Litigation Seeking to Establish
Climate Change Impacts as a
Common Law Nuisance
Robert Meltz
Legislative Attorney/Acting Section Research Manager
November 19, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41496
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Litigation Seeking to Establish Climate Change Impacts as a Common Law Nuisance
Summary
Congressional inaction on climate change has led various entities to pursue climate change
measures off Capitol Hill. Either in hopes of realizing substantive measures or to pressure
Congress to act, such entities have looked to international forums, treaty negotiations,
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) action under the Clean Air Act, state and regional
efforts, and—the topic here—lawsuits seeking to establish climate change impacts as a common
law nuisance. If congressional efforts to block or delay EPA from addressing greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions are successful, that likely will give added importance to such nuisance suits. As
background, a private nuisance is a substantial and unreasonable invasion of another’s interest in
the private use and enjoyment of land, without involving trespass; a public nuisance is an
unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.
In litigating a climate-change/nuisance suit, several issues arise at the outset and, if resolved
against the plaintiff, prevent the suit from proceeding. First, there is the question whether the
federal common law of nuisance has been displaced yet by EPA regulation of GHG emissions
under the Clean Air Act. A second threshold issue is standing to sue, which asks whether a given
party is an appropriate one to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court. As developed by the
Supreme Court, the Constitution requires that for a plaintiff to have standing in federal court,
he/she must show injury in fact, that the injury was caused by the defendant, and that the remedy
sought likely will ameliorate the injury. Suits seeking relief based on climate change claims have
run into difficulty with one or more of these requirements. A third threshold issue is the political
question doctrine, which is designed to restrain the judiciary from inappropriately interfering in
matters reposed in the other branches of government. For example, the defendants in one case
argued that one indicium of a political question—the Constitution’s textual commitment of the
issue to the executive or legislative branch—is displayed by climate change because using a
nuisance case to reduce U.S. CO2 emissions undermines the President’s constitutional authority to
manage foreign relations—in particular, to induce other nations to reduce their CO2 emissions.
There are five common law/nuisance suits addressing climate change now or formerly active. Of
the two no longer active, neither resulted in a judgment against the defendants. The three still-
active cases are (1) Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., Inc., a suit against the five
utility companies alleged by plaintiffs to be emitting the most GHGs in the nation through their
coal-fired electric power plants (following a Second Circuit decision, on petition for certiorari to
the Supreme Court on threshold issues); (2) Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, a suit against certain oil,
coal, and chemical companies in Mississippi arguing that their GHG emissions contributed to
making Hurricane Katrina more severe and thus damaged plaintiffs’ property (now before the
Supreme Court on a mandamus petition challenging the Fifth Circuit’s dismissal of the appeal
based on the circuit’s lack of a quorum); and (3) Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,
in which a coastal Eskimo village sued 24 oil and energy companies, claiming that the large
quantities of GHGs they emit contribute to climate change, which is causing coastal erosion that
will require relocating the village (now pending before the Ninth Circuit).
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Litigation Seeking to Establish Climate Change Impacts as a Common Law Nuisance
Contents
I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1
II. Recurring Issues ..................................................................................................................... 2
A. Federal Common Law ...................................................................................................... 2
B. Standing ........................................................................................................................... 3
C. Political Question Doctrine............................................................................................... 4
III. Nuisance Actions Thus Far .................................................................................................... 5
A. Active Cases..................................................................................................................... 5
1. Second Circuit: Connecticut v. American Elec. Power Co., Inc. ................................... 5
2. Fifth Circuit: Comer v. Murphy Oil USA...................................................................... 6
3. Ninth Circuit: Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp...................................... 7
B. Cases Finally Resolved..................................................................................................... 8
1. Ninth Circuit: California v. General Motors Corp........................................................ 8
2. Second Circuit: Korsinsky v. U.S. EPA......................................................................... 9
Contacts
Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................ 9
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Litigation Seeking to Establish Climate Change Impacts as a Common Law Nuisance
I. Introduction
Congressional inaction on climate change has led various entities to pursue climate change
measures off Capitol Hill. Either in hopes of realizing substantive measures or to pressure
Congress to act, such entities have looked to international forums, treaty negotiations,
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) action under the Clean Air Act, state and regional
efforts, and—the topic here—common law suits, principally seeking to establish climate change
impacts as a nuisance.
Many argue that courts will (and should) be unreceptive to dealing with a global problem such as
climate change through individual common law suits.1 Each suit, after all, brings before the court
only a handful of defendants representing only a tiny fraction of the problem. As well, nuisance
law offers courts little in the way of clear standards to apply. And how should the policy factors
that enter into a nuisance determination be weighed? Questions of causation are substantial: even
if the court accepts that man-made greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions contribute to climate
change, how can a plaintiff show that a particular adverse impact was caused by climate change,
and further was caused by the GHG emissions of the defendants? And should the defendants’
contribution to worldwide GHG emissions be viewed as de minimis—too small for a court to
bother with? Questions of remedy are likely to be particularly intractable: what amount of
emission reduction, or monetary compensation, should be imposed on a defendant given the
likely miniscule fraction of worldwide GHG emissions contributed by that defendant? Finally, the
law affords courts several easy ways of blocking nuisance-based climate change litigation,
discussed below, should they decide it is inappropriate. At a minimum, no one argues that
litigation is preferable to legislation.
Nonetheless, common law/climate change lawsuits have their defenders, as long as Congress does
not enact legislation.2 Plaintiffs argue with some merit that the kinds of harm attributed to climate
change—ecosystem and weather modifications, increased flooding, and harm to human health—
are all harms traditionally covered by nuisance doctrine. Moreover, if Congress succeeds in
barring or postponing EPA regulatory action against GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act (as
seems more likely in light of the November 2010 elections), the nuisance lawsuit option will gain
added attention. Nor can the possibility that nuisance plaintiffs will prevail in some limited way
be ruled out, though none has succeeded thus far. Five nuisance actions involving GHG emissions
have been filed, of which three are still active.
Doubtless there is fascination in efforts to enlist a doctrine as ancient as nuisance to deal with a
problem as contemporary as climate change. By way of background, nuisance law is centuries
old, born in the medieval English courts. Nor has it ever been used to tackle a problem anywhere
1 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1605, 1649 (2007)
(“Realistically, the greatest function of litigation may be to prod legislative action.”). See also Jim Gitzlaff, Getting
Back to Basics: Why Nuisance Claims Are of Limited Value in Shifting the Costs of Climate Change, 39 Envtl. L. Rptr.
10,218 (March 2009).
2 See, e.g., Randall S. Abate, Public Nuisance for the Environmental Justice Movement: The Right Thing and the Right
Time, 85 Wash. L. Rev. 197 (2010); Matthew F. Pawa, Global Warming: The Ultimate Public Nuisance, 39 Envtl. L.
Rptr. 10,230 (March 2009); Jonathan Zasloff, The Judicial Carbon Tax: Reconstructing Public Nuisance and Climate
Change, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1827 (2008) (arguing that a nuisance-based climate change regime essentially becomes a
carbon tax); Daniel V. Mumford, Curbing Carbon Dioxide Emissions Through the Rebirth of Public Nuisance Laws—
Environmental Legislation by the Courts, 30 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Policy Rev. 195 (2005); David A. Grossman,
Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1 (2003).
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near as complex as climate change. A nuisance may be either a private nuisance or a public
nuisance. An activity constitutes a private nuisance if it is a substantial and unreasonable invasion
of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, without involving trespass.3 Private
nuisance actions are brought by the aggrieved landowner. An activity is a public nuisance if it
creates an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.4
Unreasonableness may rest on the activity significantly interfering with, among other things,
public health and safety. Public nuisance cases are usually brought by the government rather than
private entities, but may be brought by the latter if they suffer special injury.5
Part II of this report notes the recurring threshold issues raised by the use of nuisance law to deal
with GHG emissions and climate change. Part III reviews the five nuisance cases filed to date
attacking GHG emissions and/or climate change impacts. As mentioned, none of these cases has
generated a final decision for plaintiffs as yet. Note that two of the cases, Connecticut v. American
Electric Power and Comer v. Murphy Oil Co., are currently before the Supreme Court on
threshold issues.
II. Recurring Issues
As the court decisions in Part III show, the use of nuisance actions to address GHG emissions
presents the plaintiff with daunting hurdles—each of which must be surmounted at the outset of
the litigation if it is to proceed.6 Following is a brief introduction to the most salient of these
threshold hurdles.
A. Federal Common Law
Because GHG emissions obviously move across state lines, a federal common law of nuisance
seems likely to govern. However, the scope of federal courts’ authority to develop their own
common law, as state courts routinely develop state common law, has long been under Supreme
Court scrutiny. Though the Court announced that it disfavored federal courts developing their
own common law 72 years ago,7 lower federal courts have continued to do precisely that in areas
of national concern, in the absence of an applicable act of Congress. Many federal courts have
decided challenges to interstate pollution based on the federal common law of nuisance, which
generally hews to the same definitions of nuisance as the state cases.
Most important here, federal common law remedies are vulnerable to being displaced
(“preempted”) by acts of Congress. Federal common law, says the Supreme Court, is a “necessary
expedient,” and “when Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision rested
on federal common law the need for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal courts
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979).
4 Id. at § 821B.
5 To have suffered “special injury,” a person must have incurred a different kind of interference than that suffered by
the public at large, not just a greater harm from the same kind of interference. Id. at § 821B comments b. and d.
6 See generally Kevin A. Gaynor et al., Challenges Plaintiffs Face in Litigating Federal Common Law Climate Change
Claims, 40 Envtl. L. Rptr. (News and Analysis) 845 (Sept. 2010); Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public
Nuisance, 30 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 293 (2005).
7 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that “[t]here is no federal general common law”; federal
courts must apply the law of the relevant state except in matters governed by federal statute or the Constitution).
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disappears.”8 Otherwise put, “new federal laws and new federal regulations may in time pre-empt
the field of federal common law of nuisance.”9 Thus, a question in some of the climate change
cases has been whether the federal Clean Air Act displaces judge-made federal common law in
the climate change area. The displacement argument was strengthened by the Supreme Court’s
2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,10 holding that EPA has authority under the Clean Air Act
to regulate GHG emissions. It was strengthened further by EPA’s promulgation under the Clean
Air Act of GHG-limiting regulations to take effect January 2, 2011.11
If the federal common law of nuisance is deemed preempted, the state common law of nuisance
may be applicable,12 though there are substantial inefficiencies to having to file suit in multiple
forums.
B. Standing
The standing inquiry asks whether a given party is an appropriate one to invoke the jurisdiction of
a federal court. Only a party with standing can bring suit in federal court. As developed by the
Supreme Court, standing has a constitutional component and a prudential (court-created)
component. The constitutional side stems from the limitation of federal court jurisdiction in
Article III of the Constitution to “Cases” and “Controversies.” As explicated by the Court, this
constraint demands that a plaintiff in federal court demonstrate that (1) he/she has been or
imminently will be injured in a way that is concrete and particularized, and not speculative; (2)
the injury is or will be caused by the defendant; and (3) there is a likelihood that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable court decision.13
One can see readily that a suit seeking relief from climate change impacts may run into difficulty
with each of the three standing requirements. For example, climate change modeling generally
predicts only large-scale effects, allowing defendants to argue in many cases that the particular
injury suffered by plaintiff was not shown to have been caused by climate change. Or that the
defendants’ GHG emissions were (or will be) at best a de minimis contributor to the injury. The
third, redressability prong of standing suggests that plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief from a
small number of GHG emitters may have a tougher time establishing standing than those seeking
monetary damages to pay for the costs of responding to climate change; the latter remedy is more
likely to “redress” the harm.
8 Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1980) (“Milwaukee II”).
9 Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972) (“Milwaukee I”). Indeed, there is a presumption in favor of
preemption. Matter of Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 335 (2d Cir. 1981).
10 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
11 75 Fed. Reg. 25,323 (May 7, 2010) (EPA GHG emission standards for new light-duty motor vehicles, promulgated
jointly with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s revised Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards
for the same vehicles); 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (EPA’s Clean Air Act “tailoring rule” limiting New Source
Review of new and modified stationary sources of GHG emissions and limiting Clean Air Act Title V permitting
requirements).
12 International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (although federal common law of interstate water pollution
was preempted under Milwaukee II, state common law applied to Vermont citizens’ suit against a New York paper
company for pollution of Lake Champlain). Federal and state common law of nuisance cannot apply simultaneously.
See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 314 n.7 (“if federal common law exists, it is because state law cannot be used”).
13 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992).
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Note that state plaintiffs may have a choice. They may bring suit as owner of natural resources or
other property, in which case they face the same standing requirements as private entities,
described above. Alternatively, states may sue in their parens patriae capacity—that is, as
protector of their quasi-sovereign interests—in which case the Article III requirement is
differently stated. For parens patriae standing, a state must articulate a quasi-sovereign interest—
that is, one apart from the interests of particular private parties. A state’s interest in the “health
and well-being—both physical and economic—of its residents in general,”14 if a substantial
portion of those residents is affected, is a well-established quasi-sovereign interest.15 Owing to
these quasi-sovereign interests, the Court has said recently (in its only climate change case) that
states are “not normal litigants for purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction,” but rather face a
lower standing threshold.16
C. Political Question Doctrine
A federal court will refuse to resolve a case it regards as presenting a “political question,” owing
to the separation of powers in the Constitution.17 Political question doctrine is “designed to
restrain the Judiciary from inappropriate interference in the business of the other branches of
Government.”18 Long ago, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote: “[q]uestions, in their nature
political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be
made in this court.”19
Deciding whether a matter has been committed by the Constitution to a nonjudicial branch of
government is, however, a “delicate exercise,”20 and is decided on a case-by-case basis. The
factors indicating a non-justiciable political question were famously stated by the Supreme Court
in Baker v. Carr in 1962.21 Baker stated six factors, of which the first three have played a role in
the climate-change nuisance cases:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found [(1)] a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or [(2)] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or [(3)] the impossibility of deciding [the issue] without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion....
For example, the defendants in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., Inc., discussed
below, argued that the first factor—textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to the executive or legislative branch—was triggered because using a nuisance case to reduce
U.S. emissions of CO2 (the major GHG) would interfere with the President’s authority to manage
14 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
15 Id. at 604-605.
16 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007).
17 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
18 United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990).
19 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
20 Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
21 369 U.S. 186, 216 (1962).
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foreign relations—for example, unilateral reductions of U.S. CO2 emissions would interfere with
the President’s efforts to induce other nations to reduce their emissions.22
Yet Baker made clear it was setting a high threshold for nonjusticiability. Unless one of the six
factors is “inextricable” from the case, Baker said,23 the case should not be dismissed on political
question grounds. A political question case, it said, is different from one that is political merely in
the sense that it involves an issue being intensely debated in the political realm.24 Since Baker
was decided almost a half-century ago, the Court has found few issues to present political
questions, but the doctrine has been ubiquitous in the nuisance/climate change litigation.
III. Nuisance Actions Thus Far
A. Active Cases
1. Second Circuit: Connecticut v. American Elec. Power Co., Inc.
Eight states, New York City, and three private land trusts brought nuisance actions, later
consolidated, against five electric utility companies—chosen as allegedly the nation’s largest
emitters of the major GHG, CO2, through their fossil-fuel electric power plants. Plaintiffs sought
to require the electric utilities to abate their contribution to the nuisance of climate change by
reducing their CO2 emissions. They cited both the federal common law of nuisance, and, in the
alternative, state common law and statutory nuisance law.
District court. In 2005, the federal district court held that because resolving the issues presented
by the case required a balancing of economic, environmental, foreign policy, and national security
interests, the court needed guidance from the political branches.25 The absence of such guidance
(Congress having refused to regulate CO2 as of 2005) meant to the court that the case satisfied
one of the factors identified in Baker v. Carr as indicating a political question: the case was
“impossib[le] [to] decid[e] without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion.” Accordingly, the suit was dismissed.
Circuit court. Plaintiffs’ appeal to the Second Circuit was notable in part because then-judge
Sonia Sotomayor was on the three-judge panel that heard oral argument. Her later nomination to
the Supreme Court while the case was under consideration by the panel ended her involvement in
the case. The remaining judges on the panel, however, elected not to rehear the case with a new
third judge. Instead, they held in 2009 that the district court had erred when it dismissed the cases
on political question grounds.26 Where a case appears to be “an ordinary tort suit,” the court said,
there is no “impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion.”27
22 582 F.3d 309, 324 (2d Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3092 (August 2, 2010) (No. 10-174).
23 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
24 Id. See also U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 458 (1992).
25 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
26 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
27 Id. at 331.
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Additionally, the circuit court found that all plaintiffs had standing, and that all may properly
maintain actions under the federal common law of nuisance and indeed had stated such a claim
here. Finally, the court held that the federal common law of nuisance had not been displaced by
the regulatory scheme established under the Clean Air Act as of the date of decision,28 or by the
collective force of various other statutes touching in some way on GHGs or climate change (e.g.,
the National Climate Program Act of 1978).29
Supreme Court. Following the Second Circuit decision, the defendants filed a petition for
certiorari in the Supreme Court.30 The Court has yet to grant or deny, and there are predictive cues
pointing both ways. On the one hand, favoring grant of certiorari, is the likely desire of the
Court’s conservatives to limit the broad reading of Article III standing in Massachusetts v. EPA,31
the Court’s 2007 climate change decision. Also favoring grant of certiorari is the fact that the
United States has weighed in with a brief on behalf of the Tennessee Valley Authority, one of the
defendants, on the side of the private petitioners. On the other hand, favoring denial of certiorari,
this case has several characteristics that often lead the Supreme Court to pass up a case: there is
no split in the circuits; the decision below is interlocutory (it does not finally resolve the case);
and subsequent developments may make Court intervention unnecessary (upcoming EPA
regulation of GHG emissions may lead the district court to find the federal common law claims
displaced32).
2. Fifth Circuit: Comer v. Murphy Oil USA
In this asserted class action, owners of Mississippi Gulf coast property damaged by Hurricane
Katrina sued certain oil, coal, and chemical companies doing business in the state under state law.
They allege a multistep chain of causation—that the defendant companies emitted substantial
amounts of GHGs, which contributed to global warming, which raised the sea level and made the
waters of the Gulf of Mexico warmer, which caused Hurricane Katrina to hit the Gulf coast with
greater ferocity, which increased the harm to plaintiffs’ property caused by the hurricane. On this
basis, plaintiffs asserted various state-law tort claims, including negligence, nuisance (public and
private), and trespass, and seek compensatory damages. They also request punitive damages for
gross negligence. Further, they claimed fraudulent misrepresentation and conspiracy to commit
fraudulent misrepresentation, alleging that the oil and coal companies disseminated
28 The court warned that the question whether the federal common law of nuisance had been displaced might be
answered differently at some future time when EPA actually regulates GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act. On
January 2, 2011, that future time will arrive. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
29 Because the court approved the federal common law of nuisance claims, it chose not to adjudicate the alternative
state-law nuisance claims.
30 79 U.S.L.W. 3092 (August 2, 2010) (No. 10-174).
31 549 U.S. 497 (2007). See four-Justice dissent by Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito,
id. at 535.
32 See note 11 supra and accompanying text. The same argument, that upcoming EPA regulation of GHG emissions
displaces federal common law, is being pressed by the United States in its brief in support of the petition for certiorari.
The state plaintiffs respond that the new EPA regulations will not preempt federal common law applicable to the coal-
fired power plants at issue in the lawsuit because the new regulations target new and modified stationary sources of
emissions, not the existing ones that are the basis of the suit. On the other hand, plaintiffs concede that if EPA were to
adopt GHG emission standards for industry sectors such as coal-fired power plants (as it is reportedly considering),
federal regulation would reach existing GHG emission sources and federal common law suits would have to be
dismissed. See Gabriel Nelson, EPA could end “nuisance” case, enviros tell Supreme Court, E&E News PM
(November 4, 2010).
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misinformation about global warming. Finally, plaintiffs made claims against their home
insurance companies (e.g., breach of fiduciary duty claim for misrepresenting policy coverage,
and violation of a state consumer-protection act) and their mortgage companies (arguing that they
may not claim sums owed by plaintiffs for the value of the mortgaged property that was
uninsured).
In a succinct order with no discussion, the district court, sitting in diversity, dismissed the action
in 2007 for lack of plaintiff standing.33 The court also found plaintiffs’ claims nonjusticiable
under the political question doctrine.
In 2009, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. 34 Relying heavily on the
Supreme Court’s approval of standing in Massachusetts v. EPA, the panel ruled that plaintiffs here
similarly had Article III standing to assert their negligence, nuisance, and trespass claims. As in
Massachusetts, at least at the pleading stage, the asserted chain of causation described above was
not too attenuated. Plaintiffs, however, were held to lack standing as to their other claims. On the
other major issue in the case, the circuit court held that the tort claims were not, contrary to the
district court, barred by political question doctrine. This ruling on the political question argument
came three weeks after the identical ruling by the Second Circuit in Connecticut v. American
Electric Power, supra, though the Fifth Circuit seemed to be aware of only the district court
decision in that case.
At this point, events took an odd turn. In early 2010, after vacating the panel ruling and taking the
case en banc, the Fifth Circuit made the unusual announcement that it lacked a quorum, so the
appeal had to be dismissed.35 As the court explained, seven of the court’s 16 active-duty judges
had initially recused themselves, leaving only nine judges to rule on the en banc petition. Those
judges had decided 6-3 to vacate the panel decision and grant en banc rehearing. Subsequently,
one of those nine recused herself, leaving only eight judges in regular active service who were not
disqualified to hear the case. Since the requisite quorum to proceed is a majority of the 17
authorized active-duty judges on the court (including one vacancy) 36—that is, nine judges—the
remaining eight judges concluded 5-3 they could not proceed with en banc review. Indeed, and
more strikingly, they concluded they could not even reinstate the vacated panel decision.
The effect of this quorum ruling was to deny appeal of the district court decision (which the Fifth
Circuit effectively reinstated). Arguing they have a statutory and constitutional right to have their
appeal decided, the plaintiffs asked the Supreme Court on August 26, 2010, for a writ of
mandamus.37 The writ would direct the Fifth Circuit to reinstate petitioners’ appeal and return the
case to the three-judge panel for adjudication. The Court has yet to rule.
3. Ninth Circuit: Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp
An Inupiat Eskimo village on the northwest Alaska coast sued 24 oil and energy companies,
claiming that the large quantities of GHGs they emit contribute to climate change. Climate
33 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. August 30, 2007).
34 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009).
35 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010).
36 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)-(d).
37 In re Ned Comer (No. 10-294).
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change, the village contends, is destroying the village by melting Arctic sea ice that formerly
protected it from winter storms, leading to massive coastal erosion that will require relocating the
village’s inhabitants at a cost of $95 million to $400 million. Plaintiffs invoke the federal
common law of public nuisance, and state statutory or common law of private and public
nuisance. They further press a civil conspiracy claim, asserting that some of the defendants have
engaged in agreements to participate in the intentional creation or maintenance of a public
nuisance—that is, global warming—by misleading the public as to the science of global warming.
The suit seeks monetary damages.
In 2009, the district court held that the federal nuisance claim was barred by the political question
doctrine (contrary to the Second Circuit’s holding in Connecticut nine days earlier) and,
independently, for lack of Article III standing.38 Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss was
granted. As to the political question issue, the court found that two Baker factors pointed to
climate change presenting a political question. First, said the court, there is “a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards,” and second, a decision cannot be rendered “without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”
As for standing, the district court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that it was enough for them to
establish that defendants “contributed to” their injuries. The court explained that in the absence of
federal standards limiting GHG emissions, no presumption arises that any defendant’s actions
harmed plaintiffs.39 “Without that presumption, and especially given the extremely attenuated
causation scenario alleged in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, it is entirely irrelevant whether any defendant
‘contributed’ to the harm....”40 Nor, in view of the undifferentiated nature of GHG emissions from
all global sources and their accumulation over long periods, is there any way to link any
particular effect of climate change to a particular entity. Having dismissed the federal claim
giving it original jurisdiction, the court declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the
state law claims.
The village has appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
B. Cases Finally Resolved
The following cases, in addition to being finally resolved, are the earliest filed in the
nuisance/climate-change area.
1. Ninth Circuit: California v. General Motors Corp.
This action was filed by California against several automobile manufacturers based on the alleged
contributions of their vehicles, through their GHG emissions, to climate change impacts in the
state. The suit asserted that these impacts constitute a public nuisance under federal common law,
and sought monetary damages ( recall that Connecticut v. American Electric Power seeks
injunctive relief).
38 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
39 As to the “absence of federal standards,” this is due to change on January 2, 2011. See note 11 supra and
accompanying text.
40 Id. at 880.
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In 2007, the district court dismissed the suit on a political-question rationale—namely, “the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion.”41 The need for an “initial policy determination” by the political branches was
supported, in the court’s view, by the complexity of the climate change issue, the need for
political guidance in divining what is an “unreasonable” interference with the public’s rights
(recall the definition of a public nuisance on page 1), and the global warming debate in the
political branches. Ironically, the environmental “win” in Massachusetts v. EPA was cited by the
court against the state, both because that decision found authority over GHG emissions to lie with
the federal government and because it recognized a state’s standing to press its grievances at the
federal level.
California appealed to the Ninth Circuit, but in 2009 motioned for voluntary dismissal, which the
circuit granted.
2. Second Circuit: Korsinsky v. U.S. EPA
Mr. Korsinsky filed this pro se suit alleging, in a difficult-to-understand complaint, that GHG
emissions, by contributing to climate change, and numerous other pollutants threatened his health
due to his enhanced vulnerability as an older person with sinus problems. He appeared to be
requesting an injunction ordering EPA to require less pollution and ordering polluters to use his
invention for reducing CO2 emissions. The district court dismissed for lack of standing, and the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed on the same ground in 2006, explaining
that plaintiff’s claim that global warming may cause him unspecified future injuries is “too
speculative.”42
Author Contact Information
Robert Meltz
Legislative Attorney/Acting Section Research
Manager
rmeltz@crs.loc.gov, 7-7891
41 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. September 17, 2007).
42 192 Fed. Appx. 71 (2d Cir. 2006).
Congressional Research Service
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