rabbani. Masud had earned a reputation as
a brilliant strategist by preventing the Soviets from occupying his power base in the Panjshir
Valley of northeastern Afghanistan. Najibullah fell, and the mujahedin regime began April 18,
1992.3 Each year, a public parade is held to mark that day. (Some major mujahedin figures did not
attend the 2010 celebration because of a perception that they are under Afghan public and
international criticism of their immunity from alleged human rights abuses during the anti-Soviet
war.)

2 For FY1991, Congress reportedly cut covert aid appropriations to the mujahedin from $300 million the previous year
to $250 million, with half the aid withheld until the second half of the fiscal year. See “Country Fact Sheet:
Afghanistan,” in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 5, no. 23 (June 6, 1994), p. 377.
3 After failing to flee, Najibullah, his brother, and aides remained at a U.N. facility in Kabul until the Taliban
movement seized control in 1996 and hanged them.
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Table 1. Afghanistan Social and Economic Statistics
Population
28
million +. Kabul population is 3 million, up from 500,000 in Taliban era.
Ethnicities/Religions
Pashtun 42%; Tajik 27%; Uzbek 9%; Hazara 9%; Aimak 4%; Turkmen 3%; Baluch 2%.
Size of Religious
Religions: Sunni (Hanafi school) 80%; Shiite (Hazaras, Qizilbash, and Isma’ilis) 19%;
Minorities
other 1%Christians-estimated 500-8,000 persons; Sikh and Hindu-3,000 persons;
Bahai’s-400 (declared blasphemous in May 2007); Jews-1 person; Buddhist- smal
numbers, mostly foreigners. No Christian or Jewish schools. One church.
Literacy Rate
28% of population over 15 years of age. 43% of males; 12.6% of females.
Total and Per Capita
$23.3 billion purchasing power parity. 114th in the world. Per capita: $800 purchasing
GDP/Growth Rates
power parity. 219th in the world. Growth: 14%, about the same 12% in 2007.
Unemployment Rate
40%
Children in
5.7 million, of which 35% are girls. Up from 900,000 in school during Taliban era. 8,000
School/Schools Built
schools built; 140,000 teachers hired since Taliban era. 17 universities, up from 2 in
2002. 75,000 Afghans in universities in Afghanistan; 5,000 when Taliban was in power.
35% of university students in Afghanistan are female.
Afghans With Access to 65% with basic health services access-compared to 8% during Taliban era. Infant
Health Coverage
mortality down 18% since Taliban to 135 per 1,000 live births. 680 clinics built .
Roads Built
About 2,500 miles paved post-Taliban, including repaving of “Ring Road” (78%
complete) that circles the country. Kabul-Qandahar drive reduced to 6 hours.
Judges/Courts
About 1,000 judges trained since fal of Taliban; some removed for corruption
Banks Operating
17, including branches in some rural areas, but still about 90% of the population use
hawalas, or informal money transfer services. Zero banks existed during Taliban era.
Some limited credit card use. Some Afghan police now paid by cell phone (E-Paisa).
Access to Electricity
15%-20% of the population.
Gov’t Revenues (excl.
About $1.4 billion in 2010; nearly double the $720 million 2007. Total Afghan budget is
donor funds)
about $3 billion, with shortfall covered by foreign donors, including through World
Bank-run Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund.
Financial Reserves
About $4.4 billion, up from $180 million in 2002. Includes amounts due Central Bank.
External Debt
$8 billion bilateral, plus $500 million multilateral. U.S. forgave $108 million in debt in
2004, and $1.6 billion forgiven by other creditors in March 2010.
Foreign/Private
About $500 million to $1 billion per year. Four Afghan airlines: Ariana (national) plus
Investment
three privately owned: Safi, Kam, and Pamir.
Mining/Minerals
Vast untapped minerals affirmed by U.S. experts (June 2010). Chinese firm mining
copper in Lowgar Province; December 2010: contracts let to produce oil in Sar-I-Pol
Province (north) and for private investers to mine gold in Baghlan Province.
Agriculture/Major Legal
80% of the population is involved in agriculture. Self-sufficiency in wheat production as
Exports
of May 2009 (first time in 30 years). Products for export include fruits, raisins, melons,
pomegranate juice (Anar), nuts, carpets, lapis lazuli gems, marble tile, timber products
(Kunar, Nuristan provinces). July 2010 Afghanistan-Pakistan trade agreement may
increase these exports. Some raisins being exported to Britain.
Oil Proven Reserves
3.6 billion barrels of oil, 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas. Current oil production negligible,
but USAID funding project to revive oil and gas facilities in the north.
Import
Pakistan 38.6%; U.S. 9.5%; Germany 5.5%; India 5.2%. Main imports are food,
Partners/Imports
petroleum, capital goods, textiles, autos
Cellphones/Tourism
About 12 million cellphones, up from several hundred used by Taliban government
officials. Tourism: National park opened in Bamiyan June 2009. Increasing tourist visits.
Sources: CIA, The World Factbook; various press and U.S. government official testimony.
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The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban
The fall of Najibullah exposed the differences among the mujahedin parties. The leader of one of
the smaller parties (Afghan National Liberation Front), Islamic scholar Sibghatullah Mojadeddi,
was president during April-May 1992. Under an agreement among the major parties, Rabbani
became President in June 1992 with agreement that he would serve until December 1994. He
refused to step down at that time, saying that political authority would disintegrate without a clear
successor. Kabul was subsequently shelled by other mujahedin factions, particularly that of
nominal “Prime Minister” Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a Pashtun, who accused Rabbani of
monopolizing power. Hikmatyar, who never formally assumed a working prime ministerial role
in Kabul because of suspicions of Rabbani, was purportedly backed by Pakistan. Hikmatyar’s
radical faction of the Islamist Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) had received a large proportion of the
U.S. aid during the anti-Soviet war. (Yunus Khalis led a more moderate faction of Hizb-e-Islami
during that war.)
In 1993-1994, Afghan Islamic clerics and students, mostly of rural, Pashtun origin, formed the
Taliban movement. Many were former mujahedin who had become disillusioned with conflict
among mujahedin parties and had moved into Pakistan to study in Islamic seminaries
(“madrassas”) mainly of the “Deobandi” school of Islam.4Some say this Islam is similar to the
“Wahhabism” that is practiced in Saudi Arabia. Taliban practices were also consonant with
conservative Pashtun tribal traditions.
The Taliban viewed the Rabbani government as corrupt and anti-Pashtun, and the four years of
civil war (1992-1996) created popular support for the Taliban as able to deliver stability. With the
help of defections, the Taliban peacefully took control of the southern city of Qandahar in
November 1994. By February 1995, it was approaching Kabul, after which an 18-month
stalemate ensued. In September 1995, the Taliban captured Herat province, bordering Iran, and
imprisoned its governor, Ismail Khan, ally of Rabbani and Masud, who later escaped and took
refuge in Iran. In September 1996, new Taliban victories near Kabul led to the withdrawal of
Rabbani and Masud to the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul with most of their heavy weapons; the
Taliban took control of Kabul on September 27, 1996. Taliban gunmen subsequently entered a
U.N. facility in Kabul to seize Najibullah, his brother, and aides, and then hanged them.
Taliban Rule (September 1996-November 2001)
The Taliban regime was led by Mullah Muhammad Umar, who lost an eye in the anti-Soviet war
while fighting as part of the Hizb-e-Islami mujahedin party of Yunis Khalis. Umar held the title of
Head of State and “Commander of the Faithful,” remaining in the Taliban power base in
Qandahar and almost never appearing in public, although he did occasionally receive high-level
foreign officials. Umar forged a political and personal bond with bin Laden and refused U.S.
demands to extradite him. Like Umar, most of the senior figures in the Taliban regime were
Ghilzai Pashtuns, which predominate in eastern Afghanistan. They are rivals of the Durrani
Pashtuns, who are predominant in the south.

4 The Deobandi school began in 1867 in a seminary in Uttar Pradesh, in British-controlled India, that was set up to train
Islamic clerics and to counter the British educational model.
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The Taliban progressively lost international and domestic support as it imposed strict adherence
to Islamic customs in areas it controlled and employed harsh punishments, including executions.
The Taliban authorized its “Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice” to
use physical punishments to enforce strict Islamic practices, including bans on television, Western
music, and dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or working outside the home,
except in health care, and it publicly executed some women for adultery. In what many consider
its most extreme action, and which some say was urged by bin Laden, in March 2001 the Taliban
blew up two large Buddha statues carved into hills above Bamiyan city, considering them idols.
The Clinton Administration held talks with the Taliban before and after it took power, but was
unable to moderate its policies. The United States withheld recognition of Taliban as the
legitimate government of Afghanistan, formally recognizing no faction as the government. The
United Nations continued to seat representatives of the Rabbani government, not the Taliban. The
State Department ordered the Afghan embassy in Washington, DC, closed in August 1997. U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1193 (August 28, 1998) and 1214 (December 8, 1998) urged the
Taliban to end discrimination against women. Women’s rights groups urged the Clinton
Administration not to recognize the Taliban government. In May 1999, the Senate-passed S.Res.
68 called on the President not to recognize an Afghan government that oppresses women.
The Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda’s leadership gradually became the Clinton Administration’s
overriding agenda item with Afghanistan. In April 1998, then U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations Bill Richardson (along with Assistant Secretary of State Karl Indurfurth and NSC senior
official Bruce Riedel) visited Afghanistan, but the Taliban refused to hand over bin Laden. They
did not meet Mullah Umar. After the August 7, 1998, Al Qaeda bombings of U.S. embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton Administration progressively pressured the Taliban, imposing
U.S. sanctions and achieving adoption of some U.N. sanctions as well. On August 20, 1998, the
United States fired cruise missiles at alleged Al Qaeda training camps in eastern Afghanistan, but
bin Laden was not hit.5 Some observers assert that the Administration missed several clearer
opportunities to strike him, including a purported sighting of him by an unarmed Predator drone
at the Tarnak Farm camp in Afghanistan in the fall of 2000.6 Clinton Administration officials said
that domestic and international support for ousting the Taliban militarily was lacking.
The “Northern Alliance” Congeals
The Taliban’s policies caused different Afghan factions to ally with the ousted President Rabbani
and Masud and their ally in the Herat area, Ismail Khan—the Tajik core of the anti-Taliban
opposition—into a broader “Northern Alliance.” In the Alliance were Uzbek, Hazara Shiite, and
even some Pashtun Islamist factions discussed in Table 3. Virtually all the figures mentioned
remain key players in politics in Afghanistan, sometimes allied with and at other times feuding
with President Hamid Karzai:
Uzbeks/General Dostam. One major faction was the Uzbek militia (the
Junbush-Melli, or National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) of General Abdul
Rashid Dostam. Frequently referred to by some Afghans as one of the “warlords”
who gained power during the anti-Soviet war, Dostam first joined those seeking

5 A pharmaceutical plant in Sudan (Al Shifa) believe to be producing chemical weapons for Al Qaeda also was struck
that day, although U.S. reviews later corroborated Sudan’s assertions that the plant was strictly civilian in nature.
6 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4540958.
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to oust Rabbani during his 1992-1996 presidency, but later joined Rabbani’s
Northern Alliance against the Taliban. (For more information on Dostam, see
CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government
Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman.)
Hazara Shiites. Members of Hazara tribes, mostly Shiite Muslims, are
prominent in Bamiyan, Dai Kundi, and Ghazni provinces (central Afghanistan)
and are always wary of repression by Pashtuns and other larger ethnic factions.
The Hazaras have tended to serve in working class and domestic household jobs,
although more recently they have been prominent in technology jobs in Kabul,
raising their economic status. They are also increasingly cohesive politically,
leading to gains in the September 2010 parliamentary elections. During the
various Afghan wars, the main Hazara Shiite militia was Hizb-e-Wahdat (Unity
Party, composed of eight different groups). Hizb-e-Wahdat suffered a major
setback in 1995 when the Taliban captured and killed its leader Abdul Ali Mazari.
One of Karzai’s vice president’s Karim Khalili, is a Hazara. Another prominent
Hazara faction leader is Mohammad Mohaqeq.
Pashtun Islamists/Sayyaf. Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, later a post-Taliban
parliamentary committee chairman, headed a Pashtun-dominated hardline
Islamist mujahedin faction called the Islamic Union for the Liberation of
Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet war. Even though he is an Islamic
conservative, Sayyaf viewed the Taliban as selling out Afghanistan to Al Qaeda
and he joined the Northern Alliance to try to oust the Taliban. He is said to eye
the speakership of the lower house of parliament.
Policy Pre-September 11, 2001
Throughout 2001, but prior to the September 11 attacks, Bush Administration policy differed little
from Clinton Administration policy—applying economic and political pressure while retaining
dialogue with the Taliban, and refraining from militarily assisting the Northern Alliance. The
September 11 Commission report said that, in the months prior to the September 11 attacks,
Administration officials leaned toward such a step and that some officials also wanted to assist
ethnic Pashtuns who were opposed to the Taliban. Other covert options were reportedly under
consideration as well.7 In a departure from Clinton Administration policy, the Bush
Administration stepped up engagement with Pakistan to try to reduce its support for the Taliban.
At that time, there were allegations that Pakistani advisers were helping the Taliban in their fight
against the Northern Alliance. In accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, in
February 2001 the State Department ordered the Taliban representative office in New York
closed, although Taliban representative Abdul Hakim Mujahid continued to operate informally.
(Mujahid has reconciled with the current Afghan government, and serves on a Council to oversee
broader reconciliation.) In March 2001, Administration officials received a Taliban envoy to
discuss bilateral issues.
Even though the Northern Alliance was supplied with Iranian, Russian, and Indian financial and
military support—all of whom had different motives for that support—the Northern Alliance
nonetheless continued to lose ground to the Taliban after it lost Kabul in 1996. By the time of the

7 Drogin, Bob. “U.S. Had Plan for Covert Afghan Options Before 9/11.” Los Angeles Times, May 18, 2002.
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September 11 attacks, the Taliban controlled at least 75% of the country, including almost all
provincial capitals. The Alliance suffered a major setback on September 9, 2001, two days before
the September 11 attacks, when Ahmad Shah Masud was assassinated by Arab journalists who
allegedly were Al Qaeda operatives. He was succeeded by his intelligence chief, Muhammad
Fahim,8 a veteran figure but one who lacked Masud’s undisputed authority.
September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom
After the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration decided to militarily overthrow the
Taliban when it refused to extradite bin Laden, judging that a friendly regime in Kabul was
needed to enable U.S forces to search for Al Qaeda activists there. United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1368 of September 12, 2001, said that the Security Council
expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond (implying force) to the
September 11 attacks.
This is widely interpreted as a U.N. authorization for military action in response to the attacks,
but it did not explicitly authorize Operation Enduring Freedom to oust the Taliban. Nor did the
Resolution specifically reference Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which allows for responses to
threats to international peace and security.
In Congress, S.J.Res. 23 (passed 98-0 in the Senate and with no objections in the House, P.L.
107-40), was somewhat more explicit than the U.N. Resolution, authorizing9
all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or persons.
Major combat in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) began on October 7, 2001. It
consisted primarily of U.S. air-strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, facilitated by the
cooperation between small numbers (about 1,000) of U.S. special operations forces and CIA
operatives. The purpose of these operations was to help the Northern Alliance and Pashtun anti-
Taliban forces by providing information to direct U.S. air strikes against Taliban positions. In
part, the U.S. forces and operatives worked with such Northern Alliance contacts as Fahim and
Amrollah Saleh, who during November 2001–June 2010 served as Afghanistan’s intelligence
director, to weaken Taliban defenses on the Shomali plain north of Kabul (and just south of
Bagram Airfield, which marked the forward position of the Northern Alliance during Taliban
rule). Some U.S. combat units (about 1,300 Marines) moved into Afghanistan to pressure the
Taliban around Qandahar at the height of the fighting (October-December 2001), but there were
few pitched battles between U.S. and Taliban soldiers. Some critics believe that U.S. dependence
on local Afghan militia forces in the war subsequently set back post-war democracy building.
The Taliban regime unraveled rapidly after it lost Mazar-e-Sharif on November 9, 2001, to forces
led by Dostam.10 Other, mainly Tajik, Northern Alliance forces—the commanders of which had

8 Some Afghan sources refer to him by the name “Fahim Khan,” or “Marshal Fahim.”
9 Another law (P.L. 107-148) established a “Radio Free Afghanistan” under RFE/RL, providing $17 million in funding
for it for FY2002.
10 In the process, Dostam captured Taliban fighters and imprisoned them in freight containers, causing many to
suffocate. They were buried in a mass grave at Dasht-e-Laili. This issue is covered in CRS Report RS21922,
(continued...)
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initially promised U.S. officials they would not enter Kabul—entered the capital on November
12, 2001, to popular jubilation. The Taliban subsequently lost the south and east to U.S.-
supported Pashtun leaders, including Hamid Karzai. The end of the Taliban regime is generally
dated as December 9, 2001, when the Taliban surrendered Qandahar and Mullah Umar fled the
city, leaving it under tribal law administered by Pashtun leaders such as the Noorzai clan.
Subsequently, U.S. and Afghan forces conducted “Operation Anaconda” in the Shah-i-Kot Valley
south of Gardez (Paktia Province) during March 2-19, 2002, against 800 Al Qaeda and Taliban
fighters. In March 2003, about 1,000 U.S. troops raided suspected Taliban or Al Qaeda fighters in
villages around Qandahar (Operation Valiant Strike). On May 1, 2003, Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld announced an end to “major combat.”
Post-Taliban Nation-Building Efforts11
With Afghanistan devastated after more than 20 years of warfare, the 2001 fall of the Taliban
regime raised questions about the extent of a U.S. and international commitment to Afghanistan.
Taking the view that leaving the Afghanistan-Pakistan theater after the 1989 Soviet pullout had
led Afghanistan degenerate into chaos, the decision was made by the Bush Administration to try
to rebuild try to build a relatively strong central government and to assist Afghanistan’s economy,
in order to prevent a return of the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and other militants to Afghanistan.
The effort, which many outside experts described as “nation-building,” was supported by major
international institutions and U.S. partners in several post-Taliban international meetings. The
task has proved slower and more difficult than anticipated, in part because of the devastation that
years of war wrought on governing institutions, on the education system, and on the already
limited infrastructure. Some observers believe the international community had unrealistic
expectations of what could be achieved in a relatively short time frame—particularly in
establishing competent, non-corrupt governance and a vibrant democracy.
The Obama Administration’s two “Afghanistan strategy reviews” in 2009 the results of which
were announced on March 27, 2009, and on December 1, 2009, narrowed official U.S. goals to
preventing terrorism safe haven in Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, the elements of Obama
Administration strategy in many ways enhance the nation-building strategy put in place by the
Bush Administration. A strategy review, the summary of results of which were released December
16, 2010, did not alter U.S. goals or strategy set in the December 1, 2009, statement.12 Reforming
Afghan governance has been a consistent theme, and was emphasized both at the two major
international conferences on Afghanistan—the January 28, 2010, “London Conference” and the
July 20, 2010, “Kabul Conference.”13 Although the issue of governance is inseparable from that
of securing Afghanistan, the sections below briefly outline Afghan-generated and international

(...continued)
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by Kenneth Katzman.
11 See also CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by Kenneth
Katzman.
12 Text of the released summary is at http://documents.nytimes.com/the-obama-administrations-overview-on-
afghanistan-and-pakistan.
13 A draft of the final communiqué of the Kabul Conference is at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100720.ap_on_re_as/
as_afghanistan/print.
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community-led efforts to build Afghanistan’s governing capacity. These governance issues are
discussed in greater detail in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and
Government Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman.
Post-Taliban Political Transition
The 2001 ouster of the Taliban government paved the way for the success of a long-stalled U.N.
effort to form a broad-based Afghan government and for the international community to help
Afghanistan build legitimate governing institutions. In the formation of the first post-Taliban
transition government, the United Nations was viewed as a credible mediator by all sides largely
because of its role in ending the Soviet occupation. During the 1990s, a succession of U.N.
mediators adopted many of former King Zahir Shah’s proposals for a government to be selected
by a traditional assembly, or loya jirga. However, U.N.-mediated cease-fires between warring
factions did not hold. Non-U.N. initiatives made little progress, particularly the “Six Plus Two”
multilateral contact group, which began meeting in 1997 (the United States, Russia, and the six
states bordering Afghanistan: Iran, China, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan).
Other failed efforts included a “Geneva group” (Italy, Germany, Iran, and the United States)
formed in 2000; an Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) contact group; and prominent
Afghan exile efforts, including discussion groups launched by Hamid Karzai and his clan, former
mujahedin commander Abd al-Haq, and Zahir Shah (“Rome process”).
Bonn Agreement
Immediately after the September 11 attacks, former U.N. mediator Lakhdar Brahimi was brought
back (he had resigned in frustration in October 1999). U.N. Security Council Resolution 1378
(November 14, 2001) called for a “central” role for the United Nations in establishing a
transitional administration and inviting member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote
stability and aid delivery. After the fall of Kabul in November 2001, the United Nations invited
major Afghan factions, most prominently the Northern Alliance and that of the former King—but
not the Taliban—to an international conference in Bonn, Germany.
On December 5, 2001, the factions signed the “Bonn Agreement.”14 It was endorsed by U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1385 (December 6, 2001). The agreement was reportedly forged
with substantial Iranian diplomatic help because Iran had supported the military efforts of the
Northern Alliance faction and had leverage to persuade temporary caretaker Rabbani and the
Northern Alliance to cede the top leadership to Hamid Karzai as leader of an interim
administration. Other provisions of the agreement:
• authorized an international peace keeping force to maintain security in Kabul,
and Northern Alliance forces were directed to withdraw from the capital. Security
Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001, and renewed yearly thereafter)
gave formal Security Council authorization for the international peacekeeping
force (International Security Assistance Force, ISAF);
• referred to the need to cooperate with the international community on counter
narcotics, crime, and terrorism; and

14 Text of Bonn agreement at http://www.ag-afghanistan.de/files/petersberg.htm.
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• applied the constitution of 1964 until a permanent constitution could be drafted.15
Permanent Constitution
A June 2002 “emergency” loya jirga put a representative imprimatur on the transition; it was
attended by 1,550 delegates (including about 200 women). Subsequently, a 35-member
constitutional commission drafted the constitution, unveiling it in November 2003. It was debated
by 502 delegates, selected in U.N-run caucuses, at a “constitutional loya jirga (CLJ)” during
December 13, 2003–January 4, 2004. The CLJ, chaired by Sibghatullah Mojadeddi (mentioned
above) ended with approval of the constitution with only minor changes. It set up a presidential
system, with an elected president and a separately elected National Assembly (parliament). The
Northern Alliance failed in its effort to set up a prime ministership (in which the elected
parliament would select a prime minister and a cabinet) , but the faction did achieve some
limitation to presidential powers by assigning major authorities to the parliament, such as the
power to veto senior official nominees. The constitution made former King Zahir Shah honorary
“Father of the Nation,” a title that is not heritable. Zahir Shah died on July 23, 2007.16
First Post-Taliban Elections in 2004
Security conditions precluded the holding of the first post-Taliban elections simultaneously. The
first election, for president, was held on October 9, 2004, missing a June constitutional deadline.
Turnout was about 80%. On November 3, 2004, Karzai was declared winner (55.4% of the vote)
over his 17 challengers on the first round, avoiding a runoff. Parliamentary and provincial council
elections were intended for April-May 2005 but were delayed until September 18, 2005. Because
of the difficulty in confirming voter registration rolls and determining district boundaries,
elections for the 364 district councils, each of which will likely have contentious boundaries
because they will inevitably separate tribes and clans, have not been held to date.
Formation of an Elected National Assembly (Parliament)
The National Assembly (parliament), particularly the elected lower house, has emerged as a
relatively vibrant body that creates accountability and has often asserted itself politically. The
most notable example has been the 2009-2010 confirmation process for Karzai’s cabinet choices,
in which many of Karzai’s nominees were voted down. The Assembly’s assertiveness—expected
to continue when a newly elected parliament is seated on January 20, 2011—shows, in part, that
the better educated “independents” are emerging as pivotal members of parliament. Substantial
detail on the factions in the Afghan parliament is provided in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan:
Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman.


15 The last pre-Karzai loya jirga that was widely recognized as legitimate was held in 1964 to ratify a constitution.
Najibullah convened a loya jirga in 1987 to approve pro-Moscow policies, but that gathering was widely viewed by
Afghans as illegitimate.
16 Text of constitution: http://arabic.cnn.com/afghanistan/ConstitutionAfghanistan.pdf.
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Hamid Karzai, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Hamid Karzai, born December 24, 1957, was selected to lead Afghanistan at the Bonn Conference because he was a
prominent Pashtun leader who had been involved in Taliban-era political talks among exiled Afghans and was viewed
as a compromiser rather than a “strongman.” However, some observers consider his compromises as Afghanistan’s
leader a sign of weakness, and criticize him for indulging members of his clan and other allies with appointments.
Others view him as overly suspicious of the intentions of the United States and other outside powers, believing they
are intent on replacing him or favoring certain groups of Afghans over others. He has consistently denied al egations
by unnamed U.S. and other officials that he is taking mood altering medications—asserted to be a possible explanation
for his occasional sharp criticisms of some aspects of U.S. Afghanistan policy.
From Karz village in Qandahar Province, Hamid Karzai has led the powerful Popolzai tribe of Durrani Pashtuns since
1999, when his father was assassinated, al egedly by Taliban agents, in Quetta, Pakistan. Karzai’s grandfather was head
of the consultative National Council during King Zahir Shah’s reign. He attended university in India and supported the
mujahdin party of Sibghatullah Mojadeddi (still a very close ally) during the ant-Soviet war. He was deputy foreign
minister in the mujahidin government of Rabbani during 1992-1995, but he left the government and supported the
Taliban as a Pashtun alternative to Rabbani. He broke with the Taliban as its excesses unfolded and forged alliances
with other anti-Taliban factions, including the Northern Alliance. Karzai entered Afghanistan after the September 11
attacks to organize Pashtun resistance to the Taliban, supported by U.S. Special Forces. He became central to U.S.
efforts after Pashtun commander Abdul Haq entered Afghanistan in October 2001 without U.S. support and was
captured and hung by the Taliban. Karzai was slightly injured by an errant U.S. bomb during major combat of
Operation Enduring Freedom (late 2001).
Karzai also relies heavily for advice from tribal and faction leaders from southern Afghanistan, including Sher
Mohammad Akhunzadeh, the former governor of Helmand (until 2005), as wel as from wel -educated professionals
such as his current Foreign Minister Zalmay Rasool, his brother-in-law and key Afghanistan National Security Council
official Ibrahim Spinzada, and the former foreign minister, now National Security Adviser, Rangeen Spanta.
With heavy protection, Karzai has survived several assassination attempts since taking office, including rocket fire or
gunfire at or near his appearances. His wife, Dr. Zenat Karzai, is a gynecologist by profession. They have been married
about 11 years and have a son, Mirwais, born in 2008. In December 2009, he spoke publicly about personal turmoil
among relatives in Karz vil age that resulted in the death of an 18-year-old relative in October 2009.
His half brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, is the most powerful political figure in that province, He is key to Karzai’s
maintenance of support and the cornerstone of his information network in Qandahar but Ahmad Wali has been
widely accused of involvement in or tolerating narcotics trafficking. A New York Times article on October 28, 2009,
said Ahmad Wali is also a paid informant for the CIA and some of his property has been used by U.S. Special Forces.
Ahmad Wali was the apparent target of at least two bombings in Qandahar in 2009. Others of Karzai’s several
brothers have lived in the United States, including Qayyum Karzai. Qayyum Karzai won a parliament seat in the
September 2005 election but resigned his seat in October 2008 due to health reasons. Qayyum subsequently
represented the government in inconclusive talks, held in several Persian Gulf states, to reconcile with Taliban figures
close to Mul ah Umar. Another brother, Mahmoud Karzai, is a businessman reportedly under U.S. Justice Department
investigation of his business interests in Qandahar and Kabul, including auto dealerships, apartment houses, and a
stake in Kabul Bank, which nearly col apsed in September 2010. Other Karzai relatives and associates have formed
security companies and other contracting firms that have profited extensively from international reconstruction,
transportation, and protection funds, including a $2.2 billion U.S. “Host Nation Trucking” contract. The United States
banned contracts to one such firm, Watan Risk Management, as of January 6, 2011; the firm is co-owned by two
Karzai cousins Ahmad and Rashid Popal.

2009 Presidential and Provincial Elections
The 2009 presidential and provincial elections were expected to further Afghanistan’s democratic
development. However, because of the widespread fraud identified by Afghanistan’s U.N.-
appointed “Elections Complaints Commission” (ECC) in the August 20, 2009, first round of the
elections, the process did not produce that result. The election fraud difficulty may have
contributed to the substantial parliamentary opposition to many of Karzai’s nominees for his post-
election cabinet. In each of three rounds of cabinet nominations in 2009 and 2010, many, if not
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most, of Karzai’s nominees were voted down by the National Assembly. The latest round of
nominations occurred in late June 2010, after Karzai forced Interior Minister Mohammad Hanif
Atmar to resign, ostensibly for failing to prevent insurgent attacks in Kabul itself. Atmar was
close to and well respected by U.S. officials. Also resigning on June 6 was National Directorate
of Security (NDS, Afghan intelligence) chief Amrollah Saleh, a Tajik and an ally of the United
Front leaders. Both were believed to oppose Karzai’s efforts to reconcile with senior insurgent
leaders. See also: CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government
Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman.
September 18, 2010, Parliamentary Elections
A key test of Karzai’s repeated commitment to reforms were the September 18, 2010, National
Assembly elections. That election was held amid significant violence but not sufficient to derail
the voting. Final results were expected October 30, 2010 but widespread fraud complaints
delayed finalization of the results until November 24, 2010. The election is covered in CRS
Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, cited earlier.
Some of the election results remain in dispute, and some worry that the disputes are widening
ethnic differences because a substantial number of Pashtuns lost seats they expected to retain.
Karzai’s allies apparently did not win enough seats (a majority) to ensure that Pashtun
conservative Sayyaf, mentioned above, would replace Yunus Qanooni, an Abdullah supporter, as
lower house speaker. The Assembly convenes on January 20, 2011. Perhaps in an effort to
overturn some of the results and achieve a parliament more supportive, the Karzai government
has asked Afghanistan’s Supreme Court to become involved in adjudicating the results, and the
Court, on December 28, 2010, set up a special tribunal to review candidate complaints. It is not
clear whether the tribunal will have the authority or will to try to change any results.
Other Major Governance Issues
Obama Administration policy, as articulated on March 27, 2009, and December 1, 2009,
emphasizes expanding and improving Afghan governance as a long-term means of stabilizing
Afghanistan. The latter Obama statement specified that there would be “no blank check” for the
Afghan government if it does not reduce corruption and deliver services. This emphasis is
expressed extensively in the State Department January 2010 document outlining its policy
priorities, entitled Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy.17 The December 16,
2010 summary of the Administration policy review on Afghanistan did not emphasize governance
issues, but did specify that “[The United States is] also supporting Afghanistan’s efforts to better
improve national and sub-national governance, and to build institutions with increased
transparency and accountability to reduce corruption—key steps in sustaining the Afghan
government. Several of the various aspects of U.S. efforts to build the capacity of the central and
local government institutions are discussed in greater detail in CRS Report RS21922,
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance.
U.S. policy has been to expand governance throughout the country, a policy that is receiving
increased U.S. financial and advisory resources under the Obama Administration. A key to

17 Released by the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, January 2010.
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135728.pdf.
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governance strategy, particularly during 2002-2006, was to strengthen the central government by
helping Karzai curb key regional strongmen and local militias—whom some refer to as
“warlords.” These actors controlled much of Afghanistan after the Taliban regime disintegrated in
late 2001, but there was a decision by the international community to build up an accountable
central government rather than leave Afghanistan in the hands of local militias. These forces often
arbitrarily administer justice and use their positions to enrich themselves and their supporters.
Karzai has marginalized some of the largest regional leaders, but he is criticized by some human
rights groups and international donors for continuing to tolerate or rely on others to keep order in
some areas, particularly in non-Pashtun inhabited parts of Afghanistan (the north and west).
Karzai’s view is that maintaining ties to ethnic and regional faction leaders has prevented the
emergence of ethnic conflict that would detract from the overall effort against the Taliban.
Several of these faction leaders are discussed in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics,
Elections, and Government Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman.
Anti-Corruption Efforts
An accelerating trend in U.S. policy—and emphasized in both major Obama Administration
strategy reviews as well as by many in Congress—is to press Karzai to weed out official
corruption. U.S. officials believe that rife corruption in the Afghan government is undermining
U.S. domestic support for the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, and causing the Afghan population to
sour on the Karzai government. U.S. anti-corruption and rule of law efforts are discussed
extensively in the “Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy” issued by the office
of the late Ambassador Holbrooke in January 2010, referenced above. The Obama Administration
reportedly has decided to mute its public criticism of Karzai on the grounds that public criticism
causes Karzai to become suspicious of U.S. intent and to ally with undemocratic elements in
Afghanistan. The corruption issue—its sources, U.S. and Afghan efforts to curb corruption, and
progress—is discussed in CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector
Assistance
, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman and in CRS Report RS21922,
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by Kenneth Katzman.
Enhancing Local Governance
In part because building the central government has gone slowly and because official corruption
is widespread, there has been a U.S. shift, predating the Obama Administration, away from
reliance toward promoting local governance. Some argue that, in addition to offering the
advantage of bypassing an often corrupt central government, doing so is more compatible with
Afghan traditions of local autonomy.
As emphasized in the January 2010 SRAP strategy document cited earlier, there has been a major
U.S. and Afghan push to build up local governing structures, reflecting a shift in emphasis from
the 2001-2007 approach of focusing on building up central authority. However, building local
governance has suffered from a deficit of trained and respected local government administrators
ready or willing to serve, particularly where hostilities are ongoing. This deficiency has hindered
U.S. counter-insurgency efforts in southern Afghanistan, as discussed further below, and accounts
for many of the uncertainties clouding the prospects for transition to Afghan security leadership
by the end of 2014.
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U.S. policy has sought to use local governance promotion efforts to support U.S. security strategy
for Afghanistan. Several districts have received special attention to become “models” of district
security and governance are Nawa, in Helmand Province, and Baraki-Barak, in Lowgar Province,
both cleared of Taliban militants in 2009. With substantial infusions of U.S. development funds
that put sometime insurgents to work on projects (offering $5 per day to perform such tasks as
cleaning irrigation canals), these districts are, by several accounts, far more stable and secure than
they were in 2009. As part of “Operation Moshtarek” (Operation Together), launched February
13, 2010, to clear the city of Marjah of militants, a district governor (Hajji Zahir) and district
administration were selected in advance. Zahir tried to build up his administration after the town
was wrested from Taliban control, but governance there was slow to expand. Zahir was replaced
in early July 2010. Still, the British civilian representative in Marjah said in October 2010 that
central government ministry representation in Marjah is now in place and operating consistently.
(Marjah is currently part of Nad Ali district, and is eventually to become its own district,
according to Afghan observers.)
Human Rights and Democracy
The Administration and Afghan government claim progress in building a democratic Afghanistan
that adheres to international standards of human rights practices. The State Department report on
human rights practices for 2009 (released March 11, 2010)18 said that Afghanistan’s human rights
record remained “poor,” noting in particular that the government or its agents commit arbitrary or
unlawful killings. Still, virtually all observers agree that Afghans are freer than they were under
the Taliban. The tables at the end of this report contain information on U.S. funding for
democracy, governance, rule of law and human rights, and elections support since the fall of the
Taliban. Numerous aspects of Afghan performance on human rights are covered in CRS Report
RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance.
Narcotics Trafficking/Insurgent Financing19
Narcotics trafficking is regarded by some as a core impediment to the U.S. mission in
Afghanistan by undermining rule of law and providing funds to the insurgency. However, it is
also an area on which there has been progress in recent years. The trafficking is said to generate
an estimated $70 million–$100 million per year for the Taliban.
U.S. officials hope that recent progress will be sustained. A UNODC report of September 2010,
continued a relatively positive trend in reporting on this issue, noting that all of the 20 provinces
(out of 34 provinces in Afghanistan) in the “poppy free” category remain that way. Total
production in 2010 is estimated at 3,600 metric tons, a 48% decrease from 2009, although this
was due to a crop disease, for the most part. 20
Obama Administration policy is focusing on promoting legitimate agricultural alternatives to
poppy growing and, in conjunction, the late Ambassador Holbrooke announced in July 2009 that

18 For text, see http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/sca/136084.htm.
19 For a detailed discussion and U.S. funding on the issue, see CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S.
Policy
, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
20 UNDOC. Opium Survey 2010. http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/
Afg_opium_survey_2010_exsum_web.pdf
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the United States would end its prior focus on eradication of poppy fields. In this view,
eradication was driving Afghans into the arms of the Taliban as protectors of their ability to earn a
living, even if doing so is from narcotics cultivation. Encouraging alternative livelihoods has
always been the preferred emphasis of the Afghan government. The de-emphasis on eradication
also put aside the long-standing differences over whether to conduct spraying of fields,
particularly by air. That concept was strenuously opposed by Karzai and not implemented.
Congress sided with Karzai’s view; the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 110-161)
prohibited U.S. counter-narcotics funding from being used for aerial spraying on Afghanistan
poppy fields without Afghan concurrence. That provision was reiterated in the FY2010
consolidated appropriation (P.L. 111-117). Other policies promote incentives; Helmand, for
example, received about $10 million in Good Performance funding in 2009 for a 33% cut in
poppy cultivation that year.
How consistently to use U.S. and NATO forces to combat narcotics has been under almost
constant debate. Some NATO contributors, such as Britain, have focused on interdicting
traffickers and raiding drug labs. The U.S. military, in support of the effort after initial reluctance,
is flying Afghan and U.S. counter-narcotics agents (Drug Enforcement Agency, DEA) on
missions and identifying targets; it also evacuates casualties from counter-drug operations. The
Department of Defense is also playing the major role in training and equipping specialized
Afghan counter-narcotics police, in developing an Afghan intelligence fusion cell, and training
Afghan border police, as well as assisting an Afghan helicopter squadron to move Afghan
counter-narcotics forces around the country. To help break up narcotics trafficking networks, the
DEA presence in Afghanistan is has expanded from 13 agents in 2008 to over 80 in 2010, with
additional agents in Pakistan.
The late Ambassador Holbrooke also placed additional focus on the other sources of Taliban
funding, including continued donations from wealthy residents of the Persian Gulf. He has
established a multinational task force to combat Taliban financing generally, not limited to
narcotics, and U.S. officials are emphasizing with Persian Gulf counterparts the need for
cooperation.
Narcotics trafficking control was perhaps the one issue on which the Taliban regime satisfied
much of the international community. The Taliban enforced a July 2000 ban on poppy
cultivation.21
Narcotics-Related Aid Conditionality
The Bush Administration repeatedly named Afghanistan as a major illicit drug producer and drug
transit country, but did not include Afghanistan on a smaller list of countries that have “failed
demonstrably to make substantial efforts” to adhere to international counter-narcotics agreements
and take certain counter-narcotics measures set forth in U.S. law.22 The Bush Administration
exercised waiver provisions to a required certification of full Afghan cooperation that was needed
to provide more than congressionally stipulated amounts of U.S. economic assistance to
Afghanistan. A similar certification requirement (to provide amounts over $300 million) was
contained in the FY2008 appropriation (P.L. 110-161); in the FY2009 regular appropriation, P.L.

21 Crossette, Barbara. “Taliban Seem to Be Making Good on Opium Ban, U.N. Says.” New York Times, February 7,
2001.
22 Afghanistan had been so designated every year during 1987-2002.
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111-8 ($200 million ceiling); and the FY2010 appropriation, P.L. 111-117, ($200 million ceiling).
The FY2009 supplemental (P.L. 111-32) withheld 10% of State Department narcotics funding
(International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, INCLE) pending a report that
Afghanistan is removing officials involved in narcotics trafficking or gross human rights
violations. No funds for Afghanistan have been held up.
Civilian U.S. and International Policy Implementation
Building the capacity of the Afghan government, and helping it develop economically, is
primarily, although not exclusively, the purview of U.S. and international civilian officials and
institutions. In line with the prioritization of Afghanistan policy, in February 2009, the
Administration appointed Ambassador Richard Holbrooke as “Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan” (SRAP), reporting to Secretary of State Clinton. Holbrooke died on
December 13, 2010, but his team at the State Department, now led by his deputy, Frank Ruggiero
in an acting capacity, remains intact. It consists mainly of members detailed from several different
agencies; several have long-term experience on Afghanistan and Pakistan affairs. Karl
Eikenberry, who served as commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan during 2004-2005, is U.S.
Ambassador. While the main focus of the civilian side of U.S. and international policy is on
building governance and promoting economic development, President Obama has said he expects
the civilian team to work closely with the U.S. and NATO military structure, and a U.S. civilian-
military “joint campaign plan” was developed and released in mid-August 2009.23
On February 7, 2010, in an effort to improve civilian coordination between the United States, its
foreign partners, and the Afghan government, a NATO “Senior Civilian Representative” in
Afghanistan, UK Ambassador Mark Sedwill, took office. Ambassador Sedwill works not only
with U.S. military officials but with representatives of the embassies of partner countries and with
a special U.N. Assistance Mission–Afghanistan (UNAMA, see Table 2).
At U.S. Embassy Kabul, there is a “deputy Ambassador”—senior official Francis Ricciardone.
Another Ambassador rank official (William Todd) manages U.S. economic assistance issues.
Another Ambassador-rank official, Joseph Mussomeli, handles Embassy management.
Ambassador Timothy Carney oversaw U.S. policy for the 2009 elections. Another official of
Ambassador rank, Hans Klemm, (as of June 2010) coordinates U.S. rule of law programs
The U.S. Embassy has progressively expanded its personnel and facilities and will expand its
facilities further to accommodate some of the additional civilian hires and Foreign Service
officers who have been posted to Afghanistan as mentors and advisers to the Afghan government.
U.S. officials say there are more than 1,100 U.S. civilian officials in Afghanistan, as of December
2010, up from only about 400 in early 2009. Most of the newly posted officials are being
deployed outside Kabul. The tables at the end of this report include U.S. funding for State
Department and USAID operations, including Embassy construction and running the “Embassy
air wing,” a fleet of twin-engine turboprops that ferry U.S. officials and contractors around
Afghanistan. In a significant development attempting to signal normalization of certain areas of
Afghanistan, in early 2010 the United States formally inaugurated U.S. consulates in Herat and
Mazar-e-Sharif. In November 2010, contracts were announced for expansion of the U.S. Embassy
($511 million) and to construct the two consulates ($20 million for each facility).

23 For a copy of the joint campaign plan, see http://info.publicintelligence.net/0908eikenberryandmcchrystal.pdf.
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The Afghan Ambassador to the United States, Sayed Tayib Jawad, served as Ambassador from
2004 until his recall in August 2010. He was recalled because of complaints in Kabul about
Western-style parties that were being held at the Afghan embassy in the United States. No
replacement has been named, to date. There is some discussion on the Afghan side of appointing
a special envoy, possibly Ashraf Ghani, to interact on a global basis with the Afghanistan donor
community.
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Table 2. U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)
The United Nations is extensively involved in Afghan governance and national building, primarily in factional conflict
resolution and coordination of development assistance. The coordinator of U.N. efforts is the U.N. Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), headed as of March 22, 2010, by Swedish diplomat Staffan de-Mistura, replacing
Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide. Mistura formerly played a similar role in Iraq. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1806 of
March 20, 2008, expanded UNAMA’s authority to coordinating the work of international donors and strengthening
cooperation between the international peacekeeping force (ISAF, see below) and the Afghan government. In concert
with the Obama Administration’s emphasis on Afghan policy, UNAMA is to open offices in as many of Afghanistan’s
34 provinces as financial y and logistical y permissible. (The mandate of UNAMA, reviewed at one-year intervals, ran
until March 23, 2010, as provided for by Resolution 1869 of March 23, 2009, and was renewed for another year on
March 22, 2010 (Resolution 1917)). Resolution 1917 largely restated UNAMA’s expanded mandate and coordinating
role with other high-level representatives in Afghanistan, and election support role.
In keeping with its expanding role, in 2008 U.S. Ambassador Peter Galbraith was appointed as Eide’s deputy, although
he left Afghanistan in early September 2009 in a reported dispute with Eide over how vigorously to insist on
investigating fraud in the August 20 Afghan election. Galbraith reportedly pressed Afghan and independent election
bodies to be as vigorous as possible in the interests of rule of law and election legitimacy; Eide purportedly was willing
to encourage an Afghan compromise to avoid a second round run-off. The split led U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki
Moon to remove Galbraith from his post at UNAMA in late September 2009 on the grounds that the disharmony was
compromising the UNAMA mission. Several Galbraith supporters subsequently resigned from UNAMA and Galbraith
has appealed his firing amid reports he was proposing a plan to replace Karzai had an election runoff been postponed
until 2010. The turmoil may have caused Eide to leave his post when his contract with the U.N. expired in March
2010.
UNAMA is co-chair of the joint Afghan-international community coordination body cal ed the Joint Coordination and
Monitoring Board (JCMB), and is helping implement the five-year development strategy outlined in a “London
Compact,” (now cal ed the Afghanistan Compact) adopted at the January 31–February 1, 2006, London conference on
Afghanistan. The priorities developed in that document comport with Afghanistan’s own “National Strategy for
Development,” presented on June 12, 2008, in Paris. During his term, Eide urged the furnishing of additional capacity-
building resources, and he complained that some efforts by international donors are redundant or tied to purchases
by Western countries. In statements and press conferences, Eide continued to note security deterioration but also
progress in governance and in reduction of drug cultivation, and he publicly supported negotiations with Taliban
figures to end the war. His final speech before leaving criticized the U.S.-led coalition for focusing too much on
military success and not enough on governance. UNAMA also often has been involved in local dispute resolution
among factions, and it helps organize elections. Under a March 2010 compromise with Karzai, it nominates two
international members of the five person Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), one fewer than the three it
selected under the prior election law. UNAMA was a co-convener of the January 28, 2010, and July 20, 2010, London
and Kabul Conferences, respectively.
The difficulties in coordinating U.N. with U.S. and NATO efforts were evident in a 2007 proposal to create a new
position of “super envoy” that would represent the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO in Afghanistan.
The concept advanced and in January 2008, with U.S. support, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon tentatively
appointed British diplomat Paddy Ashdown as the “super envoy.” However, Karzai rejected the appointment
reportedly over concerns about the scope of authority of such an envoy. Karzai might have also sought to show
independence from the international community. Ashdown withdrew his name on January 28, 2008. However, the
concept reportedly was floated again in late 2009, but was again suppressed by Karzai and others who say it
contradicts U.S. and other efforts to promote Afghan leadership. The NATO senior civilian representative post, held
by Amb. Mark Sedwill (UK), appears to represent a step in the direction of improved donor coordination in
Afghanistan and streamlining of the foreign representative structure there.
For more information on UNAMA, see CRS Report R40747, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan:
Background and Policy Issues, by Rhoda Margesson.

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Security Policy and Force Capacity Building24
The U.S. definition of “success” of the stabilization mission in Afghanistan, articulated since the
ouster of the Taliban in late 2001, is to help build up an Afghan government and security force
that can defend itself, expand governance, and develop economically. The Obama
Administration’s policy reviews in 2009 formally narrowed U.S. goals to preventing Al Qaeda
from reestablishing a base in Afghanistan. However, the policy and military tools employed by
the Obama Administration in most ways continue and even expand a nation-building goal. The
December 1, 2009, speech by President Obama stated U.S. goals as: (1) denying Al Qaeda a safe
haven [in Afghanistan]; and (2) reversing the Taliban’s momentum and denying it the ability to
overthrow the government. The statement generally backed the August 30, 2009,
recommendations of then-top commander in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal’s to
undertake a fully resourced counter-insurgency mission. The focus of the mission is on 121
districts (out of 364 total districts in Afghanistan) deemed restive and in which support for the
Afghan government is lowest. Of those, 80 districts are of the most intense focus, according to
Defense Department reports and officials. The Administration review, the summary of results of
which were released December 16, 2010 (cited earlier) did not announce any major changes to
U.S. goals or strategy.
The Obama Administration has not significantly changed the basic pillars of U.S. and NATO
security strategy that have been in place since 2001, although the blend of these components often
shifts as outcomes and prospects of various initiatives are evaluated. The main elements include
(1) combat operations and patrols by U.S. forces and a NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) to “provide space” for the expansion of Afghan governance, security
leadership, and infrastructure and economic development; (2) U.S. and NATO operation of
“provincial reconstruction teams”(PRTs) to serve as enclaves to facilitate the strategy; and (3) the
equipping, training, and expansion of Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). Some
strategy elements that have emerged since 2008, and which are taking precedence as Western
public support for the war effort erodes, include establishing local protection forces and backing
efforts to reconcile with Taliban leaders who might want to end armed struggle. Another strategy
element apparently under debate is whether to expand the conflict area to include additional U.S.,
allied, and Afghan ground action against militants over the border in Pakistan.
Who are U.S. /NATO Forces Fighting? Taliban, Al Qaeda, and
Related Insurgents and Their Strength

As noted in General McChrystal’s August 2009 initial assessment and the Defense Department
November 2010 report, security is being challenged by a confluence of related armed groups who
are increasingly well equipped and sophisticated in their tactics and operations, particularly by
using roadside bombs.25 There has not been agreement about the relative strength of insurgents in
all of the areas where they operate, or their degree of cooperation with each other, although press
reports in December 2010, quoting U.S. military officers in Afghanistan, say there has been
increasing operational cooperation among the various Afghan insurgent groups. Afghan and U.S.

24 Some of the information in this section is taken from Department of Defense. “Report on Progress Toward Security
and Stability in Afghanistan.” November 2010.
25 http://www.defense.gov/pubs/November_1230_Report_FINAL.pdf.
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assessments are that there are more than 20,000 total insurgents operating in Afghanistan, up from
a few thousand in 2003.
Prior to U.S.-led offensives launched since mid-2009, the Karzai government was estimated by to
control about 30% of the country, while insurgents controlled 4% (13 out of 364 districts).
Insurgents “influenced” or “operated in” another 30% (Afghan Interior Ministry estimates in
August 2009). Tribes and local groups with varying degrees of loyalty to the central government
control the remainder. Outside groups, such as aid groups that released their own findings in
September 2010, sometimes report higher percentages of insurgent control or influence.26 U.S.
military officers in Kabul told CRS in October 2009 that the Taliban had named “shadow
governors” in 33 out of 34 of Afghanistan’s provinces, although many provinces in northern
Afghanistan were assessed as having minimal Taliban presence.
As far as tactics, U.S. commanders increasingly worry about growing insurgent use of improvised
explosive devices (IEDs), including roadside bombs. IED’s are the leading cause of U.S. combat
deaths, and IED attacks nearly doubled again in frequency in the first four months of 2010,
according to a U.N. Secretary General report of June 16, 2010. In January 2010, President Karzai
issued a decree banning importation of fertilizer chemicals (ammonium nitrate) commonly used
for the roadside bombs, but there reportedly is informal circumvention of the ban for certain
civilian uses, and the material reportedly still comes into Afghanistan from Pakistan . U.S.
commanders have said they have verified insurgent use of surface-to-air missiles.27
There were about 310 U.S. soldiers killed in 2009, nearly double the previous year, and U.S.
deaths in 2010 appear to have reached a new high for the Afghan conflict of about 500. There
were about 210 soldiers from partner countries killed during 2010. According to a UNAMA
report issued in December 2010, covering the fall of 2010, there was a 66% increase in security
incidents as compared to the same period in 2009. However, over 80% of those deaths are
purportedly caused by insurgent attacks.
Groups: The Taliban (“Quetta Shura Taliban”)
The core of the insurgency remains the Taliban movement centered around Mullah Umar, who led
the Taliban regime during 1996-2001. Mullah Umar and many of his top advisers remain at large
and are reportedly running their insurgency from their safe haven in Pakistan. They are believed
to be primarily in and around the city of Quetta, according to Afghan officials, thus accounting
for the term usually applied to Umar and his aides: “Quetta Shura Taliban” (QST).
Some believe that Umar and his inner circle blame their past association with Al Qaeda for their
loss of power and want to distance themselves from Al Qaeda. Other experts see continuing close
association that is likely to continue were the Taliban movement to return to power.
Some believe that the U.S. “surge” in Afghanistan may be causing Umar, or some around him, to
mull the concept of a political settlement. Umar’s top deputy, Mullah Bradar, was arrested in a
reported joint U.S.-Pakistani operation near the city of Karachi in February 2010—Karzai
considered his capture set back Afghan government-Taliban reconciliation talks, which Bradar
reportedly supports. It was also reported in March 2010 that Pakistan had briefly detained another

26 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/12/world/asia/12afghan.html?_r=1
27 Maj. Gen. John Campbell, commander of RC-E, July 28, 2010, press briefing.
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member of the Quetta Shura, Mullah Kabir, and arrested Agha Jhan Motasim, a son-in-law of
Umar.28 In recent years, other top Taliban figures, including Mullah Dadullah, his son Mansoor,
and Mullah Usmani have been killed or captured. Some observers say that informal settlement
ideas floated between the Taliban and the Karzai government may envision Umar being granted
exile in Saudi Arabia.
To address losses, Umar reportedly replaced Bradar with a young leader, Mullah Abdul Qayyum
Zakir, a U.S. detainee in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, until 2007.29 Some reports assert that other
aides (most notably Mullah Ghul Agha Akhund) may not recognize Zakir and might themselves
be seeking the number two spot in the organization. Two members of the Quetta Shura, Mullah
Hassan Rahmani, former Taliban governor of Qandahar, and Mullah Afghan Tayib, another
spokesman, are said to have come under some Pakistani pressure to refrain from militant
activities. The Taliban has several official spokespersons still at large, including Qari Yusuf
Ahmadi and Zabiullah Mujahid, and it operates a clandestine radio station, “Voice of Shariat” and
publishes videos.
Al Qaeda/Bin Laden Whereabouts
The summary of the Administration policy review, released December 16, 2010, says that “there
has been significant progress in disrupting and dismantling the Pakistan-based leadership and
cadre of Al Qaeda over the past year.” U.S. commanders say that Al Qaeda militants are more
facilitators of militant incursions into Afghanistan rather than active fighters in the Afghan
insurgency. Director of Central Intelligence Leon Panetta said on June 27, 2010, that Al Qaeda
fighters in Afghanistan itself might number 50-100.30 Small numbers of Al Qaeda members—
including Arabs, Uzbeks, and Chechens—have been captured or killed in battles in Afghanistan
itself, according to U.S. commanders. Some of these fighters apparently belong to Al Qaeda
affiliates such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Some NATO/ISAF officials said in
October 2010, however, that some Al Qaeda cells may be moving back into remote areas of
Kunar and Nuristan provinces.31
Despite the reports of progress against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Al Qaeda’s top
leadership has consistently eluded U.S. efforts. In December 2001, in the course of the post-
September 11 major combat effort, U.S. Special Operations Forces and CIA operatives reportedly
narrowed Osama bin Laden’s location to the Tora Bora mountains in Nangarhar Province (30
miles west of the Khyber Pass), but the Afghan militia fighters who were the bulk of the fighting
force did not prevent his escape. Some U.S. military and intelligence officers (such as Gary
Berntsen and Dalton Fury, who have written books on the battle) have questioned the U.S.
decision to rely mainly on Afghan forces in this engagement.
Bin Laden and his close ally Ayman al-Zawahiri have long been presumed to be on the Pakistani
side of the border. CNN reported October 18, 2010, that assessments from the U.S.-led coalition
now say the two are likely in a settled area near the border with Afghanistan, and not living in a
very remote uninhabited area. A U.S. strike reportedly missed Zawahiri by a few hours in the

28 Filkins, Dexter and Pir Zubair Shah. “After Arrests, Taliban Promote a Fighter.” New York Times, March 25, 2010.
29 Ibid.
30 Text of the Panetta interview with ABC News is at http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=11025299.
31 Dreazen, Yochi. “Al Qaida Returning to Afghanistan for New Attacks.” Nationaljournal.com. October 18, 2010.
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village of Damadola, Pakistan, in January 2006, suggesting that there was intelligence on his
movements.32 On the ninth anniversary of the September 11 attacks, some U.S. observers said it
was still significant to try to capture bin Laden if for no other reason than for symbolic value.
Among other bin Laden aides, press reports in September 2010 said that Al Qaeda’s former
spokesman, Kuwait-born Sulayman Abu Ghaith, may have been released from house arrest by
Iran and allowed to proceed to Pakistan. Other reports in November 2010 said that another Al
Qaeda senior operative, Sayf al Adl, who was believed to be in Iran during 2002-2010, may have
left Iran and gone to Pakistan, and reportedly may have been elevated by bin Laden to top Al
Qaeda operational commander.
As a consequence of other U.S. efforts, a January 2008 strike near Damadola killed Abu Laith al-
Libi, a reported senior Al Qaeda figure who purportedly masterminded, among other operations,
the bombing at Bagram Air Base in February 2007 when Vice President Cheney was visiting. In
August 2008, an airstrike was confirmed to have killed Al Qaeda chemical weapons expert Abu
Khabab al-Masri, and two senior operatives allegedly involved in the 1998 embassy bombings in
Africa reportedly were killed by an unmanned aerial vehicle (Predator) strike in January 2009.
Such aerial-based strikes have become more frequent under President Obama, indicating that the
Administration sees the tactic as effective in preventing attacks. Unmanned vehicle strikes are
also increasingly used on the Afghanistan battlefield itself and against Al Qaeda affiliated
militants in such countries as Yemen.
Hikmatyar Faction
Another “high value target” identified by U.S. commanders is the faction of former mujahedin
party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, HIG) allied with Al Qaeda and
Taliban insurgents. As noted above, Hikmatyar was one of the main U.S.-backed mujahedin
leaders during the Soviet occupation era. Hikmatyar’s faction received extensive U.S. support
against the Soviet Union, but is now active against U.S. and Afghan forces in Kunar, Nuristan,
Kapisa, and Nangarhar provinces, north and east of Kabul. On February 19, 2003, the U.S.
government formally designated Hikmatyar as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist,” under
the authority of Executive Order 13224, subjecting it to financial and other U.S. sanctions. It is
not designated as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization” (FTO). Table 5 contains estimated numbers
of HIG.
While U.S. commanders continue to battle Hikmatyar’s militia, on March 22, 2010, both the
Afghan government and Hikmatyar representatives confirmed they were in talks in Kabul,
including meetings with Karzai. Hikmatyar has expressed a willingness to discuss a cease-fire
with the Karzai government since 2007, and several Karzai’s key allies in the National Assembly
are former members of Hikmatyar’s party. In January 2010, Hikmatyar outlined specific
conditions for a possible reconciliation with Karzai, including elections under a neutral caretaker
government following a U.S. withdrawal. These conditions are unlikely to be acceptable to
Karzai or the international community, although many of them might be modified or dropped.
Some close to Hikmatyar apparently attended the consultative peace loya jirga on June 2-4, 2010,
which discussed the reconciliation issue, as analyzed further below.

32 Gall, Carlotta and Ismail Khan. “U.S. Drone Attack Missed Zawahiri by Hours.” New York Times, November 10,
2006.
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Haqqani Faction
Another militant faction, cited repeatedly as a major threat, is the “Haqqani Network” led by
Jalaludin Haqqani and his eldest son, Siraj (or Sirajjudin). Jalaludin Haqqani, who served as
Minister of Tribal Affairs in the Taliban regime of 1996-2001, is believed closer to Al Qaeda than
to the ousted Taliban leadership in part because one of his wives is purportedly Arab. The group
is active around its key objective, Khost city, capital of Khost Province. The Haqqani network has
claimed responsibility for attacks on India’s embassy in Kabul and other India-related targets.
U.S. officials say they are continuing to pressure the Haqqani network with military action in
Afghanistan and air strikes on the Pakistani side of the border. Haqqani property inside Pakistan
has been repeatedly targeted since September 2008 by U.S. aerial drone strikes. Siraj’s brother,
Mohammad, was reportedly killed by a U.S. unmanned vehicle strike in late February 2010,
although Mohammad was not thought to be a key militant commander. Pakistan reportedly
arrested a minor family member (Nasruddin Haqqani) in December 2010—a possible indication
that Pakistan senses U.S. pressure for increased action against the network. However, some doubt
has been cast that an arrest took place. The Haqqani network is said to be a major driver of the
reported debate within the Obama Administration over whether to authorize additional Special
Operations raids across the border into Pakistan, and presumably against the Haqqani network.33
Among other steps, in July 2010, it was reported that General Petraeus, as part of his adjustments
to policy as top commander in Afghanistan, wants the Haqqani network to be named as an FTO
under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. Secretary of State Clinton said on July 19, 2010,
during a visit to Pakistan, that U.S. policy is moving in that direction. Such a move would be
intended to signal to Pakistan that it should not see the Haqqani network, as a whole, as part of a
reconciled political structure in Afghanistan that would protect Pakistan’s interests and work to
limit the influence of India. This view was emphasized in a New York Times story of June 25,
2010.34 The Haqqani faction has been thought not amenable to a political settlement, but some
reports in November 2010 have said that members of the faction may have participated in
exploratory reconciliation meetings with government representatives. Table 5 contains estimated
numbers of Haqqani fighters.
Pakistani Groups
The Taliban of Afghanistan are increasingly linked politically and operationally to Pakistani
Taliban militants. The Pakistani groups might see a Taliban recapture of Afghanistan’s
government as helpful to the prospects for these groups inside Pakistan or in their Kashmir
struggle. A major Pakistani group, the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP), is
primarily seeking to challenge the government of Pakistan, but they facilitate the transiting into
Afghanistan of Afghan Taliban and support the Afghan Taliban goals of recapturing Afghanistan.
The TTP may also be seeking to target the United States, based on a failed bombing in New York
in May 2010. The State Department designated the TTP as a Foreign Terrorist Organization
(FTO) under the Immigration and Naturalization Act on September 2, 2010, allegedly for having
close connections to Al Qaeda.

33 Mazzzetti, Mark and Dexter Filkins. “U.S. Commanders Push to Expand Raids in Pakistan.” New York Times,
December 21, 2010.
34 Jane Perlez, Eric Schmitt, and Carlotta Gall, “Pakistan Is Said to Pursue Foothold in Afghanistan,” The New York
Times
, June 24, 2010.
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Another Pakistani group said to be increasingly active inside Afghanistan is Laskhar-e-Tayyiba
(LET, or Army of the Righteous). LET is an Islamist militant group that has previously been
focused on operations against Indian control of Kashmir.
The U.S. Military Effort
The vast majority of U.S. troops in Afghanistan are under NATO/ISAF command. The remainder
are part of the post-September 11 anti-terrorism mission Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
There are also Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan under a separate command. Serving
under General Petraeus is Major General David Rodriguez, who heads a NATO-approved
“Intermediate Joint Command” focused primarily on day-to-day operations and located in a
facility adjoining Kabul International Airport. He has been in this position since mid-2009. The
ISAF/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan commander reports not only to NATO but, through U.S. channels,
to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).
Whether under NATO or OEF, many U.S. forces in Afghanistan are in eastern Afghanistan and
lead Regional Command East of the NATO/ISAF operation. These U.S. forces belong to
Combined Joint Task Force 101 (as of June 2010), which is commanded by Major General John
Campbell. As of November 2010, the most restive provinces in RC-E are Paktia, Paktika, Khost,
Kunar, Nangarhar, and Nuristan.
Helmand, Qandahar, Uruzgan, Zabol, Nimruz, and Dai Kundi provinces constitute “Regional
Command South (RC-S),” a command formally transferred to NATO/ISAF responsibility on July
31, 2006. U.S. forces have not led RC-S; the command was rotated among Britain, the
Netherlands, and Canada. However, with the Dutch pullout in July 2010 and the growing U.S.
troop strength in RC-S prompted a May 23, 2010, NATO decision to bifurcate RC-S, with the
United States leading a “southwest” subdivision focused on Helmand and Nimruz. This is an
evolution of the growing U.S. involvement in RC-S since 2008.
Perception of “Victory” in the First Five Post-Taliban Years
During 2001-mid-2006, U.S. forces and Afghan troops fought relatively low levels of insurgent
violence. The United States and Afghanistan conducted “Operation Mountain Viper” (August
2003); “Operation Avalanche” (December 2003); “Operation Mountain Storm” (March-July
2004) against Taliban remnants in and around Uruzgan province, home province of Mullah Umar;
“Operation Lightning Freedom” (December 2004–February 2005); and “Operation Pil”
(Elephant) in Kunar Province in the east (October 2005). By late 2005, U.S. and partner
commanders appeared to believe that the combat, coupled with overall political and economic
reconstruction, had virtually ended any insurgency. Anticipating further stabilization,
NATO/ISAF assumed lead responsibility for security in all of Afghanistan during 2005-2006.
Contrary to U.S. expectations, violence increased significantly in mid-2006, particularly in the
east and the south, where ethnic Pashtuns predominate. Reasons for the deterioration include
some of those discussed above in the sections on governance: Afghan government corruption; the
absence of governance or security forces in many rural areas. Other factors included the safe
haven enjoyed by militants in Pakistan; the reticence of some NATO contributors to actively
combat insurgents; a popular backlash against civilian casualties caused by NATO and U.S.
military operations; and the slow pace of economic development. Many Afghans are said to have
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turned to the Taliban as a source of impartial and rapid justice, in contrast to the slow and corrupt
processes instituted by the central government.
Perception of Deterioration and Growing Force Levels in 2007 and 2008
Since 2006, and particularly during 2009 and 2010, the key theater of implementation of U.S.
strategy has been eastern and southern Afghanistan, especially Helmand and Qandahar provinces.
NATO counter-offensives during 2006-2008—such as Operation Mountain Lion, Operation
Mountain Thrust, and Operation Medusa (August-September 2006, in Panjwai district of
Qandahar Province)—cleared key districts but did not prevent subsequent reinfiltration. In late
2006, British forces—who believe in negotiated local solutions—entered into an agreement with
tribal elders in the Musa Qala district of Helmand Province, under which they would secure the
main town of the district themselves. That strategy failed when the Taliban took over Musa Qala
town in February 2007. A NATO offensive in December 2007 retook it.
As a further response, NATO and OEF forces tried to apply a more integrated strategy involving
preemptive combat, increased development work, and a more streamlined command structure.
Major combat operations in 2007 included U.S. and NATO attempted preemption of an
anticipated Taliban “spring offensive” (“Operation Achilles,” March 2007) in the Sangin district
of Helmand Province, around the Kajaki dam, and Operation Silicon (May 2007), also in
Helmand. (In September 2010, Britain turned over security leadership in Sangin to U.S. forces in
the near future; combat in the district has accounted for nearly half of Britain’s entire casualties in
Afghanistan to date. U.S. strategy for the district is said to try to push out the boundaries of
secure area of the district; British efforts focused on better securing the district major city.)
Despite the additional resources put into Afghanistan, throughout 2008, growing concern took
hold within the Bush Administration. Pessimism was reflected in such statements as one in
September 2008 by Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Admiral Mike Mullen that “I’m not sure we’re
winning” in Afghanistan. Several major incidents supported that assessment, including (1)
expanding Taliban operations in provinces where it had not previously been active, particularly
Lowgar, Wardak, and Kapisa, close to Kabul; (2) high-profile attacks in Kabul against well-
defended targets, such as the January 14, 2008, attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul and the July
7, 2008, suicide bombing at the Indian Embassy in Kabul, killing more than 50; (3) the April 27,
2008, assassination attempt on Karzai during a military parade celebrating the ouster of the Soviet
Union; and (4) a June 12, 2008, Sarposa prison break in Qandahar (several hundred Taliban
captives were freed, as part of an emptying of the 1,200 inmates there).
To try to arrest deterioration, the United States and its partners decided to increase force levels.
The added forces partly fulfilled a mid-2008 request by General McKiernan for 30,000 additional
U.S. troops (beyond the approximately 35,000 there at the time of the request). However, as the
November 2008 U.S. presidential election approached, the decision whether to fulfill the entire
request was deferred to the next Administration. U.S. troop levels started 2006 at 30,000; climbed
slightly to 32,000 by December 2008; and reached 39,000 by April 2009. Partner forces were
increased significantly as well, by about 6,000 during this time, to a total of 39,000 at the end of
2009 (rough parity between U.S. and non-U.S. forces). Many of the U.S. forces deployed in 2008
and 2009 were Marines that deployed to Helmand, large parts of which had fallen out of
coalition/Afghan control.
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Obama Administration Strategy Reviews and Further Buildup
In September 2008, the U.S. military and NATO each began strategy reviews. The primary U.S.
review was headed by Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute, the Bush Administration’s senior adviser on Iraq
and Afghanistan (still in the Obama Administration with responsibility for Afghanistan). Other
U.S. reviews were conducted by the Department of Defense, by CENTCOM, and by the State
Department. These reviews were briefed to the incoming Obama Administration. The Obama
Administration, which maintained that Afghanistan needed to be given a higher priority than it
was during the Bush Administration, integrated the reviews into an overarching 60-day inter-
agency “strategy review.” It was chaired by South Asia expert Bruce Riedel and co-chaired by
Ambassador Holbrooke and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy.
March 27, 2009, Policy Announcement and Troop Increase, First Command
Change, and McChrystal Assessment

President Obama announced a “comprehensive” strategy on March 27, 2009.35 In conjunction, he
announced the deployment of an additional 21,000 U.S. forces, of which about 4,000 would be
trainers. Shortly after the announcement, the Administration decided that U.S. military leadership
in Afghanistan was insufficiently innovative. On May 11, 2009, Secretary of Defense Gates and
Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Michael Mullen announced that General McKiernan would be
replaced by General Stanley McChrystal, considered an innovative commander as head of U.S.
special operations from 2003 to 2008. He assumed command on June 15, 2009.
General McChrystal, after assuming command, assessed the security situation and suggested a
strategy in a report of August 30, 2009, and presented to NATO on August 31, 2009.36 The main
elements are:
• That the goal of the U.S. military should be to protect the population—and to
help the Afghan government take steps to earn the trust of the population—rather
than to search out and combat Taliban concentrations. Indicators of success such
as ease of road travel and normal life for families are more important than are
counts of numbers of enemy fighters killed.
• That there is potential for “mission failure” unless a fully resourced,
comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy is pursued and reverses Taliban
momentum within 12-18 months.
• About 44,000 additional U.S. combat troops (including trainers) would be needed
to have the greatest chance for his strategy’s success—beyond those approved by
the Obama Administration strategy review in March 2009.

35 “White Paper”: http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf.
36 Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan.
“Commander’s Initial Assessment.” August 30, 2009, available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?
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Second High-Level Review and Further Force Increase
The McChrystal assessment set off debate within the Administration. In September 2009, the
Administration began a second high-level review of U.S. strategy, taking into account the
McChrystal recommendations and the marred August 20, 2009, presidential election. Some senior
U.S. officials, such as Secretary of Defense Gates, were concerned that adding many more U.S.
forces could create among the Afghan people a sense of “occupation” that could prove counter-
productive. Some Members of Congress, including Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman
Carl Levin, said that the U.S. focus should be on expanding Afghan security forces capabilities
before sending additional U.S. forces.
The high-level review included at least nine high-level meetings, chaired by President Obama,
and reportedly concluded on November 19, 2009. The President announced his decisions in a
speech at West Point military academy on December 1, 2009.37 The major features of the
December 1 statement included the following:
• That 30,000 additional U.S. forces (plus an unspecified number of additional
“enablers”) would be sent to “reverse the Taliban’s momentum” and strengthen
the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government in order to pave the
way for a transition, beginning in July 2011, to Afghan leadership of the
stabilization effort. U.S. force levels did reach their current level of about 98,000
on/about September 4, 2010.
• The July 2011 deadline is the policy element that has caused significant
controversy, as discussed below.
McChrystal Replaced by Petraeus
On June 23, 2010, President Obama accepted the resignation of General McChrystal after
summoning him to Washington, DC, to discuss the comments by him and his staff to a reporter
for Rolling Stone (article cited earlier) that disparaged virtually all the civilian figures involved in
Afghanistan policy. He named General Petraeus as General McChrystal’s successor, a move that
appeared to reassure President Karzai. In a June 23, 2010, statement, President Obama attributed
the change purely to the disrespect of civilian authority contained in the Rolling Stone comments,
and stated that Afghanistan policy would not change. General Petraeus was confirmed by the
Senate on June 30, 2010, and assumed command on July 4, 2010.
Summary of Current U.S. Strategy as Implemented by General Petraeus
The major outlines of Obama Administration strategy have taken shape as outlined below, and the
Administration review the summary of which was released on December 16, 2010, cited earlier,
reaffirmed that U.S. strategy is “working well.” The major tenets are:
Key Goals: (1) disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan to degrade
their ability to launch international terrorist attacks; (2) promote a more capable,
accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan; (3) develop self-reliant

37 President Obama speech, op. cit. Testimony of Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, and Admiral Mullen before the
Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. December 2, 2009.
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Afghan security forces; and (4) involve the international community to actively
assist in addressing these objectives. These relatively targeted goals are in line
with comments by President Obama that he wants to “finish the job” in
Afghanistan during his presidency.
Strategy Definition: The overall counter-insurgency strategy is intended to “clear,
hold, build, and transition”—to protect the population and allow time for Afghan
governance and security forces to take leadership and for infrastructure and
economic development to take root.
Limiting Civilian Casualties. Part of the strategy is to win support of Afghans by
sharply limiting air strikes and some types of raids and combat that cause Afghan
civilian casualties and resentment38 Some refer to the rules as the “Karzai 12,”
referring to the number of points of these rules of engagement. The NATO
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Karzai government want
to prevent any recurrence of incident such as the one that occurred near Herat on
August 22, 2008, in which a NATO bomb killed up to 90 civilians, as well as the
incident in September 2009 in Konduz in which Germany’s contingent called in
an airstrike on Taliban fighters who captured two fuel trucks; killing several
civilians as well as Taliban fighters. Still, ISAF-caused civilian casualties
continue, mainly due to misunderstandings at ISAF checkpoints, and in
November 2010 President Karzai publicly called for a reduction of some of the
night raids that are causing popular backlash.
July 2011 Deadline. The Obama Administration emphasis on transition to Afghan
security leadership beginning in July 2011 has been interpreted by some
Administration officials—and by some Afghan and regional leaders—as laying
the groundwork for winding down U.S. involvement in coming years.39 The time
frame stimulated considerable debate and may have been somewhat overtaken by
NATO decisions in Lisbon in November, 2010, as discussed further below.
Resources and Troops: The Administration and foreign partners assert that
resource “inputs” are, as of October 2010, aligned with mission requirements.
Pressing the Afghan Government: The Administration asserts that the Karzai
government is being held to account for its performance, although, as noted, no
specific penalties have been imposed on the Afghan government for shortfalls.
Civilian “Uplift”: A key strategy component is to develop Afghan institutions,
particularly at the provincial and local levels. To be effective, the number of U.S.
civilian advisors in Afghanistan reached about 1,000 in early 2010 and is over
1,100 as of the end of 2010. Of these at least 400 serve outside Kabul as part of
initiatives such as the 32 “District Support Teams” and the “District Working
Groups.” That is up from 67 outside Kabul in early 2009.

38 See CRS Report R41084, Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians, by Susan G. Chesser.
39 Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan.
“Commander’s Initial Assessment.” August 30, 2009, available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf. White House. Remarks by the President In Address to the Nation on the
Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. December 1, 2009; Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “Differing Views of New
Afghanistan Strategy.” Washington Post, December 26, 2009.
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Civilian-Military Integration: There is a commitment to civilian-military
integration, as outlined in a DOD-State Department joint campaign plan and the
late Ambassador Holbrooke’s January 2010 strategy document, referenced
earlier. High-level “Senior Civilian Representatives” have been appointed to help
the military formulate strategy for the regional commands where they serve. This
is part of a new “Interagency Provincial Affairs” initiative that is less military-
focused.
Reintegration and Reconciliation: As discussed later, the Administration supports
Afghan efforts to provide financial and social incentives to persuade insurgents to
lay down their arms and accept the Afghan constitution. The United States was at
first skeptical but is now increasingly supporting Karzai’s policy of negotiating
with senior insurgent leaders.
Pakistan: Engagement with Pakistan and enlisting its increased cooperation is
pivotal to U.S. policy. More information is in the section on Pakistan, below, and
in CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
International Dimension: New international diplomatic mechanisms have been
formed to better coordinate all “stakeholders” in the Afghanistan issue (NATO,
Afghanistan’s neighbors, other countries in Afghanistan’s region, the United
Nations, and other donors). Meetings such as the January 28, 2010, meeting in
London and the July 20, 2010, Kabul Conference are part of that effort. To date,
at least 25 nations have appointed direct counterparts to the SRAP, including the
UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, which meet periodically as part of a 44-nation
(and growing) “International Contact Group” for Afghanistan. It has met nine
times, most recently in Rome on October 18, 2010. (Iran attended it for the first
time.)
Partner Contributions: Increased partner contributions of funding and troops
were sought and offered. Currently, there is U.S. effort to encourage partner
forces to remain in Afghanistan at least until a planned transition to Afghan
leadership by 2014.
Metrics: The Administration will continue to measure progress along clear
metrics. Many in Congress, pressing for clear metrics to assess progress, inserted
into P.L. 111-32 (FY2009 supplemental appropriation) a requirement that the
President submit to Congress, 90 days after enactment (by September 23, 2009),
metrics by which to assess progress, and a report on that progress every 180 days
thereafter. The Administration’s approximately 50 metrics were reported at the
website of Foreign Policy40 and were submitted. However, the difficulty in
formulating useful and clear metrics that would enable Members and officials to
assess progress in the war effort was demonstrated by comments by Ambassador
Holbrooke on August 12, 2009, saying that on defining success in Afghanistan
and Pakistan: “We will know it when we see it.”41 In its September 22, 2009,
report on the situation in Afghanistan (A/64/364-S/2009/475), the United Nations
developed its own “benchmarks” for progress in Afghan governance and security.

40 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/16/evaluating_progress_in_afghanistan_pakistan.
41 Schmitt, Eric. “White House Is Struggling to Measure Success in Afghanistan.” New York Times, August 7, 2009.
Comments by Ambassador Holbrooke at seminar hosted by the Center for American Progress. August 12, 2009.
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July 2011 “Drawdown” Giving Way to 2014 “Transition”
The Obama Administration emphasis on transition to Afghan security leadership beginning in
July 2011 has been perhaps the most widely discussed and debated aspect of policy. Debate over
whether to announce such a timeframe is covered extensively in the book “Obama’s Wars,” by
Bob Woodward. The 2011 “deadline” was interpreted by some Administration critics—and by
some Afghan and regional leaders—as laying the groundwork for winding down U.S.
involvement in coming years.42 The Administration has said it set the time frame to demonstrate
to a war-weary public that U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan is not open-ended. Perhaps
to address perceived criticism of such a deadline in the upper ranks of the U.S. military, in an
August 31, 2010 statement, the President asserted that the pace and scope of any drawdown in
2011 would be subject to conditions on the ground. These comments appeared to modify the July
18, 2010, Vice President Biden amended earlier remarks by saying that only a few thousand U.S.
forces might come out at that time as part of a process of transitioning some Afghan provinces to
Afghan lead.
The debate over the July 2011 drawdwon appears to have abated somewhat with an agreement
between the United States and NATO partner forces to focus on a longer time frame for transition
to Afghan leadership. With European publics tiring of involvement in Afghanistan, a July 2010
agreement reportedly was reached on a joint Afghan-NATO board to decide on locations that
might be selected for transition to Afghan lead. These locations, reportedly whole provinces and
districts to transition to Afghan leadership beginning in 2011—and running through the end of
2014—were ratified at the November 19-20, 2010, NATO summit in Lisbon. The 2014 date is
one that Karzai articulated in 2009 as a time frame when Afghan forces would be able to secure
Afghanistan on their own. According to some U.S. commanders, some provinces in the U.S.-led
eastern sector, such as Panjshir or Bamiyan, could be turned over in 2011, with Nangarhar
considered a candidate for turnover thereafter. President Obama and other senior U.S. officials
say that 2014 is not a date certain for a complete international pullout, but rather for a transition
to Afghan lead, with some international forces remaining after 2014 to train and mentor the
Afghans.
There are no firm estimates on how many U.S. forces might be withdrawn from Afghanistan in
July 2011. However, observers appear to agree that the numbers will be relatively small, perhaps
a few thousand, drawn from districts where U.S. forces have been “thinned out” as Afghan forces
expand their responsibilities.
Implementation of Strategy, Early Results, and Doubts
As discussed, the December 16, 2010, summary of the Administration review says that U.S.
strategy is showing results, particularly in the provinces of focus (Helmand, Qandahar) although
such gains are “fragile and reversible.” The possible signs of momentum appear to reflect the
beginnings of a possible turnaround from a September 30, 2010, White House assessments of the
situation and press reports about less optimistic assessments of the U.S. intelligence community

42 Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan.
“Commander’s Initial Assessment.” August 30, 2009, available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf. White House. Remarks by the President In Address to the Nation on the
Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. December 1, 2009; Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “Differing Views of New
Afghanistan Strategy.” Washington Post, December 26, 2009.
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or the United Nations. Several U.S. commanders say they are receiving overtures from local
insurgent leaders who have lost morale and seek to discuss possible terms for their surrender and
reintegration. Other reports say that insurgent factions are running low on supplies and
ammunition. The less optimistic views are based on observations that the insurgency continues to
make gains in previously quiet provinces, including Baghlan, Konduz, and Faryab provinces. Still
others say that Afghan governance is lagging to the point where the Afghans will not be able to
hold U.S./NATO gains on their own and insurgents will be able to regroup as soon as
international forces thin out.
According to General Petraeus, operations in 2010 have ended Taliban control in large parts of
Helmand and produced major progress in Qandahar province, as discussed below. The progress is
creating a contiguous secure corridor for commerce between Helmand and Qandahar. Markets
and other signs of normal life have proliferated in Helmand, according to several U.S.
commanders in October 2010. In August 2010, he took NBC News correspondents to Wardak
province as a showcase of stability in a province that, in 2008, was considered largely under
Taliban influence. The first of the operations in 2009 that produced some of the relatively positive
assessments was Operation Khanjar—intended to expel the Taliban and reestablish Afghan
governance in parts of the province. The offensive reportedly ended Taliban control of several
districts in Helmand, including Nawa, Now Zad, and Musa Qala.
Some commanders attribute the signs of progress not only to the increase in numbers of U.S.
forces, but to General Petraeus’ tactics, including nearly tripling Special Operations Force
operations in Afghanistan and greatly increased UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) strikes on
concentrations across the border in Pakistan to try to drive insurgents to reconcile with the Karzai
government and cease fighting. Some attribute progress to increased operations by U.S. Special
Forces and CIA-trained Afghan special forces and militias, including Afghan “Counterterrorism
Pursuit Teams.” In November 2010, General Petraeus reportedly approved the deployment of
about 16 M1A1 tanks for use by the Marines in southern Afghanistan in order to put further
pressure on militants. A report, cited earlier but denied by NATO officials, say the U.S. military
might be seeking U.S. presidential authority to increase ground raids against militant safe havens
in Pakistan. Such a move could be perceived as expanding the U.S.-led war effort and there are
no firm indications that President Obama’s approval for such operations is imminent.
Operation Moshtarek in Marjah/Nad Ali
The reports of progress in Helmand represent a turnaround from earlier pessimism about the
outcome of “Operation Moshtarek” (Operation Together). It consisted of about 15,000 U.S.,
foreign partner, and Afghan forces (about 8,000 of the total) that, beginning on February 13,
2010, sought to clear Taliban militants from Marjah city (85,000 population) in Helmand. An
Afghan governing structure was identified in advance (so-called “government in a box”), the
population had substantial warning, and there were meetings with regional elders just before the
offensive began—all of which were an apparent effort to cause militants to flee and to limit
civilian losses.43 The city, for the most part, was declared cleared of militants as of February 26,
2010, but some militants continue to fight in and on the outskirts of Marjah and to assassinate and
intimidate Afghans cooperating with U.S. and Afghan forces. Some Afghan officials, such as
ministry representatives, are now beginning to serve regularly in the city itself, although town
governor Hajji Zahir was fired in July 2010.

43 Holbrooke interview on CNN, March 14, 2010, op. cit.
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As part of the U.S. effort, U.S. forces, primarily Marines, disburse Commanders Emergency
Response Program (CERP-funds controlled by U.S. officers) funds to clear rubble from schools,
clean canals, repair markets, rebuild bridges, and compensate families who lost members due to
the combat. Afghans who work on these projects in Marjah and in the previously cleared Nawa
district are reportedly being paid about $5 per day as part of an effort to provide livelihoods to
Afghans who might previously have supported the Taliban for purely financial reasons.44 Some
fear that many of these workers might rejoin insurgent activities when U.S. funding for these
“cash for work” programs declines.
Qandahar Effort
The Administration assessment of progress in December 2010 was based largely on views of
success in Qandahar Province. In early 2010, U.S. commanders had emphasized that the
Qandahar effort would focus less on combat and more on conducting consultations and shuras
with tribal leaders and other notables to enlist their cooperation against Taliban infiltrators. U.S.
commanders described the operation as more of a “process,” or a slow push into restive districts
by setting up Afghan checkpoints to secure the city and districts around it (particularly
Arghandab, Zhari, and Panjwai)—and not a classic military offensive. Qandahar’s population is
far larger (about 2 million in the province), and Qandahar province and city have functioning
governments, which Marjah did not. The city hosts numerous businesses and has always
remained vibrant, despite some Taliban clandestine activity.
A sense of doubt about the prospects for the operation built in April-August 2010 as Afghan tribal
and other residential resistance—expressed at local shuras—to any combat to secure Qandahar.
However, General Petraeus has increased operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces against
key militants near the city that began in April 2010.45 Subsequently, as U.S. forces have expanded
their presence in the province in partnership with Afghan forces since September 2010, Taliban
control has ended in many neighborhoods and Afghan checkpoints have been established. Further
shuras have been held to promote Afghan governance. As part of the effort to stabilize Qandahar
U.S. officials are also reportedly trying to strengthen Governor Tooryalai Wesa and balance the
flow of U.S. and international funds to the various tribes and clans in the province. An unstated
objective is also to weaken the influence of Karzai’s brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, chair of the
provincial council, who is discussed above.46
Security Innovations Under Way
Despite the assessments of progress, General Petraeus and others are said to believe that a clear
end to the conflict on U.S./NATO/Afghan government terms requires new approaches that
convince insurgent leaders that further conflict is futile. Discussed below are some additional or
alternative approaches that are increasing feature of U.S. policy.

44 Nissenbaum, Dion. “Marine Forward Operating Base Marjah Takes Root.” McClatchy Newspapers, March 16, 2010.
45 “U.S. Elite Units Step Up Effort in Afghan City.” New York Times, April 26, 2010.
46 Partlow, Joshua. “U.S. Seeks to Bolster Kandahar Governor, Upend Power Balance.” Washington Post, April 29,
2010.
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“Reintegration” and “Reconciliation” With Insurgents
The issue of reintegration fighters and reconciling with insurgent leaders is an Afghan-led process
but one in which the United States and the international community is increasingly involved. The
issue has made some in the international community, and within Afghanistan, concerned for the
potential to involve compromises with insurgents and perhaps some backsliding on human rights.
Most insurgents are highly conservative Islamists who agreed with the limitations in women’s
rights that characterized Taliban rule. Many leaders of ethnic minorities are also skeptical of the
effort because they fear that it might further Pashtun political strength within Afghanistan, and
enhance the influence of Pakistan in Afghan politics. General Petraeus has said that the way
conflicts like the one in Afghanistan end is through a political settlement. The United States and
the Karzai government agree that any settlement must involve fighters and insurgent leaders: (1)
cease fighting, (2) accept the Afghan constitution, and (3) sever any ties to Al Qaeda or other
terrorist groups.
Reintegration/”Peace Jirga”
A January 28, 2010, London conference of international donors backed devoting more emphasis
to reintegration of fighters amenable to surrendering. Some of the incentives to surrendering
insurgents that the international community deemed likely to fund are jobs, amnesty, and
protection, and possibly making them part of the security architecture for their communities.
These are elements included in a reintegration plan drafted by the Afghan government and
presented to the peace loya jirga during June 2-4, 2010.47 In its final declaration, the peace jirga
backed the plan, but also called for limits in NATO-led raids and further efforts to limit civilian
casualties. It also called for the release of some detained insurgents where allegations against
them are weak. The day after the jirga concluded, Karzai sought to implement that
recommendation by calling for a review of the cases of all insurgent detentions. In late June 2010,
President Karzai issued a decree to implement the plan, which involves outreach by Afghan local
leaders to tribes and others who are in a position to convince insurgents to lay down their arms.
The international community gave its support to the effort in the communiqué of the July 20,
2010, Kabul Conference. Britain, Japan, and several other countries have announced a total of
about $160 million in donations to a new fund to support the reintegration process.48 The United
States is to contribute an additional $100 million.
Although it reached some substantive conclusions, the peace jirga itself received mixed reviews
for its inclusiveness or lack thereof. Karzai tried to bring other minority communities along in
backing the peace jirga and the reintegration process, and to do so he appointed former leader
Rabbani to chair the jirga. However, “opposition leader” Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, Karzai’s rival in
the 2009 presidential election, boycotted the jirga.
However, despite the international funding for the effort, the Afghan-led reintegration process has
moved forward only slowly. Only $200,000 of the donated funds have been spent, as of early
September 2010, and only about 800 fighters have indicated willingness to reintegrate, according
to a U.N. report of December 10, 2010. However, press reports in September 2010, citing
briefings by General Petraeus for senior U.S. officials, say he anticipates many more surrenders

47 Afghanistan National Security Council. “Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program.” April 2010.
48 See http://afghanistan.hmg.gov.uk/en/conference/contributions/.
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of insurgent fighters as the success of U.S. and NATO strategy becomes clear. In addition, press
reports say that some Taliban fighters sought information on the September 18, 2010,
parliamentary election as a possible prelude to joining the political process.
The Obama Administration and its partners have been separately expanding their own efforts to
lure lower-level insurgents off the battlefield with job opportunities and infrastructure
construction incentives. Another component of the program has been meetings with tribal elders
to persuade Taliban and other insurgents in their areas to give up their fight. Some U.S.
commanders are reporting some successes with this effort, using Commanders Emergency
Response Program (CERP) funds. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 (P.L. 111-
84) authorized the use of CERP funds to win local support, to “reintegrate” Taliban fighters who
renounce violence. FY2011 budget language requested by the Administration would authorize
U.S. funds to be contributed to the reintegration fund mentioned above. To help the process along
from the international perspective, in November 2009, ISAF set up a “force reintegration cell,”
headed by Britain’s Major General Richard Barrons, to develop additional programs and policies
to accelerate the effort to cause insurgents to change sides. These strategies are similar to what
was employed successfully in Anbar Province in Iraq in 2006 and 2007.
Karzai has consistently advocated talks with Taliban militants who want to consider ending their
fight. Noted above is the “Program for Strengthening Peace and Reconciliation” (referred to in
Afghanistan by its Pashto acronym “PTS”) headed by Meshrano Jirga speaker Sibghatullah
Mojadeddi and former Vice President Karim Khalili, and overseen by Karzai’s National Security
Council. The program is credited with persuading 9,000 Taliban figures and commanders to
renounce violence and join the political process.
Reconciliation With Taliban/Insurgent Leaders
A separate Karzai initiative—far more widely debated than reintegration—is to conduct
negotiations with senior insurgent leaders. Many in the international community, and within the
Obama Administration, had feared that reconciliation has the potential to result in insurgent
leaders obtaining senior positions or control over some Afghan territory, and that these figures
will retain ties to Al Qaeda and commit abuses similar to those under the Taliban regime. The
July 20, 2010, Kabul Conference did not issue unqualified support for high-level reconciliation
talks, instead endorsing establishment of an Afghan High Peace Council to build Afghan
consensus on the issue. That Council was established on September 5, 2010, and its 70 members
met for the first time under the leadership of Tajik leader Rabbani on October 10, 2010. Yet, the
direct role of the Council in negotiations is unclear; rather, it might be asked to review and
endorse any settlement that is reached.
In an apparent shift, as stated by President Obama on December 16, 2010, in announcing the
results of the U.S. policy review, the United States now fully backs the concept of reconciliation
with insurgent leaders who meet the conditions stated above. Earlier, in March 2009, President
Obama publicly ruled out negotiations with Mullah Umar and his top aides because of their
alignment with Al Qaeda. Others still differ on the willingness of senior insurgents to bargain in
earnest. CIA director Panetta, in a June 27, 2010, interview cited earlier, and reflecting the
reported view of several U.S. intelligence agencies as of late 2010, said he saw no indications that
insurgent leaders are contemplating settling with the government.
Senior U.S. commanders have grown more optimistic about reconciliation as contacts between
Taliban representatives and the Karzai government appear to have broadened. However,
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observers say the discussions to date are about modalities and an agenda for further talks. Several
sets of talks were reported in October 2010, and some press accounts said that NATO/ISAF forces
were in fact facilitation the movement of insurgent representatives to these talks. Representatives
of the Quetta Shura Taliban were purported to be involved, although this was placed in doubt in
late November 2010 when it was revealed that one of the purported senior Taliban interlocutors
was an imposter. Still, Mullah Bradar, who is close to Mullah Umar, was said by the Afghan side
to have been engaged in talks with the Afghan government prior to his arrest by Pakistan in
February 2010. Karzai reportedly believes that Pakistan arrested Bradar in order to be able to
influence the course of any Afghan government-Taliban settlement. The Taliban as a movement
was not invited to the June 2-4, 2010, consultative peace jirga, but some Taliban sympathizers
reportedly were there. The Taliban continues to demand that (1) all foreign troops leave
Afghanistan; (2) a new “Islamic” constitution be adopted; and (3) Islamic law is imposed.
However, those are viewed as opening positions; the Afghan government, for its part, may have
softened its position on disallowing any changes to the Afghan constitution as part of a
settlement.
In advance of the peace jirga, the Karzai government and representatives of Hikmatyar confirmed
peace talks on March 21, 2010, in which Karzai, his brother, Ahmad Wali, and several Northern
Alliance figures met with the Hikmatyar representatives. The representatives reportedly presented
a 15-point peace plan to Karzai that does not necessarily demand his government step down
immediately. Other accounts say that even the Haqqani faction, often viewed as least amenable to
settlement, has been represented at some exploratory meetings with Karzai government
representatives.
Other talks have taken place over the past few years, although with less apparent momentum than
is the case in 2010. Press reports said that Afghan officials (led by Karzai’s brother Qayyum) and
Taliban members had met each other in Ramadan-related gatherings in Saudi Arabia in
September 2008. Another round of talks was held in January 2009 in Saudi Arabia, and there
were reports of ongoing contacts in Dubai, UAE. Some of these talks apparently involved Arsala
Rahmani, a former Taliban official now in parliament, and the former Taliban Ambassador to
Pakistan, Abdul Salam Zaeef, who purportedly is in touch with Umar’s inner circle. These same
Taliban representatives may have been involved in talks in the mid-late 2010 as well.
The consultative peace jirga, in its final declaration, supported Karzai’s call for the removal of the
names of some Taliban figures from U.N. lists of terrorists, lists established pursuant to
Resolution 1267 and Resolution 1333 (October 15, 1999, and December 19, 2000, both pre-
September 11 sanctions against the Taliban and Al Qaeda) and Resolution 1390 (January 16,
2002). Press reports before the July 20 Kabul Conference said the Afghan government has
submitted a list of 50 Taliban figures it wants taken off this list as a confidence-building measure.
The Conference called on Afghanistan to engage with the U.N. Security Council to provide
evidence to justify such de-listings, and U.N., U.S., and other international officials said they
would support considering de-listings on a case-by-case basis. On January 26, 2010, Russia,
previously a hold-out against such a process, dropped opposition to removing five Taliban-era
figures from these sanctions lists, including Taliban-era foreign minister Wakil Mutawwakil, who
ran in 2005 parliamentary elections. Also removed was Abdul Hakim Monib, who has served
Karzai as governor of Uruzgan, Abdul Hakim Mujahid, who was Taliban representative in the
United States, and three others. Mujahid now is one of three deputy chairs of the High Peace
Council. “Mullah Rocketi,” not on the sanctions list, is a former Taliban commander who ran for
president in the August 2009 elections.
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Local Security Experiments: Afghan Provincial Protection Program (APPP) and
Local Defense Initiative

Until mid-2008, U.S. military commanders opposed assisting local militias anywhere in
Afghanistan for fear of creating new rivals to the central government who would arbitrarily
administer justice. The urgent security needs in Afghanistan caused reconsideration and Gen
Petraeus is seeking to expand these type of local security experiments, based on his similar and
successful experiences in Iraq. Press reports in July 2010 say he succeeded, after several of his
first meetings with Karzai, in overcoming Karzai’s reticence to them. General Petraeus reportedly
has guaranteed that any local security organs would be under the administration of the Ministry of
Interior.
The newest initiative is the Afghan “Local Police Initiative,” in which local security organs would
be formed from local recruits who want to defend their communities. It was planned that up to
10,000 volunteers will serve in the initiative, but on October 19, 2010, the Defense Department
said it would be expanded to at least 20,000, if possible. The ultimate target level might be
50,000, according to press reports. The Defense Department notified Congress in September 2010
that it will reprogram about $35 million in Afghan security forces funding to support the
initiative.
The Local Police Initiative follows on another program begun in 2008, termed the “Afghan
Provincial Protection Program” (APPP, commonly called “AP3”) and is funded with DOD
(CERP) funds. The APPP got under way in Wardak Province (Jalrez district) in early 2009 and
100 local security personnel “graduated” in May 2009. It has been expanded to 1,200 personnel,
in a province with a population of about 500,000. (These personnel are expected to be integrated
into the local police initiative.) U.S. commanders say that no U.S. weapons are supplied to the
militias, but this is an Afghan-led program and the Afghan government is providing weapons
(Kalashnikov rifles) to the local groups, possibly using U.S. funds. Participants in the program are
given $200 per month.
Before the program was placed on hold, it was to be expanded to Ghazni, Lowgar, and Kapisa
provinces and eventually include as many as 8,000 Afghans. General Petraeus showcased Wardak
in August 2010 as an example of the success of the APPP and similar efforts. As an indication of
divisions among Afghan leaders about the concept, the upper house of the Afghan parliament
(Meshrano Jirga) passed a resolution in November 2008 opposing the concept. The National
Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84) calls for a report within 120 days of enactment (October
28, 2009) on the results of the program.
Another program, the Local Defense Initiative, began in February 2010 in Arghandab district of
Qandahar Province. U.S. Special Forces organized about 25 villagers into a neighborhood watch
group, which is armed. The program has been credited by U.S. commanders as bringing normal
life back to the district. A different militia was allowed to operate in Konduz to help secure the
northern approaches to that city. Problems arose when the militia began arbitrarily administering
justice, fueling concerns of Karzai and Ambassador Eikenberry about these local security
approaches.
The local security experiments to date are not arbokai, which are private tribal militias. Still,
some believe that the arbokai concept should be revived as a means of securing Afghanistan, as
the arbokai did during the reign of Zahir Shah and in prior pre-Communist eras.
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Reversal of Previous Efforts: DDR and DIAG programs
As noted, the local security programs appear to reverse the 2002-2007 efforts to disarm local
sources of armed force. The main program, run by UNAMA, was called the “DDR” program—
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration—and it formally concluded on June 30, 2006.
The program got off to a slow start because the Afghan Defense Ministry did not reduce the
percentage of Tajiks in senior positions by a July 1, 2003, target date, dampening Pashtun
recruitment. In September 2003, Karzai replaced 22 senior Tajiks in the Defense Ministry
officials with Pashtuns, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, enabling DDR to proceed. The major donor for the
program was Japan, which contributed about $140 million. Figures for collected weapons are
contained in Table 5 and U.S. spending on the program are in the U.S. aid tables at the end of this
report.
The DDR program was initially expected to demobilize 100,000 fighters, although that figure was
later reduced. (Figures for accomplishment of the DDR and DIAG programs are contained in
Table 5.) Of those demobilized, 55,800 former fighters have exercised reintegration options
provided by the program: starting small businesses, farming, and other options. U.N. officials say
at least 25% of these found long-term, sustainable jobs. Some studies criticized the DDR program
for failing to prevent a certain amount of rearmament of militiamen or stockpiling of weapons
and for the rehiring of some militiamen.49 Part of the DDR program was the collection and
cantonment of militia weapons, but generally only poor-quality weapons were collected. As one
example, Fahim, still the main military leader of the Northern Alliance faction, continues to turn
heavy weapons over to U.N. and Afghan forces (including four Scud missiles), although the U.N.
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) says that large quantities of weapons remain in the
Panjshir Valley.
Despite the earlier demobilization, which affected many of the northern minorities, there are
indications that some faction leaders may be seeking to revive disbanded militias. The minorities
may fear increased Taliban influence as a result of the Karzai reconciliation efforts, and the
minorities want to be sure they could combat any Taliban abuses that might result if the Taliban
achieves a share of power.
DIAG
Since June 11, 2005, the disarmament effort has emphasized another program called “DIAG”—
Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups. It is run by the Afghan Disarmament and Reintegration
Commission, headed by Vice President Khalili. Under the DIAG, no payments are available to
fighters, and the program depends on persuasion rather than use of force against the illegal
groups. DIAG has not been as well funded as was DDR: it has received $11 million in operating
funds. As an incentive for compliance, Japan and other donors have made available $35 million
for development projects where illegal groups have disbanded. These incentives were intended to
accomplish the disarmament of a pool of as many as 150,000 members of 1,800 different “illegal
armed groups”: militiamen that were not part of recognized local forces (Afghan Military Forces,
AMF) and were never on the rolls of the Defense Ministry. These goals were not met by the
December 2007 target date in part because armed groups in the south say they need to remain
armed against the Taliban, but UNAMA reports that some progress continues to be achieved.

49 For an analysis of the DDR program, see Christian Dennys. Disarmament, Demobilization and Rearmament?, June
6, 2005, http://www.jca.apc.org/~jann/Documents/Disarmament%20demobilization%20rearmament.pdf.
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Several U.S.-backed local security programs implemented since 2008, discussed below, appear to
reverse the intent and implementation of the DIAG process.
Possible Future Limits on U.S. Operations/Status of
Forces Agreement

The issue of a larger Afghan government role in approving NATO-led operations has surfaced
repeatedly. Such sentiments arose in 2008, when the Afghan cabinet reacted to some high-profile
instances of accidental civilian deaths by demanding negotiation of a formal “Status of Forces
Agreement” (SOFA). A SOFA would spell out the combat authorities of non-Afghan forces, and
might limit the United States to airstrikes, detentions, and house raids.50 As noted earlier,
differences between Karzai and the U.S. command in Afghanistan erupted again in November
2010 with Karzai calling for a decrease in the number of night raids and other operations that
cause civilian unrest.
A draft SOFA—or technical agreement clarifying U.S./coalition authorities in Afghanistan—
reportedly has been under discussion between the United States and Afghanistan since 2007. U.S.
forces currently operate in Afghanistan under a “diplomatic note” between the United States and
the interim government of Afghanistan that was exchanged in November 2002; the agreement
gives the United States legal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel serving in Afghanistan and states
the Afghan government’s acknowledgment that U.S.-led military operations were “ongoing.”
Long-Term Security Commitment
As noted, some Afghan leaders perceived the Obama Administration’s 2011 deadline to “begin” a
transition to Afghan security leadership as a sign the Administration might want to wind down
U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. In part to reassure the Afghan government, President Obama, at
a May 12, 2010, press conference with visiting President Karzai, stated that the United States and
Afghanistan would renew a five-year-old strategic partnership. The target for renewing the
partnership is early in 2011. However, some advocate forging a security agreement with
Afghanistan similar to that agreed with Iraq—that one stipulated an end date for U.S. military
involvement in Iraq.
The strategic partnership was first established on May 23, 2005, when Karzai and President Bush
issued a “joint declaration”51 providing for U.S. forces to have access to Afghan military
facilities, in order to prosecute “the war against international terror and the struggle against
violent extremism.” The joint statement did not give Karzai enhanced control over facilities used
by U.S. forces, over U.S. operations, or over prisoners taken during operations. Some of the
bases, both in and near Afghanistan, that support combat in Afghanistan, include those in Table 6.
Karzai’s signing of the partnership had been blessed by Afghan representatives on May 8, 2005,
when he summoned about 1,000 delegates to a consultative jirga in Kabul on whether to host
permanent U.S. bases. That jirga supported an indefinite presence of international forces to
maintain security but urged Karzai to delay a decision. A FY2009 supplemental appropriation

50 Gall, Carlotta. Two Afghans Lose Posts Over Attack. New York Times, August 25, 2008.
51 See http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/afghanistan/WH/20050523-2.pdf.
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(P.L. 111-32) and the FY2010 and FY2011 National Defense Authorization Acts (P.L. 111-84 and
H.R. 6523, respectively) prohibit the U.S. establishment of permanent bases in Afghanistan.
Alliance Issues: The NATO-Led International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom52

Almost all U.S. troops in Afghanistan remain under the umbrella of the NATO-led “International
Security Assistance Force” (ISAF)—consisting of all 26 NATO members states plus partner
countries—a total of 50 countries including the United States. President Obama’s December 1,
2009, policy speech on Afghanistan was explicit in seeking new partner troop commitments, and
pledges met or exceeded what some U.S. officials expected. However, several key contingents
have ended their combat missions (the Netherlands), will end those missions (Canada, by the
summer of 2011), or are setting notional time frames for departure before the 2014 time frame
agreed in the NATO summit in Lisbon (November 19-20, 2010) to complete the transition to
Afghan leadership. Britain has steadily increased its troop commitment in Afghanistan—mainly
in high combat Helmand Province—to about 9,500 (plus 500 special forces). In line with other
contributors, British official comments have indicated that Britain might want to end its mission
before 2014. Britain has lost over 300 soldiers in Afghanistan. Italy, Poland, and Germany have
also indicated an intent to try to wind down their involvement in Afghanistan before the end of
2014. As noted above, some of the provinces considered good candidates to transition to Afghan
leadership are in the German sector in the north. Partner forces that continue to bear the brunt of
combat in Afghanistan include Britain, Canada, Poland, France, Denmark, Romania, and
Australia.
Virtually all the European governments are under pressure from their publics and parliaments to
end or reduce the military involvement in Afghanistan. This pressure led Britain, France, and
Germany to ask the United Nations to organize the international conference that took place in
London on January 28, 2010. That conference, as these countries sought, endorsed the concept of
transition to Afghan leadership on security and improvement of its governance, while also
encouraging more regional assistance from India, China, and Russia.

52 Twelve other countries provide forces to both OEF and ISAF.
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Table 3. Background on NATO/ISAF Formation and U.N. Mandate
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was created by the Bonn Agreement and U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001, a Chapter 7 resolution),53 initial y limited to Kabul. In October 2003, after
Germany agreed to contribute 450 military personnel to expand ISAF into the city of Konduz, ISAF contributors
endorsed expanding its presence to several other cities, contingent on formal U.N. approval—which came on
October 14, 2003 in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1510. In August 2003, NATO took over command of ISAF—
previously the ISAF command rotated among donor forces including Turkey and Britain.
NATO/ISAF’s responsibilities broadened significantly in 2004 with NATO/ISAF’s assumption of security responsibility
for northern and western Afghanistan (Stage 1, Regional Command North, in 2004 and Stage 2, Regional Command
West, in 2005, respectively). The transition process continued on July 31, 2006, with the formal handover of the
security mission in southern Afghanistan to NATO/ISAF control. As part of this “Stage 3,” a British/Canadian/Dutch-
led “Regional Command South” (RC-S) was formed. Britain is the lead force in Helmand; Canada is lead in Qandahar,
and the Netherlands was lead in Uruzgan until its departure in July 2010; the three rotated the command of RC-S.
“Stage 4,” the assumption of NATO/ISAF command of peacekeeping in 14 provinces of eastern Afghanistan (and thus
all of Afghanistan), was completed on October 5, 2006. As part of the completion of the NATO/ISAF takeover, the
United States put about half the U.S. troops then operating in Afghanistan under NATO/ISAF in “Regional Command
East” (RC-E).
The ISAF mission was renewed (until October 13, 2011) by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1943 (October 13,
2010), which reiterated previous resolutions’ support for the Operation Enduring Freedom mission. Tables at the end
of this report list contributing forces, areas of operations, and their Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

Recent Major Contingent Developments
Following the Obama Administration’s March 27, 2009, policy announcement, some additional
pledges came through at the April 3-4, 2009, NATO summit. Major new force pledges were
issued after the December 1 policy statement, and in conjunction with the January 28, 2010,
conference in London. However, some of these forces were intended to compensate for the
pullouts by the Netherlands and Canada 2010 and 2011, respectively. The major recent pledges
are the following:
• April 2009: Deployment of 3,000 non-U.S. troops to secure the Afghan elections
and 2,000 trainers for the Afghan security forces. Contributing forces for the
election period include Spain (400), Germany (600), Poland (600), and Britain
(about 900). Other pledges (from Bulgaria, Estonia, Italy, Greece, Portugal,
Turkey, and Slovakia) were for trainers to fill out 61 existing Operational Mentor
and Liaison Teams (OMLTs), each of which has about 30 trainers.
• April 2009: NATO agreed to new training missions for the ANSF. A NATO
Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A) has been established. Also that month,
$500 million in additional Afghan civilian aid was pledged by several donors.
• November 10, 2009: Ahead of President Obama’s visit to Asia, Japan announced
a pledge of $5 billion over the next five years for Afghanistan civilian
development, although it suspended its naval refueling mission.
• July 2009: South Korea announced it would increase its aid contribution to
Afghanistan by about $20 million, in part to expand the hospital capabilities at

53 Its mandate was extended until October 13, 2006, by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1623 (September 13, 2005);
and until October 13, 2007, by Resolution 1707 (September 12, 2006).
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Bagram Air Base. In November 2009, it announced a return of about 150
engineers to Afghanistan for development missions, protected by 300 South
Korean forces. The forces deployed to Parwan Province in July 2010. (Until
December 2007, 200 South Korean forces at Bagram Air Base, mainly combat
engineers, were part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF); they left in
December 2007 in fulfillment of a decision by the South Korean government the
previous year. However, many observers believe South Korea did not further
extend its mission beyond that, possibly as part of an agreement in August 2007
under which Taliban militants released 21 kidnapped South Korean church group
visitors.54)
• December 2009-January 2010 (London conference): A total of about 9,000 forces
were pledged (including retaining 2,000 sent for the August 2009 election who
were due to rotate out). The pledges included Britain (500), Poland (600),
Romania (600, plus about 30 trainers), Italy (1,000), Georgia (900+), Spain
(500), Colombia (240, first time contributor of forces), Slovakia (60), Sweden
(125), Portugal (120), and Germany (500 plus 350 on reserve, but still only in the
north, not heavy combat zones). France pledged 80 trainers but no new combat
forces. Several countries pledged police trainers.
• Other Major Civilian Aid Pledges in Context of London Conference:55 France
($45 million); Saudi Arabia ($150 million over three years); Australia ($40
million); China ($75 million). Japan agreed to pay ANP salaries for another six
months (until the end of 2010), a cost of about $125 million in a six month
period, to come out of its $5 billion contribution mentioned above. Japan
reiterated that commitment during Karzai’s June 17, 2010, visit to Tokyo. Other
pledges were made for Taliban reintegration, as noted above.
• In July 2010, Malaysia became a new contributor to the Afghanistan effort,
furnishing 40 military medics.
• Later in 2010, partner countries have pledged to help fill a gap of about 750
trainers for the Afghan National Security Forces.
Equipment Issues
Some of the pledges address NATO’s chronic equipment shortages—particularly helicopters, both
for transport and attack—for the Afghanistan mission. In 2007, to try to compensate for the
shortage, NATO chartered about 20 commercial helicopters for extra routine supply flights to the
south, freeing up Chinooks and Black Hawks for other missions. Some of the Polish troops
deployed in 2008 operate and maintain eight helicopters. Germany provides six Tornado combat
aircraft to assist with strikes in combat situations in the south. NATO/ISAF also assists the
Afghan Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism in the operation of Kabul International Airport
(where Dutch combat aircraft also are located). In 2009, Belgium sent two more F-16 fighters.

54 Two were killed during their captivity. The Taliban kidnappers did not get the demanded release of 23 Taliban
prisoners held by the Afghan government.
55 For more information, see http://afghanistan.hmg.gov.uk/en/conference/contributions/.
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National “Caveats” on Combat Operations
One of the most thorny issues has been the U.S. effort to persuade other NATO countries to adopt
flexible rules of engagement that allow all contributing forces to perform combat missions.
NATO and other partner forces have not, as they pledged at the NATO summit in April 2008,
removed the so-called “national caveats” on their troops’ operations that Lt. Gen. McChrystal
says limits operational flexibility. For example, some nations refuse to conduct night-time
combat. Others have refused to carry Afghan personnel on their helicopters. Others do not fight
after snowfall. These caveats were troubling to those NATO countries with forces in heavy
combat zones, such as Canada, which feel they are bearing the brunt of the fighting.
Table 4. Operation Enduring Freedom Partner Forces
Operation Enduring Freedom continues as a separate combat track, led by the United States but joined by a few
partners. The caveat issue is less of a factor with OEF, since OEF is known as a combat-intensive mission conducted
in large part by special forces contingents of contributing nations. The overwhelming majority of non-U.S. forces are
under the NATO/ISAF mission. Prior to NATO assumption of command in October 2006, 19 coalition countries—
primarily Britain, France, Canada, and Italy contributing approximately 4,000 combat troops to OEF-Afghanistan.
Now, that figure is lower as most have been re-badged to ISAF. However, several foreign contingents, composed
mainly of special operations forces, including a 200 person unit from the UAE, are still part of OEF-Afghanistan. This
includes about 500 British special forces, some German special forces, and other special forces units. In early 2010,
U.S. Special Forces operating in Afghanistan were brought under direct command of the top U.S. command in
Afghanistan, now General Petraeus.
Under OEF, Japan provided naval refueling capabilities in the Arabian sea, but the mission was suspended in October
2007 fol owing a parliamentary change of majority there in July 2007. The mission was revived in January 2008 when
the new government forced through parliament a bill to allow the mission to resume. It was renewed again, over
substantial parliamentary opposition, in December 2008, but the opposition party won September 2009 elections in
Japan and reportedly has decided on an alternative to continuing the refueling mission—by increasing its financial
contributions to economic development in Afghanistan. That led to an October 2009 pledge by Japan—already the
third largest individual country donor to Afghanistan, providing about $1.9 billion in civilian reconstruction aid since
the fall of the Taliban—to provide another $5 billion over five years. It has been requested to be a major financial
donor of an Afghan army expansion, and, in March 2009, it pledged to pay the costs of the Afghan National Police for
six months.
As part of OEF outside Afghanistan, the United States leads a multi-national naval anti-terrorist, anti-smuggling, anti-
proliferation interdiction mission in the Persian Gulf/Arabian Sea, headquartered in Bahrain. That mission was
expanded after the fall of Saddam Hussein to include protecting Iraqi oil platforms in the Gulf.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
U.S. and partner officials have generally praised the effectiveness of “Provincial Reconstruction
Teams” (PRTs)—enclaves of U.S. or partner forces and civilian officials that provide safe havens
for international aid workers to help with reconstruction and to extend the writ of the Kabul
government—in accelerating reconstruction and assisting stabilization efforts. The PRTs,
announced in December 2002, perform activities ranging from resolving local disputes to
coordinating local reconstruction projects, although most U.S.-run PRTs and most PRTs in
combat-heavy areas focus mostly on counter-insurgency. Many of the additional U.S. civilian
officials deployed to Afghanistan during 2009 and 2010 are based at PRTs, which have facilities,
vehicles, and security.
There are 27 PRTs in operation; the list of PRTs, including lead country, is shown in Table 22.
Virtually all the PRTs are now under the ISAF mission. Each PRT operated by the United States
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has U.S. forces (50-100 U.S. military personnel); Defense Department civil affairs officers;
representatives of USAID, State Department, and other agencies; and Afghan government
(Interior Ministry) personnel. Most PRTs, including those run by partner forces, have personnel to
train Afghan security forces. USAID officers assigned to the PRTs administer PRT reconstruction
projects, although USAID observers say there is little Afghan input, either into project
decisionmaking or as contractors for facility and other construction. USAID spending on PRT
projects is in the table on USAID spending in Afghanistan at the end of this report, and there is a
database on development projects sponsored by each PRT available to CRS, information from
which can be provided on request.
In the south, most PRTs are heavily focused on security. In August 2005, in preparation for the
establishment of Regional Command South (RC-S), Canada took over the key U.S.-led PRT in
Qandahar. In May 2006, Britain took over the PRT at Lashkar Gah, capital of Helmand Province.
At the same time, the Netherlands took over the PRT at Tarin Kowt, capital of Uruzgan Province.
However, the Tarin Kowt PRT has been led by Australia and the United States since the
September 2010 Dutch departure.
Some aid agencies say they have felt more secure since the PRT program began, fostering
reconstruction,56 and many of the new civilian advisers arriving in Afghanistan under the new
Obama Administration strategy work out of the PRTs. On the other hand, some relief groups do
not want to associate with military forces because doing so might taint their perceived neutrality.
Others, such as Oxfam International, argue that the PRTs are delaying the time when the Afghan
government has the skills and resources to secure and develop Afghanistan on its own.
Evolving Civil-Military Concepts at the PRTs
Representing evolution of the PRT concept, some donor countries—as well as the United
States—are trying to enhance the civilian component of the PRTs and change their image from
mainly military institutions. There has been long been consideration to turn over the lead in the
U.S.-run PRTs to civilians rather than military personnel, presumably State Department or
USAID officials. That was first attempted in 2006 with the establishment of a civilian-led U.S.-
run PRT in the Panjshir Valley. As noted, in March 2009, the Netherlands converted its PRT to
civilian lead, although that alteration has not continued with the assumption of U.S. and
Australian PRT command as of July 2010. Turkey opened a PRT, in Wardak Province, on
November 25, 2006, to focus on providing health care, education, police training, and agricultural
alternatives in that region.
As of November 2009, the “civilianization” of the PRT concept has evolved further with the
decision to refer to PRTs as Interagency Provincial Affairs (IPA) offices or branches. In this new
concept—a local paralled to the Senior Civilian Representatives now assigned to each regional
command—State Department officers enjoy enhanced decision-making status at each PRT.
Afghan National Security Forces
The U.S. “exit strategy” from Afghanistan relies heavily on increasing the capability of the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)—the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan

56 Kraul, Chris. “U.S. Aid Effort Wins Over Skeptics in Afghanistan.” Los Angeles Times, April 11, 2003.
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National Policy (ANP)—to the point where they can assume the security mission from the
international coalition. Obama Administration strategy emphasizes expanding the ANSF and
improving it through partnering and more intense mentoring and training—about 70% of Afghan
units are now partnered with international forces.
On January 21, 2010, the joint U.N.-Afghan “Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board” (JCMB)
agreed that, by the end of 2011, the ANA would expand to 171,600 and the ANP to about
134,000. As of August 11, 2010, both forces reached their interim size of 134,000 and 109,000
respectively (two months earlier than planned). As of December 2010, the forces total about
145,000 ANA and 115,000 ANP.
U.S. forces along with partner countries and contractors, train the ANSF. In February 2010, the
U.S.-run “Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan” (CSTC-A) that ran the training
was subordinated to the broader NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A). NTM-A is
commanded by U.S. Major General William Caldwell. CSTC-A’s mission was reoriented to
building the capacity of the Afghan Defense and Interior Ministries, and to provide resources to
the ANSF. The total number of required trainers (U.S. and partner) for these institutions is 4,800.
There has been an unfilled gap of trainers totaling about 750, although, as of late 2010, partner
countries have pledged those amounts. A separate France-led 300-person European Gendarmerie
Force (EGF) has been established to train Afghan forces out in the provinces. The European
Union is providing a 190-member “EUPOL” training effort, and 60 other experts to help train the
ANP. These efforts are subsumed under NTM-A.
The U.S. police training effort was first led by State Department/INL, but the Defense
Department took over the lead in police training in April 2005. Much of the training is still
conducted through contracts with DynCorp. In addition to the U.S. effort, which includes 600
civilian U.S. police trainers (mostly still Dyncorp contractors) in addition to the U.S. military
personnel (see Table 5),
Afghan National Army
The Afghan National Army has been built “from scratch” since 2002—it is not a direct
continuation of the national army that existed from the 1880s until the Taliban era. That national
army all but disintegrated during the 1992-1996 mujahedin civil war and the 1996-2001 Taliban
period. However, some Afghan military officers who served prior to the Taliban have joined the
new military.
U.S. and allied officers say that the ANA is becoming a major force in stabilizing the country and
a national symbol. It now has at least some presence in most of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces,
working with the PRTs, and it deployed outside Afghanistan to assist relief efforts for victims of
the October 2005 Pakistan earthquake. According to the Department of Defense, the ANA is able
to lead a growing percentage of all combat operations, but there is substantial skepticism within
the U.S. defense establishment that it can assume full security responsibility by 2014, which is the
target time frame announced by Karzai. Among examples of the ANA taking overall
responsibility, in August 2008, the ANA took over security of Kabul city from Italy, and it took
formal control of Kabul Province in early 2009. The commando forces of the ANA, trained by
U.S. Special Operations Forces, and numbering about 5,300, are considered well-trained and are
taking the lead in some operations against high-value targets, particularly against HIG elements in
Nuristan province.
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However, some U.S. military assessments say the force remains poorly led. It still suffers from at
least a 20% desertion rate. Many officers are illiterate or poorly motivated.57 Some accounts say
that a typical ANA unit is only at about 50% of its authorized strength at any given time, and
there are significant shortages in about 40% of equipment items. The high desertion rate
complicates U.S.-led efforts to steadily grow the force. Some recruits take long trips to their home
towns to remit funds to their families, and often then return to the ANA after a long absence.
Others, according to U.S. observers, often refuse to serve far from their home towns. The FY2005
foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) required that ANA recruits be vetted for terrorism,
human rights violations, and drug trafficking.
ANA battalions, or “Kandaks,” are the main unit of the Afghan force. There are over 120
Kandaks. The Kandaks are stiffened by the presence of U.S. and partner embeds, called
“Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams” (OMLTs). Each OMLT—of which there are about 61—
has about 12-19 personnel, and U.S. commanders say that the ANA will continue to need embeds
for the short term, because embeds give the units confidence they will be resupplied, reinforced,
and evacuated in the event of wounding.
As noted, the Obama Administration strategy is to also partner the ANA with U.S. and other
foreign units to enhance effectiveness. General Petraeus and others have attributed the previous
lack of progress in the ANSF to the non-systematic use of the partnering concept. Among the
other countries contributing training OMLTs (all or in part) are Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic,
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Britain, and
the United States.
The United States has built five ANA bases: Herat (Corps 207), Gardez (Corps 203), Qandahar
(Corps 205), Mazar-e-Sharif (Corps 209), and Kabul (Division HQ, Corps 201, Air Corps).
Coalition officers conduct heavy weapons training for a heavy brigade as part of the “Kabul
Corps,” based in Pol-e-Charki, east of Kabul.
Ethnic and Factional Considerations
At the time the United States first began establishing the ANA, Northern Alliance figures who
were then in key security positions weighted recruitment for the national army toward its Tajik
ethnic base. Many Pashtuns, in reaction, refused recruitment or left the ANA program. The
naming of a Pashtun, Abdul Rahim Wardak, as Defense Minister in December 2004 reduced
desertions among Pashtuns (he remains in that position). U.S. officials in Afghanistan say this
problem was further alleviated with better pay and more close involvement by U.S. forces, and
that the force is ethnically integrated in each unit and representative. With about 41% Pashtuns,
34% Tajiks, 12% Hazaras, and 8% Uzbeks, the force is roughly in line with the broad
demographics of the country, according to the April 2010 DOD report. However, U.S.
commanders say that those Pashtuns who are in the force are disproportionately eastern Pashtuns
(from the Ghilzai tribal confederations) rather than southern Pashtuns (mostly Durrani tribal
confederations). The chief of staff was General Bismillah Khan, a Tajik who was a Northern
Alliance commander, although as of June 2010 he is Interior Minister.

57 Report by Richard Engel. NBC Nightly News. December 29, 2009.
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Afghan Air Force
Equipment, maintenance, and logistical difficulties continue to plague the Afghan National Army
Air Corps (Afghan Air Force). The force is a carryover from the Afghan Air Force that existed
prior to the Soviet invasion, and is expanding gradually after its equipment was virtually
eliminated in the 2001-2002 U.S. combat against the Taliban regime. It now has about over 3,000
personnel, including 400 pilots, as well as a total of about 46 aircraft. Afghan pilots are based at
Bagram air base.
The Afghan goal is to have 61 aircraft by 2011, but it remains mostly a support force for ground
operations rather than a combat-oriented Air Force. However, the Afghan Air Force has been able
to make ANA units nearly self-sufficient in airlift. Afghanistan is seeking the return of 26 aircraft,
including some MiG-2s that were flown to safety in Pakistan and Uzbekistan during the past
conflicts in Afghanistan. U.S. plans do not include supply of fixed-wing combat aircraft such as
F-16s, which Afghanistan wants, according to U.S. military officials. In 2010, Russia and
Germany supplied MI-8 helicopters to the Afghan Air Force.
Afghan National Police (ANP)
U.S. and Afghan officials believe that building up a credible and capable national police force is
at least as important to combating the insurgency as building the ANA. The April 2010 and
November 2010 DOD reports on Afghanistan stability reinforce a widespread consensus that the
ANP substantially lags the ANA in its development. Outside assessments are widely disparaging,
asserting that there is rampant corruption to the point where citizens mistrust and fear the ANP.
Among other criticisms are a desertion rate far higher than that of the ANA; substantial illiteracy;
involvement in local factional or ethnic disputes because the ANP works in the communities its
personnel come from; and widespread use of drugs. It is this view that has led to consideration of
stepped up efforts to promote local security solutions such as those discussed above.
Some U.S. commanders are more positive, saying that it is increasingly successful in repelling
Taliban assaults on villages and that is experiencing fewer casualties from attacks than it was
previously. Afghan police in Kabul won praise from the U.S. commanders for putting down,
largely on their own and without major civilian casualties, the insurgent attack on Kabul locations
near the presidential palace on January 18, 2010, and a similar attack on February 26, 2010.
Bismillah Khan, the new Interior Minister, was highly respected as ANA chief of staff and has
taken new steps to try to improve the police force, including through unannounced visits to ANP
bases and stations around the country. Still, some Pashtuns might resent him for his Tajik
ethnicity.
Other U.S. commanders credit a November 2009 raise in police salaries (nearly doubled to about
$240 per month for service in high combat areas)—and the streamlining and improvement of the
payments system for the ANP—with reducing the solicitation of bribes by the ANP. The raise also
stimulated an eightfold increase in the number of Afghans seeking to be recruited. Others note the
success, thus far, of efforts to pay police directly (and avoid skimming by commanders) through
cellphone-based banking relationships (E-Paisa, run by Roshan cell network).
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Retraining and Other Initiatives
Some U.S. officials believe that the United States and its partners still have not centered on a
clearly effective police training strategy. The latest training reorganization implemented since
2007 is called “focused district development,” which attempts to retrain individual police forces
in districts, which is the basic geographic area of ANP activity. (There are about 10 “districts” in
each of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.) In this program, a district force is taken out and retrained, its
duties temporarily performed by more highly trained police (Afghan National Civil Order Police,
or ANCOP, which number about 5,800 nationwide), and then reinserted after the training is
complete. As of late 2010, police in at least 100 districts have undergone this process, although
program success has been hampered by continuing governance and other problems in those
districts. There has also been some criticism of the ANCOP performance in Marjah, even though
the unit is supposed to be elite and well trained. The ANCOP officers are being used to staff the
new checkpoints being set up to better secure Qandahar.
Police training now includes instruction in human rights principles and democratic policing
concepts, and the State Department human rights report on Afghanistan, referenced above, says
the government and outside observers are increasingly monitoring the police force to prevent
abuses. In March 2010, then-Interior Minister Atmar signed a “strategic guidance” document for
the ANP, which prioritizes eliminating corruption within the ANP and winning public confidence.
About 1,000 ANP are women, demonstrating some commitment to gender integration of the
force.
There have been few quick fixes for the chronic shortage of equipment in the ANP. Most police
are under-equipped, lacking ammunition and vehicles. In some cases, equipment requisitioned by
their commanders is being sold and the funds pocketed by the police officers. These activities
contributed to the failure of a 2006 “auxiliary police” effort that attempted to rapidly field large
numbers of new ANP officers.
Rule of Law/Criminal Justice Sector
Many experts believe that an effective justice sector is vital to Afghan governance. Some of the
criticisms and allegations of corruption at all levels of the Afghan bureaucracy have been
discussed throughout this report. U.S. justice sector programs generally focus on promoting rule
of law and building capacity of the judicial system, including police training and court
construction. The rule of law issue is covered in greater detail in CRS Report R41484,
Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth
Katzman
U.S. Security Forces Funding/”CERP”
Because the Afghan government has so few resources, the Afghan security sector is funded
almost entirely through international donations. In December 2009, Karzai asserted that the
Afghan government could not likely fund its own security forces until 2024. More than half of all
U.S. assistance to Afghanistan since 2002 has gone toward building the ANSF. U.S. funds are
used to cover ANA salaries as well as to equip and train them. Recent appropriations for the ANA
and ANP are contained in the tables at the end of this report, which also contain breakdowns for
Commanders Emergency Response Program funds, or CERP, which is used for projects that build
goodwill and presumably reduce the threat to use forces. The tables at the end also list
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breakdowns for requested ANSF funding for FY2011 and supplemental FY2010 funding. As
noted in the table, as of FY2005, the security forces funding has been DOD funds, not State
Department funds.
International Trust Fund for the ANSF
In 2007, ISAF set up a trust fund for donor contributions to fund the transportation of equipment
donated to and the training of the ANSF. U.S. funding for the ANSF is provided separately, not
through this fund. The fund is estimated to require $2 billion per year. However, the fund totals
only about $145 million coming from several donors, according to the DOD report of November
2010.
However, the fund does not represent the extent of funding for the Afghan forces. Japan, as noted,
separately pledged to pay the expenses of the Afghan police for six months (about $125 million).
Law and Order Trust Fund
There is also a separate “Law and Order” Trust Fund for Afghanistan, run by the U.N.
Development Program. The fund is used to pay the salaries of the ANP and other police-related
functions. Its budget for the two years September 2008—August 2010 is about $540 million,
funded by donors such as Japan (as discussed above). From 2002-2010, donors contributed $1.56
billion to the Fund, of which the United States contributed about $500 million, according to the
November 2010 DOD report (p. 19).
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Table 5. Major Security-Related Indicators
Force Current
Level
Total Foreign Forces in
About 140.000: About 98,000 U.S. and 41,000 non-U.S. partner forces. (U.S. total was:
Afghanistan
25,000 in 2005; 16,000 in 2003; 5,000 in 2002. ISAF totals were: 12,000 in 2005; and
6,000 in 2003.) US. forces deployed at 88 bases in Afghanistan, and include 1 air wing (40
aircraft) and 1 combat aviation brigade (100 aircraft).
U.S. Casualties in
1,337 killed, of which 1,101 by hostile action. Additional 94 U.S. deaths in other OEF
Afghanistan
theaters, including the Philippines and parts of Africa. Over 315 U.S. killed in 2009-
highest yet. 150 U.S. killed from October 2001-January 2003. 45 killed in each of July and
August 2009,and 50-55 in each of September and October 2009. At least 25 U.S. killed
per month in 2010, with over 60 in each of June and July. Over 300 UK forces killed in
Afghanistan to date.
NATO Sectors (Regional
Commands-South, east,
RC-S: 35,000 (U.K. lead). RC-Southwest: 27,000 (U.S. lead); RC-E: 32,000 (U.S. lead);
north, west, and
RC-N: 11,000 (German lead); RC-W: 6,000 (Italy lead) RC-Kabul: 5,000 (Turkey, Afghan
central/Kabul)
lead).
Afghan National Army
145,000, more than the interim goal for October 2010. End goal is 171,600 by late 2011.
(ANA)
There are 120+ battalions ranging from 300-1,000 soldiers each. About 2,000 trained
per month. 5,300 are commando forces, trained by U.S. Special Forces. ANA private
paid about $200 per month; generals receive about $750 per month. ANA being
outfitted with U.S. M16 rifles and 4,000 up-armored Humvees.
Afghan National Police
115,000+, exceeding the interim goal of 109,000 by October 2010. End goal is 134,000
(ANP)
by late 2011. Of the force, 14,000 are border police; 3,800+ counter-narcotics police;
5,300 civil order police. 1,000+ are female, some serving in very conservative south.
Most ANP salaries raised to $240 per month in November 2009, from $120, to counter
corruption. Some police paid by E-Paisa system of Roshan cel phone network.
U.S. and Partner Trainers
About 4,000, with target of 4,800.
Legally Armed Fighters
disarmed by DDR
63,380; al of the pool identified for the program
Number of Al Qaeda
50-100, according to CIA Director Panetta in June 2010. Also, smal numbers of
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Pakistan Taliban, others.
Number of Taliban
Over 20,000 (U.S. military and Afghan estimates). Some estimates higher. Plus about
fighters
2,500 Haqqani faction and 1,000 Hikmatyar (HIG).
Attacks per day (average)
1,500+ per month in 2010; compared to 800 per month in 2007; 400 in 2005.
Afghan casualties
For extended discussion, see CRS Report R41084, Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces
and Civilians, by Susan G. Chesser.
Sources: CRS; testimony and public statements by DOD officials.


Policy Alternatives/Support for Reduced U.S. Military Involvement
Although the Administration review summarized on December 16, 2010, points to clear positive
results, there is growing discussion of alternatives to address the apparent growth of support for
efforts to wind down U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. Those who support policy alternatives
generally believe that the current Afghanistan effort is unwinnable at acceptable cost, and that it is
distracting from other priorities on foreign or domestic policy.58 Others believe that pursuing the

58 This argument is presented by State Dept. director of Policy Planning during the Bush Administration, now President
(continued...)
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suggested alternatives could lead to a collapse of the Afghan government, and would produce an
unraveling of the economic, political, and social gains made through the international military
involvement in Afghanistan since 2001.
“Counter-Terrorism” Strategy
During the late 2009 strategy review, some, purportedly including Vice President Joseph Biden,
favored a more limited mission for Afghanistan designed solely to disrupt Al Qaeda in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. This approach envisioned only a small increase in U.S. or other
international forces present in Afghanistan. Advocates of this approach asserted that the
government of Afghanistan is not a fully legitimate partner, primarily because of widespread
governmental corruption. This strategy was not adopted, in favor of the U.S. “surge” that was
authorized. However, as noted above, U.S. commanders say that some of the most effective U.S.
operations consist of Special Operations forces tracking and killing selected key mid-level
insurgent commanders, even though such operations were not intended to be the centerpiece of
U.S. strategy that was decided in 2009. Some of these operations reportedly involve Afghan
commandos trained by U.S. Special Forces and the CIA, bearing such names as the
“Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams” and the “Paktika Defense Force.” Some believe that there
could be a decision to pursue this counter-terrorism strategy more directly, and to include raids
across the border into Pakistan, as 2011 progresses.
Critics of the limited counter-terrorism strategy express the view that the Afghan government
might collapse and Al Qaeda would have safe haven again in Afghanistan if there are insufficient
numbers of U.S. forces there to protect the government.59 Others believed it would be difficult for
President Obama to choose a strategy that could jeopardize the stability of the Afghan
government, after having defined Afghan security and stability as a key national interest. Still
others say that it would be difficult to identify targets to strike with unmanned or manned aircraft
unless there were sufficient forces on the ground to identify targets.
Legislative Initiatives: Drawdown Plans
In Congress, some have expressed support for efforts, or planning, to wind down the U.S.
involvement in Afghanistan. H.Con.Res. 248, a resolution introduced by Representative Kucinich
to require removal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan not later than December 31, 2010, was
defeated in the House by a vote of 65 to 356 on March 10, 2010.) Other Members have
introduced legislation to require the Administration to develop, by January 1, 2011, plans to wind
down the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. This provision was voted on in consideration of a
FY2010 supplemental appropriation (H.R. 4899), where it failed in the Senate (May 27, 2010) by
a vote of 18-80. On July 1, 2010, the House voted 162-260 to reject a plan in that bill to require
the Administration to submit, by April 4, 2011, a plan and timetable to redeploy from
Afghanistan. Earlier, in House consideration of a FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act
(H.R. 2647), a similar provision failed on June 25, 2009, by a vote of 138-278.

(...continued)
of the Council on Foreign Relations Richard Haass in July 2010. http://www.newsweek.com/2010/07/18/we-re-not-
winning-it-s-not-worth-it.html.
59 Ibid.
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Concede Parts of Afghanistan to the Taliban
Some experts believe that the Afghanistan conflict is unwinnable and that a preferable strategy
would be to work with Pakistan and other regional actors to reach a political settlement relatively
favorable to the Taliban. These plans might involve allowing the Taliban to control large parts of
the south and east, where the insurgency is most active, and to work with the Northern Alliance to
keep other parts of Afghanistan relatively peaceful. Others believe these plans amount to little
more than a managed U.S. defeat and that Al Qaeda and other militants would likely take root in
Taliban-controlled areas.
Regional Dimension
Most of Afghanistan’s neighbors believed that the fall of the Taliban would stabilize the region,
but Islamist militants have not only continued to challenge the Afghan government but have also
battled the government of Pakistan and have conducted acts of terrorism in India and elsewhere in
the region. The Obama Administration announcement of a beginning of a “transition” to Afghan
leadership in July 2011 has led some regional powers to plan for what they believe might be a
post-U.S. presence scramble for influence in Afghanistan—or at least for the ability to deny their
rivals influence there. Iran, which shares with India a fear of any return of radical Taliban
extremism in Afghanistan, has begun discussing the future of Afghanistan with other regional
countries and, to a lesser extent ,with other international actors in Afghanistan. These
maneuverings, to some extent, cast doubt on the commitment of Afghanistan’s six neighbors to a
non-interference pledge (Kabul Declaration) on December 23, 2002. U.S. officials have sought to
enlist both regional and greater international support for Afghanistan through a still expanding
44-nation “International Contact Group.”
At the same time, Afghanistan has been re-integrating into regional security and economic
organizations that reflect an effort to conduct relatively normal commerce and diplomatic
relationships. In November 2005, Afghanistan joined the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC), and Afghanistan has observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, which is discussed below. Several regional summit meeting series have been
established involving Afghanistan, including summit meetings between Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and Turkey; and between Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The fifth of the Turkey-led meetings
occurred on December 24, 2010, and resulted in a decision for joint military exercises in March
2011 between Turkey, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and support from Karzai for the Taliban to set
up an office in Istanbul for the purpose of conducting reconciliation talks with his government.
Russia has put together two “quadrilateral summits,” the latest of which was on August 18, 2010,
among Pakistan, Russia, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan, and focused on counter-narcotics and anti-
smuggling
Other regional collaborations include the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on
Afghanistan, which was launched in 2005. Another is a UNAMA-led “Kabul Silk Road”
initiative, to promote regional cooperation on Afghanistan. As shown in the table below,
cooperation from several of the regional countries are crucial to U.S. and ISAF operations and
resupply in Afghanistan.
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Table 6. Afghan and Regional Facilities Used for
Operations in and Supply Lines to Afghanistan
Facility
Use
Bagram Air
50 miles north of Kabul, the operational hub of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and base for CJTF-
Base
82. At least 2000 U.S. military personnel are based there. Handles many of the 150+ U.S.
aircraft (including helicopters) in country. Hospital constructed, one of the first permanent
structures there. FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) provided about $52 million for various
projects to upgrade facilities at Bagram, including a control tower and an operations center, and
the FY2006 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provided $20 million for military
construction there. NATO also using the base and sharing operational costs. Bagram can be
accessed directly by U.S. military flights following April 2010 agreement by Kazakhstan to allow
overflights of U.S. lethal equipment.
Qandahar Air
Just outside Qandahar, the hub of military operations in the south. Turned over from U.S. to
Field
NATO/ISAF control in late 2006 in conjunction with NATO assumption of peacekeeping
responsibilities. Enhanced (along with other facilities in the south) at cost of $1.3 billion to
accommodate influx of U.S combat forces in the south.
Shindand Air
In Farah province, about 20 miles from Iran border. Used by U.S. forces and combat aircraft
Base
since October 2004, after the dismissal of Herat governor Ismail Khan, who controlled it.
Peter Ganci
Used by 1,200 U.S. military personnel as well as refueling and cargo aircraft for shipments into
Base: Manas,
Afghanistan. Leadership of Kyrgyzstan changed in April 2005 in an uprising against President
Kyrgyzstan
Askar Akayev and again in April 2010 against Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Previous Kyrgyz governments
demanded the U.S. vacate the base but in both cases, (July 2006 and July 2009) agreement to
use the base was extended in exchange for large increase in U.S. payments for its use (to $60
million per year in the latter case). Interim government formed in April 2010 first threatened
then retracted eviction of U.S. from the base, but the issue remains subject to decisionmaking
by a new government elected in Kyrgyzstan on October 11, 2010. Some questions have arisen
in Congress over alleged corruption involving fuel suppliers of U.S. aircraft at the base.
Incirlik Air
About 2,100 U.S. military personnel there; U.S. aircraft supply U.S. forces in Iraq and
Base, Turkey
Afghanistan. U.S. use repeatedly extended for one year intervals by Turkey.
Al Dhafra, UAE Air base used by about 1,800 U.S. military personnel, to supply U.S. forces and related
transport into Iraq and Afghanistan. Could see increasing use if Manas closes.
Al Udeid Air
Largest air facility used by U.S. in region. About 5,000 U.S. personnel in Qatar. Houses central
Base, Qatar
air operations coordination center for U.S. missions in Iraq and Afghanistan; also houses
CENTCOM forward headquarters. Could see increased use if Manas closes.
Naval Support
U.S. naval command headquarters for OEF anti-smuggling, anti-terrorism, and anti-proliferation
Facility, Bahrain
naval search missions, and Iraq-related naval operations (oil platform protection) in the Persian
Gulf and Arabian Sea. About 5,100 U.S. military personnel there.
Karsi-Khanabad Not used by U.S. since September 2005 fol owing U.S.-Uzbek dispute over May 2005 Uzbek
Air Base,
crackdown on unrest in Andijon. Once housed about 1,750 U.S. military personnel (900 Air
Uzbekistan
Force, 400 Army, and 450 civilian) supplying Afghanistan. Uzbekistan allowed German use of
the base temporarily in March 2008, indicating possible healing of the rift. U.S. relations with
Uzbekistan improved in 2009, but U.S. officials said in 2010 that the use of the air base is still
not under active discussion. Some shipments beginning in February 2009 through Navoi airfield
in central Uzbekistan, and U.S. signed agreement with Uzbekistan on April 4, 2009, al owing
nonlethal supplies for the Afghanistan war. Goods are shipped to Latvia and Georgia, some
transits Russia by rail, then to Uzbekistan.
Tajikistan
Some use of air bases and other facilities by coalition partners, including France, and emergency
use by U.S. India also uses bases under separate agreement. New supply lines to Afghanistan
established in February 2009 (“northern route”) make some use of Tajikistan.
Pakistan
As discussed below, most U.S. supplies flow through Pakistan. Heavy equipment docks in
Karachi and is escorted by security contractors to the Khyber Pass crossing.
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Pakistan/Pakistan-Afghanistan Border60
Pakistan’s apparent determination to retain influence over Afghanistan is heavily colored by fears
of historic rival India. Pakistan viewed the Taliban regime as providing Pakistan strategic depth
against rival India, and Pakistan apparently remains wary that the current Afghan government
may come under the sway of India. Numerous militant groups, such as LET (Laskhar-e-Tayyiba,
or Army of the Righteous) were formed in Pakistan to challenge India’s control of part of the
disputed territories of Jammu and Kashmir. Some observers believe Pakistan wants to retain the
ability to stoke these militants against India, even though these militants may be aiding Islamist
groups challenging Pakistan’s stability. Pakistan says India is using its Embassy and four
consulates in Afghanistan (Pakistan says India has nine such consulates) to train and recruit anti-
Pakistan insurgents, and is using its reconstruction funds to build influence there.
The Obama Administration strategy reviews in 2009 and 2010 all emphasized the linkage
between militants present in Pakistan and the difficulty stabilizing Afghanistan. The December
2010 U.S. policy review says that greater cooperation with Pakistan is necessary to address
militant safehavens there, but that denial of safehavens also requires effective development
strategies inside Pakistan. Since the late 2009 review, in which the concept of a start of a U.S.
drawdown beginning in July 2011 was stated, Pakistan appears to have tried to position a political
deal between the Afghan government and the insurgency. It has done so by purportedly protecting
certain Afghan militant factions, such as the Haqqani network, that might play a role in a post-
settlement Afghanistan. As part of its efforts to engage Karzai on the shape of any conflict-ending
settlement, during 2010 there has been a growing pattern of meetings between Karzai and
Pakistan’s army chief of staff General Ashfaq Kiyani and with the head of Pakistan’s Inter
Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), General Ahmad Shuja Pasha. Through meetings such as
these, Pakistan has sought to rebut allegations that its Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) directorate is
supporting the Haqqani faction and others.61 It is not certain how Pakistan would react to any U.S.
effort to stage ground raids into Pakistan against the Haqqani network or other militants, if there
is a U.S. decision to emphasize such operations.
Pakistan has also sought to control Afghanistan’s trade, particularly with India, leading to U.S.
efforts to persuade Pakistan to forge a “transit trade” agreement with Afghanistan. That effort
bore success with the signature of a trade agreement between the two on July 18, 2010, allowing
for an easier flow of Afghan products, which are mostly agricultural products that depend on
rapid transit. The two are estimated to do about $2 billion in trade per year. The agreement could
also represent a success for the Canada-sponsored “Dubai Process” of talks between Afghanistan
and Pakistan on modernizing border crossings, new roads, and a comprehensive border
management strategy to meet IMF benchmarks. The trade agreement comes after earlier signs of
growing cooperation, including Afghan agreement to send more Afghan graduate students to
study in Pakistan, and a June 2010 Afghan agreement to send small numbers of ANA officers to
undergo training in Pakistan.62

60 For extensive analysis of U.S. policy toward Pakistan, and U.S. assistance to Pakistan in conjunction with its
activities against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
61 Mazzetti, Mark and Eric Schmitt. “CIA Outlines Pakistan Links With Militants.” New York Times, July 30, 2008.
62 Partlow, Joshua. “Afghans Build Up Ties With Pakistan.” Washington Post, July 21, 2010.
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Cooperation Against Al Qaeda
During 2001-2006, the Bush Administration praised then President Pervez Musharraf for
Pakistani accomplishments against Al Qaeda, including the arrest of over 700 Al Qaeda figures
since the September 11 attacks.63 After the attacks, Pakistan provided the United States with
access to Pakistani airspace, some ports, and some airfields for OEF. Others say Musharraf acted
against Al Qaeda only when it threatened him directly; for example, after the December 2003
assassination attempts against him. Musharraf resigned in August 2008, and the civilian
government is led by the party of the late Pakistani secular leader Benazir Bhutto. Her widower,
Asif Ali Zardari, is President.
U.S. criticism of Pakistan’s approach increased following a New York Times report (February 19,
2007) that Al Qaeda had reestablished some small terrorist training camps in Pakistan, near the
Afghan border. This possibly was an outgrowth of a September 5, 2006, compromise between
Pakistan and tribal elders in this region. That, and subsequent compromises were criticized,
including a 2008 “understanding” with members of the Mehsud tribe, among which is Tehrik-e-
Taliban (TTP, Pakistan Taliban) leader Baitullah Mehsud (killed in a U.S. strike in August 2009).
As noted, the TTP was named a Foreign Terrorist Organization on September 2, and some of its
leaders (Hakimullah Mehsud) were named as terrorism supporting entities that day.
Increased Direct U.S. Action64
The Obama Administration has tried to combat Afghanistan-focused militants in Pakistan without
directly violating Pakistan’s restrictions on the U.S. ability to operate “on the ground” in Pakistan.
The Obama Administration has significantly increased the use of Predator and Reaper unmanned
aircraft to strike militant targets in Pakistan as compared to the Bush Administration. Such a
strike reportedly was responsible for the death of Beitullah Mehsud, and some militant websites
say the strikes are taking a major toll on their operations and networks. The New York Times
reported on February 23, 2009, that there are about 70 U.S. military advisers on the ground in
Pakistan but they are there to help train Pakistani forces to battle Al Qaeda and Taliban militants.
However, a U.S. raid over the border, which killed two Pakistani Frontier Corps soldiers in early
October 2010, caused Pakistan to close off for several days the northern border crossing through
with much of NATO/ISAF’s supplies flow.
Recent History of Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations
The fluctuating nature of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations is not a new feature, and is based on
Pakistan’s past involvements in Afghanistan’s struggles. Afghans fondly remember Pakistan’s
role as the hub for U.S. backing of the mujahedin that forced the Soviet withdrawal in 1988-89.
However, some Afghan leaders resent Pakistan as the most public defender of the Taliban
movement when it was in power (Pakistan was one of only three countries to formally recognize
it as the legitimate government; Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the others).

63 Among those captured by Pakistan are top bin Laden aide Abu Zubaydah (captured April 2002); alleged September
11 plotter Ramzi bin Al Shibh (September 11, 2002); top Al Qaeda planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (March 2003);
and a top planner, Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005).
64 CRS Report RL34763, Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and U.S. Policy, by K. Alan
Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzman.
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Since 2008, the end of the Musharraf era, there has been a dramatic improvement in Afghanistan-
Pakistan relations. Karzai attended the September 9, 2008, inauguration of Zardari. A “peace
jirga” process—a series of meetings of notables on each side of the border—was launched at a
September 28, 2006, dinner hosted by President Bush for Karzai and Musharraf, and meetings of
700 Pakistani and Afghan tribal elders were held in August 2007 and again in October, 2008. The
latter, led on the Afghan side by Dr. Abdullah, and resulted in a declaration to endorse efforts to
try to engage militants in both Afghanistan and Pakistan to bring them into the political process.
Zardari visited Kabul and met with Karzai on January 9, 2009, where the two signed a joint
declaration against terrorism that affects both countries. (A September 2010 meeting between
them appeared to be a rededication of this declaration.) Additional progress was made during the
visit of Afghan and Pakistani ministers to Washington, DC, during February 23-27, 2009, to
participate in the Obama Administration strategic review. As noted above, Karzai and Zardari
visit Washington, DC, in May 2009 to continue the strategic dialogue.
In April 2008, in an extension of the Tripartite Commission’s work, the three countries agreed to
set up five “border coordination centers”—which will include networks of radar nodes to give
liaison officers a common view of the border area. These centers build on an agreement in May
2007 to share intelligence on extremists’ movements. Three have been established to date,
including one near the Torkham Gate at the Khyber Pass, one at Nawa, and one at Liwara. In June
2008, Pakistan ended a six-month suspension in attendance at meetings of the Tripartite
Commission under which NATO, Afghan, and Pakistani military leaders meet regularly on both
sides of the border.
Regarding the long-term relationship, Pakistan wants the government of Afghanistan to pledge to
abide by the “Durand Line,” a border agreement reached between Britain (signed by Sir Henry
Mortimer Durand) and then Afghan leader Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893, separating
Afghanistan from what was then British-controlled India (later Pakistan after the 1947 partition).
The border is recognized by the United Nations, but Afghanistan continues to indicate that the
border was drawn unfairly to separate Pashtun tribes and should be renegotiated. As of October
2002, about 1.75 million Afghan refugees have returned from Pakistan since the Taliban fell, but
as many as 3 million might still remain in Pakistan, and Pakistan says it plans to expel them back
into Afghanistan in the near future.
Iran
The Obama Administration initially saw Iran as potentially helpful to its strategy for Afghanistan.
Ambassador Holbrooke had advocated a “regional” component of the strategy, which focuses
primarily on Pakistan but also envisioned cooperation with Iran on Afghanistan issues. However,
as Iran-U.S. relations worsened in 2010 over Iran’s nuclear program, the Obama Administration
became more critical of Iran’s activities in Afghanistan. Still, press reports in September 2010
indicated that the view within the Administration that Iran is key to helping stabilizing
Afghanistan may be returning to the forefront. The Administration reported to be considering a
U.S.-Iran dialogue in Kabul on Afghan issues.65 Iran’s attendance of the October 18, 2010,
International Contact Group” meeting in Rome, including a briefing by General Petraeus, might
be an indication of more engagement between Iran and the United States on the Afghanistan
issue.

65 Ignatius, David. “A Chance to Engage Iran?” Washington Post, September 17, 2010.
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Early in the Administration, Secretary of State Clinton made a point of announcing that Iran
would be invited to the U.N.-led meeting on Afghanistan at the Hague on March 31, 2009. At the
meeting, Special Representative Holbrooke briefly met the Iranian leader of his delegation to the
meeting, and handed him a letter on several outstanding human rights cases involving Iranian-
Americans. At the meeting, Iran pledged cooperation on combating Afghan narcotics and in
helping economic development in Afghanistan—both policies Iran is already pursuing to a large
degree. The United States and Iran took similar positions at a U.N. meeting in Geneva in
February 2010 that discussed drug trafficking across the Afghan border. Iran did not attend the
January 28, 2010, international meeting in London, but it did attend the July 28, 2010,
international meeting in Kabul (both discussed above).
Iranian Material Support to Militants in Afghanistan
A U.S.-Iran dialogue on Afghanistan would presumably be intended to address the U.S. concerns
about Iran’s support for groups that operate against U.S. forces. Iran may be arming groups in
Afghanistan to try to pressure U.S. forces that use Afghanistan’s Shindand air base,66 which Iran
fears the United States might use to attack or conduct surveillance against Iran. Or, Iran’s policy
might be to gain broader leverage against the United States by demonstrating that Iran is in
position to cause U.S. combat deaths in Afghanistan. Yet, the Iranian aid is not at a level that
would make Iran a major player in the insurgency in Afghanistan. U.S. officials, including
General Petraeus in his August 2010 press meetings, has called Iranian influence in Afghanistan,
including its support for armed groups, “modest.” Others are puzzled by Iran’s support of Taliban
fighters who are Pashtun, because Iran has traditionally supported Persian-speaking non-Pashtun
factions in Afghanistan.
The State Department report on international terrorism for 2009, released August 5, 2010, said the
Qods Force of the Revolutionary Guard of Iran continues to provide training to the Taliban on
small unit tactics, small arms, explosives, and indirect weapons fire, as well as ships arms to
“selected Taliban members” in Afghanistan. Weapons provided, according to the State
Department report, as well as an April 2010 Defense Department report on Iran’s military
capabilities, include mortars, 107mm rockets, rocket-propelled grenades, and plastic explosives.
Some reports, however, say Iran is actively paying Afghan militants to specifically target U.S.
forces. On August 3, 2010, the Treasury Department, acting under Executive Order 13224, named
two Qods Force officers as terrorism supporting entities (freezing assets in the United States, if
any). They are: Hossein Musavi, Commander of the Qods Force Ansar Corps, which is the key
Qods unit involved in Afghanistan, and Hasan Mortezavi, who is a Qods officer responsible for
providing funds and materiel to the Taliban, according to the Treasury Department. 67
Bilateral Afghan-Iranian Relations
Iran, like President Karzai, is concerned about how any reduction in U.S. involvement in
Afghanistan might improve the prospects for a Taliban return to power. Iran’s interest in a broad
relationship with Karzai has not, to date, been affected by Iran’s continued support for Taliban
and other militants in Afghanistan. Aside from its always tense relations with the United States,

66 Rashid, Ahmed. “Afghan Neighbors Show Signs of Aiding in Nation’s Stability.” Wall Street Journal, October 18,
2004.
67 Treasury Department. Fact Sheet: U.S. Treasury Department Targets Iran’s Support for Terrorism. August 3, 2010.
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Iran perceives its key national interests in Afghanistan as exerting its traditional influence over
western Afghanistan, which Iran borders and was once part of the Persian empire, and to protect
Afghanistan’s Shiite and other Persian-speaking minorities. Karzai has, at times, called Iran a
“friend” of Afghanistan, and in March 2010 he met with Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad on two occasions, possibly to signal to the United States that he might realign with
regional actors if the United States continues to criticize his leadership. One of the meetings was
just after the departure of visiting Defense Secretary Gates. Previously, Karzai received
Ahmadinejad in Kabul in August 2007, and he visited Tehran at the end of May 2009 as part of
the tripartite diplomatic process between Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. During his visit to the
United States in May 2009, Karzai said he had told both the United States and Iran that
Afghanistan must not become an arena for the broader competition and disputes between the
United States and Iran.68
Iran’s pledged assistance to Afghanistan has totaled about $1.164 billion since the fall of the
Taliban, mainly to build roads, schools, and electricity lines in Herat Province, near the Iranian
border.69 Iranian funds have also been used to construct mosques in the province, as well as pro-
Iranian theological seminaries in Shiite districts of Kabul. Iran also offers scholarships to Afghans
to study in Iranian universities, and there are consistent allegations that Iran has funded Afghan
provincial council and parliamentary candidates who are perceived as pro-Tehran.70 A
controversy arose in late October 2010 when Karzai acknowledged accepting about $2 million
per year in cash payments from Iran, via his chief of Staff Mohammad Daudzai. On the other
hand, in December 2010, Iran suddenly ceased shipping fuel into Afghanistan, causing some spot
dislocations in Afghanistan. The move could have been related to reported shortages of gasoline
inside Iran, which are a result of U.S. sanctions imposed on sales of gasoline to Iran in July 2010.
Many Afghans look fondly on Iran for helping them try to oust the Taliban regime when it was in
power. Iran saw the Taliban regime, which ruled during 1996-2001, as a threat to its interests in
Afghanistan, especially after Taliban forces captured Herat in September 1995. Iran subsequently
drew even closer to the ethnic minority-dominated Northern Alliance than previously, providing
its groups with fuel, funds, and ammunition.71 In September 1998, Iranian and Taliban forces
nearly came into direct conflict when Iran discovered that nine of its diplomats were killed in the
course of the Taliban’s offensive in northern Afghanistan. Iran massed forces at the border and
threatened military action, but the crisis cooled without a major clash, possibly out of fear that
Pakistan would intervene on behalf of the Taliban. Iran offered search and rescue assistance in
Afghanistan during the U.S.-led war to topple the Taliban, and it also allowed U.S. humanitarian
aid to the Afghan people to transit Iran. Iran helped construct Afghanistan’s first post-Taliban
government, in cooperation with the United States—at the December 2001 “Bonn Conference.”
In February 2002, Iran expelled Karzai-opponent Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, but it did not arrest him.
At other times, Afghanistan and Iran have had disputes over Iran’s efforts to expel Afghan
refugees. About 1.2 million remain, mostly integrated into Iranian society, and a crisis erupted in
May 2007 when Iran expelled about 50,000 into Afghanistan. About 300,000 Afghan refugees
have returned from Iran since the Taliban fell.

68 Comments by President Karzai at the Brookings Institution. May 5, 2009.
69 Iranian economic and political influence efforts in Herat were discussed in a CRS visit to Herat in October 2009.
70 King, Laura. “In Western Afghan City, Iran Makes Itself Felt.” Los Angeles Times, November 14, 2010.
71 Steele, Jonathon, “America Includes Iran in Talks on Ending War in Afghanistan.” Washington Times, December 15,
1997.
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India
The interests and activities of India in Afghanistan are almost the exact reverse of those of
Pakistan. India’s goal is to deny Pakistan “strategic depth” in Afghanistan, and to deny Pakistan
the ability to block India from trade and other connections to Central Asia and beyond. Some
believe India is increasingly concerned that any negotiated settlement of the Afghanistan conflict
will give Pakistan preponderant influence in Afghanistan, and India, which supported the
Northern Alliance against the Taliban in the mid-1990s, is said to be stepping up its contacts with
those factions to discuss possible contingencies in the event of an Afghan settlement deal.
Many of the families of Afghan leaders have lived in India at one time or another and, as noted
above, Karzai studied there. India saw the Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda as a major threat to India
itself because of Al Qaeda’s association with radical Islamic organizations in Pakistan dedicated
to ending Indian control of parts of Jammu and Kashmir. Some of these groups have committed
major acts of terrorism in India, and there might be connections to the militants who carried out
the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008.
Pakistan accuses India of using its four consulates in Afghanistan (Pakistan says there are nine
such consulates) to spread Indian influence in Afghanistan. However, many U.S. observers
believe India’s role in Afghanistan is constructive, and some would support an Indian decision to
deploy more security forces in Afghanistan to protect its construction workers, diplomats, and
installations. India reportedly decided in August 2008 to improve security for its officials and
workers in Afghanistan, but not to send actual troops there. Yet, Tajikistan, which also supported
the mostly Tajik Northern Alliance against the Taliban when it was in power, allows India to use
one of its air bases.
India is the fifth-largest single country donor to Afghan reconstruction, funding projects worth
over $1.2 billion. Indian officials assert that all their projects are focused on civilian, not military,
development and are in line with the development priorities set by the Afghan government. India,
along with the Asian Development Bank, financed a $300 million project, mentioned above, to
bring electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan. It has also renovated the well-known Habibia
High School in Kabul and committed to a $25 million renovation of Darulaman Palace as the
permanent house for Afghanistan’s parliament. India financed the construction of a road to the
Iranian border in remote Nimruz province, and it is currently constructing the 42 megawatt
hydroelectric Selwa Dam in Herat Province at a cost of about $80 million. This will increase
electricity availability in the province. India is also helping the IDLG with its efforts to build
local governance organizations, and it provides 1,000 scholarships per year for Afghans to
undergo higher education in India. Some Afghans want to enlist even more Indian assistance in
training Afghan bureaucrats in accounting, forensic accounting, oversight, and other disciplines
that will promote transparency in Afghan governance.
Russia, Central Asian States, and China
Some neighboring and nearby states take an active interest not only in Afghan stability, but in the
U.S. military posture that supports U.S. operations in Afghanistan. The region to the north of
Afghanistan is a growing factor in U.S. efforts to secure new supply lines to Afghanistan. Some
of these alternative lines have begun to open, at least to non-lethal supplies.
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Russia
Russia wants to reemerge as a great power and to contain U.S. power in Central Asia, including
Afghanistan. Its hosting of the “quadrilateral summits”mentioned above, the first in July 2009
and the latest on August 18, 2010, could represent stepped up efforts by Russia to exert influence
on the Afghanistan issue. Still, Russia supports U.S. efforts to combat militants in the region who
have sometimes posed a threat to Russia itself. Previously, Russia had kept a low profile in the
country because it still feels humiliated by its withdrawal in 1989 and senses some Afghan
resentment of the Soviet occupation. In November 2010, in its most significant intervention in
Afghanistan since its occupation, Russian officers reportedly joined U.S. and Afghan forces
attempting to interdict narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan; the move reportedly prompted a
complaint by President Karzai because he was not consulted about the inclusion of the Russians.
In June 2010, Russia said more economic and social assistance is needed for Afghanistan. Russia
reportedly is considering investing $1 billion in Afghanistan to develop its electricity capacity and
build out other infrastructure. Since 2002, Russia has been providing some humanitarian aid to
Afghanistan.
Russian cooperation is crucial to the U.S. effort in Afghanistan. In February 2009, Russia
resumed allowing the United States to ship non-lethal equipment into Afghanistan through Russia
(following a suspension in 2008 caused by differences over the Russia-Georgia conflict). In July
2009, following President Obama’s visit to Russia, it announced it would allow the transit to
Afghanistan of lethal supplies as well. Russia reportedly is being urged by NATO (as evidenced
in a visit by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen to Russia in December 2009) to
provide helicopters and spare parts to the Afghan forces (which still make heavy use of Russian-
made Hind helicopters) as well as fuel.
During the 1990s, Russia supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban with some military
equipment and technical assistance in order to blunt Islamic militancy emanating from
Afghanistan.72 Although Russia supported the U.S. effort against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in
Afghanistan out of fear of Islamic (mainly Chechen) radicals, Russia continues to seek to reduce
the U.S. military presence in Central Asia. Russian fears of Islamic activism emanating from
Afghanistan may have ebbed since 2002 when Russia killed a Chechen of Arab origin known as
“Hattab” (full name is Ibn al-Khattab), who led a militant pro-Al Qaeda Chechen faction. The
Taliban government was the only one in the world to recognize Chechnya’s independence, and
some Chechen fighters fighting alongside Taliban/Al Qaeda forces have been captured or killed.
Central Asian States
These states are becoming increasingly crucial to U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. As discussed in
the chart, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan are pivotal actors in U.S. efforts
to secure supply routes into Afghanistan that avoid Pakistan.
During Taliban rule, Russian and Central Asian leaders grew increasingly alarmed that radical
Islamic movements were receiving safe haven in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan, in particular, has long
asserted that the group Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), allegedly responsible for four
simultaneous February 1999 bombings in Tashkent that nearly killed President Islam Karimov, is

72 Risen, James. “Russians Are Back in Afghanistan, Aiding Rebels.” New York Times, July 27, 1998.
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linked to Al Qaeda.73 One of its leaders, Juma Namangani, reportedly was killed while
commanding Taliban/Al Qaeda forces in Konduz in November 2001. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
do not directly border Afghanistan, but IMU guerrillas transited Kyrgyzstan during incursions
into Uzbekistan in the late 1990s.
During Taliban rule, Uzbekistan supported Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostam, who was part of
that Alliance. It allowed use of Karshi-Khanabad air base by OEF forces from October 2001 until
a rift emerged in May 2005 over Uzbekistan’s crackdown against riots in Andijon, and U.S.-
Uzbek relations remained largely frozen. Uzbekistan’s March 2008 agreement with Germany for
it to use Karshi-Khanabad air base temporarily, for the first time since the rift in U.S.-Uzbek
relations developed in 2005, suggests that U.S.-Uzbek cooperation on Afghanistan and other
issues might be rebuilt. Ambassador Holbrooke visited in February 2010, indicating further
warming. Renewed U.S. discussions with Uzbekistan apparently bore some fruit with the Uzbek
decision in February 2009 to allow the use of Navoi airfield for shipment of U.S./NATO goods
into Afghanistan.
Central Asian Activities During Taliban Rule
In 1996, several of the Central Asian states banded together with Russia and China into a regional
grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to discuss the Taliban threat. It includes
China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Reflecting Russian and
Chinese efforts to limit U.S. influence in the region, the group has issued statements, most
recently in August 2007, that security should be handled by the countries in the Central Asia
region. Despite the Shanghai Cooperation Organization statements, Tajikistan allows access
primarily to French combat aircraft, and Kazakhstan allows use of facilities in case of emergency.
In April 2010, it also agreed to allow U.S. overflights of lethal military equipment to Afghanistan,
allowing the United States to use polar routes to fly materiel directly from the United States to
Bagram Airfield. A meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to discuss Afghanistan
was held in Moscow on March 25, 2009, and was observed by a U.S. official, as well as by Iran.
Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, only Turkmenistan chose to seek close
relations with the Taliban leadership when it was in power, possibly viewing engagement as a
more effective means of preventing spillover of radical Islamic activity from Afghanistan. It saw
Taliban control as facilitating construction of a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through
Afghanistan (see below). The September 11 events stoked Turkmenistan’s fears of the Taliban
and its Al Qaeda guests and the country publicly supported the U.S.-led war. No U.S. forces have
been based in Turkmenistan.
China74
China’s involvement in Afghanistan policy appears to be growing. China reportedly is
considering contributing some People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces, possibly in a non-combat
role, to helping secure Afghanistan. A communiqué from the Obama visit to China in November
2009 implied a possible larger role for China to help stabilize Afghanistan. In late 2009, China

73 The IMU was named a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department in September 2000.
74 For more information, see CRS Report RL33001, U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy,
by Shirley A. Kan.
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allocated an additional $75 billion in economic aid to Afghanistan, bringing its total to close to $1
billion since 2002. On March 20, 2010, ahead of a visit to China by Karzai, China called for more
international support for Afghanistan. During the visit, China stressed that its investments in
Afghanistan would continue.
Chinese delegations continue to assess the potential for new investments in such sectors as
mining and energy,75 and a $3.4 billion deal was signed in November 2007 for China
Metallurgical Group to develop the Aynak copper mine south of Kabul, and build related
infrastructure. The deal represents the largest investment in Afghanistan in history. However, U.S.
Embassy officials told CRS in October 2009 that actual work at the mine has been stalled for
some time. U.S. forces do not directly protect the project, but U.S. forces are operating in Lowgar
province, where the project is located, and provide general stability there. China is also a major
contender to develop the Hajji Gak iron ore mine near Kabul.
A major organizer of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China has a small border with a
sliver of Afghanistan known as the “Wakhan corridor.” As noted in the U.N. report on
Afghanistan of December 10, 2010, Afghanistan is increasingly involved in Shanghai
Cooperation Organization affairs. China had become increasingly concerned about the potential
for Al Qaeda to promote Islamic fundamentalism among Muslims in China. In December 2000,
sensing China’s increasing concern about Taliban policies, a Chinese official delegation met with
Mullah Umar. China did not enthusiastically support U.S. military action against the Taliban,
possibly because China was wary of a U.S. military buildup nearby. In addition, China has been
allied to Pakistan in part to pressure India, a rival of China.
Persian Gulf States: Saudi Arabia and UAE
The Gulf states are, according to Ambassador Holbrooke, a key part of the effort to stabilize
Afghanistan. As noted, Ambassador Holbrooke has focused increasing U.S. attention—and has
formed a multilateral task force—to try to curb continuing Gulf resident donations to the Taliban
in Afghanistan. Holbrooke has said these donations might be a larger source of Taliban funding
than is the narcotics trade.
Saudi Arabia has a role to play in Afghanistan in part because, during the Soviet occupation,
Saudi Arabia channeled hundreds of millions of dollars to the Afghan resistance, primarily
Hikmatyar and Sayyaf. Drawing on its reputed intelligence ties to Afghanistan during that era,
Saudi Arabia worked with Taliban leaders to persuade them to suppress anti-Saudi activities by Al
Qaeda. Some press reports indicate that, in late 1998, Saudi and Taliban leaders discussed, but did
not agree on, a plan for a panel of Saudi and Afghan Islamic scholars to decide bin Laden’s fate.
A majority of Saudi citizens practice the strict Wahhabi brand of Islam similar to that of the
Taliban, and Saudi Arabia was one of three countries to formally recognize the Taliban
government. The Taliban initially served Saudi Arabia as a potential counter to Iran, but Iranian-
Saudi relations improved after 1997 and balancing Iranian power ebbed as a factor in Saudi
policy toward Afghanistan.
Saudi Arabia has played a role as a go-between for negotiations between the Karzai government
and “moderate” Taliban figures. This role was recognized at the London conference on January

75 CRS conversations with Chinese officials in Beijing. August 2007.
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28, 2010, in which President Karzai stated in his opening speech that he sees a role for Saudi
Arabia in helping stabilize Afghanistan. As noted, some reports say that a political settlement
might involve Mullah Umar going into exile in Saudi Arabia.
According to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia cooperated extensively, if not publicly, with OEF. It
broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban in late September 2001 and quietly permitted the
United States to use a Saudi base for command of U.S. air operations over Afghanistan, but it did
not permit U.S. airstrikes from it.
The United Arab Emirates, the third country that recognized the Taliban regime, is emerging as
another major donor to Afghanistan. Its troop contribution was discussed under OEF, above. At a
donors conference for Afghanistan in June 2008, UAE pledged an additional $250 million for
Afghan development, double the $118 million pledged by Saudi Arabia. That brought the UAE
contribution to Afghanistan to over $400 million since the fall of the Taliban. Projects funded
include housing in Qandahar, roads in Kabul, a hospital in Zabol province, and a university in
Khost. There are several daily flights between Kabul and Dubai emirate.
U.S. and International Aid to Afghanistan and
Development Issues

Many experts have long believed that accelerating economic development would do more to
improve the security situation—and to eliminate narcotics trafficking—than intensified anti-
Taliban combat. This belief appears to constitute a major element of Obama Administration
strategy. Afghanistan’s economy and society are still fragile after decades of warfare that left
about 2 million dead, 700,000 widows and orphans, and about 1 million Afghan children who
were born and raised in refugee camps outside Afghanistan. More than 3.5 million Afghan
refugees have since returned, although a comparable number remain outside Afghanistan. The
U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) supervises Afghan repatriation and Afghan
refugee camps in Pakistan. The literacy rate is very low and Afghanistan lacks a large pool of
skilled labor.
U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan
During the 1990s, the United States became the largest single provider of assistance to the Afghan
people. During Taliban rule, no U.S. aid went directly to that government; monies were provided
through relief organizations. Between 1985 and 1994, the United States had a cross-border aid
program for Afghanistan, implemented by USAID personnel based in Pakistan. Citing the
difficulty of administering this program, there was no USAID mission for Afghanistan from the
end of FY1994 until the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan in late 2001.
For all of FY2002-FY2009, the United States has provided about $40 billion in assistance,
including military “train and equip” for the ANA and ANP (which is about $21 billion of these
funds). The Obama Administration request for FY2010 (regular and supplemental) and for
FY2011 are in separate tables below. The figures in the tables do not include costs for U.S.
combat operations. Including those costs, the United States spent about $105 billion for FY2010
and expects to spend about $120 billion for FY2011. For further information on combat costs, see
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CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror
Operations Since 9/11
, by Amy Belasco.
There is also a debate over how aid is distributed. Some of the more stable provinces, such as
Bamiyan and Balkh, are complaining that U.S. and international aid is flowing mostly to the
restive provinces in an effort to quiet them, and ignoring the needs of poor Afghans in peaceful
areas. Later in this report are tables showing U.S. appropriations of assistance to Afghanistan, and
Table 20 lists U.S. spending on all sectors for FY2002-FY2009.
Direct Aid and Budget Support to the Afghan Government
Although the Afghan government has been increasing its revenue (about $1.4 billion for 2010)
and is covering about one quarter of its overall budget, USAID provides funding to help the
Afghan government meet gaps in its operating budget—both directly and through a U.N.-run
multi-donor Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) account, run by the World Bank. The
Obama Administration has requested about $200 million in FY2011 funds to provide direct
budget support to Afghan ministries that meet reform benchmarks. Those figures are provided in
the U.S. aid tables at the end.
Currently, only about 20% of all donated aid funds disbursed are channeled through the Afghan
government. The United States views only four ministries as sufficiently transparent to handle
donor funds. However, the Kabul Conference (July 20, 2010) communiqué endorsed a goal of
increasing that to about 50%.
Aid Oversight
Still heavily dependent on donors, Karzai has sought to reassure the international donor
community by establishing a transparent budget and planning process. Some in Congress want to
increase independent oversight of U.S. aid to Afghanistan; the conference report on the FY2008
defense authorization bill (P.L. 110-181) established a “special inspector general” for Afghanistan
reconstruction, (SIGAR) modeled on a similar outside auditor for Iraq (“Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction,” SIGIR). Funds provided for the SIGAR are in the tables below.
On May 30, 2008, Major General Arnold Fields (Marine, ret.) was named to the position. He has
filed several reports on Afghan reconstruction, which include discussions of SIGAR staffing
levels and activities, as well as several specific project audits. However, he acknowledged that
criticisms in a July 2010 “peer review” of SIGAR operations by the Inspectors General of several
U.S. agencies were valid, attributing many of the shortcomings to slow pace of fully funding his
office.76 One recent SIGAR report noted deficiencies in the ability of the Afghan government’s
Central Audits Office to monitor how funds are used. Some Members of Congress have criticized
the SIGAR for ineffective oversight and have called for his replacement.
Aid Authorization: Afghanistan Freedom Support Act
A key post-Taliban aid authorization bill, S. 2712, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (AFSA)
of 2002 (P.L. 107-327, December 4, 2002), as amended, authorized about $3.7 billion in U.S.
civilian aid for FY2003-FY2006. The law, whose authority has now expired, was intended to

76 http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/peer_review/Section5.pdf.
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create a central source for allocating funds; that aid strategy was not implemented. However,
some of the humanitarian, counter-narcotics, and governance assistance targets authorized by the
act were met or exceeded by appropriations. No Enterprise Funds authorized by the act have been
appropriated. The act authorized the following:
• $60 million in total counter-narcotics assistance ($15 million per year for
FY2003-FY2006);
• $30 million in assistance for political development, including national, regional,
and local elections ($10 million per year for FY2003-FY2005);
• $80 million total to benefit women and for Afghan human rights oversight ($15
million per year for FY2003-FY2006 for the Afghan Ministry of Women’s
Affairs, and $5 million per year for FY2003-FY2006 to the Human Rights
Commission of Afghanistan);
• $1.7 billion in humanitarian and development aid ($425 million per year for
FY2003-FY2006);
• $300 million for an Enterprise Fund;
• $550 million in drawdowns of defense articles and services for Afghanistan and
regional militaries. (The original law provided for $300 million in drawdowns.
That was increased by subsequent appropriations laws.)
A subsequent law (P.L. 108-458, December 17, 2004), implementing the recommendations of the
9/11 Commission, contained “The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004.” The
subtitle mandated the appointment of a U.S. coordinator of policy on Afghanistan and requires
additional Administration reports to Congress.
Afghan Freedom Support Act Reauthorization
In the 110th Congress, H.R. 2446, passed by the House on June 6, 2007 (406-10), would have
reauthorized AFSA through FY2010. A version (S. 3531), with fewer provisions than the House
bill, was not taken up by the full Senate. AFSA reauthorization was not reintroduced in the 111th
Congress. H.R. 2446 would have authorized about $1.7 billion in U.S. economic aid and $320 in
military aid (including drawdowns of equipment) per fiscal year. It also would have authorized a
pilot program of crop substitution to encourage legitimate alternatives to poppy cultivation; and a
cut off of U.S. aid to any Afghan province in which the Administration reports that the leadership
of the province is complicit in narcotics trafficking.
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Table 7. Major Reporting Requirements
Several provisions require Administration reports on numerous aspects of U.S. strategy, assistance, and related issues:
• P.L. 108-458, The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments required, through the end of FY2010, an
overarching annual report on U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Other reporting requirements expired, including
required reports: (1) on long-term U.S. strategy and progress of reconstruction; (2) on how U.S. assistance is
being used; (3) on U.S. efforts to persuade other countries to participate in Afghan peacekeeping; and (4) a joint
State and Defense Department report on U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan.
• P.L. 110-181 (Section 1230), FY2008 Defense Authorization Act requires a quarterly DOD report on the
security situation in Afghanistan; the first was submitted in June 2008. It is required by that law through FY2011.
Section 1231 requires a report on the Afghan National Security Forces through the end of FY2010.
• Section 1229 of the same law requires the quarterly report of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR).
• P.L. 111-8 (Omnibus Appropriation, explanatory statement) required a State Department report on the use of
funds to address the needs of Afghan women and girls (submitted by September 30, 2009).
• P.L. 111-32, FY2009 Supplemental Appropriation (Section 1116), required a White House report, by the time of
the FY2011 budget submission, on whether Afghanistan and Pakistan are cooperating with U.S. policy sufficiently
to warrant a continuation of Administration policy toward both countries, as well as efforts by these
governments to curb corruption, their efforts to develop a counter-insurgency strategy, the level of political
consensus in the two countries to confront security chal enges, and U.S. government efforts to achieve these
objectives. The report was released with a date of September 30, 2010.
• The same law (Section 1117) required a report, by September 23, 2009, on metrics to be used to assess
progress on Afghanistan and Pakistan strategy. A progress report measured against those metrics is to be
submitted by March 30, 2010, and every six months thereafter, until the end of FY2011.
• Section 1228 of the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84) required a report, within 120
days, on the Afghan Provincial Protection Program and other local security initiatives. Section 1235 authorized a
DOD-funded study of U.S. force levels needed for eastern and southern Afghanistan, and Section 1226 required
a Comptroller General report on the U.S. “campaign plan” for the Afghanistan (and Iraq) effort.
• The FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6523, cleared for the White House) provides for::
(Section 1231) a one year extension—through FY2012 - on the security situation in Afghanistan that was begun
in P.L. 11-181: a two year extension (Section 1232) in the reporting requirement—through FY 2012 - on the
Afghan National Security Forces; (Section 1535) a report within six months of enactment on U.S. economic
strategy for Afghanistan and a plan, to be submitted concurrent with the FY2012 budget submission, to transition
the duties of the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations in Afghanistan to the Department of State; and
a report by State, DOD, and USAID on the use of contractors in Afghanistan.


International Reconstruction Pledges/National Development Strategy
International (non-U.S.) donors have pledged over $30 billion since the fall of the Taliban. When
combined with U.S. aid, this by far exceeds the $27.5 billion for reconstruction identified as
required for 2002-2010. The major donors, and their aggregate pledges to date, are listed in Table
8, below. These amounts were pledged, in part, at the following donor conferences: (Tokyo),
Berlin (April 2004), Kabul (April 2005), the London conference (February 2006), and the June
12, 2008, conference in Paris, discussed below. The January 28, 2010, London conference
resulted in further pledges, as noted above. The Afghanistan Compact leaned toward the view of
Afghan leaders that a higher proportion of the aid be channeled through the Afghan government,
a policy adopted by the United States.
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Among multilateral lending institutions, in May 2002, the World Bank reopened its office in
Afghanistan after 20 years. Its projects have been concentrated in the telecommunications and
road and sewage sectors. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has also been playing a major role
in Afghanistan. One of its projects in Afghanistan was funding the paving of a road from
Qandahar to the border with Pakistan, and as noted above, it is contributing to a project to bring
electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan. On the eve of the London conference on January 28,
2010, the IMF and World Bank announced $1.6 billion in Afghanistan debt relief.
National Solidarity Program
The United States and the Afghan government are also trying to promote local decision making
on development. The “National Solidarity Program” (NSD) largely funded by U.S. and other
international donors—but implemented by Afghanistan’s Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and
Development—seeks to create and empower local governing councils to prioritize local
reconstruction projects. It is widely hailed as a highly successful, Afghan-run program. The
assistance, channeled through donors, provides block grants of about $60,000 per project to the
councils to implement agreed projects, most of which are water projects. The U.S. aid to the
program is part of the World Bank-run Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) account.
A FY2009 supplemental request asked about $85 million for the ARTF account, of which much
of those funds would be used to fill a $140 million shortfall in the NSP program. P.L. 111-32, the
FY2009 supplemental discussed above, earmarks $70 million to defray the shortfall. The FY2010
consolidated appropriation (P.L. 111-117) earmarked another $175 million in ESF for the
program. The FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84) authorizes the use of
some CERP funds, controlled by the U.S. military, to supplement the funding for the NSP.
However, this authorization, if implemented, is likely to incur opposition from some international
NGOs who are opposed to combining military action with development work.
Results of U.S. and International Aid in Key Sectors
Efforts to build the legitimate economy are showing some results, by accounts of senior U.S.
officials, including expansion of roads and education and health facilities constructed. The
following are some key sectors and what has been accomplished with U.S. and international
donor funds:
Roads. Road building is considered a U.S. priority and has been USAID’s largest
project category there, taking up about 25% of USAID spending since the fall of
the Taliban. Roads are considered key to enabling Afghan farmers to bring
legitimate produce to market in a timely fashion, and former commander of U.S.
forces in Afghanistan General Eikenberry (now Ambassador) said “where the
roads end, the Taliban begin.” The major road, the Ring Road, is nearly all
repaved. Among other major projects completed are a road from Qandahar to
Tarin Kowt, (Uruzgan province) built by U.S. military personnel, inaugurated in
2005; and a road linking the Panjshir Valley to Kabul. In several provinces, U.S.
funds (sometimes CERP funds) are being used to build roads that link up farming
communities to the market for their products. Another key priority is building a
Khost-Gardez road, under way currently.
Bridges. Afghan officials are said to be optimistic about increased trade with
Central Asia now that a new bridge has opened (October 2007) over the Panj
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River, connecting Afghanistan and Tajikistan. The bridge was built with $33
million in (FY2005) U.S. assistance. The bridge is helping what press reports say
is robust reconstruction and economic development in the relatively peaceful and
ethnically homogenous province of Panjshir, the political base of the Northern
Alliance.
Education. Despite the success in enrolling Afghan children in school since the
Taliban era (see statistics above), setbacks have occurred because of Taliban
attacks on schools, causing some to close.
Health. The health care sector, as noted by Afghan observers, has made
considerable gains in reducing infant mortality and giving about 65% of the
population at least some access to health professionals. In addition to U.S.
assistance to develop the health sector’s capacity, Egypt operates a 65-person
field hospital at Bagram Air Base that instructs Afghan physicians. Jordan
operates a similar facility in Mazar-e-Sharif.
Railways. Afghanistan does not currently have any functioning railway.
However, a railway from Mazar-i-Sharif to the border with Uzbekistan, is now
under construction with $165 million from the Asian Development Bank. The rail
will eventually link up with Herat and will integrate Afghanistan to the former
Soviet railway system in Central Asia, increasing Afghanistan’s economic
integration in the region.
Electricity Sector
At least 10% of USAID funds for Afghanistan have been spent on power projects, although that
percentage is rising in 2010 and 2011. The Afghanistan Compact states that the goal is for
electricity to reach 65% of households in urban areas and 25% in rural areas by 2010, a goal that
has not been met. However, severe power shortages in Kabul, caused in part by the swelling of
Kabul’s population to about 3 million, up from half a million when the Taliban was in power, are
fewer now than two years ago. Power to the capital has grown due to the Afghan government’s
agreements with several Central Asian neighbors to import electricity, as well as construction of
new substations. Many shops in Kabul are now lit up at night, as observed by CRS in October
2009. Afghanistan has no hydrocarbons energy export industry and a small refining sector that
provides some of Afghanistan’s needs for gasoline or other fuels. Russia, Kazakhstan, and
Uzbekistan are its main fuel suppliers. A major USAID and DOD focus is on power projects in
southern Afghanistan. The key longterm project is to expand the capacity of the Kajaki Dam,
located in unstable Helmand Province. USAID has allocated about $500 million to restore and
expand the capacity of the dam. As of October 2009, two turbines were operating—one was
always working, and the second was repaired by USAID contractors. This has doubled electricity
production in the south and caused small factories and other businesses to come to flourish.
USAID plans to further expand capacity of the dam by installing a third turbine (which there is a
berth for but which never had a turbine installed.) In an operation involving 4,000 NATO troops
(Operation Ogap Tsuka), components of the third turbine were successfully delivered to the dam
in September 2008. It was expected to be operational in mid-late 2009 but technical and security
problems, such as inability to secure and build roads leading to the dam, have delayed the project
and there is no public estimate as to when the third turbine will be completed. In the interim, the
U.S. military and USAID have agreed on a plan to focus on smaller substations and generator
projects that can bring more electricity to Qandahar and other places in the south quickly. For this
and other power projects, the Administration is requesting legislative authority for an
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“Infrastructure Fund” to be funded by DOD ($400 million - $600 million in FY2011) but
controlled jointly by DOD and USAID.
Solar Power
There is also an apparent increasing emphasis on providing electricity to individual homes and
villages through small solar power installations. A contractor to USAID, IRG, is providing small
solar powered-electricity generators to homes in several districts of Afghanistan, alleviating the
need to connect such homes to the national power grid. However, there are technical drawbacks,
including weather-related inconsistency of power supply and the difficulty of powering
appliances that require substantial power. The U.S. broadcasting service to Afghanistan, Radio
Azadi, run by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, has given out 20,000 solar-powered radios
throughout Afghanistan, according to RFE/RL in December 2010.
Agriculture Sector
With about 80% of Afghans living in rural areas, the agriculture sector has always been key to
Afghanistan’s economy and stability. Ambassador Holbrooke, including in his January 2010
strategy document, has outlined U.S. policy to boost Afghanistan’s agriculture sector not only to
reduce drug production but also as an engine of economic growth. Prior to the turmoil that
engulfed Afghanistan in the late 1970s, Afghanistan was a major exporter of agricultural
products.
USAID has spent about 15% of its Afghanistan funds on agriculture (and “alternative
livelihoods” to poppy cultivation), and this has helped Afghanistan double its legitimate
agricultural output over the past five years. One emerging “success story” is growing Afghan
exports of high-quality pomegranate juice called Anar. Other countries are promoting not only
pomegranates but also saffron rice and other crops that draw buyers outside Afghanistan. Another
emerging success story is Afghanistan’s November 2010 start of exports of raisins to Britain.77
Wheat production was robust in 2009 because of healthy prices for that crop, and Afghanistan is
again self-sufficient in wheat production. According to the SRAP January 2010 strategy
document reference earlier, 89 U.S. agricultural experts (64 from U.S. Department of Agriculture
and 25 from USAID) are in Afghanistan. Their efforts include providing new funds to buy seeds
and agricultural equipment, and to encourage agri-business.
U.S. strategy has addressed not only crop choice but also trying to construct the entirety of the
infrastructure needed for a healthy legitimate agriculture sector, including road building, security
of the routes to agriculture markets, refrigeration, storage, transit through Pakistan and other
transportation of produce, building legitimate sources of financing, and other aspects of the
industry. U.S. officials in Kabul say that Pakistan’s restrictions on trade between Afghanistan and
India have, to date, prevented a rapid expansion of Afghan pomegranate exports to that market.
Dubai is another customer for Afghan pomegranate exports. A key breakthrough on this issue was
reached with the July 18, 2010, signing of a transit trade agreement between Afghanistan and
Pakistan, reportedly brokered by the United States. It will allow for more rapid transit of Afghan
and Pakistani trucks through each others’ territories, ending a requirement that goods be offloaded
at border crossings.

77 Lemmon, Gayle Tzemach. “New Hope for Afghan Raisin Farmers.” New York Times, October 9, 2010.
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To help Afghanistan develop the agriculture sector, the National Guard from several states (Texas,
for example) is deploying “Agribusiness Development Teams” in several provinces to help
Afghan farmers with water management, soil enhancement, crop cultivation, and improving the
development and marketing of their goods. The timber industry in the northwest is said to be
vibrant as well.
Private Sector-Led Development
Some sectors are being developed primarily with private investment funding. There has been
substantial new construction, particularly in Kabul, such as the Serena luxury hotel (opened in
November 2005); a $25 million Coca Cola bottling factory (opened in September 2006); and
numerous apartment complexes, marriage halls, office buildings, and other structures. The
bottling factory is located near the Bagrami office park (another private initiative), which includes
several other factories. The Serena was built by the Agha Khan foundation, a major investor in
Afghanistan; the Agha Khan is a leader of the Isma’ili community, which is prevalent in northern
Afghanistan. The foundation has also funded the successful Roshan cellphone company. An arm
of the Defense Department, called the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations, headed
by deputy undersecretary Paul Brinkley, is attempting to facilitate the investment. Some say that
private investment could be healthier if not for the influence exercised over it by various faction
leaders and Karzai relatives.
Telecommunications and Transportation. Several Afghan telecommunications
firms have been formed, including Afghan Wireless (another cell phone service,
which competes with Roshan) and Tolo Television. The 52-year-old national
airline, Ariana, is said to be in significant financial trouble due to corruption that
has affected its safety ratings and left it unable to service a heavy debt load, but
there are new privately run airlines, such as Pamir Air, Safi Air (run by the Safi
Group, which has built a modern mall in Kabul), and Kam Air. Major new
buildings include several marriage halls in Kabul city, as observed by CRS in
October 2009.
Mining and Gems. Afghanistan’s mining sector has been largely dormant since
the Soviet invasion. Some Afghan leaders complain that not enough has been
done to revive such potentially lucrative industries as minerals mining, such as of
copper and lapis lazuli (a stone used in jewelry). The issue became more urgent
in June 2010 when a Defense Department development team announced, based
on surveys, that Afghanistan may have untapped minerals worth over $1
trillion.78 General Petraeus, in an interview with NBC News on August 15, 2010,
said the amount could be in the “trillions.” Among the most valuable are
significant reserves of such minerals as lithium in western Afghanistan; lithium is
crucial to the new batteries being used to power electric automobiles.
Still, in November 2007, the Afghan government signed a deal with China
Metallurgical Group for the company to invest $3.4 billion to develop
Afghanistan’s Aynak copper field in Lowgar Province. The agreement, viewed as
generous to the point where it might not be commercially profitable for China
Metallurgical Group, includes construction of two coal-fired electric power plant

78 Risen, James. “U.S. Identifies Mineral Riches in Afghanistan.” New York Times, June 14, 2010.
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(one of which will supply more electricity to Kabul city); a freight railway (in
conjunction with the Asian Development Bank project above); and a road from
the project to Kabul. However, work on the mine reportedly has been slowed by
the need to clear mines in the area. On December 14, 2010, with involvement of
the DOD Task Force for Business and Stability Operations, 10 outside investors
announced $50 million in investment in a gold mine in Baghlan Province. There
is another gold mine operating in neighboring Takhar Province. Bids are being
accepted for another large mining project, the Haji Gak iron ore mine (which
may contain 60 billion tons of iron ore) near Kabul. China Metallurgy, as well as
companies from India, are said to be finalists for the project.
Hydrocarbons and Pipelines. As noted, Afghanistan has had virtually no
operational hydrocarbon energy sector. However, Afghanistan’s prospects in this
sector appeared to brighten by the announcement in March 2006 of an estimated
3.6 billion barrels of oil and 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves. Experts
believe these amounts, if proved, could make Afghanistan relatively self-
sufficient in energy and able to export energy to its neighbors. In a major
development, on December 15, 2010, the Afghan government let a six-month
contract to a local firm, Ghazanfar Neft Gas, to collect and market crude oil from
the Angot field in northern Afghanistan (part of a field that may contain 80
million barrels of oil), initially producing at the low rate of 800 barrels per day.
However, the sector is expected to expand to more fields in the Amu Darya basin
(northern Afghanistan), and a tender will be offered to develop a larger oil field
in Balkh Province, estimated to hold 1.8 billion barrels of oil. Separately, USAID
is funding a test project to develop gas resources in northern Afghanistan.
TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) Pipeline Project . Another
major energy project remains under consideration. During 1996-1998, the
Clinton Administration supported proposed natural gas and oil pipelines through
western Afghanistan as an incentive for the warring factions to cooperate. A
consortium led by Los Angeles-based Unocal Corporation proposed a $7.5
billion Central Asia Gas Pipeline that would originate in southern Turkmenistan
and pass through Afghanistan to Pakistan, with possible extensions into India.79
The deterioration in U.S.-Taliban relations after 1998 largely ended hopes for the
pipeline projects, but prospects for the project improved in the post-Taliban
period. In a summit meeting in late May 2002 between the leaders of
Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, the three countries agreed to revive the
project. Sponsors held an inaugural meeting on July 9, 2002, in Turkmenistan,
signing a series of preliminary agreements. Turkmenistan’s leadership (President
Gurbanguly Berdimukhamedov, succeeding the late Saparmurad Niyazov) favors
the project as well. Yet another agreement in principle to implement the project
was signed among Karzai and other regional leaders on December 12, 2010, in
the Turkmenistan capital Ashkabad. Although implementation may still be years
away, some U.S. officials view this project as a superior alternative to a proposed

79 Other participants in the Unocal consortium include Delta of Saudi Arabia, Hyundai of South Korea, Crescent Steel
of Pakistan, Itochu Corporation and INPEX of Japan, and the government of Turkmenistan. Some accounts say
Russia’s Gazprom would probably receive a stake in the project. Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), October 30, 1997,
p. 3.
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gas pipeline from Iran to India, transiting Pakistan. However, no U.S.
commitment to help finance the project has been announced.
Trade Initiatives/Reconstruction Opportunity Zones
The United States is trying to build on Afghanistan’s post-war economic rebound with trade
initiatives. In September 2004, the United States and Afghanistan signed a bilateral trade and
investment framework agreement (TIFA). These agreements are generally seen as a prelude to a
broader and more complex bilateral free trade agreement, but negotiations on an FTA have not yet
begun. On December 13, 2004, the 148 countries of the World Trade Organization voted to start
membership talks with Afghanistan. Another initiative supported by the United States is the
establishment of joint Afghan-Pakistani “Reconstruction Opportunity Zones” (ROZ’s) which
would be modeled after “Qualified Industrial Zones” run by Israel and Jordan in which goods
produced in the zones receive duty free treatment for import into the United States. For FY2008,
$5 million in supplemental funding was requested to support the zones, but P.L. 110-252 did not
specifically mention the zones.
Bills in the 110th Congress, S. 2776 and H.R. 6387, would have authorized the President to
proclaim duty-free treatment for imports from ROZ’s to be designated by the President. In the
111th Congress, a version of these bills was introduced (S. 496 and H.R. 1318). President Obama
specifically endorsed passage of these bills in his March 2009 strategy announcement. H.R. 1318
was incorporated into H.R. 1886, a Pakistan aid appropriation that is a component of the new
U.S. strategy for the region, and the bill was passed by the House on June 11, 2009, and then
appended to H.R. 2410. However, another version of the Pakistan aid bill, S. 1707, did not
authorize ROZ’s; it was passed and became law (P.L. 111-73).
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Table 8. Major International (Non-U.S.) Pledges to Afghanistan Since January 2002
(as of March 2010; $ in millions)
Japan 6,900
Britain 2,897
World Bank
2,803
Asia Development Bank
2,200
European Commission (EC)
1,768
Netherlands
1,697
Canada 1,479
India 1,200
Iran 1,164
Germany 1,108
Norway 977
Denmark 683
Italy 637
Saudi Arabia
533
Spain 486
Australia 440
Total Non-U.S. Pledges
30,800
(including donors not listed)
Sources: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. October 2008 report, p. 140; various press
announcements. Figures include funds pledged at April 2009 NATO summit and Japan’s October 2009 pledge of
$5 billion over the next five years.
Note: This table lists donors pledging over $400 million total.
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Table 9. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998
($ in millions)
Fiscal
Devel.
Econ. Supp.
P.L. 480 (Title I
Other (Incl. Regional
Year
Assist.
(ESF)
and II)
Military
Refugee Aid)
Total
1978 4.989 —
5.742 0.269
0.789 11.789
1979 3.074 —
7.195 —
0.347 10.616
1980

(Soviet invasion-December 1979)


1981 — —
— —


1982 — —
— —


1983 — —
— —


1984 — —
— —


1985 3.369 —



3.369
1986 — —
8.9 —

8.9
1987
17.8
12.1 2.6 — — 32.5
1988 22.5 22.5 29.9 —

74.9
1989 22.5 22.5 32.6 —

77.6
1990 35.0 35.0 18.1 —

88.1
1991 30.0 30.0 20.1 —

80.1
1992 25.0 25.0 31.4 —

81.4
1993 10.0 10.0 18.0 —
30.2 68.2
1994 3.4 2.0
9.0 —
27.9 42.3
1995 1.8 —
12.4 —
31.6 45.8
1996 — — 16.1 —
26.4 42.5
1997 — — 18.0 —
31.9a 49.9
1998

— 3.6
— 49.14b 52.74
Source: Department of State.
a. Includes $3 million for demining and $1.2 million for counternarcotics.
b. Includes $3.3 million in projects targeted for Afghan women and girls, $7 million in earthquake relief aid,
100,000 tons of 416B wheat worth about $15 million, $2 million for demining, and $1.54 for
counternarcotics.
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Table 10. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002
($ in millions)

FY1999 FY2000 FY2001
FY2002
(Final)
U.S. Department of
42.0 worth of
68.875 for 165,000
131.1 (300,000
198.12 (for food
Agriculture (DOA) and
wheat (100,000
metric tons. metric tons under
commodities)
USAID Food For Peace
metric tons under
(60,000 tons for
P.L. 480, Title II,
(FFP), via World Food
“416(b)” program.)
May 2000 drought
and 416(b))
Program(WFP)
relief)
State/Bureau of
16.95 for Afghan
14.03 for the same
22.03 for similar
136.54 (to U.N.
Population, Refugees and
refugees in Pakistan
purposes
purposes
agencies)
Migration (PRM) via
and Iran, and to
UNHCR and ICRC
assist their
repatriation
State Department/
7.0 to various
6.68 for drought
18.934 for similar
113.36 (to various
Office of Foreign
NGOs to aid
relief and health,
programs
U.N. agencies and
Disaster Assistance
Afghans inside
water, and
NGOs)
(OFDA)
Afghanistan sanitation programs
State Department/HDP
2.615 3.0
2.8
7.0
to
Halo
(Humanitarian Demining
Trust/other demining
Program)
Aid to Afghan Refugees
5.44 (2.789 for
6.169, of which
5.31 for similar

in Pakistan (through
health, training—
$3.82 went to
purposes
various NGOs)
Afghan females in
similar purposes
Pakistan)
Counter-Narcotics

1.50
63.0
USAID/Office of

0.45
(Afghan
24.35 for
Transition Initiatives
women in
broadcasting/media
Pakistan)
Dept. of Defense



50.9 ( 2.4 million
rations)
Foreign Military



57.0 (for Afghan
Financing
national army)
Anti-Terrorism



36.4
Economic Support Funds


105.2
(E.S.F)
Peacekeeping


24.0
Totals
76.6
113.2
182.6
815.9
Source: CRS.
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Table 11. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2003
($ in millions, same acronyms as Table 10)
FY2003 Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 108-7)
Development/Health 90
P.L. 108-480 Title II (Food Aid)
47
Peacekeeping 10
Disaster Relief
94
ESF
50
Non-Proliferation, De-mining, Anti-Terrorism (NADR)
5
Refugee Relief
55
Afghan National Army (ANA) train and equip (FMF)
21
Total from this law:
372
FY2003 Supplemental (P.L. 108-11)
Road Construction (ESF, Kabul-Qandahar road)
100
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ESF)
10
Afghan government support (ESF)
57
ANA train and equip (FMF)
170
Anti-terrorism/de-mining
28
(NADR, some for Karzai protection)
Total from this law:
365
Total for FY2003
737
Source: CRS.
Note: Earmarks for programs benefitting women and girls totaled: $65 million. Of that amount, $60 million was
earmarked in the supplemental and $5 million in the regular appropriation.
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Table 12. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004
($ in millions, same acronyms as previous tables)
Afghan National Police (FMF)
160
Counter-Narcotics
125.52
Afghan National Army (FMF)
719.38
Presidential Protection (NADR)
52.14
DDR Program (disarming militias)
15.42
MANPAD destruction
1.5
Terrorist Interdiction Program
0.41
Border Control (WMD)
0.23
Good Governance Program
113.57
Political Competition, Consensus Building
24.41
(Elections)
Rule of Law and Human Rights
29.4
Roads
348.68
Education/Schools 104.11
Health/Clinics 76.85
Power
85.13
PRTs
57.4
CERP (DOD funds to build good will)
39.71
Private Sector Development/Economic Growth
63.46
Water Projects
28.9
Agriculture 50.5
Refugee/IDPs 82.6
Food Assistance
88.25
De-Mining 12.61
State/USAID Program Support
203.02
Total Aid for FY2004
2,483.2
Laws Derived: FY2004 supplemental (P.L. 108-106); FY2004 regular appropriation (P.L. 108-
199). Regular appropriation earmarked $5 million for programs benefitting women and girls.
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Table 13. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2005
($ in millions)
Afghan National Police (State Dept. funds, FMF, and DOD funds,
624.46
transition to DOD funds to Afghan security forces
Counter-Narcotics 775.31
Afghan National Army (State Dept. funds, FMF, and DOD funds)
1,633.24
Presidential (Karzai) Protection (NADR funds)
23.10
DDR
5.0
Detainee Operations
16.9
MANPAD Destruction
0.75
Small Arms Control
3.0
Terrorist Interdiction Program
0.1
Border Control (WMD)
0.85
Good Governance
137.49
Political Competition/Consensus-Building/Election Support
15.75
Rule of Law and Human Rights
20.98
Roads
334.1
Afghan-Tajik (Nizhny Panj) Bridge
33.1
Education/Schools 89.63
Health/Clinics 107.4
Power
222.5
PRTs
97.0
CERP
136.0
Civil Aviation (Kabul International Airport)
25.0
Private Sector Development/Economic Growth
77.43
Water Projects
43.2
Agriculture 74.49
Refugee/IDP Assistance
54.6
Food Assistance (P.L. 480, Title II)
108.6
Demining 23.7
State/USAID Program Support
142.84
Total Aid for FY2005
4,826.52
Laws Derived: FY2005 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-447); Second FY2005 Supplemental
(P.L. 109-13). The regular appropriation earmarked $50 million to be used for programs to
benefit women and girls.
Source: CRS.
Note: In FY2005, funds to equip and train the Afghan national security forces was altered from State
Department funds (Foreign Military Financing, FMF) to DOD funds.
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Table 14. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2006
($ in millions)
Afghan National Police (DOD funds)
1,217.5
Counter-narcotics
419.26
Afghan National Army (DOD funds)
735.98
Presidential (Karzai) protection (NADR funds)
18.17
Detainee Operations
14.13
Small Arms Control
2.84
Terrorist Interdiction
.10
Counter-terrorism Finance
.28
Border Control (WMD)
.40
Bilateral Debt Relief
11.0
Budgetary Support to the Government of Afghanistan
1.69
Good Governance
10.55
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
47.5
Political Competition/Consensus Building/Elections
1.35
Civil Society
7.77
Rule of Law and Human Rights
29.95
Roads
235.95
Education/Schools 49.48
Health/Clinics 51.46
Power
61.14
PRTs
20.0
CERP Funds (DOD)
215.0
Private Sector Development/Economic Growth
45.51
Water Projects
.89
Agriculture 26.92
Food Assistance
109.6
De-mining 14.32
Refugee/IDP aid
36.0
State/USAID program support
142.42
Total 3,527.16
Laws Derived: FY2006 Regular Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 109-102); FY06
supplemental (P.L. 109-234). The regular appropriation earmarked $50 million for programs
to benefit women and girls.
Source: CRS.
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Table 15. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2007
($ in millions)
Afghan National Police (DOD funds)
2,523.30
Afghan National Army (DOD funds)
4,871.59
Counter-Narcotics
737.15
Presidential (Karzai) Protection (NADR)
19.9
Detainee Operations
12.7
Small Arms Control
1.75
Terrorist Interdiction Program
0.5
Counter-Terrorism Finance
0.4
Border Control (WMD)
0.5
Budget Support to Afghan Government
31.24
Good Governance
107.25
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (incl. National
Solidarity Program)
63
Political Competition/Election support (ESF)
29.9
Civil Society (ESF)
8.1
Rule of Law/Human Rights (ESF)
65.05
Roads (ESF)
303.1
Education/Schools (ESF)
62.75
Health/Clinics 112.77
Power (ESF)
194.8
PRTs (ESF)
126.1
CERP (DOD funds)
206
Private Sector Development/Economic Growth
70.56
Water Projects (ESF)
2.3
Agriculture (ESF)
67.03
Refugee/IDP Assistance
72.61
Food Assistance
150.9
Demining 27.82
State/USAID Program Support
88.7
Total 9,984.98
Laws Derived: Regular Appropriation P.L. 110-5; DOD Appropriation P.L. 109-289; and
FY2007 Supplemental Appropriation P.L. 110-28. The regular appropriation earmarked $50
million for programs to benefit women/ girls. Providing ESF in excess of $300 million subject
to certification of Afghan cooperation on counter-narcotics.
Sources: CRS; Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, October 2008 report.
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Table 16. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2008
(appropriated, $ in millions)
Afghan National Army (DOD funds)
1,724.68
Afghan National Police (DOD funds)
1,017.38
Counter-Narcotics (INCLE and DOD funds)
619.47
NADR (Karzai protection)
6.29
Radio Free Afghanistan
3.98
Detainee operations
9.6
Small Arms Control
3.0
Terrorist Interdiction Program
.99
Counter-Terrorism Finance
.60
Border Control (WMD)
.75
Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP, DOD
269.4
funds)
Direct Support to Afghan Government
49.61
Good Governance
245.08
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (incl. National
45.0
Solidarity program)
Election Support
90.0
Civil Society Building
4.01
Rule of Law and Human Rights
125.28
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
2.0
(SIGAR)
Roads
324.18
Education/Schools 99.09
Health/Clinics 114.04
Power (incl. Kajaki Dam rehabilitation work)
236.81
PRT programs
75.06
Economic Growth/Private Sector Development
63.06
Water Projects
16.4q
Agriculture 34.44
Refugee/IDP Assistance
42.1
Food Aid
101.83
De-Mining 15.0
State/USAID Program Support
317.4
Total 5,656.53
Appropriations Laws Derived: Regular FY2008 (P.L. 110-161); FY2008 Supplemental (P.L.
110-252). The regular appropriation earmarked $75 million for programs to benefit woman
and girls. ESF over $300 million subject to narcotics cooperation certification.
Sources: Special Inspector General Afghanistan Reconstruction, October 2008 report; CRS.
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Table 17. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2009
($ in millions)
Regular
Bridge
FY2009
Appropriation
Supplemental
Supplemental

(P.L. 111-8)
(P.L. 110-252)
(P.L. 111-32)
Total
ANSF Funding

2,000
3,607
5,607
CERP (DOD funds)

683

683
Detainee ops (DOD)

4

4
Counternarcotics (C-N) (DOD)
24
150
57
232
C-N (DEA)
19


19
C-N—Alternative. Livelihoods (INCLE)
100
70
87
257
C-N—Eradication, Interdiction (INCLE)
178
14
17
209
IMET 1.4


1.4
ARTF (Incl. National Solidarity Program)
45
20
85
150
Governance building
100
68
115
283
Civil Society promotion
8
4

12
Election Support
93
56
25
174
Strategic Program Development


50
50
Rule of Law Programs (USAID)
8
15
20
43
Rule of Law (INCLE)
34
55
80
169
Roads (ESF)
74
65

139
Power (ESF)
73
61

134
Agriculture (ESF and DA)
25

85
110
PRTs/Local Governance (ESF)
74
55
159
288
Education 88
6

94
Health 61
27

88
Econ Growth/”Cash for Work”
49
37
220
306
Water, Environment, Victims Comp.
31
3

34
Karzai Protection (NADR)
32

12
44
Food Aid (P.L. 480, Food for Peace)
14
44

58
Migration, Refugee Aid

50
7
57
State Ops/Embassy Construction
308
131
450
889
USAID Programs and Ops
18
2
165
185
State/USAID IG/SIGAR
3
11
7
20
Cultural Exchanges, International Orgs
6
10

16
Totals 1,463
3,640
5,248
10,352
Notes: P.L. 111-32 (FY2009 supplemental): provides requested funds, earmarks $70 million for National
Solidarity Program; $150 million for women and girls (all of FY2009); ESF over $200 million subject to narcotics
certification; 10% of supplemental INCLE subject to certification of Afghan government moves to curb human
rights abuses, drug involvement.
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Table 18. FY2010 Assistance (Includes Supplemental)
($ in millions)
Afghan Security Forces Funding (DOD funds)
9,162 (6,563 appropriated plus 2,600
supplemental request)
CERP (DOD funds)
1,000
Counternarcotics (DOD)
361
INCLE: all functions: interdiction, rule of law,
620 (420 regular approp. plus 200
alternative livelihoods
supplemental request)
IMET
1.5
Global Health/Child Survival
92.3
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (Incl.
200
National Solidarity Program) (ESF)
Governance building (ESF)
191
Civil Society promotion (ESF)
10
Election Support (ESF)
90
Strategic Program Development (ESF)
100
USAID Rule of Law Programs (ESF)
50
Roads (ESF)
230
Power (ESF)
230
Agriculture (ESF)
230
PRT programs/Local governance (ESF)
251
Education (ESF)
95
Health (ESF)
102
Econ Growth/”Cash for Work” (ESF)
274
Water, Environment, Victim Comp. (ESF)
15
Karzai Protection (NADR)
58
Food Aid (P.L. 480, Food for Peace)
16
Refugees and Migration
11
State Ops/Embassy Construction
697 (486 regular plus 211 supplemental)
Cultural Exchanges
6
SIGAR
37 (23 regular plus 14 supp request)
FY2010 supplemental ESF request (for ESF
1,576
programs above)
Total Appropriated (Incl. Supplemental)
15,700
Laws derived: FY2010 foreign aid appropriation in Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 111-117),
which earmarks: $175 million (ESF and INCLE) for programs for women and girls, and $175
million (ESF) for the National Solidarity Program. The FY2010 Defense Appropriation (P.L.
111-118), which cut $900 million from the requested amount for the ANSF (regular defense
appropriation). FY2010 supplemental funds appropriated by H.R. 4899 (P.L. 111-212)
Source: CRS.
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Table 19. FY2011 Regular Request
($ in millions)
Program/Area Request
Afghan National Security Forces (DOD funds)
11,600
CERP
1,100
Economic Support Funds (ESF)
3,316.3
Global Health/ Child Survival
71.1
INCLE
450
Karzai Protection (NADR funds)
69.3
IMET
1.5
State Dept. Operations (not incl. security)
754
SIGAR
35.3
Total
17,398
In FY2011 legislation, on June 30, 2010, the State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee of House Appropriations
Committee marked up an aid bill, deferring consideration of much of the Administration request for Afghanistan
pending a Committee investigation of allegations of governmental corruption in Afghanistan and of possible diversion
of U.S. aid funds by Afghan officials and other elites. The Administration has requested legislation to authorize an
“Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund,” to contain mostly DOD funds, beginning with $400 million in FY2011, possibly
supplemented by an additional $200 million later in the fiscal year. The fund will be used mostly for electricity
projects, including an ongoing major electricity project for Qandahar, but could be used for other infrastructure
projects later on, such as roads. That was authorized in H.R 6523, the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2011, cleared for the White House.
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Table 20. Total Obligations for Major Programs: FY2001-FY2009
($ millions)
Security Related Programs (mostly DOD funds)
Afghan National Security Forces
21,297
Counter-Narcotics
3,436
Karzai Protection (NADR funds)
226
DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration of militias)
20.42
Detainee Operations
57.33
MANPAD Destruction (Stingers left over from anti-Soviet war)
2.25
Small Arms Control
10.59
Commander Emergency Response Program (CERP)
1,976
De-Mining Operations (Halo Trust, other contractors)
98.53
International Military Education and Training Funds (IMET)
3
Humanitarian-Related Programs
Food Aid (P.L. 480, other aid)
958
Refugee/IDP aid
743
Debt Relief for Afghan government
11
Democracy and Governance Programs (mostly ESF)
Support for Operations of Afghan Government
80.86
Good Governance (incentives for anti-corruption, anti-narcotics)
1,044
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (funds National Solidarity Program)
305.5
Civil Society (programs to improve political awareness and activity)
31.88
Elections Support
600
Rule of Law and Human Rights (USAID and INCLE funds)
552.66
Economic Sector-Related Programs (mostly ESF)
Roads
1,908
PRT-funded projects (includes local governance as wel as economic programs)
698.11
Education (building schools, teacher training)
535.93
Health (clinic-building, medicines)
620.59
Power
934.38
Water (category also includes some funds to compensate Afghan victims/Leahy)
128.02
Agriculture (focused on sustainable crops, not temporary alternatives to poppy)
441
Private Sector Development/Economic Growth (communications, IT, but
includes some cash-for-work anti-narcotics programs)
627.52
State Dept. operations/Embassy construction/USAID operations/educational and
cultural exchanges/SIGAR operations
2,445
Total (including minor amounts not included in table)
39,730
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Table 21. NATO/ISAF Contributing Nations
(As of December 14, 2010; http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/
15%20NOV.Placemat%20page1-3.pdf)
NATO Countries
Non-NATO Partners
Belgium 519
Albania 258
Bulgaria 589
Armenia 40
Canada 2,913
Austria
3
Czech Republic
472
Australia
1,550
Denmark 750
Azerbaijan 94
Estonia 139
Bosnia-Herzegovina
45
France 3,850
Croatia 311
Germany 4,877
Finland
165
Greece 134
Georgia 924
Hungary 522
Ireland
7
Iceland 4
Jordan 0
Italy 3,770
Macedonia
163
Latvia 190
Malaysia 30
Lithuania 179
Mongolia 49
Luxemburg 9
Montenegro
31
Netherlands 190
New
Zealand 234
Norway 352
Singapore 38
Poland
2,448
South Korea
246
Portugal 95
Sweden 491
Romania 1,664
Ukraine
17
Slovakia 293
United
Arab
Emirates
35
Slovenia 80
Tonga
0
Spain 1,505

Turkey 1,815

United Kingdom
9,500


United States
90,000


Total Listed ISAF: 131,730
Note: As noted elsewhere in this report, U.S. force totals in Afghanistan are approximately 98,000. Non-U.S.
forces in the table total 41,700. In addition, the NATO/ISAF site states that troop numbers in this table are
based on broad contribution and do not necessarily reflect the exact numbers on the ground at any one time.

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Table 22. Provincial Reconstruction Teams
Location (City)
Province/Command
U.S.-Lead (all under ISAF banner)
1. Gardez
Paktia Province (RC-East, E)
2. Ghazni
Ghazni (RC-E). with Poland.
3. Jalalabad
Nangarhar (RC-E)
4. Khost
Khost (RC-E)
5. Qalat
Zabol (RC-South, S). with Romania.
6. Asadabad
Kunar (RC-E)
7. Sharana
Paktika (RC-E). with Poland.
8. Mehtarlam
Laghman (RC-E)
9. Jabal o-Saraj
Panjshir Province (RC-E), State Department lead
10. Qala Gush
Nuristan (RC-E)
11. Farah
Farah (RC-SW)
Partner Lead (most under ISAF banner)
PRT Location
Province
Lead Force/Other forces
12. Qandahar
Qandahar (RC-S)
Canada (seat of RC-S)
13. Lashkar Gah
Helmand (RC-S)
Britain. with Denmark and Estonia
14. Tarin Kowt
Uruzgan (RC-S)
Australia (and U.S.) (Replaced Netherlands in August 2010)
15. Herat
Herat (RC-W)
Italy (seat of RC-W)
16. Qalah-ye Now
Badghis (RC-W)
Spain
17. Mazar-e-Sharif
Balkh (RC-N)
Sweden
18. Konduz
Konduz (RC-N)
Germany (seat of RC-N)
29. Faizabad
Badakhshan (RC-N)
Germany. with Denmark, Czech Rep.
20. Meymaneh
Faryab (RC-N)
Norway. with Sweden.
21. Chaghcharan
Ghowr (RC-W)
Lithuania. with Denmark, U.S., Iceland
22. Pol-e-Khomri
Baghlan (RC-N)
Hungary
23. Bamiyan
Bamiyan (RC-E)
New Zealand (not NATO/ISAF).
24. Maidan Shahr
Wardak (RC-C)
Turkey
25. Pul-i-Alam
Lowgar (RC-E)
Czech Republic
26. Shebergan
Jowzjan (RC-N)
Turkey
27. Charikar
Parwan (RC-E)
South Korea (Bagram, in Parwan Province, is the base of RC-E)
Note: RC = Regional Command.

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Table 23. Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan
Party/
Ideology/

Leader
Leader
Ethnicity
Regional Base
Taliban
Mullah (Islamic cleric) Muhammad Umar (still at large
Ultra-
Insurgent
possibly in Afghanistan. Umar, born in Tarin Kowt, Uruzgan
orthodox
groups, mostly
province, is about 65 years old.
Islamic,
in the south and
Pashtun
east.
Haqqani
Jalaludin and Siraj Haqqani. Allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda. Same
as
Paktia, Paktika,
Network
Said to be heavily influenced by elements within Pakistani
above
Khost, Kabul
military intelligence.
Islamic Society Burhannudin Rabbani/ Yunus Qanooni (speaker of lower
Moderate Much of
(leader of
house)/Muhammad Fahim/Dr. Abdul ah Abdul ah (Foreign
Islamic,
northern and
“Northern
Minister 2001-2006). Ismail Khan, a so-cal ed “warlord,”
mostly Tajik western
Alliance”)
heads faction of the grouping in Herat area. Khan, now
Afghanistan,
Minister of Energy and Water, visited United States in March
including Kabul
2008 to sign USAID grant for energy projects.
National
Abdul Rashid Dostam. During OEF, impressed U.S.
Secular,
Jowzjan, Balkh,
Islamic
commanders with horse-mounted assaults on Taliban
Uzbek
Faryab, Sar-i-Pol,
Movement of
positions at Shulgara Dam, south of Mazar-e-Sharif, leading
and Samangan
Afghanistan
to the fal of that city and the Taliban’s subsequent col apse.
provinces.
Was Karzai rival in October 2004 presidential election, then
his top “security adviser.”
Hizb-e-
Composed of Shiite Hazara tribes from central Afghanistan.
Shiite,
Bamiyan, Ghazni,
Wahdat
Karim Khalili is Vice President, but Mohammad Mohaqiq is
Hazara
Dai Kundi
Karzai rival in 2004 presidential election and parliament.
tribes
province
General y pro-Iranian. Was part of Rabbani 1992-1996
government, and fought unsuccessful y with Taliban over
Bamiyan city. Still revered by Hazara Shiites is the former
leader of the group, Abdul Ali Mazari, who was captured and
killed by the Taliban in March 1995.
Pashtun
Various regional governors and local leaders in the east and
Moderate Dominant in the
Leaders
south; central government led by Hamid Karzai.
Islamic,
south and east
Pashtun
Hizb-e-Islam
Mujahedin party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. Was part of
Orthodox Small groups in
Gulbuddin
Soviet-era U.S.-backed “Afghan Interim Government” based
Islamic,
Nangarhar,
(HIG)
in Peshawar, Pakistan. Was nominal “prime minister” in
Pashtun
Nuristan, and
1992-1996 mujahedin government but never actual y took
Kunar provinces
office. Lost power base around Jalalabad to the Taliban in
1994, and fled to Iran before being expelled in 2002. Still
allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda in operations east of Kabul,
but open to ending militant activity. Leader of a rival Hizb-e-
Islam faction, Yunus Khalis, the mentor of Mullah Umar, died
July 2006.
Islamic Union
Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf. Islamic conservative, leads a pro-
orthodox Paghman
Karzai faction in parliament. Lived many years in and
Islamic,
(west of Kabul)
politically close to Saudi Arabia, which shares his “Wahhabi”
Pashtun
ideology. During anti-Soviet war, Sayyaf’s faction, with
Hikmatyar, was a principal recipient of U.S. weaponry.
Criticized the U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein after
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
Source: CRS.
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Residual Issues from Past Conflicts
A few issues remain unresolved from Afghanistan’s many years of conflict, such as Stinger
retrieval and mine eradication.
Stinger Retrieval
Beginning in late 1985 following internal debate, the Reagan Administration provided about
2,000 man-portable “Stinger” anti-aircraft missiles to the mujahedin for use against Soviet
aircraft. Prior to the U.S.-led ouster of the Taliban, common estimates suggested that 200-300
Stingers remained at large, although more recent estimates put the number below 100.80 The
Stinger issue resurfaced in conjunction with 2001 U.S. war effort, when U.S. pilots reported that
the Taliban fired some Stingers at U.S. aircraft during the war. No hits were reported. Any
Stingers that survived the anti-Taliban war are likely controlled by Afghans now allied to the
United States and presumably pose less of a threat, in part because of the deterioration of the
weapons’ batteries and other internal components.
In 1992, after the fall of the Russian-backed government of Najibullah, the United States
reportedly spent about $10 million to buy the Stingers back, at a premium, from individual
mujahedin commanders. The New York Times reported on July 24, 1993, that the buy back effort
failed because the United States was competing with other buyers, including Iran and North
Korea, and that the CIA would spend about $55 million in FY1994 in a renewed buy-back effort.
On March 7, 1994, the Washington Post reported that the CIA had recovered only a fraction
(maybe 50 or 100) of the at-large Stingers. In February 2002, the Afghan government found and
returned to the United States “dozens” of Stingers.81 In late January 2005, Afghan intelligence
began a push to buy remaining Stingers back, at a reported cost of $150,000 each.82
The danger of these weapons has become apparent on several occasions, although U.S.
commanders have not reported any recent active firings of these devices. Iran bought 16 of the
missiles in 1987 and fired one against U.S. helicopters; some reportedly were transferred to
Lebanese Hizballah. India claimed that it was a Stinger, supplied to Islamic rebels in Kashmir
probably by sympathizers in Afghanistan, that shot down an Indian helicopter over Kashmir in
May 1999.83 It was a Soviet-made SA-7 “Strella” man-portable launchers that were fired,
allegedly by Al Qaeda, against a U.S. military aircraft in Saudi Arabia in June 2002 and against
an Israeli passenger aircraft in Kenya on November 30, 2002. Both missed their targets. SA-7s
were discovered in Afghanistan by U.S. forces in December 2002.
Mine Eradication
Land mines laid during the Soviet occupation constitute one of the principal dangers to the
Afghan people. The United Nations estimates that 5 million to 7 million mines remain scattered
throughout the country, although some estimates are lower. U.N. teams have destroyed one

80 Saleem, Farrukh. “Where Are the Missing Stinger Missiles? Pakistan,” Friday Times. August 17-23, 2001.
81 Fullerton, John. “Afghan Authorities Hand in Stinger Missiles to U.S.” Reuters, February 4, 2002.
82 “Afghanistan Report,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. February 4, 2005.
83 “U.S.-Made Stinger Missiles—Mobile and Lethal.” Reuters, May 28, 1999.
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million mines and are now focusing on de-mining priority-use, residential and commercial
property, including lands around Kabul. As shown in the U.S. aid table for FY1999-FY2002
(Table 10), the U.S. de-mining program was providing about $3 million per year for Afghanistan,
and the amount increased to about $7 million in the post-Taliban period. Most of the funds have
gone to HALO Trust, a British organization, and the U.N. Mine Action Program for Afghanistan.
The Afghanistan Compact adopted in London in February 2006 states that by 2010, the goal
should be to reduce the land area of Afghanistan contaminated by mines by 70%.

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Appendix. U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted
Virtually all U.S. and international sanctions on Afghanistan, some imposed during the Soviet
occupation era and others on the Taliban regime, have now been lifted.
• P.L. 108-458 (December 17, 2004, referencing the 9/11 Commission
recommendations) repealed bans on aid to Afghanistan outright. On October 7,
1992, President George H.W. Bush had issued Presidential Determination 93-3
that Afghanistan is no longer a Marxist-Leninist country, but the determination
was not implemented before he left office. Had it been implemented, the
prohibition on Afghanistan’s receiving Export-Import Bank guarantees,
insurance, or credits for purchases under Section 8 of the 1986 Export-Import
Bank Act, would have been lifted. In addition, Afghanistan would have been able
to receive U.S. assistance because the requirement would have been waived that
Afghanistan apologize for the 1979 killing in Kabul of U.S. Ambassador to
Afghanistan Adolph “Spike” Dubs. (Dubs was kidnapped in Kabul in 1979 and
killed when Afghan police stormed the hideout where he was held.)
• U.N. sanctions on the Taliban imposed by Resolution 1267 (October 15, 1999),
Resolution 1333 (December 19, 2000), and Resolution 1363 (July 30, 2001) have
now been narrowed to penalize only Al Qaeda (by Resolution 1390, January 17,
2002). Resolution 1267 banned flights outside Afghanistan by Ariana, and
directed U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets. Resolution 1333 prohibited
the provision of arms or military advice to the Taliban (directed against
Pakistan); ordered a reduction of Taliban diplomatic representation abroad; and
banned foreign travel by senior Taliban officials. Resolution 1363 provided for
monitors in Pakistan to ensure that no weapons or military advice was provided
to the Taliban.
• On January 10, 2003, President Bush signed a proclamation making Afghanistan
a beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), eliminating U.S.
tariffs on 5,700 Afghan products. Afghanistan had been denied GSP on May 2,
1980, under Executive Order 12204 (45 F.R. 20740).
• On April 24, 1981, controls on U.S. exports to Afghanistan of agricultural
products and phosphates were terminated. Such controls were imposed on June 3,
1980, as part of the sanctions against the Soviet Union for the invasion of
Afghanistan, under the authority of Sections 5 and 6 of the Export Administration
Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404, app. 2405].
• In mid-1992, the George H.W. Bush Administration determined that Afghanistan
no longer had a “Soviet-controlled government.” This opened Afghanistan to the
use of U.S. funds made available for the U.S. share of U.N. organizations that
provide assistance to Afghanistan.
• On March 31, 1993, after the fall of Najibullah in 1992, President Clinton, on
national interest grounds, waived restrictions provided for in Section 481 (h) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 mandating sanctions on Afghanistan,
including bilateral aid cuts and suspensions, including denial of Ex-Im Bank
credits; the casting of negative U.S. votes for multilateral development bank
loans; and a non-allocation of a U.S. sugar quota. Discretionary sanctions
included denial of GSP; additional duties on exports to the United States; and
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curtailment of air transportation with the United States. Waivers were also
granted in 1994 and, after the fall of the Taliban, by President Bush.
• On May 3, 2002, President Bush restored normal trade treatment to the products
of Afghanistan, reversing the February 18, 1986, proclamation by President
Reagan (Presidential Proclamation 5437) that suspended most-favored nation
(MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan (51 F.R. 4287). The Foreign Assistance
Appropriations for FY1986 [Section 552, P.L. 99-190] had authorized the denial
of U.S. credits or most-favored-nation (MFN) status for Afghanistan.
• On July 2, 2002, the State Department amended U.S. regulations (22 C.F.R. Part
126) to allow arms sales to the new Afghan government, reversing the June 14,
1996, addition of Afghanistan to the list of countries prohibited from importing
U.S. defense articles and services. Arms sales to Afghanistan had also been
prohibited during 1997-2002 because Afghanistan had been designated under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132) as a state
that is not cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts.
• On July 2, 2002, President Bush formally revoked the July 4, 1999, declaration
by President Clinton of a national emergency with respect to Taliban because of
its hosting of bin Laden. The Clinton determination and related Executive Order
13129 had blocked Taliban assets and property in the United States, banned U.S.
trade with Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan, and applied these sanctions to
Ariana Afghan Airlines, triggering a blocking of Ariana assets (about $500,000)
in the United States and a ban on U.S. citizens’ flying on the airline. (The ban on
trade with Taliban-controlled territory had essentially ended on January 29, 2002,
when the State Department determination that the Taliban controls no territory
within Afghanistan.)

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Figure A-1. Map of Afghanistan

Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.

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Figure A-2. Map of Afghan Ethnicities

Source: 2003 National Geographic Society. http://www.afghan-network.net/maps/Afghanistan-Map.pdf. Adapted
by Amber Wilhelm, CRS Graphics.
Notes: This map is intended to be illustrative of the approximate demographic distribution by region of
Afghanistan. CRS has no way to confirm exact population distributions.

Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612


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