Algeria: Current Issues
Carol Migdalovitz
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
November 22, 2010
Congressional Research Service
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RS21532
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repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Algeria: Current Issues
Summary
The focus of this report is Algeria, a country in North Africa that is increasingly important for
U.S. efforts to counter international terrorism as a key partner in the fight against Al Qaeda linked
groups. As an energy producer, it also is a significant source of natural gas for the United States
and not a major recipient of U.S. aid.
The overall domestic situation in Algeria remains relatively stable. An elected president
dominates the political system, but the military, the most significant political force since
independence in 1962, still is viewed as the ultimate arbiter of who fills the office. It backed
Abdelaziz Bouteflika for the presidency in 1999. He was reelected for a third term in April 2009
and has no clear successor. The voice of the military has been muted publicly since Bouteflika
was first selected, but may be heard during presidential succession. Low voter turnout in the May
2007 parliamentary election may have reflected general lack of public faith in the political system
as well as common knowledge that the legislature is weak. Authorities specifically boasted of a
higher turnout in the 2009 presidential election.
The major domestic problem is terrorism, which has spread beyond Algeria’s borders. It persists
at home while Algerian terrorists operate across the southern border in the Sahel and are linked to
terrorism abroad. The U.S. State Department lists two Algerian groups as Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (FTOs). The more notorious and active is Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM), which pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2006 and may increasingly be described as a
criminal-terrorist mutation. Algeria, as the dominant economic and military power in the region,
has attempted to take the lead in developing a regional approach to counterterrorism in the Sahel.
In addition to addressing the threat, Algiers seeks to prevent foreign, that is, French and U.S.,
intervention justified by the need to combat terrorists. However, it does welcome other kinds of
outside support for the effort.
The Algerian economy is largely based on hydrocarbons, which are overwhelmingly the
predominant national export. The revenues they produce have enabled increased public
investment but have yet to remedy the country’s significant socioeconomic ills.
President Bouteflika’s tenure has produced an energized foreign policy. Strains in ties with
neighboring Morocco continue, mainly due to the unresolved status of the Western Sahara, but
also due to a rivalry for regional power. Relations with former colonial power France remain
complex and volatile as Algeria and France sometimes compete as much as cooperate in efforts to
counter terrorism in the Sahel. U.S.- Algerian relations are generally good and highly focused on
counterterrorism as the United States seeks to support regional governments in their fight against
AQIM.
See also CRS Report RS20962, Western Sahara: Status of Settlement Efforts, by Carol
Migdalovitz..
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Contents
Government and Politics ............................................................................................................. 1
Terrorism .................................................................................................................................... 2
Counterterrorism......................................................................................................................... 6
Human Rights ............................................................................................................................. 7
Economy .................................................................................................................................... 8
Foreign Affairs.......................................................................................................................... 10
Morocco ............................................................................................................................. 10
France................................................................................................................................. 11
European Union .................................................................................................................. 12
The United States................................................................................................................ 12
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Algeria and its Neighbors ................................................................................ 5
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Aid to Algeria...................................................................................................... 13
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 15
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Government and Politics
The president has long dominated the domestic political system in Algeria. After a 1965 coup, its
leader, Houari Boumediène, became president and served until his death in 1978. Another
military figure, Chadli Bendjedid, succeeded Boumediène and served as president until ousted in
1992 in another military coup that sought to prevent the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) from
coming to power. A decade of war between security forces and Islamist terrorists ensued.
In 1999, former Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a civilian with vital military backing,
won the presidential election after all other candidates withdrew, charging fraud. In April 2004, he
was reelected with 83.5% of the vote in a multiparty contest during which the military was
officially neutral. International observers hailed that election as progress toward democratization
even though the bureaucracy and judiciary had manipulated the political process to favor
Bouteflika in the pre-election period. Many saw Bouteflika’s victory as an accurate reflection of
the popular will and an endorsement of his effort to decrease violence and for continued political
stability.1 Since 2005, there have been persistent rumors about the state of the 73-year-old
president’s health, spurred in part by his repeated, intermittent absences from public view, but no
strong concern that he lacks a clear successor. The military probably will again play a
determining role in the choice of Bouteflika’s replacement.
In November 2008, a joint session of parliament adopted constitutional amendments that, among
other provisions, abolished presidential term limits and allowed Bouteflika to run for a third term.
A huge salary increase for legislators may have contributed to the amendments’ passage. Some
critics had argued that the constitutional changes required a national referendum, but the
Constitutional Court disagreed. On April 9, 2009, as expected, Bouteflika won another term as
president with more than 90.24% of the vote over five challengers, none of whom was seen as
having a remote chance of ending his leadership. The Interior Ministry claimed a 74% voter
turnout. Once again, the president’s rivals alleged fraud and added claims that the authorities had
inflated turnout figures. Some attributed the military’s acquiescence this time to their inability to
find an alternative to Bouteflika.2
The president heads the Council of Ministers (cabinet) and the High Security Council, and
appoints the prime minister. On June 23, 2008, Bouteflika named National Democratic Rally
(RND) leader Ahmed Ouyahia, who had served as prime minister from 1995 to 1999 and from
2003 to 2006, and who is known to be close to the military, to the post again. After his re-election
in 2009, Bouteflika reconfirmed Ouyahia as prime minister. Ouyahia is considered a possible
successor to Bouteflika. Media reports suggest that Bouteflika’s younger brother, Said, also may
have presidential ambitions. Speculation about Bouteflika’s successor intermittently surfaces
along with the rumors about the president’s health.
The bicameral, multiparty parliament is weak. The 380-seat National People’s Assembly was last
elected on May 17, 2007, with a voter turnout of 36.5%—the lowest ever, reflecting lack of
popular faith in the political system and common knowledge that the legislature has little power.
Parties in the governing coalition placed at the top: the National Liberation Front (FLN) won 23%
of the vote and 136 seats; the RND 10.3%, 61 seats; and the moderately Islamist Movement for a
1 Marwane Ben Yahmed, “Les Raisons D’Un Plebiscite,” Jeune Afrique Intelligent, No. 2258, 8-14 April 2004.
2 Africa Research Bulletin, April 1-30, 2009, p. 19732, citing Africa Confidential.
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Peaceful Society (MSP) 9.6%, 51 seats; 18 other parties and 33 independents also won seats. The
Council of Nations has 144 seats, one-third appointed by the president and two-thirds selected by
indirect vote. FLN has 29 seats, RND 12, MSP 3; independents and presidential appointees
comprise the remainder. The next parliamentary election is scheduled for 2012.
Terrorism3
Up to 200,000 lives were lost to terrorism and related violence in Algeria between 1992 and
2000.4 Two Algerian groups are U.S. State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (FTOs).5 The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) was most active from 1991 to 2001 and
last attacked in 2006. Former GIA members have accepted the government amnesty or joined
other groups. The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) split from GIA in 1998,
declared its allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2003 and, after Abdelmalik Droukdel (aka Abu Musab
Abdulwadood) became “emir” or leader, united with it officially on September 11, 2006, taking
the name Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM or Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic
Maghreb (AQLIM)). AQIM seeks to replace the current Algerian regime with an Islamic state
and calls for jihad against the United States, France, and Spain. The practical meaning of the
union with Al Qaeda is uncertain, and analysts suggest that links between AQIM and Al Qaeda
leaders in Pakistan/Afghanistan are nominal, but mutually beneficial.6 Adopting the famous name
may have enhanced AQIM’s legitimacy among extremists and facilitated recruitment, while
enabling Al Qaeda to burnish its international credentials. Since “uniting” with Al Qaeda,
AQIM’s rhetoric against the West and governments in the region and its calls for jihad against the
United States, France, and Spain have increased. AQIM’s cohesiveness is questioned as it may be
operating as relatively autonomous and/or rival groups and has experienced defections. The U.S.
State Department estimates AQIM’s strength at under 1,000 in Algeria, with a smaller number in
the Sahel to the south; other sources provide lower estimates.7
After Droukdel became leader, AQIM increased its attacks against the Algerian government and
security forces, and against foreign workers in the country.8 In 2007, it shifted tactics to more
frequent, “Iraqi style,” suicide attacks, with simultaneous bombings of the Government Palace
(the prime and interior ministries) and a suburban police station on April 11, 2007, and of the
Constitutional Council and the U.N. headquarters on December 11, among other attacks. In
addition, an AQIM suicide bomber unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate President Bouteflika
on September 6, 2007. All of these attacks resulted in many civilian casualties. After a relative
lull, AQIM again targeted security forces in the summer of 2008. That August, suicide bombers
perpetrated a particularly bloody assault on a police academy, resulting in more than 40 deaths.
3 See also, Jean-Pierre Filiu, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Algerian Challenge or Global Threat?” Carnegie
Papers, No. 104, October 2009, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
4 While terrorists were responsible for or inspired most of the violence, questions remain about the government’s
culpability in violence during the conflict.
5 U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2009, released August 5, 2010, at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/index.htm.
6 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Islamic Rebels Gain in the Sahara,” Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2009.
7 Country Reports, op. cit.
8 An Algerian court sentenced Droukdel in absentia to life imprisonment for his membership in a terrorist organization
and involvement in kidnappings.
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Since 2009, AQIM has operated more outside of Algiers and other large cities where security
forces have made it difficult to operate, and it has continued to focus on the Berber region of the
Kabylie, in northeastern Algeria, where the security presence was reduced after civil unrest in
2005. In line with Droukdel’s regional ambitions and because of difficulties experience in the
north, the group’s operations also have moved into the Sahelian countries of Mauritania, Niger,
and Mali, with aspirations to spread as far south as Nigeria.9 Activities along the Malian border
have manifestly increased and AQIM reportedly has agreements with tribes in northern Mali,
sometimes sealed by marriage and/or financial compensation. In May 2009, AQIM claimed
responsibility for executing a British hostage in Mali and, in June, it shot a U.S. aid worker while
attempting to kidnap him in Nouakchott, Mauritania. Also in June, terrorists killed 24 gendarmes
(paramilitary police) in an ambush about 218 miles east of Algiers. In July, they ambushed a
military convoy in Tipaza Province, 90 miles west of Algiers; at least 14 soldiers were killed.10 In
August, AQIM attacked the French Embassy in the capital. In October, terrorists killed seven and
wounded three security guards at a Canadian water project. In November, an AQIM cell
kidnapped three Spanish relief workers in Mauritania and unsuccessfully attempted to kidnap
U.S. embassy employees in Niger. In June 2010, a suicide bomber attacked a police barracks 60
miles east of Algiers, killing at least nine. In July 2010, AQIM claimed responsibility for
attacking a police convoy near the border with Mali, killing 11 gendarmes and seizing weapons.
The AQIM organizational structure is hazy. Droukdel may be the spiritual leader or ideologue of
the group who sets broad directions, but Mokhtar Belmokhtar and Yahia Djouadi have gained
public prominence as (perhaps rival) leaders of AQIM regional commands or “emirates” in the
Sahel who oversee operations. Alternatively, they may be independent of Droukdel. Abdelhamid
Abu Zaid (aka Abid Hammadou) is associated with Djouadi and reportedly is heavily engaged
money-making criminal activities. AQIM raises funds by kidnapping11 for ransoms and by
trafficking in arms, drugs, vehicles, cigarettes, and persons across that vast region. The Algerian
military claims that AQIM provides protection in return for cash for convoys smuggling drugs
from South America, across the Sahara, to Europe.12 All of these activities have led some to
describe it as “hybrid terrorist-criminal organization” or a “criminal organization with an
attachment to Al Qaeda.”13 AQIM gets some small-scale funding from cells in Europe.14 AQIM
communicates via sophisticated internet videos.
9 See also, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2009, released August 5, 2010, available online at
http://www.state.gov.
10 Some attributed the second ambush to the Protectors of Salafi Call, which reportedly had split from the GSPC and,
therefore, is not considered part of AQIM. Others attributed the attack to a different regional command of AQIM or
suggested that AQIM is encroaching on the Protectors’ territory. “Algerian Army Launches ‘Large Scale’ Operations
an Al-Qaidah Maghreb,” El-Khabar website, August 2, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East, “Five Regions Reportedly
Designated for ‘Terrorist Deployment’ in Algeria, El-Khabar website, August 5, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East,
“Retreating of the Salafi Call Protectors,” Echourouk el Youmi website, August 17, 2009, BBC Monitoring Newsfile.
11 AQIM reportedly mostly purchases Western hostages from local criminal gangs and tribes in the Sahel. Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Middle East Program, The Dynamics of North African Terrorism,
Conference Report, March 2010.
12 “Algeria Says Al Qaeda Guards Sahara Drug Smugglers,” Times of Oman, February 23, 2010.
13 CSIS, op. cit.
14 See also, Michael Jonson and Christian Nils Larson, “Illegal Tender: Funding Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,”
Janes Intelligence Review, October 2008.
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Algeria is a major source of international terrorists and was the fourth-largest supplier of anti-
coalition fighters to Iraq.15 Some Algerians were captured in Afghanistan and, at one time, a total
of 26 were held at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; most have been repatriated.
The Bush and Obama Administrations sought assurances from Algiers that repatriated detainees
would not pose a future danger and would be treated fairly. Several were tried after their return
home and acquitted for lack of evidence.
Algerians have been arrested on suspicion of belonging to or supporting AQIM in France, Spain,
Italy, Germany, and Britain. In 2010, there have been unconfirmed reports of Algerians fighting
with Islamist terrorist groups in Yemen and Somalia. In addition, several major international
terrorist plots have involved Algerians. In December 1999, Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian trained in
Afghanistan was arrested after attempting to enter the United States from Canada; he was
convicted for the so-called Millennium Plot to carry out bomb attacks in Los Angeles. His
associates and other Algerians in Canada were linked to the GIA and Al Qaeda. In January 2003,
six Algerians were arrested in a London apartment with traces of ricin, a deadly poison with no
known antidote. In October 2009, two French brothers of Algerian origin, one a worker at the
European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) in Geneva, were arrested in France after
intelligence agencies came to suspect them of “criminal activities related to a terror group,” that
is, AQIM.16
15 Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Harmony Project, “Al-Qaida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at
the Sinjar Records,” January 2008.
16 Emily Andrews, “Big Bang Scientist Admits Plotting Al Qaeda Atrocity,” Daily Mail, October 12, 2009.
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Figure 1. Map of Algeria and its Neighbors
Source: CRS.
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Counterterrorism
After President Bouteflika took office, he sought to add peaceful means to the government’s
tactics to counter terrorism. In September 1999, a national referendum approved the “Civil
Concord,” an amnesty for those who had fought the government. In September 2005, another
referendum approved the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, including an amnesty for
all except murderers, rapists, and bombers, exemption for security forces from prosecution for
crimes of the 1990s, and compensation for families of victims of violence and the disappeared.
Critics charge that it has resulted in the freeing of recidivist terrorists or that it failed to provide
accountability for the disappeared and for truth-telling about the role of the security forces. A
presidential commission determined that excesses of unsupervised security forces were
responsible for the disappearances of 6,146 civilians from 1992 to 2000 and recommended
compensation. Organizations representing victims’ families claim up to 20,000 disappeared. The
government has extended the amnesty period indefinitely and has controversially extended it to
some former GSPC leaders.
In 2008, the government began to recruit 100,000 new police and gendarme officers to reinforce
borders, augment security at airports, and increase the security presence in major cities. As noted
above, it has been successful in impeding terrorist operations in cities. In addition, the
government deployed thousands of troops to Saharan provinces along Algeria’s borders with
Mali, Niger, and Mauritania to combat AQIM.
Algeria is the region’s dominant economic and military power and it has promoted a regional
approach in which it is the lead actor to counter terrorism. It recognizes the immensity of the
Sahara Desert-Sahel territory and believes that intra-regional cooperation is needed to fight
AQIM. In line with its anti-colonial creed, Algiers is wary of a potential foreign counterterrorism
role and seeks to prevent foreign, non-African, that is, French and U.S.
involvement/interference/intervention in the region. It fears that AQIM’s propensity to kidnap
Westerners for ransom might provoke direct foreign intervention and that Algeria’s weaker
neighbors might be vulnerable to great power influence, especially if exercised by France—their
former colonial ruler. In addition, Algiers seeks to impede AQIM’s ability to extract large
ransoms from Western governments and, thereby, to build up a treasury to pay more recruits and
buy more arms. While it opposes a foreign presence, Algiers welcomes other outside support for
counterterrorist operations.
In July 2009, the leaders of Algeria, Libya, and Mali agreed to work in concert against AQIM. In
August, the military chiefs of Algeria, Libya, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania met in the southern
Algerian town of Tamanrasset and agreed to cooperate more to counter terrorism and related
crime and developed the so-called “Tamanrasset Plan.” In April 2010, following this framework,
they began to set up a joint command center for security and military coordination in
Tamanrasset; Libya is not participating, while Burkina Faso is observing. Probably due to
strained bilateral ties (see “Foreign Affairs” below) and because Algiers argues that the security
of the Sahel does not concern Morocco, it has not invited its western neighbor to participate in
regional counterterrorism efforts—despite AQIM’s attempt to use of Moroccan territory as a route
to smuggle drugs to Europe. Participating governments established several coordinating
committees, assigned countries specific missions, and reportedly agreed to increase the number of
security forces, gendarmerie, and soldiers deployed for counterterrorism in the Sahel from 25,000
(15,000 of whom were Algerian) to 75,000. Algeria already had increased its forces in the region
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to 25,000.17 Algeria is providing arms, ammunition, vehicles, fuel, and training to Mali, Niger,
and Mauritania and attempting to mount joint operations with their forces. Several additional
high-level counterterrorism meetings have been held.
The sometimes dissonant relations among the neighbors and their dependence on France have
limited implementation of Algeria’s regional approach and the Tamanrasset plan in practice. This
was apparent in July 2010, when French and Mauritanian forces carried out an unsuccessful raid
into Mali, without Mali’s permission, to rescue a Frenchman reportedly held by Abu Zaid’s
group. The effort failed and AQIM later announced that it had executed the hostage. In August,
Mali, reportedly acting for Spain, negotiated with AQIM and secured the release of two Spanish
hostages in exchange for two AQIM members and perhaps a ransom as well.18 Mali thereby
angered its neighbors, including Algeria, who oppose the payment of ransoms. Algeria does not
seem able to compete with European power, influence, and assistance to Sahelian governments.
On occasion, Algiers has condemned its neighbors for releasing terrorists as ransom for hostages
kidnapped by AQIM. Algeria recalled its ambassador from Mali in February 2010 after its
government, under considerable pressure from Paris, released four terrorists in exchange for a
French hostage—an alleged aid worker who was later found to be an intelligence officer. Shortly
thereafter, President Bouteflika postponed a visit to France and Algiers refused to schedule a visit
by French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner to Algeria.
Human Rights
A state of emergency declared in 1992 at the outset of the conflict between the Algerian security
forces and Islamist terrorists remains in effect. According to the U.S. State Department Country
Report on Human Rights Practices-2009, human rights problems in Algeria include restrictions
on freedom of assembly and association which significantly impair political party activity and
limit citizens’ ability to change the government through elections, and failure to account for
persons who disappeared in detention in the 1990s. Other abuses reportedly include official
impunity, abuse of pretrial detention, poor prison conditions, limited judicial independence, and
restrictions on freedom of speech, press, and assembly. Reports of torture and abuse occur, but are
fewer than in previous years. There are limitations on religious freedom and problems with
security-based restrictions on movement, corruption and lack of government transparency,
discrimination and violence against women, and restrictions on workers rights.19 Algerian
officials have criticized and disputed these U.S. reports.
The State Department’s International Religious Freedoms Report-201020 noted that “the status of
respect for religious freedom by the government improved marginally during the reporting
period.” However, it also stated that “the government's National Commission for Non-Muslim
17 “Anti-terrorism Troops in the Sahel Increased from 25,000 to 75,000,” El-Khabar website, April 24, 2010, BBC
Monitoring Middle East.
18 “Algerian Paper Says Mali Violating Regional Anti-terrorism Agreements,” Echourouk El Youmi website, August
19, 2010, BBC Monitoring Middle East, August 20, 2010.
19 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2009, Algeria, March 11, 2010, online at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136065.htm.
20 U.S. State Department, International Religious Freedom Report – 2010, November 17, 2010, online at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148812.htm.
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Religious Services did not establish an administrative means for non-Muslim religious groups to
register with the government as required by law,” and that “government officials also publicly
criticized evangelism and emphasized the dominant role of Islam in society.” Nonetheless, the
report recognized that “there were some positive changes in the government's treatment of
religious minorities.” It “ceased prosecutions of members of minority religious groups; paid
increasing attention to Christian groups' concerns, including organizing a symposium on religious
worship; officially recognized the first official representative of the Jewish community in the
country; and allowed for the reopening of 25 synagogues. However, the government reportedly
did not approve any other requests for registration by non-Muslim religious associations,
including Christian” ones.
The Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report places Algeria on the Tier 2 Watch List with
regard to human trafficking because it “does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the
elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so.” In January 2009, the
government approved legislation that criminalizes trafficking in persons for the purposes of labor
and sexual exploitation. It later “helped formulate a training program for police, judges, and
prosecutors on its counter-trafficking law. Despite these efforts, the government did not show
overall progress in punishing trafficking crimes and protecting trafficking victims and continued
to lack adequate measures to protect victims and prevent trafficking.”21
The Berbers, natives of North Africa from before the seventh century Arab Muslim invasions, are
a group with specific human rights concerns. They seek language and cultural rights and an end
to government discrimination and neglect. In April 2001 (“Black Spring”), the death of a Berber
youth in custody sparked riots in which security forces killed 126 people. The government agreed
to compensate the victims and recognize Tamazight, a Berber language, as a national but not an
official language (as Berber activists want but President Bouteflika opposes). The government
engaged in a dialogue with Berber representatives known as the Arouch. In January 2005, the
government agreed to rehabilitate protesters and remove security forces from Berber areas, and
established a joint committee to follow up. Berber areas are in the mountainous Kabylie region,
which, with the withdrawal of security forces, has become a focus for AQIM activity.
Economy
Hydrocarbons are the engine of the Algerian economy, providing about 60% of the budget
revenues, 30% of the gross domestic product (GDP), and 97% of export earnings.22 In the past
decade, high oil prices boosted foreign monetary reserves and economic growth, fueled a
construction boom, eased unemployment somewhat, and produced early repayment of foreign
debt. In 2009, however, the global recession resulted in a significant decline in hydrocarbon
exports and a concomitant drop in revenues. On the rebound, foreign exchange reserves hit a
healthy $157 million in September 2010, according to the Algerian Finance Ministry.
A 2005 hydrocarbon law diminished the monopoly of SONATRACH, the state energy company,
opening the sector for private and foreign investment. A 2006 law, however, required international
21 U.S. State Department, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 14, 2010, online at
http://www.state.govg/tip/rls/tiprpt/2010/142759.htm.
22 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Background Note: Algeria, March 2009, online at
http://www.state.gov.
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companies to give SONATRACH a 51% stake in new oil, gas, and related transport projects.
Such changes have prompted foreign investors, including U.S. businesses and government, to
emphasize the need and appeal for greater stability of laws in Algeria. SONATRACH accounts
for 98% of Algeria’s foreign currency receipts and employs 120,000.
In 2008, then-Minister of Energy and Mines Chakib Khelil held the rotating presidency of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); at the time, he blamed the weak dollar,
speculators, and geopolitical tensions for rising oil prices, not the market.23 Khelil sought the
formation of a “gas OPEC” to protect exporters, but found little support among other suppliers.
Algeria has several pipelines
Algeria: Basic Facts
supplying gas to Europe and plans
Population: 34.18 million (2010 est.)
for more. In July 2009, Algeria,
GDP growth rate: 2.2% (2009 est.)
Niger, and Nigeria agreed to build
an ambitious $10 billion Trans-
GDP per capita: $7,100 (2009 est.)
Saharan pipeline to ship natural gas
Inflation rate: 5.7% (2009 est.)
to Europe. The aim of the project is
Unemployment: 10.2%* (2009 est.)
to facilitate the economic
Exports: petroleum, gas, petroleum products
development of the transit countries
and provide Europe with another
Export Partners: United States, Italy, Spain, France, Canada (2009)
source of energy security. Other new
Imports: capital goods, food, consumer goods
projects include the TransMed
Import Partners: France, China, Italy, Spain, Germany, Turkey
pipeline to transport Algerian gas
(2009)
via Tunisia to Italy and the Galsi
pipeline to transport gas directly
Source: CIA, World Factbook, October 18, 2010.
from Algeria to Italy. Algeria also is
Note: The unemployment rate for young Algerians often is
expanding its exploration and
estimated at 25% to 50% or higher.
drilling for oil.
The government is directing some
of its hydrocarbon revenues for development. A $140 billion, five-year plan that ended in 2009
invested in infrastructure, highways, ports, airports, and water resources. Another $286 billion,
five-year plan for the period 2010-2014 now follows. The plans are intended to generate non-
carbon related growth and employment, which the government has been hard-pressed to achieve
thus far. In September 2010, the government announced that it is requiring foreign investors
seeking to participate in infrastructure projects to form a joint venture with an Algerian company.
Despite the country’s considerable oil and gas income and investments, there are chronic
socioeconomic problems: high unemployment and underemployment; inadequate housing, health
services, and education; decaying infrastructure; great inequality of income distribution; and
government corruption.24 These conditions have sparked social protests in several areas of the
23 Randah Taqiy-al-Din, “‘OPEC’ Decides to Maintain its Current Production,” Al-Hayat, March 6, 2008, BBC
Monitoring Middle East.
24 Algeria is placed 111 out of 180 rankings of countries on Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions
Index, online at http://www.transparency.org. In 2010, a wave of publicity surrounded allegations of corruption in
SONATRACH and the $12 billion, 927-kilometer east-west highway project. Minister of Energy and Mines Khelil, a
long-serving associate of President Bouteflika, was replaced as Energy Minister in May 2010 and the Ministry of
Public Works also was implicated in the scandals. In addition, the National Security Director was killed in mysterious
circumstances by a subordinate allegedly under investigation for taking bribes in an arms deal.
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country. In August 2009, Chinese workers clashed with Algerians in Algiers. The incident was
attributed in part to unemployed Algerians’ resentment of the estimated 50,000 Chinese working
on development projects. There have been no subsequent reports of similar incidents. (China has
been awarded approximately $20 billion in contracts under the new development plan and has
surged to become second only to France as a supplier of imports to Algeria.25 It has yet to become
a major recipient of Algerian oil exports, but it is actively prospecting new fields.)
Algeria has applied to join the World Trade Organization, but has many problems to overcome
first. Among them is central control of the economy that is only easing slowly, with a very
selective privatization program. The government argues that its conditions for foreign investment
are needed to encourage domestic companies.
In October 2008, Finance Minister Karim Djoudi asserted that the global financial crisis would
not affect Algeria because it is not present in international banking, because it had sharply
reduced its national debt, relies increasingly on domestic financing to fund development, and has
rejected total convertibility of the dinar (the national currency). However, critics pointed out as
weaknesses the absence of a modern financial market, an undeveloped stock exchange, an
underdeveloped banking system, and a failure to integrate in the world economy.26 Others suggest
that a continuing tide of illegal young Algerian immigrants to Europe is evidence of the failure of
the economy to serve the people.
Foreign Affairs
After independence in 1962, Algeria was in the forefront of Third World politics, especially the
Non-Aligned Movement, and very active in the Arab world and Africa. It was considerably less
active in the 1990s, when it was preoccupied by domestic violence. Since Bouteflika became
president, Algeria has reemerged as a regional actor, especially in Africa. It has provided airlift
support for U.N. peacekeepers in Darfur and for African Union peacekeepers in Somalia. In
February 2010, President Bouteflika also promised to contribute 1,700 soldiers to the African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).
Morocco
Algeria and Morocco are the largest countries in North Africa and are neighbors, but they had
different colonial experiences and emerged with distinctly different forms of government and a
rivalry. Algeria achieved its independence via a bloody revolution and emerged as a republic with
military or military-influenced governments. Morocco, on the other hand, is a centuries-old
monarchy that made a more peaceful transition from French control. Shortly after Algeria became
independent, Morocco laid claim to some Algerian territory, and they went to war for about five
months in 1963-64. The border was not demarcated until 1972.
25 Alfred de Montesquiou, “China Builds Up Support in Algeria; The Chinese are Aiding a Construction Boom in the
North African Nation, Eager to Earn Good Will and Oil,” Los Angeles Times, January 24, 2010, Africa Research
Bulletin, July 16-August 15, 2009, p. 18335.
26 William Maclean, “Algerian Shielded from Financial Turmoil,” Reuters, October 5, 2009.
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Algeria’s current relations with Morocco are particularly strained because Algeria supports and
hosts the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al-Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO),
which seeks independence for the former Spanish Sahara, known as the Western Sahara.
Thousands of Saharoui occupy several refugee camps in the Tindouf area of southwestern
Algeria. The camps are under the purview of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), but are run by the POLISARIO. Morocco also claims and largely occupies
the Western Sahara. Algeria considers the problem of the Western Sahara to be one of
decolonization requiring resolution by the U.N., and it maintains that it is not a party to the
conflict. Algiers viewed with favor the direct, unconditional talks between the POLISARIO and
Morocco that began in June 2007 in response to a U.N. Security Council call. However, no
progress resulted from those talks. The U.N. Secretary General’s Personal Envoy Christopher
Ross has been holding what he describes as informal talks to pave the way for formal talks, but
has not disclosed any progress. The parties continue to reiterate uncompromising positions and do
not inspire optimism for achieving a settlement.
Algeria had said that it would like to improve bilateral relations with Morocco by excluding the
Western Sahara issue from that equation. Yet, Algiers refuses to reopen the border with Morocco,
which it closed 15 years ago in retaliation for Moroccan accusations that Algerians were involved
in terror attacks in Marrakesh. Algiers maintains that smuggling, drug-trafficking, and illegal
immigration need to be dealt with before it opens the border and that an opening would endanger
Algeria’s national security.27 It also believes that Morocco has more to gain in trade and tourism
than Algeria if the border were reopened. Algerians note that Morocco continues to levy
accusations against Algeria on the Western Sahara issue at the same time that it seeks benefits
from Algeria.
France
Algeria and France, its former colonizer, have complex, unpredictable relations. France is
Algeria’s major trading partner. About 4 million Algerians and individuals of Algerian descent
live in France, but France has decreased visas for Algerians out of fear of terrorism and
absorption difficulties. Under Bouteflika, French-Algerian relations initially warmed
considerably. However, a planned treaty of friendship fizzled when France rejected Algeria’s
demand for an apology for the crimes of colonization. President Nicolas Sarkozy refuses to
apologize, but acknowledges that colonialism was “profoundly unjust.” He seeks to deepen
bilateral business and trade ties, advance civilian nuclear energy cooperation, and promote the
European Union’s Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), a community of states bordering the sea.
France’s inclusion of Algerians on a list of persons subject to “meticulous inspection” for security
purposes at French airports prompted Algiers to demand that Algerians be removed from the list
and to cancel, or at least postpone, a January 2010 visit by French Foreign Minister Bernard
Kouchner to Algeria. An Algerian official later described UfM as a “Trojan horse for the
normalization with Israel” and said that Algeria is not interested in it “if its aim is to normalize
relations with the Zionist regime.”28
27 “Zerhouni Responds to Call by Rabat, Algeria not in Hurry to Open Border,” El-Khabar, March 23, 2008, BBC
Monitoring Middle East, “Algerian President Advised by Military to Keep Border with Morocco Closed,” Al-Quds al-
Arabi website, August 1, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East, August 3, 2009.
28 Minister of State and special representative of the President Abdelaziz Belkhadem, quoted in El-Khabar website,
June 18, 2010, BBC Monitoring Middle East.
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AQIM has kidnapped several French citizens in the Sahel, and the group declared war on
President Sarkozy after the failed French attempt to free a hostage in July 2010 resulted in several
AQIM casualties. Algeria criticized the July action, and Foreign Minister Kouchner did not visit
Algeria when he subsequently tried to get increased Sahelian cooperation with Paris to fight
terrorism. President Sarkozy has declared that France is at war with AQIM and has made fighting
the group one of his highest priorities, dispatching military and intelligence forces and equipment
to the Sahel. He also said that France would no longer pay ransoms.29 If the French government
follows through on this pledge and consults Algiers about countering terrorism, then bilateral
relations and counterterrorism efforts may benefit. However, France has economic and other
interests, that is, uranium mines, in the Sahel and may, on occasion, seek to further them
unilaterally, without consulting its former colony. Nonetheless, by October, the perception of a
common AQIM threat appeared to be fostering an improvement in bilateral relations as Algerian
Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci described them as “turning a new corner” and “strategic.”30
European Union
With France’s support, Algeria signed an association agreement with the European Union (EU) in
2001 and has participated in the Europe-Mediterranean Partnership (MEDA) since 1995. In
March 2009, Algeria enacted a law making it a crime to leave “the national territory in an illegal
manner” in order to address EU concerns about illegal immigration as well as to stop human
trafficking. At the same time, Algeria wants Europe to assist with development in order to strike
at the causes of emigration.
The United States
U.S.-Algerian ties date from a Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1775. Algerians have fond
memories of President Kennedy’s support for their independence from France. Relations suffered
later due to cold war ideological differences, as Algeria was a socialist republic with close ties to
the Soviet Union. They were energized when Bouteflika met President George W. Bush several
times. Bouteflika attended the June 2004 G-8 summit of industrialized states and Russia in Sea
Island, Georgia.
U.S. policy has tried to balance appreciation for Algeria’s cooperation in counterterrorism with
encouragement of democratization. U.S. officials have urged Algiers to lift the state of emergency
and described the April 2004 presidential election as an important phase in a democratic process.
Algeria receives limited U.S. aid.
29 Charles Bremner, “Sarkozy Wages Desert War on Terror,” The Times (London), September 21, 2010.
30 “Algerian Minister Discusses French Ties,” El-Khabar website, October 22, 2010, BBC Monitoring Middle East.
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Table 1. U.S. Aid to Algeria
(in thousands of dollars)
2009
2010 estimate
2011 request
NADR 500 950 550
INCLE 0
0
870
IMET
898 950 950
DA
400 710 400
Total
1,798 2,610 2,770
Notes: NADR = Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs, INCLE = International
Narcotic Control and Law Enforcement, IMET= International Military Education and Training, DA =
Development Assistance.
Source: U.S. Department of State, Fiscal Year 2011 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations,
http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2011.
In FY2009, the U.S. Department of Defense also spent $35 million on military to military
engagement with Algeria. In 2005, the United States and Algeria launched a Joint Military
Dialogue to foster exchanges, training, and joint exercises. Algeria participates in the U.S. Trans-
Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), but prefers bilateral activities with the United
States that recognize its regional importance. As part of TSCTP, U.S. Special Forces train, equip,
and aid national forces in fighting the AQIM in southern Algeria and the Sahel.31 U.S. intelligence
also is shared.32 For their part, Algerian authorities have shared information regarding terrorists of
Algerian origin with the United States. To support Algeria’s efforts to combat terrorism, the U.S.
Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has listed leaders of AQIM, including
Droukdel, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists. Algeria also participates in the NATO-
Mediterranean dialogue and in NATO naval exercises.
On September 29, 2009, a U.S. State Department spokesman said that “Al Qaeda in North Africa
(sic) gave us an opportunity to boost our ties with Algeria” because “the presence of militant
groups represents a common challenge for both of us.” Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman made his first visit to Algeria in October 2010 and saluted the
country as “an important voice” with “a great role to play in keeping peace in Africa.” With
reference to Algeria’s sensitivities, he stated that the United States “respects the sovereignty of
the countries of the region and its commitment in the fight against terrorism did not replace that
of the countries concerned.” With regard to counterterrorism, Feltman said, “We support Algeria’s
leadership in this operation, in particular as regards the plan adopted at the last Tamanrasset
meeting…. Our intention is not to replace the countries of the region. We are merely worried
about the stability of these countries.”33
After meeting President Bouteflika in November 2009, General William E. Ward, head of the
U.S. African Command (AFRICOM), told the Algerians that the United States is determined “to
strengthen and improve bilateral relations and work closely with Algeria in several areas related
to our mutual interests in security cooperation,” including the fight against violent extremism. He
31 “Desert Shadows,” Africa Confidential, Vol. 45, No. 4, February 10, 2004, p. 8.
32 Brian Whitmore, “US Pushes Antiterror Alliance for North African Nations,” Boston Globe, April 11, 2004.
33 “US Assistant Secretary Discusses US-Algerian ties, Counter-terrorism,” Liberte website, October 22, 2010, BBC
Monitoring Middle East.
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also acknowledged Algeria’s regional power and ambition, stating, “we appreciate Algeria’s
leadership in dealing with regional questions related to security and the fight against terrorism.”
Ward said that “terrorist and criminal activities in the Maghreb and the Sahel region remain a
threat to the entire region and beyond it…. If the countries of the region have decided to organize
themselves, it means that they are aware of the proper measure of the threat. We share their
assessment of the situation and we support their efforts to secure and stabilize the Sahel.”34 On a
visit to Algeria in July 2010, U.S. State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism Daniel
Benjamin echoed the tribute to his hosts, saying “We appreciate Algerian efforts in the fight
against terrorism, both in North Africa and the Sahel region or elsewhere, and we are very
grateful.”35 He also reassured the Algerians that Washington did not want to intervene in the
Sahel, but preferred to provide technical, intelligence, and political support to fight Al Qaeda.
Benjamin and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Joseph McMillan later underscored that the United States opposed paying ransoms to win the
freedom of hostages as part of its “no-concessions policy,” which is the same policy as
Algeria’s.36
During a December 2009 visit to Washington to “strengthen the Algerian-U.S. partnership,”
Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci met Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and other
officials, and commended Algerian-U.S. cooperation, especially in the military sector, which he
described as “very ambitious.” He said that the cooperation included “exchanging information
and training human resources.”37
The United States was first to invest in the Algerian hydrocarbon sector after the 2005
liberalization law opened it to foreigners. Economic ties have broadened beyond the energy
sector, where most U.S. investment has been made, to financial services, pharmaceuticals, and
other industries, although U.S. investors confront many bureaucratic and policy obstacles. Algeria
receives duty-free treatment under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). In June 2007,
Algeria and the United States signed an agreement to cooperate in the peaceful use of nuclear
energy, but other countries, and not the United States, have and plan to build reactors for Algeria.
In June 2010, SONATRACH provided BP with equipment to help fight pollution caused by the
Gulf of Mexico oil spill.
Despite improving ties, Washington and Algiers strongly disagree about some U.S. Middle East
policies. Bouteflika condemned the use of force against Iraq and called for the early withdrawal
of foreign troops. He criticized U.S. charges against Syria for supporting terrorism and in
Lebanon, but Algeria only abstained from voting on a U.N. Security Council resolution calling on
Syria to withdraw from Lebanon. Algeria supports the Arab Peace Initiative, which promises full
normalization of relations with Israel after it withdraws from Arab lands. It roundly criticized
Israel’s military operation against Hamas in the Gaza Strip in December 2008-January 2009.
Algeria considers the situation in the Darfur region of Sudan to be the result of ethnic conflict and
poverty—not a genocide—and is concerned about its regional implications. In particular, Algeria
34 “AFRICOM Commander Strengthens US-Algerian Cooperation in Algiers Visit,” Liberte, November 26, 2009, BBC
Monitoring Middle East, December 14, 2009, “Africom Commander says no US Bases to be Set Up in Algeria,” El
Watan website, November 26, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East.
35 “Algeria, ‘Leader’ and ‘Key’ Partner in Fight Against Terrorism,” Algeria Press Service, July 27, 2010.
36 “Ransoms Fuel Al-Qaeda in Northern Africa, Says US,” Daily News (Egypt), November 18, 2010, “US Assistant
Secretary Discusses Algeria Arms Deals,” El-Khabar website, November 11, 2010, BBC Monitoring Middle East.
37 “Algerian Foreign Minister Commends US Ties,” Algerian Radio, December 9, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East.
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objects to the International Criminal Court’s warrant for the arrest of Sudanese President Omar al
Bashir because it finds unacceptable a trial of a head of state by an international court and
because it believes the warrant impedes a political solution to the Darfur situation.
The Algerian government condemned the inclusion of Algeria on the list of 14 predominantly
Muslim countries from which air travelers to the United States were subject to heightened
screening in the aftermath of a Nigerian’s failed attempt to bomb an airplane en route from
Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009. Algeria’s ambassador to Washington complained,
“This is a burden and discrimination against the citizens of Algeria who do not pose any
particular risk to the people of the United States.”38 The Algerian Foreign Ministry presented an
official protest on the issue to the U.S. Ambassador in Algiers and remonstrated repeatedly. The
United States Department of Homeland Security revised its procedures in April 2010 so that
Algeria and other countries are not listed, but their nationals may still be subject to more security
checks.
Author Contact Information
Carol Migdalovitz
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
cmigdalovitz@crs.loc.gov, 7-2667
38 Eric Lipton, “Some Cry Foul as New Travel Rules Take Effect,” International Herald Tribune, January 5, 2010.
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