Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and
Government Performance
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
November 12, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21922
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Summary
The limited capacity and widespread corruption of all levels of Afghan governance are growing
factors in debate over the effectiveness of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, although Afghan
governing capacity has increased significantly since the Taliban regime fell in late 2001. In a
December 1, 2009, policy statement on Afghanistan, which followed the second major
Afghanistan strategy review in 2009, President Obama stated that “the days of providing a blank
check [to the Afghan government] are over.” During 2010, the Administration has been pressing
President Hamid Karzai to move more decisively to address corruption within his government,
with mixed success. Karzai has agreed to cooperate with U.S.-led efforts to build the capacity of
several emerging anti-corruption institutions, but these same institutions have sometimes caused a
Karzai backlash when they have targeted his allies or relatives. Purportedly suspicious that U.S.
and other donors are trying to undermine his leadership, Karzai has strengthened his bonds to
ethnic and political faction leaders who are often involved in illicit economic activity and who
undermine rule of law. Some of the effects of corruption burst into public view in August 2010
when major losses were announced by the large Kabul Bank, in part due to large loans to major
shareholders, many of whom are close to Karzai. Addressing U.S. public complaints that U.S.
lives are being lost in part to defend a corrupt government, some in Congress have sought to link
further U.S. aid to clearer progress on the corruption issue.
The disputes with Karzai over corruption compound continuing international concerns about
Afghan democracy and political transparency. In the August 20, 2009, presidential election, there
were widespread charges of fraud, many substantiated by an Electoral Complaints Commission
(ECC). The ECC invalidated nearly one-third of President Karzai’s votes, although Karzai’s main
challenger dropped out of a runoff and Karzai was declared the winner. He subsequently faced
opposition to many of his cabinet nominees by the elected lower house of parliament, and seven
permanent ministerial posts remain unfilled. Many of the flaws that plagued the 2009 election
recurred in the parliamentary elections held September 18, 2010. However, the alleged fraud is
purportedly being addressed more openly and transparently. Final results were to be announced
October 30, but have been delayed by complaint investigation requirements. The security
situation complicated campaigning and the voting, to some extent, but did not derail the election.
Electoral competition aside, there is growing ethnic and political fragmentation over the terms of
a potential settlement to the conflict in Afghanistan. Some leaders of minority communities
boycotted a June 2-4, 2010, “consultative peace jirga (assembly)” in Kabul that endorsed Karzai’s
plan to reintegrate into society insurgents willing to end their fight against the government.
However, Karzai has named a senior Tajik leader as chair of the 68-member High Peace Council
that is to approve any settlement, if one is reached. Women, who have made substantial gains
(including appointment to cabinet posts and governorships and election to parliament) fear their
rights may be eroded under any “deal” that might put the Taliban in control of territory or agree to
change Afghanistan’s constitution and erode protections for women. For more information, see
CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by
Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report R40747, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan:
Background and Policy Issues, by Rhoda Margesson; and CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S.
Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman
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Contents
Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape .......................................................................... 1
Overview of Afghan Politics and Governance ....................................................................... 1
Affiliations Based on Ethnicity, Tribal, and Personal Relations ........................................ 2
The Ethnic Politics of the Security Sector/Security Issues................................................ 2
Lack of Affiliation by Party............................................................................................. 4
Politics: Karzai, His Allies, and His Opponents ..................................................................... 4
Pro-Karzai Factions in the Outgoing Parliament .............................................................. 4
The Opposition: Dr. Abdullah and His Lower House Supporters...................................... 5
Lower House Independents ............................................................................................. 6
The Upper House ............................................................................................................ 6
Enhancing Government Capacity and Performance ..................................................................... 7
U.S.-Karzai Relations............................................................................................................ 7
The Influences of Regional Faction Leaders/“Warlords”........................................................ 8
Vice President Muhammad Fahim................................................................................... 9
Abdurrashid Dostam: Uzbeks of Northern Afghanistan—Jowzjan, Faryab, Sar-i-
Pol, and Balkh Provinces............................................................................................ 10
Atta Mohammad Noor: Balkh Province......................................................................... 10
Isma’il Khan: Western Afghanistan/Herat...................................................................... 11
Sher Mohammad Akhundzadeh and “Koka:” Southern Afghanistan/Helmand
Province..................................................................................................................... 11
Ahmad Wali Karzai: Southern Afghanistan/Qandahar Province ..................................... 12
Ghul Agha Shirzai: Eastern Afghanistan/Nangarhar....................................................... 13
Building Central Government Capacity ............................................................................... 13
The Afghan Civil Service .............................................................................................. 14
Curbing Government Corruption and Promoting Rule of Law ............................................. 14
Scope of the Problem .................................................................................................... 15
Karzai Responses .......................................................................................................... 17
Rule of Law Efforts....................................................................................................... 20
Expanding Local Governance/U.S. Civilian “Uplift” ........................................................... 21
Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils............................................................... 21
District-Level Governance ............................................................................................ 22
U.S. Local Governance Advisory Capacity.................................................................... 23
Promoting Human Rights .................................................................................................... 24
Media and Freedom of Expression/Social Freedoms...................................................... 24
Harsh Punishments........................................................................................................ 25
Religious Freedom ........................................................................................................ 25
Human Trafficking........................................................................................................ 26
Advancement of Women ............................................................................................... 27
Democracy, Governance, and Elections Funding Issues ................................................. 29
Elections in 2009 and 2010 ....................................................................................................... 30
2009 Presidential Election................................................................................................... 31
Election Modalities and Processes................................................................................. 31
The Political Contest and Campaign.............................................................................. 32
The Campaign............................................................................................................... 33
The Election Results ..................................................................................................... 34
Post-Election Cabinet.................................................................................................... 37
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September 18, 2010, Parliamentary Elections ...................................................................... 39
Election Timing ............................................................................................................ 39
Election Decree/Reform................................................................................................ 40
Preparations and The Vote ............................................................................................. 41
Outcomes...................................................................................................................... 41
Implications for the United States of the Afghan Elections................................................... 42
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Afghan Ethnicities.......................................................................................... 47
Tables
Table 1. Afghanistan Political Transition Process....................................................................... 44
Table 2. Major Pashtun Tribal Confederations ........................................................................... 45
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 48
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 48
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Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape
In implementing policy to stabilize Afghanistan, a U.S. policy priority has been to increase the
capabilities of and extend the authority of Afghanistan’s government. The policy was predicated
on the observation that weak governance was causing some Afghans to acquiesce to, or even
support, Taliban insurgents as providers of security and traditional justice. Since 2007, in line
with the perception that weak and corrupt governance was contributing to insurgent gains, the
U.S. and Afghan focus has been on reforming and reducing corruption within the central
government, and on expanding local governance. Then-head of the U.N. Assistance Mission
Afghanistan (UNAMA) Kai Eide said in a departing news conference on March 4, 2010, that
improving governance and political processes are “indispensable” for resolving the conflict in
Afghanistan, and that U.S. and partner efforts have focused too much on military approaches.
Eide was succeeded by Staffan de Mistura in March 2010; his substantive position on the issue is
similar.
Overview of Afghan Politics and Governance
Through differing regimes of widely varying ideologies, Afghanistan’s governing structure has
historically consisted of weak central government unwilling or unable to enforce significant
financial or administrative mandates on the 80% of Afghans who live in rural areas. The tribal,
clan, village, and district political structures that provided governance and security until the late
1970s were weakened by over 20 years of subsequent war. Some traditional local authority
figures fled or were killed; others were displaced by mujahedin commanders, militia leaders, and
others. These local power brokers are widely accused of selectively applying Afghan law and
have resisted ceding any influence. In other cases, traditional tribal councils have remained intact,
and continue to exercise their writ rather than accept the authority of local government. Still other
community authorities prefer to accommodate local insurgent commanders (who are seen as
wayward members of the community) rather than help the government secure their areas.
At the national level, Afghanistan had few, if any, Western-style democratic institutions prior to
the international intervention that took place after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United
States. Karzai is the first directly elected president in Afghan history. There were parliamentary
elections during the reign of King Zahir Shah (the last were in 1969, before his reign was ended
in a 1973 military coup), but the parliament during that era was not the check on presidential
power that the post-Taliban National Assembly has. The elected institutions and the 2004
adoption of a constitution were part of a post-Taliban transition roadmap established by a United
Nations-sponsored agreement of major Afghan factions signed in Bonn, Germany, on December
5, 2001, (“Bonn Agreement”),1 after the Taliban had fallen. The political transition process is
depicted in Table 1.
Some believe that the elements of Western-style democracy introduced since 2001 are supported
by traditional Afghan patterns of decision making that have some democratic and representative
elements. On the other hand, some see the traditional patterns as competing mechanisms that
resist change and modernization, generally minimize the role of women, and do not meet
international standards of democratic governance. At the national level, the convening of a loya
1 For text, see http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm.
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jirga, or traditional Afghan assembly consisting of about 1,500 delegates from all over
Afghanistan, has been used on several occasions. In the post-Taliban period, Loya jirgas have
been convened to endorse Karzai’s leadership, to adopt a constitution, and to back long-term
defense relations with the United States. A major peace jirga was held on June 2-4, 2010, to
review government plans to offer incentives for insurgent fighters to end their armed struggle and
rejoin society. At the local level, shuras, or jirgas (consultative councils)2 composed of local
notables, are key mechanisms for making authoritative community decisions or dispensing
justice. Some of these mechanisms are practiced by Taliban members in areas under their control.
Affiliations Based on Ethnicity, Tribal, and Personal Relations
Patterns of political affiliation by family, clan, tribe, village, ethnicity, region, and other
relationships remain. These patterns were evident in the August 20, 2009, presidential campaign
in Afghanistan. Many presidential candidates, Karzai included, pursued campaign strategies
designed primarily to assemble blocs of ethnic and geographic votes, rather than advance specific
new ideas. These patterns were more pronounced in campaigns for the provincial councils, which
were elected concurrently, and appear to have been evident again in the September 18, 2010,
parliamentary election. In these cases, electorates (the eligible voters of a specific province) are
small and candidates can easily appeal to clan and familial relationships.
While Afghans continue to follow traditional patterns of affiliation, there has been a sense among
Afghans that their country now welcomes members of all political and ethnic groups and factions.
There have been very few incidents of ethnic-based violence since the fall of the Taliban, but
jealousies over relative economic and political positions of the different ethnic communities have
sporadically manifested as clashes or political disputes.
Ethnic Pashtuns (sometimes referred to as Pathans—pronounced pah-TAHNS), as the largest
single ethnicity, have historically asserted a right to rule. Pashtuns are about 42% of the
population and, with few exceptions, have governed Afghanistan. The sentiment of the “right to
lead” is particularly strong among Pashtuns of the Durrani tribal confederation, which
predominates in the south and is a rival to the Ghilzai confederation, which predominates in the
east. One recent exception was the 1992-1996 presidency of the mujahedin government of
Burhanuddin Rabbani, a Tajik. Karzai is a Durrani Pashtun, and his cabinet and inner advisory
circle has come to be progressively dominated by Pashtuns and to exclude members of the other
communities. The Taliban government was and its insurgency is composed almost completely of
Pashtuns, although there have been non-Pashtun rebel factions with given names such as “Tajik
Taliban” to denote that they are working against the Karzai government. A table on major Pashtun
clans is provided below (see Table 2), as is a map showing the distribution of Afghanistan’s
various ethnicities (see Figure 1).
The Ethnic Politics of the Security Sector/Security Issues
Although they largely concede Pashtun rule, non-Pashtuns want to be and are represented at high
levels of the central government. Non-Pashtuns also have achieved a large measure of control
over how government programs are implemented in their geographic regions. The security organs
are considered an arena where Pashtuns and Tajiks have worked together relatively well. The
2 Shura is the term used by non-Pashtuns to characterize the traditional assembly concept. Jirga is the Pashtun term.
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National Directorate for Security (NDS, the intelligence directorate) was headed by a non-
Pashtun (Amrollah Saleh, a Tajik) during 2006-2010, although he was dismissed on June 6, 2010,
by Karzai for disagreements over whether and how to engage insurgent leaders in political
settlement negotiations. He was replaced by a Pashtun, Rehmat Nabil, who has no previous
intelligence experience but is perceived as more consultative than was Saleh. Still, he inherited a
service dominated by Tajiks (although some left when Saleh was ousted) and by a mix of
personnel that served during the Soviet occupation era (the service was then called Khad), and in
the mujahedin government of 1992-1996, as well as more recent recruits. During 2002-2007, the
Central Intelligence Agency reportedly paid for all of the NDS budget.3
Perhaps to restore the tradition of ethnic balance in the security sector of government, the chief of
staff of the Afghan National Army, Bismillah Khan (a Tajik), was named interior minister on June
26, 2010. He replaced Mohammad Hanif Atmar, a Pashtun, who was fired the same day and on
roughly the same grounds as Saleh. The security ministries tend to have key deputies who are of a
different ethnicity than the minister or top official.
There is also a National Security Council that is located in the palace complex and advises
Karzai. As of February 2010, it has been headed by former Foreign Minister Rangin Spanta, a
Pashtun who was in the government during the Soviet occupation era and is said to retain
leftwing views. The NSC is dominated by Pashtuns; two high officials trusted by Karzai there are
Ibrahim Spinzadeh, first deputy NSC adviser, and Shaida Mohammad Abdali, the second deputy
NSC adviser (both are Pashtuns).
Karzai’s chief of staff is Mohammad Umar Daudzai, who is considered an Islamic conservative.
During the anti-Soviet war, he fought in the Pashtun Islamist faction of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar.
Daudzai is said to be a skeptic of Western/U.S. influence over Afghan decision making. On
October 23, 2010, the New York Times asserted that he has been the presidential office’s liaison
with Iran for accepting the approximately $2 million per year in Iranian assistance that is
provided as cash. Karzai acknowledged this financial arrangement.
Some observers take a different view, asserting that Tajiks continue to control many of the
command ranks of the Afghan security institutions, giving Pashtuns only a veneer of control of
these organizations. U.S. commanders in Afghanistan say the composition of the national security
forces—primarily the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police—has recently been
brought more into line with the population, although Pashtuns from the south (Durranis) remain
underrepresented.
Others believe that ethnic differences may be on the verge of erupting over a key security issue—
Karzai’s plan to try to induce both low-level and leading insurgent figures to end their fight and
rejoin society (reintegration and reconciliation), perhaps even in prominent posts. Tajik leaders, in
particular, as the most prominent group after the Pashtuns, fear that Karzai’s plans will increase
the Pashtun predominance in government and lead to marginalization of the Tajiks and other non-
Pashtun minorities. They also assert—and ousted NDS chief Saleh has reportedly been giving
speeches in Tajik areas making this point extensively—that Karzai is now willing to turn over
Afghanistan to undue influence from Pakistan. In part to mollify this ethnic unrest on this issue,
in September 2010 Karzai appointed a 68-member broad based High Peace Council that would
3 Filkins, Dexter, and Mark Mazzetti. “Key Karzai Aide in Graft Inquiry is Linked to C.I.A.” New York Times, August
26, 2010.
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oversee any negotiations with Taliban leaders. Former President Burhanuddin Rabbani, the most
senior Tajik faction leader, was appointed Council chairman on October 10, 2010.
Pakistan supports Afghanistan’s Pashtun community, and purportedly wants some insurgent
factions to come into a post-settlement government. The growing rift over the reconciliation issue
has alarmed Pakistan’s rival India and, to a lesser extent, Iran, who traditionally support the Tajik,
Uzbek, and Hazara communities and see Afghanistan’s Pashtuns as surrogates of Pakistan. (For
more information on the topic of reconciliation talks with insurgent leaders, see CRS Report
RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth
Katzman.)
Lack of Affiliation by Party
The major factions in Afghanistan identify only loosely with Afghanistan’s 110 registered
political parties. There is a popular aversion to formal “parties” as historically tools of
neighboring powers—a perception stemming from the war against the Soviet Union when seven
mujahedin parties were funded by and considered tools of outside parties. Partly because parties
are viewed with suspicion, Karzai has not formed his own party. Others say that parties are weak
because the Single, Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system—in which each voter casts a ballot
for only one candidate—favors candidates running as independents rather than as members of
parties. Moreover, Western-style parties are generally identified by specific ideologies, ideas, or
ideals, while most Afghans, as discussed above, retain their traditional affiliations. The larger
parties that do exist, for example the Junbush Melli of Abdul Rashid Dostam, tend to be identified
with specific ethnic (in his case, Uzbeks) or sectarian factions, rather than overarching themes.
Politics: Karzai, His Allies, and His Opponents
In post-Taliban Afghanistan, the National Assembly (parliament)—particularly the 249-seat
elected lower house (Wolesi Jirga, House of the People)—has been the key institution for non-
Pashtuns and political independents to exert influence on Karzai. The process of confirming
Karzai’s second-term cabinet—in which many of Karzai’s nominees were voted down in several
nomination rounds—demonstrates that the Assembly is an increasingly strong institution that is
pressing for honest, competent governance. These principles are advocated most stridently,
although not exclusively, by the younger, more technocratic independent bloc in the lower house.
These independents were key to the lower house vote on March 31, 2010, to reject an election
decree that would structure the holding of September 18, 2010, National Assembly elections.
This institutional development has come despite the fact that about one-third of the seats in the
lower house are held by personalities and factions prominent in Afghanistan’s recent wars, many
of whom are non-Pashtuns from the north and the west. Karzai and his allies were hoping that the
September 18, 2010, parliamentary elections would produce an increase in pro-Karzai members.
Both houses of parliament, whose budgets are controlled by the Ministry of Finance, are staffed
by about 275 Afghans, reporting to a “secretariat.” There are 18 oversight committees, a research
unit, and a library.
Pro-Karzai Factions in the Outgoing Parliament
Karzai’s core supporters in the outgoing Wolesi Jirga, which he and his aides hoped to increase in
the September 18, 2010, elections, have been about 50 former members of the conservative
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Pashtun-based Hizb-e-Islam party (the same party as that headed by insurgent leader Gulbuddin
Hikmatyar); and supporters of Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf—a prominent Islamic conservative
mujahedin era party leader.4 Karzai’s allies reportedly hope that they would win enough
additional seats in the September 18 election to enable Sayyaf to become lower house Speaker,
displacing Yunus Qanooni (Tajik); see below. However, it is not certain that pro-Karzai deputies
will increase in the newly elected Assembly.
Another base of Karzai’s support have been figures from Qandahar (Karzai’s home province) and
Helmand provinces, including several Karzai clan members. One clan member in the parliament
is his cousin Jamil Karzai, and another is relative by marriage Aref Nurzai, who was prominent in
Karzai’s 2009 election campaign. Karzai’s elder brother, Qayyum, was in the lower house
representing Qandahar until his October 2008 resignation, although he retains continued influence
in Afghanistan. Other pro-Karzai Pashtuns in the outgoing parliament are former militia and
Taliban leaders, including Hazrat Ali (Nangarhar Province), who led the Afghan component of
the failed assault on Osama bin Laden’s purported redoubt at Tora Bora in December 2001; Pacha
Khan Zadran (Paktia) who, by some accounts, helped Osama bin Laden escape Tora Bora; and
Mullah Abdul Salam (“Mullah Rocketi”), from Zabol. (Salam ran unsuccessfully for president in
2009.) A key Karzai brother, discussed further below, is Ahmad Wali Karzai, who purportedly
worked to try to ensure that pro-Karzai Assembly candidates were elected in Qandahar Province,
but it is not clear that this effort succeeded.
The Opposition: Dr. Abdullah and His Lower House Supporters
Although the political opposition to Karzai is fluid and often joins him on some issues, those who
can be considered opposition (putting aside Taliban and other insurgents) are mainly ethnic
minorities (Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara) who were in an anti-Taliban grouping called the “Northern
Alliance.” Leaders of these groups, and particularly Tajiks, view as a betrayal Karzai’s firing of
many of the non-Pashtuns from the cabinet and, as noted, are increasingly concerned about
Karzai’s outreach to Taliban figures and to Pakistan (including his meetings with Pakistan’s
military leader and the director of its intelligence service).
The overall “leader of the opposition” is former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, who is
about 50 years old and whose mother is Tajik and father is Pashtun. His identity as a key aide to
the slain Tajik mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masoud causes him to be identified politically
as a Tajik. He was dismissed from that post by Karzai in March 2006 and now heads a private
foundation named after Masoud. He emerged as Afghanistan’s opposition leader after his
unsuccessful challenge against Karzai for president in the August 2009 election in which
widespread fraud was demonstrated. He visited Washington, DC, one week after Karzai’s May
10-14, 2010, visit, criticizing Karzai’s governance at various think tanks and in a meeting with the
State Department. Dr. Abdullah subsequently declined to attend the June 2-4, 2010, peace jirga in
Kabul on the grounds that the 1,600 delegates were not representative of all Afghans, implying
that it would be overwhelmingly run and dominated by Pashtuns. He announced in late May 2010
that he has begun laying groundwork to create a formal, national democratic opposition
organization called the “Hope and Change Movement.”
Dr. Abdullah’s main base of support within the National Assembly is called the United Front
(UF), although some accounts refer to it as the “National Front” or “United National Front.” It
4 Sayyaf led the Ittihad Islami (Islamic Union) mujahedin party during the war against the Soviet occupation.
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was formed in April 2007 by Wolesi Jirga Speaker Yunus Qanooni (Karzai’s main challenger in
the 2004 presidential election) and former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani (both also
prominent ethnic Tajik Northern Alliance figures and former associates of the legendary
mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masood. Rabbani remains titular head of the mujahedin
party to which Masoud belonged—Jamiat Islami, or Islamic Society).
Although not aimed at mass appeal as is Dr. Abdullah’s Hope and Change Movement, the United
Front is nonetheless broader than the “Northern Alliance” in that the Front includes some
Pashtuns. Examples include Soviet-occupation era security figures Sayed Muhammad Gulabzoi
and Nur ul-Haq Ulumi, who has chaired the defense committee. Even before the debate over the
terms of any settlement with the Taliban escalated in 2010, the UF advocated amending the
constitution to give more power to parliament and to empower the elected provincial councils
(instead of the president) to select governors and mayors. Such steps would ensure maximum
autonomy from Kabul for non-Pashtun areas, and serve as a check and balance on Pashtun
dominance of the central government. Running in the September 18, 2010, elections under Dr.
Abdullah’s Hope and Change Movement banner, Abdullah supporters sought to nearly double
their numbers in the new Assembly from about 50 in the outgoing one. The bloc seeks to hold a
commanding position that would enable it to block Karzai initiatives and possibly even obtain
passage of its own alternative proposals. However, it is not clear that this objective was achieved.
Even before the formation of the UF, the opposition in the Wolesi Jirga first showed its strength
in March 2006, following the December 19, 2005, inauguration of parliament, by requiring
Karzai’s cabinet to be approved individually, rather than en bloc, increasing opposition leverage.
However, Karzai rallied his support and all but 5 of the 25 nominees were confirmed. In May
2006, the opposition compelled Karzai to change the nine-member Supreme Court, the highest
judicial body, including ousting 74-year-old Islamic conservative Fazl Hadi Shinwari as chief
justice. The proximate justification for the ouster was Shinwari’s age, which was beyond the
official retirement age of 65. (Shinwari later went on to head the Ulema Council, Afghanistan’s
highest religious body.) Parliament approved Karzai’s new court choices in July 2006, all of
whom are trained in modern jurisprudence.
Lower House Independents
Karzai and the UF have often competed for the support of the “independents” in the lower house.
Among them are several outspoken women, intellectuals, and business leaders, such as the 43-
year-old Malalai Joya (Farah Province), a leading critic of war-era faction leaders. In May 2007
the lower house voted to suspend her for this criticism for the duration of her term. Others in this
camp include Ms. Fauzia Gailani (Herat Province); Ms. Shukria Barekzai, editor of Woman
Mirror magazine; and Mr. Ramazan Bashardost, a former Karzai minister who champions
parliamentary powers and has established a “complaints tent” near the parliament building to
highlight and combat official corruption. (He ran for president in the 2009 elections on an anti-
corruption platform and drew an unexpectedly large amount of votes.) U.S.-based International
Republican Institute (IRI) has helped train the independents; the National Democratic Institute
(NDI) has assisted the more established factions.
The Upper House
Karzai has relatively fewer critics in the 102-seat Meshrano Jirga (House of Elder, upper house),
partly because of his bloc of 34 appointments (one-third of that body). He engineered the
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appointment of an ally as speaker: Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, a noted Islamic scholar and former
mujahedin party leader (Afghanistan National Liberation Front, ANLF), who headed the post-
Communist mujahedin government for one month (May 1992). However, because it is composed
of more elderly, established, notable Afghans who are traditionalist in their political outlook, the
upper house has tended to be more Islamist conservative than the lower house, advocating a legal
system that accords with Islamic law, and restrictions on press and Westernized media broadcasts.
As an example of the upper house’s greater support for Karzai, it voted on April 3, 2010, not to
act on the election decree that the lower house had rejected on March 31, 2010, meaning that the
decree applied to the September 18 parliamentary election.
Karzai also has used his bloc of appointments to the upper house to co-opt potential antagonists
or reward his friends. He appointed Northern Alliance military leader Muhammad Fahim to the
upper body, perhaps to compensate for his removal as defense minister, although he resigned after
a few months and later joined the UF. (He was Karzai’s primary running mate in the 2009
elections and is now a vice president.) Karzai named a key ally, former Helmand governor Sher
Mohammad Akhunzadeh, to the body. There is one Hindu, and 23 women; 17 are Karzai
appointees and six were selected in their own right.
A new upper house will be named after the results of the lower house elections are finalized.
Karzai will appoint 34 members, and the provincial councils that were elected in 2009 will
appoint a total of 68 members (two per province).
Enhancing Government Capacity and Performance5
Since 2001, U.S. policy has been to help expand the capacity of Afghan institutions, which were
nearly non-existent during Taliban rule. At the time of the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, Afghan
government offices were minimally staffed, and virtually none had computer or other modern
equipment, according to observers in Kabul. Since 2007, but with particular focus during the
Obama Administration, U.S. policy has been to not only try to expand Afghan governing
capacity—at the central and local levels—but to push for its reform and oversight. In two major
Afghanistan policy addresses—March 27, 2009, and December 1, 2009—President Obama
stressed that more needed to be done to promote the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan
government at both the Kabul and local levels. In the latter statement, he said: “The days of
providing a blank check [to the Afghan government] are over.”
U.S.-Karzai Relations
U.S. relations with President Hamid Karzai, and U.S. assessments of his performance, are key to
U.S. efforts to implement its stabilization strategy. During 2010, Obama Administration criticism
of the shortcomings of the Karzai government, particularly its corruption, have caused substantial
frictions in U.S.-Karzai relations. Continuing U.S. concerns prompted President Obama to make
anti-corruption efforts a particular focus of his talks with President Karzai in Kabul on March 28,
2010. Karzai’s frustrations at what he sees as U.S. and international pressure on him to reform
5 Some information in this section is from the State Department reports on human rights in Afghanistan for 2009,
March 11, 2010; for text, see http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/sca/136084.htm and the International Religious
Freedom Report, released October 26, 2009, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127362.htm.
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emerged in his comments on April 1, 2010, and April 4, 2010, both to groups of Afghans. On both
occasions, and the latter of which was to National Assembly members, Karzai expressed
frustration with what he claims was international meddling in the August 20, 2009, presidential
election and, more generally, what he sees as his subordination to the decisions of Afghanistan’s
international partners. The April 4, 2010, comments were more specifically critical of the United
States and suggested that Western meddling in Afghanistan was fueling support for the Taliban as
a legitimate resistance to foreign occupation. (An exact English translation of his April 4
comments, in which he purportedly said that even he might consider joining the Taliban if U.S.
pressure on him continues, is not available.) White House spokesperson Robert Gibbs said on
April 6, 2010, that the May 10-14, 2010, Karzai visit to Washington, DC, might be called off if
Karzai continued to make similar remarks. The visit did go forward and was widely considered
productive, including a decision to review, renew, and expand a 2005 “strategic partnership” that
would reflect a long-term U.S. commitment to Afghanistan.6 Karzai also has taken exception to
U.S. press reports that he is on mood-altering or other medication designed to treat psychological
ailments; he denies the reports categorically.
At each downturn in the relationship, top Obama Administration officials, including Secretary of
Defense Gates, Secretary of State Clinton, and General David Petraeus, have tended to issue
comments apparently designed to restore the relationship.7 Administration officials praised Karzai
for holding the June 2-4, 2010, loya jirga on reintegration of insurgents and for recommitting to
specific reform steps at the international conference in Kabul on July 20, 2010.
Still, press reports assert that differences remain within the Administration over whether to
confront Karzai more forcefully to implement reform pledges. A perception has persisted that
Karzai’s closest U.S. interlocutors are the top U.S. military representatives in Afghanistan (then-
top commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, and now, General David Petraeus).
Karzai reiterated that he has had very good relations with these two top U.S. and NATO
commanders in an interview with Larry King on October 11, 2010. Karzai’s relations with
Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) Richard Holbrooke, and with
Ambassador Eikenberry, are widely assessed as severely strained, although Holbrooke denied this
in an October 22, 2010, State Department briefing. The perception has been fed by numerous
reports and comments by observers that said that Holbrooke and Eikenberry, reportedly backed
by Vice President Biden and, to a certain extent, President Obama, believe in the efficacy of
public U.S. pressure on Karzai. In public statements, General Petraeus has stressed that Karzai is
president of a sovereign country and his support and partnership is required in order to
successfully implement U.S. strategy.
The Influences of Regional Faction Leaders/“Warlords”
A significant international concern about Afghan governance is Karzai’s willingness to sometimes
ally with unelected or well-armed faction leaders. Most of these leaders are from the north and
west, where non-Pashtun minorities predominate, but there are some major Pashtun faction
leaders that Karzai has become dependent upon as well. The Obama Administration’s March 27,
2009, and December 1, 2009, strategy statements did not outline new measures to sideline these
strongmen, who are sometimes referred to by experts and others as “warlords.” General
6 Interview with Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CNN, May 30 2010.
7 Dreazen, Yochi, and Sarah Lynch. “U.S. Seeks to Repair Karzai Tie.” Wall Street Journal, April 12, 2010.
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McChrystal’s August 2009 “initial assessment,” cited below, indicated that some of these faction
leaders—most of whom the United States and its partners regularly deal with and have good
working relations with—cause resentment among some sectors of the population and complicate
U.S. stabilization strategy. A number of them are alleged to own or have equity in security or
other Afghan firms that have won business from various U.S. and other donor agencies and fuel
allegations of nepotism and other forms of corruption. On the other hand, some Afghans and
outside experts believe that the international community’s strategy of dismantling local power
structures, particularly in northern Afghanistan, and instead to empower the central government,
has caused the security deterioration noted since 2006.
Some assert that the Obama Administration’s criticism of Karzai has caused him to become ever
more reliant on these factional power brokers. Karzai’s position is that confronting faction leaders
outright would likely cause their followers—who usually belong to ethnic or regional
minorities—to go into armed rebellion. Even before the Obama Administration came into office,
Karzai argued that keeping the faction leaders on the government side is needed in order to keep
the focus on fighting “unrepentant” Taliban insurgents (who are almost all ethnic Pashtuns).
In February 2007, both houses passed a law giving amnesty to faction leaders and others who
committed abuses during Afghanistan’s past wars. Karzai altered the draft to give victims the
right to seek justice for any abuses; Karzai did not sign a modified version in May 2007, leaving
the status unclear. However, in November 2009, the Afghan government published the law in the
official gazette (a process known as “gazetting”), giving it the force of law.
The following sections analyze some of the main faction leaders who often attract criticism and
commentary from U.S. and international partners in Afghanistan.
Vice President Muhammad Fahim
Karzai’s choice of Muhammad Fahim, a Tajik from the Panjshir Valley region who is military
chief of the Northern Alliance/UF faction, as his first vice presidential running mate in the August
2009 elections might have been a manifestation of Karzai’s growing reliance on faction leaders.
Dividing the United Front/ Northern Alliance might have been another. The Fahim choice was
criticized by human rights and other groups because of Fahim’s long identity as a mujahedin
commander/militia faction leader. A New York Times story of August 27, 2009, said that the Bush
Administration continued to deal with Fahim when he was defense minister (2001-2004) despite
reports that he was involved in facilitating narcotics trafficking in northern Afghanistan. Other
allegations suggest he has engineered property confiscations and other benefits to feed his and his
faction’s business interests. During 2002-2007, he also reportedly withheld turning over some
heavy weapons to U.N. disarmament officials who have been trying to reduce the influence of
local strongmen such as Fahim. Obama Administration officials have not announced any
limitations on dealings with Fahim now that he is vice president. In August 2010, NDS director
Nabil appointed a Fahim relative to a senior NDS position. As of August 2010, Fahim has been
undergoing treatment in Germany for a heart ailment. His ailment coincides with the accusations
that his brother was a beneficiary of concessionary loans from Kabul Bank, a major bank that has
faced major losses due to its lending practices and may need to be recapitalized (see below).
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Abdurrashid Dostam: Uzbeks of Northern Afghanistan—Jowzjan, Faryab, Sar-
i-Pol, and Balkh Provinces
Some observers have cited Karzai’s handling of prominent Uzbek leader Abdurrashid Dostam as
evidence of political weakness. Dostam commands numerous partisans in his redoubt in northern
Afghanistan (Jowzjan, Faryab, Balkh, and Sar-I-Pol provinces), where he was, during the Soviet
and Taliban years, widely accused of human rights abuses of political opponents. To try to
separate him from his armed followers, in 2005 Karzai appointed him to the post of chief of staff
of the armed forces. On February 4, 2008, Afghan police surrounded Dostam’s villa in Kabul in
response to reports that he attacked an ethnic Turkmen rival, but Karzai did not order his arrest
for fear of stirring unrest among Dostam’s followers. To try to resolve the issue without stirring
unrest, in December 2008 Karzai purportedly reached an agreement with Dostam under which he
resigned as chief of staff and went into exile in Turkey in exchange for the dropping of any case
against him.8
Dostam returned to Afghanistan on August 16, 2009, and subsequently held a large pro-Karzai
election rally in his home city of Shebergan. Part of his intent in supporting Karzai has been to
potentially oust a strong rival figure in the north, Balkh Province governor Atta Mohammad, see
below. Mohammad is a Tajik but, under a 2005 compromise with Karzai, is in control of a
province that is inhabited by many Uzbeks—a source of irritation for Dostam and other Uzbeks.
Dostam’s support apparently helped Karzai carry several provinces in the north, including
Jowzjan, Sar-i-Pol, and Faryab, although Dr. Abdullah won Balkh and Samangan. Dostam was
not nominated to the post-election cabinet, but two members of his “Junbush Melli” (National
Front) party were—although they were voted down by the National Assembly because the
Assembly insisted on competent officials rather than party loyalists in the new cabinet. Dostam
returned to Afghanistan in January 2010 and was restored to his previous, primarily honorary,
position of chief of staff of the armed forces.
Dostam’s reputation is further clouded by his actions during the U.S.-backed war against the
Taliban. On July 11, 2009, the New York Times reported that allegations that Dostam had caused
the death of several hundred Taliban prisoners during the major combat phase of OEF (late 2001)
were not investigated by the Bush Administration. In responding to assertions that there was no
investigation of the “Dasht-e-Laili” massacre because Dostam was a U.S. ally,9 President Obama
said any allegations of violations of laws of war need to be investigated. Dostam responded to
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (which carried the story) that only 200 Taliban prisoners died
and primarily because of combat and disease, not intentional actions of his forces.
Atta Mohammad Noor: Balkh Province
Atta Mohammad Noor, who is about 47 years old, has been the governor of Balkh Province,
whose capital is the vibrant city of Mazar-e-Sharif, since 2005. He is an ethnic Tajik and former
mujahedin commander who openly endorsed Dr. Abdullah in the 2009 presidential election.
However, Karzai has kept Noor in place because he has kept the province secure, allowing
Mazar-e-Sharif to become a major trading hub, and because displacing him could cause ethnic
8 CRS e-mail conversation with a then National Security aide to President Karzai, December 2008.
9 This is the name of the area where the Taliban prisoners purportedly died and were buried in a mass grave.
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unrest. Observers say that Noor exemplifies the local potentate, brokering local security and
business arrangements that enrich Noor and his allies while ensuring stability and prosperity.10
Isma’il Khan: Western Afghanistan/Herat
Another strongman that Karzai has sought to simultaneously engage and weaken is prominent
Tajik political leader and former Herat governor Ismail Khan. In 2006, Karzai appointed him
minister of energy and water, taking him away from his political base in the west. However, Khan
remains influential there, and maintaining ties to Khan has won Karzai election support. Khan
apparently was able to deliver potentially decisive Tajik votes in Herat Province that might
otherwise have gone to Dr. Abdullah. Certified results showed Karzai winning that province,
indicating that the deal with Khan was helpful to Karzai.
Still, Khan is said to have several opponents in Herat, and a bombing there on September 26,
2009, narrowly missed his car. U.S. officials purportedly preferred that Khan not be in the cabinet
because of his record as a local potentate, although some U.S. officials credit him with
cooperating with the privatization of the power sector of Afghanistan. Karzai renominated Khan
in his ministry post on December 19, 2009, causing purported disappointment by
parliamentarians and western donor countries who want Khan and other faction leaders
weakened. His renomination was voted down by the National Assembly and no new nominee for
that post was presented on January 9, 2010. Khan remains as head of the ministry but in an acting
capacity. Khan is on the High Peace Council that is to oversee negotiations with insurgent leaders.
However, new questions about Khan were raised in November 2010 when Afghan television
broadcast audio files purporting to contain Khan insisting that election officials alter the results of
the September 18, 2010, parliamentary elections.11
Sher Mohammad Akhundzadeh and “Koka:” Southern Afghanistan/Helmand
Province
Karzai’s relationship with another Pashtun strongman, Sher Mohammad Akhundzadeh,
demonstrates the dilemmas facing Karzai in governing Afghanistan. Akhunzadeh was a close
associate of Karzai when they were in exile in Quetta, Pakistan, during Taliban rule. Karzai
appointed him governor of Helmand after the fall of the Taliban, but in 2005, Britain demanded
he be removed for his abuses and reputed facilitation of drug trafficking, as a condition of Britain
taking security control of Helmand. Karzai reportedly wants to reappoint Akhundzadeh, who
Karzai believes was more successful against militants in Helmand using his local militiamen than
Britain has been with its more than 9,500 troops there. Akhunzadeh said in a November 2009
interview that many of his followers joined the Taliban insurgency after Britain insisted on his
ouster. However, Britain and the United States have strongly urged Karzai to keep the existing
governor, Ghulab Mangal, who is winning wide praise for his successes establishing effective
governance in Helmand (discussed further under “Expanding Local Governance,” below) and for
reducing poppy cultivation there. Akhunzadeh attempted to deliver large numbers of votes for
Karzai in Helmand, although turnout in that province was very light partly due to Taliban
intimidation of voters.
10 Gall, Carlotta. “In Afghanistan’s North, Ex-Warlord Offers Security.” New York Times, May 17, 2010.
11 Partlow, Joshua. “Audio Files Raise New Questions About Afghan Elections.” Washington Post, November 11,
2010.
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An Akhunzadeh ally, Abdul Wali Khan (nicknamed “Koka”), was similarly removed by British
pressure in 2006 as police chief of Musa Qala district of Helmand. However, Koka was reinstated
in 2008 when that district was retaken from Taliban control. The Afghan government insisted on
his reinstatement and his militia followers subsequently became the core of the 220-person police
force in the district. Koka is mentioned in a congressional report as accepting payments from
security contractors who are working under the Defense Department’s “Host National Trucking”
contract that secures U.S. equipment convoys. Koka allegedly agrees to secure the convoys in
exchange for the payments.12
Ahmad Wali Karzai: Southern Afghanistan/Qandahar Province
Governing Qandahar, a province of about 2 million, of whom about half live in Qandahar city, is
a sensitive issue in Kabul because of President Karzai’s active political interest in his home
province. Qandahar governance is particularly crucial to an ongoing 2010 U.S. military-led
operation to increase security in surrounding districts. In Qandahar, Ahmad Wali Karzai, Karzai’s
elder brother, is chair of the provincial council. He has always been more powerful than any
appointed governor of Qandahar, and President Karzai has frequently rotated the governors of
Qandahar to ensure that none of them will impinge on Ahmad Wali’s authority. Perceiving him as
the key power broker in the province, many constituents and interest groups meet him each day,
requesting his interventions on their behalf. Numerous press stories have asserted that he has
protected narcotics trafficking in the province, and some press stories say he is also a paid
informant and helper for CIA and Special Forces operations in the province.13 Some Afghans
explain Ahmad Wali Karzai’s activities as an effort to ensure that his constituents in Qandahar
have financial means to sustain themselves, even if through narcotics trade, before there are
viable alternative sources of livelihood. On October 11, 2010, President Karzai said (Larry King
interview) Ahmad Wali’s attorney had shown President Karzai a letter from the U.S. Department
of Justice to the effect that no investigation of him was under way. Observers report that President
Karzai has repeatedly rebuffed U.S. and other suggestions to try to convince his brother to step
down as provincial council chairman for Qandahar, and U.S. officials reportedly had ceased
making those suggestions as of August 2010.
Still, U.S. officials say that policy is to try to bolster the clout in Qandahar of the appointed
governor, Tooryalai Wesa. The U.S. intent to is empower Wesa to the point where petitioners seek
his help on their problems, not that of Ahmad Wali. Karzai appointed Wesa—a Canadian-Afghan
academic—in December 2008, perhaps hoping that his ties to Canada would convince Canada to
continue its mission in Qandahar beyond 2011. The United States and its partners are trying to
assist Wesa with his efforts to equitably distribute development funds and build local governing
structures out of the tribal councils he has been holding. U.S. officials reportedly have sought to
keep Ahmad Wali from interfering in Wesa’s efforts.14
12 House of Representatives. Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform. “Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan.” Report
of the Majority Staff, June 2010.
13 Filkins, Dexter, Mark Mazetti and James Risen, “Brother of Afghan Leader Is Said to be on C.I.A. Payroll,” New
York Times, October 28, 2009.
14 Partlow, Joshua, “U.S. Seeks to Bolster Kandahar Governor, Upend Power Balance,” Washington Post, April 29,
2010.
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Ghul Agha Shirzai: Eastern Afghanistan/Nangarhar
A key gubernatorial appointment has been Ghul Agha Shirzai as governor of Nangarhar. He is a
Pashtun from Qandahar, and is generally viewed in Nangarhar as an implant from the south.
However, much as has Noor in Balkh, Shirzai has exercised effective leadership, particularly in
curbing poppy cultivation there. At the same time, Shirzai is also widely accused of arbitrary
action against political or other opponents, and he reportedly does not remit all the customs duties
collected at the Khyber Pass/Torkham crossing to the central government. He purportedly uses
the funds for the benefit of the province, not trusting that funds remitted to Kabul would be spent
in the province. Shirzai had considered running against Karzai in 2009 but then opted not to run
as part of a reported “deal” with Karzai that yielded unspecified political and other benefits for
Shirzai.
Building Central Government Capacity
In the nearly nine years of extensive international involvement in Afghanistan, Afghan ministries
based in Kabul have been slowly but steadily increasing their staffs and technological capabilities
(many ministry offices now have modern computers and communications, for example), although
the government still faces a relatively small recruitment pool of workers with sufficient skills.
Afghan-led governmental reform and institution-building programs under way, all with U.S. and
other donor assistance, include training additional civil servants, instituting merit-based
performance criteria, basing hiring on qualifications rather than kinship and ethnicity, and
weeding out widespread governmental corruption. Corruption is fed, in part, by the fact that
government workers receive very low salaries (about $200 per month, as compared to the pay of
typical contractors in Afghanistan that might pay as much as $6,500 per month).
Some observers assert that the Afghan government requires not only more staff and transparency,
but also improved focus and organization, most notably in the presidential office. One idea that
surfaced in 2009, and which some Afghans are again raising to help overcome administrative
bottlenecks in the palace, was to prod Karzai to create a new position akin to a “chief
administration officer.” Several potential officials reportedly negotiated with Karzai about playing
that role, including one of Karzai’s 2009 election challengers, Ashaf Ghani. Ghani has not been
given this role but he is advising Karzai on government reform and institution building after
reconciling with him in November 2009 (after the election was settled). Ghani was part of
Karzai’s advisory team during the January 28, 2010, London conference and the July 20, 2010,
Kabul conference. Some observers say Ghani might be in line for a “special envoy” role abroad.
The Obama Administration has developed about 45 different metrics to assess progress in
building Afghan governance and security, as it was required to do (by September 23, 2009) under
P.L. 111-32, an FY2009 supplemental appropriation.15 To date, and under separate authorities
such as provisions of supplemental appropriations and foreign aid appropriations, only small
amounts of U.S. aid have been made conditional on Afghanistan’s performance on such metrics,
and no U.S. aid has been permanently withheld.
15 “Evaluating Progress in Afghanistan-Pakistan” Foreign Policy website, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/
09/16/evaluating_progress_in_afghanistan_pakistan.
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The Afghan Civil Service
The low level of Afghan bureaucratic capacity is being addressed in a number of ways, although
slowly. The United States and its partners do not have in place a broad program to themselves
train Afghan government officials, but instead fund Afghan institutions to conduct such training.
Issues of standardizing job descriptions, salaries, bonuses, benefits and the like are being
addressed by Afghanistan’s Civil Service Commission. According to the April 2010 version of a
mandated Defense Department report on Afghanistan,16 the commission has thus far redefined
more than 80,000 civil servant job descriptions.
Under a program called the Civilian Technical Assistance Plan, the United States is providing
technical assistance to Afghan ministries and to the commission. From January 2010 until January
2011, the United States is giving $85 million to programs run by the commission to support the
training and development of Afghan civil servants. One of the commission’s subordinate
organizations is the Afghan Civil Service Institute, which envisions training over 16,000
additional bureaucrats by the end of 2010, according to USAID.
Many Afghan civil service personnel undergo training in India, building on growing relations
between Afghanistan and India. Japan and Singapore also are training Afghan civil servants on
good governance, anti-corruption, and civil aviation. Some of these programs are conducted in
partnership with the German Federal Foreign Office and the Asia Foundation. In order to address
the problem of international donors luring away Afghan talent with higher salaries, the July 20,
2010, Kabul conference included a pledge by the Afghan government to reach an understanding
with donors, within six months, on a harmonized salary scale for donor-funded salaries of Afghan
government personnel.
Curbing Government Corruption and Promoting Rule of Law17
As noted throughout, there is a consensus within the Administration—not disputed by Karzai—on
the wide scope of the corruption in Afghan governance. The Administration has wrestled
throughout 2010 with the degree to which to press an anti-corruption agenda with the Karzai
government, but press accounts in October 2010 suggest the Administration has decided to focus
on reducing low-level corruption, and less so on investigations of high-level allies of Karzai. The
anti-corruption effort has sometimes come into conflict with other U.S. objectives—not only
obtaining Afghan government cooperation on the security mission but also in cultivating allies
within the Afghan government who can help stabilize areas of the country. Some of these Afghans
are said to be paid by the CIA for information and other support, and the National Security
Council reportedly has issued guidance to U.S. agencies to review which Afghans are receiving
any direct U.S. funding.18
Yet, U.S. officials believe that an anti-corruption effort must be pursued because corruption is
contributing to a souring of Western publics on the mission as well as causing some Afghans to
embrace Taliban insurgents. Official corruption was identified as a key problem in the August 30,
16 Department of Defense. “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan.” April 2010.
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/report_final_secdef_04_26_10.pdf.
17 For more information, particularly on Rule of Law programs, see: CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of
Law and Justice Sector Assistance, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman.
18 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “A Subtler Takc to Fight Afghan Corruption.” Washington Post, September 13, 2010.
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2009, assessment by General Stanley McChrystal, then overall commander of U.S. and
international forces there. His successor in the post, General Petraeus, the top U.S. and NATO
commander in Afghanistan, has said he is making anti-corruption a top priority to support his
counter-insurgency strategy. In September 2010, he issued guidance throughout the theater for
subordinate commanders to review their contracting strategies so as to enhance Afghan capacity
and reduce the potential for corruption.
The Obama Administration’s March 2009 and December 2009 strategy announcements
highlighted the issue but did not specifically make U.S. forces or assistance contingent on
progress on this issue. However, the December 2009 stipulation of July 2011 as the beginning of
a “transition” process to Afghan leadership implied that U.S. support is not open-ended or
unconditional. In the December 1, 2009, statement, the President said “We expect those [Afghan
officials] who are ineffective or corrupt to be held accountable.” As noted, pressing Karzai on
corruption reportedly was a key component of President Obama’s brief visit to Afghanistan on
March 28, 2010. Attorney General Eric Holder visited Afghanistan during June 2010 to discuss
anti-corruption efforts with his Afghan counterparts, including Afghan Attorney General
Mohammad Ishaq Aloko.
Scope of the Problem
Partly because many Afghans view the central government as “predatory,” many Afghans and
international donors have lost faith in Karzai’s leadership. A U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime
report released in January 2010 said 59% of Afghans consider corruption as a bigger concern than
the security situation and unemployment. NATO estimates that about $2.5 billion in total bribes
are paid by Afghans each year. Transparency International, a German organization that assesses
governmental corruption worldwide, ranked Afghanistan in 2008 as 176th out of 180 countries
ranked in terms of government corruption.
At the upper levels of government, some observers have asserted that Karzai deliberately tolerates
officials who are allegedly involved in the narcotics trade and other illicit activity, and supports
their receipt of lucrative contracts from donor countries, in exchange for their support. Another of
Karzai’s brother, Mahmoud Karzai, has apparently grown wealthy through real estate and auto
sales ventures in Qandahar and Kabul, purportedly by fostering the impression he can influence
his brother. Mahmoud Karzai held a press conference in Washington, DC, on April 16, 2009,
denying allegations of corruption and, in mid-2010, he hired attorney Gerald Posner to counter
corruption allegations against him by U.S. press articles. However, in October 2010 it was
reported that a Justice Department investigation of Mahmoud Karzai’s dealings (he holds dual
U.S.-Afghan citizenship) had begun. Mahmoud Karzai subsequently announced that he has
determined that he does owe back taxes to the United States and would clear up the arrearage.
Several other high officials, despite very low official government salaries, have acquired ornate
properties in west Kabul since 2002, according to Afghan observers. This raises the further
question of the inadequacy of and possible corruption within Afghanistan’s land titling system.
Other observers who have served in Afghanistan say that Karzai has appointed some provincial
governors to “reward them” and that these appointments have gone on to “prey” economically on
the populations of that province.
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Kabul Bank Difficulties
The near collapse of Kabul Bank is another example of how well-connected Afghans can avoid
regulations and other restrictions in order to garner personal profit. Mahmoud Karzai is a major
(7+%) shareholder in the large Kabul Bank, which is used to pay Afghan civil servants and
police, and he reportedly received large loans from the bank to buy his position in it. Another big
shareholder is the brother of First Vice President Fahim. The insider relationships were exposed
in August and September 2010 when Kabul Bank reported large losses from shareholder
investments in Dubai properties, prompting President Karzai to appoint a Central Bank official to
run the Kabul Bank. However, the moves did not prevent large numbers of depositors from
moving their money out of it. As of early November, the bank is still operating, but some doubt
whether it can survive long term. U.S. officials have asserted that no U.S. funds will be used to
recapitalize the bank, if that is needed. The Afghan government has said it has ample funds (about
$800 million in gold, among other assets) to recapitalize it, which may require several hundred
million dollars.
Lower-Level Corruption
Aside from the issue of high-level nepotism, observers who follow the issue say that most of the
governmental corruption takes place in the course of performing mundane governmental
functions, such as government processing of official documents (ex. passports, drivers’ licenses),
in which processing services routinely require bribes in exchange for action.19 Other forms of
corruption include Afghan security officials’ selling U.S./internationally provided vehicles, fuel,
and equipment to supplement their salaries. In other cases, local police or border officials may
siphon off customs revenues or demand extra payments to help guard the U.S. or other militaries’
equipment shipments. Other examples security commanders’ placing “ghost employees” on
official payrolls in order to pocket their salaries. As noted, it is this low-level corruption that the
Obama Administration reportedly has decided to focus on.
Because of corruption, only about 20% of U.S. aid is channeled through the Afghan government,
although a target figure of 50% of total donor funds to be channeled through the government was
endorsed at the July 20, 2010, Kabul conference. Currently, the Ministry of Public Health, the
Ministry of Communications, the Ministry of Finance, and the World Bank-run Afghan
Reconstruction Trust Fund (which the U.S. contributes to for Afghan budget support) qualify to
have U.S. funds channeled through them. The FY2011 Obama Administration aid request
expressed the goal that six ministries would qualify for direct funding by the end of 2010. Among
those potentially ready, according to criteria laid out by SRAP Holbrooke and USAID Director
Shah on July 28, 2010, three others are nearly ready to receive direct funding: the Ministry of
Education; the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, run by the widely praised
Minister Asif Rahimi; and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), which
runs the widely praised National Solidarity Program. That program awards local development
grants for specific projects. The MRRD has developed a capability, widely praised by Britain and
other observers, to account for large percentages of donated funds to ensure they are not siphoned
off by corruption.
19 Filkins, Dexter, “Bribes Corrode Afghan’s Trust in Government,” New York Times, January 2, 2009.
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Karzai Responses
Karzai has taken note of the growing U.S. criticism, and Obama Administration officials have
credited him with taking several steps, tempered by congressional and some Administration
criticism of slow implementation and allegations that he continues to shield his closest allies from
investigation or prosecution. At the January 28, 2010, London conference, the Afghan
government committed to 32 different steps to curb corruption; many of them were pledged again
at the July 20, 2010, Kabul conference. Only a few of the pledges have been completed outright,
others have had their deadlines extended or been modified. The following are measures pledged
and the status of implementation, if any:
• Assets Declarations and Verifications. During December 15-17, 2009, Karzai
held a conference in Kabul to combat corruption. It debated, among other ideas,
requiring deputy ministers and others to declare their assets, not just those at the
ministerial level. That requirement was imposed. Karzai himself earlier declared
his assets on March 27, 2009. On June 26, 2010, Karzai urged anti-corruption
officials to monitor the incomes of government officials and their families,
including his, to ensure their monies are earned legally. The July 20, 2010, Kabul
conference communiqué20 included an Afghan pledge to verify and publish these
declarations annually, beginning in 2010. This will presumably be accomplished
by a Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, which, according to the Kabul
conference communiqué, is to be established within three months of the
conference.
• Establishment of High Office of Oversight. In August 2008 Karzai, with reported
Bush Administration prodding, set up the “High Office of Oversight for the
Implementation of Anti-Corruption Strategy” (commonly referred to as the High
Office of Oversight, HOO) with the power to identify and refer corruption cases
to state prosecutors, and to catalogue the overseas assets of Afghan officials. On
March 18, 2010, Karzai, as promised during the January 28, 2010, international
meeting on Afghanistan in London, issued a decree giving the High Office direct
power to investigate corruption cases rather than just refer them to other offices.
The United States gave the High Office about $1 million in assistance during
FY2009 and its performance was audited by the Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), in an audit released in December 2009.21
USAID will provide the HOO $30 million during FY2011-FY2013 to build
capacity at the central and provincial level, according to USAID officials.
USAID pays for salaries of 6 HOO senior staff and provides some information
technology systems as well.
• Establishment of Additional Investigative Bodies: Major Crimes Task Force and
Sensitive Investigations Unit. Since 2008, several additional investigative bodies
have been established under Ministry of Interior authority. The most prominent is
the “Major Crimes Task Force,” tasked with investigating public corruption,
organized crime, and kidnapping. A headquarters for the MCTF was inaugurated
on February 25, 2010. According to the FBI press release that day, the MTCF is
Afghan led, but it is funded and mentored by the FBI, the DEA, the U.S. Marshal
20 Communique text at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/world/asia/21kabultext.html.
21 http://www.sigar.mil/reports/pdf/audits/SIGAR20Audit-10-2.pdf.
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Service, Britain’s Serious Crimes Organized Crime Agency, the Australian
Federal Police, EUPOL (European police training unit in Afghanistan), and the
U.S.-led training mission for Afghan forces. The MCTF currently has 169
investigators working on 36 cases, according to Ambassador Holbrooke’s July
28, 2010, testimony.
A related body is the Sensitive Investigations Unit (SIU), run by several dozen
Afghan police officers, vetted and trained by the DEA.22 This body led the arrest
in August 2010 of a Karzai NSC aide, Mohammad Zia Salehi, on charges of
soliciting a bribe from the large New Ansari money trading firm in exchange for
ending a money-laundering investigation of the firm. The middle-of-the-night
arrest prompted Karzai, by his own acknowledgment on August 22, 2010, to
obtain Salehi’s release and to say he would establish a commission to place the
MCTF and SIU under more thorough Afghan government control. Following
U.S. criticism that Karzai is protecting his aides (Salehi reportedly has been
involved in bringing Taliban figures to Afghanistan for conflict settlement talks),
Karzai pledged to visiting Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John
Kerry on August 20, 2010, that the MCTF and SIU would be allowed to perform
their work without political interference. In November 2010, the Attorney
General’s office said it had ended the prosecution of Salehi.
• Anti-Corruption Unit,” and an “Anti-Corruption Tribunal.” These investigative
and prosecutory bodies have been established by decree. Eleven judges have
been appointed to the tribunal. The tribunal, under the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, tries cases referred by an Anti-Corruption Unit of the Afghan
Attorney General’s office. According to testimony before the House
Appropriations Committee (State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee) by
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke on July 28, 2010, the Anti-Corruption Tribunal
has received 79 cases from the Anti-Corruption Unit and is achieving a
conviction rate of 90%. President Obama said on September 10, 2010, that 86
Afghan judges have been indicted in 2010 for corruption, up from 11 four years
ago. (The July 20, 2010, Kabul conference included a pledge by the Afghan
government to establish a statutory basis for the Anti-Corruption Tribunal and the
Major Crimes Task Force with laws to be passed by parliament and signed by
July 20, 2011.)
• Implementation: Prosecutions and Investigations of High-Level Officials.
According to the Afghanistan Attorney General’s office on November 9, 2010,
there are ongoing investigations of at least 20 senior officials, including two
sitting members of the cabinet. The two are believed to be Minister of Mining
Sharani, and his father, who is a cabinet-rank adviser to Karzai on religious
affairs. Two former ministers under investigation currently are former Commerce
Minister Amin Farhang for allegedly submitting inflated invoices for
reimbursement, and former Transportation Minister Hamidullah Qadri. There
have also been investigations of former Minister of Mines Mohammad Ibrahim
Adel, who reportedly accepted a $30 million bribe to award a key mining project
in Lowgar Province (Aynak Copper Mine) to China;23 and former Minister of the
22 Nordland, Ron and Mark Mazzetti. “Graft Dispute in Afghanistan Is Test for U.S.” New York Times, August 24,
2010.
23 Partlow, Joshua, “Afghanistan Investigating 5 Current and Former Cabinet Members,” Washington Post, November
(continued...)
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Hajj Mohammad Siddiq Chakari, under investigation for accepting bribes to steer
Hajj-related travel business to certain foreign tourist agencies. Chakari was able
to flee Afghanistan to Britain. Karzai publicly criticized the December 2009
embezzlement conviction of then Kabul Mayor Abdul Ahad Sahibi. On
December 13, 2009, the deputy Kabul mayor (Wahibuddin Sadat) was arrested at
Kabul airport for alleged misuse of authority.
• Salary Levels. The government has tried to raise salaries of security forces in
order to reduce their inclination to solicit bribes. In November 2009, the Afghan
government also has announced an increase in police salaries (from $180 per
month to $240 per month).
• Bulk Cash Transfers. At the July 2010 Kabul conference, the government pledged
to adopt regulations and implement within one year policies to govern the bulk
transfers of cash outside the country. This is intended to grapple with issues
raised by reports, discussed below, of officials taking large amounts of cash out
of Afghanistan (an estimated $1 billion per year taken out). U.S. officials say that
large movements of cash are inevitable in Afghanistan because only about 5% of
the population use banks and 90% use informal cash transfers (“hawala” system).
Ambassador Holbrooke testified on July 28, 2010 (cited earlier), that the Afghan
Central Bank has begun trying to control hawala transfers; 475 hawalas have
been licensed, to date. None were licensed as recently as three years ago. In June
2010, U.S. and Afghan officials announced establishment of a joint task force to
monitor the flow of money out of Afghanistan, including monitoring the flow of
cash out of Kabul International Airport. On August 21, 2010, it was reported that
Afghan and U.S. authorities would implement a plan to install U.S.-made
currency counters at Kabul airport to track how officials had obtained their cash
(and ensure it did not come from donor aid funds).24
• Auditing Capabilities. The U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR) has assessed that the mandate of Afghanistan’s Control
and Audit Office is too narrow and lacks the independence needed to serve as an
effective watch over the use of Afghan government funds.25 At the Kabul
conference, the government pledged to submit to parliament an Audit Law within
six months, to strengthen the independence of the Control and Audit Office, and
to authorize more auditing by the Ministry of Finance.
• Legal Review. The Kabul conference communiqué commits the government to
establish a legal review committee, within six months, to review Afghan laws for
compliance with the U.N. Convention Against Corruption. Afghanistan ratified
the convention in August 2008.
• Local Anti-Corruption Bodies. Some Afghans have taken it upon themselves to
oppose corruption at the local level. Volunteer local inspectors, sponsored
originally by Integrity Watch Afghanistan, are reported to monitor and report on
the quality of donor-funded, contractor implemented construction projects.
(...continued)
24, 2009.
24 Miller, Greg and Joshua Partlow. “Afghans, U.S. Aim to Plug Cash Drain.” Washington Post, August 21, 2010.
25 Madhani, Aamer. “U.S. Reviews Afghan Watchdog Authority.” USA Today, May 12, 2010.
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However, these local “watchdog” groups do not have an official mandate, and
therefore their authority and ability to rectify inadequacies are limited.
Moves to Penalize Lack of Progress on Corruption
Several of the required U.S. “metrics” of progress, cited above, involve Afghan progress against
corruption. A FY2009 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 111-32) mandated the withholding of
10% of about $90 million in State Department counter-narcotics funding subject to a certification
that the Afghan government is acting against officials who are corrupt or committing gross human
rights violations. No U.S. funding for Afghanistan has been withheld because of this or any other
legislative certification requirement. On the other hand, in FY2011 legislation, in June 2010, the
Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee deferred
consideration of some of the nearly $4 billion in civilian aid to Afghanistan requested for
FY2011, pending the outcome of a committee investigation of the issue. The subcommittee’s
action came amid reports that Afghan leaders are impeding investigations by the Afghan justice
system of some politically well-connected Afghans, and following reports that as much as $3
billion in funds have been allegedly embezzled by Afghan officials over the past several years.26
Others note that some of the funds might have been legal earnings from contracts or other work,
and not represent U.S. aid funds.
Rule of Law Efforts
U.S. efforts to curb corruption go hand-in-hand with efforts to promote rule of law. As of July
2010, the U.S. Embassy has an Ambassador rank official, Hans Klemm, as a rule of law
coordinator. U.S. funding supports training and mentoring for Afghan justice officials, direct
assistance to the Afghan government to expand efforts on judicial security, legal aid and public
defense, gender justice and awareness, and expansion of justice in the provinces. At the July 20,
2010, Kabul conference, the Afghan government committed to:
• Enact its draft Criminal Procedure Code into law within six months.
• Improve legal aid services within the next 12 months.
• Strengthen judicial capabilities to facilitate the return of illegally seized lands.
• Align strategy toward the informal justice sector (discussed below) with the
National Justice Sector Strategy.
• Separate from the Kabul conference issues, USAID has provided $56 million
during FY2005-2009 to facilitate property registration. An additional $140
million is being provided from FY2010-2014 to inform citizens of land processes
and procedures, and to establish a legal and regulatory framework for land
administration.
One concern is how deeply the international community should become involved in the informal
justice sector. Afghans turn often to local, informal mechanisms (shuras, jirgas) to adjudicate
disputes, particularly those involving local property, familial or local disputes, or personal status
issues, rather than use the national court system. Some estimates say that 80% of cases are
26 Rosenberg, Matthew. “Corruption Suspected in Airlift of Billions in Cash From Kabul.” Wall Street Journal, June
28, 2010.
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decided in the informal justice system. In the informal sector, Afghans can usually expect
traditional practices of dispute resolution to prevail, including those practiced by Pashtuns. Some
of these customs, including traditional forms of apology (“nanawati” and “shamana”) and
compensation for wrongs done, are discussed at http://www.khyber.org/articles/2004/
JirgaRestorativeJustice.shtml.
However, the informal justice system is dominated almost exclusively by males. Some informal
justice shuras take place in Taliban-controlled territory, and some Afghans may prefer Taliban-
run shuras when doing so means they will be judged by members of their own tribe or tribal
confederation. The rule of law issue is discussed in substantially greater depth in: CRS Report
R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance, by Liana Sun Wyler and
Kenneth Katzman
Expanding Local Governance/U.S. Civilian “Uplift”
As U.S. concerns about corruption in the central government have increased since 2007, U.S.
policy has increasingly emphasized building local governance. The U.S. shift in emphasis
complements those of the Afghan government, which asserts that it has itself long sought to
promote local governance as the next stage in Afghanistan’s political and economic development.
A key indicator of the Afghan intent came in August 2007 when Karzai placed the selection
process for local leaders (provincial governors and down) in a new Independent Directorate for
Local Governance (IDLG)—and out of the Interior Ministry. As noted above, the IDLG is headed
by Jelani Popal, a member of Karzai’s Popolzai tribe and a close ally. Some international officials
say that Popal packed local agencies with Karzai supporters, where they were able to fraudulently
produce votes for Karzai in the August 2009 presidential elections.
Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils
Many believe that the key to effective local governance is the appointment of competent
governors in all 34 Afghan provinces. U.N., U.S., and other international studies and reports all
point to the beneficial effects (reduction in narcotics trafficking, economic growth, lower
violence) of some of the strong Afghan civilian appointments at the provincial level. However,
many of the governors are considered weak, ineffective, or corrupt. Others, such as Ghul Agha
Shirzai and Atta Mohammad Noor, discussed above in the section on faction leaders, are
considered effective but also relatively independent of central authority.
One of the most widely praised gubernatorial appointments has been the March 2008 replacement
of the weak and ineffective governor of Helmand with Gulab Mangal, who is from Laghman
Province. The U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) praised Mangal in its September 2009
report for taking effective action to convince farmers to grow crops other than poppy. The
UNODC report said his efforts account for the 33% reduction of cultivation in Helmand in 2009,
as compared with 2008. Mangal has played a key role in convening tribal shuras and educating
local leaders on the benefits of the U.S.-led offensive to remove Taliban insurgents from Marjah
town and install new authorities there (“Operation Moshtarek,” which began in February 2010.)
Still, there are widespread concerns about provincial governing capacity. For example, out of over
200 job slots available for the Qandahar provincial and Qandahar city government, only about
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30% are filled. In four key districts around Qandahar city, there are 44 significant jobs, including
district governors, but only about 12 officials are routinely present for work.27 Similar
percentages are reported in neighboring Helmand Province, the scene of substantial U.S.-led
combat during 2010.
Provincial Councils
One problem noted by governance experts is that the role of the elected provincial councils is
unclear. The elections for the provincial councils in all 34 provinces were held on August 20,
2009, concurrent with the presidential elections. The previous provincial council elections were
held concurrent with the parliamentary elections in September 2005. The 2009 election results for
the provincial councils were certified on December 29, 2009. In most provinces, the provincial
councils do not act as true legislatures, and they are considered weak compared to the power and
influence of the provincial governors.
Still, the provincial councils will play a major role in choosing the upper house of the National
Assembly (Meshrano Jirga). The next selection process is to occur in December 2010, after
certification of results of the lower house elections. In the absence of district councils (no
elections held or scheduled), the provincial councils elected in 2009 will choose two-thirds (68
seats) of the 102-seat Meshrano Jirga.
District-Level Governance
District governors are appointed by the president, at the recommendation of the IDLG. Only about
half of all district governors (there are 364 districts) have any staff or vehicles. Efforts to expand
village local governance have been hampered by corruption and limited availability of skilled
Afghans. In some districts of Helmand that had fallen under virtual Taliban control until the July
2009 U.S.-led offensives in the province, there were no district governors in place at all. Some of
the district governors, including in Nawa and Now Zad district, returned after the U.S.-led
expulsion of Taliban militants.
The ISAF campaign plan to retake the Marjah area of Helmand (Operation Moshtarak), which
began on February 14, 2010, and succeeded in ousting Taliban control of the town by February
25, 2010, included recruiting, in advance, civilian Afghan officials who would govern the district
once military forces had expelled Taliban fighters from it. Haji Zahir, a businessman who was in
exile in Germany during Taliban rule, took up his position to become the chief executive in
Marjah (which is to become its own district). He held meetings with Marjah residents, one of
which included hosting a visit to Marjah by President Karzai (March 7, 2010). He had planned to
expand his staff to facilitate the “build phase” of the ISAF counter-insurgency plan for the area.
However, the expansion of that staff—and the building of governance in Marjah more
generally—has been slow and some officials assigned to the city refused to serve in it for fear of
Taliban assassination. As an example of the difficulties in building up local governance, Zahir
was replaced in early July 2010, apparently because of his inability to obtain cooperation from
Marjah tribal leaders. However, British civilian representatives in Marjah reported in October
27 Partlow, Joshua and Karen DeYoung. “Afghan Government Falters in Kandahar.” Washington Post, November 3,
2010.
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2010 that many central government ministries now have personnel in place in Marjah and they
live there and are showing up daily. Still, as noted, many slots are unfilled.
As far as the relationship between local representatives of the central government ministries and
district governments, some difficulties have been noted. Local officials sometimes disagree on
priorities or on implementation mechanisms. As is the case with the staffing of district
government offices, the presence of Kabul representatives throughout Afghanistan is expanding
very slowly and unevenly throughout the country.
District Councils and Municipal and Village Level Authority
No elections for district councils have been held due to boundary and logistical difficulties.
However, in his November 19, 2009, inaugural speech, Karzai said the goal of the government is
to hold these elections along with the 2010 parliamentary elections. However, subsequently,
Afghan officials have said that there will not be district elections in September 2010 when the
parliamentary elections were to be held.
As are district governors, mayors of large municipalities are appointed. There are about 42
mayors nationwide, many with deputy mayors. Karzai pledged in his November 2009 inaugural
that “mayoral” elections would be held “for the purpose of better city management.” However, no
municipal elections have been held and none is scheduled.
The IDLG, with advice from India and other donors, is also in the process of empowering
localities to decide on development priorities by forming Community Development Councils
(CDC’s). Thus far, there are about 30,000 CDC’s established, and they are eventually to all be
elected.
U.S. Local Governance Advisory Capacity
As a consequence of the March 2009 Obama Administration review, to help build local governing
capacity, the Administration recruited about 500 U.S. civilian personnel from the State
Department, USAID, the Department of Agriculture, and several other agencies—and many
additional civilians from partner countries will join them—to advise Afghan ministries, and
provincial and district administrations. That effort raised the number of U.S. civilians in
Afghanistan to about 975 by early 2010. Of these, nearly 350 are serving outside Kabul, up from
67 in early 2009. USAID Director Rajiv Shah testified on July 28, 2010, that 55% of USAID’s
420 personnel in Afghanistan are serving outside Kabul. A strategy document released by the
office of Ambassador Holbrook in January 2010 said that the number of U.S. civilians is slated to
grow by another 30% (to about 1,300) in 2010.28
Although many U.S. civilian officials now work outside Kabul, there are about 1,100 employees
at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, rising to about 1,200 by the end of 2010. To accommodate the
swelling ranks, in early November 2010 a $511 million contract was let to Caddell Construction
to expand it, and two contracts of $20 million each were let to construct U.S. consulates in Herat
and Mazar-e-Sharif.
28 For text, see http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135728.pdf.
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Senior Civilian Representative Program
The Administration also has instituted appointments of “Senior Civilian Representatives”
(SCR),29 who are counterparts to the military commanders of each NATO/ISAF regional
command (there are currently five of them). Each Senior Civilian Representative is to have 10-30
personnel on their team. For example, Ambassador Frank Ruggiero, who is serving in Qandahar
as the SCR for Regional Command South, is based at Qandahar airfield and interacts closely with
the military command of the southern sector. He testified before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on May 6, 2010. USAID official Dawn Liberi is SCR for Regional Command East
(RC-E), which is U.S.-run. She was mentioned specifically by President Obama in his address to
U.S. forces at Bagram Airfield (headquarters of RC-E) on March 28, 2010.
Promoting Human Rights
None of the Obama Administration strategy reviews in 2009 specifically changed U.S. policy on
Afghanistan’s human rights practices. U.S. policy has been to build capacity in human rights
institutions in Afghanistan and to promote civil society and political participation. On human
rights issues, the overall State Department judgment is that the country’s human rights record
remains poor, according to the department’s report for 2009 (issued March 11, 2010).30 The latest
State Department report was similar in tone and substance to that of previous years, citing Afghan
security forces and local faction leaders for abuses, including torture and abuse of detainees.
One of the institutional human rights developments since the fall of the Taliban has been the
establishment of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). It is headed
by a woman, Sima Simar, a Hazara Shiite from Ghazni Province. It acts as an oversight body but
has what some consider to be too cozy relations with Karzai’s office and is not as aggressive as
some had hoped. The July 20, 2010, Kabul conference communiqué contained a pledge by the
Afghan government to begin discussions with the AIHRC, within six months, to stabilize its
budgetary status. USAID has given the AIHRC about $10 million per year since the fall of the
Taliban.
Media and Freedom of Expression/Social Freedoms
Afghanistan’s conservative traditions have caused some backsliding in recent years on media
freedoms, which were hailed during 2002-2008 as a major benefit of the U.S. effort in
Afghanistan. A press law was passed in September 2008 that gives some independence to the
official media outlet, but also contains a number of content restrictions, and requires that new
newspapers and electronic media be licensed by the government. Backed by Islamic
conservatives in parliament, such as Sayyaf (referenced above), and Shiite clerics such as
Ayatollah Asif Mohseni, Afghanistan’s conservative Council of Ulema (Islamic scholars) has
been ascendant. With the council’s backing, in April 2008 the Ministry of Information and
Culture banned five Indian-produced soap operas on the grounds that they are too risque,
although the programs were restored in August 2008 under a compromise that also brought in
some Islamic-oriented programs from Turkey. At the same time, according to the State
29 For more information, see the Defense Department report on Afghanistan stability, April 2010, cited earlier.
pp. 19-20.
30 Department of State. 2009 Human Rights Report: Afghanistan, March 11, 2010.
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Department there has been a growing number of arrests or intimidation of journalists who
criticize the central government or local leaders.
Ulema Council
Press reports in September 2010 note that the Ulema Council, a network of 3,000 clerics
throughout Afghanistan, has increasingly taken conservative positions more generally. Each cleric
in the council is paid about $100 per month and, in return, is expected to promote the government
line. However, in August 2010, 350 members of the Council voted to demand that Islamic law
(Sharia) be implemented. If the government were inclined to adopt that recommendation, either
on its own or as part of a peace agreement with major Taliban leaders, it is likely that doing so
would require amending the Afghan constitution, which does not implement Sharia. Some believe
the Ulema Council is drifting out of government control in part because of the incapacity of its
chairman, former Supreme Court Chief Justice Fazl Hadi Shinwari, who has been in a coma in
India for several months. No replacement for him has been named by the government.
In September 2010, some Ulema Council figures organized protests against plans by a Florida
pastor to burn Qurans on the anniversary of the September 11 attacks (plans which were
abandoned). As another example of the growing power of harder line Islamists, alcohol is
increasingly difficult to obtain in restaurants and stores, although it is not banned for sale to non-
Muslims. There were reports in April 2010 that Afghan police had raided some restaurants and
prevented them from selling alcoholic beverages at all.
Harsh Punishments
In October 2007, Afghanistan resumed enforcing the death penalty after a four-year moratorium,
executing 15 criminals. In August 2010, the issue of stoning to death as a punishment arose when
Taliban insurgents ordered a young couple who had eloped stoned to death in a Taliban-controlled
area of Konduz Province. Although the punishment was not meted out by the government, it was
reported that many residents of the couple’s village supported the punishment. The stoning also
followed one week after the national Council of Ulema issued a statement (August 10, 2010),
following a meeting with government religious officials, calling for more application of Shariah
punishments (including such punishments as stoning, amputations, and lashings) in order to better
prevent crime.
Religious Freedom
The October 2009 International Religious Freedom report (released October 26, 2009) says the
Afghan government took limited steps during the year to increase religious freedom, but that
“serious problems remain.” Members of minority religions, including Christians, Sikhs, Hindus,
and Baha’i’s, often face discrimination; the Supreme Court declared the Baha’i faith to be a form
of blasphemy in May 2007. Northeastern provinces have a substantial population of Islamailis, a
Shiite Muslim sect often called “Seveners” (believers in the Seventh Imam as the true Imam).
Many Ismailis follow the Agha Khan IV (Prince Qarim al-Husseini), who chairs the large Agha
Khan Foundation that has invested heavily in Afghanistan.
One major case that drew international criticism was a January 2008 death sentence, imposed in a
quick trial, against 23-year-old journalist Sayed Kambaksh for allegedly distributing material
critical of Islam. On October 21, 2008, a Kabul appeals court changed his sentence to 20 years in
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prison, a judgment upheld by another court in March 2009. He was pardoned by Karzai and
released on September 7, 2009.
A positive development is that Afghanistan’s Shiite minority, mostly from the Hazara tribes of
central Afghanistan (Bamiyan and Dai Kundi provinces) can celebrate their holidays openly, a
development unknown before the fall of the Taliban. Some Afghan Shiites follow Iran’s clerical
leaders politically, but Afghan Shiites tend to be less religious and more socially open than their
co-religionists in Iran. The Hazaras are also advancing themselves socially and politically through
education in such fields as information technology.31 The former Minister of Justice, Sarwar
Danesh, is a Hazara Shiite, the first of that community to hold that post. He studied in Qom, Iran,
a center of Shiite theology. (Danesh was voted down by the parliament for reappointment on
January 2, 2010, and again on June 28 when nominated for Minister of Higher Education.) The
justice minister who was approved on January 16, 2010, Habibullah Ghalib, is part of Dr.
Abdullah’s faction, but not a Shiite Muslim. Ghaleb previously (2006) was not approved by the
Wolesi Jirga for a spot on the Supreme Court. There was unrest among some Shiite leaders in late
May 2009 when they learned that the Afghan government had dumped 2,000 Iranian-supplied
religious texts into a river when an Afghan official complained that the books insulted the Sunni
majority.
A previous religious freedom case earned congressional attention in March 2006. An Afghan
man, Abd al-Rahman, who had converted to Christianity 16 years ago while working for a
Christian aid group in Pakistan, was imprisoned and faced a potential death penalty trial for
apostasy—his refusal to convert back to Islam. Facing international pressure, Karzai prevailed on
Kabul court authorities to release him (March 29, 2006). His release came the same day the
House passed H.Res. 736 calling on protections for Afghan converts. In May 2010, the Afghan
government suspended the operations of two Christian-affiliated international relief groups
claiming the groups were attempting to promote Christianity among Afghans—an assertion
denied by the groups (Church World Service and Norwegian Church Aid).
Human Trafficking
Afghanistan was placed in Tier 2: Watch List in the State Department report on human trafficking
issued on June 14, 2010 (Trafficking in Persons Report for 2010). The placement was a
downgrade from the Tier 2 placement of the 2009 report. The Afghan government is assessed in
the report as not complying with minimum standards for eliminating trafficking, but making
significant efforts to do so. However, the downgrade was attributed to the fact that the
government did not prosecute any human traffickers under a 2008 law. The State Department
report says that women from China, some countries in Africa, Iran, and some countries in Central
Asia are being trafficked into Afghanistan for sexual exploitation. Other reports say some are
brought to work in night clubs purportedly frequented by members of many international NGOs.
In an effort to also increase protections for Afghan women, in August 2008 the Interior Ministry
announced a crackdown on sexual assault—an effort to publicly air a taboo subject. The United
States has spent about $500,000 to eliminate human trafficking in Afghanistan since FY2001.
31 Oppel, Richard Jr. and Abdul Waheed Wafa, “Hazara Minority Hustles to Head of the Class in Afghanistan,” New
York Times, January 4, 2010.
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Advancement of Women
Freedoms for women have greatly expanded since the fall of the Taliban with their elections to
the parliament and their service at many levels of government. According to the State Department
human rights report for 2009, numerous abuses, such as denial of educational and employment
opportunities, continue primarily because of Afghanistan’s conservative traditions. Other
institutions, such as Human Rights Watch, report backsliding due in part to the lack of security.32
Many Afghan women are concerned that the efforts by Karzai and the international community to
persuade insurgents to end their fight and rejoin the political process (“reintegration and
reconciliation” process) could result in backsliding on women’s rights. Most insurgents are highly
conservative Islamists who oppose the advancement of women that has occurred. They are
perceived as likely to demand some reversals of that trend if they are allowed, as part of any deal,
to control territory, assume high-level government positions, or achieve changes to the Afghan
constitution. Karzai has said that these concessions are not envisioned, but skepticism remains,
and some Afghan officials close to Karzai do not rule out the possibility of amending the
constitution to accommodate some Taliban demands. Women have been a target of attacks by
Taliban supporters, including attacks on girls’ schools and athletic facilities.
A major development in post-Taliban Afghanistan was the formation of a Ministry of Women’s
Affairs dedicated to improving women’s rights, although numerous accounts say the ministry’s
influence is limited. It promotes the involvement of women in business ventures, and it plays a
key role in trying to protect women from domestic abuse by running a growing number of
women’s shelters across Afghanistan. Husn Banu Ghazanfar remains minister in an acting
capacity, having been voted down by the lower house for reappointment.
The Afghan government tried to accommodate Shiite leaders’ demands in 2009 by enacting
(passage by the National Assembly and signature by Karzai in March 2009) a “Shiite Personal
Status Law,” at the request of Shiite leaders. The law was intended to provide a legal framework
for members of the Shiite minority in family law issues. However, the issue turned controversial
when international human rights groups and governments—and Afghan women in a
demonstration in Kabul—complained about provisions that would appear to sanction marital rape
and which would allow males to control the ability of females in their family to go outside the
home. President Obama publicly called these provisions “abhorrent.” In early April 2009, taking
into account the outcry, Karzai sent the law back to the Justice Ministry for review, saying it
would be altered if it were found to conflict with the Afghan constitution. The offending clauses
were substantially revised by the Justice Ministry in July 2009, requiring that wives “perform
housework,” but also apparently giving the husband the right to deny a wife food if she refuses
sex. The revised law was passed by the National Assembly in late July 2009, signed by Karzai,
and published in the official gazette on July 27, 2009, although it remains unsatisfactory to many
human rights and women’s rights groups.
On August 6, 2009, perhaps in an effort to address some of the criticisms of the Shiite law, Karzai
issued, as a decree, the “Elimination of Violence Against Women” law. Minister of Women’s
Affairs Ghazanfar told CRS in October 2009 that the bill was long contemplated and not related
to the Shiite status law.33 However, it is subject to review and passage by the National Assembly,
32 “We Have the Promises of the World:Women’s Rights in Afghanistan,” Human Rights Watch, December 2009,
http://www.wluml.org/sites/wluml.org/files/hrw_report_2009.pdf.
33 CRS meeting with the Minister of Women’s Affairs, October 13, 2009.
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where some Islamic conservatives, such as Sayyaf (cited above) have been blocking final
approval. Sayyaf and others reportedly object to the provisions of the law criminalizing child
marriages.
Women in Key Positions
Despite conservative attitudes, women have moved into prominent positions in all areas of
Afghan governance, although with periodic setbacks. Three female ministers were in the 2004-
2006 cabinet: former presidential candidate Masooda Jalal (Ministry of Women’s Affairs), Sediqa
Balkhi (Ministry for Martyrs and the Disabled), and Amina Afzali (Ministry of Youth). Karzai
nominated Soraya Sobhrang as minister of women’s affairs in the 2006 cabinet, but she was voted
down by Islamist conservatives in parliament. He eventually appointed another female, Husn
Banu Ghazanfar, as minister. Ghazanfar, who is a Russian-speaking Uzbek from northern
Afghanistan, has been the only woman in the cabinet for several years. She was renominated on
December 19, 2009, was voted down on January 2, 2010, but remains in an acting capacity.
Karzai subsequently named three women in new selections presented on January 9, 2010,
including Afzali (to Labor and Social Affairs). Of the three, however, only Afzali was confirmed
on January 16, 2009; the other two were opposed by Islamic conservatives. In March 2005,
Karzai appointed a former minister of women’s affairs, Habiba Sohrabi, as governor of Bamiyan
province, inhabited mostly by Hazaras. (She hosted then First Lady Laura Bush in Bamiyan in
June 2008.)
The constitution reserves for women at least 17 of the 102 seats in the upper house and about one
quarter of the 249 seats in the lower house of parliament. There are 23 serving in the outgoing
upper house, 6 more than Karzai’s mandated bloc of 17 female appointees. There are 68 women
in the outgoing lower house (when the quota was 62), meaning 6 were elected without the quota.
The ratio is ensured by reserving an average of two seats per province (34 provinces) for
women—the top two female vote getters per province. Kabul province reserves 9 female seats.
Two women ran for president for the August 20, 2009, election, as discussed below, although
each received less than one-half of 1%. Some NGOs and other groups believe that the women
elected by the quota system are not viewed as equally legitimate parliamentarians.
For the September 18, 2010, parliamentary elections, about 400 women ran (about 16% of all
candidates). About 350 women were delegates to the 1,600-person “peace jirga” that was held
during June 2-4, 2010, which endorsed an Afghan plan to reintegrate insurgents who want to end
their fight. The High Peace Council to oversee the reconciliation process, which met for the first
time on October 10, 2010, has eight women out of 68 members.
More generally, women are performing jobs that were rarely held by women even before the
Taliban came to power in 1996, including in the new police force. There are over 200 female
judges and 447 female journalists working nationwide. The most senior Afghan woman in the
police force was assassinated in Qandahar in September 2008. Press reports say Afghan women
are increasingly learning how to drive. Under the new government, the wearing of the full body
covering called the burqa is no longer obligatory, and fewer women are wearing it than was the
case a few years ago.
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U.S. and International Posture on Women’s Rights
U.S. officials have had some influence in persuading the government to codify women’s rights.
After the Karzai government took office, the United States and the new Afghan government set
up a U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council to coordinate the allocation of resources to Afghan women.
Some believe that, in recent years, the U.S. government has dropped women’s issues as a priority
for Afghanistan. Some criticized President Obama’s speech on December 1, 2009, for its absence
of virtually any mention of women’s rights. Promoting women’s rights was discussed at the
January 28, 2010, London conference but primarily in the context of the reintegration issue.
Specific earmarks for use of U.S. funds for women’s and girls’ programs in Afghanistan are
contained in recent annual appropriations, and these earmarks have grown steadily. The United
States provided $153 million to programs for Afghan women in FY2009, and expects to provide
$175 million for FY2010, in line with these earmarks.34 According to State Department reports on
U.S. aid to women and girls, covering FY2001-2008, and then FY2008-2009, the United States
has numerous, multi-faceted projects directly in support of Afghan women, including women’s
empowerment, maternal and child health and nutrition, funding the Ministry of Women’s Affairs,
and micro-finance projects. Some programs focus on training female police officers.35 Some
donors, particularly those of Canada, have financed specific projects for Afghan women farmers.
The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (AFSA, P.L. 107-327) authorized $15 million per
year (FY2003-FY2006) for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. Those monies are donated to the
Ministry from Economic Support Funds (ESF) accounts controlled by USAID. S. 229, the
Afghan Women Empowerment Act of 2009, introduced in the 111th Congress, would authorize
$45 million per year in FY2010-FY2012 for grants to Afghan women, for the ministry of
Women’s Affairs ($5 million), and for the AIHRC ($10 million).
Democracy, Governance, and Elections Funding Issues
U.S. funding for democracy, governance, and rule of law programs has grown, in line with the
Obama Administration strategy for Afghanistan. During FY2002-FY2008, a total of $1.8 billion
was spent on democracy, governance, rule of law and human rights, and elections support. Of
these, by far the largest category was “good governance,” which, in large part, are grant awards to
provinces that make progress against narcotics.
The following was spent in FY2009:
• $881 million for all of democracy and governance, including
• $283 million for good governance;
• $150 million for National Solidarity Program and direct budget support to
Afghan government;
• $174 million for election support;
34 For prior years, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by
Kenneth Katzman, in the section on aid to Afghanistan, year by year.
35 Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, “Report on U.S. Government Activities 2008-
2009 For Women and Girls in Afghanistan,” October 20, 2009.
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• $50 million for strategic program development; and
• $212 million for rule of law, funded by both USAID and State Department
Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE).
Planned for FY2010 (regular appropriation and FY2010 supplemental request):
• $1.7 billion for all democracy and governance, including
• $1.15 billion for “good governance”;
• $411 million for rule of law and human rights (ESF funds controlled by
USAID and INCLE funds);
• $113 million for “civil society” building programs; and
• $25 million for political competition and consensus building (elections).
Key Components of FY2011 request:
• $1.388 billion for all democracy and governance funds, including:
• $1.01 billion for good governance. This program is used to build the financial
and management oversight capability of the central government.
• $248 million for rule of law and human rights;
• $80 million for civil society building; and
• $50 million for political competition and consensus building.
For comprehensive tables on U.S. aid to Afghanistan, by fiscal year and by category and type of
aid, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,
by Kenneth Katzman.
Elections in 2009 and 2010
As noted throughout, the 2009 presidential and provincial elections were anticipated to be a major
step in Afghanistan’s political development. They were the first post-Taliban elections run by the
Afghan government itself in the form of the Afghanistan Independent Electoral Commission.
Donors, including the United States, invested almost $500 million in 2009 to improve the
capacity of the Afghan government to conduct the elections.36
Nonetheless, there were assertions of a lack of credibility of the IEC, because most of its
commissioners, including then-Chairman Azizullah Ludin, were selected by and politically close
to Karzai. As a check and balance to ensure electoral credibility, there was also a U.N.-appointed
Elections Complaints Commission (ECC) that reviews fraud complaints. Under the 2005 election
law, there were three seats for foreign nationals, appointed by the Special Representative of the
U.N. Secretary General/head of U.N. Assistance Mission–Afghanistan, UNAMA. The two
36 Report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). September 9, 2010.
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Afghans on the ECC governing council37 were appointed by the Supreme Court and Afghanistan
Independent Human Rights Commission, respectively.
2009 Presidential Election
Special Representative Holbrooke said at a public forum on August 12, 2009, that the August 20,
2009, presidential elections were key to legitimizing the Afghan government, no matter who won.
Yet, because of the widespread fraud identified by Afghanistan’s U.N.-appointed Elections
Complaints Commission (ECC) in the first round of the elections, the process did not produce full
legitimacy. The marred elections process was a major factor in a September-November 2009
high-level U.S. strategy reevaluation because of the centrality of a credible, legitimate partner
Afghan government to U.S. strategy.38
Problems with the election began in late 2008 with a dispute over the election date. On February
3, 2009, Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission (IEC) set August 20, 2009, as the
election date (a change from a date mandated by Article 61 of the Constitution as April 21, 2009,
in order to allow at least 30 days before Karzai’s term expired on May 22, 2009). The IEC
decision on the latter date cited Article 33 of the Constitution as mandating universal accessibility
to the voting—and saying that the April 21 date was precluded by difficulties in registering
voters, printing ballots, training staff, advertising the elections, and the dependence on
international donor funding, in addition to the security questions.39
In response to UF insistence that Karzai’s presidency ended May 22, and that a caretaker
government should run Afghanistan until elections, Karzai issued a February 28, 2009, decree
directing the IEC to set the elections in accordance with all provisions of the constitution. The
IEC reaffirmed on March 4, 2009, that the election would be held on August 20, 2009. Karzai
argued against his stepping down, saying that the Constitution does not provide for any transfer of
power other than in case of election or death of a President. The Afghan Supreme Court backed
that decision on March 28, 2009, and the Obama Administration publicly backed these rulings.
Election Modalities and Processes
Despite the political dispute between Karzai and his opponents, enthusiasm among the public
appeared high in the run-up to the election. Registration, which updated 2005 voter rolls, began in
October 2008 and was completed as of the beginning of March 2009. About 4.5 million new
voters registered, and about 17 million total Afghans were registered. However, there were
widespread reports of registration fraud (possibly half of all new registrants), with some voters
registering on behalf of women who do not, by custom, show up at registration sites. U.S. and
other election observers found instances of fraudulent registration cards and evidence that cards
had been offered for sale. U.S./NATO military operations in some areas, including in Helmand in
January 2009, were conducted to secure registration centers; however, some election observers
noted that there was insufficient international assistance to the IEC, which ran the election, to
ensure an untainted registration process.
37 ECC website, http://www.ecc.org.af/en/.
38 Fidler, Stephen and John W. Miller, “U.S. Allies Await Afghan Review,” Wall Street Journal, September 25, 2009.
39 Statement of the Independent Election Commission Secretariat, February 3, 2009, provided to CRS by a Karzai
national security aide.
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Candidates filed to run during April 24-May 8, 2009. A total of 44 registered to run for president,
of which three were disqualified for various reasons, leaving a field of 41 (later reduced to 32
after several dropped out).
In the provincial elections, 3,200 persons competed for 420 seats nationwide. Those elections
were conducted on a “Single Non-Transferable Vote” (SNTV) system, in which each voter votes
for one candidate in a multi-member constituency. That system encourages many candidacies and
is considered to discourage the participation of political parties. Although about 80% of the
provincial council candidates ran as independents, some of Afghanistan’s parties, including Hezb-
i-Islam, which is a prominent grouping in the National Assembly, fielded multiple candidates in
several different provinces.
The provincial elections component of the election received little attention, in part because the
role of these councils is unclear. Of the seats up for election, about 200 women competed for the
124 seats reserved for women (29%) on the provincial councils, although in two provinces
(Qandahar and Uruzgan) there were fewer women candidates than reserved seats. In Kabul
Province, 524 candidates competed for the 29 seats of the council.
The European Union, supported by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) sent a few hundred observers, and the International Republican Institute and National
Democratic Institute sent observers as well. About 8,000 Afghans assisted the observation
missions, according to the U.N. Nations Development Program. Because much of Afghanistan is
inaccessible by road, ballots were distributed (and were brought for counting) by animals in
addition to vehicles and fixed and rotary aircraft.
Security was a major issue for all the international actors supporting the Afghan elections process,
amid open Taliban threats against Afghans who vote. In the first round, about 7,000 polling
centers were to be established (with each center having multiple polling places, totaling about
29,000), but, of those, about 800 were deemed too unsafe to open, most of them in restive
Helmand and Qandahar provinces. A total of about 6,200 polling centers opened on election day.
The total cost of the Afghan elections in 2009 were about $300 million. Other international
donors contributing funds to close the gap left by the U.S. contribution of about $175 million.
The Political Contest and Campaign
The presidential competition took shape in May 2009. In the election-related political deal-
making,40 Karzai obtained an agreement from Fahim to run as his first vice presidential running
mate. Karzai, Fahim, and incumbent second Vice President Karim Khalili (a Hazara) registered
their ticket on May 4, 2009, just before Karzai left to visit the United States for the latest round of
three-way strategic talks (U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan).
Karzai convinced several prominent Pashtuns not to run. Ghul Agha Shirzai, a member of the
powerful Barakzai clan, reportedly reached an arrangement with Karzai the week of the
registration period that headed off his candidacy. Anwar al-Haq Ahady, the former finance
40 Some of the information in this section obtained in CRS interviews with a Karzai national security aide, December
2008.
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minister and Central Bank governor, did not run. (He did receive a cabinet nomination in the
December 19 ministry list but was voted down by the parliament.)
Anti-Karzai Pashtuns did not coalesce around one challenger. Former Interior Minister Ali Jalali
(who resigned in 2005 over Karzai’s compromises with faction leaders), and former Finance
Minister (2002-2004) and Karzai critic Ashraf Ghani did not reach agreement to forge a single
ticket. In the end, Ghani, the 56-year-old former World Bank official, registered his candidacy,
but without Jalali or prominent representation from other ethnicities in his vice presidential slots.
The UF had difficulty forging a united challenge to Karzai. Burhanuddin Rabbani (Afghanistan
President during 1992-1996), the elder statesman of the UF bloc, reportedly insisted that an ethnic
Tajik (the ethnic core of the UF) head the UF ticket. Former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah
Abdullah, the 50-year-old former ophthalmologist and foreign envoy of the legendary Tajik
mujahedin leader Ahmad Shah Masoud, registered to run with UF backing. His running mates
were Dr. Cheragh Ali Cheragh, a Hazara who did poorly in the 2004 election, and a little known
Pashtun, Homayoun Wasefi. However, the presence of a key Tajik, Fahim, on Karzai’s ticket
showed the UF to be split. Another problem for the UF was that Ahmad Zia Massoud (a vice
president) did not win support of the bloc to head its ticket. Massoud is the brother of Ahmad
Shah Masoud (see above), who was killed, purportedly by Al Qaeda, two days before the
September 11 attacks on the United States.
The Campaign
Karzai went into the election as a clear favorite, but the key question was whether he would win
in the first round (more than 50% of the vote). IRI and other pre-election polls showed him with
about 45% support. Dr. Abdullah polled about 25% and emerged as the main challenger. The
conventional wisdom has always been that the two-round format favors a Pashtun candidate.
Although Karzai’s public support was harmed by perceptions of ineffectiveness and corruption,
many Afghan voters apparently see many of Afghanistan’s problems as beyond Karzai’s control.
He used some U.S. policy setbacks to bolster his electoral prospects, for example by railing
against civilian casualties resulting from U.S./NATO operations, and by proposing new curbs on
international military operations in Afghanistan. Karzai said he would hold a loya jirga, if elected,
including Taliban figures, to try to reach a settlement with the insurgency. He restated that intent
in his November 19, 2009, inaugural speech and has moved on that front, as noted.
Karzai was criticized for a campaign that relied on personal ties to ethnic faction leaders rather
than a retail campaign based on public appearances. Karzai agreed to public debates with rivals,
although he backed out of a scheduled July 23 debate with Abdullah and Ghani (on the private
Tolo Television network) on the grounds that the event was scheduled on short notice and was
limited to only those three. Abdullah and Ghani debated without Karzai, generating additional
criticism of Karzai. Karzai did attend the next debate (on state-run Radio-Television Afghanistan)
on August 16, debating Ghani and Bashardost, but without Abdullah. Karzai was said to benefit
from his ready access to media attention, which focuses on his daily schedule as president.
Dr. Abdullah stressed his background of mixed ethnicity (one parent is Pashtun and one is Tajik)
to appeal to Pashtuns, but his experience and background has been with other Tajik leaders and he
campaigned extensively in the north and west, which are populated mainly by Tajiks. However,
he also campaigned in Qandahar, in Pashtun heartland. Both Karzai and Abdullah held large
rallies in Kabul and elsewhere.
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Ghani polled at about 6% just before the election, according to surveys. Ghani appeared
frequently in U.S. and Afghan media broadcasts criticizing Karzai for failing to establish
democratic and effective institutions, but he has previously spent much time in the United States
and Europe and many average Afghans viewed him as out of touch with day-to-day problems in
Afghanistan. Ghani made extensive use of the Internet for advertising and fundraising, and he
hired political consultant James Carville to advise his campaign.41
Another candidate who polled unexpectedly well was 54-year-old anti-corruption parliamentarian
Ramazan Bashardost, an ethnic Hazara. He was polling close to 10% just before the election. He
ran a low-budget campaign with low-paid personnel and volunteers, but attracted a lot of media.
This suggests that, despite most Hazara ethnic leaders, such as Mohammad Mohaqiq, endorsing
Karzai, Bashardost would do well among Hazaras, particularly those who are the most educated.
Some believe the Shiite personal status law, discussed above, was an effort by Karzai to win
Hazara Shiite votes. According to the preliminary results, Bashardost carried several Hazara
provinces, including Ghazni and Dai Kondi, but Mohaqiq’s backing apparently helped Karzai
carry the Hazara heartland of Bamiyan province. Other significant candidates are shown below.
Other Candidates
Abd al-Salam Rocketi ("Mullah Rocketi”). A Pashtun, reconciled Taliban figure, member of the lower house of
parliament. Was expected to do well if Taliban sympathizers participated, but received less than 1% (preliminary
totals), putting him in 9th place out of 32.
Hedayat Amin Arsala. A Pashtun, was a vice president during 2001-2004. He was Foreign Minister in the 1992-96
Rabbani-led mujahedin government. He is a prominent economist and perceived as close to the former royal family.
Finished 30th out of 32.
Abd al Jabbar Sabit. A Pashtun, was fired by Karzai in 2007 for considering a run against Karzai in the election.
Finished in 19th place.
Shahnawaz Tanai. A Pashtun. Served as defense minister in the Communist government of Najibullah (which was
left in place after the Soviets withdrew in 1989) but led a failed coup against Najibullah in April 1990. Finished an
unexpectedly strong sixth place and did wel in several Pashtun provinces.
Mirwais Yasini. Another strong Pashtun candidate, was viewed as a dark horse possible winner. 48-year-old deputy
speaker of the lower house of parliament, but also without wel -known non-Pashtun running mates. Finished fifth.
Frozan Fana and Shahla Ata. The two women candidates in the race. Fana is the wife of the first post-Taliban
aviation minister, who was killed during an altercation at Kabul airport in 2002. These two candidates are widely given
almost no chance of winning, but attracted substantial media attention as trail-blazers. Fana finished seventh but Ata
finished in 14th place.
The Election Results
Taliban intimidation and voter apathy appears to have suppressed the total turnout to about 5.8
million votes cast, or about a 35% turnout, far lower than expected. Twenty-seven Afghans,
mostly security forces personnel, were killed in election-day violence. Turnout was said by
observers and U.S. and other military personnel based there to have been very low in Helmand
Province, despite the fact that Helmand was the focus of a U.S. military-led offensive.
41 Mulrine, Anna, “Afghan Presidential Candidate Takes a Page From Obama’s Playbook,” U.S. News and World
Report, June 25, 2009.
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Some observers said that turnout among women nationwide was primarily because there were not
sufficient numbers of female poll workers recruited by the IEC to make women feel comfortable
enough to vote. In general, however, election observers reported that poll workers were generally
attentive and well trained, and the voting process appeared orderly.
In normally secure Kabul, turnout was said to be far lighter than in the 2004 presidential election.
Turnout might have been dampened by a suicide bombing on August 15, 2009, outside
NATO/ISAF military headquarters and intended to intimidate voters not to participate. In
addition, several dozen provincial council candidates, and some workers on the presidential
campaigns, were killed in election-related violence. A convoy carrying Fahim (Karzai vice
presidential running mate, see below) was bombed, although Fahim was unharmed.
Clouding the election substantially were the widespread fraud allegations coming from all sides.
Dr. Abdullah held several news conferences after the election, purporting to show evidence of
systematic election fraud by the Karzai camp. Karzai’s camp made similar allegations against
Abdullah as applied to his presumed strongholds in northern Afghanistan. The ECC, in
statements, stated its belief that there was substantial fraud likely committed, and mostly by
Karzai supporters. However, the low turnout in the presumed Karzai strongholds in southern
Afghanistan led Karzai and many Pashtuns to question the election’s fairness as well, on the
grounds that Pashtuns were intimidated from voting in greater proportions than were others.
The IEC released vote results slowly. Preliminary results were to be announced by September 3.
However, the final, uncertified total was released on September 16, 2009. It showed Karzai at
54.6% and Dr. Abdullah at 27.7%. Bashardost and Ghani received single-digit vote counts (9%
and 3% respectively), with trace amounts for the remainder of the field.
Vote Certified/Runoff Mandated
The constitution required that a second-round runoff, if needed, be held two weeks after the
results of the first round are certified. Following the release of the vote count, the complaints
evaluation period began which, upon completed, would yield a “certified” vote result. On
September 8, 2009, the ECC ordered a recount of 10% of polling stations (accounting for as many
as 25% total votes) as part of its investigations of fraud. Polling stations were considered
“suspect” if: the total number of votes exceeded 600, which was the maximum number allotted to
each polling station; or where any candidate received 95% or more of the total valid votes cast at
that station (assuming more than 100 votes were cast there). Perhaps reflecting political
sensitivities, the recount consisted of a sampling of actual votes.42 Throughout the investigation
period (September 16-October 20), the ECC said it was not “in a rush” to finish.
On October 20, 2009, the ECC determined, based on its investigation, that about 1 million Karzai
votes, and about 200,000 Abdullah votes, were considered fraudulent and were deducted from
their totals. The final, certified, results of the first round were as follows: Karzai—49.67%
(according to the IEC; with a slightly lower total of about 48% according to the ECC
determination); Abdullah—30.59%; Bashardost—10.46%; Ghani—2.94%, Yasini—1.03%, and
lower figures for the remaining field.43
42 “Afghan Panel to Use Sampling in Recount,” USA Today, September 22, 2009.
43 See IEC website for final certified tallies, http://www.iec.org.af/results.
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During October 16-20, 2009, U.S. and international officials, including visiting Senator John
Kerry, met repeatedly with Karzai to attempt to persuade him to acknowledge that his vote total
did not legitimately exceed the 50%+ threshold to claim a first-round victory. On October 21,
2009, the IEC accepted the ECC findings and Karzai conceded the need for a runoff election. A
date was set as November 7, 2009. Abdullah initially accepted.
In an attempt to produce a fair second round, UNAMA, which provided advice and assistance to
the IEC, requested that about 200 district-level election commissioners be replaced. In addition, it
recommended there be fewer polling stations—about 5,800, compared to 6,200 previously—to
eliminate polling stations where very few votes are expected to be cast. Still, there were concerns
that some voters may be disenfranchised because snow had set in some locations. Insurgents were
expected to resume their campaign to intimidate voters from casting ballots.
After a runoff was declared, no major faction leader switched support of either candidate, making
it difficult to envision an Abdullah victory. Prior to the ECC vote certification, Dr. Abdullah told
CRS at a meeting in Kabul on October 15, 2009, that he might be willing to negotiate with Karzai
on a “Joint Program” of reforms—such as direct election of governors and reduced presidential
powers—to avoid a runoff. Abdullah told CRS he himself would not be willing to enter the
cabinet, although presumably such a deal would involve his allies doing so. However, some said
the constitution does not provide for a negotiated settlement and that the runoff must proceed.
Others said that a deal between the two, in which Abdullah dropped his candidacy, could have led
the third-place finisher, Ramazan Bashardost, to assert that he must face Karzai in a runoff. Still
others say the issue could have necessitated resolution by Afghanistan’s Supreme Court.
Election Conclusion
The various pre-runoff scenarios were mooted on November 1, 2009, when Dr. Abdullah refused
to participate in the runoff on the grounds that the problems that plagued the first round were
likely to recur. He asserted that Karzai, in negotiations during October 2009, was refusing to
replace the IEC head, Azizullah Ludin, to fire several cabinet ministers purportedly campaigning
for Karzai, or to address several other election-related complaints. The IEC refused to follow a
UNAMA recommendation to reduce the number of polling stations. Some believe Abdullah
pulled out because of his belief that he would not prevail in the second round.
On November 2, 2009, the IEC issued a statement saying that, by consensus, the body had
determined that Karzai, being the only candidate remaining in a two-person runoff, should be
declared the winner and the second round not held. The Obama Administration accepted the
outcome as “within Afghanistan’s constitution,” on the grounds that the fraud had been
investigated. On that basis, the United States, as well as U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon
(visiting Kabul), and several governments, congratulated Karzai on the victory. U.S. officials,
including Secretary of State Clinton, praised Dr. Abdullah for his relatively moderate speech
announcing his pullout, in particular his refusal to call for demonstrations or violence. Dr.
Abdullah denied that his pullout was part of any “deal” with Karzai for a role for his supporters in
the next government. Amid U.S. and international calls for Karzai to choose his next cabinet
based on competence, merit, and dedication to curbing corruption, Karzai was inaugurated on
November 19, 2009, with Secretary of State Clinton in attendance.
As noted above, the election for the provincial council members were not certified until
December 29, 2009. The council members have taken office.
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Fallout for UNAMA
The political fallout for UNAMA was significant. During the complaint period, a dispute between
UNAMA head Kai Eide and the American deputy, Ambassador Peter Galbraith, broke out over
how vigorously to press for investigation of the fraud. This led to the September 29, 2009,
dismissal by Secretary General Ban Ki Moon of Galbraith, who had openly accused UNAMA
head Kai Eide of soft-pedaling on the fraud charges and siding with Karzai. Galbraith appealed
his dismissal, amid press reports that he had discussed a plan with some U.S. officials to replace
Karzai with an interim government, if the second round could not be held until after the winter. In
December 2009, Eide announced he would not seek to renew his two year agreement to serve as
UNAMA chief. The replacement named at the January 28, 2010, London conference was Staffan
de Mistura, who previously played a similar U.N. role in Iraq. He arrived in Kabul in mid-March
2010.
Post-Election Cabinet
U.S. officials stated they would scrutinize the post-election cabinet for indications that Karzai
would professionalize his government and eliminate corruption. Complicating Karzai’s efforts to
obtain confirmation of a full cabinet was the need to present his choices as technically competent
while also maintaining a customary and expected balance of ethnic and political factions. In the
parliamentary confirmation process that has unfolded, National Assembly members, particularly
the well-educated independents, have objected to many of his nominees as “unknowns,” as
having minimal qualifications, or as loyal to faction leaders who backed Karzai in the 2009
election. Karzai’s original list of 24 ministerial nominees (presented December 19) was generally
praised by the United States for retaining the highly praised economic team (and most of that
team was confirmed). However, overall, only 7 of the first 24 nominees were confirmed (January
2, 2010), and only 7 of the 17 replacement nominees were confirmed (January 16, 2010), after
which the Assembly went into winter recess. Another five (out of seven nominees) were
confirmed on June 28, 2010, although one was a replacement for the ousted Interior Minister
Atmar. Seven permanent posts remain unfilled. Although then UNAMA head Kai Eide called the
vetoing of many nominees a “setback” to Afghan governance, Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff
Morrell said on January 6, 2010, that the vetoing by parliament reflected a “healthy give and
take” among Afghanistan’s branches of government. Outside experts have said the confirmation
process—and the later parliamentary review of a 2010 election decree, discussed below—reflects
the growing institutional strength of the parliament and the functioning of checks and balances in
the Afghan government. Of the major specific developments in the cabinet selection process to
date (and with seven ministries remaining unfilled by permanent appointees, as of September
2010):
The main security ministers—Defense Minister Abdal Rahim Wardak and Interior Minister
Mohammad Hanif Atmar—were renominated by Karzai and confirmed on January 2, 2010. They
work closely with the U.S. military to expand and improve the Afghan national security forces.
(Atmar was later dismissed, as discussed below.)
• Three key economic/civilian sector officials who work very closely with USAID
and U.S. Embassy Kabul—Finance Minister Omar Zakhiwal, Agriculture
Minister Mohammad Rahimi, and Education Minister Ghulam Faruq Wardak—
were renominated and also were confirmed on January 2. The highly praised
Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (Ehsan Zia), who runs the
widely touted and effective National Solidarity Program, was not renominated, to
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the chagrin of U.S. officials. His named replacement (Wais Barmak, a Fahim and
Dr. Abdullah ally) was voted down. The second replacement, Jarullah Mansoori,
was confirmed on January 16.
• The U.S.-praised Commerce Minister Wahidollah Sharani was selected to move
over to take control of the Mines Ministry from the former minister, who is under
investigation for corruption. Sharani was confirmed on January 2, 2010.
However, as noted, Sharani is reportedly under investigation for corruption as of
November 2010. Also confirmed that day was Minister of Culture Seyyed
Makhdum Raheen. He had been serving as Ambassador to India.
• The clan of former moderate mujahedin party leader Pir Gaylani rose to
prominence in the December 19 list. Gaylani son-in-law Anwar al Haq Al Ahady
(see above) was named as economy minister and Hamid Gaylani (Pir Gaylani’s
son) was named as minister of border and tribal affairs. However, neither was
confirmed and neither was renominated.
• Ismail Khan was renominated as minister of energy and water on December 19,
disappointing U.S. officials and many Afghans who see him as a faction leader
(Tajik leader/mujahedin era commander, Herat Province) with no technical
expertise. He was voted down but remains in an acting capacity.
• Karzai initially did not nominate a permanent foreign minister, leaving Spanta in
place as a caretaker. However, in the second nomination round, Karzai selected
his close ally Zalmay Rassoul, who has been national security adviser since 2004,
to the post. Rassoul was confirmed on January 16. Spanta is head of the National
Security Council.
• Minister of Women’s Affairs Ghazanfar was renominated to remain the only
female minister, but was voted down (January 2). In the cabinet renominations,
Karzai named three women—Suraiya Dalil to Public Health, Pelwasha Hassan to
Women’s Affairs, and Amina Afzali (minister of youth in an earlier Karzai
cabinet) to Labor and Social Affairs. Of those, only Afzali was confirmed on
January 16. Ghazanfar and Dalil are heading those ministries in an acting
capacity. In the December 16, 2009, list, Karzai proposed a woman to head a new
Ministry of Literacy, but parliament did not vote on this nomination because it
had not yet acted to approve formation of the ministry
• Of the other nominees confirmed on January 16, 2010, at least one has previously
served in high positions. The Assembly confirmed that day: Zarar Moqbel (who
previously was interior minister) as Counternarcotics Miinister; Economy
Minister Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal, who belongs to the party linked with pro-
Taliban insurgent leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (although the faction in the
government has broken with Hikmatyar and rejects violence); Yousaf Niazi,
minister of Hajj and Waqf (religious endowments) affairs; and Habibullah
Ghalib, Minister of Justice.
• The following 10 were voted down on January 16: (1) Palwasha Hassan,
nominated to head the Ministry of Women’s Affairs; (2) Dalil, Public Health,
now acting minister, mentioned above; (3) Muhammad Zubair Waheed, minister
of commerce; (4) Muhammad Elahi, minister of higher education; (5)
Muhammad Laali, Public Works; (6) Abdul Rahim, who was telecommunications
minister in the first Karzai cabinet, as minister of refugee affairs (acting); (7)
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Arsala Jamal, formerly the governor of Khost Province who was widely praised
in that role by Secretary Gates, as minister of border and tribal affairs (and now is
acting minister); (8) Abdul Qadus Hamidi, minister of communications; (9)
Abdur Rahim Oraz, minister of transport and aviation; and (10) Sultan Hussein
Hesari, minister of urban development (acting).
• On June 28, 2010, Karzai obtained parliamentary approval for five positions out
of seven nominees. Approved were Bismillah Khan as interior minister
(replacing Atmar, who was fired on June 6); Al Ahady as commerce minister;
former Qandahar governor Asadullah Khalid as minister of border and tribal
affairs; Hamidi (see above) as minister of public works; and Jamahir Anwari as
minister of refugees and repatriation. Voted down were two Hazara Shiites:
Sarwar Danesh as minister of higher education, and former IEC chief Daud Ali
Najafi as minister of transportation. Their rejection caused Hazara members in
the Assembly to demonstrate their disapproval of the vote, and Karzai called for
Hazaras to be approved in the future to ensure all-ethnic participation in
government.
September 18, 2010, Parliamentary Elections
Some, including the referenced report by the SIGAR, feared that the difficulties that plagued the
2009 presidential election were not adequately addressed to ensure that the September 18, 2010,
parliamentary elections were fully free and fair. Many of these fears apparently were realized. A
dispute over a new election decree that governed the election, which weakened the international
voice on the ECC, is discussed below. The July 20, 2010, Kabul conference final communiqué
included an Afghan government pledge to initiate, within six months, a strategy for long-term
electoral reform.
Election Timing
On January 2, 2010, the IEC had initially set National Assembly elections for May 22, 2010. The
IEC view was that this date was in line with a constitutional requirement for a new election to be
held well prior to the expiry of the current Assembly’s term. However, U.S., ECC, UNAMA, and
officials of donor countries argued that Afghanistan’s flawed institutions would not be able to
hold free and fair elections under this timetable. Among the difficulties noted were that the IEC
lacks sufficient staff, given that some were fired after the 2009 election; that the IEC lacks funds
to hold the election under that timetable; that the U.S. military buildup will be consumed with
securing still restive areas at election time; and that the ECC’s term expired at the end of January
2010. A functioning ECC was needed to evaluate complaints against registered parliamentary
candidates because there are provisions in the election law to invalidate the candidacies of those
who have previously violated Afghan law or committed human rights abuses.
The international community pressed for a delay of all of these elections until August 2010 or,
according to some donors, mid-2011.44 Bowing to funding and the wide range of other
considerations mentioned, on January 24, 2010, the IEC announced that the parliamentary
elections would be postponed until September 18, 2010. Other experts said that the security
44 Trofimov, Yaroslav, “West Urges Afghanistan to Delay Election,” Wall Street Journal, December 11, 2009.
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issues, and the lack of faith in Afghanistan’s election institutions, necessitated further
postponement.45
About $120 million was budgeted by the IEC for the parliamentary elections, of which at least
$50 million came from donor countries, giving donors leverage over when the election might take
place. The remaining $70 million was funds left over from the 2009 elections. Donors had held
back the needed funds, possibly in an effort to pressure the IEC to demonstrate that it is
correcting the flaws identified in the various “after-action” reports on the 2009 election. With the
compromises and Karzai announcements below, those funds were released as of April 2010.
Election Decree/Reform
With the dispute between the Karzai government and international donors continuing over how to
ensure a free and fair election, the Afghan government drafted an election decree that would
supersede the 2005 election law and govern the 2010 parliamentary election.46 Karzai signed the
decree in February 2010. The Afghan government argues that the decree supersedes the
constitutional clause that any new election law not be adopted less than one year prior to the
election to which that law will apply.
Substantively, some of the provisions of the election decree—particularly the proposal to make
the ECC an all-Afghan body—caused alarm in the international community. Another
controversial element was the registration requirements of a financial deposit (equivalent of about
$650), and that candidates obtain signatures of at least 1,000 voters. On March 14, 2010, after
discussions with outgoing UNAMA head Kai Eide, Karzai reportedly agreed to cede to UNAMA
two “international seats” on the ECC, rather than to insist that all five ECC members be Afghans.
Still, the majority of the ECC seats were Afghans.
The election decree became an issue for Karzai opponents and others in the National Assembly
who seek to assert parliamentary authority. On March 31, the Wolesi Jirga voted to reject the
election decree, leaving its status unclear. However, on April 3, 2010, the Meshrano Jirga decided
not to act on the election decree, meaning that it was not rejected by the Assembly as a whole and
will likely stand to govern the September 18, 2010, National Assembly elections. Karzai upheld
his pledge to implement the March 2010 compromise with then UNAMA head Eide by allowing
UNAMA to appoint two ECC members and for decisions to require that at least one non-Afghan
ECC member concur.
Among other steps to correct the mistakes of the 2009 election, the Afghan Interior Ministry
planned instituted a national identity card system to curb voter registration fraud. However,
observers say that registration fraud still occurred. On April 17, 2010, Karzai appointed a new
IEC head, Fazel Ahmed Manawi, who drew praise from many factions (including “opposition
leader” Dr. Abdullah) for impartiality. The IEC also barred 6,000 poll workers who served in the
2009 election from working the 2010 election.
45 Rondeaux, Candace. “Why Afghanistan’s September Elections Ought to Be Postponed.” Washington Post, July 11,
2010.
46 Partlow, Joshua, “Afghanistan’s Government Seeks More Control Over Elections,” Washington Post, February 15,
2010.
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Preparations and The Vote
Preparations for the September 18 election went relatively well, according to reports by the IEC.
Candidates registered during April 20-May 6, 2010. A list of candidates was circulated on May
13, 2010, including 2,477 candidates for the 249 seats.47 These figures included 226 candidates
who registered but whose documentation was not totally in order; and appeal restored about 180
of them. On May 30, 2010, in a preliminary ruling, 85 candidates others were disqualified as
members of illegal armed groups. However, appeals and negotiations restored all but 36 in this
latter category. A final list of candidates, after all appeals and decisions on the various
disqualifications, was issued June 22. The final list included 2,577 candidates, including 406
women. Since then, 62 candidates were invalidated by the ECC, mostly because they did not
resign their government positions, as required.
Voter registration was conducted June 12-August 12. According to the IEC, over 375,000 new
voters were registered, and the number of eligible voters was about 11.3 million. Campaigning
began June 23. Many candidates, particularly those who are women, said that security difficulties
have prevented them from conducting active campaigning. At least three candidates and 13
candidate supporters were killed by insurgent violence.
On August 24, 2010, the IEC announced that the Afghan security forces say they would only be
able to secure 5,897 of the planned 6,835 polling centers. To prevent so-called “ghost polling
stations” (stations open but where no voters can go, thus allowing for ballot-stuffing), the 938
stations considered not secure were not opened. The IEC announcement stated that further
security evaluation could lead to the closing of still more stations and, on election day, a total of
5,355 centers opened, 304 of those slated to open did not, and for 157 centers there was no
information available. In part to compensate, the IEC opened extra polling stations in centers in
secure areas near to those that were closed.
On election day, about 5.6 million votes were cast out of about 11.3 million eligible voters.
Turnout was therefore about 50%. A major issue was security. At first, it appeared as though
election-day violence was lower than in the 2009 presidential election. However, on September
24, NATO/ISAF announced that there were about 380 total attacks, about 100 more than in 2009.
However, voting was generally reported as orderly and the attacks did not derail the election.
Outcomes
Preliminary results were announced on October 20, 2010, and final, certified results were to be
announced by October 30, 2010, but have been delayed due to investigation of fraud complaints.
While the information below illustrates that there was substantial fraud, the IEC and ECC have
been widely praised for their handling of the fraud allegations. Among the key outcomes, both in
terms of process and results, are:
• Of the 5.6 million votes cast, the ECC has invalidated 1.3 million (about 25%)
after investigations of fraud complaints. The ECC prioritized complaints filed as
follows: 2,142 as possibly affecting the election, 1,056 as unable to affect the
47 The seat allocation per province is the same as it was in the 2005 parliamentary election—33 seats up for election in
Kabul; 17 in Herat province; 14 in Nangarhar, 11 each in Qandahar, Balkh, and Ghazni; 9 in Badakhshan, Konduz, and
Faryab, 8 in Helmand, and 2 to 6 in the remaining provinces. Ten are reserved for Kuchis (nomads).
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result, and 600 where there will be no investigation. Causes for invalidation most
often included ballot boxes in which all votes were for one candidate.
• About 1,100 election workers have been questioned, and 413 candidates have
been referred by the ECC to the Attorney General for having allegedly committed
election fraud.
• There have been at least three demonstrations against the fraud by about 300
candidates who felt deprived of victory, under a banner called the “Union of
Afghan Wolesi Jirga Candidates 2010,”
Political Results
Without finally certified results, it is difficult to judge the political impact of the elections.
However, the following have become apparent.
• The IEC has said that the new lower house will have approximately 50% new
membership, meaning that many incumbents apparently have lost their seats.
• The camps of both Karzai as well as those of Dr. Abdullah and the opposition
appear to have failed to meet their objectives, according to observers and press
reports. Each camp sought to hold commanding blocs of about 100 seats in the
next lower house, and it is not clear that either achieved that result. This apparent
result also complicates any effort to pin blame for fraud clearly on one camp or
another. It also makes in unlikely that Karzai’s allies would be apply to install
Sayyaf as next lower house speaker, replacing Abdullah ally Qanooni.
• Karzai’s allies fared poorly apparently due to several pro-Karzai candidates
losing in Qandahar Province, and because many Pashtuns did not vote, due to
security reasons, in mixed Ghazni Province.
• The poor Pashtun turnout in Ghazni has apparently led to a much greater than
expected showing for Hazara candidates, who live in more secure areas of
Ghazni and voted in large numbers. Some assessments say that Hazaras may win
20% (about 50 seats) in the next lower house.
• It is likely that the next lower house will be more diverse politically than the
outgoing one, and less predictable in whether it supports or opposes Karzai on
certain issues. The Hazara strength, which has prompted a Pashtun political
backlash, has no clear impact because many Hazaras support Karzai while many
also oppose him as a representative of the political strength of the Pashtuns (who
have a reputation of repressing or discriminating against the Hazaras).
Implications for the United States of the Afghan Elections
U.S. officials express clear U.S. neutrality in all Afghan elections. However, in the 2009
presidential election, Karzai reportedly believed the United States was hoping strong candidates
might emerge to replace him. This perception was a function of the strained relations between
Karzai and some Obama Administration officials, particularly Ambassadors Holbrooke and
Eikenberry. Ambassador Timothy Carney was appointed to head the 2009 U.S. election support
effort at U.S. Embassy Kabul, tasked to ensure that the United States was even-handed.
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The legitimacy of the Afghan partner of the United States was a major factor in the
Administration’s consideration of the McChrystal initial assessment of August 2009, 48 which
recommended pursuing a classic counterinsurgency strategy to protect the Afghan population. If
there is no legitimate Afghan partner available, then some might argue that the recommended
strategy might not succeed because U.S. forces are not authorized or able to reform the Afghan
government. According to the DOD report of April 2010, cited earlier, the strategy is focused on
120 restive districts (of the 364 total Afghan districts). Administration officials clarified that any
July 2011 deadline to begin transitioning to Afghan security leadership would be subject to
evaluation of conditions that would be determined in a December 2010 review. That review is
likely to take into account an assessment of the credibility of the September 18, 2010,
parliamentary elections, particularly the public perception of whether the problems of the 2009
presidential election were corrected. A provision of an FY2010 supplemental appropriation (P.L.
111-212) makes U.S. aid to the IEC and ECC contingent on certification by the Secretary of State
that those Afghan officials who committed fraud in the 2009 presidential election are not involved
in the September 2010 parliamentary election.
48 Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan.
“Commander’s Initial Assessment,” August 30, 2009, available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?.
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Table 1. Afghanistan Political Transition Process
Interim Administration
Formed by Bonn Agreement. Headed by Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, but key
security positions dominated by mostly minority “Northern Alliance.” Karzai
reaffirmed as leader by June 2002 “emergency loya jirga.” (A jirga is a traditional
Afghan assembly).
Constitution
Approved by January 2004 “Constitutional Loya Jirga” (CLJ). Set up strong presidency,
a rebuke to Northern Alliance that wanted prime ministership to balance presidential
power, but gave parliament significant powers to compensate. Gives men and women
equal rights under the law, allows for political parties as long as they are not “un-
Islamic”; al ows for court rulings according to Hanafi (Sunni) Islam (Chapter 7, Article
15). Set out electoral roadmap for simultaneous (if possible) presidential, provincial,
and district elections by June 2004. Named ex-King Zahir Shah to non-hereditary
position of “Father of the Nation;” he died July 23, 2007.
Presidential Election
Elections for President and two vice presidents, for 5-year term, held Oct. 9, 2004.
Turnout was 80% of 10.5 million registered. Karzai and running mates (Ahmad Zia
Masud, a Tajik and brother of legendary mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud,
who was assassinated by Al Qaeda two days before the Sept. 11 attacks, and Karim
Khalili, a Hazara) elected with 55% against 16 opponents. Second highest vote getter,
Northern Alliance figure (and Education Minister) Yunus Qanooni (16%). One female
ran, got about 1%. Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqiq got 11.7%; and Dostam won
10%. Funded with $90 million in international aid, including $40 million from U.S.
(FY2004 supplemental, P.L. 108-106).
First Parliamentary Elections
Elections held Sept. 18, 2005, on “Single Non-Transferable Vote” System; candidates
stood as individuals, not part of party list. Parliament consists of a 249 elected lower
house (Wolesi Jirga, House of the People) and a selected 102 seat upper house
(Meshrano Jirga, House of Elders). Voting was for one candidate only, although
number of representatives varied by province, ranging from 2 (Panjshir Province) to
33 (Kabul Province). Herat has 17; Nangahar, 14; Qandahar, Balkh, and Ghazni, 11
seats each. The body is 28% female (68 persons), in line with the legal minimum of 68
women—two per each of the 34 provinces. Upper house appointed by Karzai (34
seats, half of which are to be women), by the provincial councils (34 seats), and
district councils (remaining 34 seats). There are 23 women in it, above the 17
required by the constitution. Because district elections (400 district councils) were
not held, provincial councils selected 68 on interim basis. 2,815 candidates for Wolesi
Jirga, including 347 women. Turnout was 57% (6.8 million voters) of 12.5 million
registered. Funded by $160 million in international aid, including $45 million from
U.S. (FY2005 supplemental appropriation, P.L. 109-13).
First Provincial Elections/
Provincial elections held Sept. 18, 2005, simultaneous with parliamentary elections.
District Elections
Exact powers vague, but now taking lead in deciding local reconstruction Provincial
council sizes range from 9 to the 29 seats on the Kabul provincial council. Total seats
are 420, of which 121 held by women. l3,185 candidates, including 279 women. Some
criticize the provincial election system as disproportionately weighted toward large
districts within each province. District elections not held due to complexity and
potential tensions of drawing district boundaries.
Second Presidential and
Presidential and provincial elections were held Aug. 20, 2009, but required a runoff
Provincial Elections
because no candidate received over 50% in certified results issued October 20.
Second round not held because chal enger, Dr. Abdul ah, pulled out of a second-
round runoff vote. Election costs about $300 million.
Parliamentary Elections
Original y set for May 22, 2010; held September 18, 2010.
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Table 2. Major Pashtun Tribal Confederations
Clan/Tribal
Confederations
Location Example
Durrani
Mainly southern Afghanistan:
Qandahar, Helmand, Zabol,
Uruzgan,Nimruz
Popalzai
Qandahar
Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan; Jelani Popal,
head of the Independent Directorate of Local
(Zirak branch
Governance; Mullah Bradar, the top aide to Mullah
of Durrani
Umar, captured in Pakistan in Feb. 2010. Two-
Pashtun)
thirds of Qandahar’s provincial government posts
held by Zirak Durrani Pashtuns
Alikozai
Qandahar
Mullah Naqibullah (deceased, former anti-Taliban
faction leader in Qandahar)
Barakzai
Qandahar, Helmand
Ghul Agha Shirzai (Governor, Nangarhar Province)
Achakzai
Qandahar, Helmand
Abdul Razziq, Chief of Staff, Border Police,
Qandahar Province
Alozai
Helmand (Musa Qala district)
Sher Mohammad Akhunzadeh (former Helmand
governor); Hajji Zahir, former governor of Marjah
Noorzai
Qandahar
Noorzai brothers, briefly in charge of Qandahar
after the fal of the Taliban in November 2001
Ghilzai
Eastern Afghanistan: Paktia, Paktika,
Khost, Nangarhar, Kunar
Ahmadzai
Mohammed Najibullah (pres. 1986-1992); Ashraf
Ghani, Karzai adviser, Finance Minister 2002-2004
Hotak
Mullah Umar, but hails from Uruzgan, which is
dominated by Durranis
Taraki
Nur Mohammed Taraki (leader 1978-1979)
Kharoti
Hafizullah Amin (leader September-
December1979); Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, founder of
Hezb-e-Islami (Gulbuddin), former mujahedin party
leader now anti-Karzai insurgent.
Zadran
Paktia, Khost
Pacha Khan Zadran; Insurgent leader Jalaluddin
Haqqani
Kodai
Mangal
Paktia, Khost
Ghulab Mangal (Governor of Helmand Province)
Orkazai
Shinwari
Nangarhar province
Fasl Ahmed Shinwari, former Supreme Court Chief
Justice
Mandezai
Sangu Khel
Sipah
Wardak
Wardak Province
Abdul Rahim Wardak (Defense Minister)
(Pashtu-speaking
non-Pashtun)
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Clan/Tribal
Confederations
Location Example
Afridis
Tirah, Khyber Pass, Kohat
Zaka khel
Jawaki
Adam khel
Malikdin, etc
Yusufzais
Khursan, Swat, Kabul
Akozais
Malizais
Loezais
Khattaks
Kohat, Peshawar, Bangash
Akorai
Terai
Mohmands
Near Khazan, Peshawar
Baizai
Alimzai
Uthmanzais
Khawazais
Wazirs Mainly
in
Waziristan
Darwesh khel
Bannu
Source: This table was prepared by Hussein Hassan, Information Research Specialist, CRS.
Note: N/A indicates no example is available.
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Figure 1. Map of Afghan Ethnicities
Source: 2003 National Geographic Society, http://www.afghan-network.net/maps/Afghanistan-Map.pdf. Adapted by Amber Wilhelm, CRS
Notes: This map is intended to be illustrative of the approximate demographic distribution by region of Afghanistan. CRS has no way to confirm exact population
distributions.
CRS-47
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
Acknowledgments
The table of major Pashtun tribes was prepared by Hussein Hassan, Information Research Specialist, CRS.
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