Guinea: Background and Relations with the
United States
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
Nicolas Cook
Specialist in African Affairs
November 24, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40703
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Guinea: Background and Relations with the United States
Summary
The past two years have seen a series of deep changes in Guinea’s political landscape, a new
experience for a country that had only two presidents in the first 50 years after independence in
1958. In June 2010, Guineans voted in the country’s first presidential election organized by an
independent electoral commission and without an incumbent candidate. A presidential run-off
poll was held in early November, but provisional results have yet to be certified by the Supreme
Court. The election is expected to bring an end to two years of military rule, which began after a
junta seized power in December 2008 following the death of Guinea’s long-time president,
Lansana Conté. Many Guineans and foreign diplomats also expect the election to provide a
stepping-stone toward reforming state institutions and implementing the rule of law, considered a
prerequisite for greater private sector investment and increased respect for human rights. At the
same time, the election has sparked incidents of ethnic violence and reported abuses by security
forces that could threaten the political transition.
A former French colony on West Africa’s Atlantic coast, with a population of about 10 million,
Guinea is rich in natural resources but characterized by widespread poverty and limited
socioeconomic development. While Guinea has experienced regular episodes of internal political
turmoil, it was considered a locus of relative stability during much of the past two decades, a
period during which each of its six neighbors suffered armed internal conflicts. At the same time,
democratic progress was limited, while popular discontent with the government rose along with
instability within the sizable armed forces.
U.S. interests and associated policy challenges in Guinea center on democratization and good
governance; counternarcotics issues; security sector reform; bilateral economic interests and
relations; regional peace and stability; and socioeconomic and institutional development. The
United States suspended some development aid and all security assistance to Guinea in the wake
of the 2008 coup. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) governance and
humanitarian assistance programs, which comprised a substantial portion of the U.S. aid budget
in Guinea before the coup, were not affected by the suspension; nor were U.S. contributions
toward Guinea’s electoral process. In response to a military crackdown on opposition supporters
in September 2009, the United States called for Dadis Camara to step down and announced
targeted travel restrictions against National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD)
members and selected associates. After a military-led transitional government was formed in
January 2010, some U.S. restrictions on security assistance were rolled back, and bilateral aid is
expected to increase if the transition to elected government is completed.
Guinea-focused legislation in the 111th Congress has included H.Res. 1013 (Ros-Lehtinen) and
S.Res. 345 (Boxer). This report focuses on recent events, U.S.-Guinea bilateral relations, and U.S.
policy and assistance. For further analysis, see CRS Report R41200, Guinea’s New Transitional
Government: Emerging Issues for U.S. Policy, by Alexis Arieff.
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Guinea: Background and Relations with the United States
Contents
Recent Developments.................................................................................................................. 1
Overview .................................................................................................................................... 2
U.S. Interests in Guinea......................................................................................................... 2
Recent Congressional Actions ............................................................................................... 3
Background ................................................................................................................................ 4
The Rise of the CNDD .......................................................................................................... 5
The September 28 Protests and International Criminal Court Investigation ...................... 6
Dadis Camara’s Exit and Growing Instability ........................................................................ 7
Formation of a Transitional Government ............................................................................... 7
Elections ..................................................................................................................................... 8
The Vote: June-November 2010 ............................................................................................ 8
Election Violence ................................................................................................................ 10
The FOSSEPEL: A New Election Security Force ................................................................ 11
The Economy............................................................................................................................ 11
Socioeconomic Conditions .................................................................................................. 12
Recent Mining Sector Developments................................................................................... 12
Security Issues and the Rule of Law .......................................................................................... 14
Drug Trafficking ................................................................................................................. 14
The Guinean Military: A Key Security Challenge ................................................................ 15
Foreign Relations ...................................................................................................................... 16
U.S. Relations ........................................................................................................................... 17
Foreign Aid......................................................................................................................... 18
Elections and Democracy Promotion............................................................................. 18
Security Assistance and Counter-Narcotics Cooperation ................................................ 18
Multilateral Aid............................................................................................................. 19
Outlook..................................................................................................................................... 20
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Guinea ............................................................................................................. 4
Tables
Table 1. Selected Bilateral Aid by Account ................................................................................ 20
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 21
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Guinea: Background and Relations with the United States
Recent Developments
On November 7, 2010, a presidential run-off vote was held between Alpha Condé, of the Rally
for the Guinean People (RPG) party, and Cellou Dalein Diallo, of the Union of Democratic
Forces of Guinea (UFDG) party, the two candidates who had garnered the most votes in Guinea’s
June 2010 presidential election. The run-off was held because none of the 24 candidates who
competed in the June election won over 50% of the vote.
On November 15, Guinea’s national electoral commission announced that provisional results
showed Condé to be the winner, with about 52.5% of the vote, against 47.5% for Diallo, but the
results will not become final until they are certified by Guinea’s Supreme Court, which has until
November 23 to do so.1 Diallo refused to accept the provisional results after they were
announced, and violence again broke out, particularly in Conakry and in the Diallo strongholds of
Labé and Pita in the northern Fouta Djallon region. On November 17, interim President General
Sékouba Konaté declared a “state of emergency” pending Supreme Court confirmation of the
provisional results. Some reports indicated that security forces engaged in abuses during the
crackdown, including targeted attacks against Diallo supporters.2 On November 18, the
independent think-tank International Crisis Group warned that “Guinea’s political and military
leaders and the international community must take urgent measures to halt widespread attacks
against defenseless civilians and to prevent political tensions from degenerating into large-scale
ethnic violence and regional instability.”3
The November poll represented a contest between two candidates with starkly contrasting
political histories and bases of support. Condé is a long-time opposition leader who lived in exile
during most of Guinea’s post-independence history, while Diallo is a former prime minister who
also held a variety of ministerial portfolios during the government of Guinea’s former president,
Lansana Conté. The vote was nonetheless perceived by many, in part, as an ethnic contest
between Guinea’s two largest ethnic groups: the Peul (Fulbe/Fulani), who are seen as constituting
Diallo’s base, and the Malinké (Mandingo), seen as constituting Condé’s base. The run-off vote
was preceded by incidents of ethnic violence, reportedly including systematic attacks against
ethnic Peuls in several majority-Malinké areas in northeastern Guinea.
1 Scott Stearns, “Guinea State of Emergency Contingent on Certifying Election Results,” Voice of America (VOA),
November 18, 2010.
2 Ougna Camara, “Guinean Armed Forces Deployed as U.S. Condemns Post-Election Violence,” Bloomberg,
November 18, 2010. As of November 18, at least seven people had been reported killed in the post-election clashes.
3 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Conflict Risk Alert: Guinea,” November 18, 2010.
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Overview
Guinea is a former French colony in West
Guinea at a Glance
Africa, about the size of Oregon, which has
Population: 10.3 million (2010 est.)
experienced regular episodes of political
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): $3.8 billion (2008)
turmoil. Despite its wealth in natural
resources, Guinea’s development indicators
GDP Per Capita: $350 (2008)
are poor even by regional standards, and
Ethnic Groups: Peul (Fulbe/Fulani) 40%, Malinke
standards of living are among the worst in the
(Mandingo) 30%, Soussou 20%, smal er ethnic groups
10%
world.4 During much of the past two decades,
Guinea was considered a locus of relative
Religions: Muslim 85%; Christian 8%; indigenous beliefs
stability in a sub-region that has witnessed
Languages: French (official); local languages
multiple armed conflicts.
Life Expectancy at Birth: 57.6 years (2010 est.)
Guinea is currently governed by a transitional
HIV/AIDS Adult Prevalence: 1.6% (2007 est.)
government of national unity made up of
Adult Literacy: 29.5% (2003 est.)
civilians and members of a military junta, the
Natural Resources: bauxite [aluminum ore], iron ore,
National Council for Democracy and
diamonds, gold, uranium, hydropower, fish, salt
Development (CNDD), that seized power in
Major Trading Partners: India, China, France,
December 2008, following the death of
Netherlands, Spain, Russia, Germany, United States,
Guinea's long-time president, Lansana Conté.
Belgium, Ukraine
The transitional government was formed
Sources: CIA World Factbook; World Bank
under an agreement signed by the CNDD’s
two top leaders in January 2010. A key
component of the agreement was that Guinea would hold presidential elections in June, in which
no member of the junta or government would be a candidate.
U.S. Interests in Guinea
U.S. interests and associated policy challenges in Guinea center on democratization and good
governance; counternarcotics issues; security sector reform; bilateral economic interests and
relations; regional peace and stability; and socioeconomic and institutional development.5
Ensuring a transition to a democratically elected, civilian-led government is currently a focus of
U.S. governance concerns, as is ensuring that political instability in Guinea does not spill over
into fragile neighboring states, such as Liberia. Guinea’s extractive industry sector is also of
financial and strategic interest to the United States: in addition to gold, diamonds, uranium, and
potential oil and gas reserves, Guinea possesses an estimated 27% or more of global reserves of
bauxite, a key component of aluminum, and Guinea provided 16% of U.S. bauxite and alumina
imports between 2004 and 2007.6 Several U.S.-based resource firms operate in Guinea and face
4 See e.g., U.N. Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report 2010, at http://hdr.undp.org/en/.
5 In particular, in the final years of Conté’s tenure, U.S. concern had focused on issues of governance, political stability
and succession, and democratization prospects, notably following the Conté administration’s violent suppression of a
general strike in 2007 and in light of Conté’s long-reported ill health. See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, Prospects for Peace in Guinea, 110th Cong., 1st sess., March 22,
2007 (Washington: GPO).
6 U.S. Geological Survey, 2009 Bauxite and Alumina Survey.
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possible growing competition from other foreign investors in Guinea, notably from China.7 U.S.
interest has also arisen over Guinea’s identity as a historically moderate, majority-Muslim
country in a region affected by violent extremism.
Issues of interest to Congress may include:
• the appropriation and oversight of U.S. foreign assistance;
• Guinea’s democratic trajectory and prospects for state institutional and legal
reforms;
• the role of Guinea’s military and its subordination to civilian political leadership;
• counter-narcotics and transnational organized crime;
• Guinea’s natural resource wealth and related U.S. investments; and
• Guinea’s potential impact on regional stability.
Recent Congressional Actions
Several pieces of legislation related to Guinea were introduced during the 111th Congress. These
include H.Res. 1013 (Ros-Lehtinen), Condemning the violent suppression of legitimate political
dissent and gross human rights abuses in the Republic of Guinea, passed by the House on January
20, 2010; and S.Res. 345 (Boxer), A resolution deploring the rape and assault of women in
Guinea and the killing of political protesters on September 28, 2009, passed by the Senate on
February 22, 2010. Several Members criticized the CNDD following a violent military
crackdown in September 2009.8 In March 2007, the House Foreign Affairs Committee convened
a hearing on the political situation in Guinea and the eruption of mass anti-government
demonstrations earlier that year.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (Section 7008, Title VII, Division F of P.L. 111-117,
signed into law on December 16, 2009), states that “none of the funds appropriated or otherwise
made available pursuant to titles III through VI of this Act shall be obligated or expended to
finance directly any assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of
government is deposed by military coup or decree,” with an exemption for “assistance to promote
democratic elections or public participation in democratic processes.” The prohibition covers
bilateral economic assistance, international security assistance, multilateral assistance, and export
7 The large U.S.-based multinational aluminum firm Alcoa, for instance, is a major shareholder in the Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, a bauxite mining and export partnership with the Guinean state, while a much smaller U.S energy
firm, Hyperdynamics, holds the largest single license for offshore oil exploration. Hyperdynamics, a Texas-based oil
prospecting firm, holds exploration rights in Guinea under a Production Sharing Contract (PSC) signed with the
Guinean government in 2006. The Guinean government later disputed the terms of the PSC, and in 2009
Hyperdynamics was forced to rescind all but 36% of its original acreage in exchange for confirmation of the validity of
its remaining concession. The firm has indicated it will continue oil exploration activities within the remaining area.
8 “Statement of Senator Russ Feingold on Guinean Soldiers Firing Into an Opposition Rally,” September 29, 2009;
Office of Congressman Howard Berman, “Guinea’s Military Leaders, Tarnished by Violence, Should Allow for Free
and Fair Elections, Berman Says,” October 8, 2009; Yvette D. Clarke, “Movement of Guinean Women in the United
States,” October 28, 2009, Congressional Record, Page E2648; Letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, signed by
Senators Russ Feingold, Richard G. Lugar, Jeanne Shaheen, Johnny Isakson, Barbara Boxer, James M. Inhofe, Patrick
J. Leahy, Sam Brownback, Robert P. Casey Jr., Benjamin Cardin, Mary L. Landrieu, Sheldon Whitehouse, Bill Nelson,
and Roland W. Burris, October 15, 2009.
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and investment assistance; humanitarian aid is generally exempt. The act (Section 7070) also
restricts International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs in Guinea to Expanded
IMET (E-IMET)—emphasizing respect for human rights and civilian control of the military.
These and other provisions were carried over in the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, which
was signed into law as P.L. 111-242 on September 30, 2010.
Figure 1. Map of Guinea
Background
For 26 years following independence from France in 1958, Guinea was ruled as a one-party,
quasi-socialist state under the charismatic but repressive leadership of Ahmed Sékou Touré.
Following Touré’s death in 1984, Colonel (later, General) Lansana Conté came to power in a
military coup d’état. Conté oversaw some economic and political reforms, but his critics accused
him of stifling Guinea’s democratic development while allowing corruption and nepotism to
flourish. The final years of Conté’s rule were marked by a decline in average living standards, the
co-option of power by members of Conté’s inner circle of businessmen and politicians amid the
disintegration of state institutions, and increasing signs of public dissatisfaction. Conté’s
supporters, however, argued that his leadership prevented Guinea from experiencing the kind of
brutal armed civil conflict that has afflicted many of its neighbors. While Guinea held several
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general elections under Conté, democratic gains were limited, and power remained concentrated
in the president’s hands.
Starting in 2006, growing public discontent with economic stagnation and high inflation, the slow
pace of promised democratic reforms, extensive corruption, and Conté’s semi-autocratic
leadership spurred a growing number of formerly rare strikes and protests. These peaked with
nationwide anti-government demonstrations in early 2007. Divisions and unrest within the
military, often over pay and slow rates of promotion, also grew. Particularly notable was a May
2008 uprising led by junior army officers at Camp Alpha Yaya, the largest military base in
Conakry and the headquarters of the army’s elite commando unit known as the BATA. In June
2008, military troops crushed an attempted police mutiny over alleged non-payment of back-
wages and a failure to implement pledged promotions. This culminated in a bloody shoot-out at a
police headquarters that left at least four police officers dead, according to an official tally.
Many analysts predicted a military coup if Conté were to die in office. However, it was unclear
what faction or individuals might prevail, as the military was reportedly deeply divided along
ethnic and generational lines. Analysts also debated whether Guinea risked significant ethnic
violence, which could potentially spread to neighboring states, or whether Guineans’ historically
strong sense of national identity and social cohesion meant that such a scenario was unlikely.
International concerns over potential instability heightened with reports that drug trafficking
activities were being facilitated or directly undertaken by government officials, members of the
military, and Conté associates.
The Rise of the CNDD
On December 23, 2008, a military junta seized power after Conté died following a long illness.
The junta, which called itself the National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD,
after its French acronym), appointed as president a previously little-known military officer, Capt.
Moussa Dadis Camara. A member of the southeastern Guerzé (also known as Kpelle) ethnic
group, Dadis Camara was a member of the elite BATA airborne commando unit and had served as
director of Army fuel supplies, a reportedly powerful position that helped him build a base of
support among the rank-and-file. Other powerful CNDD members included Gen. Sekouba
Konaté, former commander of the BATA, who was named defense minister, and Gen.
Mamadouba Toto Camara, the most senior CNDD officer in terms of rank, who was named
security minister. The CNDD’s composition was ostensibly multi-ethnic, but many key posts
appeared split between ethnic Malinké and Forestiers, a collective term for a constellation of
small ethnic groups (including the Guerzé) who tie their roots to Guinea’s rain-forested southeast
and have historically been politically marginalized at the national level. Only a small number of
junta members were Peuls, who make up the largest ethnic block within Guinea’s population but
have historically not played a major role in the senior military hierarchy.
Upon assuming power, the CNDD immediately took steps to assert its authority, for instance by
suspending civilian regional administrators and replacing them with military commanders. The
CNDD also created several new ministerial-level positions, headed by members of the military or
close civilian associates. Several key ministries, including security, defense, and finance, and the
governor of the Central Bank, were attached to the presidency. Signs of fault lines within the
military soon emerged, heightening concerns over potential intra-military violence. Several
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military officers were purged from the junta or imprisoned in 2009 on accusations of plotting
against Dadis Camara or other leaders. In July 2009, Gen. Mamadouba “Toto” Camara, security
minister and the most senior CNDD officer, was assaulted by members of the presidential guard.9
Dadis Camara initially committed to overseeing free and fair elections and a “peaceful transition”
to a civilian-led government within a year, agreeing to a timetable set by a broad coalition of
political parties, trade unions, and civil society groups known as the Forces Vives (“Active
Forces”). He also promised that neither he nor any CNDD member would run for office.
However, in August 2009, the CNDD postponed elections until early 2010. Dadis Camara also
indicated that he might choose to run for president, compounding widespread suspicions that
junta members were reluctant to leave power.
The September 28 Protests and International Criminal Court Investigation
On September 28, 2009, security forces opened fire on tens of thousands of protesters who had
gathered peacefully in and around an outdoor stadium in Conakry to protest repeated election
delays and Dadis Camara’s perceived intention to run for president.10 A Human Rights Watch
investigation concluded that the crackdown was “premeditated” and that soldiers and
gendarmes—including members of the Presidential Guard and of the CNDD’s anti-drug and anti-
crime unit, both of which ostensibly answered to the presidency—had directly fired on the
stadium crowd and stabbed those fleeing with knives and bayonets.11 At least 150 people were
killed and over 1,000 wounded in the crackdown, and several opposition leaders who had planned
to address the crowd were assaulted and threatened.12 According to numerous reports, soldiers
also assaulted and raped dozens of women openly in public, including in full view of military
commanders. In the days following the protests, lootings continued and sporadic confrontations
and extrajudicial detentions were reported in several opposition strongholds in Conakry.
The report of a United Nations (U.N.) commission of inquiry confirmed 156 deaths, 109
instances of sexual violence, “hundreds of other cases of torture or of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment,” and dozens of extrajudicial arrests. The commission concluded that the
crackdown may have constituted “crimes against humanity” and recommended a referral to the
International Criminal Court (ICC).13 In October, the chief prosecutor for the ICC announced he
was opening a “preliminary examination” of the situation.14 Although Dadis Camara condemned
the violence, he denied responsibility, contending that the opposition was at fault and that he was
not in full command of the armed forces.15
9 BBC News Online, “Troops Crawl After Guinea Attack,” July 24, 2009; United Nations, Contingency Plan Conakry,
August 2009; AFP, “Guinée: Une ONG Redoute une ‘Dérive Dictatoriale,’ Dénonce la Torture,” August 12, 2009.
10 Associated Press (AP), “Guinea Soldiers Shoot Dead at Least 10 Protesters,” September 28, 2009; Adam Nossiter,
“Over 100 Protesters Killed in Guinea,” The New York Times, September 29, 2009.
11 Human Rights Watch (HRW), Bloody Monday: The September 28 Massacre and Rapes by Security Forces in
Guinea, December 2009.
12 Many believe the death toll to have been significantly higher, and reports indicate that the military engaged in a
systematic cover-up by removing bodies from the site and burying them in mass graves. See HRW, Bloody Monday,
op. cit.
13 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry Mandated to Establish the Facts and Circumstances of the Events
of 29 September 2009 in Guinea, December 29, 2009.
14 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, “ICC Prosecutor Confirms Situation in Guinea Under Examination,” October 14, 2009.
15 Agence France Presse (AFP), “Guinea Under Fire After Scores Killed in Opposition Crackdown,” September 28,
(continued...)
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Dadis Camara’s Exit and Growing Instability
The September 2009 violence presaged rising insecurity in Conakry and fears of a breakdown in
military command and control. At the same time, international condemnation catalyzed latent
fractures within the junta. On December 3, 2009, Dadis Camara was shot in the head by a
commander of his presidential guard, Aboubacar “Toumba” Diakité, who had been cited in the
U.N. investigation as a key instigator of the September 28 violence. Dadis Camara was evacuated
to Morocco to receive medical care; he subsequently traveled to Burkina Faso, where he remains
in exile.
The shooting and subsequent power vacuum coincided with reports of rising ethnic tensions and
instability within the CNDD and wider armed forces. Reports also indicated that the CNDD was
recruiting hundreds of irregular fighters and training them as militias in camps located near
Conakry, and referred to rising arms imports and the presence of foreign mercenaries.16 Several
targeted killings were reported in Conakry, including at least one government official.17 Fears of
imminent conflict caused some Guineans, human rights groups, and foreign diplomats to call for
a regional intervention force.
Formation of a Transitional Government
In January 2010, after several weeks of uncertainty following the attack on Dadis Camara, CNDD
Defense Minister Gen. Sekouba Konaté assumed executive powers as interim president. On
January 15, 2010, Dadis Camara, Konaté, and ECOWAS mediator Blaise Compaoré (president of
Burkina Faso) announced a new political agreement.18 The Joint Declaration of Ouagadougou
provided for the formation of a unity government headed by Konaté, with a prime minister
chosen from the civilian opposition. The signatories also agreed to hold a presidential election
within six months, in which members of the CNDD, the unity government, and the security forces
would be barred from running as candidates.19
Forces Vives spokesman Jean-Marie Doré was named prime minister on January 19, and in
February he appointed a 34-person cabinet composed of a mix of CNDD members and civilians.
In early March, a National Transition Council (CNT) was inaugurated as a quasi-legislative body,
with 155 members representing political parties, trade unions, civil society groups, and other
(...continued)
2009; Agence Guinéenne de Presse, “Discours A La Nation du Chef de l’Etat,” November 3, 2009; Jeune Afrique,
“Massacres du 28 Septembre: Dadis a-t-il été l’instigateur?” September 30, 2009; AFP, “Massacre en Guinée: Dadis
Camara Ne Se Reconnaît ‘Aucune Responsabilité,’” October 4, 2009 ; Adam Nossiter, “Guinea Seethes as a Captain
Rules at Gunpoint,” The New York Times, October 3, 2009.
16 Richard Moncrieff, “Repression and Violence Are a Danger to the Whole Region,” The Independent, September 30,
2009; Beeld (South Africa), “Secretive Mails Sent to Recruits,” October 18, 2009; HRW, “Guinea: September 28
Massacre Was Premeditated,” October 27, 2009; Reuters, “Foreign Gunmen Helped Guinea Crackdown—Witnesses,”
October 3, 2009; BBC, “‘Big Guns’ Herald Guinea’s Crisis,” October 31, 2009; Ed Butler, “Guinea’s Military Junta
Imports Millions of Dollars Worth of Arms Despite Embargo,” The Guardian, November 3, 2009.
17 Reuters, “Guinea Sees New Violence After Protest Crackdown,” October 23, 2009; RFI via BBC Monitoring,
“Twelve Opposition Supporters Said Killed in Guinea’s ‘Targeted Killings,’” October 23, 2009.
18 In October 2009, ECOWAS appointed Blaise Compaoré to mediate between the CNDD and the opposition Forces
Vives coalition.
19 “Joint Declaration of Ouagadougou,” State Department Office of Language Services, January 2010.
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socio-economic demographics.20 The CNT drafted a new constitution and a new electoral code,
which were promulgated by presidential decree. Dadis Camara has declined to return to Guinea,
and he publicly supported the transitional government and progress toward elections.21
As interim president, Konaté moved to build donor and regional support, and made multiple state
visits to neighboring countries and to France. Using a combination of patronage and force, he also
consolidated power within the fractious armed forces. He closed down militia training camps and
arrested or otherwise sidelined a number of military commanders seen as loyal to Dadis Camara
and other potential rivals.22 In early July, Konaté granted mass promotions to much of the
military’s officer corps, in what was widely seen as a reward to soldiers for refraining from
intervening in the vote. Konaté received widespread praise for instituting greater discipline and
control within the military, and for stemming military abuses against civilians. However, his
actions have largely focused on internal command issues and have not necessarily paved the way
for greater civilian oversight under an eventual elected government.
Elections
The transitional government’s clearest accomplishment to date has been the organization of
presidential elections, as required under the Ouagadougou declaration. Elections were organized
by the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), which was created in 2007 as an
oversight body, part of a series of reforms agreed to under Conté. The interior ministry (known in
Guinea as the MATAP), which was previously responsible for organizing elections, played a
secondary role by assisting the CENI with logistics. The presidential election cost an estimated
$36.1 million, not including voter registration and related costs.23 Major donors included the
European Union, the United States, France, Japan, Germany, and Spain; the U.N. Development
Program played a coordinating role. China also reportedly contributed, for example through the
donation of motorcycles for the transportation of electoral materials and other equipment.
The legal framework for the elections consists of a new constitution and electoral law
promulgated by decree in April and May 2010. While both contained improvements over
previous frameworks—such as the institution of term limits, guarantees as to the CENI’s
independence, and the introduction of a single-ballot system—implementation was reportedly
inconsistent, in part due to the short time-line prior to the vote. In addition, several deadlines
required under the electoral law were not respected, for example, with regard to the determination
of polling station locations and the development of new voting procedures.24
The Vote: June-November 2010
On June 27, 2010, Guineans went to the polls to select from among 24 presidential candidates.
The vote was historically significant because it was the first national election in Guinea’s history
20 Guineenews, "Liste Complète des Membres du CNT," March 8, 2010.
21 Guineenews, “Moussa Dadis Camara S’Adresse au Peuple de Guinée Depuis Ougadougou,” June 14, 2010.
22 Reuters, “Guinea Says Arrests Mutinous Pro-Camara Soldiers,” April 2, 2010.
23 USAID responses to CRS query, November 2010.
24 The Carter Center, “The Carter Center Commends Guinea’s Historical Election; Urges Continued Calm in Post-
Election Period,” June 29, 2010.
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organized by an independent commission, and the first not to feature an incumbent government
candidate. Campaigning was largely peaceful and reportedly characterized by messages of
national unity and respect, though there were a few isolated incidences of violent confrontations
between supporters of opposing candidates.25 According to official results reported by the
Supreme Court on July 20, no candidate won more than 50% of the vote, necessitating a run-off
election. The two candidates who won the most votes in the June poll—making them adversarial
contestants in the run-off election—were Cellou Dalein Diallo of the Union of Democratic Forces
of Guinea (UFDG) party, who won 43.7% of the vote, and Alpha Condé of the Rally of the
Guinean People (RPG) party, who won 18.3%.
In many ways, Diallo and Condé represent contrasting political profiles: Diallo served as a
cabinet minister and prime minister under Conté, while Condé was a longtime Conté opponent
and has spent much of the past 40 years in exile in France. They also represent Guinea’s two
largest ethnic groups: the Peul (Diallo), and the Malinké (Condé). Diallo’s experience in
government and Condé’s outsider status were both thought to carry positive and negative aspects
in terms of their electability. At the same time, ethnicity was also widely expected to play a
decisive role in the outcome of the election.
International and domestic election monitoring groups praised the vote as an important step in
Guinea’s hoped-for democratic transition, though they also observed severe logistical
challenges—such as shortages of election materials, a lack of polling stations in some areas,
insufficient poll-worker training, and problems with the distribution of voter cards.26 In addition,
the final official election results nullified all the votes cast in several major population centers.
The U.S.-based Carter Center, which fielded an election observation mission, stated it was
“concerned by the Court’s exclusion of these almost 900,000 votes with no justification of or
explanation for doing so”; the center contended that this “resulted in a de facto
disenfranchisement of approximately one third of the electorate without adequate justification.”27
The final participation rate among registered voters was 52%, compared to 77% reported in
provisional results.
Several candidates, including Condé and third-place rival Sidya Touré, contested the results; these
challenges were overturned by the Supreme Court. In September, the then-president of the CENI,
Ben Sékou Sylla, was convicted of election fraud in absentia; at the time, Sylla was in France
receiving medical treatment, and he died soon after the verdict was announced. The details of the
case against Sylla remained unclear and appeared to be affected by procedural irregularities.
After a long series of delays related to logistical challenges, politicized wrangling over election
administration, and a dispute over the leadership of the CENI, a run-off vote between Diallo and
Condé was scheduled for November 7, 2010. Election observers noted that many deficiencies
recorded during the first round—such as insufficient election materials, too few polling stations in
some regions, and a lack of training for many poll workers—were corrected prior to the run-off
vote. The distribution of voting cards was nonetheless reportedly incomplete by the time of
25 E.g., AFP, “One Dead in Guinea Election Clash,” June 25, 2010.
26 The Carter Center, “The Carter Center Commends Guinea’s Historical Election,” op. cit.
27 The Carter Center, “Guinea’s Transitional Elections Marked by Peaceful Voting; Commitment to Transparency in
Final Results Is Important [Preliminary Statement], November 9, 2010.
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voting.28 International election observers were largely positive in their initial, preliminary
statements following the vote.29
On November 15, the CENI announced that provisional results showed a victory by Condé, with
about 52.5% of the vote, against 47.5% for Diallo. Participation was roughly 67% percent
nationally, according to provisional results. Diallo, however, refused to accept the results—which
must be confirmed by the Supreme Court—and claimed that they were tainted by fraud,
particularly in two districts affected by ethnic violence just prior to the vote (see “Election
Violence,” below).30 Prior to the vote, both candidates had pledged to form a unity government no
matter which one won the election, and Condé has reportedly stated that he is prepared to form
such a government, possibly one that would include a role for Diallo.31
Election Violence
Delays associated with the organization of the run-off vote provoked violence between party
supporters, at times along ethnic lines, in mid-September and mid-October. In October, a wave of
violence in urban centers across the country appeared to be sparked by allegations that Peul
vendors had poisoned RPG supporters at a political rally.32 In the northeastern towns of Siguiri
and Kouroussa, witnesses characterized the violence as ethnically motivated, with majority-
Malinké populations (perceived as largely supporting the RPG) reportedly targeting Peul
residents and shopkeepers, resulting in thousands of displacements soon before the vote. (Special
polling stations were later set up so that these displaced persons could vote in areas to which they
had fled.)
While the violence did not immediately escalate into wider reprisal attacks, the incidents in
Siguiri and Kouroussa became a key grievance of the UFDG party. Contending that its party
representatives were unable to observe the vote in those areas due to intimidation, the UFDG
called on the electoral commission to nullify the Siguiri and Kouroussa results—amounting to
some 200,000 votes, or more than the total separating Diallo from Condé in provisional results.33
Violence again erupted after the November 15 announcement of Condé’s victory, this time in
Conakry and the Diallo strongholds of Labé and Pita. On November 17, interim president General
Sékouba Konaté declared a “state of emergency,” and the military joined in security patrols along
with police and members of the Special Force for the Security of the Election Process
(FOSSEPEL), a newly created election security force.
28 The Carter Center, “Guinea's Transitional Elections Marked by Peaceful Voting…” op. cit.
29 Ibid; European Union (EU), “Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the Presidential Elections
in the Republic of Guinea,” November 8, 2010.
30 AP, “Guinea Election Victor Celebrates, Country Tense,” November 16, 2010; Ougna Camara, “Guinean
Presidential Candidate Will Challenge Result,” Bloomberg, November 16, 2010.
31 U.N. IRIN, “Guinea: The Waiting Game - State of Emergency,” November 19, 2010
32 AFP, “Guinée: Violences Contre des Peuls Dans la Ville de Siguiri (Témoins),” October 23, 2010. These allegations
were publicly repeated by senior RPG officials.
33 Guineenews, “Résultats Officiels Présidentielle 2010 (CENI),” at http://www.guineenews.org.
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The FOSSEPEL: A New Election Security Force
In May 2010, a new, 16,000-member Special Force for the Security of the Election Process
(FOSSEPEL) was created to protect polling stations and the tabulation of results, along with
ensuring basic crowd-control functions. Members were ostensibly recruited from existing police
and gendarme personnel, and were commanded by the gendarmerie chief of staff. They were
equipped with riot gear but not permitted to carry firearms, though in practice, many reportedly
did. France and Spain assisted in training FOSSEPEL members, with participation from Mali. A
State Department-funded contractor also provided assistance (see “Security Assistance and
Counter-Narcotics Cooperation,” below).
Reports on the FOSSEPEL’s performance, particularly during the run-off vote, were mixed. In
early November, Human Rights Watch reported that it had received
numerous credible reports of misconduct by policemen and gendarmes serving with
FOSSEPEL, including beatings and assaults on party supporters.... Based on the reports,
some members of the security unit used the [election-related] unrest as a pretext to loot shops
and commit criminal acts, including theft of mobile phones, money, and other goods.34
At the same time, some observers noted that police and gendarmes were less likely to be
implicated in abuses than members of the military who had previously ensured urban security
during times of unrest. The FOSSEPEL’s future mandate and composition, following the
completion of elections, is unclear.
The Economy
Guinea boasts a wide array of natural resources, including up to half of the world’s reserves of
bauxite (aluminum ore) and sizable deposits of high-grade iron ore, diamonds, gold, and uranium.
Guinea may also have oil and gas reserves, and has significant hydro-electric and agricultural
potential. The economy relies heavily on mineral exports; joint-venture bauxite mining and
alumina operations have historically provided about 80% of Guinea’s foreign exchange.35
However, the global economic crisis, political instability, and the government’s erratic
governance of and contractual interference in the mining sector have negatively affected Guinea’s
mining output and caused major investment projects to be delayed or canceled.36 Still, a number
of new mining agreements, albeit some that are controversial, have been signed since 2008.
While Guinea’s economic potential is considerable, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is
estimated at only $386, and GDP growth was negative in 2009.37 Over 70% of the workforce is
employed in (largely subsistence) agriculture.38 Limited national infrastructure, periodic labor
34 HRW, “Guinea: Ensure Restraint by Security Forces During Elections,” November 5, 2010.
35 State Department, “Background Note: Guinea.” The Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea (CBG), for example, is a
joint venture in which 49% of the shares are owned by the Guinean Government and 51% by an international
consortium led by Alcoa and Rio Tinto-Alcan.
36 EIU, Country Report: Guinea, June 2009; Lydia Polgreen, “As Chinese Investment in Africa Drops, Hope Sinks,”
The New York Times, March 25, 2009; Andrea Hotter, “Guinea Ruler Worries Miners,” The Wall Street Journal, April
16, 2009; Reuters, “Guinea Bauxite Income Seen Down 60 Pct in 2010,” September 28, 2009.
37 World Bank development indicators database; CIA world factbook.
38 World Bank development indicators database.
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strikes, corruption, and political instability are considered to pose barriers to growth. A lack of
capacity and the poor quality of national education are also hindrances; the rate of children
enrolled in school is reported to have declined since 2007.39 Reports suggest government finances
have been depleted due to various factors, including corruption and mismanagement, a drop in the
collection of import duties, declining global mineral commodity prices, misguided monetary
policy, and the freezing of some donor budgetary support after the 2008 military coup.40 Guinea’s
external debt burden—$3.1 billion in 2008 according to the World Bank—is also considerable.
Socioeconomic Conditions
Guinea’s living standards are among the world’s worst.41 Access to running water and electricity
is rare, including in Conakry and other urban centers; shortages of basic goods, including petrol,
cooking gas, and staple food commodities, are common. Though agriculturally fertile, Guinea is
periodically subject to food insecurity. According to figures released by the United Nations in
May 2009, the rate of chronic malnutrition increased over the previous two years, from 34.8% to
36.2%; 8.3% of Guinean children are thought to suffer from serious malnutrition.42 The adult
prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS is estimated at 1.6%.43 Annual health expenditures per capita
amount to only $26, according to the World Bank. The World Health Organization considers
Guinea to be a “country under surveillance” with respect to potential complex humanitarian
emergency needs.44 At the same time, the suspension of some non-emergency donor assistance
reportedly negatively affected humanitarian aid in some parts of Guinea.45 Poor living conditions
helped spark nationwide anti-government protests in 2007, and some fear that continued
economic decline could lead to further unrest.
Recent Mining Sector Developments
A number of new mining agreements were signed in the first half of 2010, during the transitional
government. Such deals have come under criticism from some Guinean politicians and civil
society groups who contend that the terms are opaque and that the transitional government did not
have the right to conclude significant sovereign agreements prior to elections.46 Both presidential
contenders, Cellou Dalein Diallo and Alpha Condé, have committed to a review of all mining
contracts to determine whether they are sufficiently beneficial to the Guinean state.
In 2009, the government’s unpredictable actions under Capt. Dadis Camara, who publicly
threatened to close or nationalize various mining projects, sparked fears among international
39 VOA, “Overcrowding, Stalled Reform Keep Guinea’s Children Out of School,” May 13, 2010.
40 IMF and World Bank programs were suspended in early 2009. EIU, “Guinea Economy: Government faces fiscal
crisis,” June 1, 2009. The EIU has elsewhere noted that “the poor quality of fiscal reporting in Guinea makes it difficult
to estimate the size of the fiscal deficit” (EIU, Guinea: Country Report, March 2009: 8). Ama Egyaba Baidu-Forson,
“IMF Expresses Concern Over Guinea’s Financial Situation,” IHS Global Insight, March 30, 2010.
41 See e.g., U.N. Development Program (UNDP), “Guinea: 2007/2008 Human Development Report.”
42 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Information Bulletin May 2009.
43 CIA World Factbook.
44 World Health Organization, Africa Weekly Emergency Situation Update, February 8, 2010.
45 IRIN, “Guinea: Climbing Out of the Donor Funding Gap,” July 28, 2010.
46 Reuters, “INTERVIEW-Guinea Opposition Says Vale Iron Deal Invalid,” May 4, 2010; EIU, Guinea: Country
Report, September 2010.
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investors concerned about the security of their assets.47 For example, in April 2009, the Guinean
government reclaimed ownership of an alumina refinery that the Russia-based aluminum
producer RusAl had purchased from the state in 2006, reportedly for $19 million. Dadis Camara
accused RusAl and former government officials of corruption and declared the sale void, a
decision later upheld by a Guinean court. The junta subsequently valued the refinery at $257
million and accused RusAl of failing to pay significant taxes and royalties. RusAl has repeatedly
stated that the refinery was legitimately acquired; negotiations over its status are ongoing.48
Another case of disputed foreign asset ownership centers around the multinational mining
company Rio Tinto. In August 2009, Rio Tinto announced it would pull its equipment from an
anticipated $6 billion iron ore project in southeastern Simandou after the CNDD indicated it
would uphold a decision made under Conté to award half of Rio Tinto’s concession to another
company, BSG Resources Guinea, a subsidiary of Israeli businessman Benny Steinmetz’s BSG
Resources (BSGR). Rio Tinto has rejected the decision and pledged to fight it in court. In March
2010, Rio Tinto and China’s state-run mining firm Chinalco signed a $1.35 billion deal in which
Chinalco was said to acquire a 47% stake in the Simandou venture. However, Guinean authorities
said they did not recognize the deal.49 The leadership of the transitional government has
reportedly warned Rio Tinto to publicly accept the transfer of part of its concession, or else incur
further losses. The warning may stem from fears among some officials who benefited from the
transaction that a new elected government would revise the decision.50 At the same time, the
transitional government approved a joint venture between BSGR and the Brazilian mining
company Vale pertaining to the portion of the Simandou reserve claimed by BSGR. The terms of
the Vale deal reportedly remain opaque.51
In October 2009, the Guinean government announced a $7 billion mining and infrastructure
agreement with a Hong Kong-based firm, the China International Fund (CIF), in partnership with
the Angolan state-owned conglomerate Sonangol. Previously, following the December 2008
coup, China had appeared poised to abandon prior plans to invest in major infrastructure projects
in Guinea due to perceived political instability and weak global commodity markets.52 While the
CIF, which has been linked to multi-billion dollar deals in Angola and other African countries, is
ostensibly a privately owned company, an investigative report released in July 2009 by the U.S.-
China Economic & Security Review Commission found that “key personnel have ties to Chinese
state-owned enterprises and government agencies.”53 Chinese officials maintain that the
company’s “actions have no connection with the Chinese government.” The deal has been
criticized by donors and the Guinean opposition.
47 EIU, Guinea: Country Report, March 2009: 16; Andrea Hotter, “Guinea Ruler Worries Miners,” The Wall Street
Journal, April 16, 2009; Reuters, “Analysis-Guinea RUSAL Dispute Sends Warning Sign to Miners,” September 16,
2009.
48 Reuters, “Guinea Court Reclaims Friguia From RUSAL,” September 10, 2009; Ria Novosti, “Guinea Demands $430
Mln from Russia’s RusAl in Alumina Business Dispute,” January 27, 2010.
49 EIU, Guinea: Country Report, September 2010.
50 Africa Confidential, “Mine Not Yours,” June 25, 2010.
51 EIU, Guinea: Country Report, September 2010.
52 Lydia Polgreen, “As Chinese Investment in Africa Drops, Hope Sinks,” The New York Times, March 25, 2009.
53 USCC, The 88 Queensway Group. See also Africa-Asia Confidential, “Blood and Money in the Streets: China’s
Business Ties to the Loathed Camara Junta Could Quickly Backfire,” October 20, 2009; Christopher Bodeen, “China-
Guinea Deal Highlights Africa Business Ties,” AP, October 24, 2009.
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Security Issues and the Rule of Law
While Guinea was considered an anchor of regional stability during much of the past two
decades, it is now considered by most observers to be a potential vector of insecurity. Guinea’s
fractious military, periodic political unrest, poorly policed borders, endemic corruption, and weak
state institutions have fed concerns over the potential spillover of instability into fragile post-
conflict neighboring countries, such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Côte d’Ivoire.
A reported hub for illicit narcotics trafficking and other forms of transnational crime, Guinea is
also potentially vulnerable to transnational threats such as violent extremism and maritime piracy.
Having been governed by authoritarian regimes since independence, Guinea has never
experienced the effective rule of law. It is among the world’s most corrupt countries, ranking 168
out of 180 countries assessed on Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions
Index. Judicial and law enforcement capacity is reportedly very low and further compromised by
corruption and political interference.54 Such weaknesses have reportedly contributed to a high
incidence of vigilante justice, which was even encouraged under the CNDD.55 Security forces
have frequently been accused of looting homes and businesses in Conakry, carrying out extra-
judicial arrests, targeting perceived opponents, and other abuses of power.56
Drug Trafficking
Counternarcotics issues are a relatively recent area of concern to U.S. policy-makers, as Guinea,
among other countries in the region, has emerged as a reported transshipment hub for cocaine en
route from South America to Europe.57 Senior officials and members of the armed forces are
believed by Guineans and the diplomatic community to have ties to the drug trade.58 In June
2010, President Obama designated Ousmane Conté, a son of the late president, as a “drug
kingpin,” freezing any U.S. assets held by Conté and prohibiting any transactions with him by
persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction.59 Conté was arrested by the CNDD in February 2009, but he
was released from detention in July 2010.60
54 According to the State Department’s 2009 Human Rights Report, Guinea’s “judicial system was endemically
corrupt.... Budget shortfalls, a shortage of qualified lawyers and magistrates, and an outdated and restrictive penal code
limited the judiciary's effectiveness.”
55 Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme (RADDHO), Rapport d’Enquêtes sur les Evénements
de N’Zérékoré du Début 2010, February 23, 2010 (CRS translation from French); AFP, “Guinée: ‘Graves violations
des droits de l'Homme’ (ordre des avocats),” May 15, 2009; Reuters, “Burn Armed Robbers, Says Guinea Crime
Chief,” June 2, 2009.
56 HRW, “Guinea: Plan Elections and Hold Rights Abusers Accountable,” January 21, 2009; HRW, “Guinea: Rein in
Soldiers,” April 27, 2009; Guineeactu.com, “Perquisition Chez la SG de la CNTG : Le Capitaine Tiègboro et Raby
s’Expliquent,” March 5, 2009; HRW, “Guinea: Respect Rights of Opposition,” August 31, 2009.
57 See CRS Report R40838, Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy, by Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas
Cook.
58 Africa Confidential: “Guinea: A Popular Putsch, So Far,” January 23, 2009.
59 Conté, who had been imprisoned in Guinea on drug-related accusations since February 2009, was released by
Guinean authorities in mid-July 2010. Further details on the scope of the “kingpin” designation, made under the
Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Title VIII, P.L. 106-120), are discussed in U.S. Treasury, Narcotics: What
You Need to Know about U.S. Sanctions Against Drug Traffickers, July 15, 2010.
60 BBC Online, “Guinea: Ex-President’s Son Ousmane Conte Freed on Bail,” July 16, 2010.
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Soon after taking power, Dadis Camara initiated populist moves to crack down on drug
trafficking. These measures appeared designed to signal a break with the Conté regime, enhance
the junta’s popularity, and respond to international pressure. CNDD actions largely relied on the
“naming and shaming” of alleged wrongdoers, rather than advancing institutional reform. At least
20 high-profile individuals, including top Conté officials, senior police officers, the former chief
of the armed forces, and three sons and a brother-in-law of the late president were arrested in
2009 on drug trafficking allegations. Dadis Camara personally interrogated several alleged
traffickers on national television, in some cases eliciting detailed “confessions.” While many
Guineans welcomed the attempt to pursue powerful figures in the former regime, concerns arose
over a lack of due process, and some arrests appeared to be politically selective.
The CNDD’s anti-drug efforts concentrated power in the presidency and sidelined civilian-led
anti-drug agencies in favor of the military. Dadis Camara created a new agency, the State
Secretariat for Special Services, to focus on drug and human trafficking, money laundering, and
organized crime. A military officer, Moussa Tiegboro Camara, was appointed to head the agency,
with a corps of gendarmes and soldiers for enforcement. The agency’s legal mandate and
authorities were not clearly defined, notably vis-à-vis the judiciary or police. This raised further
due process and human rights concerns, and some troops participating in anti-drug efforts were
accused of abuses of power.61
The Guinean Military: A Key Security Challenge
Nearly all observers point to Guinea’s bloated and undisciplined military as a central cause of
political instability.62 The military has been implicated in high-level corruption, multiple coup
attempts, mutinies, and human rights abuses, including the abuses of September 2009 and the
shooting of over 100 unarmed anti-government demonstrators in early 2007.63 Military officers
implicated in abuses are perceived as benefiting from near-complete impunity from judicial
sanction. The armed forces are also divided along ethnic, generational, and factional lines; such
divisions reportedly grew further entrenched under the CNDD.64 In the eyes of some, the armed
forces serve largely as a vehicle for corruption and patronage rather than national defense. At the
same time, military salaries and other benefits serve as a vital safety net for a deeply
impoverished population.
Following the CNDD coup and throughout 2009, abuses by security forces reportedly escalated,
while discipline and the effectiveness of the military chain of command were seen as
deteriorating. While many credit Konaté with improving military discipline since January, the
potential for abuses remains high. Some contend that a broad-based truth and reconciliation
process is needed to address public perceptions of the armed forces and allegations of abuses
stretching back to the post-colonial period. Repeated attempts by civil society groups to push for
official investigations into crimes and human rights abuses by members of the military have not
succeeded. In addition to perceived impunity from the law and lack of discipline, key factors seen
as challenges associated with security sector reform include a lack of civilian control and
61 HRW, “Rein in Soldiers,” April 27, 2009.
62 See, for example, ICG, Guinea: Reforming the Army, Africa Report N°164, September 23, 2010.
63 See HRW, Dying for Change: Brutality and Repression by Guinean Security Forces in Response to a Nationwide
Strike, April 24, 2007.
64 La Lettre du Continent, “Un Chef, Une Armée, Des Clans!” October 8, 2009.
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oversight; an overweening size (Guinea’s military, estimated at over 30,000 personnel, is one of
the region’s largest despite a population of only 10 million); an undefined mandate; and the
incomplete integration of irregular recruits.65
Foreign Relations
Guinea’s relations with donors and neighboring countries are currently circumspect and restricted,
given uncertainty over the country’s future trajectory and leadership. The African Union (AU)
and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) both suspended Guinea’s
membership following the 2008 CNDD coup. President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal and Libya’s
Muammar al Qadhafi, who was then chairman of the AU, nevertheless expressed initial support
for the CNDD. Many donors, including the United States (see “U.S. Relations,” below) and the
European Union (EU), suspended some bilateral assistance programs after the coup. Relations
with Russia, a longtime diplomatic partner, have reportedly been negatively affected by a dispute
over rights to an aluminum refinery claimed by RusAl (see “Recent Mining Sector
Developments,” above). Economic and diplomatic ties with China, another longtime partner,
appear to be increasing.
The violent military crackdown of September 2009 prompted further attempts by donors to
isolate the CNDD government. In October 2009, the EU and AU announced targeted sanctions
against CNDD members and certain associates; the EU, AU, and ECOWAS additionally imposed
an arms embargo.66 The United States announced targeted travel restrictions. France suspended
military aid; previously, it had been one of the only donors to continue such aid to the CNDD.67
(France resumed bilateral cooperation programs, including military assistance, in February 2010.)
Since the formation of the transitional government in January, donors and regional organizations
have moved toward normalizing relations, particularly in anticipation of a transition toward an
elected government. On July 23, the AU announced that Guinea would deploy a battalion to the
AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), although the status and likelihood of such a deployment are
unclear.68 The EU has reportedly tied the resumption of aid and the end of sanctions to the
completion of democratic elections.69
Guinea has had historically tense relations with many of its neighbors. Guinea played an active
role in supporting various factions in the Sierra Leone and Liberia civil wars, and contributed
troops to ECOWAS peacekeeping missions in both countries as part of ECOWAS’ Military
Observer Group (ECOMOG). Guinean relations with Liberia deteriorated significantly after
Charles Taylor was elected president of Liberia in 1997: Conté reportedly provided logistical
65 For further analysis on Guinea’s security sector, see CRS Report R41200, Guinea’s New Transitional Government:
Emerging Issues for U.S. Policy, by Alexis Arieff. See also Joint Mission of ECOWAS, the AU, and the United
Nations for Security Sector Reform in the Republic of Guinea, Rapport d’Évaluation du Secteur de la Sécurité en
République de Guinée, May 2010; and ICG, Guinea: Reforming the Army, op. cit.
66 Reuters, “West African Leaders Impose Arms Embargo on Guinea,” October 17, 2009; Europolitique, “UE/Guinée:
L’UE Adopte des Sanctions Contre la Guinée”; AU Peace and Security Council Communiqué, October 29, 2009.
67 AFP, “France Condemns ‘Violent Repression’ in Guinea,” September 28, 2009; Reuters, “Clash Toll in Guinea
Soars, France Cuts Aid,” September 29, 2009.
68 AFP, “Guinea to Send Troops to AU Force in Somalia,” July 23, 2010.
69 Guineenews, “Guinea: EU Links Resumption of Aid to Democracy,” via BBC Monitoring, September 25, 2010;
AFP, “EU to Extend Guinea Sanctions Awaiting Vote,” October 21, 2010.
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support and rear bases to anti-Taylor rebels, while Taylor-backed militia fighters launched attacks
on Guinean border towns in 2000 and 2001. Relations between the two governments have
improved enormously since Taylor’s departure in August 2003.70 Guinea also hosted hundreds of
thousands of refugees from regional conflicts, most of whom have now returned to their countries
of origin.
Conté’s government forged close ties with President Laurent Gbagbo of Côte d’Ivoire and the late
President João Bernardo Vieira of Guinea-Bissau. In 1998, Guinea (along with Senegal) sent
troops to Guinea-Bissau to support Vieira against a military mutiny, while Guinea-Bissau
reportedly sent military reinforcements to support Conté during anti-government demonstrations
in early 2007.71
U.S. Relations
The Obama Administration has stated that the primary U.S. objective is to assist “peaceful,
democratic change” in Guinea.72 The United States condemned the 2008 military coup and called
for a return to civilian rule and the holding of free, fair, and transparent elections as soon as
possible. Prior to the coup, the United States had maintained cordial relations with Guinea. In
response to the September 2009 military crackdown, senior U.S. officials called for CNDD
leaders to step down. The State Department also imposed targeted travel restrictions on certain
members of the CNDD, members of the government, and associates.73 Peace Corps assistance
was suspended in October 2009; the program had previously been halted for six months in 2007
due to insecurity in connection with the January-February 2007 general strikes and anti-
government protests. The Fulbright exchange program was also suspended.
Since the formation of the transitional government in January, U.S. officials have signaled
approval of Interim President Konaté’s leadership, and strongly praised the June elections as
peaceful and “historic.”74 In August, Konaté was granted a diplomatic visa to visit the United
States; however, the trip has yet to take place. The United States repeatedly called for elections to
take place according to schedule, amid multiple delays, and condemned the violence that erupted
in response to the November announcement of provisional results, calling on supporters of both
candidates to remain calm and exercise legal forms of redress for election-related grievances.75
70 Taylor stepped down amid a rebel assault on Liberia’s capital, Monrovia, and is currently on trial in The Hague
before the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
71 For background on Guinea’s involvement in neighboring conflicts, see Arieff, “Still Standing: Neighbourhood Wars
and Political Stability in Guinea,” Journal of Modern African Studies, 47, 3 (September 2009).
72 FY2011 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations.
73 Adam Nossiter, “U.S. Envoy Protests Violence in Guinea,” The New York Times, October 7, 2009; U.S. Fed News,
“Guinea Violence ‘Vile Violation’ of Human Rights, Clinton Says,” October 9, 2009; Congressional Quarterly
Transcript, “Secretary of State Clinton Holds Press Conference with Pakistani Foreign Minister Qureshi,” October 6,
2009; State Department, “Guinea: Travel Restrictions,” October 29, 2009.
74 AFP, “Obama Calls for Peaceful Guinea Run-Off Vote,” July 7, 2010; U.S. Embassy Conakry press statement, via
Guineenews, July 8, 2010.
75 State Department, “Post-Election Violence in Guinea [press release],” November 17, 2010.
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Foreign Aid
In January 2009, the United States suspended bilateral aid in response to the coup, with the
exception of humanitarian and democracy-promotion assistance. In practice, security assistance
was suspended, while most non-military aid fit into permitted categories. While this policy
broadly conformed to congressional directives included in annual appropriations legislation, legal
restrictions on assistance to post-coup governments were not triggered.76 Election assistance,
which is largely funded out of the Development Assistance account and exempt from the
restriction, increased in FY2009. A $32 million USAID-funded umbrella project initiated in 2007,
Projet Faisons Ensemble, has continued. Considered to be an innovative approach to
development assistance in a fragile state, Faisons Ensemble aims to bolster governance at the
local level to achieve better outcomes in health, education, agriculture, and other sectors.
It seems likely that many of the same goals that previously defined U.S. aid priorities will
continue to be pursued if a transfer to civilian, elected leadership occurs. In its FY2011
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, the Obama Administration stated that
“assuming a credibly elected, civilian government is in place … U.S. assistance in FY2011 will
focus on fostering more effective law enforcement and judicial systems, greater democracy, good
governance, better health services, and improved economic opportunity.”
Elections and Democracy Promotion
Programs supporting Guinea’s electoral process are not affected by the suspension of U.S. aid.
The Obama Administration’s FY2011 request for democracy and governance funding is for
roughly $5.53 million, and an estimated $8.639 million was appropriated for democracy and
governance programs in FY2010. U.S. support for Guinea’s electoral process will be largely
implemented through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID
programmed roughly $6.85 million in FY2008 and FY2009 funds for electoral assistance
programs, making the United States the second-largest donor to the election process after the
EU.77 U.S. officials have not publicly outlined what, if any, criteria might be required with respect
to the continuation or suspension of electoral assistance or democracy and governance programs.
Security Assistance and Counter-Narcotics Cooperation
Security assistance—which was relatively large compared to other countries of comparable size
in the region—was suspended in connection with the 2008 military coup. However, several new
security assistance programs were initiated in 2010. In early June 2010, the State Department
76 The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-8, Division H, Title VII, section 7008) barred direct assistance
“to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree,” with
the exception of democracy promotion assistance. A substantively identical provision was included in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-117, Title VII, Division F, Section 7008). Such provisions, which have been
included in annual appropriations legislation since at least 1985, are often referred to as “Section 508” sanctions.
However, the State Department determined that the December 2008 coup in Guinea did not trigger the provision
because the deposed government had not been “duly elected.” (State Department response to CRS query, March 2010.)
77 Information provided by USAID, November 2010. U.S. programs included the provision of electoral equipment and
materials; training and technical assistance for Guinea’s National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), electoral
agents and poll workers, and political parties and candidates; voter education; civil society and media election
monitoring and oversight; an international election observation mission implemented by the Carter Center.
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initiated the training of a new, 75-member presidential security detail, funded by approximately
$1.5 million in Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funds. The Department’s Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) also funded a resident advisor to act as a
consultant on elections security and broader police reform issues, through the Department of
Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). The State
Department also funded two experts’ participation in an ECOWAS-led assessment of Guinea’s
security sector, and intends to obligate up to $200,000 in IMET funds for courses for military
officials and civilians on topics including civil-military relations, military justice, human rights,
and the rule of law.
The Obama Administration has indicated that the United States will resume a broad array of
security assistance programs if the transition to an elected civilian government is completed.78 In
March 2010, a U.S. delegation representing the State Department, the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), and the Defense Department met with Guinean officials in
Conakry to discuss potential U.S. support for security sector reform. State Department officials
have also indicated the possibility of assisting Guinean troops who may deploy to Somalia as
peacekeepers.79
Prior to the 2008 coup, Guinea benefitted from IMET, Foreign Military Financing (FMF),
“Section 1206” programs, and other U.S. assistance aimed at enhancing security forces’
capabilities and professionalism. 80 Before aid was suspended, U.S. officials had informally
planned a wide range of programs, many focusing on maritime security and counter-narcotics. In
2002, the United States trained an 800-person Guinean Ranger unit to shore up border security
after Liberian-backed incursions in 2000-2001. Human rights concerns have also periodically
limited military training programs, and Congress has restricted IMET assistance in Guinea to
“Expanded” IMET, which emphasizes human rights and civilian control of the military.81
Multilateral Aid
Multilateral development assistance, concessional loans, and anti-poverty programs were affected
by the coup. In 2009 the World Bank stopped disbursing roughly $200 million in outstanding
loans designated for programs related to health, transportation, education, and other sectors, due
to political uncertainty following the coup as well as Guinea’s subsequent failure to make
sufficient payments on its existing loans.82 The International Monetary Fund-led Heavily Indebted
78 FY2011 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations.
79 CRS interview with State Department officials, July 2010.
80 Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163) provides the
Secretary of Defense with authority to train and equip foreign military and foreign maritime security forces for counter-
terrorism and other purposes. Guinea was one of 15 beneficiary countries of an FY2007 Africa regional Section 1206
program. Planned FY2008 Section 1206 funding for Guinea was redirected in 2009 following the military coup.
81 Most recently, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117, Division F, Title VII, Section 7070).
82 Arieff interview with World Bank officials, May 2009 and February 2010. The World Bank classifies Guinea as one
of the world’s 78 poorest countries, which qualifies Guinea for loans through the Bank’s International Development
Association (IDA). IDA lends money (credits) on concessional terms, meaning that credits have no interest charge and
repayments are stretched over 35 to 40 years, including a 10-year grace period. IDA also provides grants to countries at
risk of debt distress.
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Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, which was due to provide additional government financing in
2009, has not advanced since Conté’s death.83
Table 1. Selected Bilateral Aid by Account
$ thousands
FY2007 FY2008 FY2009
FY2010
(est.)
FY2011
(req.)
TOTAL
17,797 14,206 13,377 22,018 18,317
Development
5,529 2,400 2,576 14,518 10,277
Assistance
Global Health
7,844 [Child
8,458 8,200 7,500 7,500
and Child
Survival and
Survival—
Health]
USAID
Food Aid (P.L.
4,093 2,993 2,501 0
0
480)
International
331 246 0 0 40
Military
Education and
Training
Foreign Military 0 0 0 0 0
Financing
International
0 0 100
0 500
Narcotics
Control and
Law
Enforcement
Source: State Department, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2009-FY2011
Outlook
Guinea is likely to continue to interest U.S. policymakers for its role in transnational security
issues and in regional stability, its economic potential, and its hoped-for democratic transition.
The country’s outlook has improved, in some ways, from early January 2010, when Guinea was
beset by deep political uncertainty and fears of imminent civil conflict. However, the election
period has also exacerbated certain societal tensions and raised the stakes for the electoral victor.
Inter-ethnic relations—historically perceived as relatively harmonious in Guinea though subject
to political manipulation and occasional violent confrontation—have deteriorated, and the full
implications of recent ethnic violence have yet to be assessed. Although the transitional
government brought a measure of stability, notably by reigning in the military, its leadership has
not altered the underlying causes of Guinea’s instability, including economic stagnancy and the
military’s opaque structure and overweening size. The handling of the transition to a newly
83 The HIPC Initiative is a comprehensive approach to debt reduction for heavily indebted poor countries pursuing
IMF- and World Bank-supported adjustment and reform programs. At the time of the coup, the program was on track.
Reaching the HIPC “completion point” would grant Guinea an estimated relief of $2.2 billion and reduce debt service
by approximately $100 million the first year (Arieff interview with IMF official, May 2009).
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elected government could prove decisive for the country’s future trajectory. Any number of
potential factors, including negotiations between the two presidential candidates, delays in the
transition, regional developments, continued economic hardship, military divisions, and ethnic
tensions, could spark renewed insecurity and corresponding challenges to U.S. policy goals.
Author Contact Information
Alexis Arieff
Nicolas Cook
Analyst in African Affairs
Specialist in African Affairs
aarieff@crs.loc.gov, 7-2459
ncook@crs.loc.gov, 7-0429
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