Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues
for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke, Coordinator
Specialist in Naval Affairs
October 8, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41153
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has
heightened concerns about the region’s future. The United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic
country and has substantial interests in the region. On January 12, 2009, the George W. Bush
Administration released a presidential directive, called National Security Presidential Directive
66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25 (NSPD 66/HSPD 25), establishing a new U.S.
policy for the Arctic region.
Record low extent of Arctic sea ice in 2007 focused scientific and policy attention on its linkage
to global climate change, and to the implications of projected ice-free seasons in the Arctic within
decades. The Arctic has been projected by several scientists to be perennially ice-free in the late
summer by the late 2030s.
The five Arctic coastal states—the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark (of
which Greenland is a territory)—are in the process of preparing Arctic territorial claims for
submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The Russian claim to the
enormous underwater Lomonosov Ridge, if accepted, would reportedly grant Russia nearly one-
half of the Arctic area. There are also four other unresolved Arctic territorial disputes.
The diminishment of Arctic ice could lead in the coming years to increased commercial shipping
on two trans-Arctic sea routes. Current international guidelines for ships operating in Arctic
waters are being updated, with a targeted completion date of 2010.
Changes to the Arctic brought about by warming temperatures will likely allow more exploration
for oil, gas, and minerals. Warming that causes permafrost to melt could pose challenges to
onshore exploration activities. Increased oil and gas exploration and tourism (cruise ships) in the
Arctic increase the risk of pollution in the region. Cleaning up oil spills in ice-covered waters will
be more difficult than in other areas, primarily because effective strategies have yet to be
developed.
Large commercial fisheries exist in the Arctic. The United States is currently meeting with other
countries regarding the management of Arctic fish stocks. Changes in the Arctic could affect
threatened and endangered species. Under the Endangered Species Act, the polar bear was listed
as threatened on May 15, 2008. Arctic climate change is also expected to affect the economies,
subsistence, health, population, societies, and cultures of Arctic indigenous peoples.
Two of the Coast Guard’s three polar icebreakers—Polar Star and Polar Sea—have exceeded
their intended 30-year service lives. The Coast Guard since 2008 has been studying how many
polar icebreakers, with what capabilities, should be procured as replacements for Polar Star and
Polar Sea. The possibility of increased sea traffic through Arctic waters also raises an issue
concerning Arctic search and rescue capabilities.
The Arctic has increasingly become a subject of discussion among political leaders of the nations
in the region. Although there is significant international cooperation on Arctic issues, the Arctic is
also increasingly being viewed by some observers as a potential emerging security issue. In
varying degrees, the Arctic coastal states have indicated a willingness to establish and maintain a
military presence in the high north. U.S. military forces, particularly the Navy and Coast Guard,
have begun to pay more attention to the region.
Congressional Research Service
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
Definitions of the Arctic ........................................................................................................ 1
Arctic Circle Definition and Resulting Arctic Countries .................................................. 1
Definition in Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 ...................................................... 2
Other Definitions ............................................................................................................ 2
U.S. Arctic Research ............................................................................................................. 3
Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984, As Amended ..................................................... 3
NSF FY2011 Budget Request For Arctic Research .......................................................... 4
January 2009 Presidential Arctic Policy Directive.................................................................. 5
May 2010 National Security Strategy .................................................................................... 6
The Arctic and the U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ...................................... 6
Background to UNCLOS ................................................................................................ 6
Part VI of UNCLOS and Commission on Limits of Continental Shelf ............................. 6
U.S. Activities As a Non-Party to UNCLOS .................................................................... 7
Issues for Congress ..................................................................................................................... 8
Climate Change and Loss of Arctic Sea Ice ........................................................................... 8
Territorial Claims and Sovereignty Issues............................................................................ 11
Commercial Sea Transportation........................................................................................... 13
Background .................................................................................................................. 13
Regulation of Arctic Shipping ....................................................................................... 16
Oil, Gas, and Mineral Exploration ....................................................................................... 17
Oil and Gas................................................................................................................... 18
Extent of the Continental Margin .................................................................................. 19
Minerals........................................................................................................................ 20
Environment and Economics......................................................................................... 21
Oil Pollution and Pollution Response .................................................................................. 21
Oil Pollution Implications of Arctic Change .................................................................. 21
Response and Cleanup Challenges in the Arctic Region................................................. 23
Fisheries ............................................................................................................................. 25
Protected Species ................................................................................................................ 26
Indigenous People Living in the Arctic ................................................................................ 27
Background .................................................................................................................. 27
Effects of Climate Change............................................................................................. 29
Polar Icebreaking ................................................................................................................ 31
Search and Rescue .............................................................................................................. 32
U.S. Relations with Other Arctic Countries ......................................................................... 33
U.S. Military Forces and Operations.................................................................................... 35
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review................................................................................ 36
Navy and Coast Guard .................................................................................................. 37
January 2009 Arctic Policy Directive .................................................................................. 43
CRS Reports On Specific Arctic-Related Issues ........................................................................ 44
Congressional Research Service
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Figures
Figure 1. Arctic Sea Ice Extent in September 2008, Compared with Prospective Shipping
Routes and Oil and Gas Resources ......................................................................................... 10
Appendixes
Appendix A. Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373)............................. 45
Appendix B. P.L. 101-609 of 1990, Amending Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 ............. 53
Appendix C. January 2009 Presidential Arctic Policy Directive ................................................. 55
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 63
Congressional Research Service
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has
heightened concerns about the region’s future. Issues such as Arctic sovereignty claims;
commercial shipping through the Arctic; Arctic oil, gas, and mineral exploration; endangered
Arctic species; and increased military operations in the Arctic could cause the region in coming
years to become an arena of international cooperation, competition, or conflict. The United States,
by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial political, economic, energy,
environmental, and other interests in the region. Decisions that Congress, the executive branch,
foreign governments, international organizations, and commercial firms make on Arctic-related
issues could significantly affect these interests.
This report provides an overview of Arctic-related issues for Congress, and refers readers to more
in-depth CRS reports on specific Arctic-related issues. Congressional readers with questions
about an issue discussed in this report should contact the author or authors of the section
discussing that issue. The authors are identified by footnote at the start of each section.
This report does not track legislation on specific Arctic-related issues. For tracking of legislative
activity, see the CRS reports relating to specific Arctic-related issues.
Background1
Definitions of the Arctic
There are multiple definitions of the Arctic that result in differing descriptions of the land and sea
areas encompassed by the term. Policy discussions of the Arctic can employ varying definitions
of the region, and readers should bear in mind that the definition used in one discussion may
differ from that used in another. This CRS report does not rely on any one definition.
Arctic Circle Definition and Resulting Arctic Countries
The most common and basic definition of the Arctic defines the region as the land and sea area
north of the Arctic Circle (a circle of latitude at about 66.30o North). For surface locations within
this zone, the sun is generally above the horizon for 24 continuous hours at least once per year (at
the summer solstice) and below the horizon for 24 continuous hours at least once per year (at the
winter solstice).
The Arctic Circle definition includes the northernmost third or so of Alaska, as well as the
Chukchi Sea, which separates that part of Alaska from Russia, and U.S. territorial and Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) waters north of Alaska. It does not include the lower two-thirds or so of
Alaska or the Bering Sea, which separates that lower part of the state from Russia.
1 Except for the subsection on the Arctic and the U.N. Convention on the law of the Sea, this section was prepared by
Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.
Congressional Research Service
1
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Eight countries have territory north of the Arctic Circle: the United States (Alaska), Canada,
Russia, Norway, Denmark (by virtue of Greenland, a member country of the Kingdom of
Denmark), Finland, Sweden, and Iceland.2 These eight countries are often referred to as the Arctic
countries, and they are the member states of the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum
established in 1996.3 A subset of the eight Arctic countries are the five countries that are
considered Arctic coastal states: the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark (by
virtue of Greenland).
Definition in Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984
Section 112 of the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373 of July 31,
19844) defines the Arctic as follows:
As used in this title, the term “Arctic” means all United States and foreign territory north of
the Arctic Circle and all United States territory north and west of the boundary formed by the
Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers [in Alaska]; all contiguous seas, including the
Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian chain.
This definition, which is codified at 15 U.S.C. 4111,5 includes certain parts of Alaska below the
Arctic Circle, including the Aleutian islands and portions of central and western mainland Alaska,
such as the Seward Peninsula and the Yukon Delta.
Other Definitions
Other definitions of the Arctic are based on factors such as average temperature, the northern tree
line, the extent of permafrost on land, the extent of sea ice on the ocean, or jurisdictional or
administrative boundaries.6 A definition based on a climate-related factor could circumscribe
differing areas over time as a result of climate change.
The 10o C isotherm definition of the Arctic defines the region as the land and sea area in the
northern hemisphere where the average temperature for the warmest month (July) is below 10o
Celsius, or 50o Fahrenheit. This definition results in an irregularly shaped Arctic region that
excludes some land and sea areas north of the Arctic Circle but includes some land and sea areas
south of the Arctic Circle. This definition currently excludes all of Finland and Sweden, as well as
2 On November 25, 2008, voters in Greenland approved a referendum for greater autonomy that some observers view
as a step toward eventual independence from Denmark. (Alan Cowell, “Greenland Vote Favors Independence,” New
York Times, November 26, 2008.)
3 For more on the Arctic Council on the Internet, see http://www.arctic-council.org/.
4 Title II of P.L. 98-373 is the National Critical Materials Act of 1984.
5 As codified, the definition reads, “As used in this chapter....”
6 For discussions and (in some cases) maps, see Susan Joy Hassol, Impacts of a Warming Arctic [Executive Summary].
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 4. Available online at http://amap.no/acia/; Oran R. Yong and Niels
Einarsson, Arctic Human Development Report, Stefansson Arctic Institute, Akureyri, Iceland, 2004, pp. 17-18,
available online at http://www.svs.is/AHDR/AHDR%20chapters/English%20version/Chapters%20PDF.htm; and Hugo
Ahlenius, editor in chief, et al. Vital Arctic Graphics, People and Global Heritage on Our Last Wild Shores,
UNEP/GRID-Arendal, Arendal, Norway, p. 6, available online at http://www.grida.no/publications/vg/arctic/.
Congressional Research Service
2
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
some of Alaska above the Arctic Circle, while including virtually all of the Bering Sea and
Alaska’s Aleutian Islands.7
The definition of the Arctic adopted by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme
(AMAP)—a working group of the Arctic Council—“essentially includes the terrestrial and
marine areas north of the Arctic Circle (66°32’ N), and north of 62° N in Asia and 60° N in North
America, modified to include the marine areas north of the Aleutian chain, Hudson Bay, and parts
of the North Atlantic, including the Labrador Sea.”8 The AMAP website includes a map showing
the Arctic Circle, 10o C isotherm, tree line, and AMAP definitions of the Arctic.9
Some observers use the term “high north” as a way of referring to the Arctic. Some observers
make a distinction between the “high Arctic”—meaning, in general, the colder portions of the
Arctic that are closer to the North Pole—and other areas of the Arctic that are generally less cold
and further away from the North Pole, which are sometimes described as the low Arctic or the
subarctic.
U.S. Arctic Research
Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984, As Amended
The Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373 of July 31, 198410) “provide[s]
for a comprehensive national policy dealing with national research needs and objectives in the
Arctic.”11 The act, among other things
• made a series of findings concerning the importance of the Arctic and Arctic
research;
• established the U.S. Arctic Research Commission (USARC) to promote Arctic
research and recommend Arctic research policy;
• designated the National Science Foundation (NSF) as the lead federal agency for
implementing Arctic research policy;
• established the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC) to
develop a national Arctic research policy and a five-year plan to implement that
policy, and designated the NSF representative on the IARPC as its chairperson;12
and
7 A map showing the line that results from 10o isotherm definition is available online at https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/reference_maps/pdf/arctic.pdf.
8 Discussion entitled “Geographical Coverage,” available online at http://www.amap.no/ (click on “About AMAP” and
then the tab “Geographical coverage.”)
9 Discussion entitled “Geographical Coverage,” available online at http://www.amap.no/ (click on “About AMAP” and
then the tab “Geographical coverage.”)
10 Title II of P.L. 98-373 is the National Critical Materials Act of 1984.
11 These words are taken from the official title of P.L. 98-373. (Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 is the short title
of Title I of P.L. 98-373. ) The remainder of P.L. 98-373’s official title relates to Title II of the act, the short title of
which is the National Critical Materials Act of 1984.)
12 The IARPC currently includes more than a dozen federal agencies, departments, and offices. Additional information
on the IARPC is available on the Internet at http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/arctic/iarpc/start.jsp.
Congressional Research Service
3
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
• defined the term “Arctic” for purposes of the act.
The Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 was amended by P.L. 101-609 of November 16,
1990. For the texts of the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 and P.L. 101-609, see
Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively.
NSF FY2011 Budget Request For Arctic Research
NSF—the lead federal agency for implementing Arctic research policy (see “Arctic Research and
Policy Act of 1984, As Amended”)—carries out Arctic research activities through its Division of
Arctic Sciences (ARC), which forms part of NSF’s Office of Polar Programs (OPP). NSF is
requesting a total of $527.99 million for OPP for FY2011, including $111.36 million for ARC and
$54.0 million for U.S. Coast Guard polar icebreaker operations and maintenance in support of
Arctic and Antarctic research activities.13 NSF states in its budget request that
OPP provides primary U.S. support for fundamental research in polar regions through
several mechanisms. In addition, NSF provides interagency leadership for U.S. activities in
polar regions. In the Arctic, NSF leads research planning as directed by the Arctic Research
Policy Act of 1984. The NSF Director chairs the Interagency Arctic Research Policy
Committee created for this purpose....
Research in polar regions addresses critical aspects of the global earth system – glacial and
sea ice, permafrost, terrestrial and marine ecosystems, the ocean, and the atmosphere – that
help shape the global environment and climate. This work addresses the Administration’s
focus on making the U.S. a world leader on climate change and builds on a foundation
established during the International Polar Year (IPY) 2007-2009.... Research in polar regions
also offers opportunities for fundamental advances in each of the disciplinary sciences,
ranging from the behavior of the Earth’s inner core, the formation of galaxies, the biology of
life in the cold and dark, and how Arctic residents and institutions are affected by
environmental change.
The Administration is assessing the overarching issues facing the Arctic, including those
associated with impacts of climate change, increased human activity, new or additional
information needs, and conservation of Arctic resources. This approach will necessarily
include identifying implementation issues associated with the U.S. Arctic Policy released in
January 2009.14
Regarding the $111.36 million requested for ARC for FY2011, NSF states
13 National Science Foundation, FY 2011 Budget Request to Congress, February 1, 2010, p. OPP-1 (pdf page 167 of
458). Regarding the $54.0 million requested for U.S. Coast Guard polar icebreaker operations and maintenance, NSF
states:
This budget line item funds the operation and maintenance of the [Coast Guard polar icebreaker]
Polar Sea and the [Coast Guard polar icebreaker] Healy in support of NSF science and, on a
reimbursable basis, the needs of other federal agencies. The U.S. Coast Guard estimates that $54.0
million will be needed to fund operation and maintenance of the two vessels in FY 2011, which
includes significant funding for a triennial dry dock for each vessel.
(National Science Foundation, FY 2011 Budget Request to Congress, February 1, 2010, p. OPP-16
(pdf page 182 of 458).)
14 National Science Foundation, FY 2011 Budget Request to Congress, February 1, 2010, p. OPP-2 (pdf page 168 of
458).
Congressional Research Service
4
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
ARC is organized into several programs that support research in social science, earth system
science, and a broad range of natural science. Educational projects are also supported. The
Research Support & Logistics program assists researchers with access to the Arctic,
improves safety and environmental stewardship, and increases the ability of researchers to
share plans and results with local Arctic communities.... Arctic Sciences funds a broad range
of activities to provide an integrated understanding of environmental change in the Arctic,
including study of significant, system-scale environmental change and its human
dimension.15
NSF’s FY2011 budget also requests $1.6 million to fund the operations of USARC.16
January 2009 Presidential Arctic Policy Directive
On January 12, 2009, the George W. Bush Administration released a presidential directive
establishing a new U.S. policy for the Arctic region. The directive, dated January 9, 2009, was
issued as National Security Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25
(NSPD 66/HSPD 25). The directive was the result of an interagency review, and it superseded for
the Arctic (but not the Antarctic) a 1994 presidential directive on Arctic and Antarctic policy. The
directive, among other things,
• states that the United States is an Arctic nation, with varied and compelling
interests in the region;
• sets forth a six-element overall U.S. policy for the region;
• describes U.S. national security and homeland security interests in the Arctic; and
• discusses a number of issues as they relate to the Arctic, including international
governance; the extended continental shelf and boundary issues; promotion of
international scientific cooperation; maritime transportation; economic issues,
including energy; and environmental protection and conservation of natural
resources.
15 National Science Foundation, FY 2011 Budget Request to Congress, February 1, 2010, p. OPP-9 (pdf page 175 of
458).
16 Regarding this request, NSF states:
USARC was created by the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984, (as amended, P.L. 101-609),
to establish the national policy, priorities, and goals necessary to construct a federal program plan
for basic and applied scientific research with respect to the Arctic, including natural resources and
materials, physical, biological and health sciences, and social and behavioral sciences. This request
provides funds to promote Arctic research, to recommend Arctic research policy, and to
communicate research and policy recommendations to the rest of the Administration and the
Congress, as well as supporting close collaboration with the National Science Foundation (NSF) as
the lead agency responsible for implementing Arctic research policy and supporting cooperation
and collaboration throughout the Federal Government. In addition, USARC gives guidance to the
Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC) to develop national Arctic research
projects and a five-year plan to implement those projects. USARC also supports interaction with
Arctic residents, international Arctic research programs and organizations, and local institutions,
including regional governments, in order to obtain the broadest possible view of Arctic research
needs. USARC is an independent federal agency, funded through NSF’s appropriations,
specifically as an activity in the Research and Related Activities account.
(National Science Foundation, FY 2011 Budget Request to Congress, February 1, 2010, p. USARC-
1 [pdf page 189 of 458]. Additional information about USARC is available on the Internet at
http://www.arctic.gov.)
Congressional Research Service
5
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
The Obama Administration has not issued a new directive superseding NSPD 66/HSPD 25; it is
currently operating under the Bush Administration’s policy directive.17 For the text of NSPD
66/HSPD 25, see Appendix C.
May 2010 National Security Strategy
In May 2010, the Obama Administration released a national security strategy document, which
states:
The United States is an Arctic Nation with broad and fundamental interests in the Arctic
region, where we seek to meet our national security needs, protect the environment,
responsibly manage resources, account for indigenous communities, support scientific
research, and strengthen international cooperation on a wide range of issues.18
The Arctic and the U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)19
Background to UNCLOS
In November 1994, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) entered
into force. This Convention establishes a treaty regime to govern activities on, over, and under the
world’s oceans. It builds on the four 1958 law of the sea conventions and sets forth a framework
for future activities in parts of the oceans that are beyond national jurisdiction.20 The 1982
Convention and its 1994 Agreement relating to Implementation of Part XI of the Convention were
transmitted to the Senate on October 6, 1994.21 In the absence of Senate advice and consent to
adherence, the United States is not a party to the Convention and Agreement.
Part VI of UNCLOS and Commission on Limits of Continental Shelf
Part VI of the Convention, dealing with the Continental Shelf, and Annex II, which established a
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, are most pertinent to the Arctic as it becomes
more accessible ocean space, bordered by five coastal States.22 The Convention gives the coastal
State sovereign jurisdiction over the resources, including oil and gas, of its continental shelf.23
17 CRS communication with State Department official, October 8, 2010.
18 National Security Strategy, Washington, May 2010, p. 50. The quoted sentence constitutes the entirety of the
document’s comments specifically on the Arctic. It is the final sentence of a section on “sustain[ing] broad cooperation
on key global challenges” that includes longer discussions on climate change, peacekeeping and armed conflict,
pandemics and infectious disease, transnational criminal threats and threats to governance, and safeguarding the global
commons.
19 This section prepared by Marjorie Ann Browne, Specialist in International Relations, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and
Trade Division.
20 The United States is party to the four conventions adopted in 1958: Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, Convention on the High Seas, Convention on the Continental Shelf, and Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas.
21 Treaty Document 103-39.
22 Other relevant provisions of the Convention, applicable depending on the extent of Arctic melting, relate to
navigation, high seas freedoms, fisheries, and exclusive economic zones.
23 The continental shelf is the under-sea extension of a coastal state’s land territory. Article 76 of the Convention
defines the continental shelf, inter alia, as “the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
6
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Under Article 76 of the Convention, a coastal State with a broad continental margin may establish
a shelf limit beyond 200 nautical miles. This jurisdiction is subject to the submission of the
particulars of the intended limit and supporting scientific and technical data by the coastal State to
the Commission for review and recommendation.24 The Commission reviews the documentation
and, by a two-thirds majority, approves its recommendations to the submitting State. Coastal
States agree to establish the outer limits of their continental shelf, in accordance with this process
and with their national laws. In instances of disagreement with the Commission’s
recommendations, the coastal State may make a revised or new submission. The actions of the
Commission “shall not prejudice matters relating to delimitation of boundaries between States
with opposite or adjacent coasts.”25 The “limits established by a coastal State on the basis of these
recommendations shall be final and binding.”26
U.S. Activities As a Non-Party to UNCLOS
As a non-Party to the Convention, the United States cannot participate as a member of the
Commission; it cannot submit a claim under Article 76. Over the years, however, it has submitted
observations on submissions made by other States, requesting that those observations be made
available online and to the Commission. In addition, since 2001, the United States has gathered
and analyzed data to determine the outer limits of its extended continental shelf. Starting in 2007,
this effort became the Extended Continental Shelf Project, directed by an interagency task force
under the lead of the Department of State.27
Some observers have suggested that a separate regime be negotiated to address the changing
circumstances in the Arctic. They maintain that this phenomenon was not envisioned at the time
the Law of the Sea Convention was negotiated. Still others suggest that the Arctic region above a
certain parallel be designated a wilderness area, and they cite as precedent Article 4 of The
Antarctic Treaty, under which any current claims to sovereign territory are frozen and
No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis
for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create
any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim,
to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force.
Supporters of the Law of the Sea Convention maintain that changing circumstances in the Arctic
strengthen their argument that the United States should become a party to the Convention. In this
way, they argue, the United States can be best situated to protect and serve its national interests,
under both Article 76 and other parts of the Convention.
(...continued)
[coastal state’s] territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the
continental margin.”
24 A coastal State Party has 10 years from the entry into force of the Convention for submission of information on its
proposed limits. In May 2001, the Meeting of States Parties to the Convention decided that for any State for which the
Convention entered into force before May 13, 1999, the date of commencement of the 10-year time period for making
submissions to the Commission is May 13, 1999.
25 Annex II, Article 9. Article 83 of the Convention provides that questions relating to these boundary delimitation
disputes shall be resolved by agreement between the States or by the Dispute Settlement options set forth in Part XV of
the Convention.
26 Article 76, para. 8.
27 For more information, see http://www.state.gov/g/oes/continentalshelf/index.htm.
Congressional Research Service
7
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Issues for Congress
Climate Change and Loss of Arctic Sea Ice28
Record low extent of Arctic sea ice in 2007 focused scientific and policy attention on its linkage
to global climate change, and to the implications of projected ice-free29 seasons in the Arctic
within decades. The Arctic has been projected by several scientists to be ice-free in the late
summer in most years as soon as the late 2030s.30 This opens opportunities for transport through
the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route, extraction of potential oil and gas resources,
and expanded fishing and tourism (Figure 1). Loss of Arctic sea ice could also impact traditional
livelihoods and cultures in the region and survival of polar bear and other animal populations, and
raise risks of pollution, food supply, safety, and national security.
Like the rest of the globe, temperatures in the Arctic have varied over the past century, but show a
significant warming trend, especially since the 1970s.31 The annual average temperature for the
Arctic region (from 60o to 90o N) is now about 1.8o F warmer than the average for the “climate
normal” (the average from 1961 to 1990). Temperatures in October-November are now about 9o F
above the seasonal normal. Scientists have concluded that most of the global warming of the last
three decades is very likely caused by human-related emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG,
mostly carbon dioxide); they expect the GHG-induced warming to continue for decades, even if,
and after, GHG concentrations in the atmosphere have been stabilized.
Modeling of GHG-induced climate change is particularly challenging for the Arctic, but it
consistently projects warming through the 21st century, with annual average Arctic temperature
increases ranging from +1° to +9.0° C (+2° to +19.0° F), depending on the GHG scenario and
model used. While such warming is projected by most models throughout the Arctic, some
models project slight cooling localized in the North Atlantic Ocean just south of Greenland and
28 This section prepared by Jane Leggett, Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy, Resources, Science, and
Industry Division.
29 In scientific analyses, “ice-free” does not necessarily mean “no ice.” The definition of “ice-free” or sea ice “extent”
or “area” varies across studies. Sea ice “extent” is one common measure, equal to the sum of the area of grid cells that
have less than a set percentage—frequently 15%—ice concentration. For more information, see the National Snow and
Ice Data Center, http://nsidc.org/seaice/data/terminology.html.
30 Muyin Wang and James E. Overland, “A Sea Ice Free Summer Arctic within 30 Years?,” Geophysical Research
Letters 36, no. L07502 (April 3, 2009): 10.1029/2009GL037820; Marika Holland, Cecilia M. Bitz, and Bruno
Tremblay, “Future abrupt reductions in the summer Arctic sea ice,” Geophysical Research Letters 33, no. L23503
(2006), http://www.cgd.ucar.edu/oce/mholland/abrupt_ice/holland_etal.pdf; David Adam, “Ice-free Arctic could be
here in 23 years,” The Guardian, September 5, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/sep/05/
climatechange.sciencenews. But see also Julien Boé, Alex Hall, and Xin Qu, “Sources of spread in simulations of
Arctic sea ice loss over the twenty-first century,” Climatic Change 99, no. 3 (April 1, 2010): 637-645; Wieslaw
Maslowski, “Toward Advanced Modeling and Prediction of Arctic Sea Ice and Climate,” in 2010 AAAS Annual
Meeting, Session 1505, Toward Advanced Modeling and Prediction of Arctic Sea Ice and Climate, San Diego CA,
February 19, 2010, http://aaas.confex.com/aaas/2010/webprogram/Paper1505.html; I. Eisenman and J. S. Wettlaufer,
“Nonlinear threshold behavior during the loss of Arctic sea ice,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106,
no. 1 (January 6, 2009): 28-32; Dirk Notz, “The Future of Ice Sheets and Sea Ice: Between Reversible Retreat and
Unstoppable Loss,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106, no. 49 (December 8, 2009): 20590-20595.
31 There was a regionally warm period in the Arctic from the mid-1920s to around 1940, which scientists have assessed
to have been driven by natural climate variability. They have found that period to be distinctly different from the recent
multi-decadal warming, in part because the current warmth is global.
Congressional Research Service
8
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Iceland. Most warming would occur in autumn and winter, “with very little temperature change
projected over the Arctic Ocean” in summer months.32
The observed warmer temperatures in the Arctic have reduced sea ice extent and thickness, and
the amount of ice that persists year-round (“perennial ice”); natural climate variability has likely
contributed as well, such as in the record low ice extent of 2007. The 2007 record minimum sea
ice extent was influenced by warm Arctic temperatures and warm, moist winds blowing from the
North Pacific into the central Arctic, contributing to melting and pushing ice toward and into the
Atlantic past Greenland. Warm winds did not account for the near-record sea ice minimum in
2008.33
Due to observed and projected climate change, scientists have concluded that the Arctic will have
changed from an ice-covered environment to a recurrent ice-free34 ocean (in summers) as soon as
the late 2030s. The character of ice cover is expected to change as well, with the ice being thinner
and more fragile. The variability from year to year of both ice quantity and location could be
expected to continue.
32 William L. Chapman and John E. Walsh, “Simulations of Arctic Temperature and Pressure by Global Coupled
Models,” Journal of Climate 20, no. 4 (February 1, 2007): 609-632.
33 J. Overland, J. Walsh, and M. Wang, Arctic Report Card - Atmosphere (NOAA Arctic Research Program, October 6,
2008), http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/reportcard/atmosphere.html.
34 See footnote 29. Also, although one Canadian scientist has predicted that recurrent ice-free summers may begin
sometime between 2013 and 2020, this is not consistent with other climate models’ projections.
Congressional Research Service
9
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Figure 1. Arctic Sea Ice Extent in September 2008, Compared with Prospective
Shipping Routes and Oil and Gas Resources
Source: Graphic by Stephen Rountree at U.S. News and World Report, http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/
world/2008/10/09/global-warming-triggers-an-international-race-for-the-artic/photos/#1.
Congressional Research Service
10
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Territorial Claims and Sovereignty Issues35
Motivated in part by a desire to exercise sovereign control over the Arctic region’s increasingly
accessible oil and gas reserves (see “Oil, Gas, and Mineral Exploration”), the four Arctic coastal
states other than the United States—Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark (of which Greenland
is a territory)—are in the process of preparing territorial claims in the Arctic, including claims for
expanded Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), for submission to the Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf. (As mentioned earlier—see “U.S. Activities As a Non-Party to
UNCLOS”—the United States, as a non-Party to UNCLOS, cannot participate as a member of the
Commission; it cannot submit a claim under Article 76. Over the years, however, it has submitted
observations on submissions made by other States, requesting that those observations be made
available online and to the Commission. In addition, since 2001, the United States has gathered
and analyzed data to determine the outer limits of its extended continental shelf.)
Russia has been attempting to chart the Arctic Ocean’s enormous underwater Lomonosov Ridge
in an attempt to show that it is an extension of Russia’s continental margin. The Russian claim to
this ridge, if accepted, would reportedly grant Russia nearly one-half of the Arctic area; a 2001
claim submitted by Russia was rejected as insufficiently documented. Canada also claims a
portion of the Lomonosov Ridge as part of its own underwater continental shelf.36 In August
2007, a Russian submersible on a research expedition deposited an encased Russian Federation
flag on the seabed of the presumed site of the North Pole. The action captured worldwide
attention, but analysts note that it did not constitute an official claim to the territory and was
therefore a purely symbolic act.
At a May 2008 meeting in Ilulissat, Greenland, the five Arctic coastal States reaffirmed their
commitment to the UNCLOS legal framework for the establishment of extended continental shelf
limits in the Arctic.37 (For further discussion, see “Extent of the Continental Margin” in “Oil, Gas,
and Mineral Exploration.”)
In addition to this process, there are four unresolved Arctic territorial disputes:
• Scientists have forecast that in coming decades, global warming will reduce the
ice pack in Canada’s northern archipelago sufficiently to permit ships to use the
trans-Arctic shipping route known as the Northwest Passage during the summer
months (see “Commercial Sea Transportation”). The prospect of such traffic
raises a major jurisdictional question. Ottawa maintains that such a passage
would be an inland waterway, and would therefore be sovereign Canadian
territory subject to Ottawa’s surveillance, regulation, and control. The United
States, the European Union, and others assert that the passage would constitute
an international strait between two high seas.
• The United States and Canada are negotiating over a binational boundary in the
Beaufort Sea.
35 This section prepared by Carl Ek, Specialist in International Relations, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division.
36 “Russia, Canada Make Competing Claims To Arctic Resources,” The Canadian Press, September 16, 2010.
37 “5 Countries Agree To Talk, Not Compete, Over the Arctic,” New York Times, May 29, 2008.
Congressional Research Service
11
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
• The United States and Russia in 1990 signed an agreement regarding a disputed
area of the Bering Sea; the U.S. Senate ratified the pact the following year, but
the Russian Duma has yet to approve the accord.
• Denmark and Canada disagree over which country has the territorial right to
Hans Island, a tiny, barren piece of rock between Greenland and Canada’s
Ellesmere Island. Some analysts believe the two countries are vying for control
over a future sea lane that might be created if the Arctic ice were to melt
sufficiently to create a Northwest Passage. Others claim that the governments are
staking out territorial claims in the event that future natural resource discoveries
make the region economically valuable.38
In addition to these disputes, Norway and Russia had been at odds for decades over the boundary
between the two in the so-called “Grey Zone” in the Barents Sea, an area believed to hold rich
undersea deposits of petroleum. On September 15, 2010, Norwegian Prime Minister Jens
Stoltenberg and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed an agreement in Murmansk, a
Russian city near the Norwegian border. The accord awards roughly half of the 175,000 square
kilometer area to each country; it spells out fishing rights, and provides for the joint development
of future oil and gas finds that straddle the boundary line. Some observers believe it is noteworthy
that Russia would concede sovereignty over such a large, resource-rich territory to a small,
neighboring country. But others have noted that Moscow may be hoping for Norwegian
cooperation in developing offshore resources, and eventually in winning approval when Russia
submits its Article 76 UNCLOS claim.39
In August 2010, Canadian Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon announced a new “Statement of
Canada’s Arctic Policy,” which reaffirmed the government’s commitment to Canada’s sovereignty
in the region, to economic and social development, to environmental protection, and to
empowerment of the peoples in the north. The statement also emphasized the government’s
intention to negotiate settlements to its disputes with the United States over the Beaufort Sea
boundary, and with Denmark over Hans Island. Minister Cannon declared that “making progress
on outstanding boundary issues will be a top priority.”40
38 For additional information, see Natalie Mychajlyszyn, The Arctic: Geopolitical Issues, Canadian Library of
Parliament, October 24, 2008.
39 “Russia, Norway Sign Deal On Barents Sea Border, Seek More Development in Mineral-rich Arctic,” Associated
Press, September 15, 2010.
40 Cannon quoted in “Canada Seeks To Settle Arctic Borders,” Agence France Presse, August 20, 2010. For additional
information concerning Canada’s August statement on Arctic policy, see “Statement on Canada’s Arctic foreign policy:
Exercising sovereignty and promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy abroad,” Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Canada website, http://www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/canada_arctic_foreign_policy-
la_politique_etrangere_du_canada_pour_arctique.aspx?lang=eng.
Congressional Research Service
12
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Commercial Sea Transportation41
Background
The search for a shorter route from the Atlantic to Asia has been the quest of maritime powers
since the Middle Ages. The melting of Arctic ice raises the possibility of saving several thousands
of miles and several days of sailing between major trading blocs.42 If the Arctic were to become a
viable shipping route, the ramifications could extend far beyond the Arctic. For example, lower
shipping costs could be advantageous for China (at least its northeast region), Japan, and South
Korea because their manufactured products exported to Europe or North America could become
less expensive relative to other emerging manufacturing centers in Southeast Asia, such as
India.43 Melting ice could potentially open up two trans-Arctic routes (see Figure 1):44
• The Northern Sea Route (NSR, a.k.a. the “Northeast Passage”), along Russia’s
northern border from Murmansk to Provideniya, is about 2,600 nautical miles in
length. It was opened by the Soviet Union to shipping in 1931 but was not
opened to the rest of the world until 1991. Even so, these waters are little used by
non-Russian ships.45 This route would be applicable for trade between northeast
Asia (north of Singapore) and northern Europe.
• The Northwest Passage (NWP) runs through the Canadian Arctic Islands. The
NWP actually consists of several potential routes. The southern route is through
Peel Sound in Nunavut, which has been open the past three summers and
contains mostly one-year ice. However, this route is circuitous, contains some
narrow channels, and is shallow enough to impose draft restrictions on ships. The
more northern route, through McClure Strait from Baffin Bay to the Beaufort Sea
north of Alaska, is much more direct, and therefore more appealing to ocean
carriers, but more prone to ice blockage.46 The NWP is potentially applicable for
trade between northeast Asia (north of Shanghai) and the northeast of North
America, but is considered by many to be less commercially viable than the
NSR.47
41 This section prepared by John Frittelli, Specialist in Transportation Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry
Division. Vanessa Cieslak, Information Research Specialist, Knowledge Services Group, assisted in compiling
information for the background part of this section.
42 Extended daylight hours in the Arctic during the summer may also be an advantage.
43 Presentation by Stephen Carmel, Senior Vice President, Maersk Line Ltd., Halifax International Security Forum,
Arctic Security: The New Great Game? November 21, 2009, available at http://fora.tv/.
44 A third but more remote possibility is a route directly over the North Pole.
45 In the summer of 2009, two German-owned ships are believed to be the first non-Russian ships to transit the NSR,
sailing from Korea to deliver oil-service equipment to the Russian Arctic and then sailing on to Rotterdam.
46 This was the route pioneered by the SS Manhattan, an oil tanker modified for ice breaking in 1969 to carry Alaskan
North Slope oil to the Atlantic. This was the first commercial passage through the NWP, but the building of the
Alaskan pipeline was found to be the more economical means of transporting oil from the North Slope to the lower 48
states.
47 Although the NWP is often compared to the alternative route through the Panama Canal in terms of distance and
sailing days from Asia to the U.S. east coast, another alternative to consider is the shorter and faster transcontinental
rail route across Canada or the United States.
Congressional Research Service
13
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Destination Traffic, Not Trans-Arctic Traffic
Almost all cargo ship activity currently taking place in the Arctic is to transport natural resources
from the Arctic or to deliver general cargo and supplies to communities and natural resource
extraction facilities. Thus, cargo ship traffic in the Arctic presently is mostly regional, not trans-
Arctic. While there has been a recent uptick in Arctic shipping activity, this activity has more to
due with a spike in commodity prices than it does with the melting of Arctic ice. Even so, recent
activity is less than it has been in the past. The NSR continues to account for the bulk of Arctic
shipping activity. The western end of the NSR, in the Barents Sea, is open year round. Further
east, sections of the NSR are open for as little as two and a half months during the summer. From
Murmansk, oil is transported to Europe, as well as ore and timber, while general cargo and fuel
are delivered to the port by ship. Nickel and copper are also shipped from the northern coast of
Russia. Coal has been shipped from Svalbard to Europe for almost a century. The Murmansk
Shipping Company keeps the NSR route open with nuclear powered icebreakers. It is partially
owned by LukOil, which has a fleet of ice-strengthened oil tankers. Norilsk Nickel, a large
producer of nickel, is also a large shipper in NSR and is currently building five reinforced cargo
vessels. In NWP waters, general cargo is shipped along Alaska’s north coast between Point
Barrow and Prudhoe Bay and zinc is shipped from the Red Dog Mine in Alaska. Crude oil tankers
load at Bent Horn and Cameron Island in the Canadian Arctic.
Cruise Ship Activity
Considerable cruise ship activity takes place in Arctic waters. In the summer of 2007, three cruise
ships reportedly sailed through the NWP from the Atlantic to Alaska’s North Slope.48 In the
Barents Sea, there are regular cruise ships sailing to Svalbard. The inherent dangers for passenger
ships in the Arctic have prompted calls for international regulations promoting the safety of cruise
ships in the area. Some have suggested that cruise ships sail in pairs to provide assistance to one
another, given the Arctic’s remoteness and the difficulty land based rescuers would have in
reaching a vessel in distress.49 Requiring that Arctic cruise vessels have ice-strengthened hulls
and be equipped with enclosed lifeboats could be other safety requirements. In 2003, some Arctic
cruise and tourist operators formed the Association of Arctic Expedition Cruise Operators
(AECO) to establish agreed-upon safety and environmental protection guidelines, but this
organization only covers the portion of the Arctic around Greenland, Svalbard, and Jan Mayen.50
Unpredictable Ice Conditions Hinder Trans-Arctic Shipping
Arctic waters do not necessarily have to be ice free to be open to shipping. Multiyear ice can be
over 10 feet thick and problematic even for icebreakers, but one-year ice is typically three feet
thick or less. This thinner ice can be more readily broken up by icebreakers or ice class ships.
However, more open water in the Arctic has resulted in another potential obstacle to shipping,
namely unpredictable ice flows. In the NWP, melting ice and the opening of waters that were
once covered with one-year ice has allowed blocks of multiyear ice from farther north, or
icebergs from Greenland, to flow into potential sea lanes. The source of this multiyear ice is not
predicted to dissipate in spite of climate change. Moreover, the flow patterns of these ice blocks
48 “U.S. Needs to Prepare for Arctic Traffic Surge,” Anchorage Daily News, February 12, 2008, p. A4.
49 “Northern Waters,” The Globe and Mail (Canada), August 14, 2008, p. A8.
50 See http://www.aeco.no/index.htm for more information.
Congressional Research Service
14
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
are very difficult to predict, and they have blocked potential routes for shipping.51 Thus, the lack
of ice in potential sea lanes during the summer months can add even greater unpredictability to
Arctic shipping. This is in addition to the extent of ice versus open water, which is also highly
variable from one year to the next and seasonally. As mentioned above, “ice free” does not mean
“no ice” and the presence of even small blocks of ice or icebergs from a melting Greenland ice
sheet requires slow sailing.
The unpredictability of ice conditions is a major hindrance for trans-Arctic shipping in general,
but can be more of a concern for some types of ships than it is for others. For instance, it would
be less of a concern for cruise ships, which may have the objective of merely visiting the Arctic
rather than passing through the Arctic and could change their route and itinerary depending on ice
conditions. On the other hand, unpredictability is of the utmost concern for container ships that
carry thousands of containers from hundreds of different customers, all of whom expect to unload
or load their cargo upon the ship’s arrival at various ports as indicated on the ship’s advertised
schedule. Other ships carrying entirely one commodity in bulk from one port to another for just
one customer could have more flexibility in terms of a delivery window, but would not likely risk
an Arctic passage under prevailing conditions.
Ice is not the sole impediment to Arctic shipping. Adverse weather is also an impediment. This
includes not only severe storms, but also intense cold, which can impair deck machinery. During
the summer months when shipping is most likely to occur, heavy fog is most common in the
Arctic. Operating costs are higher in the Arctic. Ship size is an important factor in reducing
freight costs and many ships sailing in other waters would require two icebreakers to break a path
wide enough for them to sail through.52 Also, icebreakers or ice-class cargo vessels burn more
fuel than is required to sail through open water and ships would have to sail at slower speeds. The
shipping season in the Arctic only lasts for a few weeks. Icebreakers and other special required
equipment would sit idle the remainder of the year. None of these impediments by themselves
may be enough to discourage Arctic passage but they do raise costs, perhaps enough to negate the
savings of a shorter route. Thus, from a shipper’s perspective, shorter via the Arctic does not
necessarily mean cheaper and faster.53
Basic Navigation Infrastructure Is Lacking
Considerable investment in navigation-related infrastructure would be required if trans-Arctic
shipping were to become a reality. Channel marking buoys and other floating visual aids are not
possible in Arctic waters because moving ice sheets will continuously shift their positions.
Therefore, marine surveys and ice charts would need to be relied on exclusively. For some areas
in the Arctic, however, these surveys and charts are out of date and not sufficiently accurate.54 To
remedy this problem, aviation reconnaissance of ice conditions and satellite images would need to
51 S.E.L. Howell and J.J. Yackel, “A Vessel Transit Assessment of Sea Ice Variability in the Western Arctic, 1969-
2002: Implications for Ship Navigation,” Canadian Journal of Remote Sensing, vol. 30, no. 2, 2004.
52“Arctic Unlikely to See Major Shipping Growth,” New Zealand Transport and Logistics Business Week, April 24,
2008.
53 Presentation by Stephen Carmel, Senior Vice President, Maersk Line Ltd., Halifax International Security Forum,
Arctic Security: The New Great Game? November 21, 2009, available at http://fora.tv/.
54 In July and August 2010, NOAA is surveying the Bering Straits area in order to update its charts but states that it will
take more than 25 years to map the prioritized areas of navigational significance in U.S. Arctic waters. See
http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2010/20100720_fairweather.html.
Congressional Research Service
15
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
become readily available for ship operators.55 Ship-to-shore communication infrastructure would
need to be installed where possible. Refueling stations may be needed, as well as, perhaps,
transshipment ports where cargo can be transferred to and from ice capable vessels at both ends
of Arctic routes. Shipping lines would need to develop a larger pool of mariners with ice
navigation experience. Marine insurers would need to calculate the proper level of risk premium
for polar routes, which would require more detailed information about Arctic accidents and
incidents in the past.
Regulation of Arctic Shipping
Due to the international nature of the shipping industry, maritime trading nations have adopted
international treaties that establish standards for ocean carriers in terms of safety, pollution
prevention, and security. These standards are agreed upon by shipping nations through the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), a United Nations agency that first met in 1959.56 Key
conventions that the 168 IMO member nations have adopted include the Safety of Life at Sea
Convention (SOLAS), which was originally adopted in response to the Titanic disaster in 1912
but has since been revised several times; the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL),
which was adopted in 1973 and modified in 1978; and the Standards for Training, Certification,
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (SCTW), which was adopted in 1978 and amended in 1995. It is
up to ratifying nations to enforce these standards. The United States is a party to these
conventions and the U.S. Coast Guard enforces these regulations when it boards and inspects
ships and crews arriving at U.S. ports and the very few ships engaged in international trade that
sail under the U.S. flag. Like the United States, most of the other major maritime trading nations
lack the ability to enforce these regulations as a “flag state” because much of the world’s
merchant fleet is registered under so-called “flags of convenience.” While most ship owners and
operators are headquartered in developed countries, they often register their ships in Panama,
Liberia, the Bahamas, the Marshall Islands, Malta, and Cyprus, among other “open registries,”
because these nations offer more attractive tax and employment regulatory regimes. Because of
this development, most maritime trading nations enforce shipping regulations under a “port state
control” regime—that is, they require compliance with these regulations as a condition of calling
at their ports. The fragmented nature of ship ownership and operation can be a further hurdle to
regulatory enforcement. It is common for cargo ships to be owned by one company, operated by a
second company (which markets the ship’s space), and managed by a third (which may supply the
crew and other services a ship requires to sail), each of which could be headquartered in different
countries.
Arctic Guidelines
While SOLAS and other IMO conventions include provisions regarding the operation of ships in
ice-infested waters, they are not specific to the polar regions. To supplement existing
requirements, in December 2002, the IMO approved guidelines for ships operating in Arctic ice-
covered waters.57 These are only recommendations for ships operating in the Arctic, not
requirements. They apply to passenger and cargo ships of 500 gross tons or more engaged in
international voyages. They do not apply to fishing vessels, military vessels, pleasure yachts, and
55 Ice reporting that currently exists is intended for scientists not mariners.
56 See http://www.imo.org/ for more information.
57 See MSC/Circ. 1056/MEPC/Circ.399 at http://www.imo.org/.
Congressional Research Service
16
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
smaller cargo ships. The guidelines are intended to improve safety and prevent pollution in the
Arctic, and they include provisions on ship construction, ship equipment related to navigation,
and crew training and ship operation. The guidelines recommend that ships carry fully enclosed
lifeboats or carry tarpaulins to cover their lifeboats. They recommend that the crew include at
least one ice navigator with documented evidence of having completed an ice navigation training
program.
Nations can enforce additional requirements on ships arriving at their ports or sailing through
their coastal waters. For instance, U.S. Coast Guard regulations largely follow IMO conventions
but mandate additional requirements in some areas. U.S. coastal states can require ships calling at
their ports to take additional safety and pollution prevention safeguards. Canada and Russia have
additional pollution regulations for Arctic waters exceeding MARPOL. The U.S. Coast Guard is
seeking agreement with Russia to establish a vessel traffic separation scheme for the strait
between Alaska and Russia. The United States and Canada have set up a unique cooperative
arrangement in governing the St. Lawrence Seaway System that some suggest could serve as a
model for multinational regulation of Arctic shipping.
Regardless of whether it is trans-Arctic or destination shipping that increases in the region,
protection of life and the environment is a concern. Among the issues for U.S. policymakers to
consider are whether IMO guidelines for Arctic shipping should become mandatory, the
appropriate roles of the U.S. federal government and the State of Alaska in regulating Arctic
shipping, and how best to arrange a multinational framework for governing Arctic navigation.
Oil, Gas, and Mineral Exploration58
Changes to the Arctic brought about by warming temperatures resulting from climate change will
likely allow more exploration for oil and gas offshore where the extent of summer sea ice is
shrinking. Similarly, shrinking glaciers onshore could expose land containing economic deposits
of gold, iron ore, or other minerals that were previously covered by glacial ice. Warming that
causes permafrost to melt could also pose challenges to onshore exploration activities because
ground structures, such as pipelines and other infrastructure that depend on footings sunk into the
permafrost for support, could become unstable. Despite the warming temperatures, however,
exploration and development in the Arctic would still be subject to harsh conditions, especially in
winter, which makes it costly and challenging to develop infrastructure necessary to produce,
store, and transport oil, gas, and minerals from newly discovered deposits.
Shrinking sea ice cover in the Arctic has also intensified interest in mapping the continental
margins of countries with lands in the Arctic. Delineating the extent of the continental margins
beyond the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) under the terms of Article 76 of
the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) could open up substantial amounts of
submerged lands for development. Mapping projects are underway, by individual countries and in
cooperative studies, that would be used to support national claims to submerged lands which may
contain large amounts of oil, natural gas, methane hydrates, or minerals.
58 This section prepared by Curry Hagerty, Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy, Resources, Science, and
Industry Division; Peter Folger, Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry
Division; and Marc Humphries, Analyst in Energy Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry Division.
Congressional Research Service
17
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Expiration of the annual congressional moratoria on September 30, 2008, coupled with other
developments in offshore leasing activity, impacts federal policies on Arctic offshore
development in a number of ways.59 The expiration of leasing restrictions allows Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS) areas where leasing has not been considered for many years to be
considered for potential federal leasing activity. Other developments in offshore leasing activity
include a presidential order to lift the executive restrictions on certain OCS areas to allow
offshore drilling,60 the emergence of new offshore operations (OCS renewable energy leasing in
Arctic areas61), and the general emergence of new technologies related to OCS research and
development. Diminished leasing restrictions impact OCS activity in a domestic and an
international context and generally contribute to the larger debate over OCS drilling in the Arctic.
Oil and Gas
A primary driver for the increased interest in exploring for oil and gas offshore in the Arctic is the
shrinking Arctic ice cap, or conversely, the growing amount of ice-free ocean in the summertime.
Reduced sea ice in the summer means that ships towing seismic arrays62 can explore previously
inaccessible regions of the Arctic Ocean, Chukchi Sea, Beaufort Sea and other offshore regions
for longer periods of time without risk of colliding with floating sea ice. Less sea ice over longer
periods compared to previous decades also means that the seasonal window for offshore drilling
in the Arctic remains open longer in the summer and increases the chances for making a
discovery.
In addition to the improved access to larger portions of the Arctic afforded by shrinking sea ice,
recent interest in Arctic oil and gas was fueled by a 2008 U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)
appraisal of undiscovered oil and gas north of the Arctic Circle.63 The USGS asserts that “The
extensive Arctic continental shelves may constitute the geographically largest unexplored
prospective area for petroleum remaining on Earth.”64 In the report, the USGS estimates that 90
billion barrels of oil, nearly 1,700 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of
natural gas liquids may remain to be discovered in the Arctic. Nearly all (84%) of the oil and gas
is expected to occur offshore. The USGS estimate for total undiscovered oil and gas in the Arctic
exceeds the total discovered amount of Arctic oil and oil-equivalent natural gas (240 billion
59 The Continuing Appropriations Resolution 2009 (P.L. 110-329) did not extend the annual congressional moratorium
on oil and gas leasing activities. On March 11, 2009, the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8) was enacted
without moratoria provisions, confirming that the oil and gas development moratoria in the OCS along the Atlantic and
Pacific Coasts, parts of Alaska, and the Gulf of Mexico that had been in place since 1982 had not been restored in 2009
appropriations measures. The combined effect of Presidential Directives from 1990 to 2008 also impacted moratoria
constraints.
60 On July 14, 2008, a Modification of the Presidential Withdrawal of areas of the United States Outer Continental
Shelf from leasing disposition was announced by President Bush in the following statement, ‘‘Under the authority
vested in me as President of the United States, including section 12(a) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43
U.S.C. 1341(a), I hereby modify the prior memoranda of withdrawals from disposition by leasing of the United States
Outer Continental Shelf issued on August 4, 1992.”
61 Effective on June 29, 2009, the rule established two types of leases: (1) commercial leases for full development and
power generation, and (2) limited leases for resource assessment and technology testing. See 73 Fed Reg 39376.
62 A seismic array is typically a long string or streamer of geophones—acoustic devices used for recording seismic
signals—towed behind a ship while the ship traverses a prospective oil and gas-bearing portion of the seafloor. The
seismic signals are processed and interpreted to give a cross-section or three-dimensional image of the subsurface.
63 See USGS Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal website at http://energy.usgs.gov/arctic/.
64 USGS Fact Sheet 2008-3049: Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of
the Arctic Circle; at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/.
Congressional Research Service
18
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
barrels), which constitutes almost 10% of the world’s known conventional petroleum resources.65
An important caveat to the USGS assessment, however, is that it excludes economic
considerations. The report only includes resources that would be technically recoverable with
current technology; they may not necessarily be economically recoverable under prevailing oil
and gas prices.
Despite the warming trend in the Arctic, a discovery of new oil and gas deposits far from existing
storage, pipelines, and shipping facilities can not be developed until infrastructure is built to
extract and transport the petroleum. For example, a Devon Energy spokesman noted in April 2008
that a 240 million barrel discovery in the Beaufort Sea won’t be developed for at least 10 years
because the company does not have the infrastructure to transport the oil.66 Other areas with oil
and gas potential, such as offshore east Greenland, may take even longer to develop because they
are still covered by substantial summer sea ice that would hinder exploration and development
unless more ice melts.67
Extent of the Continental Margin
Increased interest in developing offshore resources in the Arctic has sparked efforts by nations
bordering the Arctic Ocean to map the extent of their continental margins beyond the 200-mile
EEZ limit. Under UNCLOS, nations can submit a claim to submerged lands if they demonstrate
that their continental margin extends beyond the 200-mile limit according to the definition in
Article 76. Under Article 76, the extent of the continental margin beyond the 200-mile limit
depends on the position of the foot of the continental slope, the thickness of sediments, and the
depth of water. Also, the continental margin could include geologic features that extend from the
continent out to sea, which may include undersea ridges continuing for hundreds of miles
offshore.
As mentioned earlier—see “U.S. Activities As a Non-Party to UNCLOS”—the United States, as a
non-Party to UNCLOS, cannot participate as a member of the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf; it cannot submit a claim under Article 76. Over the years, however, it has
submitted observations on submissions made by other States, requesting that those observations
be made available online and to the Commission. In addition, since 2001, the United States has
gathered and analyzed data to determine the outer limits of its extended continental shelf.
Arctic border countries have begun the complex investigations needed to support claims for an
extended continental shelf in the Arctic. Claims have already been submitted by several countries,
including the Russian Federation, which submitted its UNCLOS claim to a portion of the Arctic
continental shelf in 2001.68 Russia made claims to the Lomonosov Ridge, an undersea feature
spanning the Arctic from Russia to Canada, as an extension of its continental margin. The
submission demonstrated Russia’s bid to extend activities in Arctic regions. The United States has
65 USGS Fact Sheet 2008-3049: Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of
the Arctic Circle; at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/.
66 Hugo Miller, “BHP Billiton Leads Arctic Gold Hunt in Global Warming Bonanza,” Bloomberg.com (April 16,
2008), at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601081&sid=ag.kQZln.mFg&refer=australia.
67 The Associated Press, “Greenland Opens to Oil Firms; Melting Ice Unlocks Reserves,” International Herald Tribune
(January 14, 2008), at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/01/14/business/NA-FIN-US-Greenland-Oil-Companies.php.
68 Tony Halpin, “President Medvedev Threatens Russian Arctic Annexation,” Times Online (September 18, 2008), at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4773567.ece.
Congressional Research Service
19
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
started to gather and analyze data through an initiative called the Extended Continental Shelf
Project.69 In this effort, the United States is working closely with Canada to prepare and present
Canada’s submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.
Canada and the United States share overlapping regions of the seabed as part of the extended
continental margin of both nations. Both countries have conducted research singly and jointly to
map the extended continental shelf.70 In August 2008, Canada’s prime minister announced that
Canada would spend $100 million (Canadian) over five years to map its total Arctic mineral and
energy resources and bolster Canada’s sovereignty over its northern resources.71 On January 12,
2009, the Bush Administration issued a presidential directive addressing the extended continental
shelf and boundary issues in the Arctic, among other issues, including national security and
maritime transportation.72 The directive acknowledges an unresolved boundary between the
United States and Canada in the Beaufort Sea, and notes that Russia and the United States abide
by a 1990 maritime boundary treaty pending its entry into force once it is ratified by the Russian
Federation. According to the USGS, however, most of the potential oil and gas resources
estimated for the Arctic are likely to occur within already agreed-upon territorial boundaries.73
(For further discussion, see “Territorial Claims and Sovereignty Issues.”)
Minerals
A warming Arctic means new opportunities and challenges for mineral exploration and
development. Receding glaciers expose previously ice-covered land that could host economic
mineral deposits that were previously undetectable and un-mineable below the ice. Longer
summers would also extend exploration seasons even for areas not currently ice-covered but
which are only accessible for ground surveys during the warmer months. In some parts of the
Arctic, such as Baffin Island, Canada, less sea ice allows ships to transport heavy equipment to
remote locations, and to convey ore from mines to the market further south. Some railway and
mining operators are considering developing railroads and other infrastructure to transport ore
year-round.74 As with onshore oil and gas development, however, mining infrastructure that
depends on footings sunk into permafrost could become unstable if the permafrost melts in
response to warmer temperatures. Also, as with oil and gas development, mineral deposits that
may be technically recoverable with current technology may not be economically profitable.
One important part of the current infrastructure in the Arctic that supports oil, gas, and mineral
development is the construction and use of ice roads—built and used during the winter—but
which are not passable during the warmer months. Warmer temperatures are shortening the ice
69 The purpose of the U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project is to establish the full extent of the continental shelf of
the United States, consistent with international law. Involved in this mission are the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG),
Department of State (DOS), and the University of New Hampshire (UNH). NOAA has the lead in collecting
bathymetric data. The U.S. Geological Survey has the lead in collecting seismic data.
70 See USGS, U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project, at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/continentalshelf/.
71 Press release, Office of the Prime Minister, Canada (August 26, 2008), at http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?
category=1&id=2242.
72 National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-66 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-25, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2009/01/20090112-3.html.
73 Don Gautier, Research Geologist, USGS, quoted in “Countries in Tug-of-War Over Arctic Resources,” CNN.com
(January 2, 2009), at http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/science/01/02/arctic.rights.dispute/index.html?iref=newssearch.
74 Carolyn Fitzpatrick, “Heavy Haul in the High North,” Railway Gazette International (July 24, 2008), at
http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/single-view/view/10/heavy-haul-in-the-high-north.html.
Congressional Research Service
20
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
road transport seasons and creating transportation challenges. For example, the opening date for
tundra roads in northern Alaska has shifted from early November prior to 1991 to January in
recent years.75
Environment and Economics
The warming Arctic has focused attention on threats to its wildlife and ecosystems, and it is
expected that increased oil, gas, and mineral exploration and development activities may also
invite increased scrutiny of possible harm to the fragile Arctic ecosystems. Federal offshore
programs are often the subject of this type of scrutiny, as demonstrated by litigation largely
focusing on environmental impacts. For example, plaintiffs in cases challenging government
approval of OCS development activity in the Chukchi Sea generally are local communities and
national environmental groups. The defendant in litigation over federal leasing in the Alaska
program areas is the Secretary of the Interior. Typically litigation over federal offshore programs
in Alaska takes place in two venues—the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and/or the
U.S. District Court of the District of Alaska. The schedule for litigation can be an issue because
the schedule in one venue has some bearing on rulings related to litigation in the other venue. A
new schedule for litigation regarding OCS development in the Chukchi Sea is currently under
consideration. The outcome of court cases will likely impact future development activities.
The outcome of judicial action on environmental regulations is not yet known, but it is widely
accepted that complying with current environmental laws and regulations in the Arctic adds to the
comparatively high cost of doing business in the far north. In addition, the price and price
stability of petroleum and mineral commodities will underlie industry decisions about whether to
make large investments in multi-year exploration and development projects in the Arctic. Low or
volatile prices could curtail any sustained development efforts north of the Arctic Circle, even if
continued warming opens new territory to petroleum and mineral exploration. In addition to
uncertainty regarding the price of oil, gas, and minerals, and the environmental considerations
that accompany exploration and development, there is the uncertainty for the United States
regarding its claims to submerged lands beyond the 200-mile EEZ.
Even if the commodity prices and environmental costs were favorable toward exploration and
development, uncertainty over U.S. claims to the extended continental shelf—because the United
States is a non-Party to UNCLOS—may influence private sector decisions to invest in Arctic oil,
gas, and mineral resource development.
Oil Pollution and Pollution Response76
Oil Pollution Implications of Arctic Change
Climate change impacts in the Arctic, particularly the decline of sea ice and retreating glaciers,
have stimulated human activities in the region, many of which have the potential to create oil
pollution. A primary concern is the threat of a large oil spill in the area. Although a major oil spill
75 See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Arctic Change, at http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/detect/land-
road.shtml?page=land.
76 This section prepared by Jonathan L. Ramseur, Analyst in Environmental Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry
Division.
Congressional Research Service
21
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
has not occurred in the Arctic region,77 recent economic activity, such as oil and gas exploration
and tourism (cruise ships), increases the risk of oil pollution (and other kinds of pollution) in the
Arctic. Significant spills in high northern latitudes (e.g., the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska
and spills in the North Sea) suggest that the “potential impacts of an Arctic spill are likely to be
severe for Arctic species and ecosystems.”78
Risk of Oil Pollution in the Arctic
A primary factor determining the risk of oil pollution in the Arctic is the level and type of human
activity being conducted in the region. Although climate changes in the Arctic are expected to
increase access to natural resources and shipping lanes, the region will continue to present
logistical challenges that may hinder human activity in the region. For example (as discussed in
another section of this report),79 the unpredictable ice conditions may discourage trans-Arctic
shipping. If trans-Arctic shipping were to occur on a frequent basis, it would represent a
considerable portion of the overall risk of oil pollution in the region. In recent decades, many of
the world’s largest oil spills have been from oil tankers, which can carry millions of gallons of
oil.80
Although the level of trans-Arctic shipping is uncertain, many expect oil exploration and
extraction activities to intensify.81 Historically, oil well blowouts from offshore oil extraction
operations have been a source of major oil spills. The largest accidental oil spill in world
history—the IXTOC I, estimated at 140 million gallons—was due to an oil well blowout in
Mexican Gulf Coast waters in 1979.82 A 1969 well blowout off the coast of Santa Barbara
released approximately 4 million gallons into the environment and has been credited with
catalyzing some of the landmark environmental legislation of the 1970s. However, in recent
decades the spill record for offshore platforms in U.S. federal waters has improved.83 Indeed, a
2003 National Research Council (NRC) study of oil and gas activities on Alaska’s North Slope
identified five loss-of-well-control events between 1977 and 2001, but none of these incidents led
to oil spills. During this time period, approximately 5,000 wells were drilled or re-drilled,
yielding an event frequency of 1 per 1,000. According to studies cited in the NRC report, this is
comparable to frequencies in other regions, such as the Gulf of Mexico or the Pacific Coast. The
NRC report stated “the conclusion of these analyses is that blowouts that result in large spills are
unlikely.”84
77 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Arctic Oil and Gas 2007 (2008).
78 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Arctic Oil and Gas 2007 (2008).
79 See this report’s section “Implications for Sea Transportation” by John Fritelli.
80 For example, the Exxon Valdez spilled approximately 10 million gallons of oil, but its carrying capacity was
approximately 60 million gallons.
81 See this report’s section “Implication of Changes in the Arctic for Oil, Gas, and Mineral Exploration and
Development,” by Peter Folger and Marc Humphries.
82 National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies of Science, Oil in the Sea III: Inputs, Fates, and
Effects (2003).
83 See CRS Report RL33705, Oil Spills in U.S. Coastal Waters: Background and Governance, by Jonathan L. Ramseur
84 National Research Council of the National Academies of Science, Cumulative Environmental Effects of Oil and Gas
Activities on Alaska’s North Slope (2003).
Congressional Research Service
22
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Although the 2003 NRC report stated (citing Minerals Management Service data) that there have
been no spills over 39,000 gallons on the North Slope,85 approximately 200,000 gallons of crude
oil were released from a North Slope pipeline in 2006.86 This spill drew intense attention from the
public and Members of Congress.87 Even under the most stringent control systems, some tanker
spills, pipeline leaks, and other accidents are likely to occur from equipment leaks or human error.
Potential Impacts
No oil spill is entirely benign. Even a relatively minor spill, depending on the timing and location,
can cause significant harm to individual organisms and entire populations. Regarding aquatic
spills, marine mammals, birds, bottom-dwelling and intertidal species, and organisms in early
developmental stages—eggs or larvae—are especially vulnerable. However, the effects of oil
spills can vary greatly. Oil spills can cause impacts over a range of time scales, from only a few
days to several years, or even decades in some cases.
Conditions in the Arctic may have implications for toxicological effects that are not yet
understood. For example, oil spills on permafrost may persist in an ecosystem for relatively long
periods of time, potentially harming plant life through their root systems. Moreover, little is
known about the effects of oil spills on species that are unique to the Arctic, particularly, species’
abilities to thrive in a cold environment and the effect temperature has on toxicity.88
The effects of oil spills in high latitude, cold ocean environments may last longer and cause
greater damage than expected. Some recent studies have found that oil spills in lower latitudes
have persisted for longer than initially expected, thus raising the concern that the persistence of
oil in the Arctic may be understated. In terms of wildlife, population recovery may take longer in
the Arctic because many of the species have longer life spans and reproduce at a slower rate.89
Response and Cleanup Challenges in the Arctic Region
Climate changes in the Arctic are expected to increase human activities in the region, many of
which impose a risk of oil pollution, particularly from oil spills. Conditions in the Arctic region
impose unique challenges for personnel charged with oil spill response—the process of getting
people and equipment to the incident—and cleanup duties—either recovering the spilled oil or
mitigating the contamination so that it poses less harm to the ecosystem. These challenges may
play a role in the policy development for economic activities in the Arctic.
85 Between 1977 and 2000, the 10 largest crude oil spills on the Alaskan North Slope ranged between 5,000 and 39,000
gallons. National Research Council of the National Academies of Science, Cumulative Environmental Effects of Oil
and Gas Activities on Alaska’s North Slope (2003).
86 Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, Final Situation Report: GC-2 Oil Transit Line Release (March
2008).
87 See CRS Report RL33629, BP Alaska North Slope Pipeline Shutdowns: Regulatory Policy Issues, by Paul W.
Parfomak.
88 AMAP, Arctic Oil and Gas 2007 (2008).
89 AMAP, Arctic Oil and Gas 2007 (2008).
Congressional Research Service
23
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Spill Response Challenges
Response time is a critical factor for oil spill recovery. With each hour, spilled oil becomes more
difficult to track, contain, and recover, particularly in icy conditions, where oil can migrate under
or mix with surrounding ice.90 Most response techniques call for quick action, which may pose
logistical challenges in areas without prior staging equipment or trained response professionals.
Many stakeholders are concerned about a “response gap” for oil spills in the Arctic region. A
response gap is a period of time in which oil spill response activities would be unsafe or
infeasible. Although the response gap in the Arctic has not been quantified, a recent estimate of
Prince William Sound (PWS) may be instructive. A 2007 study found a response gap for PWS of
38% for the time of the study period (65% during the winter season).91 The response gap for the
northern Arctic latitudes is likely to be higher due to its more extreme weather conditions. In
addition, PWS has existing infrastructure for response, while the more remote Arctic areas do not.
A recent NOAA report concluded that “there is a clear need for emergency response equipment
for SAR [search and rescue] and pollution response throughout the Arctic.”92
The history of oil spills and response in the Aleutian Islands raises concerns for potential spills in
the Arctic region:
The past 20 years of data on response to spills in the Aleutians has also shown that almost no
oil has been recovered during events where attempts have been made by the responsible
parties or government agencies, and that in many cases, weather and other conditions have
prevented any response at all.93
Moreover, the Commander of the Coast Guard’s 17th District, which covers Alaska, noted in an
online journal that “we are not prepared for a major oil spill [over 100,000 gallons] in the Arctic
environment. The Coast Guard has no offshore response capability in Northern or Western Alaska
and we only dimly understand the science of recovering oil in broken ice.”94
Oil Spill Cleanup Challenges
The behavior of oil spills in cold and icy waters is not well understood.95 Cleaning up oil spills in
ice-covered waters will be more difficult than in other areas, primarily because effective
strategies have yet to be developed. Natural oil seeps, which are a major source of oil in the arctic
environment, may offer opportunities for studying the behavior of oil.96
90 World Wildlife Fund, Oil Spill: Response Challenges in Arctic Waters (2007).
91 Nuka Research and Planning Group, LLC, Response Gap Estimate for Two Operating Areas in Prince William
Sound, Alaska (2007), Report to Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council.
92 Coastal Response Research Center, Opening the Arctic Seas: Envisioning Disasters and Framing Solutions, (2009),
partnership between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the University of New Hampshire.
93 Transportation Research Board of the National Academy of Sciences, Risk of Vessel Accidents and Spills in the
Aleutian Islands: Designing a Comprehensive Risk Assessment (2008), Special Report 293, National Academies Press.
Washington, DC.
94 Arthur Brooks (Commander, 17th Coast Guard District) Coast Guard Journal, Arctic Journal (April 7, 2008).
95 Coastal Response Research Center, Opening the Arctic Seas: Envisioning Disasters and Framing Solutions, (2009),
partnership between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the University of New Hampshire. See
also, U.S. Arctic Research Commission, (Draft) White Paper: U.S. Arctic Research Commission Recommends Steps to
Expanded U.S. Funding for Arctic/Subarctic Oil Spill Research (February 24, 2010).
96 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Arctic Oil and Gas 2007 (2008).
Congressional Research Service
24
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
The Arctic conditions present several hurdles to oil cleanup efforts. In colder water temperatures,
there are fewer organisms to break down the oil through microbial degradation. Oil evaporates at
a slower rate in colder water temperatures. Although slower evaporation may allow for more oil
to be recovered, evaporation removes the lighter, more toxic hydrocarbons that are present in
crude oil.97 The longer the oil remains in an ecosystem, the more opportunity there is for
exposure. Oil spills may get trapped in ice, evaporating only when the ice thaws. In some cases,
oil could remain in the ice for years.
Icy conditions enhance emulsification—the process of forming different states of water in oil,
often described as “mousse.” Emulsification creates oil cleanup challenges by increasing (1) the
volume of the oil/water mixture and (2) the mixture’s viscosity (resistance to flow). The latter
change creates particular problems for conventional removal and pumping cleanup methods.98
Moreover, two of the major non-mechanical recovery methods—in-situ burning and dispersant
application—may be limited (or “precluded”) by the Arctic conditions and lack of logistical
support: aircraft, vessels, and other infrastructure.99
Existing Policy Framework
Considering both the recent increase in human activity in the region (and expectation of further
interest) and the response and recovery challenges that an oil spill would impose in Arctic waters,
many would assert that the region warrants particular attention in terms of governance. However,
the existing framework for international governance of maritime operations in the Arctic region
lacks legally binding requirements. While the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) and
other International Maritime Organization (IMO) conventions include provisions regarding ships
in icy waters, the provisions are not specific to the polar regions. The IMO has “Guidelines for
Ships Operating in Arctic,” but these were considered inadequate by many participants in a recent
workshop.100 As stated in a recent NOAA report, the non-binding IMO provisions seem
“inconsistent with the hazards of Arctic navigation and the potential for environmental damage
from such an incident.”101
Fisheries102
Large commercial fisheries exist in the Arctic, including in the Barents and Norwegian Seas north
of Europe, the Central North Atlantic off of Greenland and Iceland, and the Newfoundland and
Labrador Seas off of northeastern Canada.103
97 National Research Council, Cumulative Environmental Effects of Oil and Gas Activities on Alaska’s North Slope
(2003).
98 Arturo A. Keller and Kristin Clark, Oil Recovery with Novel Skimmer Surfaces under Cold Climate Conditions
(2007), prepared for the Minerals Management Service.
99 World Wildlife Fund, Oil Spill: Response Challenges in Arctic Waters (2007). For further discussion of issues
relating to oil spills, see CRS Report RL33705, Oil Spills in U.S. Coastal Waters: Background and Governance, by
Jonathan L. Ramseur.
100 Coastal Response Research Center, Opening the Arctic Seas: Envisioning Disasters and Framing Solutions, (2009),
partnership between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the University of New Hampshire.
101 Coastal Response Research Center, Opening the Arctic Seas: Envisioning Disasters and Framing Solutions, (2009),
partnership between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the University of New Hampshire.
102 This section prepared by Eugene Buck, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry
Division.
Congressional Research Service
25
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
In the 110th Congress, P.L. 110-243 stated that “the United States should initiate international
discussions and take necessary steps with other Arctic nations to negotiate an agreement or
agreements for managing migratory, transboundary, and straddling fish stocks in the Arctic Ocean
and establishing a new international fisheries management organization or organizations for the
region.” In response to this, the United States participated in meetings with other Arctic nations at
the March 2009 UN Food and Agriculture Organization Committee on Fisheries meetings in
Rome. These international discussions are continuing.
On February 5, 2009, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council, acting under the authority
of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, unanimously approved the
Council’s draft Arctic Fisheries Management Plan and approved the preferred alternative, which
would (1) close the Arctic to commercial fishing until information improves so that fishing can be
conducted sustainably and with due concern to other ecosystem components; (2) determine the
fishery management authorities in the Arctic and provide the Council with a vehicle for
addressing future management issues; and (3) implement an ecosystem-based management policy
that recognizes the resources of the U.S. Arctic and the potential for fishery development that
might affect those resources, particularly in the face of a changing climate.
On November 3, 2009, the National Marine Fisheries Service (Department of Commerce) issued
a final rule that implemented the North Pacific Council’s Fishery Management Plan for Fish
Resources of the Arctic Management Area, as well as Amendment 29 to the Fishery Management
Plan for Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands King and Tanner Crabs. This action followed the North
Pacific Council’s recommendations establishing a basis for sustainable management of
commercial fishing in the Arctic Management Area and moving the northern boundary of the crab
fishery south of the Arctic Management Area to Bering Strait.104
Protected Species105
Concern over development of the Arctic relates to how such development might affect threatened
and endangered species. Under the Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543), the polar
bear was listed as threatened on May 15, 2008. In addition, a positive 90-day finding was made
on a petition to list the ribbon seal on March 28, 2008. The failure by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service to make a 90-day finding on a 2008 petition to list Pacific walrus has led to submission of
60-days notice of a future citizen suit, and a petition to list ringed, bearded, and spotted seals was
filed May 28, 2008.
In either terrestrial or marine environments, the extreme pace of change makes a biological
response many times more difficult. For species with adaptations for a specific optimum
temperature for egg development, or production of young timed to match the availability of a
favored prey species, or seed dispersal in predictable fire regimes, etc., evolutionary responses
may well not keep pace with the rate of change.106 While species of plants and animals farther
(...continued)
103 Erik J. Molenaar and Robert Corell, Arctic Fisheries, Arctic Transform, February 9, 2009; available at http://arctic-
transform.org/download/FishBP.pdf.
104 74 Federal Register 56734-56746, November 3, 2009.
105 Prepared by Lynne Corn and Eugene Buck, Specialists in Natural Resources Policy, Resources, Science, and
Industry Division.
106Among biologists, it is traditionally said that a species faced with extreme change can respond in three basic ways:
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
26
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
south might migrate, drift, or be transplanted from warming habitats to more northerly sites that
may continue to be suitable107, once a terrestrial species reaches the Arctic Ocean, it is very
literally at the end of the line. No more northern or colder habitat is available.
The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA; 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361 et seq.) protects whales, seals,
walruses, and polar bears. The MMPA established a moratorium on the “taking” of marine
mammals in U.S. waters and by U.S. nationals on the high seas, including the Arctic. The MMPA
protects marine mammals from “clubbing, mutilation, poisoning, capture in nets, and other
human actions that lead to extinction.” Under the MMPA, the Secretary of Commerce, acting
through National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), is responsible for the conservation and
management of whales and seals. The Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS), is responsible for walruses and polar bears.108 Despite the MMPA’s
general moratorium on taking, the MMPA allows U.S. citizens to apply for and obtain
authorization for taking small numbers of mammals incidental to activities other than commercial
fishing (e.g., offshore oil and gas exploration and development) if the taking would have only a
negligible impact on any marine mammal species or stock, provided that monitoring requirements
and other conditions are met.
Indigenous People Living in the Arctic109
Background
Seven of the eight Arctic nations have indigenous peoples,110 whose predecessors were present in
parts of the Arctic over 10,000 years ago, well before the arrival of peoples with European
backgrounds.111 Current Arctic indigenous peoples comprise dozens of diverse cultures and speak
dozens of languages from eight or more non-Indo-European language families.112
(...continued)
“migrate, mutate, or die.” When change is rapid enough, mutation (accompanied by natural selection of individuals
within the population more suited to the changed environment) may not be able to occur fast enough, leaving migration
and death as the only options. The problem of response rate is more severe for species that reproduce slowly (e.g., polar
bears) and less severe for species that reproduce rapidly (e.g. algae).
107 The efficacy and the effect of this tactic is often questioned, since natural migration is unlikely to involve the entire
suite of species in an ecosystem (e.g., host plants might not move north (or up) as fast as their moth herbivores, nor as
fast as the birds that depend on the moths). Moreover, the southerners will not find a land of sterile bare dirt—the
species that are already there may be threatened themselves by the competition from the new arrivals, perhaps tipping
the balance and pushing still more species toward extinction.
108 Under the MMPA, both NMFS and FWS have responsibility for additional marine mammal species (e.g., manatees,
sea otters, dolphins) which are not currently found in the Arctic.
109 This section prepared by Roger Walke, Specialist in American Indian Policy, Domestic Social Policy Division.
110 Arctic Human Development Report, ed. Joan Nymand Larsen, et al. (Akureyri, Iceland: Stefansson Arctic Institute,
2004), p. 47; this report is subsequently cited in this section as AHDR. The seven countries are Canada, Denmark-
Greenland, Finland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States.
111 John F. Hoffecker, A Prehistory of the North: Human Settlement of the Higher Latitudes (New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press, 2005), pp. 8, 81, 112-115.
112 AHDR, pp. 47, 53; David Crystal, Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), chap. 50; Ethnologue: Languages of the World, 16th ed., ed. M. Paul Lewis (Dallas: SIL
International, 2009) available online at http://www.ethnologue.com/. The number of languages and language families
varies not only with definitions of the Arctic but with definitions of languages and language families.
Congressional Research Service
27
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Before the arrival of Europeans, Arctic indigenous peoples lived in economies that were chiefly
dependent, in varying proportions, on hunting land and marine mammals, catching salt- and
fresh-water fish, herding reindeer (in Eurasia), and gathering, for their food, clothing, and other
products.113 Indigenous peoples’ interaction with and knowledge of Arctic wildlife and
environments has developed over millennia and is the foundation of their cultures.114
The length of time that Arctic indigenous peoples were in contact with Europeans varied across
the Arctic. As recorded by Europeans, contact began as early as the 9th century CE, if not before,
in Fennoscandia115 and northwestern Russia, chiefly for reasons of commerce (especially furs); it
progressed mostly west-to-east across northern Asia, reaching northeastern Arctic Asia by the 17th
century.116 North American Arctic indigenous peoples’ contact with Europeans started in Labrador
in the 16th century and in Alaska in the 18th century, and was not completed until the early 20th
century.117 Greenland’s indigenous peoples first saw European-origin peoples in the late 10th
century, but those Europeans died out during the 15th or 16th century and Europeans did not return
permanently until the 18th century.118
Contact led to significant changes in Arctic indigenous economies, political structures, foods,
cultures, and populations, starting especially in the 20th century. At present, for instance, most
Arctic indigenous peoples are minorities in their countries’ Arctic areas, except in Greenland and
Canada (one source estimates that, around 2003, about 10% of an estimated 3.7 million people in
the Arctic were indigenous).119 While many Arctic indigenous communities remain heavily
dependent on hunting, fishing, and herding and are more likely to depend on traditional foods
than non-indigenous Arctic inhabitants,120 there is much variation. Most Arctic indigenous people
113 Jim Berner, et al., Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chapter 12;
this report is subsequently cited in this section as ACIA.
114 ACIA, pp. 654-655.
115 Fennoscandia refers to the Scandinavian Peninsula, Finland, the Kola Peninsula of Russia, and certain parts of
Russia bordering on Finland.
116 Janet Martin, Treasure in the Land of Darkness: The Fur Trade and Its Significance for Medieval Russia
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 41-42; James Forsyth, A History of the Peoples of Siberia:
Russia’s North Asian Colony, 1581-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 69-83, 102; Lassi K.
Heininen, “Different Images of the Arctic and the Circumpolar North in World Politics,” in Knowledge and Power in
the Arctic, Proceedings at a Conference in Rovaniemi, April 16-18, 2007, Arctic Centre Reports 48, ed. Paula
Kankaanpaa, et al. (Rovaniemi, Finland: University of Lapland, Arctic Centre, 2007), p. 125.
117 James W. VanStone, “Exploration and Contact History of Western Alaska,” and David Damas, “Copper Eskimo,”
and J. Garth Taylor, “Historical Ethnography of the Labrador Coast,” in Handbook of North American Indian: Vol. 5,
Arctic, vol. ed. David Damas, gen. ed. William C. Sturtevant (Washington: Smithsonian, 1984), pp. 149-155, 408, 509-
510.
118 Inge Kleivan, “History of Norse Greenland,” in Handbook, Vol. 5, Arctic, op. cit.,, pp. 549-555; Finn Gad, “Danish
Greenland Policies,” in Handbook of North American Indians: Vol. 4, History of Indian-White Relations, vol. ed.
Wilcomb E. Washburn, gen. ed. William C. Sturtevant (Washington: Smithsonian, 1988), p. 110.
119 AHDR, pp. 19, 29. Estimates of Arctic indigenous populations are complicated by varying definitions not only of the
Arctic but also of indigenous peoples; for instance, Russia does not count some non-European Arctic ethnic groups,
such as the Yakut, as “indigenous minorities” (see “Peoples of the Arctic: Characteristics of Human Populations
Relevant to Pollution Issues,” in AMAP Assessment Report: Arctic Pollution Issues, ed. Simon J. Wilson et al. (Oslo:
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, 1998), pp. 167-169; this report is subsequently cited in this section as
AMAP 1998.
120 AMAP 1998, chapter 5; see also Birger Poppel et al., SLiCA Results, Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic
(Anchorage: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of Alaska Anchorage, 2007), pp. 4-7,
http://www.arcticlivingconditions.org.
Congressional Research Service
28
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
may no longer consume traditional foods as their chief sources of energy and nutrition.121 Major
economic change is also relatively recent but ongoing.122 Many Arctic indigenous communities
have developed a mixture of traditional economic activities and wage employment.123 Subsistence
and economics will be key factors in the effects of climate change on Arctic indigenous peoples,
and on their reaction to Arctic climate change.
Arctic indigenous peoples’ current political structures vary, as do their relationships with their
national governments. Some indigenous groups govern their own unique land areas within the
national structure, as in the United States and Canada; others have special representative bodies,
such as the Saami parliaments in Norway, Finland, and Sweden;124 a few areas have general
governments with indigenous majorities, such as Greenland (a member country of Denmark),
Nunavut territory in Canada, and the North Slope and Northwest Arctic boroughs in Alaska.125
Control of land, through claims and ownership, also varies among Arctic indigenous peoples, as
do rights to fishing, hunting, and resources.126 Arctic indigenous peoples’ political relationships to
their national and local governments, and their ownership or claims regarding land, are also
significant factors in the responses to Arctic climate change by the indigenous peoples and by
Arctic nations’ governments.
Effects of Climate Change
Arctic climate change is expected to affect the economies, subsistence, health, population,
societies, and cultures of Arctic indigenous peoples. Changes in sea ice and sea level, permafrost,
tundra, and tree and vegetation distribution, and increased commercial shipping, will affect the
distribution of land and sea mammals, of freshwater and marine fish, and of forage for reindeer,
and this will in turn affect traditional subsistence activities and related indigenous lifestyles.127
Arctic indigenous peoples’ harvesting of animals is likely to become riskier and less predictable,
which may increase food insecurity, change diets, and increase dependency on outside, non-
traditional foods.128 Sea and permafrost changes have damaged infrastructure and increased
coastal erosion, especially in Alaska, where the U.S. Government Accountability Office found
that “coastal villages are becoming more susceptible to flooding and erosion caused in part by
rising temperatures.”129
Oil, gas, and mineral exploration and development are expected to increase, as are other
economic activities, such as forestry and tourism, and these are expected to increase economic
121 Annika E. Nilson and Henry P. Huntington, Arctic Pollution 2009 (Oslo: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment
Programme, 2009), p. 39-41; this report is subsequently cited in this section as AMAP 2009.
122 ACIA, p. 1000.
123 SLiCA Results, op.cit., pp. v, 4-8.
124 AHDR, p. 232.
125 AHDR, chapter 4, and pp. 232-233.
126 AHDR, chapters 6-7, and pp. 232-233.
127 ACIA, pp. 1000-1001, 1004.
128 ACIA, pp. 1000-1001, 1004.
129 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Alaska Native Villages: Villages Affected by Flooding and Erosion Have
Difficulty Qualifying for Federal Assistance, GAO-04-895T, June 29, 2004, p. i, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d04895t.pdf. See also, GAO, Alaska Native Villages: Most Are Affected by Flooding and Erosion, but Few Qualify for
Federal Assistance, GAO-04-142, December 12, 2003, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04142.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
29
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
opportunities for all Arctic residents, including indigenous peoples.130 Pressures to increase
participation in the wage economy, however, may speed up changes in indigenous cultures.
Increased economic opportunities may also lead to a rise in the non-indigenous population, which
may further change the circumstances of indigenous cultures.
Health problems may increase with Arctic climate change. Economic development may
exacerbate Arctic pollution problems, including food contamination, and warmer temperatures
may increase insect- and wildlife-borne diseases.131 Climate change may lead to damage to water
and sanitation systems, reducing protection against waterborne diseases.132 Changes in Arctic
indigenous cultures may increase mental stress and behavioral problems.133
The response to climate change by Arctic indigenous peoples has included international activities
by Arctic indigenous organizations and advocacy before their national governments. As one
report noted, “the rise of solidarity among indigenous peoples organizations in the region is
surely a development to be reckoned with by all those interested in policy issues in the Arctic.”134
Six national or international indigenous organizations are permanent participants of the Arctic
Council, the regional intergovernmental forum.135 In April 2009, the Inuit Circumpolar Council
(an organization of Inuit in the Arctic regions of Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Russia) hosted
in Alaska the worldwide “Indigenous Peoples Global Summit on Climate Change.”136 The
conference report, forwarded to the Copenhagen Conference of the Parties of the U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change (December 2009), noted “accelerating” climate
change caused by “unsustainable development” and, among several recommendations, called for
a greater indigenous role in national and international decisions on climate change, including a
greater role for indigenous knowledge in climate change research, monitoring, and mitigation.137
In Alaska, the Alaska Federation of Natives has asked Congress to mitigate flooding and erosion
in Alaska Native villages and to fund relocation of villages where necessary.138
130 ACIA, pp. 1001, 1004.
131 AMAP Assessment 2009: Human Health in the Arctic, ed. Simon J. Wilson and Carolyn Symon (Oslo: Arctic
Monitoring and Assessment Programme, 2009), pp. 4-6, 143.
132 John Warren, “Climate change could affect human health,” Mukluk Telegraph, January/February 2005, pp. 5-6.
133 John Warren, “Climate change could affect human health,” Mukluk Telegraph, January/February 2005, pp. 5-6.
134 AHDR, p. 235.
135 See http://www.arctic-council.org/. The six organizations are the Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan
Council, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, RAIPON (Russian Association of Indigenous
Peoples of the North), and Saami Council.
136 See http://www.indigenoussummit.com/servlet/content/home.html.
137 K. Galloway-McLean et al., Report of the Indigenous Peoples’ Global Summit on Climate Change: 20-24 April
2009, Anchorage, Alaska (Darwin, Australia: United Nations University—Traditional Knowledge Initiative, 2009), pp.
5-7; available at http://www.indigenoussummit.com/servlet/content/home.html.
138 Alaska Federation of Natives, Human Resources Committee, 2010 Federal Priorities (Anchorage: Alaska
Federation of Natives, 2010), pp. 22-23; available at http://www.nativefederation.org/documents/
2010_AFN_Federal_Priorities.pdf. See also, GAO, Alaska Native Villages: Limited Progress Has Been Made on
Relocating Villages Threatened by Flooding and Erosion, GAO-09-551, June 3, 2009, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d09551.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
30
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Polar Icebreaking139
The Coast Guard’s three polar icebreakers perform a variety of missions supporting U.S. interests
in the Arctic, including the following:
• conducting and supporting U.S. scientific research in the Arctic;140
• defending U.S. sovereignty in the Arctic by helping to maintain a presence in the
region;
• defending other U.S. interests in polar regions, including economic interests
relating to the U.S. exclusive economic zone (EEZ) north of Alaska;
• monitoring sea traffic in the Arctic, including ships bound for the United States;
and
• conducting other typical Coast Guard missions (such as search and rescue, law
enforcement, and protection of marine resources) in Arctic waters, including U.S.
territorial waters north of Alaska.
The Coast Guard’s two heavy polar icebreakers—Polar Star and Polar Sea—have exceeded their
intended 30-year service lives. The Polar Star is not operational and has been in caretaker status
since July 1, 2006.141 Congress in FY2009 and FY2010 provided funding to repair Polar Star and
return it to service for 7 to 10 years; the Coast Guard expects the reactivation project to be
completed in 2013.142 On June 25, 2010, the Coast Guard announced that Polar Sea had suffered
an unexpected engine casualty and consequently will likely be unavailable for operation until at
least January 2011.143 The United States currently has no operational heavy polar icebreakers.
The Coast Guard’s third polar icebreaker—Healy—entered service in 2000. Compared to Polar
Star and Polar Sea, Healy has less icebreaking capability (it is considered a medium polar
icebreaker), but more capability for supporting scientific research. The ship is used primarily for
supporting scientific research in the Arctic.
A 2007 report from the National Research Council (NRC) on the U.S. polar icebreaking fleet
states that “U.S. [polar] icebreaking capability is now at risk of being unable to support national
interests in the north and the south.” On July 16, 2008, Admiral Thad Allen, the Commandant of
the Coast Guard, testified that: “Today, our nation is at a crossroads with Coast Guard domestic
and international icebreaking capabilities. We have important decisions to make. And I believe we
must address our icebreaking needs now.”
139 This section prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division. It is adapted from CRS Report RL34391, Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background, Issues,
and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
140 The Coast Guard’s polar icebreakers also support U.S. scientific research in the Antarctic.
141 Source for July 1, 2006, date: U.S. Coast Guard email to CRS on February 22, 2008.
142 “Icebreaker POLAR SEA Sidelined By Engine Troubles,” Coast Guard Compass (Official Blog of the U.S. Coast
Guard), June 25, 2010. An FY2011 budget justification document—Department of Homeland Security, Congressional
Budget Justification FY 2011, p. USCG-9 (pdf page 2176 of 3985)—states that the repairs to Polar Star are to be
completed in FY2012.
143 “Icebreaker POLAR SEA Sidelined By Engine Troubles,” Coast Guard Compass (Official Blog of the U.S. Coast
Guard), June 25, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
31
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
The Coast Guard since 2008 has been studying how many polar icebreakers, with what
capabilities, should be procured as replacements for Polar Star and Polar Sea.144 Following a
decision to design and build one or more new polar icebreakers, the first replacement polar
icebreaker might enter service in 8 to 10 years, by which time Polar Star and Polar Sea could be
more than 40 years old. The Coast Guard estimated in February 2008 that new replacement polar
icebreakers might cost $800 million to $925 million each in 2008 dollars, and that the alternative
of extending the service lives of Polar Sea and Polar Star for 25 years might cost about $400
million per ship.
Potential policy issues for Congress regarding Coast Guard polar icebreaker modernization
include the potential impact on U.S. polar missions of the United States having no operational
heavy polar icebreakers; numbers and capabilities of polar icebreakers the Coast Guard will need
in the future; whether to provide these icebreakers through construction of new ships or service
life extensions of Polar Start and/or Polar Sea; whether to accelerate the Coast Guard’s current
schedule for acquiring replacement ships; whether new ships should be nuclear powered; and
whether new ships should be funded entirely in the Coast Guard budget, or partly or entirely in
some other part of the federal budget, such as the Department of Defense (DOD) budget, the
National Science Foundation (NSF) budget, or both.
Search and Rescue145
The possibility of increased sea traffic through Arctic waters has increased concerns regarding
Arctic-area search and rescue capabilities. Given the location of current U.S. Coast Guard
operating bases, it could take Coast Guard aircraft several hours, and Coast Guard cutters a few or
several days, to reach a ship in distress in Arctic waters. In addition, the harsh climate
complicates search and rescue operations in the region.
Particular concern has been expressed about cruise ships that may experience problems and need
assistance; there have already been two incidents of this kind in recent years in waters off
Antarctica. One option for mitigating the risks associated with cruise ship operations in the Arctic
would be to require the vessels to sail in pairs, so that if one ship experiences a problem, the other
one could quickly come to its aid.
Increasing U.S. Coast Guard search and rescue capabilities for the Arctic could require one or
more of the following: enhancing or creating new Coast Guard operating bases in the region,
procuring additional Arctic-capable aircraft, cutters, and rescue boats for the Coast Guard, and
144 The eight Arctic countries have differing requirements for polar icebreakers, depending on the nature and extent of
their activities in Arctic (and Antarctic) waters. According to one source, as of January 2009, Russia had a fleet of 25
polar icebreakers (including six active heavy icebreakers, two heavy icebreakers in caretaker status, 15 other
icebreakers, and two additional icebreakers leased from the Netherlands); Finland and Sweden each had seven; Canada
had six; and the United States had three (including one active heavy icebreaker (Polar Sea), one heavy icebreaker in
caretaker status (Polar Star), and one additional icebreaker (Healy)). (Source: Slide entitled “Icebreaker Force
Laydown,” in “The Accessible Arctic, A Quick Overview,” a presentation given at a seminar entitled “The Changing
Strategic Landscape for Sea-Based Missile Defense,” Center for Technology and National Security, National Defense
University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, December 2-3, 2009. The slide defined a heavy icebreaker as one
with a propulsion plant rated at more than 45,000 break horsepower (BHP).) Russia’s heavy icebreakers are nuclear-
powered.
145 This section prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division.
Congressional Research Service
32
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
adding systems to improve Arctic maritime communications, navigation, and domain
awareness.146 It may also entail enhanced forms of cooperation with navies and coast guards of
other Arctic countries.
U.S. Relations with Other Arctic Countries147
Of the other Arctic coastal nations, the United States enjoys strong political and commercial ties
with Canada, Norway, and Denmark; all four countries are members of NATO. Although the
United States views Russia as an important partner in developing policies to cope with changing
conditions in the Arctic, relations with Moscow have been somewhat problematic in recent years,
particularly in the wake of Russia’s August 2008 incursion into South Ossetia and Georgia, and
its cutoff of natural gas to Ukraine and Europe.148 The two nations have also been at odds over
Washington’s plans to install in Europe missile defense facilities intended to guard against
missiles launched from Iran. In February 2009, Vice President Joseph Biden stated the Obama
Administration’s intention “to press the reset button and to revisit the many areas where we can
and should work together.”149 Washington has sought to engage Russian cooperation in
negotiations with North Korea. Also, in support of UN sanctions, Moscow has cancelled the
proposed sale of its S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to Iran. In addition, Russia is permitting non-
lethal supplies to be transported across its territory to NATO forces in Afghanistan. Finally, in
April 2010 the two countries signed the New Start Treaty, currently pending Senate ratification.
As noted elsewhere in this report (see “Territorial Claims and Sovereignty Issues”), in late May
2008, ministerial representatives of the Arctic littoral states (the United States, Denmark, Norway,
Russia, and Canada) attended a meeting convened by Denmark in Ilulissat, Greenland. Danish
Foreign Minister Stig Møller implied that the meeting was intended to develop interim measures
for Arctic governance: “We must continue to fulfill our obligations in the Arctic area until the
U.N. decides who will have the right to the sea and the resources in the region. We must agree on
the rules and what to do if climate changes make more shipping possible.”150 Attendees discussed
a variety of issues, including the environment, transportation, resources, and security. The Danish
Foreign Ministry stated that the resulting Ilulissat Declaration “sent a clear political signal to the
local inhabitants and the rest of the world that we will act responsibly when addressing the
development in the Arctic Ocean. We have committed ourselves politically to solve any
disagreements through negotiation. Thus, hopefully, we have eradicated all the myths about a
‘race for the North Pole.’ The legal framework is in place and the five States have now declared
that they will abide by it.”151
146 For a report assessing certain emergency scenarios in the Arctic, including search and rescue scenarios, see Opening
the Arctic Seas, Envisioning Disasters and Framing Solutions, Coastal Response and Research Center, University of
New Hampshire, report of January 2009, based on conference held March 18-20, 2008, at Durham, New Hampshire.
147 This section prepared by Carl Ek, Specialist in International Relations, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division.
148 “US To Seek New Cooperation In Thawing Arctic,” Reuters News, April 28, 2009. “The Transformation of US-
Russia Relations,” by Samuel Charap, Current History, October, 2010.
149 Speech at the 45th Munich Security Conference, U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden, February 7, 2009,
http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2009=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=238&.
150 Conference on the Arctic Ocean, May 26, 2008, Arctic Council website: http://arctic-council.org/article/2008/5/
conference_on_the_arctic_ocean.
151 Conference In Ilulissat, Greenland: Landmark Political Declaration on the Future of the Arctic, Edited December
11, 2008, website of the Danish Foreign Ministry, http://www.um.dk/en.
Congressional Research Service
33
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
The Arctic has increasingly become a subject of discussions in bilateral meetings among leaders
of the nations in the region. The main international forum for cooperation in the high north,
however, is the eight-nation Arctic Council, of which the United States is an active member. The
chief topics addressed by the six working groups of the Council, which was formed in 1996, are
sustainable development, environmental protection, and the social well-being of the indigenous
communities. The United States reportedly vetoed security as an issue of consideration for the
Council. The Council holds ministerial-level meetings biennially, while the working groups meet
more frequently; the most recent ministerial was held in Tromsø, Norway, in April 2009.
Denmark currently holds the revolving chairmanship. Russia has taken the lead within the
Council for developing a plan for international cooperation in search-and-rescue activities in the
region.152
Although the establishment of sovereignty through the demarcation of boundaries in the region is
being conducted peacefully under the auspices of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), the Arctic is also increasingly being viewed by some as a potential emerging security
issue. Canadian academic Rob Huebert pointed out that in August 2010 the United States,
Canada, and Denmark conducted in the Canadian Arctic their annual joint naval exercises
involving several advanced and powerful warships. Huebert observed that “while defence
officials are quick to point out they see no military threat to the region, it’s still interesting to see
these three Arctic friends coming together to improve their naval combat capability in the Far
North….”153 The Russian government has stated that, although it deplores the notion of an arms
race in the region and does not foresee a conflict there, it intends to protect its Arctic interests.154
In varying degrees, the Arctic coastal states have indicated a willingness to establish and maintain
a military presence in the high north.155 Although some have argued that terrorism and hijacking
may constitute security concerns in the region, others maintain that such threats are chimerical,
given the challenges of distance and geography, and the difficulty of navigating in a polar
environment.
China has also evinced a growing interest in the Arctic region, based mainly upon its interest in
the possibility of shorter sea routes and in the eventual development of energy-related natural
resources. China’s economy is strongly dependent upon exports; one analyst has reported an
estimate that one-half of China’s GDP is reliant upon shipping. The opening of Arctic Ocean
corridors north of Russia and/or Canada would drastically reduce both sailing times and
transportation costs. China has also been active in conducting research on the Arctic; it acquired a
large icebreaker in 1993 and is planning to construct domestically a state-of-the-art polar capable
research vessel.
152 The Council members are the “Arctic 5” coastal States plus Sweden, Finland, and Iceland. Six indigenous Arctic
peoples organizations are permanent participants. Several other countries, including Spain, China, and the UK, have
observer status. “Document On Cooperation In Arctic Search and Rescue Efforts Could Be Ready In April 2011,”
Interfax: Russia & CIS Military Newswire, February 26, 2010. Also see the Arctic Council’s website: http://arctic-
council.org/
153 “Welcome To a New Era of Arctic Security,” Rob Huebert, Canadian Defense and Foreign Affairs Institute, August,
2010.
154 “Russia Will Protect Interests In Arctic: Official,” Agence France Presse, June 10, 2009. “Russia Opposes Arms
Race In Arctic Region—Diplomat,” ITAR-TASS World Service, July 21, 2009.
155 See, for example, “Canada Vows ‘Firm’ Defence of Arctic Border,” Canwest News Service, November 24, 2009.
“Danes With Dogs To Join Military Sovereignty Patrol Of Canadian Arctic,” The Canadian Press, March 3, 2010.
“Norway Plans One New Arctic Base, Perhaps More,” Defense News, March 8, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
34
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Some Chinese leaders have voiced concern over perceived emerging security issues in the Arctic.
In early March 2010, a Chinese Admiral stated that “the current scramble for the sovereignty of
the Arctic among some nations has encroached on many other countries’ interests,” and he added
that China had to “make short and long term ocean strategic development plans to exploit the
Arctic because it will become a future mission for the navy.” Some analysts, however, believe
that China’s general approach toward the Arctic will remain decidedly low-key: “To date China
has adopted a wait-and-see approach to Arctic developments, wary that active overtures would
cause alarm in other countries due to China’s size and status as a rising global power.” China is
believed to be keen on resolving through diplomacy the national interests of both littoral and non-
Arctic states in the high north. Toward that end, it has sought permanent observer status on the
Arctic Council.156
The Arctic has also become a region of interest for NATO. Speaking in Reykjavík in January
2009, former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer urged that member states not allow
the Arctic to become a divisive issue. He also recommended that the alliance and Russia
cooperate through building upon their shared experience in search-and-rescue operations. Former
Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who became Secretary General of the alliance in
August 2009, has also addressed security in the high north. Citing the “potentially huge security
implications” of Arctic climate change, Rasmussen in October 2009 stated that “I think it is
within the natural scope of work for NATO to be the forum for consultation and discussion on
[selected Arctic] issues.” In March 2009, however, Russia’s NATO ambassador stated that
Moscow would not cooperate with the alliance on Arctic matters. And in September 2010,
President Medvedev reportedly observed that “the Arctic can do fine without NATO,” and that his
government “views [possible NATO] activity with quite serious tension, because it is after all a
zone of peaceful cooperation, economic cooperation, and of course the military factor always—at
a minimum—creates additional questions.”157
As noted earlier (see “January 2009 Presidential Arctic Policy Directive” in “Background”), the
Bush Administration in early January 2009 issued a presidential directive outlining its policy on
the Arctic region; the last such directive had been issued in 1994. The Obama Administration is
currently operating under the Bush Administration’s policy directive.158
U.S. Military Forces and Operations159
During the cold war, the Arctic was an arena of military competition between the United States
and the Soviet Union, with both countries, for example, operating nuclear-powered submarines,
long-range bombers, and tactical aircraft in the region. The end of the cold war and the collapse
156 “China Prepares For An Ice-free Arctic,” Linda Jakobson, SIPRI Insights On Peace and Security, No. 2010/2,
March 2010. “Admiral Urges Government To Stake Claim In the Arctic,” South China Morning Post, March 6, 2010.
157 “Russia, Norway Sign Border Deal For Arctic Energy,” Reuters, September 15, 2010. “NATO Chief Cautions
Against Division Over Arctic,” Canwest News Service, January 29, 2009. “NATO Proposes Arctic Cooperation With
Russia,” Reuters, January 29, 2009. Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer On Security Prospects
In the High North, January 29, 2009, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2009/s090129a.html. “NATO Chief Wars Of
Climate Change Security Risks,” Agence France Presse, October 1, 2009. “Rogozin Says He Won’t Discuss
Cooperation In Arctic With NATO,” Interfax: Russia & CIS General Newswire, March 27, 2009.
158 CRS communication with State Department official, October 8, 2010.
159 This section prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division.
Congressional Research Service
35
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
of most elements of the Russian military establishment following the dissolution of the Soviet
Union in December 1991 greatly reduced this competition and led to a reduced emphasis on the
Arctic in U.S. military planning.
The diminishment of Arctic sea ice is now leading U.S. military forces to pay increased attention
to the Arctic. This is particularly true in the case of the Navy and Coast Guard, because the
diminishment of Arctic sea ice is opening up potential new operating areas for their surface ships.
Defense officials in the United States and other countries view issues such as sovereignty,
freedom of navigation, and energy exploration as creating a potential in the Arctic for military
cooperation, competition, or conflict, depending on how these issues are handled.160
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
The Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) report on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),
submitted to Congress in February 2010, states:
The effect of changing climate on the Department’s operating environment is evident in the
maritime commons of the Arctic. The opening of the Arctic waters in the decades ahead[,]
which will permit seasonal commerce and transit[,] presents a unique opportunity to work
collaboratively in multilateral forums to promote a balanced approach to improving human
and environmental security in the region. In that effort, DoD must work with the Coast
Guard and the Department of Homeland Security to address gaps in Arctic communications,
domain awareness, search and rescue, and environmental observation and forecasting
capabilities to support both current and future planning and operations. To support
cooperative engagement in the Arctic, DoD strongly supports accession to the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.161
The report also states:
The Department of Defense and its interagency partners must be able to more
comprehensively monitor the air, land, maritime, space, and cyber domains for potential
direct threats to the United States. Such monitoring provides the U.S. homeland with an
extended, layered in depth defense. This effort includes enhanced coordination with Canada
for the defense of North America as well as assisting Mexico and Caribbean partners in
developing air and maritime domain awareness capacities. Special attention is required to
develop domain awareness tools for the Arctic approaches as well. In coordination with
domestic and international partners, DoD will explore technologies that have the potential to
detect, track, and identify threats in these spheres to ensure that capabilities can be deployed
to counter them in a timely fashion.162
The report further states:
160 See, for example, John Vandiver, “NATO Commander Sees Arctic Seabed As Cooperative Zone,” Mideast Stars
and Stripes, October 10, 2009; Tom Coghlan, “Nato Commander Warns Of Conflict With Russia In Arctic Circle,”
London Times, October 3, 2009; Gerard O’Dwyer, “Danish Report: Conflicts Coming Over Arctic,” Defense News,
September 28, 2009: 18; Gerard O’Dwyer, “Russia Warns Denmark Over Arctic Arms Race,” Defense News, August
3, 2009: 13; Gerrard Cowen, “Russia and NATO Look to Co-operation In Arctic,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 8,
2009: 12; David Scutro, “Thawing Arctic Seas May Bring Security Risk,” NavyTimes.com, January 29, 2009.
161 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 86.
162 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 19.
Congressional Research Service
36
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Central to the security of the United States is a strong transatlantic partnership, which is
underpinned by the bilateral relationships between the United States and the governments of
Europe. We will continue to work with this community of like-minded nations, whether by
engaging with allies still shaping their democracies after decades of living in the shadow of
the Soviet Union, building on the benefits of French reintegration into NATO’s military
structure, or addressing new security issues such as those arising in the Arctic region.163
The report states: “We will seek out opportunities to work with Moscow on emerging issues, such
as the future of the Arctic” and that DOD “will also enhance defense relationships and continue to
work with Canada in the context of regional security, increased interaction in the Arctic, and
combat operations in Afghanistan.”164
Navy and Coast Guard
The Navy and Coast Guard are exploring the potential implications that increased surface ship
and aircraft operations in the Arctic may have for required numbers of ships and aircraft, ship and
aircraft characteristics, new or enlarged Arctic bases, and supporting systems, such as navigation
and communication systems. The Navy and Coast Guard have sponsored or participated in
studies and conferences to explore these implications, the Coast Guard has deployed boats and
aircraft into the region to better understand the implications of operating such units there,165 and
Navy sailors in 2009 rode on Canadian Navy ships deploying to Arctic waters for similar
reasons.166 The Coast Guard is coordinating with the North Atlantic and North Pacific Coast
Guard forums to plan exercises in the Arctic in the summer of 2010.167
These U.S. Navy and Coast Guard activities are taking place as other countries, such as Canada
and Russia, are examining the potential implications for their military forces of diminished Arctic
sea ice, and taking or contemplating steps to increase their own navy and coast guard presence
and operations in the region.168
163 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 57.
164 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 62.
165 See Susan Gvozdas, “U.S. Coast Guard Preps For Open Arctic Waters,” Defense News, September 7, 2009: 40; John
C. Marcario, “Return to the Arctic,” Seapower, August 2009: 26-27; John C. Marcario, “Coming Into Focus,”
Seapower, March 2009: 42, 44; John C. Marcario, “Arctic Presence,” Seapower, August 2008: 32-33; Emelie
Rutherford, “Coast Guard To Test How Ships and Aircraft Operate in Arctic,” Inside the Navy, January 21, 2008;
Philip Ewiing, “Allen: CG Expedition To Assess Arctic Waters,” NavyTimes.com, January 17, 2009; Patricia Kime,
“North Pole Flyover A First For Coast Guard,” NavyTimes.com, October 25, 2007.
166 Andrew Scutro, “Navy Preps For Uncharted Arctic Waters,” NavyTimes.com, November 24, 2009.
167 Cid Standifer, “Allen: National Discussion On Polar Policy Set To Begin Next Year,” Inside the Navy, November
19, 2009.
168 See, for example, David Pugliese, “[Canadian] Senators: Arm [Canadian] Coast Guard Patrols in Canada’s Arctic,”
Defense News, January 18, 2010: 12; David Pugliese, “Arctic Operations Pose Challenge For Canadian Navy, Admiral
Says,” Defense News, September 7, 2009: 28; Randy Boswell, “Russia’s Plans To Drop Troopers At North Pole Raise
Eyebrows,” Ottawa Citizen, July 30, 2009: 4; “Russia Will Protect Interests in Arctic: Official,” NavyTimes.com
(Agence France-Presse), June 10, 2009; David Pugliese and Gerard O’Dwyer, “Canada, Russia Build Arctic Forces,”
Defense News, April 6, 2009: 1, 8; Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia Plans Military Force For Arctic,” Boston Globe,
March 28, 2009; Sharon Hobson and Casandra Newell, “Shrinking Ice Cover Creates Opportunities and Threats,”
Jane’s navy International, January/February 2009: 16-18, 20-21; Zachary M. Peterson, “As Ice Melts, Canadian Forces
Ramp Up Presence In The Far North,” Inside the Navy, December 8, 2008; Edward Lucas and Jon Rosamond, “Arctic
Countries Vying For a Piece of the Ice Seek to Strengthen Regional Presence,” Jane’s Navy International, September
2008: 12-14; “Russian Navy Boosts Combat Presence in Arctic,” Defense News (Agence France-Presse), July 14,
2008; Adrian Blomfield, “Russia Plans Arctic Military Build-Up,” London Daily Telegraph, June 12, 2008; David
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
37
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Points or themes that have emerged in studies and conferences regarding the potential
implications for the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard of diminished Arctic sea ice include but are not
limited to the following:
• The diminishment of Arctic ice is creating potential new operating areas in the
Arctic for Navy surface ships and Coast Guard cutters.
• U.S. national security interests in the Arctic include “such matters as missile
defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for strategic
sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations;
and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight.”169
• A mission of potential particular interest for expanded surface ship operations in
the Arctic would be defending the U.S. (and European Union) claim that the
Northern Sea Route running along Russia’s north coast and the Northwest
Passage running through Canada’s northern archipelago constitute international
straits which allow right of innocent passage.
• Search and rescue in the Arctic is a mission of increasing importance, particularly
for the Coast Guard, and one that poses potentially significant operational
challenges (see “Search and Rescue” above).
• More complete and detailed information on the Arctic is needed to more properly
support expanded Navy and Coast Guard ship and aircraft operations in the
Arctic.
• The Navy and the Coast Guard currently have limited infrastructure in place in
the Arctic to support expanded ship and aircraft operations in the Arctic.170
(...continued)
Pugliese, “Wakeup Call?” Seapower, October 2007: 19-20, 22; Iam Austen, “Canada Announces Plans For 2 New
Bases In Its Far North,” New York Times, August 11, 2007; “Canada To Strengthen Arctic Claim,” BBC News, August
10, 2007.
169 NSPD 66/HSPD 25, Section III B.
170 Regarding infrastructure in the Arctic, an October 2009 press report stated:
A big challenge will be logistics support since the only [U.S.] supply base currently available is the
town of Barrow, Alaska. [Rear Admiral Dave] Titley [the Oceanographer of the Navy] explained
that the Arctic region is roughly the size of the United States. By way of illustration Titley said:
“Think of trying to conduct operations through the entire U.S., and your one logistics base is the
size of San Clemente Island [an island off the coast of Southern California]. That is roughly the size
of Barrow.”
(Bob Freeman, “Conference Addresses Navy’s Role in a Changing Arctic,” Navy New Service, October 4, 2009. See
also Zachary M. Peterson, “As A Result of Melting Ice, Navy Study Need For Base in Far North,” Inside the Navy,
December 29, 2009; Patricia Kime, “CG Boss Calls For Forward Bases In The Arctic,” NavyTimes.com, September 28,
2007.)
Congressional Research Service
38
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
• Expanded ship and aircraft operations in the Arctic may require altering ship and
aircraft designs and operating methods.171
• Cooperation with other Arctic countries will be valuable in achieving defense and
homeland security goals.
The National Ice Center (a multi-agency operational center operated by the U.S. Navy, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the U.S. Coast Guard) and
USARC sponsored a 2007 symposium on the impact of an ice-diminished Arctic on naval and
maritime operations. The summary report on the symposium stated, among other things, that:
“While an ice-diminished Arctic will increase the scope of naval and maritime operations, the
U.S. has little capacity to expand and little ability to operate in the Arctic environment.”172 During
discussions at the symposium, the following points, among others, were made:
• Mechanisms for joint (i.e., integrated multi-service) operations in the Arctic do
not currently exist.
• A lack of infrastructure will be an issue for the Navy.
• It is important to develop interoperability between the U.S. and Canadian navies,
and among circumpolar nations.173
In October 2007, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard released a joint document on
maritime strategy, which states in part:
Climate change is gradually opening up the waters of the Arctic, not only to new resource
development, but also to new shipping routes that may reshape the global transport system.
While these developments offer opportunities for growth, they are potential sources of
competition and conflict for access and natural resources.174
In a February 2009 journal article, the Oceanographer of the Navy stated:
Competing claims dealing with the Arctic are often political in nature and have important
implications. For example, in the summer of 2008 Canada announced that it would increase
its military presence in the region, begin construction of a deep-water port on Baffin Island,
establish a cold weather training base at Resolute Bay, and build six new ice-hardened ships
to patrol the Northwest Passage. During the same period, Russia conducted strategic bomber
flights over the area for the first time since the end of the Cold War....
Preserving freedom of navigation in the region is an important tenet of U.S. policy. The NSR
[Northern Sea Route], however, is a contested waterway, with Russian claims of sovereignty
171 For articles discussing potential changes to ship and aircraft designs, see Dan Taylor, “Roughead: Navy Will Have
To Design Ships To Better Handle Arctic,” Inside the Navy, November 26, 2009; Rebekah Gordon, “Coast Guard OPC
[Offshore Patrol Cutter] Modifications For Varied Environments A Possibility,” Inside the Navy, August 24, 2009;
Andrew Scutro, “Arctic Forces Fleet to Look North,” NavyTimes.com, February 23, 2009; Amy McCullough,
“Stronger Hulls Could Help Fill Icebreaker Gap,” NavyTimes.com, February 22, 2009; Rebekah Gordon, “Coast Guard
Evaluating Effects of Increased Arctic Operations on Fleet,” Inside the Navy, February 9, 2009.
172 Impact of an Ice-Diminishing Arctic on Naval and Maritime Operations, Summary Report, July 10-12, 2007, p. 10,
http://www.star.nesdis.noaa.gov/star/documents/2007IceSymp/Summary_Report_2007.pdf.
173 Impact of an Ice-Diminishing Arctic on Naval and Maritime Operations, Summary Report, July 10-12, 2007, pp. 15
and 50-51, http://www.star.nesdis.noaa.gov/star/documents/2007IceSymp/Summary_Report_2007.pdf.
174 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, Washington, 2007, p. 3 (Section entitled “Challenges of a New
Era”), http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
39
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
competing against U.S. and European Union insistence that it is an international strait
available to all nations, subject to mutually recognized terms. Another potential [Arctic]
transoceanic shipping route may be the Northwest Passage, which extends from the Atlantic
through Baffin Bay and the Canadian Archipelago and into the Pacific by way of the Bering
Strait. Canada claims sovereignty over the waters of the Canadian Archipelago, although the
United States and the European Union claim that the Northwest Passage also constitutes an
international strait which allows right of innocent passage....
Aside from access and right of passage, the Navy and Coast Guard, in particular, must also
be concerned with strategic choke points such as the Bering Strait, Canada’s Queen
Elizabeth Islands in the Northwest Passage, and Russia’s Severnaya Zemlya and New
Siberian Islands in the Northern Sea Route. These narrow passages offer some protection
from persistent ice blockage, but they are also vulnerable to control or blockade by
adversaries that would significantly disrupt potential commercial shipping and oil
transport....
U.S. naval interests will face new challenges in an increasingly ice-free Arctic with a
strategic objective to understand potential threats to the United States from the maritime
domain. As throughout the global commons, the U.S. Navy must be aware of activities that
could be harmful to national security interests in a region that will, no doubt, see fewer
barriers to access by potential adversaries in the future. National and homeland security
interests pertinent to the U.S. Navy in the region would include early warning/missile
defense; maritime presence and security; and freedom of navigation and over-flight....
The region is primarily a maritime domain and the U.S. Navy of the future must be prepared
to protect sea lines of communication supporting maritime commerce and other national
interests—including national security—there. In addition to thinking through how we adjust
our shipbuilding emphasis to support such operations, the Navy should also be thinking
strategically about building the necessary infrastructure to provide logistic support for Arctic
patrols, search and rescue capabilities, and shore-based support activities.
To ensure complete maritime domain awareness in the region, and to provide our forces a
competitive advantage, it will be necessary to have comprehensive knowledge of the
physical environment. Data must be obtained by a suite of remote sensors (satellites, radars),
autonomous sensors (data buoys, unmanned vehicles), and manned sensors (shipboard,
coastal observing stations). Computer-based ocean and atmospheric models must be adjusted
to the geophysical peculiarities of high latitudes. Communication lines for data exchange and
reach-back processing at high-performance computing production centers must be robust and
reliable. To ensure safety of navigation, we will also need to conduct more high-resolution
bottom surveys and increase the scrutiny we place on sea ice conditions.
The Navy relies on its international and interagency partners for assistance to ensure success
of maritime domain awareness and maritime security missions. To meet the demands of
national security in the changing northern environment, strengthening mechanisms for
cooperation among the regional nations and U.S. agencies must remain a high priority. Like
everywhere else in the world, sound national security in the Arctic will require strategic
access, military mobility, safe navigation, unimpeded maritime transportation, improved
homeland security, and responsible, sustainable use of ocean and coastal resources.
International and interagency agreements and partnerships are vital to incorporating these
essential elements into a viable national security policy and will be critical for resolving
future naval challenges of a changing Arctic.175
175 David Grove, “Arctic Melt: Reopening a Naval Frontier?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 2009: 16-21.
Congressional Research Service
40
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
In a spring 2010 journal article, the Oceanographer of the Navy (the successor to the officer who
authored the above journal article) and a coauthor stated that “Navy surface vessels are able to
operate up to the marginal ice zone but will require ice-strengthening to operate in higher ice
conditions; Navy aircraft are capable of operating in the Arctic, but the lack of divert fields limits
their duration and range.”176 The article also stated:
While the Navy has a rich history in the Arctic, several challenges must be met to ensure
successful operations in the future. These include the lack of support infrastructure and
logistics support, environmental hazards such as drifting sea ice and icing on exposed
surfaces, and communications difficulties. Antiquated nautical charts, drifting ice, low
visibility, and the paucity of electronic and visual navigation aids hinder safety of navigation.
A lack of coastal installations also contributes to the difficulty of search and rescue (SAR)
operations. The only American-owned deepwater port near the Arctic basin is Dutch Harbor,
in the Aleutian Islands.177
A March 2010 press report stated that
a sustained [Navy] presence [in the Arctic] requires a lot of answers and training in the near
future. Specifically, the harsh environment will require significant modifications in ship and
satellite architecture.
“Where do we keep our fuel?” [Admiral Gary Roughead] the CNO [Chief of Naval
Operations] said. “The way that we design our heating and ventilation systems are just not
designed to keep up with ambient temperatures that are as cold as it gets up there. You have
difficulties sometimes in how the more traditional outside equipment is maintained, and
when you have freezing rain and things like that, how do you keep it clear? There are a lot of
ship designs and ship alterations aspects. ... What sort of communication architectures do we
have to have? I really believe now is the time to start thinking about that because it means
changes to ship design, which means we have to start laying in. It means perhaps some new
overhead satellite architectures, and those are extraordinarily costly.”178
The Navy examined issues and concerns relating to climate change at a May 15, 2009, meeting of
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Executive Board. Following this meeting, the Navy
decided to establish a Navy group led by the Oceanographer of the Navy called Task Force
Climate Change (TFCC), and to develop Navy roadmaps first for the Arctic, and later for more
general responses to global climate change.
The Navy issued its Arctic roadmap on November 10, 2009.179 The document, which is dated
October 2009 and co-sponsored by TFCC and the Oceanographer of the Navy,180 is intended to
guide the service’s activities regarding the Arctic for the period FY2010-FY2014. The November
10 cover memo states that the document is to remain in effect until the completion of the report
176 David W. Titley and Courtney C. St. John, “Arctic Security Considerations and the U.S. Navy’s Roadmap for the
Arctic,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2010: 41.
177 David W. Titley and Courtney C. St. John, “Arctic Security Considerations and the U.S. Navy’s Roadmap for the
Arctic,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2010: 42.
178 Lance M. Bacon, “Ice Breaker,” Armed Forces Journal, March 2010: 16-19, 34-35.
179 Memorandum for Distribution dated November 10, 2009, from Admiral J. W. Greenert, Vice Chief of Naval
Operations, on the subject of the Navy Arctic Roadmap. The document was posted on InsideDefense.com (subscription
required).
180 U.S. Navy, U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap, Washington, 2009, 29 pp. (October 2009, sponsored by Task Force Climate
Change [and] Oceanographer of the Navy.) The document was posted on InsideDefense.com (subscription required).
Congressional Research Service
41
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
on the FY2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), at which time it will be reviewed and
revised to incorporate guidance from that QDR.
The roadmap states that “significant action items” for FY2010 for the Navy include the
following:
• Conduct assessments of fleet readiness and mission requirements in the Arctic
region.
• Develop Navy strategic objectives in the Arctic region.
• Continue partnership-building activities with stakeholders in the region and
conduct a limited objective experiment (or LOE—a kind of exercise) for the
Arctic.
• Continue monitoring the Air Force’s Polar Military Satellite Communications
(MILSTACOM) program.
• Advocate for U.S. accession to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.
• Develop a Navy position regarding combatant commander authorities and
responsibilities for the Arctic.
• Conduct research and development on a next-generation environmental
prediction capability that is applicable to the Arctic.
The roadmap states that “significant action items” for FY2011-FY2012 for the Navy include the
following:
• Initiate assessments of required Navy Arctic capabilities.
• Develop recommendations to address Arctic requirements for program proposals
in the Navy’s Program Objective Memorandum (or POM—a document that
guides the development of a Navy budget) for FY2014 (POM-14).
• Continue biennial Navy participation in Arctic exercises, including ICEX-11,
ICEX-13, Arctic Edge, and Arctic Care.
• Formalize new cooperative relationships that increase Navy experience and
competency in search and rescue (SAR), maritime domain awareness (MDA),
and humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR) in the Arctic, and
defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) in Alaska.
The roadmap states that “significant action items” for FY2013-FY2014 for the Navy include the
following:
• Execute Navy POM-14 budget initiatives that address Arctic requirements.
• Initiate combined (i.e., multi-lateral) and bilateral activities which support safety,
security, and stability in the region.181
A March 2010 report stated the following regarding the roadmap:
181 For additional discussion of the roadmap, see David W. Titley and Courtney C. St. John, “Arctic Security
Considerations and the U.S. Navy’s Roadmap for the Arctic,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2010: 35-48.
Congressional Research Service
42
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Capabilities-based assessments and preparation for major funding requests will follow in
fiscal 2011-12. A priority will be an increase in hydrographic and bottom-mapping surveys,
as less than 5 percent of the region is mapped to current standards. Simultaneously, training
to increase experience and competency in search and rescue, maritime domain awareness,
humanitarian assistance and disaster response will expand. The first major investments for
major training and ship preparation will be sought in fiscal 2014.182
The report also stated that
one option the Coast Guard is considering is a modified version of its Offshore Patrol Cutter
[OPC], the third large ship it plans as part of its modernization program. The Coast Guard
could build a “Flight II” OPC, he said, built specifically to withstand the punishing seas and
drifting ice. All the ships in that special class would likely be stationed in Kodiak, Alaska.183
In December 2009, it was reported that “U.S. and Canadian defense officials are studying
emerging gaps in their awareness of Arctic activities, seeking to boost North American Aerospace
Defense [NORAD] Command’s maritime-warning mission and crafting a new threat assessment
for the region....” The effort would reportedly involve both NORAD and a Canadian-American
advisory board called the Permanent Joint Board on Defense.184
In May 2010, it was reported that “American and Canadian defense officials are bolstering
collaboration on military exercises, investment plans and technology development related to the
Arctic.” The report stated that “U.S. and Canadian intelligence officials have created a classified
joint “utilization” assessment for the Arctic looking out to 2020, which will be continuously
updated.” It also stated that “American and Canadian defense officials have just started
implementing a new five-year work plan that contains specific initiatives and requires concrete
deliverables, Stockton said, noting the Arctic received special attention in the plan. The plan also
covers defense critical infrastructure protection, defense support to civil agencies and defense
cooperation in the Americas.”185
January 2009 Arctic Policy Directive
As noted earlier (see “January 2009 Presidential Arctic Policy Directive” in “Background” and
also “U.S. Relations with Other Arctic Countries”), the Obama Administration is currently
operating under the January 2009 Arctic region policy directive (NSPD 66/HSPD 25) issued by
the George W. Bush Administration.186 Potential oversight questions include but not are limited to
the following:
• Is NSPD 66/HSPD 25 a suitable statement of U.S. policy for the Arctic region?187
182 Lance M. Bacon, “Ice Breaker,” Armed Forces Journal, March 2010: 16-19, 34-35.
183 Lance M. Bacon, “Ice Breaker,” Armed Forces Journal, March 2010: 16-19, 34-35. For more on the OPC, see CRS
Report RL33753, Coast Guard Deepwater Acquisition Programs: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
184 Christopher J. Castelli, “DOD, Canada Aim TO Develop Arctic Policy Options By Early 2010,” Inside the Navy,
December 7, 2009.
185 Christopher J. Castelli, “American, Canadian Defense Officials Tighten Ties On Arctic Issues,” Inside the Navy,
May 3, 2010.
186 CRS communication with State Department official, October 8, 2010.
187 On this question, a January 19, 2009, press article about the new directive stated:
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
43
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
• Although the Obama Administration is currently operating under NSPD
66/HSPD 25, does the Obama Administration fully agree with all parts of it? If
not, with which parts does it not fully agree?
• Is the Obama Administration planning to conduct a review of NSDP 66/HSPD
25? If so, what is the Administration’s schedule for conducting and releasing the
results of that review?
CRS Reports On Specific Arctic-Related Issues
CRS Report RL34266, Climate Change: Science Highlights, by Jane A. Leggett
CRS Report RS21890, The U.N. Law of the Sea Convention and the United States: Developments
Since October 2003, by Marjorie Ann Browne
CRS Report RL32838, Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR): Votes and Legislative Actions,
95th Congress through 110th Congress, by M. Lynne Corn and Beth A. Roberts
CRS Report RL34547, Possible Federal Revenue from Oil Development of ANWR and Nearby
Areas, by Salvatore Lazzari
CRS Report RL33705, Oil Spills in U.S. Coastal Waters: Background and Governance, by
Jonathan L. Ramseur
CRS Report RL33941, Polar Bears: Listing Under the Endangered Species Act, by Eugene H.
Buck, M. Lynne Corn, and Kristina Alexander
CRS Report RL34573, Does the Endangered Species Act Listing Provide More Protection of the
Polar Bear?, by Kristina Alexander
CRS Report RS22906, Use of the Polar Bear Listing to Force Reduction of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions: The Legal Arguments, by Robert Meltz
CRS Report RL34391, Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background, Issues, and
Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
CRS Report RL34342, Homeland Security: Roles and Missions for United States Northern
Command, by William Knight
(...continued)
The new policy directive covers several key areas, including national security, energy exploration
and the environment, but it does not specify whether any should take precedence over others.
That led Jeremy Rabkin, a professor at George Mason University Law School, to comment: “It’s
really a list of all the things we’re concerned about; that’s not policy. I don’t see anything here that
helps you decide what gets priority.”
(Juliet Eilperin and Spencer S. Hsu, “White House Directive Guides Policy On Arctic,”
Washington Post, January 19, 2009: 2.)
Congressional Research Service
44
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Appendix A. Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984
(Title I of P.L. 98-373)
The text of the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373 of July 31, 1984188)
is as follows:
TITLE I – ARCTIC RESEARCH AND POLICY
SHORT TITLE
SEC. 101. This title may be cited as the “Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984”.
FINDINGS AND PURPOSES
SEC. 102. (a) The Congress finds and declares that-
(1) the Arctic, onshore and offshore, contains vital energy resources that can reduce the
Nation’s dependence on foreign oil and improve the national balance of payments;
(2) as the Nation’s only common border with the Soviet Union, the Arctic is critical to
national defense;
(3) the renewable resources of the Arctic, specifically fish and other seafood, represent one
of the Nation’s greatest commercial assets;
(4) Arctic conditions directly affect global weather patterns and must be understood in order
to promote better agricultural management throughout the United States;
(5) industrial pollution not originating in the Arctic region collects in the polar air mass, has
the potential to disrupt global weather patterns, and must be controlled through international
cooperation and consultation;
(6) the Arctic is a natural laboratory for research into human health and adaptation, physical
and psychological, to climates of extreme cold and isolation and may provide information
crucial for future defense needs;
(7) atmospheric conditions peculiar to the Arctic make the Arctic a unique testing ground for
research into high latitude communications, which is likely to be crucial for future defense
needs;
(8) Arctic marine technology is critical to cost-effective recovery and transportation of
energy resources and to the national defense;
(9) the United States has important security, economic, and environmental interests in
developing and maintaining a fleet of icebreaking vessels capable of operating effectively in
the heavy ice regions of the Arctic;
188 Title II of P.L. 98-373 is the National Critical Materials Act of 1984.
Congressional Research Service
45
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
(10) most Arctic-rim countries, particularly the Soviet Union, possess Arctic technologies far
more advanced than those currently available in the United States;
(11) Federal Arctic research is fragmented and uncoordinated at the present time, leading to
the neglect of certain areas of research and to unnecessary duplication of effort in other areas
of research;
(12) improved logistical coordination and support for Arctic research and better
dissemination of research data and information is necessary to increase the efficiency and
utility of national Arctic research efforts;
(13) a comprehensive national policy and program plan to organize and fund currently
neglected scientific research with respect to the Arctic is necessary to fulfill national
objectives in Arctic research;
(14) the Federal Government, in cooperation with State and local governments, should focus
its efforts on the collection and characterization of basic data related to biological, materials,
geophysical, social, and behavioral phenomena in the Arctic;
(15) research into the long-range health, environmental, and social effects of development in
the Arctic is necessary to mitigate the adverse consequences of that development to the land
and its residents;
(16) Arctic research expands knowledge of the Arctic, which can enhance the lives of Arctic
residents, increase opportunities for international cooperation among Arctic-rim countries,
and facilitate the formulation of national policy for the Arctic; and
(17) the Alaskan Arctic provides an essential habitat for marine mammals, migratory
waterfowl, and other forms of wildlife which are important to the Nation and which are
essential to Arctic residents.
(b) The purposes of this title are-
(1) to establish national policy, priorities, and goals and to provide a Federal program plan
for basic and applied scientific research with respect to the Arctic, including natural
resources and materials, physical, biological and health sciences, and social and behavioral
sciences;
(2) to establish an Arctic Research Commission to promote Arctic research and to
recommend Arctic research policy;
(3) to designate the National Science Foundation as the lead agency responsible for
implementing Arctic research policy; and
(4) to establish an Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee to develop a national
Arctic research policy and a five year plan to implement that policy.
ARCTIC RESEARCH COMMISSION
SEC. 103. (a) The President shall establish an Arctic Research Commission (hereafter
referred to as the “Commission”).
Congressional Research Service
46
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
(b)(1) The Commission shall be composed of five members appointed by the President, with
the Director of the National Science Foundation serving as a nonvoting, ex officio member.
The members appointed by the President shall include-
(A) three members appointed from among individuals from academic or other research
institutions with expertise in areas of research relating to the Arctic, including the physical,
biological, health, environmental, social, and behavioral sciences;
(B) one member appointed from among indigenous residents of the Arctic who are
representative of the needs and interests of Arctic residents and who live in areas directly
affected by Arctic resource development; and
(C) one member appointed from among individuals familiar with the Arctic and
representative of the needs and interests of private industry undertaking resource
development in the Arctic.
(2) The President shall designate one of the appointed members of the Commission to be
chairperson of the Commission.
(c)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the term of office of each
member of the Commission appointed under subsection (b)(1) shall be four years.
(2) Of the members of the Commission originally appointed under subsection (b)(1)-
(A) one shall be appointed for a term of two years;
(B) two shall be appointed for a term of three years; and
(C) two shall be appointed for a term of four years.
(3) Any vacancy occurring in the membership of the Commission shall be filled, after notice
of the vacancy is published in the Federal Register, in the manner provided by the preceding
provisions of this section, for the remainder of the unexpired term.
(4) A member may serve after the expiration of the member’s term of office until the
President appoints a successor.
(5) A member may serve consecutive terms beyond the member’s original appointment.
(d)(1) Members of the Commission may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in
lieu of subsistence, as authorized by section 5703 of title 5, United States Code. A member
of the Commission not presently employed for compensation shall be compensated at a rate
equal to the daily equivalent of the rate for GS-16 of the General Schedule under section
5332 of title 5, United States Code, for each day the member is engaged in the actual
performance of his duties as a member of the Commission, not to exceed 90 days of service
each year. Except for the purposes of chapter 81 of title 5 (relating to compensation for work
injuries) and chapter 171 of title 28 (relating to tort claims), a member of the Commission
shall not be considered an employee of the United States for any purpose.
(2) The Commission shall meet at the call of its Chairman or a majority of its members.
(3) Each Federal agency referred to in section 107(b) may designate a representative to
participate as an observer with the Commission.
Congressional Research Service
47
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
These representatives shall report to and advise the Commission on the activities relating to
Arctic research of their agencies.
(4) The Commission shall conduct at least one public meeting in the State of Alaska
annually.
DUTIES OF COMMISSION
SEC. 104. (a) The Commission shall-
(1) develop and recommend an integrated national Arctic research policy;
(2) in cooperation with the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee established under
section 107, assist in establishing a national Arctic research program plan to implement the
Arctic research policy;
(3) facilitate cooperation between the Federal Government and State and local governments
with respect to Arctic research;
(4) review Federal research programs in the Arctic and suggest improvements in
coordination among programs;
(5) recommend methods to improve logistical planning and support for Arctic research as
may be appropriate and in accordance with the findings and purposes of this title;
(6) suggest methods for improving efficient sharing and dissemination of data and
information on the Arctic among interested public and private institutions;
(7) offer other recommendations and advice to the Interagency Committee established under
section 107 as it may find appropriate; and
(8) cooperate with the Governor of the State of Alaska and with agencies and organizations
of that State which the Governor may designate with respect to the formulation of Arctic
research policy.
(b) Not later than January 31 of each year, the Commission shall-
(1) publish a statement of goals and objectives with respect to Arctic research to guide the
Interagency Committee established under section 107 in the performance of its duties; and
(2) submit to the President and to the Congress a report describing the activities and
accomplishments of the Commission during the immediately preceding fiscal year.
COOPERATION WITH THE COMMISSION
SEC. 105. (a)(1) The Commission may acquire from the head of any Federal agency
unclassified data, reports, and other nonproprietary information with respect to Arctic
research in the possession of the agency which the Commission considers useful in the
discharge of its duties.
(2) Each agency shall cooperate with the Commission and furnish all data, reports, and other
information requested by the Commission to the extent permitted by law; except that no
agency need furnish any information which it is permitted to withhold under section 552 of
title 5, United States Code.
Congressional Research Service
48
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
(b) With the consent of the appropriate agency head, the Commission may utilize the
facilities and services of any Federal agency to the extent that the facilities and services are
needed for the establishment and development of an Arctic research policy, upon
reimbursement to be agreed upon by the Commission and the agency head and taking every
feasible step to avoid duplication of effort.
(c) All Federal agencies shall consult with the Commission before undertaking major Federal
actions relating to Arctic research.
ADMINISTRATION OF THE COMMISSION
SEC. 106. The Commission may-
(1) in accordance with the civil service laws and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5,
United States Code, appoint and fix the compensation of an Executive Director and
necessary additional staff personnel, but not to exceed a total of seven compensated
personnel;
(2) procure temporary and intermittent services as authorized by section 3109 of title 5,
United States Code;
(3) enter into contracts and procure supplies, services, and personal property; and
(4) enter into agreements with the General Services Administration for the procurement of
necessary financial and administrative services, for which payment shall be made by
reimbursement from funds of the Commission in amounts to be agreed upon by the
Commission and the Administrator of the General Services Administration.
LEAD AGENCY AND INTERAGENCY ARCTIC RESEARCH POLICY
COMMITTEE
SEC. 107. (a) The National Science Foundation is designated as the lead agency responsible
for implementing Arctic research policy, and the Director of the National Science
Foundation shall insure that the requirements of section 108 are fulfilled.
(b)(1) The President shall establish an Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee
(hereinafter referred to as the “Interagency Committee”).
(2) The Interagency Committee shall be composed of representatives of the following
Federal agencies or offices:
(A) the National Science Foundation;
(B) the Department of Commerce;
(C) the Department of Defense;
(D) the Department of Energy;
(E) the Department of the Interior;
(F) the Department of State;
(G) the Department of Transportation;
Congressional Research Service
49
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
(H) the Department of Health and Human Services;
(I) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration;
(J) the Environmental Protection Agency; and
(K) any other agency or office deemed appropriate.
(3) The representative of the National Science Foundation shall serve as the Chairperson of
the Interagency Committee.
DUTIES OF THE INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE
SEC. 108. (a) The Interagency Committee shall-
(1) survey Arctic research conducted by Federal, State, and local agencies, universities, and
other public and private institutions to help determine priorities for future Arctic research,
including natural resources and materials, physical and biological sciences, and social and
behavioral sciences;
(2) work with the Commission to develop and establish an integrated national Arctic
research policy that will guide Federal agencies in developing and implementing their
research programs in the Arctic;
(3) consult with the Commission on-
(A) the development of the national Arctic research policy and the 5-year plan implementing
the policy;
(B) Arctic research programs of Federal agencies;
(C) recommendations of the Commission on future Arctic research; and
(D) guidelines for Federal agencies for awarding and administering Arctic research grants;
(4) develop a 5-year plan to implement the national policy, as provided for in section 109;
(5) provide the necessary coordination, data, and assistance for the preparation of a single
integrated, coherent, and multiagency budget request for Arctic research as provided for in
section 110;
(6) facilitate cooperation between the Federal Government and State and local governments
in Arctic research, and recommend the undertaking of neglected areas of research in
accordance with the findings and purposes of this title;
(7) coordinate and promote cooperative Arctic scientific research programs with other
nations, subject to the foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State;
(8) cooperate with the Governor of the State of Alaska in fulfilling its responsibilities under
this title;
(9) promote Federal interagency coordination of all Arctic research activities, including-
(A) logistical planning and coordination; and
Congressional Research Service
50
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
(B) the sharing of data and information associated with Arctic research, subject to section
552 of title 5, United States Code; and
(10) provide public notice of its meetings and an opportunity for the public to participate in
the development and implementation of national Arctic research policy.
(b) Not later than January 31, 1986, and biennially thereafter, the Interagency Committee
shall submit to the Congress through the President, a brief, concise report containing-
(1) a statement of the activities and accomplishments of the Interagency Committee since its
last report; and
(2) a description of the activities of the Commission, detailing with particularity the
recommendations of the Commission with respect to Federal activities in Arctic research.
5-YEAR ARCTIC RESEARCH PLAN
SEC. 109. (a) The Interagency Committee, in consultation with the Commission, the
Governor of the State of Alaska, the residents of the Arctic, the private sector, and public
interest groups, shall prepare a comprehensive 5-year program plan (hereinafter referred to as
the “Plan”) for the overall Federal effort in Arctic research. The Plan shall be prepared and
submitted to the President for transmittal to the Congress within one year after the enactment
of this Act and shall be revised biennially thereafter.
(b) The Plan shall contain but need not be limited to the following elements:
(1) an assessment of national needs and problems regarding the Arctic and the research
necessary to address those needs or problems;
(2) a statement of the goals and objectives of the Interagency Committee for national Arctic
research;
(3) a detailed listing of all existing Federal programs relating to Arctic research, including
the existing goals, funding levels for each of the 5 following fiscal years, and the funds
currently being expended to conduct the programs;
(4) recommendations for necessary program changes and other proposals to meet the
requirements of the policy and goals as set forth by the Commission and in the Plan as
currently in effect; and
(5) a description of the actions taken by the Interagency Committee to coordinate the budget
review process in order to ensure interagency coordination and cooperation in (A) carrying
out Federal Arctic research programs, and (B) eliminating unnecessary duplication of effort
among these programs.
COORDINATION AND REVIEW OF BUDGET REQUESTS
SEC. 110. (a) The Office of Science and Technology Policy shall-
(1) review all agency and department budget requests related to the Arctic transmitted
pursuant to section 108(a)(5), in accordance with the national Arctic research policy and the
5-year program under section 108(a)(2) and section 109, respectively; and
Congressional Research Service
51
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
(2) consult closely with the Interagency Committee and the Commission to guide the Office
of Science and Technology Policy’s efforts.
(b)(1) The Office of Management and Budget shall consider all Federal agency requests for
research related to the Arctic as one integrated, coherent, and multiagency request which
shall be reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget prior to submission of the
President’s annual budget request for its adherence to the Plan. The Commission shall, after
submission of the President’s annual budget request, review the request and report to
Congress on adherence to the Plan.
(2) The Office of Management and Budget shall seek to facilitate planning for the design,
procurement, maintenance, deployment, and operations of icebreakers needed to provide a
platform for Arctic research by allocating all funds necessary to support icebreaking
operations, except for recurring incremental costs associated with specific projects, to the
Coast Guard.
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS; NEW SPENDING AUTHORITY
SEC. 111. (a) There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for
carrying out this title.
(b) Any new spending authority (within the meaning of section 401 of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974) which is provided under this title shall be effective for any fiscal year
only to such extent or in such amounts as may be provided in appropriation Acts.
DEFINITION
SEC. 112. As used in this title, the term “Arctic” means all United States and foreign
territory north of the Arctic Circle and all United States territory north and west of the
boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas,
including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian
chain.
Congressional Research Service
52
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Appendix B. P.L. 101-609 of 1990, Amending Arctic
Research and Policy Act of 1984
The Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 (see Appendix A) was amended by P.L. 101-609 of
November 16, 1990. The text of P.L. 101-609 is as follows:
SECTION 1. Except as specifically provided in this Act, whenever in this Act an amendment
or repeal is expressed as an amendment to, or repeal of a provision, the reference shall be
deemed to be made to the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984.
SEC. 2. Section 103(b)(1) (15 U.S.C. 4102(b)(1)) is amended—
(1) in the text above clause (A), by striking out `five’ and inserting in lieu thereof `seven’;
(2) in clause (A), by striking out `three’ and inserting in lieu thereof `four’; and
(3) in clause (C), by striking out `one member’ and inserting in lieu thereof `two members’.
SEC. 3. Section 103(d)(1) (15 U.S.C. 4102(d)(1)) is amended by striking out `GS-16’ and
inserting in lieu thereof `GS-18’.
SEC. 4. (a) Section 104(a) (15 U.S.C. 4102(a)) is amended—
(1) in paragraph (4), by striking out `suggest’ and inserting in lieu thereof `recommend’;
(2) in paragraph (6), by striking out `suggest’ and inserting in lieu thereof `recommend’;
(3) in paragraph (7), by striking out `and’ at the end thereof;
(4) in paragraph (8), by striking out the period and inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon; and
(5) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraphs:
`(9) recommend to the Interagency Committee the means for developing international
scientific cooperation in the Arctic; and
`(10) not later than January 31, 1991, and every 2 years thereafter, publish a statement of
goals and objectives with respect to Arctic research to guide the Interagency Committee
established under section 107 in the performance of its duties.’.
(b) Section 104(b) is amended to read as follows:
`(b) Not later than January 31 of each year, the Commission shall submit to the President and
to the Congress a report describing the activities and accomplishments of the Commission
during the immediately preceding fiscal year.’.
SEC. 5. Section 106 (15 U.S.C. 4105) is amended—
(1) in paragraph (3), by striking out `and’ at the end thereof;
Congressional Research Service
53
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
(2) in paragraph (4), by striking out the period at the end thereof and inserting in lieu thereof
`; and’; and
(3) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
`(5) appoint, and accept without compensation the services of, scientists and engineering
specialists to be advisors to the Commission. Each advisor may be allowed travel expenses,
including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by section 5703 of title 5, United
States Code. Except for the purposes of chapter 81 of title 5 (relating to compensation for
work injuries) and chapter 171 of title 28 (relating to tort claims) of the United States Code,
an advisor appointed under this paragraph shall not be considered an employee of the United
States for any purpose.’.
SEC. 6. Subsection (b)(2) of section 108 (15 U.S.C. 4107(b)(2)) is amended to read as
follows:
`(2) a statement detailing with particularity the recommendations of the Commission with
respect to Federal interagency activities in Arctic research and the disposition and responses
to those recommendations.’.
Congressional Research Service
54
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Appendix C. January 2009 Presidential Arctic Policy
Directive
On January 12, 2009, the George W. Bush Administration released a presidential directive
establishing a new U.S. policy for the Arctic region. The directive, dated January 9, 2009, was
issued as National Security Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25
(NSPD 66/HSPD 25). The text of NSPD 66/HSPD 25 is as follows:
SUBJECT: Arctic Region Policy
I. PURPOSE
A. This directive establishes the policy of the United States with respect to the Arctic region
and directs related implementation actions. This directive supersedes Presidential Decision
Directive/NSC-26 (PDD-26; issued 1994) with respect to Arctic policy but not Antarctic
policy; PDD-26 remains in effect for Antarctic policy only.
B. This directive shall be implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution and laws
of the United States, with the obligations of the United States under the treaties and other
international agreements to which the United States is a party, and with customary
international law as recognized by the United States, including with respect to the law of the
sea.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The United States is an Arctic nation, with varied and compelling interests in that region.
This directive takes into account several developments, including, among others:
1. Altered national policies on homeland security and defense;
2. The effects of climate change and increasing human activity in the Arctic region;
3. The establishment and ongoing work of the Arctic Council; and
4. A growing awareness that the Arctic region is both fragile and rich in resources.
III. POLICY
A. It is the policy of the United States to:
1. Meet national security and homeland security needs relevant to the Arctic region;
2. Protect the Arctic environment and conserve its biological resources;
3. Ensure that natural resource management and economic development in the region are
environmentally sustainable;
4. Strengthen institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations (the United
States, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, and Sweden);
5. Involve the Arctic’s indigenous communities in decisions that affect them; and
Congressional Research Service
55
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
6. Enhance scientific monitoring and research into local, regional, and global
environmental issues.
B. National Security and Homeland Security Interests in the Arctic
1. The United States has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic
region and is prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to
safeguard these interests. These interests include such matters as missile defense and early
warning; deployment of sea and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence,
maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of navigation
and overflight.
2. The United States also has fundamental homeland security interests in preventing
terrorist attacks and mitigating those criminal or hostile acts that could increase the United
States vulnerability to terrorism in the Arctic region.
3. The Arctic region is primarily a maritime domain; as such, existing policies and
authorities relating to maritime areas continue to apply, including those relating to law
enforcement.[1] Human activity in the Arctic region is increasing and is projected to increase
further in coming years. This requires the United States to assert a more active and
influential national presence to protect its Arctic interests and to project sea power
throughout the region.
4. The United States exercises authority in accordance with lawful claims of United States
sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction in the Arctic region, including sovereignty
within the territorial sea, sovereign rights and jurisdiction within the United States exclusive
economic zone and on the continental shelf, and appropriate control in the United States
contiguous zone.
5. Freedom of the seas is a top national priority. The Northwest Passage is a strait used for
international navigation, and the Northern Sea Route includes straits used for international
navigation; the regime of transit passage applies to passage through those straits. Preserving
the rights and duties relating to navigation and overflight in the Arctic region supports our
ability to exercise these rights throughout the world, including through strategic straits.
6. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to national security and
homeland security interests in the Arctic, the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland
Security, in coordination with heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies,
shall:
a. Develop greater capabilities and capacity, as necessary, to protect United States air,
land, and sea borders in the Arctic region;
b. Increase Arctic maritime domain awareness in order to protect maritime commerce,
critical infrastructure, and key resources;
c. Preserve the global mobility of United States military and civilian vessels and aircraft
throughout the Arctic region;
d. Project a sovereign United States maritime presence in the Arctic in support of essential
United States interests; and
e. Encourage the peaceful resolution of disputes in the Arctic region.
C. International Governance
Congressional Research Service
56
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
1. The United States participates in a variety of fora, international organizations, and
bilateral contacts that promote United States interests in the Arctic. These include the Arctic
Council, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), wildlife conservation and
management agreements, and many other mechanisms. As the Arctic changes and human
activity in the region increases, the United States and other governments should consider, as
appropriate, new international arrangements or enhancements to existing arrangements.
2. The Arctic Council has produced positive results for the United States by working
within its limited mandate of environmental protection and sustainable development. Its
subsidiary bodies, with help from many United States agencies, have developed and
undertaken projects on a wide range of topics. The Council also provides a beneficial venue
for interaction with indigenous groups. It is the position of the United States that the Arctic
Council should remain a high-level forum devoted to issues within its current mandate and
not be transformed into a formal international organization, particularly one with assessed
contributions. The United States is nevertheless open to updating the structure of the
Council, including consolidation of, or making operational changes to, its subsidiary bodies,
to the extent such changes can clearly improve the Council’s work and are consistent with
the general mandate of the Council.
3. The geopolitical circumstances of the Arctic region differ sufficiently from those of the
Antarctic region such that an “Arctic Treaty” of broad scope—along the lines of the
Antarctic Treaty—is not appropriate or necessary.
4. The Senate should act favorably on U.S. accession to the U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea promptly, to protect and advance U.S. interests, including with respect to the
Arctic. Joining will serve the national security interests of the United States, including the
maritime mobility of our Armed Forces worldwide. It will secure U.S. sovereign rights over
extensive marine areas, including the valuable natural resources they contain. Accession will
promote U.S. interests in the environmental health of the oceans. And it will give the United
States a seat at the table when the rights that are vital to our interests are debated and
interpreted.
5. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to international governance, the
Secretary of State, in coordination with heads of other relevant executive departments and
agencies, shall:
a. Continue to cooperate with other countries on Arctic issues through the United Nations
(U.N.) and its specialized agencies, as well as through treaties such as the U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air
Pollution and its protocols, and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer;
b. Consider, as appropriate, new or enhanced international arrangements for the Arctic to
address issues likely to arise from expected increases in human activity in that region,
including shipping, local development and subsistence, exploitation of living marine
resources, development of energy and other resources, and tourism;
c. Review Arctic Council policy recommendations developed within the ambit of the
Council’s scientific reviews and ensure the policy recommendations are subject to review by
Arctic governments; and
d. Continue to seek advice and consent of the United States Senate to accede to the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention.
Congressional Research Service
57
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
D. Extended Continental Shelf and Boundary Issues
1. Defining with certainty the area of the Arctic seabed and subsoil in which the United
States may exercise its sovereign rights over natural resources such as oil, natural gas,
methane hydrates, minerals, and living marine species is critical to our national interests in
energy security, resource management, and environmental protection. The most effective
way to achieve international recognition and legal certainty for our extended continental
shelf is through the procedure available to States Parties to the U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea.
2. The United States and Canada have an unresolved boundary in the Beaufort Sea. United
States policy recognizes a boundary in this area based on equidistance. The United States
recognizes that the boundary area may contain oil, natural gas, and other resources.
3. The United States and Russia are abiding by the terms of a maritime boundary treaty
concluded in 1990, pending its entry into force. The United States is prepared to enter the
agreement into force once ratified by the Russian Federation.
4. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to extended continental shelf and
boundary issues, the Secretary of State, in coordination with heads of other relevant
executive departments and agencies, shall:
a. Take all actions necessary to establish the outer limit of the continental shelf
appertaining to the United States, in the Arctic and in other regions, to the fullest extent
permitted under international law;
b. Consider the conservation and management of natural resources during the process of
delimiting the extended continental shelf; and
c. Continue to urge the Russian Federation to ratify the 1990 United States-Russia
maritime boundary agreement.
E. Promoting International Scientific Cooperation
1. Scientific research is vital for the promotion of United States interests in the Arctic
region. Successful conduct of U.S. research in the Arctic region requires access throughout
the Arctic Ocean and to terrestrial sites, as well as viable international mechanisms for
sharing access to research platforms and timely exchange of samples, data, and analyses.
Better coordination with the Russian Federation, facilitating access to its domain, is
particularly important.
2. The United States promotes the sharing of Arctic research platforms with other countries
in support of collaborative research that advances fundamental understanding of the Arctic
region in general and potential Arctic change in particular. This could include collaboration
with bodies such as the Nordic Council and the European Polar Consortium, as well as with
individual nations.
3. Accurate prediction of future environmental and climate change on a regional basis, and
the delivery of near real-time information to end-users, requires obtaining, analyzing, and
disseminating accurate data from the entire Arctic region, including both paleoclimatic data
and observational data. The United States has made significant investments in the
infrastructure needed to collect environmental data in the Arctic region, including the
establishment of portions of an Arctic circumpolar observing network through a partnership
among United States agencies, academic collaborators, and Arctic residents. The United
States promotes active involvement of all Arctic nations in these efforts in order to advance
Congressional Research Service
58
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
scientific understanding that could provide the basis for assessing future impacts and
proposed response strategies.
4. United States platforms capable of supporting forefront research in the Arctic Ocean,
including portions expected to be ice-covered for the foreseeable future, as well as seasonally
ice-free regions, should work with those of other nations through the establishment of an
Arctic circumpolar observing network. All Arctic nations are members of the Group on Earth
Observations partnership, which provides a framework for organizing an international
approach to environmental observations in the region. In addition, the United States
recognizes that academic and research institutions are vital partners in promoting and
conducting Arctic research.
5. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to promoting scientific
international cooperation, the Secretaries of State, the Interior, and Commerce and the
Director of the National Science Foundation, in coordination with heads of other relevant
executive departments and agencies, shall:
a. Continue to play a leadership role in research throughout the Arctic region;
b. Actively promote full and appropriate access by scientists to Arctic research sites
through bilateral and multilateral measures and by other means;
c. Lead the effort to establish an effective Arctic circumpolar observing network with
broad partnership from other relevant nations;
d. Promote regular meetings of Arctic science ministers or research council heads to share
information concerning scientific research opportunities and to improve coordination of
international Arctic research programs;
e. Work with the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC) to promote
research that is strategically linked to U.S. policies articulated in this directive, with input
from the Arctic Research Commission; and
f. Strengthen partnerships with academic and research institutions and build upon the
relationships these institutions have with their counterparts in other nations.
F. Maritime Transportation in the Arctic Region
1. The United States priorities for maritime transportation in the Arctic region are:
a. To facilitate safe, secure, and reliable navigation;
b. To protect maritime commerce; and
c. To protect the environment.
2. Safe, secure, and environmentally sound maritime commerce in the Arctic region
depends on infrastructure to support shipping activity, search and rescue capabilities, short-
and long-range aids to navigation, high-risk area vessel-traffic management, iceberg
warnings and other sea ice information, effective shipping standards, and measures to protect
the marine environment. In addition, effective search and rescue in the Arctic will require
local, State, Federal, tribal, commercial, volunteer, scientific, and multinational cooperation.
Congressional Research Service
59
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
3. Working through the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United States
promotes strengthening existing measures and, as necessary, developing new measures to
improve the safety and security of maritime transportation, as well as to protect the marine
environment in the Arctic region. These measures may include ship routing and reporting
systems, such as traffic separation and vessel traffic management schemes in Arctic
chokepoints; updating and strengthening of the Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-
Covered Waters; underwater noise standards for commercial shipping; a review of shipping
insurance issues; oil and other hazardous material pollution response agreements; and
environmental standards.
4. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to maritime transportation in the
Arctic region, the Secretaries of State, Defense, Transportation, Commerce, and Homeland
Security, in coordination with heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies,
shall:
a. Develop additional measures, in cooperation with other nations, to address issues that
are likely to arise from expected increases in shipping into, out of, and through the Arctic
region;
b. Commensurate with the level of human activity in the region, establish a risk-based
capability to address hazards in the Arctic environment. Such efforts shall advance work on
pollution prevention and response standards; determine basing and logistics support
requirements, including necessary airlift and icebreaking capabilities; and improve plans and
cooperative agreements for search and rescue;
c. Develop Arctic waterways management regimes in accordance with accepted
international standards, including vessel traffic-monitoring and routing; safe navigation
standards; accurate and standardized charts; and accurate and timely environmental and
navigational information; and
d. Evaluate the feasibility of using access through the Arctic for strategic sealift and
humanitarian aid and disaster relief.
G. Economic Issues, Including Energy
1. Sustainable development in the Arctic region poses particular challenges. Stakeholder
input will inform key decisions as the United States seeks to promote economic and energy
security. Climate change and other factors are significantly affecting the lives of Arctic
inhabitants, particularly indigenous communities. The United States affirms the importance
to Arctic communities of adapting to climate change, given their particular vulnerabilities.
2. Energy development in the Arctic region will play an important role in meeting growing
global energy demand as the area is thought to contain a substantial portion of the world’s
undiscovered energy resources. The United States seeks to ensure that energy development
throughout the Arctic occurs in an environmentally sound manner, taking into account the
interests of indigenous and local communities, as well as open and transparent market
principles. The United States seeks to balance access to, and development of, energy and
other natural resources with the protection of the Arctic environment by ensuring that
continental shelf resources are managed in a responsible manner and by continuing to work
closely with other Arctic nations.
3. The United States recognizes the value and effectiveness of existing fora, such as the
Arctic Council, the International Regulators Forum, and the International Standards
Organization.
Congressional Research Service
60
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
4. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to economic issues, including
energy, the Secretaries of State, the Interior, Commerce, and Energy, in coordination with
heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies, shall:
a. Seek to increase efforts, including those in the Arctic Council, to study changing climate
conditions, with a view to preserving and enhancing economic opportunity in the Arctic
region. Such efforts shall include inventories and assessments of villages, indigenous
communities, subsistence opportunities, public facilities, infrastructure, oil and gas
development projects, alternative energy development opportunities, forestry, cultural and
other sites, living marine resources, and other elements of the Arctic’s socioeconomic
composition;
b. Work with other Arctic nations to ensure that hydrocarbon and other development in the
Arctic region is carried out in accordance with accepted best practices and internationally
recognized standards and the 2006 Group of Eight (G-8) Global Energy Security Principles;
c. Consult with other Arctic nations to discuss issues related to exploration, production,
environmental and socioeconomic impacts, including drilling conduct, facility sharing, the
sharing of environmental data, impact assessments, compatible monitoring programs, and
reservoir management in areas with potentially shared resources;
d. Protect United States interests with respect to hydrocarbon reservoirs that may overlap
boundaries to mitigate adverse environmental and economic consequences related to their
development;
e. Identify opportunities for international cooperation on methane hydrate issues, North
Slope hydrology, and other matters;
f. Explore whether there is a need for additional fora for informing decisions on
hydrocarbon leasing, exploration, development, production, and transportation, as well as
shared support activities, including infrastructure projects; and
g. Continue to emphasize cooperative mechanisms with nations operating in the region to
address shared concerns, recognizing that most known Arctic oil and gas resources are
located outside of United States jurisdiction.
H. Environmental Protection and Conservation of Natural Resources
1. The Arctic environment is unique and changing. Increased human activity is expected to
bring additional stressors to the Arctic environment, with potentially serious consequences
for Arctic communities and ecosystems.
2. Despite a growing body of research, the Arctic environment remains poorly understood.
Sea ice and glaciers are in retreat. Permafrost is thawing and coasts are eroding. Pollutants
from within and outside the Arctic are contaminating the region. Basic data are lacking in
many fields. High levels of uncertainty remain concerning the effects of climate change and
increased human activity in the Arctic. Given the need for decisions to be based on sound
scientific and socioeconomic information, Arctic environmental research, monitoring, and
vulnerability assessments are top priorities. For example, an understanding of the probable
consequences of global climate variability and change on Arctic ecosystems is essential to
guide the effective long-term management of Arctic natural resources and to address
socioeconomic impacts of changing patterns in the use of natural resources.
Congressional Research Service
61
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
3. Taking into account the limitations in existing data, United States efforts to protect the
Arctic environment and to conserve its natural resources must be risk-based and proceed on
the basis of the best available information.
4. The United States supports the application in the Arctic region of the general principles
of international fisheries management outlined in the 1995 Agreement for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of
December 10, 1982, relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks and similar instruments. The United States endorses the
protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems in the Arctic from destructive fishing practices
and seeks to ensure an adequate enforcement presence to safeguard Arctic living marine
resources.
5. With temperature increases in the Arctic region, contaminants currently locked in the ice
and soils will be released into the air, water, and land. This trend, along with increased
human activity within and below the Arctic, will result in increased introduction of
contaminants into the Arctic, including both persistent pollutants (e.g., persistent organic
pollutants and mercury) and airborne pollutants (e.g., soot).
6. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to environmental protection and
conservation of natural resources, the Secretaries of State, the Interior, Commerce, and
Homeland Security and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, in
coordination with heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies, shall:
a. In cooperation with other nations, respond effectively to increased pollutants and other
environmental challenges;
b. Continue to identify ways to conserve, protect, and sustainably manage Arctic species
and ensure adequate enforcement presence to safeguard living marine resources, taking
account of the changing ranges or distribution of some species in the Arctic. For species
whose range includes areas both within and beyond United States jurisdiction, the United
States shall continue to collaborate with other governments to ensure effective conservation
and management;
c. Seek to develop ways to address changing and expanding commercial fisheries in the
Arctic, including through consideration of international agreements or organizations to
govern future Arctic fisheries;
d. Pursue marine ecosystem-based management in the Arctic; and
e.
Intensify efforts to develop scientific information on the adverse effects of pollutants on
human health and the environment and work with other nations to reduce the introduction of
key pollutants into the Arctic.
IV. Resources and Assets
A. Implementing a number of the policy elements directed above will require appropriate
resources and assets. These elements shall be implemented consistent with applicable law
and authorities of agencies, or heads of agencies, vested by law, and subject to the
availability of appropriations. The heads of executive departments and agencies with
responsibilities relating to the Arctic region shall work to identify future budget,
administrative, personnel, or legislative proposal requirements to implement the elements of
this directive.
———————————————————————————
Congressional Research Service
62
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
[1] These policies and authorities include Freedom of Navigation (PDD/NSC-32), the U.S.
Policy on Protecting the Ocean Environment (PDD/NSC-36), Maritime Security Policy
(NSPD-41/HSPD-13), and the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS).189
Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke, Coordinator
John Frittelli
Specialist in Naval Affairs
Specialist in Transportation Policy
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
jfrittelli@crs.loc.gov, 7-7033
Marjorie Ann Browne
Curry L. Hagerty
Specialist in International Relations
Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy
mbrowne@crs.loc.gov, 7-7695
chagerty@crs.loc.gov, 7-7738
Eugene H. Buck
Marc Humphries
Specialist in Natural Resources Policy
Analyst in Energy Policy
gbuck@crs.loc.gov, 7-7262
mhumphries@crs.loc.gov, 7-7264
M. Lynne Corn
Jane A. Leggett
Specialist in Natural Resources Policy
Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy
lcorn@crs.loc.gov, 7-7267
jaleggett@crs.loc.gov, 7-9525
Carl Ek
Jonathan L. Ramseur
Specialist in International Relations
Specialist in Environmental Policy
cek@crs.loc.gov, 7-7286
jramseur@crs.loc.gov, 7-7919
Peter Folger
Roger Walke
Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy
Specialist in American Indian Policy
pfolger@crs.loc.gov, 7-1517
rwalke@crs.loc.gov, 7-8641
189 Source for text: http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm. The text is also available online at http://www.nsf.gov/
od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
63