Russian Political, Economic, and
Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Jim Nichol, Coordinator
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
November 4, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33407
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Summary
Russia made some uneven progress in democratization during the 1990s, but according to most
observers, this limited progress was reversed after Vladimir Putin rose to power in 1999-2000.
During this period, the State Duma (lower legislative chamber) came to be dominated by
government-approved parties and opposition democratic parties were excluded. Putin also
abolished gubernatorial elections and established government ownership or control over major
media and industries, including the energy sector. The methods used by the Putin government to
suppress insurgency in the North Caucasus demonstrated a low regard for the rule of law and
scant regard for human rights, according to critics. Dmitriy Medvedev, Vladimir Putin’s chosen
successor and long-time protégé, was elected president in March 2008 and immediately chose
Putin as prime minister. President Medvedev has continued policies established during the Putin
presidency. In August 2008, the Medvedev-Putin “tandem” directed wide-scale military
operations against Georgia and unilaterally recognized the independence of Georgia’s separatist
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, actions that were censured by most of the international community
but which resulted in few, minor, and only temporary international sanctions against Russia.
Russia’s economy began to recover from the Soviet collapse in 1999, led mainly by oil and gas
exports, but the sharp decline in oil and gas prices in mid-2008 and other aspects of the global
economic downturn put a halt to this growth. The government reported an 8% drop in gross
domestic product in 2009. This decline exacerbated existing problems: 15% of the population live
below the poverty line; an unreformed healthcare system and unhealthy lifestyles contribute to a
population decline; domestic and foreign investment is low; inflation hovers around 12%-14%;
and crime, corruption, capital flight, and unemployment remain high. Economic growth has
picked up somewhat in 2010.
Russia’s military has been in turmoil after years of severe force reductions and budget cuts. The
armed forces now number about 1.0 million, down from 4.3 million Soviet troops in 1986.
Readiness, training, morale, and discipline have suffered. Russia’s economic revival in the 2000s
allowed it to substantially increase defense spending, and some high-profile activities were
resumed, such as Mediterranean and Atlantic naval deployments and strategic bomber patrols.
Stepped-up efforts were launched in late 2007 to further downsize the armed forces and
emphasize rapid reaction and contract forces. The global economic downturn and strong
opposition among some in the armed forces appear to have slowed force modernization.
After the Soviet Union’s collapse, the United States sought a cooperative relationship with
Moscow and supplied $17 billion in aid for Russia from FY1992-FY2010 to encourage
democracy and market reforms and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). U.S. aid to reduce the threat posed by WMD proliferation has hovered around $700-
$900 million per fiscal year, while other foreign aid to Russia has dwindled. Despite rising U.S.-
Russia tensions in recent years on issues such as NATO enlargement and proposed U.S. missile
defenses in Eastern Europe, the two countries found some common ground on anti-terrorism and
non-proliferation issues; Russia’s 2008 conflict with Georgia threatened such cooperation. The
Obama Administration has worked to “re-set” relations with Russia, which welcomed the
Administration’s announcement in September 2009 of the cancellation of the planned deployment
of missile defenses in Eastern Europe. The Administration has hailed the signing of a new
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty on April 8, 2010, and the approval of new sanctions against Iran
by Russia and other members of the U.N. Security Council on June 9 , 2010, as signifying the
“re-set” of bilateral relations.
Congressional Research Service
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Contents
Recent Developments.................................................................................................................. 1
Post-Soviet Russia and Its Significance for the United States....................................................... 1
Political and Human Rights Developments.................................................................................. 2
Background .......................................................................................................................... 2
The Putin-Medvedev Era....................................................................................................... 3
The Impasse of Political Pluralism ........................................................................................ 4
Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov’s Ouster ......................................................................... 7
Human Rights Problems........................................................................................................ 8
Insurgency in the North Caucasus ....................................................................................... 10
Defense Reforms................................................................................................................. 13
Trade, Economic, and Energy Issues ......................................................................................... 16
Russia and the Global Economic Crisis ............................................................................... 16
Russia’s Accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and PNTR for Russia.............. 18
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Enforcement in Russia, Agricultural Trade, and
Other Issues ..................................................................................................................... 19
Medvedev’s Modernization Initiative .................................................................................. 20
The Skolkovo Center for Innovation.............................................................................. 21
U.S. and Foreign Interest in Skolkovo ........................................................................... 22
Russian Energy Policy ........................................................................................................ 23
Foreign Policy........................................................................................................................... 25
Russia and the West ............................................................................................................ 25
NATO-Russia Relations ................................................................................................ 26
The European Union and Russia ................................................................................... 29
Russia and the Soviet Successor States ................................................................................ 31
U.S.-Russia Relations ............................................................................................................... 34
The Obama Administration “Re-sets” Bilateral Relations .................................................... 34
Russian Public Opinion About the United States............................................................ 37
Bilateral Relations and Iran ................................................................................................. 38
Bilateral Relations and Afghanistan..................................................................................... 40
Bilateral Relations and North Korea .................................................................................... 42
Russia’s Role in the Middle East Quartet............................................................................. 43
Arms Control Issues............................................................................................................ 44
Cooperative Threat Reduction ....................................................................................... 44
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty .................................................................... 44
The Status of Ratification of the New START in Russia ................................................ 46
Russia and Missile Defense........................................................................................... 46
U.S.-Russia Economic Ties ................................................................................................. 52
U.S. Assistance to Russia .................................................................................................... 54
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Merchandise Trade with Russia, 1992-2009 ......................................................... 53
Table 2. U.S. Government Funds Budgeted for Assistance to Russia, FY1992-FY2008 ............. 56
Congressional Research Service
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Table 3. Assistance to Russia, FY2009-FY2010, and the FY2011 Request ................................. 57
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 57
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 57
Congressional Research Service
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Recent Developments
On November 2, 2010, the final arguments were made in the second trial of Mikhail
Khodorkovskiy, the imprisoned former head of the Yukos oil firm, and his associate Platon
Lebedev. Khodorkovskiy stated that he held out little hope for an acquittal because of what he
termed Russian President Vladimir Putin’s determination to keep him in prison. He condemned
the prosecutions of businessmen and the raiding of businesses by security forces as a new de-
kulakization, and warned that Russia would not be able to modernize as long as such lawlessness
and corruption persisted.
Post-Soviet Russia and Its Significance for the
United States
Although Russia may not be as central to U.S.
Russia: Basic Facts
interests as was the Soviet Union, cooperation
Area and Population: Land area is 6.6 million sq. mi.,
between the two is essential in many areas.
about 1.8 times the size of the United States. The
Russia remains a nuclear superpower. It still
population is 139.4 million (World Factbook, mid-2010
est.). Administrative subdivisions include 46 regions, 21
has a major impact on U.S. national security
republics, 9 territories, and 7 others.
interests in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.
Russia has an important role in the future of
Ethnicity: Russian 79.8%; Tatar 3.8%; Ukrainian 2%;
Bashkir 1.2%; Chuvash 1.1%; other 12.1% (2002 census).
arms control, the nonproliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, and the fight against
Gross Domestic Product: $2.1 trillion; per capita
terrorism. Such issues as the war on terrorism,
GDP is about $15,200 (World Factbook, 2009 est.,
purchasing power parity).
the future of NATO, and the U.S. role in the
world are affected by developments in Russia.
Political Leaders: President: Dmitriy Medvedev; Prime
Minister: Vladimir Putin; Speaker of the State Duma:
Boris Gryzlov; Speaker of the Senate: Sergey Mironov;
Russia is a potentially important trading
Foreign Minister: Sergey Lavrov; Defense Minister:
partner. Russia is the only country in the world
Anatoliy Serdukov.
with more natural resources than the United
Biography: Medvedev, born in 1965, received a
States, including vast oil and gas reserves. It is
doctorate in law from Leningrad (now St. Petersburg)
the world’s second-largest producer and
State University in 1990. In 1991-1996, he worked with
exporter of oil (after Saudi Arabia) and the
Vladimir Putin as an advisor to the mayor of Leningrad.
world’s largest producer and exporter of
In late 1999, he became deputy head of Putin’s
presidential administration, and in October 2003, chief of
natural gas. It has a large, well-educated labor
staff. From 2000-2008, he also was vice chairman or
force and a huge scientific establishment.
chairman of the board of Gazprom. In November 2005,
Also, many of Russia’s needs—food and food
he became first deputy prime minister and was elected
processing, oil and gas extraction technology,
President in March 2008.
computers, communications, transportation,
and investment capital—are in areas in which the United States is highly competitive, although
bilateral trade remains relatively low.
Congressional Research Service
1
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Political and Human Rights Developments
Background
Russia is a multinational, multi-ethnic state with over 100 nationalities and a complex federal
structure inherited from the Soviet period that includes regions, republics, territories, and other
subunits. During Boris Yeltsin’s presidency, many of the republics and regions won greater
autonomy. Only the Chechen Republic, however, tried to assert complete independence. During
his term, President Putin reversed this trend and rebuilt the strength of the central government vis-
à-vis the regions. In future decades, the percentage of ethnic Russians is expected to decline
because of relatively greater birthrates among non-Russian groups and in-migration by non-
Russians. Out-migration of ethnic Russians from many republics and autonomous regions may
result in the titular nationalities becoming the majority populations. Implications may include
changes in domestic and foreign policies under the influence of previously marginalized ethnic
groups and federal devolution or even rising separatism.
The Russian Constitution combines elements of the U.S., French, and German systems, but with
an even stronger presidency. Among its more distinctive features are the ease with which the
president can dissolve the parliament and call for new elections and the obstacles preventing
parliament from dismissing the government in a vote of no confidence. The president, with
parliament’s approval, appoints a prime minister who heads the government. The president and
prime minister appoint government ministers and other officials. The prime minister and
government are accountable to the president rather than the legislature. In November 2008,
constitutional amendments extended the presidential term to six years and the term of Duma
deputies from four to five years.
The bicameral legislature is called the Federal Assembly. The State Duma, the lower (and more
powerful) chamber, has 450 seats. In previous elections, half the seats were chosen from single-
member constituencies and half from national party lists, with proportional representation and a
minimum 5% threshold for party representation. In May 2005, a law was passed that all 450
Duma seats be filled by party list election, with a 7% threshold for party representation. In the
December 2007 legislative election, the pro-Kremlin United Russia Party won 315 seats, more
than the two-thirds majority required to amend the constitution. The upper chamber, the
Federation Council, has 166 seats, two from each of the 83 regions and republics of the Russian
Federation. Deputies are appointed by the regional chief executive and the regional legislature.
The judiciary is the least developed of the three branches. Some of the Soviet-era structure and
practices are still in place. Criminal code reform was completed in 2001. Trial by jury was
planned to expand to cover most cases, but recently was restricted following instances where state
prosecutors lost high-profile cases. The Supreme Court is the highest appellate body. The
Constitutional Court rules on the legality and constitutionality of governmental acts and on
disputes between branches of government or federative entities. Federal judges, who serve
lifetime terms, are appointed by the president and must be approved by the Federation Council.
The courts are widely perceived to be subject to political manipulation and control.
Congressional Research Service
2
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
The Putin-Medvedev Era
Former President Boris Yeltsin’s surprise resignation (December 31, 1999) propelled then-Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin into the Kremlin first as acting president, then as president in March
2000. Putin’s meteoric rise in popularity was due to his being presented on state-owned TV and
other mass media as a youthful, vigorous, sober, and plain-talking leader; and to his aggressive
launch of military action against the breakaway Chechnya region. Putin was a Soviet KGB
foreign intelligence officer for 16 years and later headed Russia’s Federal Security Service (the
domestic component of the former KGB). His priorities as president were strengthening the
central government and restoring Russia’s status as a great power.
Under Putin, the government took nearly total control of nation-wide broadcast media, shutting
down or effectively nationalizing independent television and radio stations. In 2006, the Russian
government forced most Russian radio stations to stop broadcasting programs prepared by the
U.S.-funded Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Liberty (RL). Journalists critical of the
government have been imprisoned, attacked, and in some cases killed with impunity.
A defining political and economic event of the Putin era was the October 2003 arrest of Mikhail
Khodorkovskiy, CEO of Yukos, then the world’s fourth-largest oil company. Khodorkovskiy’s
arrest was triggered by his criticism of some of Putin’s actions, his financing of anti-Putin
political parties, and his hints that he might enter politics in the future. Khodorkovskiy’s arrest
was seen by many as politically motivated, aimed at eliminating a political enemy and making an
example of him to other Russian tycoons. In May 2005, Khodorkovskiy was found guilty on
multiple criminal charges of tax evasion and fraud and sentenced to eight years in prison. A new
trial on charges of embezzlement, theft, and money-laundering could extend his imprisonment.1
Yukos was broken up and its principal assets sold off to satisfy alleged tax debts. Since then, the
government has re-nationalized or otherwise brought under its control a number of other large
enterprises that it views as “strategic assets.” These include ship, aircraft, and auto
manufacturing, as well as other raw material extraction activities. At the same time, the Kremlin
has installed senior officials to head these enterprises. This phenomenon of political elites taking
the helm of many of Russia’s leading economic enterprises has led some observers to conclude
that “those who rule Russia, own Russia.”
In September 2004, a terrorist attack on a primary school in the town of Beslan, North Ossetia,
resulted in hundreds of civilian casualties. President Putin seized the opportunity provided by the
crisis to propose a number of political changes he claimed were essential to quash terrorism. In
actuality, the changes marked the consolidation of his centralized control over the political system
and the vitiation of fragile democratic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, according to many
observers. The changes included abolishing the popular elections of regional governors (replacing
such elections with the appointment of presidential nominees that are confirmed by regional
legislatures) and mandating that all Duma Deputies be elected on the basis of national party lists,
based on the proportion of votes each party gets nationwide. The first measure made regional
1 S.Res. 189, introduced by Senator Roger Wicker on June 18, 2009, and a similar bill, H.Res. 588, introduced by
Representative James McGovern on June 26, 2009, express the sense of the chamber that the prosecution of
Khodorkovskiy is politically motivated, calls for the new charges against him to be dropped, and urges that he be
paroled as a sign that Russia is moving toward upholding democratic principles and human rights. See also Senator
Roger Wicker, “International Due Process Rights,” Congressional Record, June 21, 2010, p. S5179. President Obama
also has raised concerns about Khodorkovskiy. The White House. Office Of The Press Secretary. Transcript of
President Obama’s Interview with Novaya Gazeta, July 6, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
3
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
governors wholly dependent on, and subservient to, the president. The second measure eliminated
independent deputies, further strengthening the pro-presidential parties that already controlled an
absolute majority in the Duma. In early 2006, President Putin signed a new law regulating non-
government organizations (NGOs), which Kremlin critics charged has given the government
leverage to shut down NGOs that it views as politically troublesome.
The Kremlin decided to make the December 2, 2007, State Duma election a display of Putin’s
popularity. Despite Putin’s apparently genuine popular appeal, his backers used myriad official
and unofficial levers of power and influence to ensure an overwhelming victory for United
Russia, the main Kremlin party. Putin’s October 2007 announcement that he would run for a
Duma seat at the head of the United Russia ticket made the outcome doubly sure. Russian
authorities effectively prevented the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) from sending an observer team by delaying the issuance of visas until the last minute,
thus blocking normal monitoring of the election campaign. United Russia won 64.3% of the
popular vote and 315 of the 450 seats—more than the two-thirds majority required to amend the
constitution. Two other pro-Putin political parties won 78 seats, giving the Kremlin the potential
support of 393 of the 450 Duma members. The only opposition party in the Duma is the
Communist Party, which won 57 seats.2
Barely a week after the Duma election, Putin announced that his protégé Dmitriy Medvedev was
his choice for president. Medvedev announced that, if elected, he would ask Putin to serve as
prime minister. This carefully choreographed arrangement presumably was meant to ensure
political continuity for Putin and those around him. The Putin regime manipulated election laws
and regulations to block “inconvenient” candidates for the prospective March 2, 2008,
presidential election from getting onto the ballot. Medvedev easily won against three candidates,
garnering 70% of the vote. Television news coverage was skewed overwhelmingly in Medvedev’s
favor. As with the Duma election, the OSCE refused to submit to restrictions demanded by
Moscow and did not send electoral observers.3
There has been considerable speculation about power-sharing between President Medvedev and
Prime Minister Putin. The dual power arrangement between the two leaders has been viewed by
some observers as inherently unstable, although so far it has appeared that the “tandem” has
worked. Tensions in their relationship have appeared, reflected by conflicts between their
respective supporters, including over how to remedy the severe domestic impact of the global
economic downturn. Possible succession scenarios include Medvedev stepping down after his
first term as president or even resigning just short of the end of his first term. In either case, Putin
would be eligible to run, since he would not have served more than two consecutive terms.
Medvedev has suggested that he and Putin would not both run as candidates.4
The Impasse of Political Pluralism
In late 2008, President Medvedev proposed a number of political changes that were subsequently
enacted or otherwise put into place. Observers regarded some of the changes as progressive and
others as regressive. These included constitutional changes extending the presidential term to six
2 See CRS Report RS22770, Russia’s December 2007 Legislative Election: Outcome and Implications, by Jim Nichol.
3 RFE/RL, Newsline, February 5, 20, 2008.
4 The ISCIP Analyst, November 12, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
4
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
years and State Duma deputies’ terms to five years, giving small political parties more rights (see
below), requiring annual government reports to the State Duma, permitting regional authorities to
dismiss mayors, reducing the number of signatures for a party to participate in elections, reducing
the number of members necessary in order for parties to register, and abolishing the payment of a
bond in lieu of signatures for participation in elections.
Possibly a positive development, in February 2009 Medvedev revived a moribund “Presidential
Council to Promote the Development of Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights,” including
by replacing several pro-government members with prominent oppositionists. He met with the
Council in April 2009, at which criticism of the human rights situation in Russia included that
NGOs were being harmed by the 2006 NGO law. In response to the criticism, in mid-May 2009
Medvedev established a Working Group on Nonprofit Organization Law to consider amendments
to the NGO law. On June 17, 2009, Medvedev submitted amendments proposed by the Council to
the legislature, and they were approved and signed into law on July 20, 2009. Changes included
easing some reporting requirements and limiting the ability of bureaucrats to inspect NGO
facilities. Restrictions on foreign-based NGOs were only slightly eased, however. Some critics
viewed the approved amendments as mainly cosmetic.5.
Perhaps a sign of a future broadening of political accountability, the Federal Assembly approved a
Medvedev proposal in April 2009 for political parties that get between 5%-7% of the vote in
future Duma elections (presently, a party must get 7% or more of the vote to gain seats) to win
one or two seats. Subsequently, Medvedev suggested that the 7% hurdle might be lowered. In
June 2009, Medvedev met with unrepresented party leaders for discussions on how the
government might improve the environment in which the parties operate, such as making media
access more available. He also called for regional authorities to ensure that small parties are
freely able to participate in local elections.
In May 2009, Medvedev submitted legislative amendments to laws on the Constitutional Court
and on a probationary period for judicial appointments that were quickly approved. The changes
to the selection of the Chairman and two other officials of the Constitutional Court—to have the
president effectively select these officials rather than to have the members of the court elect
them—were widely viewed as democratically regressive. Alternatively, the proposal to eliminate
a probationary period for newly appointed judges was viewed as progressive, since it eliminated
an executive branch method of removing non-compliant judges. Zorkin appeared to strongly
oppose the change in the court’s election process, although his reasons may have dealt with
preserving the prerogatives of the members of the court and with preserving existing procedures.
This latter conservative stance may also have been evidenced by an article he wrote in December
2009, which extolled the benefits of authoritarian state order and condemned chaotic
democratization and imposed modernization. The article may have constituted open criticism of
Medvedev.6
Genri Reznik, president of the Moscow Bar Association and member of the Public Chamber,
argued in May 2009 that the presidential selection process for judges was a “mockery of justice,”
since the process was largely based on political rather than professional criteria, and that “the
5 Michael Allen, “Obama Trip Prompts Token NGO Reform, but Kremlin Incapable of Real Change,” Democracy
Digest, July 6, 2009.
6 Open Source Center. Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter CEDR), December 15, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-46009.
Congressional Research Service
5
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
situation has become much worse in terms of judges’ independence” from political pressure.7 In
August 2009, President Medvedev called for further limiting jury trials (he had signed a law at
the end of 2008 limiting jury trials in terrorist or extremist cases) that involve “criminal
communities,” which some legal experts and civil rights advocates criticized as an effort to
further squelch unwanted acquittals by juries.
President Medvedev authored an article in September 2009 that pledged that Russian democracy
would be developed slowly so as not to imperil social stability and that “foreign grants” would
not be permitted to influence the development of civil society (these views seemed to echo those
of Central Asia’s authoritarian leaders). He pointed to such changes as political party participation
in the Duma (mentioned above) as marking progress in democratization, but also admitted that
“we have only just embarked” on creating a judicial system free of corruption that is capable of
protecting citizens’ rights and freedoms.8 A few days later, Russian Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov
(who is, along with Putin, the top leader of United Russia) published an article that praised former
President Putin’s abolition of popular gubernatorial elections as strengthening central government
administration. He also asserted that the abolition of the elections did not harm democratization,
and praised Medvedev’s proposal to “perfect” the process by having the dominant local political
party propose gubernatorial candidates to the president. Gryzlov hailed Medvedev’s statement
that Russia would democratize at its own pace and in its own way.”9
On October 11, 2009, mayoral and other local elections took place in most of Russia’s regions.
Candidates from the ruling United Russia Party won overwhelmingly. Alleged irregularities in
many races led the three minority parties represented in the State Duma—the Communist Party,
Liberal Democratic Party, and Just Russia—to temporarily walk out as a sign of protest. President
Medvedev also criticized the elections, but was careful to blame “some regional representatives
of both United Russia and other parties” of turning elections into administrative exercises. He
stated that “we must simply get rid of these people and at the same time these bad political habits
as well.”10
In the state of the nation address to the Russian Federal Assembly on November 11, 2009,
President Medvedev deplored the economic downturn in Russia and proposed a program of
technological modernization (see also below, “Medvedev’s Modernization Initiative”). He also
appeared to criticize the top-down administrative authoritarianism implemented by Putin and the
“prejudice and nostalgia” of current foreign policy. He called for 10 political reforms—such as
standardizing the ratio of deputies to the voting populations of the regions, using the internet to
disseminate legislative debates and campaign information, and eliminating the gathering of
signatures by parties in order to qualify to run in elections—that were viewed by some critics as
useful but minor. He stated that a session of the State Council (a conclave of governors) would be
held in January 2010 to consider these and other suggestions from political parties on how to
modernize the political system.
Medvedev convened another meeting of the Presidential Council on Civil Society in November
2009, where he proposed state assistance to NGOs that do charity work. He appeared to reject
7 CEDR, May 6, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-4003.
8 CEDR, September 10, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-378001.
9 CEDR, September 14, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-23005.
10 The Kremlin. President of Russia. Speech at 11th United Russia Party Congress, November 21, 2009, at
http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2009/11/21/1823_type84779.
Congressional Research Service
6
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
criticism of the courts by some attendees, stating that the prestige of the courts should be
enhanced rather than attacked. He also expressed disbelief when told that only 0.04% of criminal
court cases result in acquittal, but pledged to examine the issue. Some human rights activists
praised the meeting as bringing problems to the attention of the president that otherwise would
have been suppressed by bureaucrats.
In June 2010, the Working Group on Nonprofit Organization Law (mentioned above) reportedly
discussed further possible amendments to the NGO law, including the easing of restrictions on
foreign NGO activities in Russia. One Russian analyst suggested that the discussion of possible
amendments was timed to take place just before President Medvedev’s visit to the United States,
where civil society might be a topic of summitry. He also suggested that government restrictions
on foreign NGOs seem less necessary now than earlier, since Russia appears less vulnerable to an
“orange revolution.” Also in June 2010, the Presidential Council to Promote the Development of
Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights sent a legal analysis to President Medvedev in
opposition to a bill that criminalizes disobeying an employee of the Federal Security Service
(FSB) or hindering him in the performance of official duties. The bill also permitted the FSB to
issue warnings to individuals or groups whose actions it felt might jeopardize national security,
even if the actions are not crimes. The Council warned that “this kind of return to the worst and
unlawful practices of a totalitarian state - with the aim of sowing fear and distrust in people -
cannot be perceived by society as anything other that legitimizing the suppression of civil
liberties and dissent.”11
Assessing the balance of Medvedev’s political changes, Freedom House, a non-governmental
organization, has concluded that they mark the deepening of Russian political authoritarianism
over the past year. Political stability is increasingly ensured through repression, including
assassinations of media and civil society personnel. Elections too are increasingly controlled by
the authorities, so that more and more Russian citizens decline to vote. The judiciary remains
subject to political pressure, and media faces ongoing restrictions on coverage. Since neither
Putin nor Medvedev has ruled out running in a presidential election scheduled for 2012, the
current authoritarian system may continue for some time, Freedom House warns.12
Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov’s Ouster
Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov was appointed mayor in 1992 after the resignation of the previous
mayor, and was subsequently popularly elected. After then-President Putin rescinded popular
elections for federal officials, he repeatedly chose Luzhkov to remain as the mayor. Most recently,
Luzhkov was re-designated by then-President Putin as mayor at the end of 2007 for a four-year
term. Luzhkov was a founding member and deputy-chairman of the ruling United Russia Party.
On September 28, 2010, President Medvedev issued a decree dismissing Luzhkov due to a “loss
of confidence.” President Medvedev reported that this was the first time he had used such a
wording to remove a federal authority. All the major political parties endorsed Luzhkov’s ouster
as appropriate.13
11 CEDR, June 22, 2010, Doc. No CEP-4005; June 24, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950171.
12 Robert Orttung, “Russia,” Nations In Transit 2010, Freedom House, June 29, 2010.
13 Interfax, September 28, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
7
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Medvedev had criticized the Moscow City Council elections in October 2009 as among regional
elections that “some regional representatives of both United Russia and other parties” had turned
into administrative exercises. He stated that “we must simply get rid of these people and at the
same time these bad political habits as well.”14 In August 2010, Medvedev personally intervened
after popular protests to postpone the planned destruction of an old-growth forest on the outskirts
of Moscow to make way for a highway. After Medvedev’s intervention, Luzhkov suddenly came
out for building the road through the forest.15
Medvedev “nominated” Sergey Sobyanin, Putin’s chief of staff and deputy prime minister, as the
new mayor, and he was confirmed by the Moscow city council on October 21, 2010. Some
observers have speculated that Sobyanin is a supporter of Putin, while others have pointed to
Sobyanin’s role as the manager of Medvedev’s presidential election campaign to argue that
Sobyanin is agreeable to both members of the “tandem.”
Human Rights Problems
According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009, there
were numerous Russian government human rights problems and abuses during the year. Law
enforcement personnel reportedly sometimes used torture to coerce confessions from suspects.
Judges and defense attorneys remained subject to pressure from the executive, military, and
security forces, particularly in politically sensitive cases, according to a Council of Europe report.
In some cases, Russia’s Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman assisted persons whom it
considered to have been treated improperly by the courts, and judges occasionally rejected
confessions obtained without a lawyer present. In December, two Constitutional Court judges
resigned in protest over what they considered violations of judicial independence. The
government increasingly restricted freedom of speech, particularly with regard to sensitive issues
such as the conflict in Chechnya, human rights, corruption, coverage of opposition candidates in
local elections, and economic problems. The government used direct ownership or other means to
control or influence all six national television stations and a majority of regional media. Beating
and intimidation of journalists remained a problem. Eight journalists were killed during the year.
The libel law was increasingly applied against some NGOs and individuals, and officials
continued to accuse NGOs that received foreign funding of disloyalty. Local authorities
increasingly restricted freedom of assembly, and police sometimes used force to disrupt peaceful
protests. Some regional and local authorities prosecuted members of the political opposition and
restricted the freedom of worship of some religious groups. The government’s poor human rights
record in the North Caucasus worsened. In Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan, the number of
extrajudicial killings and disappearances increased markedly, as did the number of insurgent
attacks against police. Several human rights activists were killed by unknown persons.16
The State Department reported in its Advancing Democracy and Human Rights report (released in
May 2010) that Russian authorities “fear that democracy will cause instability,” and place
restrictions on some civil society groups and media or even harass them. The State Department
also stressed that “political activism [in Russia] remains relatively low,” and that “public demand
14 The Kremlin. President of Russia. Speech at 11th United Russia Party Congress, November 21, 2009, at
http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2009/11/21/1823_type84779.
15 Alexander Bratersky, “Khimki Road Gets Luzhkov as Backer,” The Moscow Times, September 7, 2010.
16 U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009, March 11, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
8
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
for government accountability is generally weak, although … there are some modest, detectable
changes for the better.” The Russian Foreign Ministry protested that these statements violated the
intent of the U.S.-Russian “re-set” of relations to engage in “constructive criticism and
recommendations on the basis of mutual respect for each other’s positions.” The Foreign Ministry
countered that Russia is open to discussions but not “moral admonitions and guidance as to how
we should build real democracy.” The ministry criticized U.S. aid to civil society groups as
mentioned in the report as “verging on interference in internal affairs,” and raised hopes that the
United States would take to heart the findings of an upcoming U.N. review of human rights
conditions in the United States.
Among actions bearing on human rights taken by Russia in 2010, President Dmitriy Medvedev
convened a meeting of the advisory State Council (a conclave composed of regional governors) in
January 2010 to discuss electoral and legislative reform proposals he and various political parties
had proposed. Strong criticisms about political developments in Russia by the Communist Party
and other opposition parties were televised nationwide. A report by a State Council commission
on the parties’ suggestions basically praised the current political system (the report had been
edited by Vladislav Surkov, first deputy chief of staff of the presidential administration).
Medvedev defended Russia’s electoral system as basically democratic, stating that allegations that
recent local elections were not free and fair had not been proven in the courts. Some observers
speculated that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s appearance at the meeting indicated that there
would little progress in political reforms.
A Working Group on Civil Society, part of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission
(see below, “The Obama Administration “Re-sets” Bilateral Relations”), held its first U.S.
meeting in late January 2010. As per agreement, the working group is composed of government
officials and some representatives of non-governmental organizations. The officials and NGO
representatives met in separate sessions, and then the two groups compared notes. The topics of
discussion included corruption, protecting children, and national stereotyping. Some Members of
Congress had called in December 2009 for the Administration to boycott the meetings until
Russia changed its head of the group.17 Another meeting of the Working Group took place in
Vladimir, Russia, in May 2010, where discussions included the participation of civil society
groups in monitoring prison conditions and integrating refugees and immigrants into society.
In June 2010, the Duma passed on first reading (introduced) amendments to the Law on the FSB
that permitted the FSB to issue a warning to a person or group “on the impermissibility of actions
that would comprise grounds and create conditions for the commission of crimes.” Another
amendment would introduce a fine by the FSB for “disobeying the legal instruction or directive
of an FSB official.” Prime Minister Putin admitted that he authored the bill. The bill elicited
widespread public criticism, so that it was slightly altered in its second reading on July 9, 2010
(considered the main vote, with a third reading being the final vote). Critics raised concerns that
major rationales for the language included further restricting the ability of individuals or groups
to hold demonstrations and of media to operate freely.18 The bill received final approval and was
signed into law by President Medvedev on July 29, 2010, despite the urging of human rights
groups that it be reconsidered.
17 “Interview: McFaul on U.S., Russian Stereotypes and His Controversial Co-Chair, RFE/RL, January 28, 2010.
18 CEDR, July 7, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-8004; July 7, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-8022.
Congressional Research Service
9
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
The Russian Levada Center polling organization reported in June 2010 that 72% of Russians
surveyed feared arbitrary actions by the police, tax inspectors, courts, and other government
agencies. Such views might have been reinforced by the case of Sergey Magnitskiy—a lawyer for
the Hermitage Fund, a private investment firm—who died in November 2009 in detention eleven
months after being arrested on tax evasion charges after he alleged that police and other officials
had illicitly raided Hermitage assets. H.R. 6365 (McGovern) and S. 3881 (Cardin), both
introduced on September 29, 2010, require the Secretary of State to identify individuals
responsible for Magnitskiy’s detention, abuse, or death or for the conspiracy to raid Hermitage,
and to impose a visa ban and certain financial measures with respect to such individuals. During a
trip to Moscow on September 7-8, 2010, to discuss bilateral relations, Under Secretary of State
William Burns raised the Magnitskiy case and criticized the Russian government for using force
in recent months to break up peaceful demonstrations.19
Insurgency in the North Caucasus
Some observers have argued that Russia’s efforts to suppress the separatist movement in its
Chechnya region have been the most violent in Europe in recent years in terms of ongoing
military and civilian casualties and human rights abuses.20 In late 1999, Russia’s then-Premier
Putin ordered military, police, and security forces to enter the breakaway Chechnya region. By
early 2000, these forces occupied most of the region. High levels of fighting continued for several
more years and resulted in thousands of Russian and Chechen casualties and hundreds of
thousands of displaced persons. In 2005, then-Chechen rebel leader Abdul-Khalim Saydullayev
decreed the formation of a Caucasus Front against Russia among Islamic believers in the North
Caucasus, in an attempt to widen Chechnya’s conflict with Russia. After his death, his successor,
Doku Umarov, declared continuing jihad to establish an Islamic fundamentalist Caucasus Emirate
in the North Caucasus and beyond.
Russia’s pacification policy has involved setting up a pro-Moscow regional government and
transferring more and more local security duties to this government. An important factor in
Russia’s seeming success in Chechnya has been reliance on pro-Moscow Chechen clans affiliated
with regional President Ramzan Kadyrov. Police and paramilitary forces under his authority
allegedly have committed flagrant abuses of human rights.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies, a U.S. think tank, has estimated that armed
violence in the North Caucasus—which had ebbed markedly after the mid-2000s with the killing,
capture, or surrender of leading Chechen insurgents—started to increase in 2007.21 Among
prominent recent incidents, Dagestani Internal Affairs Minister Adilgerey Magomedtagirov was
killed in June 2009, and the president of Ingushetia, Maj. Gen. Yunus-bek Yevkurov, was severely
wounded by a bomb blast later that month. In July 2009, prominent human rights advocate
Natalia Estemirova was abducted in Chechnya and, after passing through police checkpoints, was
found murdered in Ingushetia. In August 2009, Zarema Sadulayeva and Alik Dzhabrailov, who
ran a child rehabilitation center in Chechnya, were murdered.
19 “U.S. Diplomat Raps Russia on Jailing, Free Assembly,” Reuters, September 8, 2010.
20 For background information, see CRS Report RL32272, Bringing Peace to Chechnya? Assessments and
Implications, by Jim Nichol.
21 Center for Strategic and International Studies, Violence In The North Caucasus: Trends Since 2004, 2008; Violence
in the North Caucasus: Summer 2009, 2009. See also PACE. Situation in the North Caucasus Region: Security and
Human Rights, Second Information Report, September 29, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
10
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
After a suicide truck bombing in Ingushetia killed 21 policemen and wounded 150 civilians in
August 2009, President Medvedev fired the republic’s Interior Minister. At a meeting of the
Security Council in Stavropol, Medvedev admitted that “some time ago, I had an impression that
the situation in the Caucasus had improved. Unfortunately, the latest events proved that this was
not so.” He reportedly urged legal and judicial changes that would reduce procedural rights and
streamline the prosecution of “bandits.” At a joint news conference with visiting German
Chancellor Angela Merkel in Sochi, President Medvedev asserted that the murders of human
rights workers and officials in the North Caucasus were carried out by enemies of Russia
financed and supported from abroad.22
Indicating a new widening of the conflict beyond the North Caucasus, the Nevskiy Express
passenger train was bombed outside of Moscow on November 27, 2009, killing over two dozen
civilians and injuring over 100. Some of the victims were Russian officials. The same train had
been bombed in 2007, allegedly by Pavel Kosolapov (an associate of Umarov and the late
Chechen terrorist Shamil Basayev). Russian media termed the Nevskiy Express bombing the
worst terrorist act outside of the North Caucasian region since the August 2004 bombing of two
airliners that had taken off from Moscow, killing 89. On December 2, Umarov allegedly took
responsibility for ordering the Nevskiy Express bombing.23 In mid-February 2010, Umarov stated
that “Russians do not understand that the war today is coming to their streets, the war is coming
to their homes, the war is coming to their cities.... The zone of combat actions will be expanded,
God willing, to include the whole of Russian territory.” He stated that a majlis al-shura—
composed of rebel leaders from Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and
Karachay-Cherkessia—had been formed to coordinate future operations, and proclaimed that “the
final goal is establishing shariah law in the Caucasus, the independence of the Caucasus, [and]
independent Islam in the Caucasus.”24
On March 29, 2010, suicide bombings in Moscow’s subway killed 39 people and wounded
dozens. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin condemned the attack and pledged that law enforcement
personnel would “track down the organizers of the crime [and] scrape them from sewer bottoms
and bring them into God’s light of day.” Another suicide bombing in Russia’s North Caucasus
region of Dagestan two days later claimed 12 lives. Putin suggested that the bombings in Moscow
and Dagestan were linked and that both were “crimes against Russia.” President Dmitriy
Medvedev vowed to “eliminate the terrorists” responsible for the bombings, to strengthen
security forces in the North Caucasus, and to continue to carry out “pinpoint strikes” there to
destroy terrorists “and their shelters.” He also stressed that “resolving social and economic
problems is in many respects the key to bringing about change in the situation [in the North
Caucasus republics]. Apart from the security side of things, we also need to work on this, work
with the people, work with communities and offer them better conditions for life.”25 Umarov took
responsibility for the Moscow bombings and stated that they were revenge for an attack by
Russian security forces on the village of Arshty in Chechnya on February 11. President Obama
22 President of the Russian Federation. Russian president addresses Security Council meeting on Caucasus, June 10,
2009, at http://www.kremlin.ru; CEDR, August 14, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950185; and August 25, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-
546006. See also CRS Report RL34613, Stability in Russia’s Chechnya and Other Regions of the North Caucasus:
Recent Developments, by Jim Nichol.
23 Reuters, December 2, 2009.
24 CEDR, February 16, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950085.
25 Open Source Center. Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter CEDR), March 30, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950185;
April 1, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950200; The Kremlin. President of Russia. Opening Remarks at Meeting with Security
Council Members, March 31, 2010; Voice of America, April 1, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
11
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
condemned the “outrageous” bombings in Moscow and classed them with other “violent
extremism and heinous terrorist attacks that demonstrate ... disregard for human life.”26 Many
observers suggested that the bombings were further evidence that Moscow’s ongoing security
operations in the North Caucasus—which have resulted in many human rights abuses—as well as
its efforts to boost the regional economy have not yet ameliorated instability there.
At May 2010 meeting of the Council for Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights, President
Medvedev argued that there needed to be a youth policy for the North Caucasus, including to
ameliorate the 20% unemployment in the region, which heavily impacted youth. He also
requested his presidential staff to study the issues of dwindling schooling and healthcare in the
region. He dismissed calls to investigate past extrajudicial killings and urged focusing on the
future. He also objected to discussants distinguishing between a region and Russia, stating that
“Dagestan is part of Russia,” and rejected use of the term “guerillas” instead of “terrorists.” He
called for forging a new “Russian identity” in the region that would reduce inter-ethnic conflict,
and implored North Caucasian ethnic groups to stop being extra “touchy” and “sensitive” about
the actions of governors he appoints.27
On June 23, 2010, Secretary of State Clinton designated Caucasus Emirates leader Doku Umarov
as a terrorist under Presidential Executive Order 13224, which targets terrorists and those
providing support to terrorists or acts of terrorism, to help stem the flow of financial and other
assistance to Umarov. In the Congress, H.Res. 1315 (Hastings), introduced on April 29, 2010, had
called on the Secretary of State to designate the Caucasus Emirate as a foreign terrorist
organization.
Devastating terrorist attacks occurred in the Autumn of 2010 in the North Caucasus. On August
29, a suicide attack was launched against Kadyrov’s home village of Tsentoroi, reportedly killing
six police and wounding 26 police and civilians. Three insurgent groups—that had just
announced that they were severing their allegiance to Umarov—took responsibility for the attack.
On September 9, a car-bomb exploded in Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia, killing 18 people and
wounding over 200. The terrorist Riyad-us Salikhin Brigade of Martyrs (linked to Umarov) took
responsibility. On October 19, a group of suicide bombers attacked the Chechnya republic
legislative building, reportedly killing more than 20 police and security personnel and wounding
more than 40. No group took responsibility for the attack, but Kadyrov accused Akhmad
Zakayev, a former “foreign minister” of breakaway Chechnya, of involvement in the attacks on
the legislature and on Tsentoroi.
In late October 2010, Russian Deputy Prosecutor-General Ivan Sydoruk reportedly testified to the
Federation Council that 365 “terrorist acts” or “crimes of a terrorist nature” had been committed
in the North Caucasus Federal District in 2010, with most taking place in Chechnya, and that this
number was much greater than the number that occurred in 2009. The terrorism had resulted in
hundreds of deaths among police, troops, and civilians. He also warned that many weapons used
by the terrorists had been obtained from government forces, denoting corruption, if not
collaboration, between some government forces and insurgents. Reacting to this testimony,
26 The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Statement by the President on the Bombings on the Moscow Metro,
March 29, 2010.
27 The Kremlin. Speech at Meeting of Council for Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights, May 20, 2010; ITAR-
TASS, May 20, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
12
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Russian historian Vladimir Popov stated “these are very large losses [of life], which can be
compared with the losses of the United States and NATO in Afghanistan.”28
Defense Reforms
Despite the sizeable reduction in the size of the armed forces since the Soviet period—from 4.3
million troops in 1986 to 1.0 million at present—the Russian military remains formidable in some
respects and is by far the largest in the region. Because of the deteriorating capabilities of its
conventional forces, however, Russia relies increasingly on nuclear forces to maintain its status as
a major power. There is sharp debate within the Russian armed forces about priorities between
conventional versus strategic forces and among operations, readiness, and procurement. Russia is
trying to increase security cooperation with the other Soviet successor states that belong to the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).29 Russia has military facilities on the territory of all
the CIS states (even in Azerbaijan, there is a Russian military contingent at a radar site).
Attempting to resist, Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan (and until recently, Ukraine) shifted their
security policies toward a more western, pro-NATO orientation. The passage of legislation in
October 2009 providing for the Federation Council to authorize the use of troops abroad to
protect its “peacekeepers” and citizens, and to combat piracy at sea appears to underline that
Russia might use military force to reinforce the “lesson” that small countries adjacent to Russia
may disregard Moscow’s interests and warnings only at their peril.
The improvement of Russia’s economy since 1999, fueled in large part by the cash inflow from
sharply rising world oil and gas prices, enabled Russia to reverse the budgetary starvation of the
military during the 1990s. Defense spending increased substantially in most of the 2000s, and
even continued to increase slightly after the global financial crisis of 2008 impacted Russia’s
economy. The 2010 defense budget was $39.6 billion, up slightly from $38.9 billion in 2009 and
$33.7 billion in 2008.30 Even factoring in purchasing power parity, Russian defense spending still
lags far behind current U.S. or former Soviet levels. The efficacy of the larger defense budgets is
reduced, however, by systemic corruption. Some high-profile military activities have been
resumed, such as large-scale multi-national military exercises, show-the-flag naval deployments
to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, and strategic long-range bomber patrols that approach U.S.
and NATO airspace.
In February 2007, then-President Putin appointed Anatoly Serdyukov as defense minister. With a
career outside the military establishment, many observers suggest that Serdyukov was chosen to
carry out a transformation of the armed forces from a mobilization model—large divisions only
partially staffed and dependent upon the mobilization of reserves during emergencies—to
permanently staffed smaller brigades. Problems of force composition, training, command and
control, equipment, and doctrine were highlighted during the August 2008 Russia-Georgia
conflict. According to the British International Institute for Strategic Studies, the poorly executed
Russian invasion of Georgia “increased doubt that the military could be seen as a reliable
instrument to support Russian foreign- and security policy objectives, and also reinforced the
28 Paul Goble, “Chechnya Is More Violent Than Reported,” The Moscow Times, October 29, 2010; “Defining
‘Terrorism’ In The North Caucasus,” RFE/RL, October 31, 2010.
29 Members include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and
Uzbekistan. Georgia withdrew following the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict.
30 “Russia,” The Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 3, 2010, p. 219.
Congressional Research Service
13
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
perception that the armed forces could not in the future guarantee reliable conventional defense
capabilities.”31
Partly in response, a reform plan entitled “The Future Outlook of the Russian Federation Armed
Forces and Priorities for its Creation for the period of 2009–2020” was launched in October 2008
that called for accelerating planned cuts in the bloated officer corps, to reduce their numbers from
355,000 to 150,000 within three years. Also, the plan called for abolishing the non-commissioned
officers’ ranks of warrant officer and midshipman in the Russian Army and Navy. The bulk of
these 140,000 NCOs would retire and 78,000 professional sergeants would be trained. Among
other changes, the number of personnel at the Defense Ministry and General Staff would be cut
and the number of higher military schools would be reduced. Also, the four-tier command system
of military districts, armies, divisions, and regiments would be altered to a three-tier system of
strategic commands, tactical commands, and brigades. The total size of the armed forces would
be reduced from 1.2 million to under 1 million.
During 2009, the brigade system for ground forces was set up and other reforms were carried out.
Russian Airborne Troops, however, rejected abolishing divisions. On March 5, 2010, President
Medvedev claimed that the armed forces re-organization had been completed and that personnel
had been successfully reduced to 1 million. He stated that improving the combat readiness of
combined-arms forces in their new organizational and staffing structure would be the focus in
2010, as well as the development of a 10-year plan for weapons modernization.
Contrary to Medvedev’s assessment, some reports suggested that many or most of the new
brigades were not adequately supplied with weapons and that warrant officers and midshipmen
continued to serve. Similarly, Gen. Makarov stated in February 2010 that the transition to
professional (contract) soldiers had largely failed—less than 20% of armed forces personnel were
contractees—and that conscription would increase. Critics argued that the sums paid to
contractees were far below adequate wages, so that the quality and number of contractees had
remained low. Critics also alleged that large sums in the 2004-2007 defense budgets for
transitioning to contracts had been pilfered.32 The armed forces now face a crisis in finding
enough young men to conscript for a one-year term of service given a sharp decline in births in
past years and unhealthy living conditions. Alternatives include reducing the armed forces below
1 million or increasing the length of service. A program covering the period up until 2015 calls
for units and formations to be staffed with conscripts (privates) and professionals or contract
servicemen (noncoms). The first training center for noncoms was established in Ryazan. Some
elite branches of the military, like Airborne Troops, are planned to be staffed solely with
professionals.
Also contrary to Medvedev’s assertion that reorganization was complete, in July 2010 Makarov
announced that military districts would be abolished and the West, East, South and Central
unified commands would be set up. Reportedly, these four unified commands were established by
mid-October 2010. Command West controls personnel and equipment from the former Moscow
and Leningrad military districts and the Baltic and Northern Fleets. Command South is in charge
of the former North Caucasian Military District and the Black Sea Fleet and Caspian Flotilla.
Command Center controls the former Volga-Urals Military District and the western part of the
31 The Military Balance, p. 211.
32 CEDR, June 24, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-358007.
Congressional Research Service
14
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Siberian Military District. Command East is in charge of the former Far Eastern Military District
and the larger part of the Siberian Military District.
In July 2010, large-scale military exercises were held, termed Vostok-2010, to assess the new
three-tier troop control organization. According to some observers, strategic commanders
performed well, but lower-level troop training and equipping showed weaknesses. According to
Russian military analyst Konstantin Makiyenko, the exercises reflected growing concerns among
some Russian policymakers that U.S. and NATO efforts in Afghanistan are foundering, and that
the Russian military should be prepared to combat Islamic terrorist incursions from Afghanistan
into Central Asia that threaten Russian territory.33
Weapons modernization has included the development of the RS-24 strategic nuclear ballistic
missile with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), which reportedly may
begin to be deployed in 2010 or later. However, substantial modernization is contingent on
rebuilding the largely obsolete defense industrial complex. Some observers have argued that
Russia is seeking as a partial alternative purchasing some advanced military weapons and
technology from abroad, such as a contract for twelve unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from
Israel Aerospace Industries (to be delivered in 2010) and a contract with France’s Thales for the
licensed production in Russia in 2010 of thermal imaging systems for T-90 tanks.
In 2009-2010, Russia negotiated with France over the purchase of a newly designed French
amphibious assault warship, called the Mistral. French President Nicolas Sarkozy declared that
the ship would be sold without armaments, while Russian General Nikolai Makarov, Chief of the
General Staff, asserted that a sale was contingent on the inclusion of command and navigation
systems and weapons.34 Some Members of Congress raised concerns with France over the Mistral
negotiations. H.Res. 982 (Ros-Lehtinen), introduced on December 16, 2009, called on the
President and the Secretaries of State and Defense to urge France, other NATO member states,
and the European Union not to sell offensive military arms to Russia until it has: withdrawn its
troops from Georgia and revoked its recognition of Georgia’s breakaway regions; withdrawn its
military forces from the Transnistrian region of Moldova; halted sales of materials usable in the
construction of weapons of mass destruction to state sponsors of terrorism; and made progress in
respecting the rule of law and human rights. As of late 2010, Russia and France reportedly are
still negotiating over details of the purchase.35
Force reductions and lagging weapons modernization have increased the Russian government’s
emphasis on its strategic nuclear forces. A new Russian military doctrine released in February
2010 declares that nuclear weapons may be used in local and regional conflicts with non-nuclear
powers. Some observers view this language as lowering the threshold of use, but this issue
remains opaque, since details are provided only in a classified follow-on to the doctrine termed
“Principles of National Nuclear Deterrence Policy to 2020.”36
At the July 2009 U.S.-Russia Summit, the two sides agreed to the resumption of military-to-
military activities, which had been suspended since the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict. The
33 RIA-Novosti, July 10, 2010.
34“Arms Trade,” Moscow Defense Brief, No. 1, 2010; Agence France Presse, March 25, 2010.
35 “Russia Set to Buy Mistral with Transfer of French Technologies,” RIA-Novosti, July 5, 2010.
36 CEDR, January 5, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-358002; December 15, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-677001; The ISCIP Analyst,
October 29, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
15
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
two sides agreed in their work plan to conduct nearly 20 exchanges and operational events before
the end of 2009, and to plan a more ambitious work plan for 2010. The two sides also agreed to
renew the activities of the Joint Commission on POW/MIAs and the four working groups that
seek to account for personnel from World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Cold
War, including Soviet military personnel unaccounted for in Afghanistan. The Commission’s
work had been disrupted since 2004, when Russia downgraded the status of its representatives
and failed to appoint a co-chair in the face of cooling U.S.-Russia relations. As of April 2010, the
Russian side reportedly had not yet designated officials to serve on the commission. In testimony
in March 2010, Admiral James Stavridis, the commander of the U.S. European Command, stated
that there were U.S.-Russia military-to-military discussions on a number of issues, that exchanges
were being explored, and that the two countries were cooperating in anti-piracy efforts off the
Horn of Africa.37
Trade, Economic, and Energy Issues
Russia and the Global Economic Crisis38
The Russian economy was hit hard by the global financial crisis and resulting economic
downturn. The crisis exposed weaknesses in the economy, including its significant dependence on
the production and export of oil and other natural resources and its weak financial system. Russia
shows signs of economic recovery, but persistent flaws in the economy could limit the recovery’s
depth and length.
Before the global financial crisis, Russia experienced a decade of strong economic growth. From
1999-2008, Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) increased 6.9% on average per year in
contrast to an average annual decline in GDP of 6.8% during the previous seven years (1992-
1998). The surge in economic growth—largely the result of increases in world oil prices—helped
raise the Russian standard of living and brought a large degree of economic stability that Russia
had not experienced since the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. Russia’s
government revenues increased and that, together with fiscal discipline, allowed the government
to generate budget surpluses after years of large deficits. Economic growth also contributed to
strong popular support for Vladimir Putin and Dmitriy Medvedev.
However, in 2008, Russia faced a rapid decrease in the prices for oil and other commodities. It
also faced investor unease caused in part by Russia’s military confrontation with Georgia in
August 2008 and also by the Russian government’s reassertion of control over major industries,
especially in the energy sector. Along with these events, the global financial crisis hit Russia in
the latter part of 2008 as foreign banking credits, on which many Russian companies depend,
decreased. As a result, Russia’s period of economic growth came to an abrupt end. Although
Russian real GDP increased 5.6% in 2008 as a whole, it did not grow at all during the fourth
37 U.S. Department of Defense. U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, at http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/
sovietunion/jcsd.htm; Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring,” Washington Times, July 9, 2009; U.S. House of Representatives.
Committee on Armed Services. Hearing on the FY 2011 Budget Requests for the U.S. European Command (EUCOM),
the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), March 10, 2010.
38 Prepared by William H. Cooper, Specialist in International Trade and Finance.
Congressional Research Service
16
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
quarter of 2008. Russian GDP declined 7.9% in 2009. The decline occurred across most sectors of
the economy, with manufacturing, construction, and transportation hit especially hard.39
The economic downturn also exposed Russia’s dependence on the production and export of oil,
natural gas, and other fossil fuels for economic growth and government revenues. On July 4,
2008, the price of a barrel of Urals-32 (the Russian benchmark price for oil) peaked at $137.61
and declined to a low point of $34.02 by January 2, 2009—a drop of 75.3% in six months.40 The
fuels accounted for about two-thirds of Russia’s export revenues and for more than half of
government revenues. Such a sharp drop in oil prices, along with heightened government
expenditures to stimulate the economy, forced the government to incur its first budget deficit in
10 years in 2009—a deficit equivalent to 5.9% of GDP.41
The Russian government responded in 2008-2009 to the global financial crisis with various fiscal
measures including heavier spending and tax cuts equivalent to more than 6% of GDP. These
measures were designed mostly to support the banking system, increase social expenditures, and
assist large state enterprises. The stimulus also included monetary measures that included
reducing refinance rates by the Central Bank of Russia (CBR).42 The CBR also drew down
foreign reserves in order to defend the ruble against rapid depreciation.
Russia is slowly emerging from its recession. Russian real GDP is projected to increase by 4.5%
in 2010, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, as demand for Russian exports has
increased and oil prices have risen. So far in 2010, the manufacturing and transport sectors have
rebounded, but construction has still been declining.43 During the summer of 2010, Russia
experienced a record-breaking heat wave that adversely affected crops, including wheat, causing
the government to impose a ban on wheat exports. Some companies, including auto
manufacturing firms, closed down operations temporarily because of concerns for the health and
safety of its workers, but these events are not expected to have a permanent effect on the Russian
economy.44 Nevertheless, in the long term, unless Russia can reduce its dependence on the
production of oil and other commodities and diversify and reform its economy, any recovery will
likely remain fragile.45 On several occasions, President Medvedev has expressed the need for
Russia to diversify its economy. As part of that effort, he visited Silicon Valley in California
during his June 2010 trip to the United States in order to persuade U.S. high-tech companies to
invest in Russia.46 The Russian government also announced that it planned to sell some of its
shares in major companies, including several major banks and oil companies, beginning in
2011.47
39 Economist Intelligence Unit.
40 CRS calculations based on data from the U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Energy Information Administration,
http://www.eia.doe.gov.
41 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report—Russia, September 2010, p. 21.
42 IMF. Russian Federation: 2010 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; and Public Information Notice on the
Executive Board Discussion, July 2010, p. 8.
43 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report—Russia, September 2010, p. 18.
44 Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report—Russia, September 2010, p. 19.
45 The World Bank, Russian Economic Report, No. 22, June 2010, p. 1.
46 Wall Street Journal, June 24, 2010.
47 Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report—Russia. January 2010.
Congressional Research Service
17
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Russia’s Accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
PNTR for Russia
Russia first applied to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT—now the World
Trade Organization (WTO)) in 1993. Russia has been in the process of completing negotiations
with a WTO working party (WP), which includes representatives from about 60 WTO members,
including the United States and the European Union (EU). WP members have raised concerns
about Russia’s IPR enforcement policies and practices, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)
regulations that may be blocking imports of agricultural products unnecessarily, and Russia’s
demand to keep its large subsidies for its agricultural sector. The United States has also raised
issues regarding the role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the Russian economy and Russian
impediments to imports of U.S. products containing encryption technology.
Prime Minister Putin’s June 9, 2009 announcement that Russia would be abandoning its
application to join the WTO as a single entity and would instead pursue it with Belarus and
Kazakhstan as a customs union seemed to set back the accession process. However, after meeting
resistance from WTO officials, Russia and the other two countries decided to pursue accession
separately but with common proposed tariff schedules for the three countries. On June 24, 2010,
during their meeting in Washington, DC, President Obama and President Medvedev pledged to
resolve the remaining issues regarding Russia’s accession to the WTO by September 30. The
United States also pledged to provide technical assistance to Russia to speed up the process of
Russia’s accession, taking into account its customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan. On
October 1, 2010, USTR announced that the United States and Russia had resolved some key
issues, including those related to IPR. However, it was unclear whether all of the issues had been
resolved. In addition, Russia still needs to complete negotiations with the EU and some other
WTO members The WTO requires that each member grant to all other members “unconditional”
most-favored-nation (MFN), or permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status, the term used
under U.S. law. WTO rules require that mutual PNTR must convey between WTO members to
enable them to have the relationship within the WTO framework. If the United States has not
given PNTR to a new WTO member, it must invoke the WTO’s non-application clause, which
would essentially preclude the United States and Russia from having a trade relationship under
WTO rules. This would mean , for example, that the United States could not pursue dispute
settlement action on discriminatory treatment against imported U.S. cars.
Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status is used under U.S. law to denote nondiscriminatory
treatment of a trading partner compared to that of other countries. Russia’s NTR status is
governed by Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974, which includes the so-called Jackson-Vanik
amendment (section 402). Under Title IV, Russia currently receives NTR on the condition that the
President continues to determine that Russia complies with freedom-of-emigration criteria under
section 402, subject to a semiannual review and to a possible congressional resolution of
disapproval. In order for Russia to receive unconditional or “permanent” NTR (PNTR), Congress
would have to pass, and the President would have to sign, legislation indicating that Title IV no
longer applies to Russia. To date, no such legislation has been introduced in the 111th Congress.
Russian leaders consider the absence of PNTR an affront and the Jackson-Vanik amendment to be
a relic of the Cold War that should no longer apply to U.S.-Russia trade relations, especially since
such still ostensibly communist countries as China and Vietnam are afforded PNTR status by the
United States.
Congressional Research Service
18
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Enforcement in Russia,
Agricultural Trade, and Other Issues
Several issues have hampered U.S.-Russian economic relations and have prevented the
relationship from developing. The lack of adequate intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in
Russia has tainted the business climate in Russia for U.S. investors for some time. The Office of
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) consistently identifies Russia in its Special 301
Report as a “priority watch list” country, as it did in its latest (April 30, 2010) report. While the
USTR report acknowledges some improvement in IPR protection, it also finds that
implementation of IPR laws has been slow and enforcement weak. In particular, the report cites
the failure of Russia to fulfill its commitments to improve IPR protection made as part of the
2006 bilateral agreement that was reached as part of Russia’s WTO accession.48
Russia’s treatment of imports of U.S. meat, especially poultry, has been a sensitive issue in U.S.-
Russian trade relations. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has become an
important market for U.S. exports of meat. On January 1, 2010, the Russian government
implemented new regulations on imports of poultry, claiming that the chlorine wash that U.S.
poultry producers use in the preparation of chickens violates Russian standards and is unsafe.
These regulations effectively halted U.S. exports of poultry to Russia. The United States claimed
that the wash is effective and safe and that Russian restrictions are not scientifically based. U.S.
and Russian officials conducted discussions to resolve the issue. At their June 24, 2010 press
conference that closed a bilateral summit meeting, President Obama and President Medvedev
announced that the dispute over poultry trade had been resolved and that U.S. shipments of
poultry to Russia would resume. However, the full resumption of shipments was delayed over
Russian demands to inspect U.S. poultry processing plants before poultry products can be
certified for shipping to Russia. The two countries reportedly reached a compromise on this issue
on September 30, 2010, whereby Russian inspectors would inspect plants in the United States
more quickly, beginning in earlier October in order to resume shipments.49
Other Russian economic policies and regulations have been a source of concern to the United
States. U.S. officials and the U.S. business community have asserted that structural problems and
inefficient government regulations and policies have been a major cause of the low levels of trade
and investment with the United States. Russia maintains high tariffs on a number of goods of
interest to U.S. exporters. For example, tariffs and excise taxes add close to 70% to the price of
imported U.S. passenger cars and sports utility vehicles. U.S. exporters have also cited problems
with Russian customs regulations that are complicated and time-consuming. In addition, some
experts have suggested that the heavy concentration of state control in the economy, especially in
lucrative sectors, such as energy, has bred corruption (i.e., the use of political power for private
gain), further poisoning the business environment.50 The U.S. Commercial Service cites
government corruption as a potential impediment to U.S. companies doing business in Russia.51
48 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Special 301 Report, April 30, 2010, p. 23.
49 World Trade Online, September 30, 2010. For more information on issues pertaining to U.S. exports of meat to
Russia, see CRS Report RS22948, U.S.-Russia Meat and Poultry Trade Issues, by Renée Johnson.
50 Aslund, Anders, and Andrew Kuchins, The Russia Balance Sheet, Petersen Institute for International Economics,
April 2009. p. 47-48.
51 http://www.buyusa.gov/russia/en/ccg.html.
Congressional Research Service
19
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Medvedev’s Modernization Initiative52
Toward the end of his presidency, Vladimir Putin called for an updated economic strategy to the
year 2020 to guide his chosen successor, Dmitriy Medvedev. The goal of the strategy was to make
Russia one of the five major economic powers in terms of technological innovation, energy
development, and finance. The global financial crisis led the Medvedev government to
promulgate an “anti-crisis plan” in early 2009, but it pledged to retain the goals of “Strategy
2020.” In May 2009, Medvedev complained that technological innovation was lagging, including
because private businesses were not making long-term investments, and he decreed the
establishment of a “Presidential Commission on Modernization and Technological Development
of the Russian Economy.” The foci of the monthly meetings of the Commission are on medical
technology, pharmaceuticals, energy efficiency, nuclear technology, computer hardware and
software, space technology, and telecommunications.
In September 2009, Medvedev published the article “Go Russia!” that deplored the economic
downturn in Russia and called for stepped-up efforts to boost technological innovation. In a
subsequent state of the nation address to the Russian Federal Assembly (legislature) in November
2009, he further spelled out his plans for technological modernization. A few days later, however,
the congress of the United Russia Party approved a “conservative ideology” that appeared at
variance with Medvedev’s call for modernization. State Duma (lower legislative chamber)
Speaker Boris Gryzlov then published an article that proclaimed that conservatism and
modernization were compatible, since Medvedev was advocating incremental rather than
revolutionary change that would fulfill Putin’s Strategy 2020 and maintain “traditional Russian
values.”53
The Medvedev government has compiled a list of countries that are advanced in high technology
of interest and has been inviting these states to invest in Russia. In a foreign policy speech in July
2010, President Medvedev argued that the global economic crisis had brought about a “paradigm
shift in international relations [which] opens for us a unique opportunity to put Russia’s foreign
policy instruments to the most effective use possible to assist the country’s modernization.” He
called for his diplomats and trade officials to forge a “modernization alliance” with Western
democracies, such as the European Union and the United States, and other countries.54
In a September 2010 speech, Medvedev stressed that the purpose of technological innovation was
to raise living standards. If existing government rules and regulations are rigorously applied and
living standards are improved, he appeared to argue, then there is progress in democratization. He
did not mention the need for progress on free elections, freedom of assembly, or other civil or
human rights as components of democracy, according to some critics.55
52 Prepared by Jim Nichol, Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs.
53 CEDR, December 1, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-49009.
54 CEDR, June 24, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-4950250; The Kremlin, Speech by Dmitry Medvedev, President of the Russian
Federation, at the Meeting with Russian Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives to International Organizations,
July 12, 2010.
55 CEDR, September 13, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-4013; Doc. No. CEP-4009.
Congressional Research Service
20
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
The Skolkovo Center for Innovation
At a meeting of the Presidential Commission on Modernization in February 2010, Medvedev
announced that a campus for high technology research and commerce would be constructed
outside of Moscow near the town of Skolkovo. To attract domestic and foreign firms, tax benefits
have been offered. Construction is set to begin in 2011.
During a session of the Presidential Commission on Modernization in March 2010, Medvedev
announced that Viktor Vekselberg, head of the Renova group of companies, would be the Russian
co-chairman of the Skolkovo Foundation, which will manage Skolkovo. The Presidential Staff
reportedly explained the choice of the private businessman by saying that “it is better not to
entrust this to an official.” The Skolkovo Foundation was registered in May 2010. The
international co-chairman is former Intel Chairman Craig Barrett. A scientific council is co-
chaired by Russian Nobel Laureate Zhores Alferov and U.S. Nobel Laureate David Kornberg.56
According to U.S. critic Matthew Jojansky, Russia is unlikely to be successful in creating a
Silicon Valley-like environment at Skolkovo, because Russia “ does not have the rule of law
climate, it does not have the investor-friendly climate, [and] it does not have the capital, [so] it
has to attract it from abroad.” Also, he stressed, Medvedev aimed to create Skolkovo by
bureaucratic fiat, rather that “growing this thing organically by approaching the root-level drivers
of innovation and profitability and commercialization of high technology…. He wants to create a
little bubble outside of Moscow in which the rule of law, [such as] protections for intellectual
property, will all be there within this bubble but not … in the rest of Russia.”57
Another U.S. critic, analyst Leon Aron, argues that in order to modernize, Russia must stop
persecuting Russian businessmen, strengthen democratic institutions, and withdraw its troops
from Georgia. He suggests that losses faced by foreign investors—such as the 2003 imprisonment
and ongoing prosecution of former Yukos Oil executive Mikhail Khodorkovskiy, and Royal
Dutch Shell’s 2007 forced relinquishment of half of its shares to Gazprom, a state corporation, for
well below market value—will not make many trans-national corporations eager to invest in
Skolkovo. He points out that the World Economic Forum, a non-governmental organization, in
2009 rated Russia near the bottom of 133 nations surveyed in the protection of property rights,
and that Russia’s performance on this indicator has deteriorated in recent years.58
Rejecting the argument that his modernization program is authoritarian, in September 2010
President Medvedev asserted that “I would like the people to be the modernizers - not only the
political parties, not only the president with his iPod, or the jet set society…. Modernization can
only be carried out by free people ... A man who is afraid of the government, law enforcement
agencies, opponents, and life is unable to engage in modernization.”59
56 Skolkovo Innovation Center, at http://www.expo2010-russia.ru/images/data/newexpo2010/mozartfiles/file/4755/
Scolkovo_eng.pdf.
57 Larisa Epatko, “Q&A: Medvedev Meets With Obama on Modernization Plan, Arms Control,” PBS Newshour, June
24, 2010.
58 Leon Aron, Dmitriy Medvedev’s Modernization Thaw: Objectives, Actions, and Policy Tests, American Enterprise
Institute, Summer 2010.
59 “Speech of President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev at Plenary Session of Global Policy Forum ‘The Modern State:
Standards of Democracy and Criteria of Efficiency,’” Global Policy Forum 2010, September 9, 2010, at http://en.gpf-
yaroslavl.ru/presscenter/publications/Speech-of-President-of-Russia-Dmitry-Medvedev-at-plenary-session-of-Global-
Policy-Forum-The-Modern-State-Standards-of-Democracy-and-Criteria-of-Efficiency.
Congressional Research Service
21
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
U.S. and Foreign Interest in Skolkovo
The United States and other countries and international corporations have already pledged to
become involved in the Skolkovo Center for Innovation and many others have indicated interest
in the project.
In May 2010, a U.S. business delegation sponsored by American Business Association of
Russian-Speaking Professionals (AmBAR) and Russian Corporation of Nanotechnologies
(Rusnano) travelled to Skolkovo. One firm that went on the trip, private equity firm Siguler Guff
& Co. announced an investment of $250 million in Skolkovo.60
During President Medvedev’s visit to California’s Silicon Valley on June 24, 2010, Cisco Systems
signed an memorandum of understanding with Vekselburg to invest $1 billion over ten years for
developing the Skolkovo park and for other projects.61 Also, the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) and Vekselburg signed a framework agreement on collaboration in education
and research in Russia.62
After visiting Silicon Valley, President Medvedev traveled to Washington, DC, for a presidential
summit meeting and a conclave hosted by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. At the summit, the
two presidents issued a “Joint Statement on a Strategic Partnership in Innovation” that expressed
the intent of the two sides “to begin new and dedicated efforts to promote collaboration in the
areas of development of civil technologies, open standards, and innovation and technology
policy.” The Skolkovo Innovation Center appeared to be referenced when the two sides pledged
to develop “cooperation on innovation in science and technology through both existing
mechanisms of strategic partnership and through new cooperation instruments at the level of
government institutions, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector.” At the “U.S.-
Russia Business Summit” hosted by the Chamber of Commerce, President Obama specifically
mentioned the Skolkovo Innovation Center, stating that he had “pledged to President Medvedev
that the United States wants to be Russia’s partner as he pursues his vision of modernization and
innovation in Russia, including his initiative to create a Russian Silicon Valley outside of
Moscow. American companies and universities were among the first to invest in this effort.”63
On October 10-13, 2010, a U.S. delegation headed by California Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger and including U.S. businessmen and investors visited Skolkovo and attended the
Russian-American “Global Innovative Partnership” Forum.
Among other international interest, at the November 2009 EU-Russia Summit, President
Medvedev called for more stress on high technology trade and investment, and at the June 2010
60 Siguler Guff Backs Russia’s Economy with $250m for Innovation Hub,” AltAssets Private Equity News, June 1,
2010.
61 Cisco Commits to Sustainable Development of Russian Technology Innovation Agenda Through $1B Multi-Year
Investment: Cisco CEO Chambers Signs MoU with Viktor Vekselberg to Establish Physical Presence in Skolkovo,
June 23, 2010, at http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/2010/prod_062310d.html.
62 “MIT and the Skolkovo Foundation of Russia Reach Agreement: Opportunities for Educational and Research
Collaboration to be Explored,” MIT News, June 24, 2010, at http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2010/ia-skolkovo-
0624.html.
63 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Joint Statement by the Presidents of the United States of America
and the Russian Federation on a Strategic Partnership in Innovation, June 24, 2010; Remarks by President Obama and
President Medvedev of Russia at the U.S.-Russia Business Summit, June 24, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
22
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
EU-Russia Summit, the two sides signed a “Partnership for Modernization.” However, the EU
insisted that in addition to combating corruption and enhancing property rights, democratization
and respect for human rights were fundamental to modernization. During July 2010 Russia-
German bilateral consultations in Yekaterinburg, Siemens and the Skolkovo Foundation signed an
accord on the company’s involvement in the Skolkovo Innovation Center. Medvedev stated that
during his September 2010 visit to China he had discussed possible cooperation in the Skolkovo
project with Chinese Premier Hu Jintao. Medvedev reported that “Hu Jintao said this was
interesting and that Chinese partners were ready to participate in Skolkovo.”64
Russian Energy Policy65
The Russian oil and natural gas industries are important players in the global energy market,
particularly in Europe and Eurasia. Russia has by far the largest natural gas reserves in the world,
possessing over 30% of the world’s total. It is eighth in the world in oil reserves, with at least
10% of the global total. Firms in these industries are either directly controlled by the Russian
government or are subject to heavy Russian government influence. The personal and political
fortunes of Russia’s leaders are tied to the energy firms. Russian government revenues and
Russia’s economic revival in the Putin/Medvedev era have been heavily dependent on the
massive wealth generated by energy exports, mainly to Europe.
Some Members of Congress, U.S. officials, and European leaders (particularly those in central
and eastern Europe) have claimed that European dependence on Russian energy and Russia’s
growing influence in large segments of Europe’s energy infrastructure poses a long-term threat to
transatlantic relations. Analysts have noted that Russia itself views its natural resources as a
political tool. Russia’s “National Security Strategy to 2020,” released in May 2009, states that
“the resource potential of Russia” is one of the factors that has “expanded the possibilities of the
Russian Federation to strengthen its influence on the world arena.”66
Concerns about Russian energy policy have centered largely on Russia’s natural gas supplies to
Europe. In early January 2009, the state-controlled Russian natural gas firm Gazprom halted all
gas supplies transiting Ukraine after the two sides failed to reach agreement on several issues,
including a debt allegedly owed by Ukraine to Gazprom and the price that Ukraine would pay for
gas supplies for 2009. About 80% of Europe’s natural gas imports from Russia transit Ukrainian
pipelines. Finally, Russia and Ukraine reached an agreement, and gas supplies to Europe resumed
on January 20. A similar Russian-Ukrainian dispute led to another gas cutoff to Europe at the
beginning of 2006. In 2010, disputes between Russian and Belarus over a variety of issues,
including energy prices, debts owed by Belarus, and transit fees paid by Russia for the use of
Belarusian pipelines, led to temporary reductions of oil and natural gas supplies to Belarus and
neighboring countries. These incidents have provided further evidence of Russia’s unreliability as
an energy supplier, according to some observers.
Concerns about the reliability of gas supplies and transit have caused Russia and some European
countries to propose new pipeline projects. Gazprom has started work on the Nord Stream natural
64 Interfax, September 28, 2010.
65 Prepared by Steven Woehrel, Specialist in European Affairs.
66 The text of the National Security Strategy can be found at the website of the Russian National Security Council at
http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html
Congressional Research Service
23
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
gas pipeline, which will transport natural gas from Russia to Germany via a pipeline under the
Baltic Sea, bypassing pipelines running through the states of central and eastern Europe. Nord
Stream will have a planned capacity of 55 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year, as compared to the
Ukrainian pipeline system’s 120-130 bcm per year. Nord Stream is working on the underwater
segments of the pipeline, with hopes that the first supplies from the pipeline will flow in late
2011.
Another pipeline project favored by Moscow is South Stream. In November 2007, Gazprom and
the Italian firm ENI signed an agreement to build South Stream, which would run from Russia
under the Black Sea to Bulgaria, with branches to Austria, Italy, and Greece. Serbia and Hungary
have also signed on to the project. Russia plans to start construction of South Stream in 2013, and
begin deliveries in 2015.. Like Nord Stream, South Stream would bypass Belarus, Ukraine,
Poland, and other central European countries. In May 2009, Russia and Italy announced that the
pipeline would have a capacity of 63 bcm per year.
Those concerned about the possible consequences of overdependence on Russia for energy have
called for the building of pipelines circumventing Russian territory that would transport non-
Russian gas supplies to Europe. The EU is supporting the creation of the Nabucco pipeline, which
could have a capacity of 31 bcm per year. It would get its supplies from Azerbaijan and perhaps
Turkmenistan through pipelines in Georgia and Turkey. Nabucco received a boost in July 2009,
when Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey signed an intergovernmental agreement
on the project. It is hoped that work on the pipeline could begin in 2012, with the first gas
supplies available by 2015 and full capacity reached in 2019.
While denying that Nabucco and South Stream are conflicting projects, Russian officials have
cast doubt on Nabucco’s prospects, claiming that the gas supplies for such a pipeline may be
difficult to find. Russia has attempted to buy up gas supplies in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, in
what some analysts view as an attempt to undermine Nabucco. In order to build political support
for South Stream, Russia has tried to entice key western European companies to participate in the
project. It has also discussed the possibility of changing the route for the pipeline in order to play
potential transit countries off against each other.
Russia has long sought a controlling stake in Ukraine’s pipeline system. Ukrainian President
Viktor Yanukovych, elected in February 2010, has expressed concern about the impact of South
Stream on transit volumes through its pipeline system. He has offered Russia partial ownership of
the Ukrainian pipeline system in exchange for a share in natural gas fields in Russia and
guaranteed transit volumes through Ukraine’s pipelines. Ukraine has also proposed a joint venture
with Russia and the EU in building a new pipeline through Ukraine that would eliminate the need
for South Stream. So far Russia has not accepted these proposals.
In addition to possible competition from Europe for Central Asian energy supplies, Russia also
faces a challenge from other countries. A pipeline from Turkmenistan to China opened in 2009,
delivering 30 bcm of gas per year. Turkmenistan has also expanded its gas pipeline capacity to
Iran, which is expected to reach 20 bcm eventually. Other factors could diminish Russia’s
leverage over Eurasian natural gas supplies. The development of previously difficult-to-develop
“unconventional” gas deposits in Europe and elsewhere could diversify supplies and keep prices
down. The growth of the spot market for natural gas and the development of liquefied natural gas
infrastructure in Europe could also help diversify supplies as well as reduce dependence on
Russian-controlled pipelines.
Congressional Research Service
24
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Like the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration has promoted the diversification of
natural gas supplies and pipelines to Europe, including the building of pipelines from Central
Asia and the Caspian region that bypass Russia, chief among them Nabucco. However, the
Obama Administration has been less critical of Nord Stream and South Stream than the previous
Administration. Part of the change in tone may be due to the effort to “re-set” ties with Russia
that were frayed during the Bush years. Ambassador Richard Morningstar, the State Department
Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy, has denied that the United States and Russia are involved in a
“great game”—that is, a geopolitical struggle—for Central Asian energy supplies. Morningstar
has said that the United States does not oppose Nord Stream and South Stream; that the United
States does not see Nabucco as being in competition with South Stream; and that it was possible
that Russia could provide gas for Nabucco.67
Foreign Policy
Russia and the West
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the turmoil associated with the Yeltsin period, a
consensus emerged as the Putin era began on reestablishing Russia’s global prestige as a “great
power” and its dominance in “the former Soviet space.” The pursuit of these goals by then-
President Putin and his closest policy advisors seemed to be driven by the belief that the West,
and in particular the United States, had taken advantage of Russia’s political turmoil and overall
weakness during the Yeltsin years. Putin and his advisors were determined to restore what they
believed to be Russia’s rightful place as a significant influence on the world stage.
Fueled in part by the massive inflow of petro-dollars, Moscow’s self-confidence grew over the
several years prior to the late 2008 global economic downturn, and officials and observers in
Europe and the United States expressed growing concern about what they viewed as an
increasingly contrarian Russian foreign policy. This was evident in recent years in Russia’s sharp
political struggles with Estonia and Ukraine, its opposition to a planned U.S. missile defense
system in Eastern Europe, the suspension of compliance with the Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe Treaty, and its strong opposition to NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia.
According to analyst Dmitri Trenin, then-President Putin became greatly alarmed following the
“rose revolution” in Ukraine in 2004-2005 and the “tulip revolution” in Kyrgyzstan later in 2005,
and his attitude toward the United States hardened. Trenin claims that Putin viewed these popular
revolts as “part of a U.S.-conceived and led conspiracy. At minimum, these activities ... aimed at
drastically reducing Russia’s influence.... At worst, they constituted a dress rehearsal for ...
installing a pro-U.S. liberal puppet regime in the Kremlin.”68 In February 2007, at the 43rd annual
Munich Security Conference, President Putin delivered a particularly harsh speech attacking Bush
Administration policies and condemning the “unipolar” world he alleged the United States was
creating.69
67 Morningstar’s testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing “$150 Oil: Instability, Terrorism,
and Economic Disruption, July 16, 2009; State Department Foreign Press Center Briefing, June 23, 2009.
68 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Spheres of Interest, not Influence,” The Washington Quarterly, October 2009.
69 The full text of Vladimir Putin’s speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 10, 2007 can be
found at http://www.securityconference.de.
Congressional Research Service
25
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
In contrast to Putin, President Medvedev has been considered by some observers to be a
potentially pragmatic leader who could shift Russia’s attitudes more positively toward the United
States and the West. However, during Medvedev’s first year or so in office, Russia’s relations
with the west became increasingly tense. In the aftermath of the August 2008 Russia-Georgia
conflict, relations between Russia and the West reached what many considered to be their lowest
point since the Cold War. Russia continued to voice strong opposition to NATO enlargement to
Georgia and Ukraine; invaded Georgia and occupied two of its regions; refused to recognize
Kosovo’s independence; cut off or reduced energy supplies in disputes with Ukraine and Belarus;
boosted ties with Cuba and Venezuela; and attempted to end the use of airbases in Central Asia by
the United States and NATO.
Responding in part to the Obama Administration’s efforts to “re-set” relations, Russia has
appeared somewhat more conciliatory toward the EU and the United States in recent months. An
alleged Russian Foreign Ministry document leaked to the media in May 2010 called for the
government to adopt a more conciliatory foreign policy toward the West in order to attract foreign
investment. Similarly, Russian analyst Igor Yurgens has argued that the Russian leadership no
longer is concerned that the West seeks to foment “colored revolutions” in Russia, stating that
“there is no danger that someone from the West will want to rock the situation in our country.”70
NATO-Russia Relations71
Post-Cold War efforts to build a cooperative NATO-Russia relationship have had mixed results, at
best. Russian views toward NATO, particularly since the beginning of the Putin era, have been
marked predominantly by suspicion and skepticism regarding NATO’s intentions. NATO-Russia
ties in the mid- to late-1990s suffered largely due to Russian opposition to NATO plans to enlarge
eastward and to NATO and western involvement in the Balkan wars. Since NATO-Russia
relations reached a new low in the wake of Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, both the United
States and NATO have renewed efforts to improve ties with Moscow. Alliance members continue
to disagree, however, on the form future relations should take and on their assessment of Russian
intentions. Although Russian officials have welcomed NATO and U.S. overtures, they remain
critical of many aspects of NATO policy.
The principal institutional mechanism for NATO-Russia relations is the NATO-Russia Council
(NRC), established in May 2002. Recognizing that both NATO and Russia faced many of the
same global challenges and shared similar strategic priorities, Russian and NATO leaders
structured the NRC as a “consensus” forum of equals with a goal of “political dialogue, common
approaches, and joint operations.”
The NRC has recorded some achievements since its inception, including a 2004 comprehensive
action plan on terrorism and a 2005 agreement for providing a joint counter-narcotics training
program in Afghanistan. However, most observers agree that the NRC has fallen far short of its
potential due largely to Russian concerns about NATO’s long-term intentions. Many in Russia
viewed NATO’s 1999 and 2004 enlargements to 10 former Soviet satellite states as an affront to
Russian power and prestige and Russian leaders continue to oppose the idea of NATO
70 Owen Matthews and Anna Nemtsova, “The New Putin Profile,” Newsweek, June 12, 2010; CEDR, June 22, 2010,
Doc. No. CEP-4005.
71 Prepared by Paul Belkin, Analyst in European Affairs.
Congressional Research Service
26
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
enlargement to former eastern bloc countries.72 The establishment of U.S. and NATO airbases in
Central Asia after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States for operations in
Afghanistan and a United States decision to establish military facilities, albeit non-permanent, in
Bulgaria and Romania after NATO’s 2004 enlargement were viewed by some in Moscow as
further evidence of an encirclement of Russia by NATO and the United States.
More recently, Russian leaders appear concerned by NATO and U.S. insistence that the alliance
will not recognize a Russian sphere of influence along its borders. Specifically, Moscow has
criticized NATO member states for their refusal to recognize the Russian-encouraged
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and for their reluctance to establish alliance
relations with the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO members include
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan). In addition, Moscow has
been critical of those who have suggested a more formal role for NATO in European energy
security issues.
Russian reactions to U.S. and NATO policies it opposes have also caused concern within the
alliance and have exposed differences among the allies on how to manage ongoing relations with
Russia. These include Russia’s 2007 decision to suspend compliance with the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), its vocal opposition to proposals to enhance
NATO ties with Georgia and Ukraine and of proposed U.S./NATO missile defense installations in
Europe, and, most significantly, its August 2008 invasion of Georgia. Finally, Russian proposals
for an alternative European security architecture have been viewed by many as an attempt to
undermine NATO and to increase Russian influence in European affairs.
In 2007 Russia suspended its compliance with the CFE Treaty, signed in 1990 by 22 members of
NATO and the Warsaw Pact to limit non-nuclear forces in Europe. The CFE agreement was
designed to limit troop and equipment levels; provide for the exchange of data on equipment and
training maneuvers; provide procedures for the destruction of equipment; and permit on-site
inspections to verify treaty compliance. Moscow claimed that NATO countries were taking too
long to ratify the CFE Treaty. NATO claimed that Russia had failed to live up to previous
commitments to remove its military forces from Georgia and Moldova.
At NATO’s April 2008 summit in Bucharest, then-President Putin strongly urged NATO not to
offer Membership Action Plans (MAPs) to Georgia and Ukraine. Although NATO, after serious
internal debate, decided not to extend MAPs at the summit, Moscow still appeared disappointed
with NATO’s concluding statement that both Georgia and Ukraine would eventually become
members of the alliance. Putin also warned against the deployment of a U.S. missile defense
system in Poland and the Czech Republic. Some Russian officials even suggested that the
decision could make those two countries targets of Russia’s nuclear arsenal.
Tensions between Russia and NATO escalated in the wake of Russia’s August 2008 invasion of
Georgia, after which the two sides suspended formal ties in the NATO-Russia Council. Russia’s
actions sparked a strong debate within the alliance over how Europe should react to what many
considered a new, more aggressive Russian foreign policy intended to re-establish a Russian
sphere of influence along its border with Europe. Some allies argued that NATO’s inability or
unwillingness to prevent Russia from moving to establish a permanent military presence in
72 The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary joined the alliance in March 1999; Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined in March 2004.
Congressional Research Service
27
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Abkhazia and South Ossetia could lead some to question the credibility of the alliance’s core
principle of collective defense, as enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Although
Georgia is not a member of the alliance, they contended that NATO had given the impression that
it could concede to Russian demands in its relations with aspiring alliance members. Several
Central and Eastern European allies also expressed concern about a reported lack of NATO
contingency planning in response to the possibility of future Russian action against a NATO ally
or partner.
Despite ongoing disagreement within the alliance on how to manage relations with Russia,
ambassadorial-level meetings of the NATO-Russia Council resumed in April 2009. In subsequent
meetings at both the ambassadorial and foreign minister level, Russian and NATO officials have
agreed that the NATO-Russia Council represents the best approach for promoting Euro-Atlantic
security, agreed to restart military cooperation within the NRC, and pledged to enhance
cooperation in training Afghan and Central Asian authorities for counternarcotics operations.
One issue that some NATO allies have been reluctant to discuss in the NRC is a Russian proposal
for an alternative European security architecture, first raised by President Medvedev in June
2008. President Medvedev has argued that the United States, through its membership in NATO,
continues to exercise disproportionate influence in European affairs and that Russia should have a
more formal role in the current European security architecture. While Russian officials claim that
a new security architecture would improve trust among Euro-Atlantic governments and reduce
the risk of internal European conflicts, many in the United States and Europe view the Russian
proposals as attempts to weaken NATO, constrain the OSCE, and stop further encroachment of
these organizations on Russia’s borders. The United States and most European countries maintain
that any dialogue on the future of European security must build upon the existing Euro-Atlantic
institutions.
Since assuming his post in August 2009, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has
made improved NATO-Russia ties a priority. He has emphasized the two sides’ shared interests
and called for enhanced cooperation on missile defense and counterterrorism, among other
areas.73 Rasmussen’s efforts have generally been welcomed in Moscow. Nonetheless, observers
point out that while limited progress has been made in some areas, disagreement both within the
alliance and between NATO and Russia persists on some core issues. Russia has allowed the
establishment of air and land supply routes for the NATO mission in Afghanistan on its territory
and has agreed to consider bolstering training for Afghan police forces and to providing financial
assistance for reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. Russian helicopters, operated by civilian
crews, have also begun providing transport in Afghanistan. On the other hand, little, if any,
progress has been made on the issue of Georgia’s territorial integrity and NATO membership
prospects, the unratified CFE Treaty, a proposed NATO/U.S. missile defense system (discussed in
detail later in the report), and Russian calls for more influence within the Euro-Atlantic security
architecture.
Rasmussen’s efforts to enhance NATO-Russia ties appear in line with the Obama
Administration’s stated intention to pursue a path of constructive engagement with Russia. U.S.
officials have emphasized the need to engage Russia in an effort to improve U.S.- and NATO –
73 See, for example, “NATO and Russia: A new Beginning,” Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh
Rasmussen at the Carnegie Endowment, Brussels, September 18, 2009. Available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natolive/opinions_57640.htm.
Congressional Research Service
28
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Russia cooperation in areas ranging from the NATO mission in Afghanistan and counter-
terrorism, to arms control and non-proliferation and international efforts to curb Iran’s nuclear
program.74 At the same time, NATO and U.S. officials stress that they will continue to oppose
Russian policies that they perceive as conflicting with the core values of the alliance. They say,
for example, that NATO will not recognize a Russian sphere of influence outside its borders and
will continue to reject Russia’s recognition of Georgia’s breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. There continues to be concern among some NATO allies that Russia has not changed its
fundamental view of NATO as a security threat and that unresolved issues will continue to plague
NATO-Russia relations. Observers and officials in some allied nations—notably Poland and
Lithuania—have expressed concern that NATO’s reengagement with Russia could signal that the
alliance is not serious about standing up to Russian behavior it has deemed unacceptable. In this
vein, they have urged the United States Administration to consider the interests and views of all
NATO allies as it seeks to improve relations with Russia.
The European Union and Russia75
Attitudes and outlooks on Russia differ widely among the 27 member states of the European
Union (EU). The governments of some countries, such as Germany, France, and Italy, are inclined
to an approach based on pragmatism and engagement. They believe that the maintenance of
extensive ties and constructive dialogue is the most effective way to influence Russia. Supporters
of this approach also argue that Russia should be viewed as a strategic partner and observe that
Russian cooperation is important on issues such as energy, Iran, climate change, and arms control.
Countries such as Poland and the Baltic States, on the other hand, tend to view Russia as a
potential threat to themselves and their neighbors. Difficult relations between these countries and
Russia are deeply rooted in the historical experiences of the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.
As a result of such internal differences, the EU has had difficulty developing coherent and robust
common policies on Russia, and critics note that the EU lacks a comprehensive strategic
approach to its eastern neighbor. The EU was critical of Russia’s actions during the August 2008
conflict with Georgia and continues to object to Russia’s support of Georgia’s breakaway
provinces. The EU has also sought to pressure Russia on governance and human rights issues, but
some analysts argue that the EU’s attempts to influence Russia in such areas have been tempered
and ineffective. The Lisbon Treaty, the EU reform treaty that came into effect in December 2009,
is designed to give the EU new institutional tools with which to develop stronger and more visible
external policies. Nevertheless, the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) remains
based on member state consensus—CFSP tends to be weak or non-existent in areas where such a
consensus is lacking.
In general, Russia has tended to perceive EU enlargement with less hostility and suspicion than
NATO enlargement. Russian officials, however, have expressed displeasure with the EU’s Eastern
Partnership initiative, which seeks to deepen ties with six countries of the former Soviet Union
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine). At the May 2009 EU-Russia
summit, President Medvedev expressed a view that the Eastern Partnership was directed against
74 See Remarks by Vice President Biden at the 45th Munich Security Conference, February 7, 2009,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
RemarksbyVicePresidentBidenat45thMunichConferenceonSecurityPolicy/
75 Prepared by Derek E. Mix, Analyst in European Affairs.
Congressional Research Service
29
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Russia. U.S. officials have expressed support for the Eastern Partnership as a way to “extend
democracy, stability, and security” to the post-Soviet region.76
Relations between the EU and Russia revolve largely around energy and economics. Russia
supplies the EU with more than one-quarter of its total gas and oil supplies, and some EU
member states are almost completely reliant on Russian energy. As discussed above (see “Russian
Energy Policy”), energy dependence and aggressive Russian energy policies contribute to the
tensions felt by some of the countries of central and eastern Europe with regard to Russia. The
EU’s energy dependence on Russia is expected to grow substantially over the next 20 years and
the apparent Russian inclination to use energy supplies as an instrument of foreign policy has
raised concerns about potential vulnerabilities that could arise from this trend. Many officials and
analysts agree on the need for the EU to diversify its energy supply, but the EU has struggled to
formulate a common strategic energy policy. According to some observers, the willingness of
numerous EU member states to conclude bilateral energy deals with Russia has served to
undermine the prospects of developing a stronger common policy.
Russia signed the EU Energy Charter treaty, which sets out market principles for energy
cooperation, in 1994. Russia never ratified the treaty, however, due to an unwillingness to apply
the requirements regarding transparency and foreign investment reciprocity—before terminating
provisional application of the treaty altogether in October 2009, Russia had in effect applied only
those treaty elements it deemed consistent with standing Russian law. EU and Russian officials
have been discussing the conditions under which Russia might agree to return to the treaty
framework.77
To some extent, however, the EU-Russia energy relationship works two ways: while Russia is a
crucial energy supplier for Europe, Europe is also a vital energy market for Russia. In terms of
trade and investment, the EU is an even more important partner for Russia, accounting for more
than half of Russia’s trade and three-quarters of its foreign direct investment (FDI).78 Russia, in
turn, is the EU’s third largest trade partner (behind the United States and China); EU-Russia trade
totaled some $235 billion in 2009.79
The EU and Russia have been negotiating a new framework agreement to replace the EU-Russia
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) that came into force in 1997, but which expired at
the end of 2007. Progress has been slowed by contention over Russia’s bid for membership in the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and by EU objections to the continuing presence of Russian
troops in Georgia’s separatist regions. Under the original PCA, the two sides launched efforts to
develop a more open and integrated Common Economic Space (CES) and to establish deeper
cooperation on issues such as rule of law, human rights, research, education, crisis management,
and non-proliferation.80 The EU-Russia Summit held on May 31-June 1, 2010, launched a
“Partnership for Modernization” in which the EU has pledged to help develop and diversify the
76 Philip H. Gordon, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, The
United States and Europe: An Agenda for Engagement, Remarks at the SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations,
Washington, DC, October 18, 2010, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2010/149608.htm.
77 Energy Charter Secretariat website, http://www.encharter.org/.
78 European Commission, DG Trade, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/
russia/index_en.htm.
79 Global Trade Atlas database, EU27 External Trade: All Commodity Chapters.
80 European Commission, DG External Relations, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/common_spaces/
index_en.htm.
Congressional Research Service
30
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Russian economy, and the two sides have been negotiating on the possibility of a visa-free travel
regime.81
On October 18-19, 2010, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela
Merkel met with President Medvedev in Deauville, France to discuss a range of issues including
EU-Russia relations, regional frozen conflicts, and Medvedev’s proposal for a new Euro-Atlantic
security architecture. One idea under consideration, originally proposed by Chancellor Merkel
and President Medvedev in June 2010, is the creation of a new EU-Russia Political and Security
Committee. Such a committee, made up of foreign ministers and EU High Representative
Catherine Ashton, would be intended to strengthen civil and military cooperation in crisis
management operations.
Some European leaders expressed reservations about the trilateral structure of the Deauville
meeting, noting the exclusion of EU officials and all other national leaders. Despite such
concerns, the direct results of the meeting—described by the French government as a
“brainstorming exercise”—appear to be rather modest. Some observers concluded that the
meeting was designed largely as a confidence-building measure to improve EU-Russia relations,
and to help set the stage for the NATO Summit in November 2010, the OSCE Summit in early
December 2010, and France’s 2011 presidency of the G-20.
Russia and the Soviet Successor States82
Russia’s July 2008 Foreign Policy Concept and the May 2009 National Security Strategy hail
cooperation within the CIS as “a priority foreign policy direction.” The latter document proclaims
that the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO; composed of CIS members Armenia,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) is “the main interstate
instrument” to combat regional military threats.83 The February 2010 Military Doctrine states that
the priorities of military-political cooperation are Belarus (formally part of a union with Russia),
the CSTO, and the CIS. Despite Russia’s emphasis on interests in the CIS, there has long been
scant progress toward overall CIS integration. Many CIS summit meetings have ended in failure,
with many of the presidents sharply criticizing lack of progress on common concerns and Russian
attempts at domination.
The CSTO was formed in 2002 with a headquarters in Moscow.84 An airbase at Kant, Kyrgyzstan,
was designated in 2002 to provide support for Central Asian rapid reaction forces, but the base
has housed Russian troops. President Medvedev called in February 2009 for forming a new and
sizeable CSTO rapid reaction force based in Russia, which he claimed would rival NATO.
Uzbekistan raised concerns that the force could be used by Russia to intervene in its internal
affairs, and refused to sign a June 2009 agreement on the formation of the force. Belarus too
balked at signing the agreement until October 2009, and Tajikistan has not ratified the agreement.
81 Council of the European Union, Joint Statement on the Partnership for Modernisation, June 1, 2010,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/114747.pdf.
82 Prepared by Jim Nichol, Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs, and Steven Woehrel, Specialist in European
Affairs.
83 The Kremlin. President of Russia. The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, July 12, 2008; Russian
Federation Security Council. Russian Federation National Security Strategy Until 2020, May 12, 2009; The Kremlin.
President of Russia. The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, February 5, 2010.
84 The Collective Security Treaty was signed in 1992 and renewed in 1999.
Congressional Research Service
31
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Despite the lack of consensus within the CSTO, Russia moved forward unilaterally, assigning the
98th Airborne Division and the 31st Airborne Assault Brigade (reportedly 8,000 troops) to the
force. Although Russia welcomed Belarus as a member of the force in October, the Belarusian
constitution forbids the use of its troops abroad. The rapid reaction force ostensibly is to be used
to repulse military aggression from outside the CSTO, react to natural disasters, and to combat
terrorist groups, trans-national organized crime, and drug traffickers. The force may be used
outside the CSTO at the aegis of the U.N. The decision to use the rapid reaction force is made by
the presidents of the member-states at the request of one or a group of member states. The worth
of the CSTO has been a matter of debate among its members and others, since it has not been
efficacious in protecting borders or halting internal disorder. The CSTO’s worth appeared to be
placed in added question in June 2010 when Russia and other members balked at Kyrgyzstan’s
request for troops to quell inter-ethnic conflict in southern Kyrgyzstan.
Russian policy toward Belarus appears to be focused on gaining control of Belarus’s key
economic assets, while limiting subsidies to the Belarusian economy. Moscow forced Belarus to
sell control of the Beltransgaz natural gas firm (which controls the pipelines and other
infrastructure on Belarusian territory) to Russia by threatening steep gas price rises if it did not.
Russia has also cut the amount of inexpensive and duty-free crude oil supplies to be processed at
Belarusian refineries, reducing a large de facto subsidy to Belarus’s economy. Lukashenko has
pointed to close military cooperation between the two countries and Belarus’s geographical
position between NATO and Russia as reasons for Russia to subsidize energy supplies to Belarus.
Belarus is a member of the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),
which Russia hopes to make into a counterweight to NATO influence. However, Belarus has
distanced itself from the CSTO’s rapid reaction force, saying that Belarus would not deploy its
forces outside its borders.
Normally the Kremlin’s most loyal ally, Lukashenko has shown some independence from
Moscow’s foreign policy recently. Belarus has refrained from recognizing the Georgian
breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent countries, despite continuing
pressure from Moscow to do so. Belarus has provided asylum to former Kyrgyzstan President
Kurmanbek Bakiyev, whose April 2010 ouster was supported by Moscow. Lukashenko has also
played host to Georgian President and Kremlin antagonist Mikheil Shaakashvili. In addition to
conflicts over energy and foreign policy, tensions between the two countries have risen as a result
of attacks on Lukashenko in government-controlled Russian media. Since July 2010, Russian
television (which is widely available in Belarus) has repeatedly launched sharp attacks on
Lukashenko. The Russian media campaign may be timed to coincide with Belarus’s presidential
elections, scheduled for December 2010. Analysts have speculated on whether Moscow is
attempting to undermine the Lukashenko regime with such attacks or is merely trying to warn
him to fall in line with the Kremlin’s wishes.
Russian forces remain in the Transnistria region of Moldova against the wishes of the Moldovan
government (and in violation of Russia’s 1999 commitment under the adapted CFE Treaty to
withdraw the forces), in effect bolstering a pro-Russian separatist regime in the Transnistria
region of eastern Moldova. The United States and the EU call upon Russia to withdraw from
Moldova. Russian leaders have sought to condition the withdrawal of their troops on the
resolution of Transnistria’s status, which is still manipulated by Moscow. The election of a pro-
Romanian, pro-European integration government in Moldova after July 2009 parliamentary
elections has not led to a significant deterioration in Russian-Moldovan relations. However,
continuing political turmoil in Moldova led to new parliamentary elections scheduled for
Congressional Research Service
32
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
November 2010, perhaps giving Moscow hopes that a more pro-Russian government will rule
Moldova in the future.85
Moscow has used the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh to pressure both
sides, maintain Armenia as an ally, and otherwise exercise regional influence. Citing instability
and the threatened spread of Islamic extremism on its southern flank as a threat to its security,
Moscow intervened in Tajikistan’s civil war in 1992-1996 against Tajik rebels. Russia’s policy of
trying to exclude U.S. influence from Central Asia as much as possible was temporarily reversed
by President Putin after the September 11, 2001, attacks, but appeared to be back in place after
2005. On July 29, 2005, the Uzbek government directed the United States to cease its operations
at the Karshi-Khanabad (K2) airbase within six months. Tashkent is believed to have acted not
only in response to Russian and Chinese urging but also after the United States criticized the
Uzbek government’s repression in Andijon in May 2005. In February 2009, Kyrgyzstan accepted
a large loan proffered by Russia and simultaneously requested that the United States wind up
operations at the Manas airbase by August 2009. After intense U.S.-Kyrgyz talks, Kyrgyzstan
reversed course in late June 2009 and agreed to permit U.S. and NATO cargoes to transit through
Manas, reportedly angering Putin.86 In the wake of the “re-set” in U.S.-Russia relations in 2009-
2010, there appears to again be some cooperation from Russia regarding a U.S. and NATO
military presence in Central Asia to support operations in Afghanistan.
The international community condemned Russia’s military incursion into Georgia in early August
2008 and President Medvedev’s August 26, 2008, decree officially recognizing the independence
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russian officials announced in September 2008 that two army
brigades, each consisting of approximately 3,700 troops, would be deployed to new military bases
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (the brigades were reduced to a reported 1,700-1,800 troops each
in mid-2009, allegedly because of Russia’s budgetary problems). A part of the Black Sea Fleet
also was deployed to Ochamchire in Abkhazia. The United States and others in the international
community have called for Russia to reverse these deployments and rescind the recognitions of
independence.
During the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko from 2005 until February 2010, Russia’s relations
with Ukraine were often tense due to differences over such issues as the supply of Russian energy
through Ukrainian pipelines (leading to shut-offs of natural gas to Europe in 2006 and 2009),
Russia’s conflict with Georgia in 2008, the status of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine’s
Crimea region, and Yushchenko’s advocacy of NATO membership for Ukraine. The victory of the
pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych in Ukrainian presidential elections in February 2010 has led to a
rapid improvement in Russian-Ukrainian relations. Yanukovych dropped Yushchenko’s NATO
membership aspirations, saying that the country will remain outside all military blocs. Russia and
Ukraine have agreed to extend the stay of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea until 2042, from
the original withdrawal date of 2017. In exchange, Russia will provide Ukraine with discounted
prices for natural gas supplies for 10 years, a benefit that the two sides estimated as worth $40
billion. Yanukovych has offered Russia part-ownership of Ukraine’s gas pipeline system in
exchange for guaranteed gas volumes for Ukrainian gas pipelines and access to Russian gas and
85 See also CRS Report RS21981, Moldova: Background and U.S. Policy, by Steven Woehrel.
86 For more on Russian policy in these regions, see CRS Report RL33453, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political
Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, CRS Report RL33458, Central Asia: Regional Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests; and CRS Report R40564, Kyrgyzstan and the Status of the U.S. Manas Airbase: Context
and Implications, all by Jim Nichol.
Congressional Research Service
33
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
oil deposits. Russian firms, with Russian government support, have also reportedly stepped up
efforts to buy key industrial assets in Ukraine since Yanukovych has come to power.
However, some of Russia’s boldest proposals for improving ties with Ukraine appear to have
gone further than Kiev can support. Ukraine has rebuffed Russian suggestions that it join the
CSTO. It has also so far not accepted Russia’s proposal that that it join the customs union with
Russia, Belarus and other former Soviet countries, which would likely conflict with Ukraine’s
WTO membership and its professed aspirations for eventual membership in the European Union.
Ukraine has rejected Russia’s idea to merge Gazprom with Ukraine’s state-controlled gas firm
Naftohaz, which would amount to a Russian takeover of the Ukrainian company, due to the
former’s much larger size.
U.S.-Russia Relations
The spirit of U.S.-Russian “strategic partnership” of the early 1990s was replaced by increasing
tension and mutual recrimination in succeeding years. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001,
attacks, the two nations reshaped their relationship on the basis of cooperation against terrorism
and Putin’s goal of integrating Russia economically with the West.87 However, tensions soon
increased on a number of issues that contributed to ever-growing discord in U.S.-Russian
relations. Cooperation continued in some areas, and then-Presidents Bush and Putin strove to
maintain at least the appearance of cordial personal relations. In the wake of the August 2008
Russia-Georgia conflict, bilateral ties reached their lowest point since the Cold War.
The Obama Administration “Re-sets” Bilateral Relations
The Obama Administration called for starting a dialogue with Russia from a fresh slate. A
February 2009 speech in Munich by Vice President Biden to “re-set” U.S.-Russian relations was
an early sign of the President’s intentions. At their first “get acquainted” meeting on April 1,
2009, in London, Presidents Obama and Medvedev issued two joint statements on opening
nuclear weapons talks and on U.S.-Russia relations.
In their joint statement on U.S.-Russia relations, the two presidents agreed to “deepen cooperation
to combat nuclear terrorism” and to “support international negotiations for a verifiable treaty to
end the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.” President Obama confirmed his
commitment to work for U.S. Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
Both sides also pledged to bring into force the bilateral Agreement for Cooperation in the Field of
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, which former President Bush had withdrawn from
consideration in the U.S. Senate following the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict. Russia
agreed to assist the United States and the international community in responding to terrorism and
the insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to drug trafficking from Afghanistan. The two
sides called for the continuation of the Six-Party Talks and for the verifiable denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula. They also pledged to strengthen Euro-Atlantic and European security,
including through the OSCE and NATO-Russia Council.88
87 For the change in Russian policy toward integration with the West and cooperation with the United States, see CRS
Report RL31543, Russian National Security Policy After September 11, by Stuart D. Goldman.
88 The White House. Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks By President Obama and Russian President Medvedev
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
34
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Reflective of Russia’s views of the bilateral relationship, its May 2009 National Security Strategy
states that Moscow strives to establish “an equal and full-fledged strategic partnership” with the
United States. The Strategy claims that the two countries have “key” influence in the world and
should work together on arms control, on confidence-building measures, on the nonproliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, on counterterrorism, and on the settlement of regional conflicts.
The Strategy proclaims that Russia will work to maintain parity with the United States in strategic
offensive weapons even if the United States deploys a global missile defense system.89
At the July 2009 summit, President Obama stated that “the relationship between Russia and the
United States has suffered from a sense of drift” in recent years, and that the two presidents had
“resolved to reset U.S.-Russian relations.” He stressed that the United States wanted “to deal as
equals” with Russia, since both countries are nuclear superpowers, and that the United States has
recognized that its role “is not to dictate policy around the world, but to be a partner with other
countries” to solve global problems. Some observers have argued that these statements were
aimed at assuaging Russian sensitivities about the country’s status in the world. Russia’s
hyperbole about its role in the world, these observers have suggested, was evidenced by President
Medvedev’s statement at the summit that the United States and Russia are “powerful states [that]
have special responsibility for everything that is happening on our planet,” and that strengthened
bilateral cooperation “will ensure international peace and security.”
The two presidents and other officials signed six accords and issued three joint statements (details
on significant decisions and deliberations at the summit are discussed below). According to
Michael McFaul, the Senior Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs on the National Security
Council, the main topics at the summit were Iran, a major U.S. concern, and missile defense, a
major Russian concern. One achievement of the summit was the establishment of a U.S.-Russia
Bilateral Presidential Commission intended to strengthen consultations and diplomacy. President
Obama highlighted the commission as the “foundation” element in re-setting relations, since it
would greatly expand communications between the two countries. The presidents are the co-
chairs, and the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister coordinate meetings.
At the July 2009 summit, President Obama stated that one area where the two presidents “agreed
to disagree” was on Georgia. McFaul reported that President Obama stated that the United States
would not recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states and also argued that the
Russian idea of a “sphere of influence” in the Soviet successor states does not belong in the 21st
century. The two presidents did agree, however, that “no one has an interest in renewed military
conflict.” They also discussed the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Azerbaijan’s breakaway
Nagorno Karabakh (NK) region, according to McFaul, and agreed to continue cooperative efforts
to resolve the conflict.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reported that her visit to Russia on October 12-14, 2009, had
resulted in progress in negotiations to replace the expiring Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START), support for the Global Initiative To Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and cooperation in
Afghanistan. Discussions about Iran’s nuclear proliferation threat revealed ongoing differences,
with Foreign Minister Lavrov stating that tightened sanctions against Iran were premature while
diplomatic efforts were underway to ensure that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons. Meeting
(...continued)
after Meeting, April 1, 2009.
89 Russian Federation Security Council. Russian Federation National Security Strategy Until 2020, May 12, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
35
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
with Russian human rights advocates, Secretary Clinton argued that the United States would
continue to advocate democratization and respect for human rights in Russia.
During her visit, Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov convened the first meeting of the
U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission. They agreed to create added working groups on
counterterrorism, the environment, and on military-to-military ties. Several of the co-chairs of
working groups attached to the Commission also met. McFaul, who co-chairs the civil society
working group, reportedly stated that government officials and representatives of non-
governmental groups would meet separately. Some Russian human rights groups criticized their
exclusion from the working group. Ahead of Secretary Clinton’s trip, some co-chair meetings
already had taken place, including the education and culture working group and the anti-narcotics
trafficking working group in Washington, DC, in late September. At the latter working group
meeting, Russia urged the United States to greatly step up poppy eradication efforts in
Afghanistan.
Meeting on November 15, 2009, on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific summit in Singapore,
Presidents Obama and Medvedev continued discussions on START and Iran. President Obama
reported that he had again stressed to Medvedev that added international sanctions should be
applied to Iran if it continued to defy its international obligation not to develop nuclear weapons.
In her January 2010 speech on European security, Secretary of State Clinton stated that Russia
had violated a fundamental principle of U.S. and European policy—respect for the sovereignty
and territory of all states—by invading Georgia and by claiming that Georgia’s breakaway
regions are independent. She more broadly criticized efforts to declare a sphere of influence in
Europe, presumably by Russia. Secretary Clinton called for Russia instead to recognize that the
enlargement of NATO and the European Union benefits it as well as the rest of Europe by
spreading peace and prosperity. She praised President Medvedev’s proposal for broadening
European security, but rejected his call for a new European Security Treaty. Instead, she called for
existing European institutions—the OSCE and the NATO-Russia Council—to examine how to
enhance European security. Such efforts should include revitalizing the Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe Treaty, which Russia had stopped implementing in 2008. She hailed U.S.-
Russia cooperation on such issues as challenging Iran’s nuclear ambitions, stabilizing
Afghanistan, confronting North Korea, negotiating a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, and
tackling pandemic disease, cyber warfare, and the trafficking of children. The United States also
is exploring cooperation with Russia on European missile defense, she averred.90
The Obama Administration’s National Security Strategy, released in May 2010, asserts that the
United States endeavors “to build a stable, substantive, multidimensional relationship with
Russia, based on mutual interests. The United States has an interest in a strong, peaceful, and
prosperous Russia that respects international norms.” The strategy calls for bilateral cooperation
with Russia—termed one of the 21st century centers of influence in the world—in bolstering
global nonproliferation; in confronting violent extremism, especially in Afghanistan; in forging
new trade and investment arrangements; in promoting the rule of law, accountable government,
and universal values within Russia; and in cooperating as a partner in Europe and Asia. At the
same time, the strategy stresses that the United States “will support the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Russia’s neighbors.”91
90 U.S. Department of State. Remarks on the Future of European Security, January 29, 2010.
91 The White House. National Security Strategy, May 2010.
Congressional Research Service
36
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
President Medvedev visited the United States on June 22-24, 2010, to focus on business and
technology ties between the two countries. In eleven joint statements, the two presidents pledged
further cooperation to achieve stability in Afghanistan, to foster open government, and to
strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation, among other issues. In a joint statement on strategic
stability, they vowed to continue “the development of a new strategic relationship based on
mutual trust, openness, predictability, and cooperation.” President Obama also called for
accelerating efforts with other members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to complete the
steps necessary for Russian accession to the WTO. He announced that Russia had agreed to
purchase 50 Boeing aircraft, worth $4 billion, and that the two countries had reached an
agreement that would permit U.S. poultry products to again be exported to Russia.92
Just days after Medvedev’s U.S. visit, the United States announced on June 28, 2010, the arrest of
11 Russian spies, (one spy was outside the United States and apparently escaped). Some of the
spies had been paired as couples by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. The spies had lived
in several U.S. metropolitan areas for up to 10 years or longer. They were arrested on charges that
included money-laundering and not registering as foreign agents. An FBI investigation against the
“deep cover” agents reportedly had been ongoing for several years. The timing of the arrests
reportedly was determined by suspicions of one of the agents that her cover had been blown. The
10 agents were swapped in Vienna, Austria, on July 9 for four Russian citizens whom Moscow
had alleged were U.S. or British spies. Some U.S. observers suggested that the focus of the 10
Russian agents on seemingly public information gathering was a reflection of the paranoia and
myopia of Russia’s political leaders.93 Some observers in the United States and Russia speculated
that the quick resolution of the spy case indicated a concerted effort among policymakers in both
countries to preserve the “re-set” in bilateral relations.
Russian Public Opinion About the United States
According to some Russian public opinion polls, popular attitudes toward the United States have
improved in recent months. According to a poll reported by the Levada Center (independent
polling organization formed by sociologist Yuriy Levada in 2003) in June 2010, the percentage of
Russians who had a positive view of the United States rose from 54% to 60% during 2010.94
The All-Russia Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM; government-owned) reported similar
findings in June 2010. VTsIOM found that 59% of Russians had a positive attitude toward the
United States, compared to 46% in mid-2009 and 22% in September 2008 (just after the Russia-
Georgia conflict, when Russian officials alleged that U.S. arms sales and military training
contributed to Georgian aggression). VTsIOM reported that Russians in rural areas had more
positive views of the United States and that residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg had less
positive views. About 64% of younger Russians (aged 18-14) had positive views of the United
States. Socioeconomically better-off Russians (not defined) also had a more positive view of the
United States (67%), which less well-off respondents tended to have a less positive viewpoint
(35%). Among political parties, members of the ruling United Russia Party had the most positive
92 The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. U.S.-Russia Joint Statements, June 24, 2010; Remarks by President
Obama and President Medvedev of Russia at Joint Press Conference, June 24, 2010.
93 Financial Times (London), July 1, 2010.
94 Open Source Center. Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter CEDR), June 23, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950232.
Congressional Research Service
37
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
view of the United States (64%), while members of the Communist Party had the least positive
view (41%).95
A poll by the Public Opinion Foundation (independent organization; carries out some polling for
the government) in 44 regions of Russia found that 46% of Russians in July 2010 thought that
relations had improved between the United States and Russia, a large boost from February 2010
(before the signing of the START II Treaty), when only 31% thought that relations had improved.
The poll also indicated that over one-third of respondents hoped that U.S.-Russia relations would
improve further.96
Bilateral Relations and Iran
Russian perceptions of the Iranian nuclear threat and its policies toward Iran are driven by a
number of different and sometimes competing factors. Russia signed the agreement to build a
nuclear power plant at Bushehr and provide other assistance to an Iranian civilian nuclear
program in January 1995. Although the White House and Congress have argued that Iran will use
the civilian nuclear reactor program as a cover for a clandestine nuclear weapons program, Russia
refused to cancel the project. Moscow maintains that its cooperation with Iran’s civilian nuclear
program is legal, proper, and poses no proliferation threat, arguing that Iran is a signatory of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and that the light water reactor built by Russia is not well-
suited for producing weapons-grade fissionable material.
Russia agrees with the United States and many other nations that a nuclear-armed Iran would be
destabilizing and undesirable. After Iran’s clandestine program to master the entire nuclear cycle,
including uranium reprocessing, was revealed, Russia took steps to head off this development.
Moscow withheld delivery of nuclear fuel for the Bushehr reactor, pending agreement with
Tehran about return of spent fuel to Russia for reprocessing. Russia joined the United States and
the “EU-3” group (Great Britain, France, and Germany) in approving a series of limited U.N.
Security Council sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, including asset freezes and
trade bans targeting certain Iranian entities and individuals.97 Moscow temporarily withdrew most
of its technicians and scientists from the unfinished Bushehr reactor in 2007. However, Russia
soon resumed construction and shipment of nuclear fuel to Bushehr. Fuel delivery was completed
in January 2008. Russian and Iranian officials have stated that the reactor may become
operational in late 2010.
In a joint statement issued at their meeting on April 1, 2009, Presidents Obama and Medvedev
“urged Iran to ... address the international community’s concerns” about its civilian nuclear
energy program. They stressed that Iran had pledged as a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to retain its status as a state that does not possess nuclear
weapons, and called on Iran to fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
At the July 2009 U.S.-Russia summit, nuclear and missile proliferation by Iran were the dominant
topics, according to McFaul. President Obama warned that “in the Middle East, there is deep
concern about Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons capability not simply because of one country
95 CEDR, June 28, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950146.
96 CEDR, July 8, 2010, Doc. No CEP-950146.
97 See CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.
Congressional Research Service
38
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
wanting nuclear weapons, but the fact that ... we would then see a nuclear arms race in perhaps
the most volatile part of the world.” Another concern, he stated, was “the possibility that those
nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of non-state actors.” He also stressed that Iran’s
ballistic missile program could also pose a threat to the broader region. President Medvedev did
not mention Iran by name at the summit press conference, but he did admit that some countries
“have aspirations to have nuclear weapons and declare so openly or, which is worse, [build them]
clandestinely.... These are areas where we should concentrate our efforts together with our
American partners.”
On September 21, 2009, Iran informed the IAEA that it had been building a second uranium
enrichment plant near the city of Qom. Many observers raised fears that the disclosure was
further evidence that Iran intended to build nuclear weapons. On September 23, President Obama
reported that a meeting he held with President Medvedev on the sidelines of a U.N. General
Assembly session dealt mostly with Iran. President Medvedev stated that the international “task is
to create ... a system of incentives that would allow Iran to continue its fissile nuclear program,
but at the same time prevent it from obtaining nuclear weapons.”98 In a meeting with concerned
nations on October 1, 2009 (now termed the Sextet, consisting of the United States, United
Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany), Iran agreed to a late October IAEA inspection of
the Qom enrichment site and initially appeared positive toward a plan to export most of its low-
enriched uranium to Russia or France to be further enriched to fuel the Tehran Research Reactor.
After inspecting the enrichment plant near Qom, the IAEA concluded that it was in an advanced
stage of completion and that Iran’s efforts to hide it for years heightened IAEA concerns that
other nuclear facilities were being hidden. Russia reportedly mediated with Iran to urge it to
accept the research reactor fuel deal.
On November 15, 2009, after meeting with President Obama in Singapore, President Medvedev
stated that “we are prepared to work further to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is only for
peaceful purposes. In case we fail, the other options remain on the table.” The next day, Russia
announced that it was further delaying the start-up of the Bushehr reactor, perhaps indicating
some Russian pressure on Iran to accept the research reactor fuel deal.99 On November 18, Iran
rejected the research reactor fuel deal. On November 27, Russia joined other representatives of
the IAEA in censuring Iran for concealing the enrichment plant near Qom. In February 2010, Iran
stated that it would start enriching uranium to 20% to fuel the Tehran Research Reactor.
In early March 2010, President Medvedev stated that Russia might consider cooperating on a
U.N. Security Council resolution that imposed “smart sanctions” on Iran that impacted only Iran’s
nuclear proliferation capabilities and not its population. In announcing the agreement on the new
START on March 26, 2010, Secretary Clinton stressed that it demonstrates “to states like Iran and
North Korea” that one of the top priorities of the United States and Russia is “to strengthen the
global non-proliferation regime and keep nuclear materials out of the wrong hands.”100 Foreign
Minister Lavrov asserted on March 27, 2010, that Russia would only back a new sanctions
resolution that affirmed the non-use of force against Iran.101 According to some observers, Russia
98 The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Remarks by President Obama and President Medvedev of Russia
after Bilateral Meeting, September 23, 2009.
99 U.S. Fed News, November 16, 2009.
100 U.S. Department of State. Announcement of New START Treaty, March 26, 2010.
101 BBC Worldwide Monitoring, March 27, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
39
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
had changed its stance that its cooperation on further U.N. Security Council sanctions on Iran was
contingent on the United States ending plans for missile defenses in Eastern Europe.102
On June 9, 2010, Russia supported the approval of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929, which
expressed growing international concern with Iran’s lack of compliance with ensuring that its
nuclear program is peaceful and directed an expanded international arms embargo and added
restrictions on commerce dealing with “proliferation-sensitive activities” in Iran. Explaining
Russia’s vote for the resolution, U.N. ambassador Vitaliy Churkin stated that “it has become
inevitable that additional restrictive measures should be adopted to constrain development in
those Iranian activities that run counter to the task of strengthening the non-proliferation
regime.”103 Perhaps also a significant factor, simultaneously with Russia’s agreement on the draft
resolution, its state arms export agency, Rosoboronexport, and other Russian firms were removed
from U.S. lists of sanctioned entities.104
After CIA revelations about Iran’s possession of highly-enriched uranium, President Medvedev
concurred in July 2010 that “Iran is nearing the possession of the potential which in principle
could be used for the creation of a nuclear weapon.” He also stated that “we should not forget that
Iran’s attitude [toward cooperation with the international community] is not the best one.” Iran’s
Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki reacted that these “comments made by Medvedev
regarding the Iranian nuclear theme are totally false and we deny them… Russia is our neighbor
and we want to maintain good relations but we are critical of some of its positions.”105 Russia’s
backing for the resolution has contributed to tension in its ties with Iran which both states have
attempted at times to smooth over. Russia has in part appeared to try to deflect Iran’s anger by
denouncing added sanctions imposed by the United States and the EU in the wake of the approval
of the U.N. Security Council resolution. Most recently, Iran expressed anger after President
Medvedev signed a decree on September 22, 2010, banning the supply of the S-300 surface-to-air
missile system to Iran, asserting that the weapons transfer to Iran is blocked by U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1929.
Bilateral Relations and Afghanistan
In a meeting with Afghan President Hamid Karzai in August 2008, Russian President Medvedev
called for “opening a new page in relations” between the two countries, “because, unfortunately,
our countries are coming up against similar threats and problems.” Russia provides some foreign
assistance and investment to Afghanistan, although it has rejected sending military forces. Russia
hosted a Shanghai Cooperation Organization conference on Afghanistan, counter-terrorism, and
counter-narcotics in late March 2009, which was attended by U.S. and NATO observers. The
conference communique praised the efforts of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
in Afghanistan but offered no substantive assistance. At the July 2009 U.S.-Russia summit, a joint
statement on assistance to Afghanistan called for enhancing cooperation within the U.S.-Russia
Counter-Terrorism Working Group (established in 2000); further implementing the Russia-NATO
102 Alexander Gabuyev, “Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant Stopped Moscow and Washington,” Defense and Security,
March 22, 2010.
103 United Nations. Security Council. 6335th Meeting, Meeting Record, S/PV.6335, June 9, 2010.
104 CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.
105 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Speech by Dmitry Medvedev, President of the Russian
Federation, at the Meeting with Russian Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives to International Organizations,
July 13, 2010; Agence Presse France, July 13, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
40
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Council’s counter-narcotics project; supporting Afghanistan-related activities of the OSCE;
increasing training for the Afghan National Army, police, and counter-narcotics personnel; and
greatly increasing cooperation to halt illicit financial flows related to heroin trafficking in
Afghanistan. The two sides also called for enhancing counter-terrorism cooperation between
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The State Department reported that an agenda-setting meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Working
Group took place in Berlin in November 2009. In January 2010, the director of Russia’s Federal
Drugs Control Service, Viktor Ivanov, raised concerns that of the 28 anti-narcotics policemen
trained under the Russia-NATO cooperation plan, 26 allegedly had been fired by Afghan officials.
The Russian permanent representative to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, and Moscow Regional
Governor Boris Gromov (the former commander of Soviet forces in Afghanistan) called in
January 2010 for NATO forces not to “withdraw without victory” in Afghanistan. They argued
that Soviet forces had withdrawn in 1989 after ensuring some political stability, and that the
international community had not “thanked” the Soviet Union for its efforts to combat the first
terrorist threat to Europe. They asserted that the “Russian position” is that NATO should ensure
political stability in Afghanistan and claimed that Russia is forming the CSTO’s rapid reaction
forces to protect Central Asia as a hedge against NATO’s failure in Afghanistan. In late March
2010, Rogozin suggested that Russia should link its cooperation as a transit state for supply
shipments to Afghanistan to a NATO pledge to combat drug trafficking into Russia. Seeking to
elevate its status, the CSTO repeated a call for NATO to formally cooperate with it in order to
stanch drug trafficking from Afghanistan and to defeat the Taliban.106
Alternative Supply Routes to Afghanistan
In late 2008, the United States and NATO stepped up efforts to develop supplemental air and land
routes into Afghanistan because of growing problems in sending supplies through Pakistan. The
incoming Obama Administration also planned increasing the number of troops in Afghanistan,
which also spurred the search for alternate supply routes. A “northern supply network” was
envisaged for transits through Russia or the South Caucasus to Central Asia and then to
Afghanistan. The U.S. Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan, established in late 2001, was to be a
component of this route. In February 2009, however, Kyrgyzstan announced that it intended to
close the airbase, but an agreement was reached in late June 2009 to keep it open in exchange for
higher U.S. rent and other payments.
As early as the April 2008 NATO summit, Russia’s then-President Putin had offered to permit the
shipment of non-lethal NATO goods through Russia to Afghanistan. In late 2008, Russia also
permitted Germany to ship weapons and other equipment by land to its troops in Afghanistan.
NATO reached agreement with Russia in February 2009 on the land transit of non-lethal supplies
to Afghanistan, and all the Central Asian states except neutral Turkmenistan also agreed to permit
overland shipments. The first railway shipment from the Baltic states reached Afghanistan—after
transiting Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan—in late March 2009.
At the U.S.-Russia summit meeting in early July 2009, Foreign Minister Lavrov and
Undersecretary of State William Burns signed an agreement allowing up to 4,500 annual air
106 ITAR-TASS, January 18, 2010; Boris Gromov and Dmitry Rogozin, “Russian Advice on Afghanistan,” The
International Herald Tribune, January 12, 2010; BBC Worldwide Monitoring, March 31, 2010; “NATO Not
Cooperating Sufficiently with Russia—CSTO Head,” RIA Novosti, March 27, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
41
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
flights of troops and lethal supplies through Russia to Afghanistan. Lauded by McFaul as
“historic,” the agreement complements the NATO-Russia arrangement reached in early 2009 on
land transit. The Administration reports that air transit through Russia could save the United
States government up to $133 million annually in fuel, maintenance and other transportation
costs, and that this agreement would be free of any air navigation charges.
Reportedly, the first flight by the United States using this route took place in early October 2009,
and another took place in November 2009. Allegedly, Russia was slow in facilitating such flights,
and the United States and NATO used air transit through the Caspian region to reach Afghanistan.
According to Assistant Secretary of State Philip Gordon, these air transit problems were resolved.
He stated in mid-2010 that “on average, two U.S. planes a day to fly over Russia carrying troops
and supplies in support of the mission in Afghanistan. To date, over 275 flights have carried over
35,000 passengers and valuable cargo. Russia’s rail network has facilitated transit of more than
10,000 containers of supplies…. About 30% of cargo to Afghanistan goes through the Northern
Distribution Network (NDN) and 60% of the NDN goes through Russia.”107 A June 2010
Administration factsheet adds that Russia has provided airlift for over 12,000 flights in support of
U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, 30% of the fuel U.S. military troops use in Afghanistan,
and over 80 MI-17 helicopters to the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and Afghan
Drug Interdiction Forces.108
Bilateral Relations and North Korea
Russia has expanded its ties with North Korea in recent years as part of its policy of strengthening
its role as an Asia-Pacific power. Russia stresses a negotiated settlement of the Korean conflict
that protects the stability of its eastern regions and ensures a draw-down of U.S. forces in South
Korea. Russia also seeks the continuation of the six-party talks on North Korea’s de-
nuclearization (see below) as a means of containing, if not reducing, the threat posed by a
nuclear-armed Pyongyang, according to some observers. Russia prefers that the transition of
power from Kim Jong Il to his son be relatively peaceful, rather than involve a regime collapse
that could involve refugee flows into Russia or other trans-border problems, or the occupation of
North Korea by South Korea or China, according to some observers. Moscow will seek to retain
effective relations with Pyongyang throughout the succession period, in this view. Russia seeks
working relations with South Korea for many of the same reasons—the pursuit of Asia-Pacific
regional influence and stability in areas near its borders—as well as for economic and trade
benefits.109
A phase of closer Russia-North Korea ties was launched in February 2000, when the foreign
ministers of the two countries signed a Treaty on Friendship, Good-Neighborly Relations and
Cooperation. Then-President Vladimir Putin visited Pyongyang in July 2000 and Supreme Leader
Kim Jong Il visited Russia in August 2001. Because of the closer bilateral ties, North Korea
insisted in 2003 that it would not take part in what came to be known as the six-party
denuclearization talks unless Russia also participated. The six-party talks opened in August 2003.
107 U.S. Department of State. U.S.-Russia Relations Under the Obama Administration: Remarks at the German
Marshall Fund, June 16, 2010.
108 The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. U.S.-Russia Relations: “Reset” Fact Sheet, June 24, 2010.
109 Alexander Vorontsov, Current Russia—North Korea Relations: Challenges And Achievements, The Brookings
Institution, February 2007; Georgy Toloraya, “Russia and the North Korean Knot,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan
Focus Newsletter, April 19, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
42
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Russia-North Korea relations appeared strained somewhat after Russia supported U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1718 in October 2006 that criticized a North Korean nuclear test and applied
sanctions. Russia stressed that the sanctions did not involve military force, and urged that the six-
party talks continue. Tensions in the relationship increased in April-May 2009 after Russia
supported the U.N. Security Council in approving Resolution 1874 that condemned North Korean
missile and nuclear tests and expanded sanctions on North Korea. Russia’s Permanent
Representative to the U.N., Vitaliy Churkin, stressed that the sanctions excluded military force
and argued that they would be reviewed once North Korea renewed cooperation within the format
of the six-party talks. Russia and China insisted that a U.N. Security Council Presidential
Statement issued in July 2010 not assess blame for the sinking of the South Korean naval corvette
Cheonan. Russia argued that its stance of not assessing blame would help “de-escalate tensions
on the Korean Peninsula, restore dialogue and interaction between North Korea and South Korea,
and resume the six-party talks.”110
Russia’s Role in the Middle East Quartet
Russia is a member of “the Quartet” (formed in 2002 by Russia, the United States, the EU, and
the U.N.) that mediates between Israel and the Palestine National Authority (PNA), headed by
President Mahmoud Abbas. Russia supported the holding of the U.S.-brokered Annapolis
Conference in 2007 on a two-state solution, and the Quartet has agreed to a Russian proposal to
hold a follow-on conference in Moscow at some point. Meeting a condition set by Israel for
attending such a conference, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has stated that it will be
limited to representatives from countries, so that the Palestinian Hamas and the Lebanese
Hezbollah—considered to be terrorist groups by the United States, EU, and Israel but to be
“popular movements” by Russia—will not be invited.
According to Russian analyst Dmitriy Trenin, Russia seeks to present itself as an unbiased arbiter
in the Quartet, and participates in order to demonstrate its status as a great power.111 Russian
Foreign Minister Lavrov met with Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal in 2006 to discuss the future of
the peace process after Hamas won a majority of seats in the Palestinian National Authority
Legislative Council. Russia argues that Hamas has popular support in the Gaza strip and that such
ties enable Russia to urge Hamas to moderate its behavior and take part in the establishment of a
peaceful Palestinian state. The other members of the Quartet maintain that that there should be no
engagement with Hamas until it forswears terrorism, recognizes Israel’s right to exist, and
supports the Middle East peace process as outlined in the 1993 Oslo Accords. Russian President
Medvedev met with Meshaal during his May 2010 trip to Syria. Medvedev called for Hamas to
release captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, to reconcile with Fatah, and to re-engage in the peace
process. Israel condemned Medvedev’s meeting with Meshaal.112
Russia and other members of the Quartet urged the resumption of direct talks between Fatah and
Israel after the last such talks in 2008. The sides agreed to resume direct talks in August 2010 and
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met on
September 2, 2010, in Washington, DC.
110 “Moscow Backs UN Security Council Statement on S. Korean Corvette Incident,” Russia & CIS General Newswire,
July 10, 2010.
111 Dmitriy Trenin, Russia’s Policy in the Middle East: Prospects for Consensus and Conflict with the United States,
The Century Foundation, 2010.
112 “Israel Slams Russia’s Hamas Stance,” Jerusalem Post, May 12, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
43
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Arms Control Issues113
Cooperative Threat Reduction
Since 1992, the United States has spent over $9 billion to help Russia and the other former Soviet
states dismantle nuclear weapons and ensure the security of nuclear weapons, weapons-grade
nuclear material, other weapons of mass destruction, and related technological know-how. This
funding supports the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) managed by the Department
of Defense, along with nonproliferation programs managed by the Departments of Energy and
State. These programs have helped to eliminate nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles in
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and to transport, store, and eliminate weapons in Russia. They
have also funded improvements in security at storage areas for both nuclear weapons and nuclear
materials. During the Bratislava Summit in 2005, Presidents Bush and Putin agreed to enhance
their cooperation and move more quickly in securing weapons and materials. As a result, the
Department of Energy has nearly completed its efforts to secure nuclear warheads in storage in
Russia and nuclear materials at a number of critical sites. The two sides have also cooperated to
construct a chemical weapons destruction facility in Shchuch’ye, which, after overcoming
congressional concerns between 2000 and 2002, is nearing completion.
The focus of U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance has changed over the years.
Initially, many in Congress saw U.S. assistance as an emergency response to impending chaos in
the Soviet Union. Even after the sense of immediate crisis passed in 1992 and 1993, many
analysts and Members of Congress remained concerned about the potential for diversion or a loss
of control of nuclear and other weapons. Now, much of the work on strategic offensive arms
reductions has been completed, and the United States has allocated a growing proportion of its
funding to projects that focus on securing and eliminating chemical and biological weapons and
securing storage sites that house nuclear warheads removed from deployed weapons systems.
Further, in recent years, the United States has increased funding for projects that seek to secure
borders and track materials, in an effort to keep weapons of mass destruction away from
terrorists. This has directed a growing proportion of the funding to nations other than Russia.
Many analysts in the United States see the U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in
Russia as a model for U.S. nonproliferation and anti-terrorism assistance to nations around the
world. Some who support this expansion of U.S. threat reduction assistance argue, however, that
the United States should not increase funding for other nations at the expense of funding for
programs in Russia because Russia is still home to large stocks of insecure nuclear materials.
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
In 2006, in advance of the impending December 2009 expiration of the 1991 Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START), the United States and Russia began to discuss options for the future
of their arms control relationship. Many analysts had expressed concern that the two nations
would not be able to monitor compliance with the 2002 Moscow Treaty without START, as the
newer Treaty lacked any verification provisions. They, and others who saw arms control as a key
feature of U.S.-Russian relations, hoped the two sides would agree to either extend or replace
START. Others suggested the two sides no longer needed to regulate their competition with arms
113 Prepared by Amy Woolf, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy.
Congressional Research Service
44
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
control agreements, and favored a posture that would allow START to lapse and allow both sides
to pursue nuclear force postures that met their own national security needs. When the discussions
began in 2006, Russia sought to replace START with a new, formal treaty that would include
many of the same definitions, counting rules, and restrictions as START, albeit with lower levels
of nuclear forces. The Bush Administration rejected this approach and offered, at most, to attach
an informal monitoring regime to the 2002 Moscow Treaty. When the Bush Administration
ended, the two sides had not agreed on whether or how to advance their arms control relationship.
The Obama Administration pledged to pursue arms control negotiations with Russia and to,
specifically, negotiate a new treaty to replace START. In April 2009, Presidents Obama and
Medvedev agreed that their nations would pursue stepped-up negotiations toward this end, and
that a new treaty would address deployed strategic offensive nuclear forces, leaving discussions
on nonstrategic nuclear weapons and warheads in storage to a future agreement, and to reduce
their deployed forces to levels below those set by the 2002 Moscow Treaty.
After nearly a year of negotiations, the United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty
on April 8, 2010. This Treaty limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed
ICBM and SLBM launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry
nuclear armaments. Within that total, each side can retain no more than 700 deployed ICBMs,
deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. The treaty
also limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads. The new Treaty also contains a
number of complex and overlapping monitoring provisions that will help each side verify the
other’s compliance with the treaty. Many analysts believe that this verification regime is
particularly important because it mandates transparency and cooperation between the two sides.
The Obama Administration has argued that the New START Treaty will strengthen U.S. security
and contribute to the “re-set” in relations with Russia. The Administration has also noted that the
Treaty contributes to U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals by indicating that the United States and
Russia are both committed to meeting their disarmament obligations under Article VI of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Some, however, have questioned whether the United States and
Russia need a treaty to maintain stability in their relationship and reduce their nuclear weapons.
They note that Russia is already reducing its forces as it retires aging systems. Moreover, some
question whether arms control agreements between the United States and Russia will have any
affect on the goals and interests of nations seeking their own nuclear weapons.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee began its hearings on the New START Treaty in late
April 2010 and completed them in July 2010. Together, the Foreign Relations Committee, Senate
Armed Services Committee, and Senate Intelligence Committee held a total of 21 hearings and
briefings with Administration officials, senior statesmen, and outside analysts. Most witnesses
have praised the treaty, and, although recognizing that it contains only modest reductions in U.S.
and Russian nuclear weapons, have argued that, on balance, it will enhance stability and
predictability. Many have also noted that its verification regime will restore the ability of the
United States and Russia to monitor each other’s strategic forces. Some have, however,
questioned whether the treaty may restrain U.S. missile defense programs. The Administration
has disputed this, noting that the treaty contains no limits on current or planned missile defense
programs and simply acknowledges that robust missile defenses can undermine offensive forces.
Others have noted that the Treaty does not address Russia’s stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear
weapons. Treaty supporters agree with this point but argue that the United States and Russia
cannot move on to a treaty that will address these weapons until the parties ratify and implement
Congressional Research Service
45
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
New START. On September 16, 2010, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the
Resolution of Ratification on New START by a vote of 14-4.
The Status of Ratification of the New START in Russia114
Under the 1995 Russian constitution, both the Duma and the Federation Council must approve
the ratification of international treaties by majority votes. The Duma has held hearings on the
New START, but reportedly will not proceed with approval for ratification until such action is
taken by the U.S. Senate. The chairmen of the International Affairs Committees in the Duma and
the Federation Council have stated that the Russian Federal Assembly (legislature) would follow
a procedure of “synchronous ratification,” approving the Treaty soon after the U.S. Senate acts.115
The Communist Party and the Liberal Democratic Party minority factions in the Duma have
publicized their opposition to the New START on the grounds that the pact will allegedly leave
Russia “defenseless.”116 The Communist Party faction has stated that it will vote against the
Treaty unless added funding is approved for nuclear weapons modernization. The Liberal
Democratic Party faction has indicated outright opposition to the Treaty. According to one
Russian opinion poll in May 2010, a minority of Russians are concerned that the Treaty may
reduce Russia’s security.117
Many Russian officials hailed the approval of the New START by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee (SFRC) on September 16, 2010 (Exec.Rept. 111-6), and raised hopes that the Treaty
could be ratified by both sides by the end of the year. On November 3, 2010, however, State
Duma International Affairs Committee Chairman Kosachev stated that his committee would re-
open hearings to discuss the ramifications of the action by the SFRC. He alleged that many of the
conditions, understandings, and declarations in the resolution of advice and consent to ratification
proposed by the SFRC are “deeply worrisome” to many Russian Duma members, and stated that
not only the synchronization of the ratification was necessary, but also the formulation of Russian
statements to address those raised by the SFRC. He also raised concerns that a shift in party
control in the U.S. Congress could delay or derail U.S. Congressional action on the treaty.118
Russia and Missile Defense119
Background: Recent U.S. Missile Defense Plans120
Successive U.S. governments have supported the development of a missile defense system to
protect against long-range ballistic missile threats from adversary states. The Bush Administration
argued that North Korea and Iran represented strategic threats and questioned whether they could
be deterred by conventional means. In 2007, the Bush Administration proposed deploying a
114 Prepared by Jim Nichol, Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs.
115 ITAR-TASS, September 17, 2010.
116 Open Source Center, Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter CEDR), September 22, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-
2037011; Interfax, July 8, 2010.
117 CEDR, July 5, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-5950221; July 27, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-337001.
118 CEDR, November 3, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950294.
119 For additional information, see CRS Report RL34051, Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe, by Steven
A. Hildreth and Carl Ek.
120 Prepared by Steven A. Hildreth, Specialist in Missile Defense.
Congressional Research Service
46
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) element of the larger Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
system in Europe to defend against a possible Iranian missile threat. This “European Capability”
(EC) system would have included 10 interceptors in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic.
Both countries signed agreements with the Bush Administration permitting GMD facilities to be
stationed on their territory; however, the two countries’ parliaments decided to wait to ratify the
accords until after the Obama Administration clarified its intentions on missile defense policy.
In September 2009, the Obama Administration canceled the Bush-proposed European BMD
program. Instead, Defense Secretary Gates announced U.S. plans to further develop a regional
BMD capability that could be surged on relatively short notice during crises or as the situation
might demand. Gates argued this new capability, known as the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA),
would be based initially around existing BMD sensors and Patriot, THAAD and Aegis BMD
interceptors, and would be more responsive and adaptable to growing concern over the direction
and pace of Iranian short- and medium-range ballistic missile proliferation. The Administration
plans for the PAA to evolve and expand over the next decade to include BMD against
intermediate- and long-range Iranian ballistic missiles. This effort is largely supported by the
Congress.
The Russian Response121
The EC program significantly affected U.S.-Russia relations. At the February 2007 Wehrkunde
security conference in Munich, then-Russian President Vladimir Putin strongly criticized the
Bush Administration’s proposal, maintaining that it would lead to “an inevitable arms race.”
Russia threatened to abrogate the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and also
announced that it had suspended compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. In
August 2008, following the signing of the U.S.-Poland agreement, Russia once more vociferously
objected to the Bush Administration’s missile defense plan; a Russian general stated that Poland’s
acceptance of the interceptors could make it a target for a nuclear attack.
Some analysts argue that Russia had other motives for raising alarms about the U.S. missile
defense system: to foment discord among NATO member states, and to draw attention away from
Russia’s suppression of domestic dissent, its aggressive foreign policy actions, and its nuclear
technology cooperation with Iran. Observers point out that Russian acceptance of NATO
enlargement in 2004 was conditioned on a tacit understanding that NATO or U.S. military
expansion into the new member states would not occur. The proposed European GMD in this
regard was seen as unacceptable to Russia.
On November 5, 2008—the day after the U.S. presidential election—President Medvedev stated
that Russia would deploy short-range Iskander missiles to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad,
which borders Poland and Lithuania, if the EC were built. In late January 2009, however, the
Russian media reported that Moscow had “suspended” plans to move short-range missiles to
Kaliningrad because the Obama Administration was not “pushing ahead” with the EC
deployment. However, there were reports that President Medvedev at the July 2009 G-8 (Group
of eight highly industrialized nations) summit may have intimated that the Iskander deployment
was still an option.
121 Prepared by Carl Ek, Specialist in International Relations.
Congressional Research Service
47
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
On February 7, 2009, at the annual Wehrkunde conference, Vice President Biden stated that “we
will continue to develop missile defenses to counter a growing Iranian capability…. We will do
so in consultation with our NATO allies and Russia.”122 However, the Obama Administration also
indicated that it was prepared to open talks with Tehran if it is willing to shelve its nuclear
program and renounce support of terrorism. During a February 10 visit to Prague, Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton said that any change in U.S. policy on missile defense would depend on
Iran, but that “we are a long, long way from seeing such evidence of any behavior change” in
Iran.123
In early March 2009, the media reported that President Obama had sent a letter to President
Medvedev offering to stop the development of the EC if Russia cooperated with international
efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons and missile programs. President Obama denied such a quid
pro quo, stating that “what I said in the letter was that, obviously, to the extent that we are
lessening Iran’s commitment to nuclear weapons, then that reduces the pressure for, or the need
for a missile defense system. In no way does that diminish my commitment to [the security of ]
Poland, the Czech Republic and other NATO members.”124
In a joint statement issued at their “get acquainted” meeting on April 1, 2009, Presidents Obama
and Medvedev acknowledged that differences remained in their views toward the placement of
U.S. missile defenses in Europe, but pledged to examine “new possibilities for mutual
international cooperation in the field of missile defense.” Later that month, however, Russian
Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov charged that “[U.S.] work in the missile defense has
intensified, including in the NATO format.” Shortly thereafter, in a Russian media interview,
Ryabkov was asked to comment on U.S.-Russia-NATO cooperation on missile defense through
the use of Russian radar installations. He explained that the Russian offer was predicated on the
fulfillment of “certain preliminary stages,” including the U.S. cancellation of the EC program,
followed by a threat assessment, and then by political and economic measures to eliminate the
threat.125
In early June 2009, a Russian official indicated that Moscow would not likely be willing to
reduce its nuclear weapons arsenal unless the United States were to scrap plans to establish its
missile defense site in Poland and the Czech Republic. However, the Russian government also
stated that it still might deploy Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad if the United States were to
transfer Patriot missile batteries to Poland. 126
At the July 2009 U.S.-Russia summit, the two presidents declared in a joint statement that their
governments “plan to continue the discussion concerning the establishment of cooperation in
122 Vice President Joseph Biden’s speech at the 45th Munich Security Conference, http://www.securityconference.de/
konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2009=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=238&
123 “Clinton Says Missile Shield Hinges in Part on Iran,” Reuters, February 10, 2009; “Obama Seen Unlikely to Hedge
on Missile Defense,” Associated Press, February 13, 2009.
124 The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Remarks By President Obama and British Prime Minister Gordon
Brown After Meeting, March 3, 2009.
125 “President Obama, Russian President Medvedev Commit To Reduce Nuclear Arms, Reset Relationship,” US Fed
News, April 11, 2009; “Russia Warns U.S. Stepping Up Shield Plans—Agency,” Reuters, April 21, 2009; Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Interview of Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Ryabkov on Disarmament
Issues, April 23, 2009.
126 “Russian General Links Arms Cuts To Missile Shield,” Associated Press. June 5, 2009; “Russian Source: Patriot
Missiles To ‘Cloak’ Strategic Effort,” Interfax, May 22, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
48
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
responding to the challenge of ballistic missile proliferation,” and that both countries would task
experts “to work together to analyze the ballistic missile challenges of the 21st century and to
prepare appropriate recommendations, giving priority to the use of political and diplomatic
methods.” One day after the meeting, however, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated
that if the Obama Administration decided to pursue missile defense unilaterally, Russia might be
reluctant to reduce its nuclear arsenal.127
As noted above, in September 2009 the Obama Administration’s announced a new program for a
European-based BMD. In Russia, President Medvedev called the change “a responsible move,”
adding that “we value the responsible approach of the U.S. President to our agreement. I am
ready to continue our dialogue.”128 In addition, Moscow appeared to back away from its earlier
signal that it might deploy Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad. In November, the U.S. ambassador to
Ukraine quashed rumors that the United States had been discussing with Kiev deployment of
missile defense facilities in Ukraine.
Some analysts on both sides of the Atlantic, however, argued that cancelling the Bush
Administration’s BMD plan could be viewed by Moscow as a climb-down resulting from
Russia’s incessant diplomatic pressure. 129 Further, some critics faulted the White House for not
having gained anything from Moscow in exchange for its apparent walk-back on missile defense.
However, Obama Administration supporters maintained that Russia likely would not have wished
to reveal an obvious quid pro quo immediately; Administration backers advised critics to wait and
see what actions Russia would take, particularly with respect to cooperation with the United
States on policy toward Iran.
In October 2009, during a visit to Warsaw by Vice President Biden, Polish President Donald Tusk
announced that Poland would participate in the Obama Administration’s new BMD program by
hosting SM-3 short- to medium-range missiles.130
In December 2009, NATO foreign ministers commented favorably on the new U.S. missile
defense plan, and reiterated the alliance’s willingness to cooperate with Russia on the issue,
stating that they reaffirmed “the Alliance’s readiness to explore the potential for linking United
States, NATO and Russian missile defence systems at an appropriate time. The United States’
new approach provides enhanced possibilities to do this.” The Russian media reported that NATO
and Russia had formed a working group to study the issue. In a speech shortly thereafter, NATO
Secretary General Ander Fogh Rasmussen said that he hoped the alliance and Russia would have
a joint system by 2020.131
127 The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Joint Statement By Dmitry A. Medvedev, President of the Russian
Federation, and Barack Obama, President of the United States, On Missile Defense Issues, July 6, 2009; “Russia
Warns U.S. Over Missile Shield,” Associated Press, July 7, 2009.
128 “Obama Cancels Bush Plan For European Missile Shield That Had Soured Relations With Russia,” Associated
Press Newswire. September 17, 2009; “Medvedev Praises Obama’s Move on Europe Missile Shield,” RIA Novosti,
September 17, 2009.
129 “Russia Could Scrap Baltic Missile Plans Following U.S. Move,” RIA Novosti, September 18, 2009.
130 “US/CEE: Biden Touts New Missile Plan In Central Europe,” Oxford Analytica, October 22, 2009.
131 NATO. Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Foreign Ministers held at NATO Headquarters,
Brussels: Final Statement, December 4, 2009, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_59699.htm?mode=
pressrelease; “Russia, NATO Form Working Group on Missile Defense—Rogozin,” RIA Novosti, December 5, 2009;
“Russia Not Ready to Set Up Missile Defense Shield Together With U.S.—Lavrov,” Interfax, January 22, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
49
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Before long, however, Russia began to criticize the new U.S. plan for missile defense against
Iran, reviving the argument that it would compromise Russia’s nuclear forces. In late December
Prime Minister Putin tied discussions over missile defense to the re-negotiation of START. He
asserted that Moscow would need to beef up its offensive nuclear weapons forces in order to
“preserve a strategic balance” with the planned U.S. missile defense system. A State Department
spokesperson acknowledged the relationship between offensive and defensive missile
capabilities, but maintained that the two countries should discuss missile defense “in a separate
venue.” The Administration has also said that it “will continue to reject any negotiated restraints
on U.S. ballistic missile defenses.”132 Observers assert that Putin’s intervention would not likely
affect the disarmament talks. Regarding missile defense, in January 2010 Russian Foreign
Minister Lavrov stated that Russia had “told the U.S. and NATO that it is necessary to start
everything from scratch—to jointly analyze the origin and types of missile proliferation risks and
threats.”133
Also in January 2010, the United States and Poland announced that, under the terms of the August
2008 agreement between Warsaw and Washington, a battery of short-range, surface-to-air Patriot
missiles—along with a crew of about 100 U.S. service personnel—would be rotated from
Germany to Poland in June and stationed close to Poland’s border with Kaliningrad. Foreign
Minister Lavrov claimed that he “doesn’t understand” the apparent need for Poland to defend
itself from Russia. In response to the planned deployment of the Patriots, a Russian official
indicated that Moscow might strengthen its Baltic fleet. In February 2010, a Polish official
expressed doubts that the Patriots would be stationed permanently in Poland. 134
On February 4, 2010, the U.S. and Romanian governments announced that Bucharest had agreed
to host U.S. short-to-medium-range interceptor missiles to extend missile defense into southern
Europe. The Romanians reportedly hope that the deployment will help cement bilateral ties, as
well as protect Romanian territory—the Bush Administration’s plan would only have covered the
western part of the country from a possible Iranian missile launch. A State Department
spokesperson and Romanian President Traian Basescu both stated that the system was not
intended to guard against Russia.
Russian officials, including the chief of Russia’s general staff, countered that the missile defense
system was indeed directed at Russia, and that the proposed deployment likely would delay
negotiations in arms talks between Russia and the United States. Moscow also expressed vexation
over the possibility of U.S Aegis anti-missile ships patrolling the Black Sea. Nevertheless,
commenting on Iran’s stepped-up uranium enrichment activities, the head of Russia’s National
Security Council appeared to confirm international concerns about whether Iran’s eventual goals
are scientific or military; he stated that international doubts about Iran’s intentions “are fairly
well-grounded.”
However, Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s ambassador to NATO, stated that “maybe [U.S. BMD] is
against Iran, but this system could be aimed against any other country, including against Russia’s
132 U.S. Department of Defense. Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, Pt. IV, February 2010.
133 “Putin Plays MD Card, Placates Hardliners,” Oxford Analytica, December 29, 2009; “Russia to Continue Offensive
Arms to Balance U.S.—Putin,” RIA Novosti, December 29, 2009; “U.S. Missile Shield Holding Up Nuclear Deal—
Putin,” Reuters, December 29, 2009; “U.S. Rejects Russia Shield Concerns,” BBC News, December 29, 2009.
134 “CEE/Russia: CEE Attitudes to Russia become More Sober,” Oxford Analytica, January 21, 2010; “Polish Missile
Base Re-ignites Tension with Russia,” Deutsche Welle, January 22, 2009; “USA May Renege on Patriot Missile
Deployment Accord—Polish Daily,” BBC Monitoring European, February 12, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
50
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
strategic nuclear potential.” The ambassador took a rather truculent attitude toward the planned
deployment. Writing in Twitter, Rogozin, who reportedly has a reputation for being outspoken,
responded to the Romanian announcement by stating “the Americans and their allies want to
surround the cave of the Russian bear? ... How many times must they be reminded how
dangerous this is!? The bear will come out and kick the ass of these pathetic hunters.”135
Some analysts have argued, however, that the interceptors planned for Romania would not be able
to take out a Russian ICBM launched at the United States. A Russian military analyst, writing in
RIA Novosti, conceded that the Obama-proposed SM-3 interceptors stationed anywhere in Europe
would be incapable of downing Russian long-range ballistic missiles. He argued that Moscow’s
main objections were that 1) it had not been consulted on the decision, and 2) that the U.S. system
might be subject to change. On the first point, a spokesperson for the Romanian Foreign Ministry
maintained that Russia had been kept in the loop, stating that “information coming from our
American partners indicate that in the time that followed the September 2009 announcement by
the U.S. president, the U.S. had detailed consultations with Russia concerning their plans for the
anti-missile defense system.” Also, on February 16, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher stated that Russia had been told of the planned
deployment to Romania. On the latter point, Russia is concerned that the SM-3 interceptors could
eventually be upgraded to bring down ICBMs without Russia’s knowledge, as the United States is
not required to share information about its missile defense system.136
On February 12, Bulgaria’s prime minister announced that he supported participation in the U.S.
missile defense system; the U.S. ambassador to Bulgaria confirmed that discussions on such a
deployment were in their early stages with Bulgaria—and with other countries. Bulgaria’s foreign
minister noted that the missile shield would also protect Russia from the threat of Iranian
missiles. Russia, however, professed that it had been caught unawares by the announcement;
Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that “we have already questioned our U.S. partners in Washington
... as to the meaning of this, and why we have this Bulgarian surprise after the Romanian
surprise.” Russian NATO Ambassador Rogozin tweeted that “Bulgarians are our brothers, but
politically they are promiscuous.” A few days later, Russia turned aside an apparent offer by
Transnistria, a breakaway region of Moldova, to host Russian Iskander missiles. 137
It has been argued that the new U.S. focus on Southern Europe is likely viewed with less alarm by
Russia than the former plan, which included Poland and the Czech Republic. However, a member
of the Russian Duma claimed that the possible deployments do not square with the Obama
Administration’s intention to improve relations with the Russian Federation. Konstantin
135 “Russia Says Concerned at Romania Hosting U.S. Missiles,” Reuters News, February 5, 2010; “Russia: Disconnect
Between MD Policy, Iran Persist,” IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, February 5, 2010; “Romania Agrees to Host
U.S. Anti-Missile System,” Oxford Analytica,. February 10, 2010; “Russia Toughens Line on Iran Nuclear Ambitions,”
Agence France Presse, February 9, 2010; “Twitter Diplomacy: Envoy Says Russia Will ‘Kick Ass’ of U.S.” Agence
France Presse, February 10, 2010.
136 “Romania Says U.S. Informed Russia on Anti-missile Shield Plan,” BBC Monitoring European, February 10, 2010;
“U.S. Kept Russia Informed About Romania Missiles Plan—U.S. Diplomat,” Interfax, February 16, 2010; “U.S. and
Romania: A New Alignment?” RIA Novosti, February 9, 2010; “Russia Cool to U.S. Plan for Missiles in Romania,”
New York Times, February 6, 2010.
137 “Bulgaria Wants to Participate in US Missile Defense Shield: PM,” Agence France Presse, February 12, 2010;
“Russia Wants Bulgaria to Explain favor of U.S. Missile Shield,” Agence France Presse, February 14, 2010; “Russia’s
NATO Envoy Quashes Transdniestr Missiles Bid—Report,” Dow Jones International Press, February 16, 2010; “U.S.
Missile Shield Not Targeting Russia, Bulgaria Says,” Agence France Presse, February 17, 2010; “Dmitry Rogozin
Accuses Bulgarian Leadership of ‘Political Promiscuity,’” WPS: Defense and Security, February 17, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
51
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Kosachyov, chairman of the Duma’s International Affairs Committee, stated on February 16 that
“the most regrettable thing is that these plans [to deploy missile defense facilities] do not fit the
well known ‘reset’ program in Russian-American relations in any way.”138
Russia sought to tie discussions over missile defense to the renegotiation of START, contrary to
the July 2009 agreement reached by Presidents Obama and Medvedev not to link the two.
However, the United States refused to accede to the Russian position, and on April 8, 2010, the
two governments signed the New START treaty. The agreement acknowledges that there is a
relationship between offensive and defensive systems, but does not place any limits on missile
defense or on the expanded system that has been proposed by the Obama Administration.139
On July 3, Secretary of State Clinton and Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski signed an annex
to the 2008 U.S.-Poland agreement permitting the deployment of U.S. BMD in Poland. The
amendment provided approval for the deployment of SM-3 missiles, rather than silo-based
interceptors. After the signing ceremony, Sikorski stated that Russia would be permitted to
inspect the facilities. Russian Foreign Minister Ryabkov stated that Moscow did not believe that
the potential threat from Iran warranted an anti-missile system such as the Obama Administration
was planning to put in place; Foreign Ministry Spokesman Andrei Nesterenko echoed these
comments, and also complained of insufficient consultation. However, a Russian parliamentarian
stated that “there will be detailed discussions [concerning the proposed SM-3 deployment], but
they will not be confrontational.”140
Also in July 2010, it was reported that NATO Secretary General Rasmussen hoped not only to
have the Obama Administration’s PAA adopted as an additional alliance capability, but also to
have Russia participate with NATO in missile defense. Partnering with Russia would, in
Rasmussen’s words, “demonstrate that missile defence is not against Russia, but to protect
Russia.”141 In September, Russia was invited to attend the next alliance summit meeting,
scheduled for mid-November in Lisbon; Rasmussen indicated he hoped that cooperation on
missile defense could be taken up by the NATO-Russia Council. Although some Russian officials
continued to express misgivings about the U.S./NATO missile defense plans, on October 20,
2010, it was announced that President Medvedev would attend the Lisbon summit.142
U.S.-Russia Economic Ties143
U.S.-Russian trade and investment flows have increased in the post-Cold War period, reflecting
the changed U.S.-Russian relationship. Many experts have suggested that the relationship could
138 “U.S. New Missile Defense Plans Do Not Fit Logic of ‘Reset’ Policy—Russian MP,” Interfax, February 16, 2010.
139 CRS Report R41251, Ballistic Missile Defense and Offensive Arms Reductions: A Review of the Historical Record,
by Steven A. Hildreth and Amy F. Woolf.
140 “Moscow Says European Missile Defense Unjustified,” RIA Novosti, July 6, 2010; “U.S. & NATO Good Intentions
at Discrepancy with Deeds—RF ForMin,” ITAR-TASS World Service, July 5, 2010; “Moscow to Discuss Missile
Defense with Warsaw in Non-confrontational Way,” Interfax: Russia & CIS Military Newswire, July 5, 2010.
141 “Trust, But Make Military Plans/NATO and Russia,” The Economist. July 31, 2010. For additional information, see
“A Primer On transatlantic Missile Defense,” by Patricia A. Puttmann and Robert Bracknell, The Atlantic Council.
October 2010.
142 “Russia Voices Skepticism Over NATO Missile Shield,” Agence France Presse. October 15, 2010. “Russia Accepts
Invitation To Attend NATO Summit Meeting,” New York Times. October 20, 2010.
143 Prepared by William H. Cooper, Specialist in International Trade and Finance.
Congressional Research Service
52
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
expand even further. U.S. imports from Russia have increased substantially, rising from $0.5
billion in 1992 to a peak of $26.8 billion in 2008. The large increase in U.S. imports reflects not
so much an increase in the volume of trade but the rise in world prices of raw materials,
particularly oil, that comprise the bulk of those imports (64% in 2008). U.S. exports have
increased from $2.1 billion in 1992 peaking at $9.3 billion in 2008. Major U.S. exports to Russia
consist of machinery, vehicles, and meat (mostly chicken).144
Table 1. U.S. Merchandise Trade with Russia, 1992-2009
(in billions of dollars)
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
Trade
U.S.
U.S.
Trade
Year
Exports
Imports
Balances Year
Exports
Imports
Balances
1992
2.1 0.5 1.6
2001 2.7 6.3 -3.5
1993
3.0 1.7 1.3
2002 2.4 6.8
-4.4
1994
2.6 3.2 -0.6
2003 2.4 8.6 -6.2
1995
2.8 4.0 -1.2
2004 3.0 11.9 -8.9
1996
3.3 3.6 -0.3
2005 3.9 15.3
-11.3
1997
3.4 4.3 -0.9
2006 4.7 19.8
-15.1
1998
3.6 5.7 -2.1
2007 7.4 19.4
-12.0
1999
2.1 5.9 -3.8
2008 9.3 26.8
-17.5
2000
2.1 7.7 -5.6
2009 5.4 18.2
-12.8
Source: Compiled by CRS from U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau data. FT900.
Note: Major U.S. exports: machinery; vehicles; meat; aircraft. Major U.S. imports: mineral fuels; inorganic
chemicals aluminum; steel.
Despite the increase in bilateral trade, the United States and Russia still account for small shares
of each others’ trade. In 2009, Russia accounted for about 0.5% of U.S. exports and 1.2% of U.S.
imports. It was the 20th -largest source of imports and 32nd largest export market for the United
States. The United States accounted for 3.6% of Russian exports and 5.7% of Russian imports. It
was the third largest source of imports and ninth largest export market for Russia.145
According to Russian government data, by the end of 2008, the United States accounted for 3.3%
of total accumulated foreign direct and portfolio investments in Russia and was the eighth-largest
source of foreign investment. However, the first three countries were Cyprus (21.5%), the
Netherlands (17.5%), and Luxembourg (13.0%), suggesting that at least 50% of the investments
night have been repatriated Russian funds.146
Russia and the United States have never been major economic partners, and it unlikely that the
significance of bilateral trade will increase much in the near term. However, in some areas, such
as agriculture, Russia has become an important market for U.S. exports. Russia is the largest
144 CRS calculations based on data from the Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Global Trade
Information System.
145 Global Trade Information Systems, Inc. World Trade Atlas.
146 Tendentsii I perspectiva (Trends and Outlook). Russian Economic Report. April 2006. p. 24..
Congressional Research Service
53
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
foreign market for U.S. poultry. Furthermore, U.S. exports to Russia of energy exploration
equipment and technology, as well as industrial and agricultural equipment, have increased as the
dollar has declined in value. Russian demand for these products will likely grow as old equipment
and technology need to be replaced and modernized. Russia’s significance as a supplier of U.S.
imports will also likely remain small given the lack of international competitiveness of Russian
production outside of oil, gas, and other natural resources. U.S.-Russian investment relations
could grow tighter if Russia’s business climate improves; however, U.S. business concerns about
the Russian government’s seemingly capricious intervention in energy and other sectors could
dampen the enthusiasm of all but adventuresome investors.
The greater importance of Russia’s economic policies and prospects to the United States lies in
their indirect effect on the overall economic and political environment in which the United States
and Russia operate. From this perspective, Russia’s continuing economic stability and growth can
be considered positive for the United States. Because financial markets are interrelated, chaos in
even some of the smaller economies can cause uncertainty throughout the rest of the world. Such
was the case during Russia’s financial meltdown in 1998 and more recently with the 2008-2009
crisis. Promotion of economic stability in Russia has been a basis for U.S. support for Russia’s
membership in international economic organizations, including the IMF, the World Bank, and the
WTO. As a major oil producer and exporter, Russia influences world oil prices that affect U.S.
consumers.
U.S. Assistance to Russia
From FY1992 through FY2011, the U.S. government has budgeted or requested over $17 billion
in assistance to Russia, including for democratization, market reform, and health needs. The bulk
of this assistance (nearly 60%) has been expended on CTR (Nunn-Lugar) and other security-
related programs aiming to prevent the proliferation of WMD, combat drug-trafficking and
transnational crime, foster law enforcement and criminal justice sector reforms, and support
reconciliation and recovery efforts in Chechnya and other areas of the North Caucasus. U.S.
assistance to Russia as a percentage of all aid to Eurasia has declined over the years, but
historically Russia has received about one-half of all U.S. assistance to Eurasia.147
Annual foreign operations appropriations bills have contained conditions that Russia is expected
to meet in order to receive assistance:
• A restriction on aid to Russia was approved in the FY1998 appropriations and
each year thereafter, prohibiting any aid to the government of the Russian
Federation (i.e., central government; it does not affect local and regional
governments) unless the President certifies that Russia has not implemented a
law discriminating against religious minorities. Successive administrations have
made such determinations each year.
• Since FY1996, direct assistance to the government of Russia has hinged on its
continuing sale of nuclear reactor technology to Iran. As a result, in most years as
much as 60% of planned U.S. assistance to the federal Russian government has
been cut.
147 See CRS Report RL32866, U.S. Assistance to the Former Soviet Union, by Curt Tarnoff.
Congressional Research Service
54
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
• The FY2001 foreign aid bill prohibited 60% of aid to the central government of
Russia if it was not cooperating with international investigations of war crime
allegations in Chechnya or providing access to NGOs doing humanitarian work
in Chechnya. Possibly as a result of Russian cooperation with the United States
in its war on terrorism, the war crime provision was dropped.
Congressional Research Service
55
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Table 2. U.S. Government Funds Budgeted for Assistance to Russia, FY1992-FY2008
(in millions of dollars)
Fiscal
Year/
Program
Area 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
Economic
84.68 137.21 1,187.92
231.37 72.69 39.35 51.21 74.01 58.65 60.13 60.62 54.47 33.93 9.54 7.71 3.41 0.7 2,167.6
Growth
Governing
33.93 66.13 242.86 74.15 50.68 38.45 69.58 85.64 68.26 82.06 79.89 79.98 64.31 63.8 78.7 55.96 67.8 1302.18
Justly &
Democr.
Humanit.
167.89 1,060.4 39.49 48.44 35.34 0.93 6.34 1,167.34 243.1 92.37 23.83 26.1 19.97 1.5 13.23 0.0
0.0 2,946.27
Asst.
Investing in
13.1 8.31 79.85 12.67 10.98
10.59
10.55 15.42 15.88 26.1 27.41 24.36 24.02 35.47 28.3 23.95 29.64 396.6
People
Peace &
28.81 182.71 361.69 203.19 323.18 456.29 461.36 790.05 667.52 694.86 822.79 727.59 802.43 897.75 854.8 926.11 778.68 9979.81
Security
Program
0.0 0.0 4.0 0.44 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.24 1.4 7.08
Support
Total
328.42 1,454.75 1,915.79 570.26 492.86 545.52 599.04 2,132.47 1,053.41 955.52 1,014.54 912.5 944.67 1,008.06 982.74 1,010.66 2886.22 18,807.43
As % of
50
Eurasia aid
Source: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia. Includes Freedom Support Act and other program and agency
assistance.
CRS-56
Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests
Table 3. Assistance to Russia, FY2009-FY2010, and the FY2011 Request
(in millions of dollars)
Fiscal Year/Program
Area
FY2009 Actual
FY2010 Estimate
FY2011 Request
Economic Growth
500
500
475
Governing Justly &
33.871 37.021 35.19
Democratically
Investing in People
25.408
22.508
21.979
Peace & Security
10.367
11.566
11.056
Total 70.146
71.595
68.7
As Percent of Eurasian
9 12 11
Assistance
Source: U.S. Department of State. Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Annex: Regional
Perspectives, FY2011, March 2010.
Notes: Includes the Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA) Account, Foreign Military
Financing, Global Health and Child Survival funds, International Military Education and Training funds, and the
State Department’s Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs. Does not include
Defense or Energy Department programs.
Author Contact Information
Jim Nichol, Coordinator
Amy F. Woolf
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy
jnichol@crs.loc.gov, 7-2289
awoolf@crs.loc.gov, 7-2379
William H. Cooper
Steven A. Hildreth
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Specialist in Missile Defense
wcooper@crs.loc.gov, 7-7749
shildreth@crs.loc.gov, 7-7635
Carl Ek
Paul Belkin
Specialist in International Relations
Analyst in European Affairs
cek@crs.loc.gov, 7-7286
pbelkin@crs.loc.gov, 7-0220
Steven Woehrel
Derek E. Mix
Specialist in European Affairs
Analyst in European Affairs
swoehrel@crs.loc.gov, 7-2291
dmix@crs.loc.gov, 7-9116
Acknowledgments
Some portions of this report are based on the work of former Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
Stuart Goldman.
Congressional Research Service
57