International Climate Change:
A Negotiations Side-by-Side
Jane A. Leggett
Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy
November 18, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41494
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

Summary
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), signed in
1992, gather for their 16th annual meeting in Cancun, Mexico, from November 29 to December
10, 2010. Several formal and informal negotiating sessions in 2010, intended to resuscitate the
global negotiations to address climate change beyond the year 2012, have followed the 2009
meeting in Copenhagen, with which many countries and observers were disappointed.
Under the UNFCCC, 194 governments, including the United States, have taken on obligations to
address climate change through enhanced scientific and technological cooperation, assessment of
sources of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and removals, and policies and measures to mitigate
GHG and to promote adaptation to climate changes. By the time the UNFCCC entered into force
in 1994, countries agreed that these obligations were inadequate to achieve the objective of
“stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” By 1995, a Berlin Mandate called
for negotiation of a new agreement for deeper abatement, but with no new obligations for
developing countries. The resulting Kyoto Protocol established emission reduction targets in
aggregate of at least 5% below 1990 levels during 2008-2012 for the “Annex I” (developed)
Parties. It also established GHG reduction targets (“assigned amounts”) for all Annex I Parties.
For the European Union, Japan, and the United States, the assigned amounts were 8%, 7%, and
6%, respectively, below their 1990 levels of GHG emissions. The Kyoto Protocol allowed some
credits for enhanced sequestration by forests, and for three new emissions trading mechanisms.
President Clinton signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. In 2001, President George W. Bush
indicated that the United States would not become a Party to that agreement, citing its omission
of GHG commitments for all major emitters, and possible adverse effects on the U.S. economy.
U.S. policy continues to reject becoming a Party to the Kyoto Protocol.
The Kyoto Protocol had always been viewed as a first step toward deeper and longer-term
reductions of GHG emissions. In 2007, the Parties established an Ad Hoc Group on Further
Commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) to negotiate GHG reductions after 2012,
when the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period ends. Also in 2007, Parties to the UNFCCC
agreed to the Bali Action Plan, which set a mandate for negotiations among all Parties for future
commitments on a “shared vision” for the long term, climate change mitigation, adaptation,
technology, and financing. This second track, under the Ad Hoc Group on Long Term
Cooperation (AWG-LCA), proceeds in parallel, with conflicting views among Parties as to how
the two possible agreements may relate to each other or converge into one.
In 2009, many observers and Parties hoped that the hard-negotiated Copenhagen Accord might
serve as the vehicle to bridge deep divides between the two negotiating tracks and various
regional and economic groupings of countries. During formal and informal meetings in 2010,
some Parties seemed to back away from their pledges under the Copenhagen Accord, although
some progress was made on several technical issues. Some Parties seek to codify that progress in
decisions by the Cancun Conference of the Parties. Others, including the United States, insist that
all major issues be resolved in a “balanced package” of agreement(s).
Few expect much progress at the Cancun talks, although many seek a decision to extend the
negotiating mandates with a deadline of 2011 for comprehensive, legally binding agreements on
further GHG mitigation, financing, technology cooperation, and adaptation.
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International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

Contents
Upcoming Negotiations Seek Future GHG Commitments ........................................................... 1
United Nations Negotiations Run on Two Tracks......................................................................... 3
Questions About the Efficacy of the U.N. Forum......................................................................... 5
Not Just Carbon from Energy ...................................................................................................... 6
Congressional Interests ............................................................................................................... 7

Tables
Table 1. Comparison of International Issues by Agreement or Negotiating Forum........................ 9

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 20

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Upcoming Negotiations Seek Future GHG
Commitments
From November 29 to December 10, 2010, the Parties to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and to its subsidiary Kyoto Protocol plan to meet in
Cancun, Mexico. While the political agreement enshrined in the Copenhagen Accord1 of 2009
hangs in the background, ad hoc processes under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol proceed
separately.2 There is no common view on how to make further progress on these two tracks, or on
how to produce one or two comprehensive and consistent agreements to govern commitments
after 2012, except on a handful of limited topics (described further below and in Table 1).
The United States, along with a few other countries, insists that all elements under negotiation be
agreed simultaneously, as a package that carefully balances the interests of different Parties.3
Other Parties, including China and many developing countries, seek decisions on those elements
where Parties concur (such as on provision of financial assistance, preventing deforestation, and
promoting technological advance), without requiring agreement on the more controversial
elements (such as binding GHG reductions by Non-Annex I4 Parties).
Many Parties, particularly those least developed and perceived as most vulnerable to climate
change, are calling for the Cancun meeting to set a mandate to negotiate a “comprehensive and
ambitious” agreement by the subsequent meetings of the Parties in late 2011, to be held in South
Africa.5 Other countries (e.g., Yemen, Cuba, and sometimes China, India, and Brazil) use
procedural tactics arguably acting to prevent such an agreement. To the extent that there might be
a consensus in favor of a new agreement, the Parties appear to have different conceptions of what
it should include. Nevertheless, many Parties are promoting one or two agreements, together, that
• are legally binding;
• establish a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol to begin in 2012;
• include deeper emission cuts from the wealthiest countries than those pledged
under the Copenhagen Accord (see next section);

1 Official text available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf.
2 For background on the international negotiations on climate change, see CRS Report R40001, A U.S.-centric
Chronology of the International Climate Change Negotiations, by Jane A. Leggett; CRS Report RL34260, Climate
Change: Issues Underlying Negotiations at the Bali Conference of Parties, by Susan R. Fletcher, Larry Parker, and
Jane A. Leggett; and CRS Report R41175, International Agreements on Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions, by
Emily C. Barbour.
3 Formalizing agreement on only some elements where consensus is near, such as financing, technology, and others—
and which developing countries seek—arguably would give away elements of leverage to gain agreement on other
issues, such as Non-Annex I GHG commitments, and reporting, monitoring and verification of actions, which many
developing countries resist. Many developing countries are unhappy with the stance that “nothing is agreed until
everything is agreed.”
4 “Annex I Parties” are those countries and regional economic integration organizations (i.e., the European Union)
listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC. This list includes the high income, industrialized countries, including those of the
former Soviet Union. “Non-Annex I Parties” are those Parties to the UNFCCC not listed in its Annex I. These are often
referred to as developing countries, although income levels overlap across some Annex I and Non-Annex I Parties. A
divisive element of negotiation is when and under what conditions a Non-Annex I Party may “graduate” to Annex I.
5 Discussions are under way possibly to hold the 2012 meeting in Qatar.
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• include comparable but differentiated GHG emission reductions (below business-
as-usual) from countries that do not already have targets, including the United
States (which is not a Party to the Kyoto Protocol), China, and other major GHG
emitters;
• lock in specific amounts and mechanisms for international financing;6,7
• ensure transparency of pledges, actions taken, and finance provided; and
• provide for review of the implementation, objectives, and/or adequacy of the
agreement.
Whether to establish a quantitative objective for international cooperation is among the
contentious issues. Many, claiming support from the scientific literature, promote obligations
sufficient to contain future global temperature increases to 2o Celsius (C) or less. (Some, also
claiming scientific support, advocate for a temperature ceiling of 1.5oC or less.) Such temperature
objectives are associated with GHG reductions globally by 2050 of 50% or more below 1990
levels; many expect that GHG reductions of 80% or more from 1990 or 2005 levels should be
made by the United States and other high- to moderate-income countries, which have GHG
emissions per capita several times higher than the low-income countries.8 Most of the low-
income, large-emitting countries (such as China, India, and South Africa) oppose global targets,
presumably because of the implications for developing country shares of GHG reductions
necessary to achieve the global targets.
Different views on which countries should take on binding GHG emission commitments, and
when, are among the most challenging obstacles to the current negotiations. The United States,
the European Union (EU), the Small Island States,9 and other countries seek agreement on
differentiated and fair emission cuts simultaneously from all the world’s largest emitters, not only
those currently included in Annex I of the UNFCCC. China and others of these largest developing
country emitters, however, contend that the current Annex I Parties must make deeper GHG
reductions and provide funding to developing countries before the Non-Annex I Parties
“graduate” to legally binding obligations. These countries thus far have procedurally postponed
discussion of graduation to Annex I and binding GHG commitments. Russia and other economies
in transition (EITs) seek special treatment they received under the Kyoto Protocol to continue
under any new agreement, which many other Parties oppose.

6 The Copenhagen Accord included “Fast-Start” financial pledges of $30 billion during 2010-2012, and a long-term
goal of $100 billion annually by 2020 “in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on
implementation.” Funding was agreed to flow from public and private, bilateral and multilateral, and alternative
sources. While most Annex I Parties have indicated, and begun to provide, Fast-Start financial assistance, it is unclear
what the status of these agreements will be as the Copenhagen Accord was not adopted by the Parties. Still, a large
majority of stakeholders believe that follow-through on these financial pledges is essential to rebuilding trust of the
Annex I Parties (which have not fully met past pledges) and constructive engagement of developing countries.
7 On financial arrangements, see also CRS Report R41165, Global Environment Facility (GEF): An Overview, by
Richard K. Lattanzio and CRS Report R41302, Climate Investment Funds (CIFs): An Overview, by Richard K.
Lattanzio.
8 For comparison of GHG emissions across major countries, see CRS Report RL32721, Greenhouse Gas Emissions:
Perspectives on the Top 20 Emitters and Developed Versus Developing Nations, by Larry Parker and John Blodgett.
9 Formally, the AOSIS group of 42 countries represents the Alliance of Small Island States and low-lying coastal
countries, and includes such diverse members as the Bahamas, Belize, Cuba, Guinea-Bissau, the Marshall Islands,
Palau, Singapore, Papua New Guinea, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, and Saint Lucia.
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Closely coupled with commitments to address GHG emissions are questions of how to increase
transparency and encourage compliance by Parties with those commitments. For Annex I Parties,
“monitoring, reporting, and verification” (MRV) already proceeds under guidelines and
procedures under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, although several issues and
enhancements are under negotiation. The Copenhagen Accord also provides for MRV of
financing provided by Annex I Parties and of the actions so financed in developing country
Parties. Because of objections by China and others of “intrusive” international processes, and
concerns about giving up sovereignty, the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs)
that Non-Annex I Parties have pledged under the Copenhagen Accord would be subject to
International Consultation and Analysis (ICA)—yet to be defined. Most Parties see MRV and
ICA as supporting transparency and capacity-building, not punitive. Since 2009, however, China
and some other Non-Annex I Parties may have fallen back to pre-Copenhagen positions, that only
self-verification should be expected of developing countries. Some of the countries most
vulnerable to climate change have voiced more loudly that all major emitters must provide
transparency regarding their actions and impacts on GHG trajectories.
Many participants in the negotiations and observers have noted that, although some technical
progress has been made since 2009, recent meetings have included repetition of well-known and
intransigent positions. Many have pointed to these divisions, and the extreme difficulty of
reaching unanimous consent among 194 Parties in the best of circumstances, and suggest that the
United Nations may no longer be the sole or most productive forum for achieving international
cooperation to address climate change. (Discussed further below.)
United Nations Negotiations Run on Two Tracks
Negotiations on further cooperation to address climate change internationally have proceeded on
two official tracks since 2007.
• The first track is under the Kyoto Protocol, which is subsidiary to the
Convention. Pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol, (developed) Parties listed in Annex I
made commitments to reduce GHG during 2008 to 2012. Now, all Parties are
negotiating to consider a second commitment period for the post-2012 era. The
United States does not participate in these negotiations because it is not a Party to
the Kyoto Protocol, and has consistently opposed becoming a Party to the Kyoto
Protocol.
• The second track proceeds directly under the Convention, under the Bali Action
Plan.10 Negotiations pursuant to the Bali Action Plan focus on five primary
elements:
1. a “shared vision” for reducing global GHG emissions by around 2050;
2. mitigation of GHG emissions by developed and developing countries;
3. adaptation to impacts of climate change;

10 For more detail on the Bali Action Plan (and the Kyoto Protocol), see CRS Report RL33826, Climate Change: The
Kyoto Protocol, Bali “Action Plan,” and International Actions, by Jane A. Leggett.
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4. financial assistance to low-income countries; and
5. technology development and diffusion.
Requirements for reporting, monitoring, and verification (MRV) of GHG emissions, mitigation
actions, and other national policies to achieve commitments are a theme through several of these
five elements of negotiation.
The topics of negotiation overlap between the two tracks, and there is disagreement among
Parties as to whether agreement must be reached under one track before agreement can be
reached under the other. Many Parties express concern about potential incoherence between the
two tracks, and some urge that the two tracks converge into a single agreement. Many Non-
Annex I Parties insist that, before they engage in discussion of their own GHG commitments, the
GHG reduction “numbers” be committed by Annex I Parties under an extension of the Kyoto
Protocol.
In 2009 and early 2010, many countries and observers anticipated that the Copenhagen Accord
had broken that impasse, by providing that all countries would pledge GHG reductions to be
compiled in non-binding documentation. However, a few Parties (e.g., Cuba, Peru, Venezuela)
blocked adoption of the Copenhagen Accord,11 with the result that it has no legal status under the
UNFCCC. Further, many Non-Annex I Parties (including China) have since insisted that
negotiations proceed under the terms of the Bali Action Plan, rather than building from the
agreements reached in the Copenhagen Accord, thereby undermining the progress that many
Parties thought had been achieved in Copenhagen.
Table 1 identifies the major issues covered by the Kyoto Protocol, the Ad Hoc Group on Further
Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP), the Ad Hoc Group on
Long-Term Cooperation (AWG-LCA), and the Copenhagen Accord. The table summarizes the
status and major positions for each major topic of negotiation. Necessarily, the table provides a
simplified overview of the issues.
For two decades, the UNFCCC has been the formally agreed channel for addressing climate
change among sovereign states. Many analysts consider that it provides a common framework for
multi-national action while leaving implementation to those sovereign states. Within that
framework, nations and other Parties (i.e., the European Union) decide, establish the means,
monitor, and report on how they fulfill their obligations. The reporting with review by experts and
the multi-national forum helps to support compliance by the Parties, along with dispute resolution
and other non-compliance mechanisms. Nonetheless, China, Egypt, and a few other countries
have protested proposals to set new reporting, monitoring, and verification (MRV) guidelines for
them, guidelines that would approach those for the Annex I Parties, on the grounds that these
could undermine their national sovereignty. However, the current impasse on MRV and several
additional key issues, especially regarding how a global effort should be distributed and how
transparency of efforts and results should be ensured, has raised questions about the efficacy of
the UNFCCC over the coming years.

11 A summary of the Copenhagen Accord and the meeting in Copenhagen is available in CRS Report R40001, A U.S.-
centric Chronology of the International Climate Change Negotiations, by Jane A. Leggett.
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Simultaneously, many observers underscore that most actions to mitigate climate change and to
reduce vulnerability must be taken by local entities and private sector organizations.
Representatives and advocates for the rights of indigenous populations and local communities had
pressed for greater voice in how climate change will be addressed. Certain sectoral
representatives, for example, of agricultural producers in developing countries, have also become
more engaged in seeking special provisions under any new agreement, while the international
aviation and maritime sectors gained provisions in the Kyoto Protocol that leave accord on their
GHG mitigation to their own international fora, the International Civilian Aviation Organization
and the International Maritime Organization, respectively (without reaching agreement on
appropriate obligations). Governments of many municipalities around the world have formed
their own organizations to commit to and support GHG mitigation and adaptation efforts. These
are a few examples of the multiplicity of formal efforts now being pursued internationally. If the
UNFCCC processes remain at virtual impasse, the array of distributed efforts may expand.
Questions About the Efficacy of the U.N. Forum
Some observers of the negotiations under the United Nations, including some government
officials, question whether the U.N. process will be able to support future progress on cooperation
to address climate change. These observers note the procedural and substantive difficulties
encountered in the Copenhagen Conference of the Parties in 2009, as well as the broader
challenge of reaching consensus among the 194 Parties to the UNFCCC, in the absence of agreed
rules that would allow agreement by qualified majority.12
The flagging of progress under the United Nations is partly due to an apparent stalemate among
key Parties and groups of Parties on major elements of cooperation. For example, in meetings in
Tianjin, China, in October 2010, a number of delegates noted that much discussion has devolved
into repeated restatement of well-known positions, although minor movements were also visible.
The challenges have been apparent since the mid-1990s, however, as Parties were unable to agree
on rules for reaching agreement other than unanimous consensus. Consequently, it has been
possible for only one or a few countries to obstruct formal agreement on many issues in the
negotiations.
Some suggest that further development of international climate change cooperation may be more
successful, at least over the next few years, through bilateral agreements (e.g., the U.S.-China
Strategic and Economic Dialogue), regional arrangements, alternative and smaller multilateral
processes (e.g., the G-20), and private actions. For example, the Group of 20 (G-20) Finance
Ministers agreed in 2009 to end subsidies to fossil fuels (although independent observers assert
that no significant reductions have been achieved). In addition, the European Union, Japan,
Norway, and many other countries have well-established arrangements with China. These nations
anticipate bilateral activities to help generate emissions trade that will enhance their technological
competitiveness, while also helping those Annex I Parties to comply with their commitments
under the Kyoto Protocol.

12 See also CRS Report R41175, International Agreements on Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions, by Emily C.
Barbour, which summarizes, “Unlike the adoption of amendments and annexes, the UNFCCC does not provide a rule
for the adoption of protocols. The parties have, moreover, failed to reach an agreement on a voting rule in this context
despite years of trying. In the absence of an agreed upon rule for the number of votes necessary to adopt a protocol,
protocols are adopted by consensus.”
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Interest in pursuing alternative vehicles for cooperation may be, in part, because of doubts that
some countries (including the United States, China, Japan, and Australia) will follow through
with their official pledges under the UNFCCC for GHG mitigation and financing. Certainly, the
U.S. decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol has encouraged such skepticism.
Some observers, including businesses that seek greater certainty in their investment
environments, now propose that an agreement among three to four countries, including the United
States, the European Union, and China, would be the most productive next step. A growing
number of observers suggest that using a greater multiplicity of avenues to address climate
change could be most productive, with a variety of organizations taking charge in the domain to
which it is best suited. Such a strategy could include such efforts as the Group of 20 Finance
Ministers’ commitment to end subsidies for fossil fuels,13 or the International Energy Agency’s
Implementing Agreement to support multi-national technology research.14 (There is little
evidence to suggest that the commitment to phase out subsidies is being achieved, however,
leaving open the question of whether using more channels to address climate change will increase
efficacy.)
Some observers are skeptical that anthropogenic15 emissions of GHG are leading to significantly
adverse climate change.16 Others are unconvinced that global agreement can be reached and
carried out. Still others object to giving greater authority to a supra-national (or national)
organization, even to address global issues, or suspect that the United Nations and other
institutions may be more concerned with enhancing their own influence and resources than with
reducing the risks of climate change.17
The outcome of the next meeting of the Conference of the Parties may corral greater cooperation
under the UNFCCC, or incite greater diffusion of efforts to alternative fora. While the prospects
for cooperative action may increase by diversifying the multilateral vehicles, achieving
comprehensive and least-cost arrangements may be diminished.
Not Just Carbon from Energy
While the UNFCCC emphasized carbon dioxide and its relationship to climate change, it
identified a broader range of “greenhouse gases (GHG).” Under the Kyoto Protocol, the set of
gases to be counted in Parties’ emissions, and for compliance with the targets, included carbon
dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),
perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6)—sometimes referred to as the “basket of
six” greenhouse gases. The HFC, PFC and SF6 are almost entirely synthetically produced, not

13 The initial agreement can be found at http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm. Two progress
reports can be found at http://priceofoil.org/2010/11/08/g20-fossil-fuel-report/, from two environmentally oriented
groups, and at http://www.oecd.org/document/57/0,3343,en_2649_33713_45233017_1_1_1_1,00.html, from the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
14 For an index of IEA’s multilateral technology Initiatives, see http://www.iea.org/techno/index.asp.
15 Human-generated.
16 China Daily has reported, for example, about views of skeptics in China: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2010-
02/03/content_9418037.htm.
17 See, for example, Michael Levi, “The UN Doesn’t Understand Climate Change,” Council on Foreign Relations,
September 17, 2010.
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occurring naturally in significant quantities. Some were created as substitutes for other
compounds phased out by the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and
subsequent amendments to it. Additional new chemicals are manufactured today that, although
present in minute quantities, could have important effects on the atmosphere and climate,
especially because many stay in the atmosphere for thousands to tens of thousands of years.
In the current negotiations, proposals include an expanded set of GHG, particularly new
synthetically produced compounds.18 Currently listed for potential inclusion in an amendment to
the Kyoto Protocol are
• perfluorinated compounds, including SF6, nitrogen trifluoride(NF3), and
trifluoromethyl sulfur pentafluoride (SF5CF3);
• fluorinated ethers (HFEs); and
• perfluoropolyethers, such as perfluoropolymethylisopropyl ether (PFPMIE).
Despite controversy and concerns for unreliable accounting, the Kyoto Protocol allowed credit
for reducing emissions from deforestation and other land use changes, and for removals of carbon
from the atmosphere due to enhanced photosynthesis. However, the language was limited and
challenging to implement without creating perverse incentives. Since then, technical analysis and
negotiations have sought to improve methods and technologies for accounting for “land use, land
use change, and forestry” (LULUCF) and to build new international partnerships and programs to
“reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation” and to improve conservation
(REDD+). While technical issues remain to be resolved, LULUCF and REDD+ negotiations have
made progress, and a decision to codify those agreements could be decided as early as the Cancun
meeting or, more likely, as part of a more comprehensive and “balanced package” of agreements,
possibly at the South Africa Conference of the Parties in 2011.
Congressional Interests
Some Members of Congress do not consider climate change science to be sound or sufficiently
advanced to merit the costs of GHG mitigation actions, domestically or internationally. Even
among Members who view human-induced climate change as a significant risk, many are
concerned with the goals and obligations that a treaty or other form of agreement might embody.
Under the Copenhagen Accord, which is a political (not legal) commitment, President Obama
pledged to reduce U.S. GHG emissions by 17% below 2005 levels by 2020 “in conformity with
anticipated U.S. energy and climate legislation, recognizing that the final target will be reported
to the Secretariat in light of enacted legislation.” The Copenhagen Accord also included pledges
of financing from the developed countries in aggregate of $30 billion during 2010 to 2012, and
aiming at $100 billion annually by 2020, with funds to come from both public and private
sources.

18 See, for example, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Safeguarding the Ozone Layer and the Global
Climate System: Issues Related to Hydrofluorocarbons and Perfluorocarbons, Cambridge University Press, 2009.
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Some Members promote ambitious U.S. leadership internationally: beyond diplomatic
advantages, they view the United States as bearing exceptional responsibility for climate change,
having contributed more emissions than any other nation to the enhanced GHG concentrations in
the atmosphere since the Industrial Revolution. In 2005, U.S. GHG emissions per capita were
more than three times the world average, and almost fives times that of developing countries.19
Some may also note that the United States is wealthier and hence better able to bear the costs of
GHG mitigation than most other countries, and/or that there could be commercial and trade
advantages to leading technological changes. Among the Members who might support concerted
international action to address climate change, particular concerns regard parity of actions across
Parties, and potential effects on trade competitiveness among countries.
For U.S. legislators, related issues include
• the compatibility of any international agreement with U.S. domestic policies and
laws;
• consistency and potential reinforcement of other major policy goals (e.g., energy
security, development assistance);
• the adequacy of appropriations, fiscal measures, and programs to achieve any
commitments under the agreement;
• implications for employment, technological advance, and trade; and
• the desirable form of the agreement and related requirements.
While the Constitution gives authority to negotiate treaties to the President, any treaty would need
the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification before it could be legally binding on the
United States.
While the 111th Congress held many hearings and debated bills addressing aspects of climate
change internationally, it remains to be seen the level of priority and specific questions to be
raised by the 112th Congress.

19 According to data in the World Resources Institute, Climate Analysis Indicators Tool, extracted November 16, 2010.
http://cait.wri.org/.
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Table 1. Comparison of International Issues by Agreement or Negotiating Forum
(as of November 2010)
Ad Hoc Group on Further
Commitments for Annex I
Ad Hoc Group on Long Term
Parties Under the Kyoto
Topic of
Cooperation (AWG-LCA)
Protocol (AWG-KP) (Under
Negotiation
Copenhagen Accord (2010)a
(Under the UNFCCC)
the Kyoto Protocol - KP)
Kyoto Protocol (1997)b
Nature of
Political, not legally binding. “Noted,”
Intended to be legal y binding.
Intended to be legal y binding.
Became legally binding on
Agreement
not accepted, by the UNFCCC
Parties when it entered into
Parties, so no formal status under the Many developed countries seek to
Many developed countries seek to
force in 2005. (United States is
UNFCCC.
coordinate both LCA and KP
coordinate both LCA and KP
not a Party.)
negotiating tracks, and some
negotiating tracks, and some
developing countries would possibly
developing countries would
support a “common space” or limited possibly support a “common space”
joint discussions. United States says
or limited joint discussions. United
this is inappropriate as it is not a KP
States says this is inappropriate as it
Party.
is not a KP Party. Small Island
States advocate using KP as
Some Parties wish to formalize
foundation for a single agreement
decisions on those issues with
with global commitments.
general agreement (technology,
financing, REDD+c). United States
and others seek “balanced package”
across all issues, especially to include
NA1g commitments and MRV.h
Share
“Deep cuts” in global emissions are
Parties do not agree on the purpose
Not proposed.
“In order to promote
Vision/Long-
required “with a view to ... hold the
or scope. Some conceive it as setting
sustainable development.”
Term Objective
increase in global temperature below
a long-term ceiling on global
2o C.”
temperature rise (i.e., <2oC or
<1.5oC) or common GHG reduction
goal (e.g., 50% below 1990 levels).
Some such “visions” quantitatively
require GHG reductions by NAIg
Parties.
Some developing country proposals
would expand scope to cover almost
al topics under negotiation.
China and Bolivia propose language
to allocate a global carbon cap, which
United States and others oppose.
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Ad Hoc Group on Further
Commitments for Annex I
Ad Hoc Group on Long Term
Parties Under the Kyoto
Topic of
Cooperation (AWG-LCA)
Protocol (AWG-KP) (Under
Negotiation
Copenhagen Accord (2010)a
(Under the UNFCCC)
the Kyoto Protocol - KP)
Kyoto Protocol (1997)b
Mitigation by
Annex I Partiesd report GHG
Proposals for QELROSe for
One option is a “top-down”
UNFCCC AI Parties agreed
Developed
mitigation targets for 2020 or
developed countries range from
aggregate target to be allocated
collectively to reduce their
Countries
mitigation actions. Deadline was
levels of Copenhagen Accord
among AI Parties. The “bottom-up” GHG emissions by at least 5%
February 1, 2010. Reports compiled
pledges, to at least 45% below 1990
option would transform pledges
below 1990 levels during the
in non-binding documentation.
levels by 2020. Overlap with
made under the Copenhagen
period 2008-2012, and specific
discussion in AWG-KP poses
Accord into new QELROS,e though “assigned amounts” are listed
problems.
assumptions and rules need
for each Party in Annex B.
clarification, especially on
Russia and some other
Some Parties propose to inscribe all
accounting of forest-related carbon
economies in transition have
Parties’ pledges under the
and use of market mechanisms.
targets higher than their
Copenhagen Accord in a decision by
projected (and current)
the Conference of the Parties in
Most NAI Parties consider AI
emissions.
2010. Others, notably some NAI
Parties’ pledges inadequate, seeking
Parties, would have only pledges by
greater “ambition”—as much as
AI Parties included in any such
45% below 1990 levels by 2020.
decision, or only that of the United
Yemen (G-77), China, India,
States, which is not a Party to the
Venezuela, and others block
Kyoto Protocol. Still others are
“graduation” of additional Parties
concerned that including pledges in a
into abatement commitments.
decision in 2010 could make a later,
binding agreement redundant and
Japan and others insist NAI Parties
undermine further work under the
step up to commitments as pledged
AWG-LCA.
by leaders in Copenhagen.
Russia and other economies in
transition (EITs) seek to carry over
unused Assigned Amount Units
from first commitment period, and
to continue special status with less
strenuous QELROS than other AI
Parties.
Negotiations are pressured to
avoid a gap between the end of the
first commitment period in 2012
and the beginning of any new
commitment period. However,
New Zealand and Russia oppose a
second commitment period
without global participation.
CRS-10

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

Ad Hoc Group on Further
Commitments for Annex I
Ad Hoc Group on Long Term
Parties Under the Kyoto
Topic of
Cooperation (AWG-LCA)
Protocol (AWG-KP) (Under
Negotiation
Copenhagen Accord (2010)a
(Under the UNFCCC)
the Kyoto Protocol - KP)
Kyoto Protocol (1997)b
Monitoring,
Under UNFCCC, AI Parties report
Many Parties support using and
MRV developed and applied under
Requires national systems for
Reporting, and
GHG inventories annual y and
enhancing existing KP provisions for
the KP would be enhanced,
GHG emission and removal
Verification
National Communications every five
MRV, and to apply to United States.
especially for reporting on
estimation, according to
(MRV) for
years, using agreed reporting
emissions and sequestration related agreed methods. Annual GHG
Developed
guidelines.
United States stresses that MRV for
f
to Land Use, Land Use Change, and inventories and supplemental
Parties
developed country Parties must exist
Forestry (LULUCF).
information must demonstrate
in tandem with ICAi for developing
compliance with
country Parties.
commitments. Verification by
expert review teams and
review of National
Communications, which
periodically are in-country.
Mitigation by
Non-Annex I Partiesg report
Most Annex I Parties insist that GHG Many AI Parties seek progress on
None specified, although all
Developing
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation
abatement commitments expand to
GHG abatement commitments
Parties to the UNFCCC share
Countries
Actions (NAMA) before February 1,
be “common” to all major emitters
under the AWG-LCA before
general obligations under Art.
2010, compiled in non-binding
and moderate income countries.
agreeing on a second commitment
4, paragraph 1, with “common
documentation. Least Developed
They advocate compiling
period for AI Parties under this
but differentiated
Countries and small island developing Copenhagen pledges into new
track.
responsibilities,” taking into
states become a new mitigation
agreement.
account their specific national
grouping that may identify actions
Many NAI Parties have blocked any
and regional development
voluntarily and with financial support.
China, India, Brazil, and others argue
discussion of NAI abatement
priorities, objectives, and
this contradicts the “differentiated
commitments until they are
circumstances.
responsibilities” principle in the
satisfied with the AI commitments.
UNFCCC.
This divide has led to procedural
obstacles for both tracks of
negotiation. As a result, some
Parties (New Zealand, Australia,
Small Island States, South Africa)
have begun to seek convergence of
the two negotiating tracks under a
single agreement, or as two
agreements under a single umbrel a
agreement.
CRS-11

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

Ad Hoc Group on Further
Commitments for Annex I
Ad Hoc Group on Long Term
Parties Under the Kyoto
Topic of
Cooperation (AWG-LCA)
Protocol (AWG-KP) (Under
Negotiation
Copenhagen Accord (2010)a
(Under the UNFCCC)
the Kyoto Protocol - KP)
Kyoto Protocol (1997)b
Financing
“Fast-Start” pledges of $30 billion
General agreement exists to establish No specific provisions for financing. The Protocol’s “mechanisms”
during 2010-2012, and a long-term
a new fund with a board, trustee, and The market mechanisms, however,
result in financing for GHG
goal of $100 billion annually by 2020
secretariat. The fund should be
constitute incentives for the private reductions through sale (or
“in the context of meaningful
accountable to the COP.
sector to finance least-cost GHG
other terms of transfer) of
mitigation actions and transparency
abatement to sell as credits, such as assigned amounts, emission
on implementation.” Funding will
G-77 wants a new mechanism
under the Clean Development
reduction units, or certified
come from public and private,
managed by the COP, giving more
Mechanism.
emission reductions. The
bilateral and multilateral, and
weight to developing country votes
generated financing has been
alternative sources. Some developing
than if managed by the World Bank
Flows of financing under the KP
lower than anticipated for
countries do not want to count
or other options preferred by the AI
market mechanisms have been
several reasons, including non-
financing that flows through
Parties.
much smal er than anticipated.
participation of the United
emissions trading markets, however.
They have been associated with
Most AI Parties expect most financing
States in the Kyoto Protocol,
investments in only a few
and high transaction costs
Calls for financing to support
to come from private sector via
developing countries, primarily
under the Clean Development
mitigation, adaptation, REDD-plus,
some kinds of market mechanisms,
China.
Mechanism.
technology development and transfer, with a minor portion via foreign aid
and capacity building.
and other public funds. G-77 seek
A share of the proceeds of
public funding, believing it is more
GHG credits under the Clean
Establishment of the Copenhagen
reliable and easier to direct than
Development Mechanism are
Green Climate Fund under the
private investment. Some consider
earmarked to support
Global Environment Facility (GEF),
funding through private markets to
adaptation in low-income
managed by the World Bank to
be a transfer of responsibility from
countries.
support international financing.
developed to developing countries.
A Secretary-General’s High Level
Many seek equal financing attention
Advisory Group on Climate Change
to adaptation and GHG mitigation.
Financing (AGF) released in
Some would direct financing to Least
November 2010 a report identifying
Developed Countries and those most
options to raise the $100 billion of
vulnerable to climate change. Others
long-term financing sought under the
want al developing countries treated
Copenhagen Accord. It concludes
equally.
raising $100 billion is feasible and
emphasizes putting a price on carbon, Some Parties propose quantity of
such as carbon taxes on international
financing should be 1.5% of each
bunker fuels, carbon trading markets,
Annex I Party’s GDP.
and public sources, such as a shift
Options for MRV of financing include
away from fossil fuel subsidies.
use of current mechanisms, new
guidelines.
CRS-15

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

Ad Hoc Group on Further
Commitments for Annex I
Ad Hoc Group on Long Term
Parties Under the Kyoto
Topic of
Cooperation (AWG-LCA)
Protocol (AWG-KP) (Under
Negotiation
Copenhagen Accord (2010)a
(Under the UNFCCC)
the Kyoto Protocol - KP)
Kyoto Protocol (1997)b
Future Reviews
Assessment of the Copenhagen
Proposals for future reviews and
Cal s for comprehensive reviews of
The first review took place at
and Possible
Accord, to be completed by 2015,
revisions include options for lowering the KP and ensuing “appropriate
the 2nd meeting of the
Revisions of
that would include consideration of
the target for long-term temperature
action.” First review to begin by
Conference of the Parties
Commitments
strengthening the “long-term goal” of change; criteria for reviews; and
2014 and conclude by 2016.
serving as the Meeting of the
the Accord.
whether reviews should include
Further reviews periodically, with 4 Parties to the Protocol, in
actions by NAI Parties in addition to
years as the sole current proposal,
2006. To take place
AI Party actions and financing.
unless the Parties decide otherwise. periodically thereafter.
First review would begin by 2013 and
be conducted or concluded in 2015,
with subsequent reviews every five
years.
Source: CRS.
a. The text of the Copenhagen Accord is available at http://unfccc.int/home/items/5262.php.
b. The text of the Kyoto Protocol is available at http://www.oecd.org/document/57/0,3343,en_2649_33713_45233017_1_1_1_1,00.html.
c. REDD+ is Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and Conservation, and refers to policies, measures, partnerships, and financing that are
intended to slow deforestation and land degradation and provide for financing through, inter alia, market-like mechanisms.
d. “Annex I Parties” (AI Parties) are those countries and regional economic integration organizations (i.e., the European Union) listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC. This
list includes the high income, industrialized countries, including those of the former Soviet Union.
e. QELROS are Quantitative Emission Limitation and Reduction Objectives, or “the numbers” for Parties’ GHG reduction commitments embodied in the Kyoto Protocol
and any new agreement.
f.
These provisions exist under the UNFCCC and so are not included in the Copenhagen Accord, but are noted in this table because of their relevance to on-going
negotiations.
g. “Non-Annex I Parties” (NAI Parties) are those Parties to the UNFCCC not listed in its Annex I. These are often referred to as developing countries, although income
levels overlap across some Annex I and Non-Annex I Parties. A divisive element of negotiation is when and under what conditions a Non-Annex I Party may
“graduate” to Annex I.
h. MRV is Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification, and may apply to GHG abatement and/or financing.
i.
“International Consultation and Analysis” (ICA) is the phrase embodied in the Copenhagen Accord referring to international procedures for consideration of
developing countries’ mitigation actions that are not financed international y.
j.
GHG are greenhouse gases.
CRS-19

International Climate Change: A Negotiations Side-by-Side

Author Contact Information

Jane A. Leggett

Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy
jaleggett@crs.loc.gov, 7-9525

Congressional Research Service
20