Proposed U.S.-Colombia Free Trade
Agreement: Labor Issues
Mary Jane Bolle
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
October 5, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL34759
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Proposed Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Labor Issues
Summary
This report examines three labor issues and arguments related to the pending U.S.-Colombia free
trade agreement (CFTA; H.R. 5724 and S. 2830): violence against trade unionists; impunity
(accountability for or punishment of the perpetrators); and worker rights protections for
Colombians. For general issues relating to the CFTA, see CRS Report RL34470, The Proposed
U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, by M. Angeles Villarreal. For background on Colombia
and its political situation and context for the agreement, see CRS Report RL32250, Colombia:
Issues for Congress, by June S. Beittel.
Opponents of the pending U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement (CFTA) argue against it on three
points: (1) the high rate of violence against trade unionists in Colombia; (2) the lack of adequate
punishment for the perpetrators of that violence; and (3) weak Colombian enforcement of
International Labor Organization (ILO) core labor standards and labor laws.
Proponents of the agreement argue primarily for the proposed Colombia FTA on the basis of
economic and national security benefits. Accordingly, they argue, the CFTA would support
increased exports, expand economic growth, create jobs, and open up investment opportunities
for the United States. They also argue that it would reinforce the rule of law and spread values of
capitalism in Colombia, and anchor hemispheric stability.
Proponents specifically respond to labor complaints of the opponents, that (1) violence against
trade unionists has declined dramatically since former President Álvaro Uribe took office in
2002; (2) substantial progress is being made on the impunity issue as the government has
undertaken great efforts to find perpetrators and bring them to justice; and (3) the Colombian
government is taking steps to improve conditions for workers.
If Congress were to approve the Colombia FTA, it would be the second FTA (after Peru) to have
some labor enforcement “teeth.” Labor provisions including the four basic ILO core labor
standards would be enforceable through the same dispute settlement procedures as for all other
provisions (i.e., primarily those for commercial interests.) Opponents argue that under CFTA,
only the concepts of core labor standards, and not the details of the ILO conventions behind them,
would be enforceable.
Proponents point to recent Colombian progress in protecting workers on many fronts. They argue
that approval of the FTA and the economic growth in Colombia that would result is the best way
to protect Colombia’s trade unionists. They also argue that not passing the agreement would not
resolve Colombia’s labor issues. In addition, they argue, the United States could lose jobs through
trade diversion as Colombia continues to enter into regional trade agreements with other
countries.
Opponents argue that delaying approval of the proposed CFTA further would give Colombia
more time to keep improving protections for its workers.
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Proposed Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Labor Issues
Contents
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
Political Context ................................................................................................................... 1
Trade/Economic Context....................................................................................................... 2
Labor Context ....................................................................................................................... 3
Violence Against Trade Unionists................................................................................................ 3
Long-Term Trends in Homicides of Trade Unionists.............................................................. 3
Long-Term Trends in Three Measures of Violence Against Trade Unionists........................... 6
Impunity ..................................................................................................................................... 7
Labor Laws, Protections, and Enforcement.................................................................................. 8
Possible Implications .................................................................................................................. 9
Figures
Figure 1. Historic Data on Homicides of Trade Unionists, 1997-2009.......................................... 5
Figure 2. Homicide Rate for the General Population and for Trade Unionists............................... 6
Figure 3. Assassinations, Death Threats, and Arbitrary Detentions of Trade Unionists,
1999-2009................................................................................................................................ 7
Tables
Table 1. Data for Figure 1: Historic Data on Homicides of Trade Unionists ............................... 11
Table 2. Data for Figure 2: Population, Homicides, and Homicide Rates for Colombia
Generally ............................................................................................................................... 12
Table 3. Data for Figure 3: Assassinations, Death Threats, and Arbitrary Detentions of
Trade Unionists...................................................................................................................... 13
Appendixes
Appendix. Data for Figures 1, 2, and 3 ...................................................................................... 11
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 13
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Proposed Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Labor Issues
he purpose of this report is to examine three labor issues and arguments related to the
pending U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement (CFTA; H.R. 5724 and S. 2830): violence
T against trade unionists; impunity (accountability for or punishment of the perpetrators);
and worker rights protections for Colombians.1 For general issues relating to the CFTA, see CRS
Report RL34470, The Proposed U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
For background on Colombia and its political situation and context for the agreement, see CRS
Report RL32250, Colombia: Issues for Congress, by June S. Beittel.
Opponents of the pending U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement (CFTA) argue against it on three
points: (1) the high rate of violence (homicides, arbitrary detentions/kidnappings, and death
threats) against trade unionists in Colombia; (2) the lack of adequate punishment for the
perpetrators of that violence; and (3) weak Colombian enforcement of International Labor
Organization (ILO) core labor standards and labor laws.
Proponents of the agreement primarily argue for the proposed Colombia FTA on the basis of
economic and national security benefits. Trade typically benefits all parties to a trade agreement,
as each country tends to specialize in exporting those goods which it can produce relatively more
efficiently, and to import those which it produces relatively less efficiently than its trading
partners. Accordingly, proponents argue, the CFTA would support increased exports, expand
economic growth, create U.S. jobs, offer consumers a greater variety of goods and services at
lower prices, and encourage economic development by attracting foreign investment and
expanding output. They also argue that it would reinforce the rule of law, spread values of
capitalism in Colombia, and anchor hemispheric stability.
Proponents specifically respond to the above labor complaints that (1) homicides and kidnappings
against trade unionists have declined dramatically since former President Álvaro Uribe took
office in 2002; (2) substantial progress is being made on the impunity issue as the government has
undertaken great efforts to find perpetrators and bring them to justice; and (3) the Colombian
government is taking steps to improve conditions for workers. President Juan Manuel Santos
succeeded Uribe in August of 2010.
Background
Political Context2
Colombia is one of the oldest democracies in Latin America, and has a bicameral legislature. Yet
it has been plagued by an ongoing armed conflict for over 40 years. This violence has been
aggravated by a lack of state control over much of Colombian territory—rugged terrain that has
1 The proposed U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was signed on November 22, 2006. Implementing
legislation was introduced on April 8, 2008 as H.R. 5724 and S. 2830. On April 9, 2008, through H.Res. 1092 (H.Rept.
110-574) the House made certain provisions under “trade promotion authority” (otherwise known as the “fast-track”)
inapplicable to the CFTA, so that it is no longer obligated to vote within 60 days of a session and may schedule a vote
at any time. This stopped the fast-track clock. For more information on the fast-track or trade promotion process, see
CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): Issues, Options, and Prospects for Renewal, by J. F.
Hornbeck and William H. Cooper; and CRS Report RL33864, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) Renewal: Core Labor
Standards Issues, by Mary Jane Bolle.
2 This section was taken from CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Issues for Congress, by June S. Beittel.
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Proposed Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Labor Issues
been hard to govern. In addition, a long history of poverty and inequality has left Colombia open
to other influences, among them drug trafficking. Leftist guerrilla groups inspired by the Cuban
Revolution formed in the 1960s as a response to state neglect and poverty. Right-wing
paramilitaries formed in the 1980s to defend landowners, many of whom were drug traffickers,
against guerrillas. The shift of coca production from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia in the 1980s
increased drug violence and provided a new source of revenue for both guerrillas and
paramilitaries. In 2002 Colombians elected an independent, Álvaro Uribe, as president (2002-
2010), largely because of his aggressive plan to reduce violence in Colombia.
Trade/Economic Context
Colombia is the United States’ fourth-largest trading partner in Latin America (after Mexico,
Brazil, and Venezuela). It is the United States’27th-largest import source ($11 billion in U.S.
imports from Colombia) and its 23rd-largest export destination worldwide ($9 billion in U.S.
exports to Colombia.)(2009 data). Machinery parts, oil, and organic chemicals constitute more
than half of total U.S. exports to Colombia, and crude oil and other mineral fuels account for 59%
of all imports from Colombia.3
Given the relatively small level of trade between the United States and Colombia, (0.8% of all
U.S. trade in 2009) the CFTA would, according to a U.S. International Trade Commission
(USITC), likely have minimal to no effect on output or employment for most sectors of the U.S.
economy, because most Colombian products already enter the U.S. market free of duty under the
Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA).4 However, new U.S. investment in Colombia as a result of
the agreement could support increased economic growth and employment and additional exports
to the United States.
U.S. proponents argue that the proposed CFTA would provide a number of economic benefits,
including market access for U.S. consumer and industrial products; cooperation in the production
of textiles and apparel; and new opportunities for U.S. farmers and ranchers.5 With regard to the
projected small potential effect on U.S. jobs, the largest changes in U.S. output are projected for
the cereal grains production sector (0.3%) and the sugar sector (-0.3%), with similar effects on
employment. The largest changes in U.S. employment are projected to be in cereal grains (0.3%),
sugar cane (-0.3%), and textiles (-0.3%.)6
Opponents may argue that new U.S. investment in Colombia as a result of the agreement could
support increased economic growth and employment in Colombia and additional exports to the
United States, given the relative wage difference. U.S. total monthly compensation costs in
manufacturing for 2008 (most recent data) expressed in U.S. dollars, were roughly five times the
level of such costs in Colombia—$5,060 for the United States and $984 for Colombia.7
3 Source: U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) Dataweb.
4 U.S. International Trade Commission. U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement: Potential Economy-Wide and
Selected Sectoral Effects, December, 2006. P. 2-13.
5 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Colombia FTA Facts, October 2008.
6 USITC U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement: Potential Economy-Wide and Selected Sectoral Effects, op. cit.
7 Source: Unpublished estimates compiled by Bureau of Labor Statistics, Division of International Labor Comparisons
based on data from Colombia’s Annual Survey of Manufacturing and U.S. hourly compensation data adjusted to a
comparable monthly basis. Relative compensation costs for any given year are influenced by continuing adjustment in
exchange rates.
(continued...)
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Proposed Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Labor Issues
Colombian proponents argue that the only Western Hemisphere “Pacific Rim” countries with
which the United States does not have a free trade agreement are Colombia, Ecuador, and
Panama. The United States has FTAs with all others: Canada, Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El
Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Peru, and Chile. The investment that goes into these other
countries from the United States as a result, the Colombian Embassy argues, means that new
exports from Latin America to the United States are increasingly coming from non-Colombian
countries, putting Colombia at an economic disadvantage relative to its neighbors.8
U.S. proponents concerned that U.S. trade with Colombia could get diverted to other countries if
the agreement is not approved, point out that Colombia currently has regional trade agreements
with the Andean Community, Chile, Mexico, Latin American countries, Canada, and four
European countries (Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland).9
Labor Context
Colombia’s official labor force is about 18.4 million, as compared with 154 million for the United
States. Roughly 23% of Colombia’s labor force is involved in the agricultural sector, 19% is
involved in the manufacturing/industry sector, and 58% is employed in the service sector. Almost
60% of the workforce in Colombia is employed in the (largely unregulated, undocumented)
informal sector. The unemployment rate in Colombia was roughly 12.% in 2009. During most of
the more than 40 years that Colombia has experienced internal armed conflict, membership and
participation in labor unions has waned. Between 1959 and 1965, the unionization rate grew from
5.5% to 13.5%. Since 1966, the unionization rate has declined to 4.4% or 815,000 of the 18.4
million workforce. Of these, fewer than 150,000, or 0.8% of the labor force are working under a
labor contract.10
Violence Against Trade Unionists
Long-Term Trends in Homicides of Trade Unionists
A key issue in the debate on the CFTA is the long-term trend in homicides of Colombia’s trade
unionists as they try to express rights that are in concept protected in Colombia’s laws.
Three organizations track data on the number of trade unionists murdered each year: the
Colombian government; the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), successor to the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU); and the Escuela Nacional Sindical
(ENS) or National Labor School, a non-governmental organization founded in 1982 in Colombia
to provide “non-partisan and independent” information on human rights, labor, and the dynamics
(...continued)
8 Colombian embassy, in an interview, November 20, 2008.
9 World Trade Organization Regional Trade Agreement Gateway.
10 Data in this paragraph are from Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report Colombia, Sept. 2010, p. 16; U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics; and U.S. State Department. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2009, published
March, 2010.
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Proposed Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Labor Issues
of association and collective bargaining. Figure 1 below tracks each of their data on the number
of homicides of trade unionists in Colombia and worldwide between 1997 and 2009. It shows a
wide year-to-year variation in the number of trade unionists murdered, but a primarily downward
trend since 2001.
Inconsistency among the three trend lines for Colombia reflects the fact that the three data
sources do not always agree on which homicides should be counted as “trade unionist.” Those
homicides that may not be counted by all sources include non-affiliated advisors to unions, retired
and inactive union members, rural and community organization members, and teachers.11
Teachers make up the largest percentage of union members who were victims of violence by
illegal armed groups. There are two reasons cited for this. First, they constituted a sizable 27% of
registered unionists; and second because their work situates them in rural, conflict-ridden parts of
the country.12
The large bump in the homicide trend line from 1999-2003 coincides with a large bulge in the
cultivation of coca produced in Colombia and a simultaneous decline in coca production in
Bolivia and Peru, according to Department of State data. The fact that the three lines for
Colombia’s homicides of trade unionists closely track and crowd the line depicting such
homicides world-wide shows the extent to which Colombia accounts for most such world-wide
homicides. Colombia’s share ranges from a low of 49% in 1999 to a high of 86% in 2002, and
then declines to 54% in 2006.
Proponents argue that Colombia’s large share of the total may reflect the fact that other countries
may not document the homicides of their trade unionists as carefully as Colombia does.
11 Until recently, murders of teachers were not counted in Colombian government statistics. Yet teachers constitute the
group that has suffered the most casualties. Out of 1,994 murders in which the victim is identified by occupation
between 1986 and 2006, 825, or 41%, were teachers. Source: 2,515 or that sinister case to forget, by Guillermo Correa
Montoya, researcher for the ENS. Two researchers note that most teachers who are victims are typically singled out for
what they do outside of their classrooms as labor activists. Source: “Targeted Teachers,” by Seth Stern and Rachel Van
Dongen, Christian Science Monitor, June 17, 2003. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2008, notes that for
2008, teachers made up the largest percentage of registered unionists (34%). In part because of their presence in rural,
conflict-laden parts of the country, teachers constituted 55% of all trade unionists killed during the year.
12 U.S. Department of State. 2009 Human Rights Reports: Colombia, p. 19.
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Proposed Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Labor Issues
Figure 1. Historic Data on Homicides of Trade Unionists, 1997-2009
Source: ICFTU/ITUC, ENS, and Colombian Government. See Appendix for data behind this graph.
Opponents of the proposed Colombia FTA tend to focus on the entire 10-plus year trend in
homicides and the close relationship between Colombia’s homicides and world-wide homicides
of trade unionists. Proponents, including the Colombian government, focus on the steady decline
in such homicides since former President Uribe took office in 2002, and on actions taken recently
by the Colombian government to reduce these fatalities. Such actions include bringing to
Colombia a permanent ILO representative, passing new labor laws, stepping up enforcement of
labor laws, implementing a new judicial system, and setting up a trade unionist protection
program.
Under this protection program, in 2009, roughly 1,550 trade unionists were receiving
protection—14% of all persons receiving protection.13 Opponents of the Colombia FTA also point
out other reasons for the decline in homicides, including the decline in targets: Unions in
Colombia have declined from 13% of the formal labor force in 1965 to 4.4% currently. They and
their efforts have been eroded primarily through such means as violence and employer-mandated
union-substitution devices such as government-sanctioned collective pacts and cooperative
associations.14
Proponents of the proposed CFTA point out that the number of trade unionist homicides as a
share of all trade unionists is considerably smaller than the total number of homicides as a share
of the general population. For the year 2009, according to data provided by the government and
ENS, the homicide rate per 100,000 was five for unionists and 35 for the general population. (See
13 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2009: Colombia, March 11, 2010.
14 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2007.
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Proposed Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Labor Issues
Figure 2.)15 The AFL-CIO counters that “it is simply not meaningful to compare random crime
statistics to targeted assassinations.”16
Figure 2. Homicide Rate for the General Population and for Trade Unionists
Source: See Appendix data tables for Figure 2.
Long-Term Trends in Three Measures of Violence Against
Trade Unionists
A companion issue to trade unionist homicides is long-term trends in three separate measures of
trade union violence: homicides/assassinations, kidnappings/arbitrary detentions, and death
threats.
Proponents of the CFTA note reductions in assassinations and arbitrary detentions since 2004.
Opponents, examining the data longer term, focus on a third means of intimidation: death threats.
They argue that in recent years perpetrators have switched their focus from homicides to death
threats, because this more subtle form of intimidation can achieve the same results of
discouraging union activity with less public notice.17 These three methods of intimidation are
tracked individually in the left graph in Figure 3 and cumulatively in the right graph. The right
graph shows that assassinations/homicides were about equal to death threats in 2001-2002 when
15 U.S. Department of State: 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Colombia. March 11, 2010.
16 AFL-CIO. Colombia: Continued Violence, Impunity and Non-Enforcement of Labor Law Overshadow the
Government’s Minor Accomplishments, September 2008 Update.
17 Speech by José Luciano Sanín Vásquez, Director General of the ENS, sponsored by the Global Policy Network,
February 27, 2008.
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Proposed Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Labor Issues
homicides were at their peak, but averaged less than one-quarter the number of death threats
between 2003 and 2009, when homicides were lower.
Figure 3. Assassinations, Death Threats, and Arbitrary Detentions of
Trade Unionists, 1999-2009
Source: See Appendix data table for Figure 3.
Impunity
The second main issue of opponents in debating CFTA is impunity—accountability for and
punishment of the perpetrators of assassinations, arbitrary detentions, and death threats.
Perpetrators of the violence typically fall into three main groups: paramilitaries, guerrillas, and
the Colombian military.18 The human rights advocates group Amnesty International USA reports
on the difficulty in identifying the perpetrators in cases of trade union violence. However, it
reports that, among “cases in which clear evidence of responsibility is available” in 2005, of all
human rights abuses against trade unionists: paramilitaries committed 49%; security forces
committed 43%; guerrilla forces committed 2%; and criminals committed 4%.19
Proponents of the agreement cite data showing progress in bringing perpetrators of the violence to
justice: as the result of a tripartite agreement with the ILO (among the government, trade
confederations, and business groups), the Office of the Colombian Prosecutor General, in October
2006, created a special sub-unit to investigate and prosecute 1,272 criminal cases of violence
against trade union members. These included 187 priority cases as determined by the unions.20
18 U.S. State Department. Charting Colombia’s Progress.
19 Amnesty International USA. Colombia Killings, Arbitrary Detentions, and Death Threats—the Reality of Trade
Unionism in Colombia, Introduction. 2007. ENS data.
20 On June 12, 2008, three union confederations, CUT, CGT, and CTC, submitted to the ILO a list of 2,669 homicides
and forced disappearance cases as part of case 1787. According to the government of Colombia, the Ministry of Social
(continued...)
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As of February 20, 2010, there were a total of 248 convictions in cases involving violence against
trade union members between 2001 and the first two months of 2010, with 199 (80%) of them
handed down in 2007-2010. These 248 conviction cases resulted in the conviction of 350
individuals, including 216 imprisonments.21 José Luciano Sanín Vásquez, Director General of the
ENS views convictions over a longer period of time and points out that since 1986, in about 97%
of the cases of homicides of trade unionists, the perpetrators have never been identified and
brought to justice. He argues further that while in some cases the perpetrators of labor killings are
found guilty, in zero cases has the mastermind behind the crime been convicted.22
In September 2009, the AFL-CIO, in a submission to the USTR, laid out detailed labor and
human rights conditions it wanted Colombia to meet before the United States would consider
approving the CFTA. These included (1) convictions in a substantial majority of the over 2,700
cases of trade unionists murdered and prosecutions against both those responsible for carrying out
the crimes and those planning the crimes; and (2) the undertaking of substantial efforts to
investigate non-lethal forms of violence, including death threats.23
Labor Laws, Protections, and Enforcement
A third main issue in the CFTA is adequacy of enforcement of Colombia’s labor laws, and
Colombia’s ability to protect workers. Many observers point out that enforcement of labor laws
and standards generally is an issue for Colombia as well as throughout Latin America and other
developing countries.
Proponents point to Colombia’s system of labor laws and protections, which include ratification
of all four ILO core labor standards. They argue that “Colombia’s laws provide for fundamental
labor rights and more.”24 These ILO standards (1) protect the right of workers to organize and
bargain collectively, (2) prohibit forced labor, (3) prohibit child labor, and (4) provide for non-
discrimination in employment.
After long-standing criticisms by the ILO that Colombia was not adhering to its labor code, in
January 2007, a “permanent” ILO representative opened an office in Colombia pursuant to a June
2006 tripartite agreement. In October 2007, it received $4.0 million in funding from the
Colombian government. Subsequently, the ILO removed Colombia from discussion in its
(...continued)
Protection is now cross-referencing this new case list with its existing case list.
21 Fiscalia, February 20, 2010. It should be noted that, according to the statistical branch of the Colombian government,
in a significant number of the cases, the defendant was convicted in absentia and is not currently in custody. Therefore,
currently, about two-thirds of those convicted are serving time in prison.
22 Speech by José Luciano Sanín Vásquez, op. cit., with updated figures from the Colombian government. As of July of
2009, an AFL-CIO submission to the USTR notes 154 convictions in cases involving violence between 2001 and 2008,
with most of them handed down in 2007-2008. The AFL-CIO Submission notes that a March 2009 report by Fiscalia
(Colombia’s Office of the Attorney General) claims that 33 “intellectual authors” of the crimes had been sentenced.
However, a subsequent July 20, 2009, report included no information on intellectual authors. Source: AFL-CIO. Before
the U.S. Trade Representative, Comments Concerning the Pending Free Trade Agreement with Colombia. Filed
September 15, 2009, p. 4.
23 AFL-CIO. Before the U.S. Trade Representative, Comments Concerning the Pending Free Trade Agreement with
Colombia. Filed September 15, 2009, pp. 5-6.
24 Office of the USTR. Colombia FTA Facts. Colombia’s Labor Laws and Labor Protections. March 2008.
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Proposed Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Labor Issues
Committee for the Application of Standards (which examines significant problems in specific
countries) for the first time in 21 years.25 The ILO has no enforcement authority. Its main tools
are technical assistance and moral suasion. However, the government and the ILO are working to
improve cooperation among national, regional and municipal governments to eradicate child
labor and protect working youth—issues addressed in the paragraph below.
Opponents argue that the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2009
notes numerous shortcomings in Colombian law and its enforcement, of which the following are
examples:
• Right to organize and bargain collectively: The right to organize and bargain
collectively in Colombia is limited because of high unemployment, a large
informal economic sector, traditional anti-union attitudes, and violence against
trade union leaders.
• Prohibitions against forced labor: Forced labor is a problem in prostitution and
in new illegal guerrilla groups which practice forced conscription, including the
conscription of children.
• Prohibitions against child labor: Child labor remains a significant problem,
particularly in the informal sector, as well as in the sex industry, in mining, and in
coca picking. Colombia’s 180 labor inspectors for enforcing child labor laws in
the formal sector (covering about 20% of the child labor force) are seen as
inadequate for effective enforcement.
• Acceptable conditions of work: The monthly minimum wage is the U.S.
equivalent of $250, which is not enough to provide sufficient income for a basic
market basket of goods for a family of four. In addition, it is difficult to enforce
the minimum wage in the informal sector, according to the source.26
Possible Implications
If Congress were to approve the proposed Colombia FTA, it would be the second FTA (after
Peru) to have some labor enforcement “teeth.” Labor provisions including the four basic ILO core
labor standards (enumerated in the previous section) would be enforceable through the same
dispute settlement procedures as for all other provisions, such a those for commercial interests.
Opponents argue that under CFTA, only the concepts of core labor standards, and not the details
of the ILO conventions behind them, would be enforceable.
Proponents point to recent Colombian progress in protecting workers on many fronts. First, the
personal protection program for union members has been a success in that since 2002, not a
single trade union member enrolled in the program has been killed, according to the Colombian
Embassy. Second, funding for investigating and prosecuting perpetrators of crimes against trade
unionists has increased. Third, the government has engaged in greater social dialogue with the
ILO and other international union organizations, which are having an impact on national labor
25 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2007. The removal has been continued through 2008 and 2009.
26 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Colombia, Sec. Sec. 7,Worker Rights. March 2010.
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policy. Fourth, there are a number of new legislative proposals pending to further protect basic
core labor rights.27
On national security issues, proponents acknowledge the continuing violence in Colombia as well
as recent corruption and wiretapping scandals. They assert that the level of reported violence has
steadily and significantly declined under former President Uribe. They argue further that rather
than hiding the scandals or minimizing them, Colombia is taking steps to root them out and
cleanse the political system, recognizing that more must be done, including bringing to justice
those who have committed crimes against unionists. However, they argue, walking away from the
proposed CFTA or postponing it until conditions are perfect would send an unambiguous signal to
friends and opponents alike that the United States is an unreliable partner without a vision for
cooperation in the Western Hemisphere. They argue that this would make Colombia, Panama,
Peru, and others who are making political decisions to enhance relations with the United States
despite strong domestic and external political pressure re-evaluate their relationship with the
United States.28
Opponents argue that delaying the vote on the proposed CFTA further would give Colombia more
time to keep improving protections for its workers. They assert that Colombia is still the most
dangerous place in the world to be a trade unionist, since it still accounts for the majority of
homicides of trade unionists world-wide. They also argue that the progress made in bringing to
justice perpetrators of violence against union workers is limited, and point to the fact that a
significant percentage of those convicted in these cases (34% as of October 20, 2008, according
to the Colombian government) are convicted in absentia and remain at large. They also argue that
members of the Uribe government continue to inaccurately denounce union members as
guerrillas. Finally, they argue that passing the CFTA could very well halt the “meager” progress
by the Colombian government on worker rights protections achieved to date.29
Proponents argue that the window of opportunity to pass the CFTA may be relatively narrow, and
that approval of the proposed FTA and the economic growth in Colombia that would result is the
best way to protect Colombia’s trade unionists. They also argue that not passing the agreement
would not resolve Colombia’s labor issues.
27 An Open Letter to Congressional Democrats on Hemispheric Trade Expansion. Signed by seven former Members of
Congress and the Senate and at least 30 former cabinet officials, ambassadors, and foreign and trade policy advisors.
Available at http://www.chamberpost.com/files/Colombia_Letter_from_Former_Democratic_Officials.pdf. (Undated.)
28 Ibid.
29 Various sources already identified plus USLEAP. Violence Against Colombia Trade Unionists and Impunity: How
Much Progress Has There Been Under Uribe? April 2008.
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Appendix. Data for Figures 1, 2, and 3
Table A-1. Data for Figure 1: Historic Data on Homicides of Trade Unionists
Year
World-Wide
Colombia
Colombian
ICFTU/ITUC
ICFTU/ITUC
ENS
Government
1997
299
170
1998
157
97
1999 140 69 82
2000 210 153 134 105
2001 223 185 194 205
2002 213 154 192 196
2003 129 90 102 101
2004 145 99 94 89
2005 115 70 72 40
2006 144 78 76 60
2007 130 39 39 26
2008 76 49 49 39
2009 101 48 47 28
Source: ICFTU/ITUC: Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights, various years; ENS: Situation of Violence
and Impunity, 1986-2010; Colombian Government: U.S. State Department. For 2009: Memorandum of
Justification Concerning Human Rights Conditions With Respect to Assistance for the Colombian Armed Forces.
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Proposed Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Labor Issues
Table A-2. Data for Figure 2: Population, Homicides, and Homicide Rates for
Colombia Generally
General Population
Number of Homicides
Homicide Rate per
Year
(millions)
(thousands)
100,000
1997 40.0
25
63
1998 40.7
23
56
1999 41.4
24
59
2000 42.1
27
63
2001 42.8
28
65
2002 43.5
29
66
2003 44.2
24
53
2004 44.9
20
45
2005 43.7
18
39
2006 44.4
17
37
2007 45
17
36
2008 45.7
16
33
2009 46.3
16
34
Source and methods: Data for general population: IMF International Financial Statistics; for homicides:
Colombia ministry of Defense and Colombian Embassy.
Table A-3. Additional Data for Figure 2: Population, Homicides, and Homicide Rates
for Members of Trade Unions
Number
Number of
Members
Number of
of
Homicides
of Trade
Homicides
Homicide Homicides Homicide
(Colombian
Homicide
Unions
(ICFTU/ITUC
Rate per
(ENS
Rate per
Government
Rate per
Year
(000)
data)
100,000
data)
100,000
data)
100,000
1997 1,054 NA
NA 170 16 NA
NA
1998 NA
NA
NA 97 NA NA NA
1999 NA 69
NA 82 NA NA NA
2000 NA 153
NA 134 NA 105
NA
2001 860 185
22 194 23 205
24
2002 NA 154
NA 192 NA 196
NA
2003 856 90
11 102 12 101
12
2004 856 99
12 94 11 89
10
2005 900 70
8 72 8 40
4
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Proposed Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Labor Issues
Number
Number of
Members
Number of
of
Homicides
of Trade
Homicides
Homicide Homicides Homicide
(Colombian
Homicide
Unions
(ICFTU/ITUC
Rate per
(ENS
Rate per
Government
Rate per
Year
(000)
data)
100,000
data)
100,000
data)
100,000
2006 830 78
9 76 9 60
7
2007 NA 39
NA 39 NA 26 NA
2008 NA 49
NA 49 NA 38 NA
2009 815 48
6 47 6 28
3
Source and Methods: Data on number of members in trade unions: ENS data as reported in the State
Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, various years.
Table A-4. Data for Figure 3: Assassinations, Death Threats, and
Arbitrary Detentions of Trade Unionists
Year
Assassinations
Arbitrary Detentions
Death Threats
1999 80 29 679
2000 137 38 180
2001 197 12 235
2002 186 13 198
2003 94 50 301
2004 96 79 455
2005 70 56 260
2006 72 16 244
2007 39 19 224
2008 49 26 497
2009 47 34 412
Source: Escuela Nacional Sindical, 2,515 or that sinister ease to forget, 2008, p. 69 Updated for 2007-2009.
Author Contact Information
Mary Jane Bolle
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
mjbolle@crs.loc.gov, 7-7753
Congressional Research Service
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