The Proposed U.S.-Colombia Free Trade
Agreement

M. Angeles Villarreal
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
October 1, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL34470
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

The Proposed U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement

Summary
The proposed U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, also called the U.S.-Colombia Free
Trade Agreement (CFTA), was signed by the United States and Colombia on November 22, 2006.
Congress must approve implementing legislation for the agreement to enter into force. The
agreement would immediately eliminate duties on 80% of U.S. exports of consumer and
industrial products to Colombia. An additional 7% of U.S. exports would receive duty-free
treatment within five years of implementation, and most remaining tariffs would be eliminated
within 10 years of implementation. The agreement also contains other provisions in services,
investment, intellectual property rights protection, labor, and the environment. About 90% of U.S.
imports from Colombia enter the United States duty-free under trade preference programs or
through normal trade relations, while U.S. exports to Colombia face duties of up to 20%.
The negotiations for the proposed CFTA were conducted under the trade promotion authority
(TPA), also called fast-track trade authority, that Congress granted the President under the
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210). The authority allows the President to
enter into trade agreements that receive expedited congressional consideration (no amendments
and limited debate). Implementing legislation for the CFTA (H.R. 5724/S. 2830) was introduced
in the 110th Congress on April 8, 2008, under TPA. The House leadership, however, took the
position that the President had submitted the legislation to implement the agreement without
adequately fulfilling the TPA requirement for consultation with Congress. On April 10, 2008, the
House voted 224-195 to make the provisions establishing expedited procedures, inapplicable to
the CFTA implementing legislation (H.Res. 1092). There is currently no indication that the 111th
Congress will consider implementing legislation for the pending U.S.-Colombia FTA.
In his January 2010 State of the Union address, President Barack Obama called for a new
National Export Initiative (NEI), which includes a component that calls for opening new markets
for U.S. exports by resolving outstanding issues on the pending CFTA. The Obama
Administration also has made a case for pursuing free trade agreements as part of the National
Security Strategy of the United States, though the CFTA is not specifically mentioned in the
report. In March 2010, U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk stated that the Obama Administration
was developing a finite list of proposals to give to Colombia to resolve the issues blocking
congressional approval of a free trade agreement with the United States.
The congressional debate surrounding the agreement has mostly centered on the violence issues
in Colombia. Some Members of Congress oppose the agreement because of concerns about
violence against union members and other terrorist activity in Colombia. Other Members who
support the CFTA take issue with these charges, stating that Colombia has made progress in
recent years to curb the violence in the country. Some policymakers argue that Colombia is a
crucial ally of the United States in Latin America and that if the trade agreement is not passed, it
may lead to further violence in the region. For Colombia, a free trade agreement with the United
States is part of its overall economic development strategy.
The United States is Colombia’s leading trade partner. Colombia accounts for a very small
percentage of U.S. trade (0.8% in 2009), ranking 22nd among U.S. export markets and 27th as a
source of U.S. imports. Economic studies on the impact of a U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement
(FTA) have found that, upon full implementation of an agreement, the impact on the United
States would be positive but very small due to the small size of the Colombian economy when
compared to that of the United States (about 1.6%).
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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Trade Promotion Authority.......................................................................................................... 1
Rationale for the Agreement ........................................................................................................ 2
Review of the Proposed U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement ................................................... 3
Key CFTA Provisions ........................................................................................................... 3
Market Access................................................................................................................. 4
Tariff Elimination and Phase-Outs................................................................................... 4
Agricultural Provisions ................................................................................................... 4
Information Technology .................................................................................................. 5
Textiles and Apparel........................................................................................................ 5
Government Procurement................................................................................................ 5
Services .......................................................................................................................... 6
Investment ...................................................................................................................... 6
IPR Protection................................................................................................................. 6
Customs Procedures and Rules of Origin......................................................................... 7
Labor Provisions ............................................................................................................. 7
Environmental Provisions ............................................................................................... 8
Dispute Settlement .......................................................................................................... 8
Strengthening of Labor and Environmental Provisions .......................................................... 8
Amendments on Basic Labor Standards........................................................................... 9
Provisions on Environment ............................................................................................. 9
Other Provisions ........................................................................................................... 10
U.S.-Colombia Economic Relations .......................................................................................... 10
U.S.-Colombia Merchandise Trade...................................................................................... 11
Andean Trade Preference Act .............................................................................................. 13
U.S.-Colombia Bilateral Foreign Direct Investment............................................................. 15
Background on Colombia.......................................................................................................... 15
Violence in Colombia.......................................................................................................... 16
Human Rights Issues........................................................................................................... 17
U.S. Policy Toward Colombia ............................................................................................. 18
The Proposed CFTA: Issues for Congress.................................................................................. 19
Economic Impact ................................................................................................................ 19
Study Findings .............................................................................................................. 19
Agricultural Sector........................................................................................................ 21
Labor Issues........................................................................................................................ 22
Violence Issues ................................................................................................................... 24
Conclusion................................................................................................................................ 25

Figures
Figure 1. U.S. Merchandise Trade with Colombia ..................................................................... 13

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Tables
Table 1. Key Economic Indicators for Colombia and the United States ...................................... 11
Table 2. U.S. Trade with Colombia, 2009 .................................................................................. 12
Table 3. U.S. Imports from Colombia ........................................................................................ 14
Table 4. U.S. Imports from Colombia under ATPA .................................................................... 14
Table 5. U.S. Direct Investment Position in Colombia ............................................................... 15

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 28

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Introduction
The proposed U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, also called the U.S.-Colombia Free
Trade Agreement (CFTA), is a bilateral free trade agreement between the United States and
Colombia which, if ratified, would eliminate tariffs and other barriers in goods and services
between the two countries. The CFTA negotiations grew out of a regional effort in 2004 to
produce a U.S.-Andean free trade agreement (FTA) between the United States and the Andean
countries of Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador. After numerous rounds of talks, negotiators failed to
reach an agreement, and Colombia continued negotiations with the United States for a bilateral
FTA. On February 27, 2006, the United States and Colombia concluded the U.S.-Colombia FTA,
and finalized the text of the agreement on July 8, 2006. On August 24, 2006, President Bush
notified Congress of his intention to sign the U.S.-Colombia FTA. The two countries signed the
agreement on November 22, 2006.
On April 8, 2008, President George W. Bush submitted implementing legislation for the United
States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act (H.R. 5724/S. 2830) in the
110th Congress. The bills were introduced under the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) provisions
of the Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210). This act made expedited legislative procedures
established in § 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618) available for congressional
consideration of legislation to implement free trade agreements negotiated under TPA. The House
leadership took the position that President Bush had submitted the legislation to implement the
CFTA without adequately fulfilling the TPA requirements for consultation with Congress, and on
April 10, 2008, the House, by a vote of 224-195, adopted H.Res. 1092, making certain provisions
of the expedited procedure inapplicable to the CFTA implementing legislation.
In his January 2010 State of the Union address, President Barack Obama called for a new
National Export Initiative (NEI) to boost U.S. exports and create jobs. One component of the NEI
calls for opening new markets for U.S. exports by resolving outstanding issues with Colombia,
Korea, and Panama with the objective of moving forward with the pending FTAs at the
appropriate time.1 There is currently no indication that the 111th Congress will consider
implementing legislation for the proposed U.S.-Colombia FTA.
Trade Promotion Authority
Under the statutory procedures, known as “trade promotion authority” or “TPA” and sometimes
called “fast track” procedures, Congress has a maximum of 90 days to consider the implementing
legislation, the measure is privileged for consideration, the length of consideration is limited, and
amendments are precluded.2 The House must act first on the bill, because the legislation would
affect revenue, and under the act it must do so within 60 days; the Senate cannot act until the bill
passes the House. The Senate could, nevertheless, take up and pass its own implementing bill,


1 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “President Obama Details Administration Efforts to Support Two
Million New Jobs by Promoting New Exports,” March 11, 2010.
2 For more information on Trade Promotion Authority, see CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA):
Issues, Options, and Prospects for Renewal
, by J. F. Hornbeck and William H. Cooper.
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then hold it at the desk pending the arrival of the House companion. In that case, however, the
expedited procedures of the statute (limiting debate, precluding amendment, etc.) would not be
applicable for the Senate’s consideration of its measure (except by unanimous consent).
The adoption of H.Res. 1092 in the 110th Congress removed the obligation for the House to vote
on the CFTA within 60 days of session, although the House leadership retained the ability to
schedule a vote at any time under the general rules of the House. If it chose to do so,
consideration most likely would have occurred pursuant to a special rule reported by the
Committee on Rules and adopted by the House, which would presumably establish terms for
consideration similar to those directed by the TPA. H.Res. 1092 did not change the TPA
provisions that the CFTA was not amendable once it came up (although in principle, this
restriction could be altered by the terms of a special rule for considering the implementing bill).
Nor did it alter the applicability of TPA rules in the Senate.
The adoption of H.Res. 1092 suspended the TPA provision requiring that the committees of
jurisdiction automatically be discharged from the U.S.-Colombia FTA implementing bill if they
had not reported it by 45 days of session after its introduction. It also removed the TPA provision
that making a motion to proceed to consideration of the bill is highly privileged and not
debatable, thereby restoring the normal control exercised by the leadership over the floor
schedule if the committees of consideration were to report the implementing bill.
Because the 110th Congress did not consider implementing legislation for the CFTA,
implementing legislation is not necessarily eligible for “fast track” consideration in the 111th
Congress. Under TPA, a trade agreement and its implementing legislation can be submitted to
Congress pursuant to the act only once, and it is the President’s initial submission of the
agreement that triggers the 90-day process under expedited procedures. For this reason, it is
generally understood that the eligibility of the CFTA for expedited consideration under the statute
would not carry over or be renewed in a subsequent Congress, although this procedural point has
not been “officially tested,” because the Speaker has made no formal ruling on the matter from
the chair.3 The CFTA implementing legislation, however, could still be re-introduced in the 111th
Congress under the general rules of both houses, and could be considered in the House under a
TPA-like procedure pursuant to a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules and approved
by the House.
Rationale for the Agreement
Since the 1990s, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have been a focus of U.S.
trade policy as demonstrated by the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, the Dominican Republic-Central America Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), and the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement. The Bush
Administration made bilateral and regional trade agreements key elements of U.S. trade policy.
U.S. trade policy in the Western Hemisphere over the past few years has been focused on
completing trade negotiations with Colombia, Peru, and Panama and on gaining passage of these


3 Inside U.S. Trade, “House Approves Fast-Track Rules Change for U.S.-Colombia FTA,” April 11, 2008.
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free trade agreements by the U.S. Congress. The U.S.-Peru FTA was approved by Congress and
signed into law in December 2007 (P.L. 110-138).4
A free trade agreement with Colombia would increase market access for U.S. goods and services
in the Colombian market, currently not the case under the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA).
ATPA is a unilateral trade preference program in which the United States extends preferential
duty treatment to select Colombian goods entering the United States. It is part of a broader U.S.
initiative with Latin America to address the illegal drug issue (see section on ATPA later in this
report). About 90% of U.S. imports from Colombia enter the United States duty-free under ATPA,
under other U.S. trade preferences, or through normal trade relations.
The major expectation among proponents of the pending free trade agreement with Colombia, as
with other trade agreements, is that it would provide economic benefits for both the United States
and Colombia as the level of trade increases between the two countries. Another expectation is
that it would improve investor confidence and increase foreign direct investment in Colombia,
which would bring more economic stability to the country. For Colombia, a free trade agreement
with the United States is part of the country’s overall development strategy and efforts to promote
economic growth and stability.
Review of the Proposed U.S.-Colombia Free Trade
Agreement

Key CFTA Provisions5
The comprehensive free trade agreement would eliminate tariffs and other barriers to goods and
services. The agreement was reached after numerous rounds of negotiations over a period of
nearly two years. Some issues that took longer to resolve were related to agriculture. Colombia
had been seeking lenient agriculture provisions in the agreement, arguing that the effects of
liberalization on rural regions could have adverse effects on smaller farmers and drive them to
coca production. The United States agreed to give more sensitive sectors longer phase-out periods
to allow Colombia more time to adjust to trade liberalization. Sectors receiving the longest phase-
out periods included poultry and rice.6
This section summarizes several key provisions in the original agreement text as provided by the
United States Trade Representative (USTR), unless otherwise noted.7


4 For more information, see CRS Report RL34108, U.S.-Peru Economic Relations and the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion
Agreement
, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
5 The text of the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) is available online at the Office of the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) website: http://www.ustr.gov.
6 Bureau of National Affairs, International Trade Reporter, “Colombia and U.S. Reach FTA after Resolving
Agriculture Issues,” March 2, 2006.
7 USTR, Trade Facts, “Free Trade with Colombia: Summary of the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion
Agreement,” June 2007.
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Market Access
The agreement would provide for the elimination of tariffs on bilateral trade in eligible goods.
Colombia’s average tariff on U.S. goods is 12.5% while the average U.S. tariff on Colombian
goods is 3%. Colombia applies tariffs in the 0%-5% range on range on capital goods, industrial
goods, and raw materials; 10% on manufactured goods with some exceptions; and 15% to 20%
on consumer and “sensitive” goods.8 Upon implementation, the agreement would eliminate 80%
of duties on U.S. exports of consumer and industrial products to Colombia. An additional 7% of
U.S. exports would receive duty-free treatment within five years of implementation and most
remaining tariffs would be eliminated within 10 years after implementation.
Tariff Elimination and Phase-Outs
The pending CFTA would eliminate most tariffs immediately upon implementation of the
agreement and phase out the remaining tariffs over periods of up to 19 years. Tariff elimination
for major sectors would include the following:
• Upon implementation of an agreement, more than 99% of U.S. and almost 76%
of Colombian industrial and textile tariff lines would be free of duty. Virtually all
industrial and textile tariff lines would be duty-free 10 years after
implementation.9
• All tariffs in textiles and apparel that meet the agreement’s rules-of-origin
provisions would be eliminated immediately (see section on Textiles and Apparel
below).10
• Tariffs on agricultural products would be phased out over a period of time,
ranging from three to 19 years (see section on Agricultural Provisions below).
Colombia would eliminate quotas11 and over-quota tariffs in 12 years for corn
and other feed grains, 15 years for dairy products, 18 years for chicken leg
quarters, and 19 years for rice.12
Agricultural Provisions
Under ATPA, almost all of Colombia’s agricultural exports enter the U.S. market free of duty. The
pending CFTA would make these trade preferences permanent. Colombia currently applies some
tariff protection on all agricultural products. The pending CFTA would provide duty-free access
on 77% of all agricultural tariff lines, accounting for 52% of current U.S. exports to Colombia,
upon implementation. Colombia would eliminate most other tariffs on agricultural products


8 See USTR, 2008 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, March 2008.
9 United States International Trade Commission (USITC), U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agrement: Potential
Economy-wide and Selected Sectoral Effects,
USITC Publication 3896, December 2006, pp. 2-1 and 2-2.
10 Ibid.
11 Tariff rate quotas are limits on the quantity of imports that can enter a country duty-free before tariff-rates are
applied.
12 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Foreign Agricultural Service, Fact Sheet: U.S.-Colombia Trade
Promotion Agreement Overall Agriculture Fact Sheet,
August 2008.
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within 15 years.13 U.S. farm exports to Colombia that would receive immediate duty-free
treatment include high-quality beef, cotton, wheat, soybeans, soybean meal, apples, pears,
peaches, cherries, and many processed food products including frozen french fries and cookies.
U.S. farm products that would receive improved market access include pork, beef, corn, poultry,
rice, fruits and vegetables, processed products, and dairy products. The agreement would also
provide duty-free tariff rate quotas on standard beef, chicken leg quarters, dairy products, corn,
sorghum, animal feeds, rice, and soybean oil.14
Colombia has a “price-band” import duty system on certain agricultural products. Under the price
band system, variable duties are imposed on top of ad valorem tariffs to keep domestic prices
within a predetermined range. This system results in higher duties for certain U.S. exports to
Colombia, including corn, wheat, rice, soybeans, pork, poultry, cheeses, and powdered milk. A
CFTA would remove Colombia’s price band system upon implementation of the agreement.
However, if the rates under the price band system result in a lower rate than that given under the
FTA, the United States will be allowed to sell the product to Colombia at the lower rates.15
Information Technology
Under a CFTA, Colombia would join the World Trade Organization’s Information Technology
Agreement (ITA), and remove its tariff and non-tariff barriers to information technology products.
Colombia would allow trade in remanufactured goods under the agreement, which would increase
export and investment opportunities for U.S. businesses involved in remanufactured products
such as machinery, computers, cellular telephones, and other devices.
Textiles and Apparel
In textiles and apparel, products that meet the agreement’s rules of origin requirements would
receive duty-free and quota-free treatment immediately. The United States and Colombia have
cooperation commitments under the agreement that would allow for verification of claims of
origin or preferential treatment, and denial of preferential treatment or entry if the claims cannot
be verified. The rules of origin requirements are generally based on the yarn-forward standard to
encourage production and economic integration. A “de minimis” provision would allow limited
amounts of specified third-country content to go into U.S. and Colombian apparel to provide
producers in both countries flexibility. A special textile safeguard would provide for temporary
tariff relief if imports prove to be damaging to domestic producers.
Government Procurement
In government procurement contracts, the two countries agreed to grant non-discriminatory rights
to bid on government contracts. These provisions would cover the purchases of Colombia’s
ministries and departments, as well as its legislature and courts. U.S. companies would also be


13 Ibid.
14 USTR, Trade Facts: Free Trade with Colombia, Summary of the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion
Agreement,”
June 2007.
15 USITC Publication 3896, December 2006, p. 3-4.
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assured access to the purchases of a number of Colombia’s government enterprises, including its
oil company.
Services
In services trade, the two countries agreed to market access in most services sectors, with very
few exceptions. Colombia agreed to exceed commitments made in the WTO and to remove
significant services and investment barriers, such as requirements that U.S. firms hire nationals
rather than U.S. citizens to provide professional services. Colombia also agreed to eliminate
requirements to establish a branch in order to provide a service and unfair penalties imposed on
U.S. companies for terminating their relationships with local commercial agents. U.S. financial
service suppliers would have full rights to establish subsidiaries or branches for banks and
insurance companies. Portfolio managers would be able to provide portfolio management services
to both mutual funds and pension funds in the partner country, including to funds that manage
privatized social security accounts.
Investment
Investment provisions would establish a stable legal framework for foreign investors from the
partner country. All forms of investment would be protected, including enterprises, debt,
concessions and similar contracts, and intellectual property. U.S. investors would be treated as
Colombian investors with very few exceptions. U.S. investors in Colombia would have
substantive and procedural protections that foreign investors have under the U.S. legal system,
including due process protections and the right to receive fair market value for property in the
event of an expropriation. Protections for U.S. investments would be backed by a transparent,
binding international arbitration mechanism. In the preamble of the agreement, the United States
and Colombia agreed that foreign investors would not be accorded greater substantive rights with
respect to investment protections than domestic investors under domestic law.16
IPR Protection
The agreement would provide intellectual property rights (IPR) protections for U.S. and
Colombian companies. In all categories of IPR, U.S. companies would be treated no less
favorably than Colombian companies. In trademark protection the agreement would require the
two countries to have a system for resolving disputes about trademarks used in internet domain
names; to develop an on-line system for the registration and maintenance of trademarks and have
a searchable database; and have transparent procedures for trademark registration.
In protection of copyrighted works, the agreement has a number of provisions for protection of
copyrighted works in a digital economy, including provisions that copyright owners would
maintain rights over temporary copies of their works on computers. Other agreement provisions
include rights for copyright owners for making their work available on-line; extended terms of
protection for copyrighted works; requirements for governments to use only legitimate computer


16 USTR, Trade Facts: Free Trade with Colombia, Summary of the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion
Agreement,
June 2007.
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software; rules on encrypted satellite signals to prevent piracy of satellite television
programming; and rules for the liability of Internet Service Providers for copyright infringement.
In protection of patents and trade secrets, U.S. companies are concerned that the Colombian
government currently does not provide patent protection for new uses of previously known or
patented products. The pending CFTA would limit the grounds on which a country could revoke a
patent, thus protecting against arbitrary revocation. In protection of test data and trade secrets, the
agreement would protect products against unfair commercial use for a period of five years for
pharmaceuticals and 10 years for agricultural chemicals. In addition, the agreement would require
the establishment of procedures to prevent marketing of pharmaceutical products that infringe
patents, and provide protection for newly developed plant varieties. The parties expressed their
understanding that the intellectual property chapter would not prevent either party from taking
measures to protect public health by promoting access to medicines for all.
The United States is concerned with music and motion picture property piracy in Colombia. The
CFTA IPR provisions would include penalties for piracy and counterfeiting and criminalize end-
user piracy. It would require the parties to authorize the seizure, forfeiture, and destruction of
counterfeit and pirated goods and the equipment used to produce them. The agreement would
mandate both statutory and actual damages for copyright infringement and trademark piracy. This
would ensure that monetary damages could be awarded even if a monetary value to the violation
was difficult to assess.
Customs Procedures and Rules of Origin
The agreement includes comprehensive rules of origin provisions that would ensure that only
U.S. and Colombian goods could benefit from the agreement. The agreement also includes
customs procedures provisions, including requirements for transparency and efficiency,
procedural certainty and fairness, information sharing, and special procedures for the release of
express delivery shipments.
Labor Provisions
The labor and worker rights obligations are included in the core text of the agreement. The United
States and Colombia reaffirmed their obligations as members of the International Labor
Organization (ILO). The two countries agreed to adopt, maintain and enforce laws that
incorporate core internationally recognized labor rights, as stated in the 1998 ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
, including a prohibition on the worst forms of child
labor. The parties also agreed to enforce labor laws with acceptable conditions of work, hours of
work, and occupational safety and health. All obligations of the CFTA chapter on labor would be
subject to the same dispute settlement procedures and enforcement mechanisms as other chapters
of the agreement.
The agreement includes procedural guarantees to ensure that workers and employers would have
fair, equitable, and transparent access to labor tribunals or courts. It has a cooperative mechanism
to promote respect for the principles embodied in the 1998 ILO Declaration, and compliance with
ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labor. The United States and Colombia agreed
to cooperative activities on laws and practices related to ILO labor standards; the ILO convention
on the worst forms of child labor; methods to improve labor administration and enforcement of
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labor laws; social dialogue and alternative dispute resolution; occupational safety and health
compliance; and mechanisms and best practices on protecting the rights of migrant workers.
Environmental Provisions
The environmental obligations are included in the core text of the agreement. The agreement
would require the United States and Colombia to effectively enforce their own domestic
environmental laws and to adopt, maintain, and implement laws and all other measures to fulfill
obligations under covered multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Both countries
committed to pursue high levels of environmental protection and to not derogate from
environmental laws in a manner that would weaken or reduce protections. The agreement
includes procedural guarantees that would ensure fair, equitable, and transparent proceedings for
the administration and enforcement of environmental laws. In addition, the agreement includes
provisions to help promote voluntary, market-based mechanisms to protect the environment and
to ensure that views of civil society are appropriately considered through a public submissions
process. All obligations in the environmental chapter of the agreement would be subject to the
same dispute settlement procedures and enforcement mechanisms as obligations in other chapters
of the agreement.
Dispute Settlement
The core obligations of the agreement, including labor and environmental provisions, are subject
to dispute settlement provisions. The agreement’s provisions on dispute panel proceedings
include language to help promote openness and transparency through open public hearings;
public release of legal submissions by parties; and opportunities for interested third parties to
submit views. The provisions would require the parties to make every attempt, through
cooperation and consultations, to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of a dispute. If the
parties are unable to settle the dispute through consultations, the complaining party would have
the right to request an independent arbitral panel to help resolve the dispute. Possible outcomes
could include monetary penalties or a suspension of trade benefits.
Strengthening of Labor and Environmental Provisions
In early 2007, a number of Members of Congress indicated that some of the provisions in pending
U.S. FTAs would have to be strengthened to gain their approval, particularly relating to core labor
standards. After several months of negotiation, Congress and the Bush Administration reached an
agreement on May 10, 2007, on a new bipartisan trade framework that calls for the inclusion of
core labor and environmental standards in the text of pending and future trade agreements. On
June 28, 2007, the United States reached an agreement with Colombia on legally binding
amendments to the CFTA on labor, the environment, and other matters to reflect the bipartisan
agreement of May 10.
The amendments to the FTA were based on the agreement reached between the Bush
Administration and Congress on May 10, 2007, and are similar to the amendments that were
made to the U.S.-Peru free trade agreement, which was approved by Congress in December 2008.
At the time they were announced, the Bush Administration stated that, because the new
commitments would have to be “legally binding”, they could not have been incorporated into the
agreement as side letters. Some of the key amendments include obligations related to five basic
ILO labor rights, multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), and pharmaceutical intellectual
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property rights (IPR). These provisions would be fully enforceable through the FTA’s dispute
settlement mechanism. The Colombian government has approved the amendments. On October
30, 2007, the Colombian Senate “overwhelmingly” approved the labor and environmental
amendments to the CFTA, marking the end of the approval process for the agreement in
Colombia.17
Amendments on Basic Labor Standards
After the bipartisan agreement, the Administration reached an agreement with Colombia to
amend the CFTA to require the parties to “adopt, maintain and enforce in their own laws and in
practice” the five basic internationally recognized labor standards, as stated in the 1998 ILO
Declaration. The amendments to the agreement strengthened the earlier labor provisions which
only required the signatories to strive to ensure that their domestic laws would provide for labor
standards consistent with internationally recognized labor principles.
The amendments that resulted from the bipartisan trade framework were intended to enhance the
protection and promotion of worker rights by including enforceable ILO core labor standards in
the agreement. These include 1) freedom of association; 2) the effective recognition of the right to
collective bargaining; 3) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor; 4) the
effective abolition of child labor and a prohibition on the worst forms of child labor; and 5) the
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. These obligations would
refer only to the 1998 ILO Declaration on the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.
Another change to the agreement relates to labor law enforcement. Any decision made by a
signatory on the distribution of enforcement resources would not be a reason for not complying
with the labor provisions. Under the amended provisions, parties would not be allowed to
derogate from labor obligations in a manner affecting trade or investment. Labor obligations
would be subject to the same dispute settlement, same enforcement mechanisms, and same
criteria for selection of enforcement mechanisms as all other obligations in the agreement.
Provisions on Environment
In the original text of the agreement, the parties would have been required to “effectively
enforce” their own domestic environmental laws; this was the only environmental provision that
would have been enforceable through the agreement’s dispute settlement procedures. Other
environmental provisions in the original text, that were not enforceable, included provisions on
environmental cooperation, procedural guarantees for enforcement of environmental laws, and
provisions for a public submissions process. Under the amended version of the proposed FTA, the
United States and Colombia agreed to effectively enforce their own domestic environmental laws,
and to adopt, maintain, and implement laws and all other measures to fulfill obligations under the
seven covered multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). The amended agreement states
that all obligations in the environment chapter would be subject to the same dispute settlement
procedures and enforcement mechanisms as all other obligations in the agreement.


17 Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., International Trade Reporter, “Colombian Senate Overwhelmingly Approves
Labor-Related Amendments to FTA with U.S.,” November 1, 2007.
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Other Provisions
Other amendments to the proposed FTA include provisions on intellectual property, government
procurement, and port security. On intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, some Members
of Congress were concerned that the original commitments would have prevented the poor from
having access to medicines to treat AIDS or other infectious diseases. The amended agreement
was a way of trying to find a balance between the need for IPR protection for pharmaceutical
companies to foster innovation and the desire for promoting access to generic medicines to all
segments of the population. The amended text of the agreement maintains the five years of data
exclusivity for test data related to pharmaceuticals. However, if Colombia relies on U.S. Federal
Drug Administration (FDA) approval of a given drug, and meets certain conditions for
expeditious approval of that drug in Colombia, the data exclusivity period would expire at the
same time that the exclusivity expired in the United States. This could allow generic medicines to
enter more quickly into the market in Colombia.
In government procurement, the amended provisions would allow U.S. state and federal
governments to condition government contracts on the adherence to the core labor laws in the
country where the good is produced or the service is performed. Government agencies also would
be allowed to include environmental protection requirements in their procurements. Concerning
port security, a new provision would ensure that if a foreign-owned company were to provide
services at a U.S. port that would raise national security concerns, the CFTA would not be an
impediment for U.S. authorities in taking actions to address those concerns.18
U.S.-Colombia Economic Relations
With a population of 46 million people, Colombia is the third-most populous country in Latin
America, after Brazil and Mexico. Colombia’s economy, the fifth-largest economy in Latin
America, is quite small when compared to that of the United States. Colombia’s gross domestic
product (GDP) in 2009 was $235 billion, about 1.6% of U.S. GDP of $14.3 trillion in 2009 (see
Table 1). Colombia’s exports accounted for 17% of GDP in 2009, while imports accounted for
19%. The United States is the leading export market for Colombian imports and exports. Any
change in U.S. demand for Colombian products could have a noticeable effect on Colombia’s
economy.




18 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Trade Facts, “Bipartisan Trade Deal,” Bipartisan Agreement on
Trade Policy, May 2007, pp. 4-5.
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Table 1. Key Economic Indicators for Colombia and the United States
Colombia
United States

1999 2009a 1999 2009a
Population (millions)
40 46 279 307
Nominal GDP ($US billions)b 97
235
9,354
14,258
GDP, PPPc Basis ($US billions) 212 403 9,354
14,258
Per Capita GDP ($US)
2,449
5,080
33,520
46,480
Per Capita GDP in $PPPc
5,333 8,690 33,520 46,480
Total Merchandise Exports (US$
12 33 696
1,057
billions)
Exports as % of GDPd
15% 17% 11% 11%
Total Merchandise Imports
11
33 1,025 1,558
(US$billions)
Imports as % of GDPd
17% 19% 13% 14%
Source: Compiled by CRS based on data from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) on-line database.
a. Some figures for 2009 are estimates.
b. Nominal GDP is calculated by EIU based on figures from World Bank and World Development Indicators.
c. PPP refers to purchasing power parity, which attempts to factor in price differences across countries when
estimating the size of a foreign economy in U.S. dollars.
d. Exports and Imports as % of GDP are derived by the EIU and include trade in both goods and services.

U.S.-Colombia Merchandise Trade
The United States is Colombia’s leading trade partner. In 2009, 39% of Colombia’s exports went
to the United States, compared to 37% in 2008 and 34% in 2007. Twenty-nine percent of
Colombia’s imports were supplied by the United States in 2009, the same as in 2008 but slightly
higher than the 2007 figure of 27%. Venezuela is Colombia’s second-most significant trade
partner, accounting for 12% of Colombia’s exports and 3% of Colombia’s imports. Other major
trade partners for Colombia are China, Mexico, and Brazil.
Colombia accounts for a very small percentage of U.S. trade (0.8% in 2009). Colombia ranks 22nd
among U.S. export markets and 27th in the world as a source of U.S. imports. U.S. exports to
Colombia totaled $8.8 billion in 2009, while U.S. imports totaled $11.2 billion. As shown in
Table 2, the dominant U.S. import item from Colombia is crude oil (43% of U.S. imports from
Colombia in 2009), followed by coal (10% of total), and gold (9% of total). The leading U.S.
export items are petroleum oils, other than crude, (14% of U.S. exports to Colombia in 2009),
machinery parts (4% of total), and corn (3% of total).


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Table 2. U.S. Trade with Colombia, 2009
U.S. Exports
U.S. Imports
Leading Items
Leading Items
(HTS 4 Digit
(HTS 4 Digit
Level)
$ Millions
Sharea
Level)
$ Millions
Sharea
Petroleum oils
1,187.6 14%
Crude
4,812.6 43%
and oils from
petroleum oils
bituminous
and oils from
minerals (other
bituminous
than crude) and
minerals
products
Machinery parts
364.0
4%
Coal and coal
1,079.0 10%
for trucks,
products
bulldozers,
snowplows, etc.
Corn (maize)
219.4
3%
Gold
1,026.8
9%
Self-propelled
204.8 2%
Coffee
and 716.1 6%
bulldozers and
coffee products
related products
Aircraft,
199.6
2%
Cut flowers and
506.7 5%
spacecraft, and
buds
parts
Al Other
6,576.7
75%
Al Other
3,068.2
27%
Total Exports
8,752.1

Total Imports
11,209.4

Source: Compiled by CRS using USITC Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb at http://dataweb.usitc.gov: HTS
4-digit level.
a. Totals may not add up due to rounding.

After increasing from $6.3 billion in 2003 to $13.1 billion in 2008, U.S. imports from Colombia
decreased to $11.2 billion in 2009. U.S. exports to Colombia also decreased in 2009 to $8.8
billion. Exports to Colombia had increased from $3.5 billion in 2003 to $10.6 billion in 2008 (see
Figure 1). In the five-year period prior to 2003, both U.S. imports from and exports to Colombia
had gone through some fluctuations, without significant changes.
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Figure 1. U.S. Merchandise Trade with Colombia
14
12
10
s
8
n
6
llio
4
$ Bi
2
US
0
-2
-4
-6
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
Exports
Imports
Trade Balance

Source: Compiled by CRS using USITC Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb at http://dataweb.usitc.gov.

Andean Trade Preference Act
The United States currently extends duty-free treatment to imports from Colombia under the
Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), a regional trade preference program.19 Under the ATPA,
the United States also extends trade preferences to imports from Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru.
ATPA was enacted on December 4, 1991 (Title II of P.L. 102-182), and was renewed and
modified under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA; Title XXXI of
P.L. 107-210) on August 6, 2002. Additional products receiving preferential duty treatment under
ATPDEA include certain items in the following categories: petroleum and petroleum products,
textiles and apparel products, footwear, tuna in flexible containers, and others. The most recent
extension of ATPA (P.L. 110-436) extended preferences for Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru through
the end of 2010. Bolivia’s designation as a beneficiary country was suspended in December 2008
because the country failed to meet the eligibility requirements set forth by the ATPA.
ATPA, as amended by ATPDEA, is part of a broader U.S. initiative with Andean countries to
address the drug trade problem with Latin America. It authorized the President to grant duty-free
treatment or reduced tariffs to certain products from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, or Peru that met
domestic content and other requirements. The act (as a complement to crop eradication,
interdiction, military training, and other counter-narcotics efforts) is intended to promote
economic growth in the Andean region and to encourage a shift away from dependence on illegal
drugs by supporting legitimate economic activities. Increased access to the U.S. market is


19 For more information see CRS Report RS22548, ATPA Renewal: Background and Issues, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
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expected to help create jobs and expand legitimate opportunities for workers in the Andean
countries in alternative export sectors.
Table 3. U.S. Imports from Colombia
($ Millions)

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Total
Imports 6,346.2 7,360.6 8,770.3 9,239.8 9,251.2 13,058.8 11,209.4
Al
Duty-Free 4,109.2 6557.8 7,892.5 8,531.5 8,447.1 12,044.1 9,962.9
%
of
Total
65% 89% 90% 92% 91% 92% 89%
ATPAa
2,908.7 3,888.9 4,653.2 4,791.2 4,527.7 7,339.2 5,589.5
%
of
Total
46% 53% 53% 52% 49% 56% 50%
Source: Compiled by CRS using USITC data.
a. Includes imports under ATPA and ATPDEA.

Almost 90% of U.S. imports from Colombia receive duty-free treatment through preference
programs or normal trade relations (see Table 3). In 2009, 50% of total U.S. imports from
Colombia received preferential duty treatment under ATPA. Of those, the leading imports were
crude oil, cut flowers and buds, petroleum oil products (other than crude), and men’s woven
apparel. The trade preference program contributed to a rapid increase in ATPA imports from
Colombia. Between 2003 and 2008, total imports from Colombia increased by 106%, while ATPA
imports from Colombia increased by 153%. The rapid increase in import value was partially due
to an increase in the volume of imports caused by the trade preferences act, but rising prices of
mineral and energy-related imports were also a major factor. Imports in 2009 declined, however,
as a result of the global financial crisis, with total imports from Colombia decreasing from $13.1
billion to $11.2 billion (14%) and ATPA imports decreasing from $7.3 billion to $5.6 billion
(24%) between 2008 and 2009. Crude oil and petroleum oil products accounted for 77% of ATPA
imports from Colombia in 2009 (see Table 4).
Table 4. U.S. Imports from Colombia under ATPA
($ Millions)
Import Itema
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Crude
Oil
1,692.9 2,299.7 2,897.1 3,183.7 3,152.6 5,813.9 4,318.2
Cut
Flowers
and
Buds 343.1 414.4 417.5 448.1 506.3 498.6 505.9
Oil and Products
321.2 405.5 454.6 202.5 141.2 375.3 249.0
(other than crude)
Men’s
Apparel
89.9 147.9 211.9 182.0 139.6 128.6 67.4
Total ATPAb

2,908.7 3,888.9 4,653.2 4,791.2 4,527.7 7,339.2 5,589.5
Source: Compiled by CRS using USITC data.
a. HTS 4-digt level.
b. Includes imports under ATPA and ATPDEA.
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U.S.-Colombia Bilateral Foreign Direct Investment
U.S. foreign direct investment in Colombia on a historical-cost basis totaled $6.7 billion in 2009
(see Table 5). The largest amount was in mining, which accounted for 46.9%, or $3.2 billion, of
total U.S. FDI in Colombia in 2009. The second-largest amount, $1.7 billion (25.0% of total), was
in manufacturing, followed by $485 million in wholesale trade.

Table 5. U.S. Direct Investment Position in Colombia
(Historical-Cost Basis: 2009)
Industry Amount

% of Total
(U.S.$ Millions)
Mining 3,153
46.9%
Manufacturing
1,683
25.0%
Finance and
485 7.2%
Insurancea
Total 6,728

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Economic Accounts.
a. Except depository institutions.

The proposed U.S.-Colombia FTA is expected to improve investor confidence in Colombia and
would likely increase the amount of U.S. FDI in the country. Investors from other countries
would also be expected to increase investment in Colombia as the FDI environment improves.
According to one study, FDI in Colombia would have increased by more than $2 billion from
2007 through 2010 had the proposed CFTA been implemented in 2007.20
Background on Colombia21
Much of the debate surrounding the proposed CFTA in the United States has focused on the issue
of violence in Colombia, particularly against labor union leaders. Colombia is a democratic
nation with a bicameral legislature. In spite of its democratic tradition, Colombia has suffered
from internal conflict for over 40 years. This conflict and drug violence present unique challenges
to Colombia’s institutions and threaten the human rights of Colombian citizens. The Liberal and
Conservative parties, which dominated Colombian politics since the 19th century, have been


20 United States International Trade Commission (USITC), U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement: Potential
Economy-wide and Selected Sectoral Effects,
Investigation No. TA-2104-023, USITC Publication 3896, December
2006, p. 7-3.
21 For more information on Colombia and issues for Congress, please see CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Issues for
Congress
, by June S. Beittel.
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weakened by their perceived inability to resolve the roots of violence in Colombia. An
independent candidate, Alvaro Uribe, won the 2002 presidential elections, largely because of his
aggressive plan to reduce violence in Colombia. President Uribe, who served two terms in office,
retained widespread support throughout his presidency. His popularity derived from the progress
his government made in improving the security situation in Colombia. Despite this progress,
Colombia continues to face serious challenges.
In the presidential election of June 2010, Juan Manuel Santos of the Partido de Unidad Nacional
(Partido de la U) was elected president of Colombia with 69% of the vote. President Santos
previously served as defense minister (2006-2009) under former President Alvaro Uribe and in
two prior governments as finance minister and minister of trade. Santos was sworn into office on
August 7, 2010, under an optimistic mood in the country, but the new government has significant
foreign policy and domestic challenges ahead. The country’s main foreign policy challenges will
be to improve relations with Venezuela and Ecuador. In addition, President Santos is planning to
move forward with a series of reforms involving oil and mining royalties, healthcare, the justice
system, and land.22 On September 9, 2010, President Santos unveiled a new ambitious trade
strategy aimed at increasing the value of Colombian exports by improving competitiveness,
increasing market access to new markets, and providing more government support. The new
strategy reflects President Santos’ support of the pending U.S.-Colombia FTA and his desire to
complete FTA negotiations with a number of countries.23
Violence in Colombia
Colombia has a long tradition of civilian, democratic rule, yet has been plagued by violence
throughout its history. The three major armed groups today are the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense Forces
of Colombia (AUC). Although the AUC disbanded in 2006, it remains a designated foreign
terrorist organization. The Colombian government has made significant achievements against
terrorist leadership targets in Colombia. A 2009 report by the State Department states that
Colombia has maintained and strengthened its “Democratic Security” strategy, which combines
military, intelligence, police operations, and efforts to demobilize combatants. It also provides
public services in rural areas previously dominated by armed groups. Kidnappings in Colombia
by criminal groups significantly decreased in 2008.24 The threat of extradition to the United States
has been a strong weapon against drug traffickers and terrorists. In 2008, Colombia extradited a
record 208 defendants to the United States for prosecution, most of which were Colombian
nationals.25
Violence in Colombia has its roots in a lack of state control over much of Colombian territory,
and a long history of poverty and inequality. The shift of cocaine production from Peru and
Bolivia to Colombia in the 1980s increased drug violence, and provided a source of revenue for


22 EIU, “Optimism for New Government but Challenges Remain,” August 12, 2010.
23 Global Insight, “Colombian President Unveils Trade Strategy,” September 9, 2010.
24 United States Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism
2008,
April 2009, pp. 11 and 155.
25 Ibid, p. 164.
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both guerrillas and paramilitaries. Conflicts between the Conservative and Liberal parties have
existed for more than 100 years and have killed hundreds of thousands of Colombians. While a
power-sharing agreement between the Liberal and Conservative parties ended a civil war in 1957,
it did not address the root causes of the violence. Numerous leftist guerrilla groups inspired by the
Cuban Revolution formed in the 1960s as a response to state neglect and poverty. Rightwing
paramilitaries were formed in the 1980s to defend landowners, many of them drug traffickers,
against guerrillas. Most of the rightist paramilitary groups were coordinated by the AUC, which
disbanded in 2006 after more than 30,000 of its members demobilized. The AUC has been
accused of gross human rights abuses and collusion with the Colombian Armed Forces in their
fight against the FARC and ELN. The AUC also participated in narcotics trafficking.
Human Rights Issues
The debate on U.S. policy toward Colombia and on the proposed free trade agreement with
Colombia has brought attention to allegations of human rights abuses by the FARC and ELN,
paramilitary groups, and the Colombian Armed Forces. The State Department’s February 2010
human rights report states that the Prosecutor General’s Office in Colombia has been assigned
1,302 cases concerning extrajudicial killings by the armed forces allegedly taking place between
1985 and 2009.26 Progress in addressing the backlog of cases concerning extrajudicial killings has
proceeded slowly.
Congress has annually required that the Secretary of State certify to Congress that the Colombian
military and policy forces are severing their links to the paramilitaries, investigating complaints
of abuses, and prosecuting those who have had credible charges made against them. In the
September 2010 report, the State Department determined and certified to Congress that the
Colombian government and armed forces are meeting statutory criteria related to human rights.
The report states that though there continues to be a need for improvement, the Colombian
government has taken positive steps to improve respect for human rights in the country.
According to the report, the Colombian government’s firm resolve on not tolerating extrajudicial
killings has led to a rapid reversal in this trend. The report also acknowledges the significant steps
that the Santos Administration has taken to demonstrate it is taking human rights seriously and its
actions on a the establishment of a roundtable on labor, meetings with NGOs and civil society
groups, increasing engagement with these groups, and outreach to Colombia’s courts to repair
relations with the judicial system.27
Relations between the Uribe Administration and human rights organizations were often tense
because of the groups’ doubts about President Uribe’s commitment to human rights. There was
some speculation that President Uribe would not renew the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights (UNHCHR) mandate in 2006. However, President Uribe extended the
UNHCHR’s mandate until October 30, 2010. The UNHCHR has criticized the paramilitary
demobilization process and the government, along with paramilitaries and leftist guerrillas, for
human rights violations.


26 U.S. Department of State, 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Colombia, March 11, 2010.
27 U.S. State Department, Office of the Spokesman, Determination and Certification of the Colombian Government and
Armed Forces with Respect to Human Rights Related Conditions,
September 15, 2010.
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The March 2010 UNHCHR report credited the Colombian government with making significant
progress in the situation regarding human rights and international humanitarian law in Colombia.
The UNHCHR acknowledged the significant progress the government has made in the drastic
reduction in the number of complaints of extra-judicial executions and prosecutions of
government officials for alleged links with paramilitary organizations. The report recognized the
government’s openness to international scrutiny with regard to human rights issues in Colombia.
The report also acknowledged the spirit of cooperation between the Colombian government and
UNHCHR-Colombia, and the commitment of the government to address human rights
challenges.28 As in previous reports, UNHCHR expressed concerns about the activities and
abuses committed by paramilitary forces that have rearmed, and by the FARC. The report
described the continued vulnerability of groups like women, children, Afro-Colombians, the
indigenous, journalists, union leaders, and human rights workers.29
U.S. Policy Toward Colombia
The focus of U.S. foreign policy toward Colombia has been to curb narcotics production and
trafficking. The United States also seeks to promote democracy and economic development in
order to strengthen regional security. Colombia’s spacious, rugged and sparsely populated
territory provides ample isolated terrain for drug cultivation and processing, and contributes to the
government’s difficulties in exerting control throughout the nation. The country is known for a
long tradition of democracy but has had to contend with continuing violence from leftist guerrilla
insurgencies dating from the 1960s and persistent drug trafficking activity. Plan Colombia, a
multi-year effort to address Colombia’s key challenges, has been the centerpiece of U.S. policy
toward Colombia since 2000.
The United States has made a significant commitment of funds and material support to help
Colombia and the Andean region fight drug trafficking since the development of Plan Colombia
in 1999. In support of the plan, Congress passed legislation providing $1.3 billion in assistance
for FY2000 (P.L. 106-246) and has provided more than $7 billion to support Plan Colombia from
FY2000 through FY2010 in both State Department and Defense Department accounts. Since
2002, Congress has granted the State Department expanded authority to use counternarcotics
funds for a unified campaign to fight both drug trafficking and terrorist organizations in
Colombia. In 2004, Congress raised the statutory cap on U.S. personnel allowed to be deployed to
Colombia in support of Plan Colombia. The three main illegally armed groups in Colombia
participate in drug production and trafficking and have been designated foreign terrorist
organizations by the State Department.
In 2008, there was significant debate in Congress about the proper balance between so-called
“hard-side” security assistance (i.e., equipment and training to the Colombian military and police)
and “soft-side” traditional development and rule of law programs. Some Members supported the
emphasis on security-related assistance to Colombia, while others expressed a desire to see more
emphasis on economic and social aid in the annual foreign assistance appropriations legislation.


28 United Nations General Assembly-Human Rights Council, “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia,” March 4, 2010.
29 Ibid.
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Since 2008, Congress has reduced and rebalanced assistance between development assistance and
security and counterdrug assistance.30
The Proposed CFTA: Issues for Congress
Economic Impact
If and when fully implemented, the U.S.-Colombia FTA would likely have a have a small, but
positive, net economic effect on the United States. Colombia’s economy is small compared to the
U.S. economy (1.6%) and the value of U.S. trade with Colombia is a very small percentage of
overall U.S. trade. Most of the economy-wide trade effects of trade liberalization from the FTA
would arise from Colombia’s removal of tariff barriers and other trade restrictions.
Approximately 90% of U.S. imports from Colombia enter the United States duty-free, either
unconditionally or under the ATPA or other U.S. provisions; hence, the marginal effects of the
FTA on the U.S. economy likely would not be significant.
Study Findings
A study by the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) assessed the potential
effects of a U.S.-Colombia FTA on the U.S. economy. The study found that, in general, the
primary impact of an FTA with Colombia would be increased U.S. exports to Colombia as a
result of enhanced U.S. access to the Colombian market.31 Major findings of the USITC study on
the likely effects of a U.S.-Colombia FTA on the U.S. economy, should the agreement be fully
implemented, include the following:32
• U.S. exports to Colombia would increase by $1.1 billion (13.7%) and U.S.
imports from Colombia would increase by $487 million (5.5%). U.S. GDP would
increase by over $2.5 billion (less than 0.05%).
• The largest estimated increases in U.S. exports to Colombia, by value, would be
in chemical, rubber, and plastic products; machinery and equipment; and motor
vehicles and parts. In terms of percentage increases, the largest increases in U.S.
exports would be in rice and dairy products.
• The largest estimated increases in U.S. imports from Colombia, by value, would
be in sugar and crops not elsewhere classified. The largest estimated increases in
U.S. imports, by percent, would be in dairy products and sugar.


30 For more information on Plan Colombia and U.S. foreign assitance, see CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Issues for
Congress
, by June S. Beittel.
31 United States International Trade Commission (USITC), U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement: Potential
Economy-wide and Selected Sectoral Effects,
Investigation No. TA-2104-023, USITC Publication 3896, December
2006. (Hereinafter USITC, December 2006).
32 USITC, December 2006, pp. 2-1 and 2-2.
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• On an industry level, the FTA would result in minimal to no effect on output or
employment for most sectors of the U.S. economy. The U.S. sugar sector would
be the only sector with an estimated decline of more than 0.1% in output or
employment. The largest increases in U.S. output and employment would be in
the processed rice, cereal grains, and wheat sectors.
The USITC reviewed seven studies that it found on the probable economic effects of a U.S.-
Colombia FTA.33 The results of the studies reviewed by USITC varied. One study found that U.S.
exports to Colombia would increase by 2.4% to 8.3%, while another study assessed that the
expected increase would be 44%. Two studies found that the largest increases in U.S. exports
would be in agriculture products, metal and wood, and food products. In assessing the impact on
U.S. imports from Colombia, the results of the studies also varied. One study found that U.S.
imports from Colombia would increase by 2.0% to 6.2%, while another found that U.S. imports
would increase by 37%. The largest increases would be in apparel and leather goods, textile
products, and metal and wood. The studies also assessed that an FTA would result in small overall
welfare gains for both the United States and Colombia and a positive impact on the U.S.
agricultural sector despite an increase in U.S. sugar imports.34
The non-governmental Institute for International Economics (IIE) also has a study assessing the
possible impact of a U.S.-Colombia FTA on both the U.S. and Colombian economies.35 The study
found that the proposed U.S.-Colombia FTA would be expected to result in an increase in total
trade between the two countries. The total value of U.S. imports from Colombia would increase
by an estimated 37% while the value of U.S. exports to Colombia would increase by an estimated
44%.36 In terms of welfare gains, the study assessed that a U.S.-Colombia FTA would result in
small welfare benefits for both partners, though the gains would be larger for Colombia. On a
sectoral level, the study found that an agreement would have a minor sectoral effect on the U.S.
economy, but the effect would be more significant for Colombia because it is the smaller partner.
The study indicated that Colombia would face certain structural adjustment issues with a
displacement of low-skilled workers in some sectors, but that these workers would all be able to
find job possibilities in the expanding sectors.37
One of the drawbacks to a bilateral free trade agreement is that it may result in trade diversion
because it is not fully inclusive of all regional trading partners.38 Trade diversion results when a


33 In its review of the seven economic studies, the USITC noted that these studies analyzed a proposed, possible, or
hypothetical U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement (FTA) and not the final text of the actual FTA that was the subject of
its investigation. Therefore, the underlying assumptions made in the reviewed studies may be different than those of the
USITC’s analysis.
34 USITC, December 2006, pp. 7-1 to 7-4.
35 Jeffrey J. Schott, editor, Institute for International Economics (IIE), Trade Relations Between Colombia and the
United States,
August 2006. (Hereinafter IIE, August 2006).
36 IIE August 2006, Chapter 4, “Potential Benefits of a U.S.-Colombia FTA,” by Dean A. DeRosa and John P. Gilbert.
This chapter uses empirical and applied methods of economic analysis to examine the potential quantitative impact of a
U.S.-Colombia FTA and is one of the studies reviewed by the USITC in its assessment of a U.S.-Colombia FTA.
37 Ibid, p. 112.
38 When a trade agreement lowers trade barriers on a good, production may shift from domestic producers to lower cost
foreign producers and result in substituting an imported good for the domestic good. This process is called trade
creation. Trade creation provides economic benefits as consumers have a wider choice of goods and services available
at lower costs. Trade creation also results in adjustment costs, however, usually in the form of domestic job losses as
(continued...)

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country enters into an FTA and then shifts the purchase of goods or services (imports) from a
country that is not an FTA partner to a country that is an FTA partner even though it may be a
higher cost producer. In the case of the United States and Colombia, for example, goods from the
United States may replace Colombia’s lower-priced imports from other countries in Latin
America. If this were to happen, the United States would now be the producer of that item, not
because it produces the good more efficiently, but because it is receiving preferential access to the
Colombian market. The IIE study assessed that a CFTA probably would not cause trade diversion
in the United States, but that it could cause some trade diversion in Colombia. The IIE study
estimated that an FTA with the United States would result in a decrease in Colombia’s imports
from other countries of approximately 9%.39
Agricultural Sector
The USITC study found that one of the impacts of a U.S.-Colombia FTA would be increased U.S.
agriculture exports to Colombia as a result of enhanced U.S. access to the Colombian market.40 In
the agricultural sector, key findings of the study include the following:
• The removal of tariff and nontariff barriers would likely result in a higher level of
U.S. exports of meat (beef and pork) to Colombia. U.S. imports of meat from
Colombia would eventually increase, but are currently restricted by Colombia’s
lack of certification to export fresh, chilled, or frozen beef or pork to the United
States.
• Colombia’s elimination of trade barriers and certain government support
measures under a CFTA would likely result in increased U.S. grain exports to
Colombia. Rice would account for most of the increase, with yellow corn and
wheat accounting for the remaining balance.
• U.S. exports to Colombia in soybeans, soybean products, and animal feeds would
likely increase under a CFTA.41
According to the IIE study, the main gains to Colombia in agricultural trade would likely be more
secure and preferential market access to the U.S. market. U.S. agricultural exports would gain a
small but not insignificant preference in the Colombian market for temperate-zone agricultural
produce. The study’s authors state that the long time periods for phasing out tariffs for sensitive
products and safeguard provisions that would replace Colombia’s price band system would lessen
the impact of increased imports from the United States. One section of the study describes the
results of a global applied general equilibrium model on the pending FTA. In terms of the overall
effects on Colombia’s economy, the results of the study imply that, in the medium term,
Colombia would lose a net amount of $63 million, or about 0.06% of GDP. In the longer term,

(...continued)

production shifts to another country.
39 IIE, August 2006, pp. 88-89.
40 USITC Publication 3896, p. xv.
41 Ibid, pp. xvi-xvii.
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however, Colombia would gain $550 million each year, or about a 0.5% permanent increase to
GDP.42
Labor Issues
The proposed CFTA includes the new trade-labor policy priorities that were established under the
May 10, 2007, “New Trade Policy for America” that was negotiated and agreed upon by
Congress and the Bush Administration. This agreement incorporated key Democratic priorities
relating to labor and other issues on U.S. trade policy. Key concepts in the new trade-labor policy
include fully enforceable provisions that (1) incorporate ILO core labor standards as stated in the
1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (henceforth referred to as
the ILO Declaration);43 and (2) prohibit partner countries from weakening laws relating to ILO
core labor standards in order to attract trade or investment.
A number of U.S. labor groups oppose the idea of a free trade agreement with Colombia. They
maintain that Colombia’s labor movement is under attack through violence, intimidation, and
harassment, as well as legal channels. In a letter to Congress opposing the U.S.-Colombia FTA, a
number of trade unions voiced their concern about the violence against Colombian trade
unionists.44 The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-
CIO) is opposed to the agreement and has issued statements saying that Colombian labor union
members face daily legal challenges to their rights to organize and bargain collectively and that
these challenges threaten the existence of the Colombian labor movement. While the AFL-CIO
acknowledges that Colombia has made progress in protecting union members, it continues to
have concerns regarding the government’s commitment to protect fundamental worker rights.45
The official position of Colombian labor unions on the U.S.-Colombia FTA is in opposition to the
agreement, but the feelings among labor unionists are mixed. In May 2007, 17 Colombian
unionists representing the textiles, flower, mining, and other Colombian industries visited the
U.S. Congress to speak out in favor of the agreement. Their main argument was that an FTA
would provide jobs for Colombia. However, another group of Colombian unions, consisting
mostly of government employees, have spoken out against the agreement, saying a CFTA would
interfere with the Colombian government’s right to govern the country, and would have a
negative effect on Colombia’s agriculture sector and the economy in general.46


42 IIE, August, 2006.
43 These are: “(a) the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; (b) the
elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor; (c) the effective abolition of child labor; and (d) the elimination
of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.” The ILO Declaration does not include in (c) the “worst
forms of child labor,” but the new text of the CFTA adds them to this list “for purposes of this agreement.”
44 A Letter to Congress from U.S. Trade Unions Opposing More U.S. Aid to the Colombian Military and the U.S.-
Colombia Free Trade Agrement,
June 11, 2007.
45 Colombia Reports, “Colombia too far behind on labor and human rights: U.S. union,” March 21, 2010.
46 Confederación General del Trabajo, letter to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and House Ways and Means Committee
Chairman Charles Rangel, January 30, 2006. Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Colombia (CUT), Rechazamos el
TLC Por Ello, Desautorizamos toda Opinión Sindical que Contrarie la Postura Institucional,
April 12, 2007. CUT,
TLC: Todos Limosnearemos Comida, April 2008.
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In November 2007, a high-level delegation from the ILO visited Colombia to assess the progress
being made there toward protecting workers’ rights. It was the first ILO-initiated mission to
Colombia since June 2006 when the Colombian government and representatives of Colombia’s
main employer and worker organizations signed the so-called Tripartite Agreement on Freedom
of Association and Democracy, which is aimed at securing the fundamental rights of workers.
Some observers viewed the ILO mission as a possible decision-making factor for some Members
of Congress who were concerned about the worker rights situation in Colombia.47 Following the
mission, the ILO Governing Body reviewed the Tripartite Agreement and “acknowledged that
there had been progress in social dialogue and freedom of association in the country due to the
Tripartite Agreement”, but also added that the situation needed improvement.48 In the ILO’s 2010
Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations
(CEACR), it expressed satisfaction regarding the measures the Colombian government had taken
in improving protection of freedom of association and collective bargaining.49 The 2010 ILO
report on the application of labor standards removed Colombia from the 25 countries it examined
for failure to comply with international labor standards. However, the report noted that Colombia
was taken off the list after a lengthy debate and that it had been taken off the list so as to break a
gridlock in that particular year.50
In response to U.S. concerns regarding worker rights in Colombia, the Embassy of Colombia in
the United States has been reporting the progress that Colombia has made since 2001 in
strengthening the rights, benefits, and security of unions in Colombia. According to progress
reports issued by the embassy, government reforms in Colombia since 2002 have helped protect
Colombian worker rights to form unions, bargain collectively, and strike. These include enhanced
efforts to open dialogue with union members, including meetings with the President and Vice
President of Colombia.51 The 2010 report issued by the embassy provides data indicating that
homicides dropped by 45% between 2002 and 2009. It also states that a protection program aimed
at vulnerable groups, including union members, and the creation of the special unit at the
Prosecutor General’s Office have led to an 86% reduction in the level of homicides of union
members. The report acknowledges that any homicide is one too many, but also states that it is
important to recognize that Colombia has made significant process in protecting labor and human
rights.52


47 Bureau of National Affairs (BNA), International Trade Reporter, “Fate of U.S. Free Trade Pact with Colombia
Could Hinge in Part on ILO Visit This Month,” November 22, 2007.
48 International Labour Organization (ILO), “ILO Governing Body concludes 301st session - Considers labour situation
in Myanmar, Colombia and other countries, welcomes growing links with World Bank,” Press Release, March 20,
2008.
49 ILO, 2010 Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, February
2010, at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/gbe/ceacr2010.htm.
50 ILO, Conference Committee on the Application of Standards: Extracts from the Record of Proceedings (ILC 2010),
at http://www.ilo.org/global.
51 Embassy of Colombia, Washington, D.C., Colombia: A Progress Report: Strengthening the Rights, Benefits, and
Security of Unions,
October 2007.
52 Embassy of Colombia, Washington, D.C., Ensuring Justice and Protecting Labor and Human Rights in Colombia,
2010.
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Violence Issues
A number of Members of Congress oppose the FTA with Colombia because of concerns about
violence against union members and other terrorist activity in Colombia. In a press release issued
in 2007, the House leadership issued a statement regarding the concerns regarding the “violence
in Colombia, the impunity, the lack of investigations and prosecutions, and the role of the
paramilitary.” The House Members stated that there must be “concrete evidence of sustained
results on the ground in Colombia” before they could support the FTA. In June 2007, several
Democratic House members said that the high rate of violence against trade unionists in
Colombia, made Colombia an “unfit free trade agreement partner for the United States.”53
Republican and some Democratic supporters of the FTA take issue with these charges, stating that
Colombia has made progress in recent years to curb the violence in the country. Certain Members
have stated that Colombia is a crucial ally of the United States in Latin America and that if the
FTA with Colombia is not passed, it may lead to further problems in the region. In a report issued
by USTR, a number of quotes by Members of Congress in support of a trade agreement with
Colombia were compiled. They were generally quoted as saying that the agreement had
implications for the economic and security interests of the United States in Colombia and that
Colombia had made significant progress in cutting down on the number of murders and other
criminal activities.54
The Bush Administration took the position that Colombia had made significant advances to
combat violence and instability under the Uribe Administration. A March 2008 fact sheet issued
by the Press Secretary of the White House stated that President Uribe “responded decisively to
concerns over the situation in Colombia that have been raised by some Members of Congress.”55
The fact sheet stated that President Uribe had demobilized tens of thousands of members of
paramilitary fighters; established an independent prosecutor’s unit; created a special program to
protect labor activists; and revised the pending FTA to include more rigorous labor protections.
The fact sheet also stated that under President Uribe’s leadership, Colombia had been a “strong
and capable partner in fighting drugs, crime, and terror.”56
President Uribe acknowledged that, while there continued to be killings in Colombia, the
situation had improved under his administration and the Colombian government had been quite
successful in reducing violence through the justice and peace process. Government reports
indicate that over 50,000 guerrilla members have been demobilized as a result of the
government’s recovery of control over territory and the implementation of a peace process with
paramilitary groups. In addition, the reports state that confessions obtained from former
paramilitaries and guerillas have provided important information in the investigation of past


53 BNA, International Trade Reporter, “Five Democratic Lawmakers Blast Proposed Colombia FTA Due to Violence,”
June 14, 2007.
54 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Broad Support for U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: What
They’re Saying,
March 2008.
55 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement Essential To Our
National Security,”
March 12, 2008.
56 Ibid.
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violence, including that against union members.57 Data provided by the Colombian government
indicate that assassinations of labor union activists and teachers decreased by 86% between 2001
and 2009, from 205 in 2001 to 28 in 2008. Total homicides in Colombia decreased from 26,540 in
2001 to 15,817 in 2009 (a 68% decrease). Homicides of labor union members account for a very
small percentage of total homicides in Colombia: 0.2% of total homicides in 2009.58
Regarding the impunity issue, the Uribe Administration made significant efforts to reform its
judicial system and increase transparency. In 2004, constitutional reforms to the judicial system
were approved and, in 2007, an “accusatory” system replaced the inquisitorial system.59
According to the Colombian government, resources for both the judicial branch and the Office of
the Prosecutor General have increased annually since 2002. In 2008, the government estimated a
75% increase in funding. The government reported that prosecutions had increased considerably
between 2001 and 2009, from virtually none in 2001 to 84 convictions and 69 sentences in
2009.60
There is a lack of evidence regarding whether or not labor activists were killed because of their
union activity. Very few investigations have been completed—of the 470 union murders that
occurred between 2002, when President Uribe first took office, and 2007, 97% remain unsolved.
In January 2007, the Colombian Attorney General’s Office set up a new special labor unit of 13
prosecutors and 78 investigators to investigate 187 priority cases.61 According to the State
Department’s human rights report covering 2009, the Colombian Prosecutor General’s office has
obtained 234 convictions (209 for murders) of 334 perpetrators of violent crimes against trade
unionists since 2000. However, a vast majority of the cases are either under investigation or in
preliminary phases of the prosecutorial process.62
Conclusion
President Barack Obama met with Colombia’s President Alvaro Uribe at the White House on
June 29, 2009. President Obama stated after the meeting that he had asked U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR) Ron Kirk to work closely with Colombian government representatives to
see how the two countries could proceed on the pending FTA. In March 2010, USTR Kirk stated
to the Senate Finance Committee that the Obama Administration is working on developing a
finite list of proposals to give to Colombia to resolve the issues that blocked congressional
approval of a free trade agreement with the United States. He said that the Administration is
developing a workable list of legislative and other issues that the two countries can work through


57 Embassy of Colombia, Ensuring Justice and Protecting Labor and Human Rights in Colombia, 2010.
58 Ibid.
59 Embassy of Colombia, Ensuring Justice and Protecting Labor and Human Rights in Colombia, 2010.
60 Ibid.
61 Frank Bajak, “U.S. Unionists Alarmed by Colombia Woes,” Miami Herald, February 13, 2008; and “Trade, Death
and Drugs,” The Economist, May 19, 2007.
62 U.S. Department of State, 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Colombia, March 11, 2010.
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and that it would not be fair to “keep moving the goal posts” for Colombia. The proposals would
likely be related to worker rights protection and persecution.63
The Obama Administration made a case for pursuing FTAs as part of the National Security
Strategy of the United States, but did not specifically mention Colombia in the report.64 Earlier in
2010, Michael Froman, Deputy National Security Adviser for International Economic Affairs and
Deputy Assistant to the President had suggested that the administration would make a case for
moving the pending FTA with Colombia as part of the national security agenda, at the appropriate
time.65 In April 2010, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates met with President Alvaro Uribe
and Defense Minister Gabriel Silva Luján in Colombia to discuss bilateral collaboration on
national security issues, and stated that his talks extended to the importance of ratifying an FTA
between the two countries. Secretary Gates spoke positively about the progress that Colombia had
made in lowering violence and expressed that a U.S.-Colombia FTA would be beneficial for both
countries.66
The Bush Administration made the argument that the U.S.-Colombia FTA was a national security
issue. It stated that passage of an agreement “would bring increased economic opportunity to the
people of Colombia through sustained economic growth, new employment opportunities, and
increased investment.”67 It also stated that an FTA would “reinforce democracy by fighting
corruption, increasing transparency, and fostering accountability and the rule of law.”68
The debate surrounding the pending U.S.-Colombia FTA has mostly centered on the violence
issues in Colombia. Many proponents of the agreement see it as having important political
implications for Colombia and U.S. interests in the region. They believe that an FTA with
Colombia would go beyond the U.S.-Colombia economic relationship because it would be
viewed by other Latin American nations as indicative of how the United States views its
relationship with the region. Some Members of Congress who have voiced support for the
agreement believe that the United States needs to support its ally in the region and that if
Congress does not pass the trade agreement, it could be used by Venezuela or Ecuador to turn
Colombia against the United States.
The leaders of several countries in Latin America have voiced support for the pending free trade
agreements with Colombia and Panama, stating that the passage of these agreements would bring
economic benefits to these countries and improve the overall U.S. relationship with Latin
America.69 In contrast, the President of Venezuela has criticized FTAs with the United States and


63 BNA, International Trade Reporter, “Kirk Says Obama Administration Working on Proposals for Colombia to
Unblock FTA,” March 11, 2010.
64 The White House, National Security Strategy, May 2010.
65 BNA, International Trade Reporter, “Obama Administration sees FTAs as Part of National Security,” March 18,
2010.
66 American Forces Press Service, “Gates Praises Colombia as ‘Exporter of Security’,” April 15, 2010.
67 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement Essential To Our
National Security,”
March 12, 2008.
68 Ibid.
69 Letters from the Presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Mexico to the leadership of the
House of Representatives, October 2007.
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has launched his own idea for trade policy through a socially oriented trade block that would
include mechanisms for poverty reduction.70
In the United States, opponents of an agreement with Colombia argue that passing an FTA would
be rewarding the government for its shortcomings in its struggle against drug trafficking, illegally
armed groups, protecting worker rights, and the history of violence in the country. Some argue
that the pending agreement would increase drug production and violence in the country and that it
could increase Colombia’s ongoing civil conflict because it would result in rural displacement.
They argue that trade liberalization would drive down the prices of agricultural products in
Colombia and put many farmers out of business.71 They maintain that small farmers would have
no choice but to migrate to urban areas, work in the drug cultivation zones, or affiliate with
illegally armed groups.72 Some opponents of a CFTA believe that trade agreements have negative
socioeconomic impacts. They argue that agreements such as NAFTA and CAFTA-DR, upon
which the CFTA is based, are failed models and have jeopardized the environment, undermined
worker rights, and caused job losses in the United States.
Much of the U.S. business community supports a free trade agreement with Colombia. They view
the pending agreement as a big opportunity for U.S. businesses and for exports of U.S.
agricultural products. The National Pork Producers Council, for example, argues that a trade
agreement would provide significant new export opportunities for U.S. pork producers and is
leading a coalition of U.S. agricultural organizations in support of the trade agreement.73 The
business community often states that an FTA with Colombia would “level the playing field” with
Colombia by providing U.S. producers of goods and services the same access to the Colombian
market that Colombian businesses currently have in the U.S. market. They also believe that a
trade agreement would give U.S. businesses a competitive edge in Colombia over other foreign-
owned businesses. A U.S. Chamber of Commerce representative said that an agreement would
help Colombia fight narco-trafficking and violence “by developing sustainable economic
alternatives to the drug trade.”74
U.S. exporters have urged congressional leaders and the Obama Administration to resolve issues
that are preventing the stalled free trade agreements with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea
from being implemented. In a July 2010 letter to House and Senate congressional leaders, 42
agricultural and food organizations urged Congress to move forward with the FTAs, arguing that
other countries throughout the world are negotiating and implementing free trade agreements and
that U.S. exporters are losing market share as a result.75 They argue that Colombia has been the
largest market in South America for U.S. agricultural exports over the past five years and that the
U.S.-Colombia FTA would result in U.S. agricultural export gains of more than $815 million per
year after full implementation. They are concerned that the FTA between Colombia and Canada


70 See CRS Report RL32488, Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy, by Mark P. Sullivan.
71 Public Citizen and the Washington Office on Latin America, Peru and Colombia FTAs Projected to Increase Drug
Trafficking, Violence, and Instability in the Andes,
undated.
72 Ibid.
73 National Pork Producers Council, NPCC Applauds President for Sending Trade Deal to Congress, April 7, 2008.
74 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamer Hails u.S.-Colombia Trade Deal, February 27, 2006.
75 Rosella Brevetti, “Agricultural Groups Call for Rapid Implementation of Stalled FTAs,” International Trade
Reporter,
July 15, 2010.
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that is expected to be implemented before the end of 2010 will cause U.S. agricultural exports to
Colombia to fall. U.S. wheat producers estimate that the U.S. share of the Colombian wheat
import market could fall from about 70% to 30% if Colombia’s FTA with Canada is
implemented.76

Author Contact Information

M. Angeles Villarreal

Specialist in International Trade and Finance
avillarreal@crs.loc.gov, 7-0321




76 Ibid.
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