American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a
Complex Threat
Jerome P. Bjelopera
Analyst in Organized Crime and Terrorism
Mark A. Randol
Specialist in Domestic Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism
September 20, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41416
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Summary
Between May 2009 and August 2010, arrests were made for 19 “homegrown,” jihadist-inspired
terrorist plots by American citizens or legal permanent residents of the United States. Two of
these resulted in attacks—U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan’s alleged assault at Fort Hood in Texas
and Abdulhakim Muhammed’s shooting at the U.S. Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock,
Arkansas—and produced 14 deaths. By comparison, in more than seven years from the
September 11, 2001, terrorist strikes (9/11) through May 2009, there were 21 such plots. Two
resulted in attacks, and no more than six plots occurred in a single year (2006). The apparent
spike in such activity after May 2009 suggests that at least some Americans—even if a tiny
minority—continue to be susceptible to ideologies supporting a violent form of jihad.
This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred
since 9/11. “Homegrown” and “domestic” are terms that describe terrorist activity or plots
perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or
visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term “jihadist” describes radicalized
individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the
establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious
leader known as a caliph. The term “violent jihadist” characterizes jihadists who have made the
jump to illegally supporting, plotting, or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity.
The report also discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist
activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorism, describes law enforcement and
intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. It also
outlines actions underway to build trust and partnership between community groups and
government agencies and the tensions that may occur between law enforcement and engagement
activities. One appendix provides details about each of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorist
plots and attacks. A second appendix describes engagement and partnership activities by federal
agencies with Muslim-American communities. Finally, the report offers policy considerations for
Congress.
There is an “executive summary” at the beginning that summarizes the report’s findings,
observations, and policy considerations for Congress.
Congressional Research Service
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Contents
Executive Summary .................................................................................................................... 1
Homegrown Jihadi Terrorists: The Problem........................................................................... 1
How Do People Become Violent Jihadists? ..................................................................... 2
Analysis of Homegrown Jihadist Plots ............................................................................ 2
Combating Homegrown Violent Jihadists .............................................................................. 3
Preventive Policing ......................................................................................................... 3
State and Local Authorities.............................................................................................. 4
Investigative Approaches ................................................................................................ 4
Trust and Partnership ...................................................................................................... 4
Balancing Security and Liberty ....................................................................................... 4
Issues for Congress ............................................................................................................... 5
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 6
Homegrown Violent Jihadists...................................................................................................... 8
Shortcomings and Strengths .................................................................................................. 8
Radicalization and Violent Extremism....................................................................................... 11
From Radicalization to Violent Extremism .......................................................................... 12
Forces and Factors in the Forging of Terrorists .................................................................... 13
Intermediaries ............................................................................................................... 14
Social Networks............................................................................................................ 16
The Internet .................................................................................................................. 18
Jailhouse Jihadism ........................................................................................................ 20
Overview of Post 9/11 Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism Plots and Attacks................................... 22
Overarching Themes ........................................................................................................... 26
A Variety of Endgames.................................................................................................. 26
Little Stomach for Suicide or Martyrdom ...................................................................... 32
The Success of Lone Wolves ......................................................................................... 33
Varied Capabilities ........................................................................................................ 33
Combating Homegrown Terrorism: Enforcement Activities ....................................................... 35
Intelligence Approaches ...................................................................................................... 36
Preventive Policing ....................................................................................................... 37
The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement .................................................................... 42
Investigative Approaches .................................................................................................... 44
The Capone Approach................................................................................................... 45
Agent Provocateur Cases............................................................................................... 46
Combating Homegrown Terrorism: Building Trust and Partnership ........................................... 50
Engagement with Communities........................................................................................... 51
Federal, State, and Local Government Activities ........................................................... 52
Muslim Community Activities ...................................................................................... 52
Risks and Challenges .................................................................................................... 53
The Tension Between Enforcement and Engagement Activities ........................................... 54
Policy Considerations for Congress ........................................................................................... 58
Unifying the National Effort to Combat Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism .............................. 58
Past Initiatives............................................................................................................... 60
A National Strategy for Combating Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism ............................... 61
Congressional Research Service
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Issues a National Strategy Could Address ...................................................................... 62
Figures
Figure 1. Homegrown Jihadist Terrorist Plots and Attacks Since 9/11:
Terrorist Profile and Training ................................................................................................. 24
Figure 2. Homegrown Jihadist Terrorist Plots and Attacks Since 9/11:
Targets, Endgames, and Investigative Tools............................................................................ 25
Figure 3. Counterterrorism Context ........................................................................................... 36
Appendixes
Appendix A. Summary of Post 9/11 Homegrown Violent Jihadist Terrorist Plots ....................... 65
Appendix B. Federal Engagement and Partnership Activities With Muslim-American
Communities........................................................................................................................ 118
Contacts
Author Contact Information .................................................................................................... 124
Congressional Research Service
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Executive Summary
This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred
since 9/11. It discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity.
It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorist activity, describes law enforcement and
intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. It also
outlines actions underway to build trust and partnership between community groups and
government agencies and the tensions that may occur between law enforcement and engagement
activities.
The report does not address terrorist activity against the United States conducted by foreigners,
such as the airline bombing attempts by Farouk Abdulmutallab (Christmas Day 2009), the
perpetrators of the Transatlantic Airliners plot (August 2006), or the “shoe bomber” Richard Reid
(December 2001). Nor does the report address domestic terrorism attributed to violent extremism
inspired by right-wing or left-wing ideologies, environmental, animal rights, or anti-abortion
causes.
Specific plots and attacks are described throughout the report to support analytic findings. A full
description of each of the post 9/11 cases is provided chronologically in Appendix A of the
report. Appendix B describes engagement and partnership activities by federal agencies with
Muslim-American communities. Finally, the report offers policy considerations for Congress.
Homegrown Jihadi Terrorists: The Problem
“Homegrown” is the term that describes terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United
States or abroad by American citizens, permanent legal residents, or visitors radicalized largely
within the United States. The term “jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an
ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate,
or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph.
There have been 40 homegrown violent jihadist plots or attacks in the United States since
September 11, 2001 (9/11).1 As part of a much-discussed apparent expansion of terrorist activity
in the United States, between May 2009 and August 2010, arrests were made for 19
“homegrown,” jihadist-inspired terrorist plots by American citizens or legal permanent residents
of the United States. Two of these resulted in attacks. Most of the 2009-2010 homegrown plots
likely reflect a trend in jihadist terrorist activity away from schemes directed by core members of
significant terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda.
Homegrown violent jihadists may exhibit a number of conventional shortcomings when
compared to international terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda. Homegrown violent jihadists,
some say, possibly lack deep understanding of specialized tradecraft such as bomb making. They
may not have the financing, training camps, support networks, and broad expertise housed in
international organizations. These apparent shortcomings may keep some homegrown violent
jihadists from independently engaging in large-scale suicide strikes. Because of this, they may
1 Throughout this report, numerous plots involving persons indicted by the Department of Justice are discussed. This
report does not presume the guilt of indicted individuals in pending federal cases.
Congressional Research Service
1
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
turn to violence requiring less preparation, such as assaults using firearms. These shortcomings
pose challenges for law enforcement, intelligence, and security officials charged with detecting,
preventing, or disrupting terrorist plots. It is likely much harder to detect smaller conspiracies that
can develop quickly.
How Do People Become Violent Jihadists?
Individuals can become jihadist terrorists by radicalizing and then adopting violence as a tactic.
“Radicalization” describes the process of acquiring and holding extremist, or jihadist beliefs. This
activity is not necessarily illegal. For this report, “violent extremism” describes violent action
taken on the basis of radical or extremist beliefs. For many, “violent extremism” is synonymous
with “violent jihadist” and “jihadist terrorist.” In other words, when someone moves from simply
believing in jihad to illegally pursuing it via violent methods, he becomes a terrorist. Because the
move from belief to violence is so individualized, there is no single path that individuals follow to
become full-fledged terrorists.
Intermediaries, social networks, the Internet, and prisons have been cited as playing key roles in
the radicalization process. Intermediaries—charismatic individuals—often help persuade
previously law-abiding citizens to radicalize or even become violent jihadists. Social networks,
virtual or actual, support and reinforce the decisions individuals make as they embrace violent
jihad as does perusal of online materials. While there has been much discussion regarding the
powerful influence online jihadist material may have on the formation of terrorists, no consensus
has emerged regarding the Web and terrorism. Prisons, seen by some as potential hotbeds of
radicalization, have not played a large role in producing homegrown jihadists.
Analysis of Homegrown Jihadist Plots
Homegrown violent jihadist activity since 9/11 defies easy categorization. No workable general
profile of domestic violent jihadists exists. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has indicted people
involved in 40 terrorist plots and attacks since 9/11. According to Congressional Research Service
(CRS) analysis, these exhibit four broad themes: a variety of endgames, little stomach for suicide
or martyrdom among plotters, successful attacks by lone wolves, and a wide range of capabilities
among the plots.
• Endgames: Thirteen plots involved individuals interested in becoming foreign
fighters in conflict zones involving violent jihad abroad. Eleven plots intended or
used explosives or incendiary devices. Four intended to use or did use firearms.
Twelve attacks and plots incorporated multiple, unspecific, or unique tactics.
Finally, outside of the 40 violent plots, since 9/11, at least eleven schemes
intended from the start only to fund or materially support the activities of their
jihadi brethren.
• Suicide or Martyrdom: According to publicly-available information, only six
plots included individuals who professed interest in killing themselves while
engaged in violent jihad.
• Success of Lone Wolves: Lone wolves conducted all four successful homegrown
attacks since 9/11.
• Divergent Capabilities: Among the 40 homegrown plots since 9/11, the
operational capabilities of participants diverge greatly. Some evinced terrorist
Congressional Research Service
2
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
tradecraft such as bomb making skills. Others appeared to be far less
experienced.
Combating Homegrown Violent Jihadists
The spate of recent arrests should not obscure the challenges facing law enforcement in disrupting
homegrown terrorist plotting. Counterterrorism activity exists within two broad contexts. The
first of these involves addressing radicalization, much of which occurs in the open marketplace of
ideas. The second context is more “operational” and encompasses both violent jihadist plots—
largely involving secretive illegal activity—and the police work used to dismantle them. The
latter context, by necessity, also occurs outside of the public’s view. Government efforts to
combat domestic violent jihad straddle both of these arenas.
Preventive Policing
In the post-9/11 environment, the public has expected law enforcement to adopt a proactive
posture in order to disrupt terrorist plots before an attack occurs. Investigative leads about
terrorist plots in the homeland may originate from foreign intelligence sources. But, for the most
part, information about homegrown plots is available only through domestic intelligence
activities. In order to proactively gather intelligence, law enforcement has adopted a preventive
policing approach that focuses not just on crime that has occurred, but on the possibility that a
crime may be committed in the future.
In this context, a major challenge for law enforcement is gauging how quickly and at what point
individuals move from radicalized beliefs to violence so that a terrorist plot can be detected and
disrupted. At the federal level, DOJ and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have
implemented a forward-leaning approach with a revision to the Attorney General’s Guidelines for
Domestic FBI Operations. 2 The revision, meant to streamline the FBI’s investigations and make
them more proactive, has at its heart a new investigative tool, assessments. These allow for the
investigation of individuals or groups without factual predication. The new guidelines have,
however, generated some controversy among civil libertarians.
Also critical among the proactive approaches employed by law enforcement is the monitoring of
Internet and social networking sites. The USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) authorizes the FBI to
use National Security Letters to obtain a range of information including data pertaining to email
and Internet use. It appears that U.S. law enforcement has effectively exploited the Internet—
which radicalizing individuals can mine for information and violent jihadists use while plotting—
in its pursuit of terrorists. A review of criminal complaints and indictments in terrorism cases
reveals that the FBI has exploited the Internet and/or email communications to build cases against
defendants in at least twelve of the post-9/11 cases studied in this report. Although much is said
about terrorist use of the Internet for recruitment, training, and communications, these cases
suggest that terrorists and aspiring terrorists will not find the Internet a uniformly permissive
environment.
2 The FBI declined to speak with CRS about its counterterrorism programs, investigative activities, or engagement
efforts for this report.
Congressional Research Service
3
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
State and Local Authorities
The role of state, local, and tribal law enforcement in detecting nascent terrorist plotting is
particularly important, especially considering the challenges involved in detecting lone wolves
and homegrown jihadist groups with few connections to larger terrorist organizations. Nine years
after the 9/11 attacks, integrating state, local, and tribal law enforcement into the national
counterterrorism effort continues to be an abiding concern of policymakers. DOJ and the FBI
have established Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) to help coordinate federal, state, and local
investigative activities. States and major urban areas have also established intelligence fusion
centers with federal agencies, in part to share intelligence. The Nationwide Suspicious Activity
Report Initiative (NSI) is a program to push terrorism-related information generated locally
between and among federal, state, local, and tribal levels via fusion centers. NSI is in the process
of being implemented throughout the country.
Investigative Approaches
To counter violent jihadist plots, U.S. law enforcement has employed two tactics that have been
described as the “Al Capone” approach and the use of “agent provocateurs.” These tactics have
long been used in a wide variety of cases but apparently have particular utility in counterterrorism
investigations. As the “Al Capone,” moniker suggests, historically, these tactics have been
employed against many types of targets such as mafia bosses, white-collar criminals, and corrupt
public servants. The Capone approach involves apprehending individuals linked to terrorist plots
on lesser, non-terrorism-related offenses such as immigration violations. In agent provocateur
cases—often called sting operations—government undercover operatives befriend suspects and
offer to facilitate their activities. The use of these techniques has generated public controversy
and illustrates a bind that law enforcement faces. It has been charged with preventing homegrown
terrorists, but its use of preemptive techniques spawns concern among community members and
civil libertarians.
Trust and Partnership
Following the 9/11 attacks, law enforcement agencies came to realize the prevention of terrorist
attacks would require the cooperation and assistance of American Muslim, Arab and Sikh
communities. At the same time, Muslim, Arab, and Sikh Americans recognized the need to define
themselves as distinctly American communities who, like other Americans, desire to help prevent
another terrorist attack. The concept of building trust through engagement and partnership is
rooted in the community policing model developed by law enforcement professionals in the
1990s. Currently, numerous U.S. government agencies conduct outreach, engage, and partner
with Muslim-American communities. From the community angle, several Arab-, Muslim-, Sikh-
and South Asian-American community groups have formed partnerships with government
officials.
Balancing Security and Liberty
Although many public officials support community engagement, significant challenges may exist
in the development of programs that foster substantive relationships rather than token discussions
or community relations events. Striking a balance between security and liberty—relying on local
communities to provide critical information to further proactive policing while simultaneously
building trust and preserving the freedoms of community members—is seen as difficult. Law
Congressional Research Service
4
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
enforcement investigative activities and tactics may pose particular complications in partnership
building. Especially challenging are law enforcement activities perceived by community
members to unfairly target law-abiding citizens or infringe on speech, religion, assembly, or due
process rights.
The hurdles evident in striking a balance between security and liberty in community engagement
is evident in law enforcement efforts to recruit and manage informants—essential to many
investigations. Some Muslim community activists fear that law enforcement coerces immigrants
into becoming informants, especially those with legal problems or those applying for green cards.
Others fear that informants target and potentially entice impressionable youth into fictitious
terrorist plots. There has also been public discussion of the trustworthiness of informants with
criminal backgrounds. CRS analysis of open source reports indicate that confidential informants
were used in at least 18 of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorism cases. In eight of those
cases, the informants had criminal histories. In considering the tradeoff between security and
liberty, policy makers face a judgment in those cases where an investigative tactic might inflame
members of a particular community: Is the impact of that tactic counterproductive in the long run,
or is it necessary, short-term collateral damage?
Issues for Congress
Many agencies at all levels of government are engaged in counterterrorism activities; however,
there is no unified strategy, plan, or framework focused on homegrown jihadist terrorism. The
Obama Administration has articulated a broad National Security Strategy, and continues to
operate with a counterterrorism plan developed in the George W. Bush Administration which is
predominantly focused on the foreign terrorist threat to the United States. The Obama
Administration’s strategy addresses the threat of violent extremism in the United States only in
general terms and as part of a broad counterterrorism effort. It may be claimed that the strategy is
not intended to include specifics and that fleshing out policy and coordinating efforts is best left
to individual executive branch agencies cooperating with one another. However, even among the
agencies, apparently no such strategy for combating homegrown jihadist terrorism exists. For
many other counterterrorism and homeland security activities—disrupting terrorist travel,
combating specific threats such as biological and other weapons of mass destruction, there are
discrete strategies that outline specific activities and responsibilities.
Congress may opt to consider requiring that the executive branch produce a national strategy,
framework, or plan to combat violent extremism domestically. In such a strategy, the following
specific issues would likely need to be addressed:
• Identifying Radicalization and Interdicting Attempts at Recruitment: It has
not been entirely settled which agencies have which responsibilities in this area.
• Countering Radicalization: What role is there for government, if any, in
countering radicalization—particularly radical jihadist ideology which is not
necessarily illegal—before it manifests itself in actual violence? Should the
government be in the business of contesting radical ideology and extremist
narratives within the United States?
• Enhancing Domestic Intelligence: According to former and current intelligence
and law enforcement officials, there is no national estimate of domestic terrorist
threats; national domestic intelligence collection plan; nor domestic intelligence
collection requirements, priorities, or coordination.
Congressional Research Service
5
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Congress may also consider requiring the Director of National Intelligence to examine whether
and how to develop a national domestic intelligence framework or plan as part of a unified
strategy to combat violent extremism within the United States.
Introduction
As part of a much-discussed apparent uptick in terrorist activity in the United States, between
May 2009 and August 2010, arrests were made for 19 “homegrown,” jihadist-inspired terrorist
plots by American citizens or legal permanent residents of the United States. 3 Two of these
resulted in attacks—U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan’s alleged assault at Fort Hood in Texas and
Abdulhakim Muhammed’s shooting at the U.S. Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock,
Arkansas—produced 14 deaths. By comparison, in more than seven years from the September 11,
2001 terrorist strikes (9/11) through May 2009, there were 21 such plots. Two resulted in attacks,
and never more than six occurred in a single year (2006).4 The apparent spike in such activity
after May 2009 suggests that at least some Americans—even if a tiny minority—are susceptible
to ideologies supporting a violent form of jihad.
How serious is the threat of homegrown, violent jihadists in the United States? Experts differ. In
May 2010 congressional testimony, terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman emphasized that it is,
“difficult to be complacent when an average of one plot is now being uncovered per month over
the past year or more—and perhaps even more are being hatched that we don’t know about.”5 By
contrast, a recent academic study of domestic Muslim radicalization supported by the National
Institute of Justice reveals that “the record over the past eight years contains relatively few
examples of Muslim-Americans that have radicalized and turned toward violent extremism” and
concludes that, “Homegrown terrorism is a serious but limited problem.”6 Moreover, the
3 We employ the terms “jihadist” and “violent jihadists” throughout this report. For our purposes, the term “jihadist”
describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the
establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph.
Jihadists draw on Salafi Islam—the peaceful fundamentalist belief that society should be governed by Islamic law
based on the Quran and following the model of the immediate followers and companions of the Prophet Muhammad. In
this paper, the term “violent jihadist” characterizes jihadists who have made the jump to illegally supporting, plotting,
or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity. We employ the terms “homegrown” and “domestic” as jihadist terrorist
activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, permanent legal residents, or
visitors radicalized largely within the United States. For more on Salafi Islam, see CRS Report RS21695, The Islamic
Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya, by Christopher M. Blanchard. For more on Al Qaeda’s global network, see
CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S.
Policy, coordinated by John Rollins.
4 See Appendix A for a summary of publicly-available information regarding these alleged plots and attacks. The
summary is presented in reverse chronological order. The two attacks between 9/11 and May 2009 involved Hasan
Akbar and Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar. On March 23, 2003, two days after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, U.S. Army
Sergeant Akbar killed two U.S. Army officers and wounded 14 others at U.S. Army Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait, 25
miles from the Iraq border. On March 3, 2006, Taheri-Azar, a 22-year-old naturalized American citizen from Iran,
drove his sport utility vehicle (SUV) into a crowd at The Pit, a popular student gathering spot at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill. The SUV struck and injured several people.
5 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and
Terrorism Risk Assessment, Written Testimony of Bruce Hoffman, Hearing: “Internet Terror Recruitment and
Tradecraft: How Can We Address an Evolving Tool While Protecting Free Speech,” 111th Cong., 2nd sess., May 26,
2010, p. 2., http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20100526101502-95237.pdf.
6 David Schanzer, Charles Kurzman, and Ebrahim Moosa, Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim Americans, Jan. 6, 2010, p.
1, http://www.sanford.duke.edu/news/Schanzer_Kurzman_Moosa_Anti-Terror_Lessons.pdf. Hereafter: Schanzer, et.al,
Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim Americans.
Congressional Research Service
6
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
radicalization of violent jihadists may not be an especially new phenomenon for the United
States. Estimates suggest that between 1,000 and 2,000 American Muslims engaged in violent
jihad during the 1990s in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya.7 More broadly, a terrorism expert
notes that during the 1970s domestic terrorists “committed 60-70 terrorist incidents, most of them
bombings, on U.S. soil every year—a level of activity 15-20 times that seen in most years since
9/11.”8 Few of the attacks during the 1970s appear to have involved individuals motivated by
jihadist ideas.
But as Dr. Hoffman’s comments suggest, the November 2009 Fort Hood shootings, which killed
thirteen, and a series of other plots and arrests in 2009 and 2010, are worrying. Secretary of
Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, has said that authorities are “just beginning to confront the
reality that we have this issue ... and that we really don’t have a very good handle on how you
prevent someone from becoming a violent extremist.”9 A single successful attack can incur scores
of casualties and cause considerable socioeconomic disruption. Regardless of their novelty,
frequency, or lethality, violent attacks fostered by violent jihadists radicalized in the United States
remain a security concern.
The bulk of the 2009-2010 homegrown plots likely reflect a trend in jihadist terrorist activity
away from schemes directed by the core leaders of Al Qaeda or other significant terrorist groups.
Marc Sageman, a forensic psychiatrist and former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations
officer who writes about terrorism, has noted a global shift in terrorism toward decentralized,
autonomously radicalized, violent jihadist individuals or groups who strike in their home
countries.10 Global counterterrorism efforts have made it harder for international terrorist
networks to formulate plots, place their recruits in targeted countries, and carry out violent strikes
in locations far from their bases of operation.11 A senior counterterrorism official told the Los
Angeles Times that Al Qaeda and affiliated groups are moving “away from what we are used to,
which are complex, ambitious, multilayered plots.”12
7 Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield
Publishers, Inc., 2005), p. 3. See also William Rosenau and Sara Daly, “American Journeys to Jihad: U.S. Extremists
During the 1980s and 1990s,” CTC Sentinel, vol. 3, no. 8 (August 2010) pp. 17-20, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/
CTCSentinel-Vol3Iss8.pdf.
8 Brian Michael Jenkins, Would Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United States Since
September 11, 2001 (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2010), p. viii.
9 Paul West and Julie Bykowicz, “Information-sharing still a roadblock,” Baltimoresun.com, Feb.22, 2010,
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bal-md.omalley22feb22,0,4661474,print.story.
10 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2008), pp. 71, 133-146. Hereafter: Sageman, Leaderless Jihad.
11 Philip Mudd, “Evaluating the Al-Qa!ida Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” CTC Sentinel, vol. 3, no. 8 (August 2010) p.
2, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol3Iss8.pdf; Dennis C. Blair, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence: U.S. Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment: Statement for the Record, Office of the Director
of National Intelligence, Feb. 2, 2010, pp. 7-8, http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20100202_testimony.pdf. Hereafter:
Blair, Annual Threat Assessment, Feb. 2, 2010.
12 Greg Miller, “Al-Qaeda’s New Tactic is to Seize Shortcuts,” Los Angeles Times, Mar. 19, 2010,
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-qaeda19-2010mar19,0,1676434.story.
Congressional Research Service
7
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Homegrown Violent Jihadists
This report focuses on geography and citizenship in its characterization of homegrown terrorism
by defining the phenomenon as jihadist terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United
States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely
within the United States.13 These homegrown groups or individuals can focus their plots on
foreign targets. They can—but most of the 2009 and 2010 plots did not—have ties to foreign
terrorist groups. Homegrown violent jihadists potentially come from either Muslim immigrant
communities or are converts to Islam. A review of the numerous arrests of homegrown violent
jihadists on terrorism-related charges since 9/11 suggests a wide array of incidents. There have
been those who have plotted or attempted terrorist attacks. Others have provided material support
to terrorist groups. Some have recruited individuals to travel abroad—or have gone themselves—
to acquire terrorist training, conduct terrorism, or join in other forms of jihadist conflict, such as
the fighting in Somalia or Afghanistan.
Shortcomings and Strengths
Homegrown violent jihadists may exhibit a number of conventional shortcomings when
compared to international terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda. Because some homegrown
terrorists are not tied to international groups, some say they possibly lack deep, hands-on
understanding of specialized tradecraft such as bomb making and may not have the financing,
training camps, support networks, and broad expertise housed in international organizations with
extensive rosters and greater resources.14 Also, homegrown groups tend to be much less formally
structured than international organizations.15 A former CIA case officer recently commented that
the threat posed by self-radicalized ‘lone’ bombers lacking support networks, “even those who
have been in contact with either Al Qaeda or the Taliban, will be hit or miss at best.”16
These apparent shortcomings may keep some homegrown violent jihadists from independently
planning, coordinating, and implementing large-scale suicide strikes such as 9/11 or the Mumbai
attacks of November 2008.17 Because of this, they may turn to violence involving less planning
13 Others have used similar definitions. Rick “Ozzie” Nelson and Ben Bodurian define homegrown as “extremist
violence perpetrated by U.S. legal residents and citizens. See Rick “Ozzie” Nelson and Ben Bodurian, A Growing
Terrorist Threat? Assessing “Homegrown” Extremism in the United States, Center For Strategic and International
Studies, Washington, DC, Mar. 8, 2010, p. v, http://csis.org/publication/growing-terrorist-threat. Hereafter: Nelson and
Bodurian, A Growing Terrorist Threat? For further discussion of definitions of homegrown terrorism, see Sam Mullins,
“Home-grown Terrorism: Issues and Implications,” Perspectives on Terrorism, vol 1, no. 3 (2007),
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=12&Itemid=54.
14 Dina Temple-Raston, “Would-Be Bombers in U.S. Hampered by Logistics,” National Public Radio, June 21, 2010,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127909962.
15 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, pp. 71, 133-146; Scott Stewart, Jihadism: The Grassroots Paradox, STRATFOR, Mar.
18, 2010, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100317_jihadism_grassroots_paradox?ip_auth_redirect=1. Hereafter:
Stewart, Jihadism.
16 Ibid.
17 On Nov. 26, 2008, ten militants came ashore from the Arabian Sea on small boats and attacked numerous high-
profile targets in Mumbai, India, with automatic weapons and explosives. Among the sites attacked were two luxury
hotels—the Taj Mahal Palace and the Oberoi-Trident—along with the main railway terminal, a Jewish cultural center, a
café frequented by foreigners, a cinema house, and two hospitals. By the time the episode ended some 62 hours later,
about 165 people, along with nine terrorists had been killed (one terrorist was captured), and hundreds more injured.
Six American citizens were among the 26 foreigners reported dead. For more information, see CRS Report R40087,
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
8
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
and preparation, such as assaults using firearms.18 Al Qaeda appears to have embraced such
homegrown lone wolf terrorist plots. In March 2010, As Sahab, Al Qaeda’s media wing, released
an English language video titled “A Call to Arms” featuring American-born spokesperson Adam
Gadahn. In the video directed toward jihadists in the United States, Israel, and the United
Kingdom, Gadahn extols alleged Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hasan as a “trailblazer” who did not
attract law enforcement attention by training abroad or relying on conspirators.19 Gadahn
encourages would-be terrorists to select realistically hittable targets, that are familiar to them and
have some broadly symbolic—especially economic—resonance.20 In the same vein as Gadahn’s
video, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (an Al Qaeda affiliate) may have also issued the first
edition of an English language propaganda magazine titled Inspire. If it is genuine, the magazine
could be an effort to recruit lone wolves such as Hasan. The magazine’s first iteration had three
readable pages, and it is unclear whether its repaired, fuller version is attracting much interest in
jihadist circles.21
This does not mean that homegrown terrorists are incapable of sophisticated, coordinated action
or linking up with international groups. For example, in 2008, foiled New York City subway
bomber, Najibullah Zazi, received explosives instruction from Al Qaeda in Pakistan. He and co-
conspirators then tried to implement this training in the United States.22 U.S. authorities allege
that senior Al Qaeda official Adnan el-Shukrijumah possibly recruited Zazi and his fellow
plotters.23 Shukrijumah—a Saudi-born, naturalized American citizen who spent part of his youth
in Brooklyn—and others involved in Al Qaeda’s “external operations” program allegedly planned
the attack.24 The relative sophistication of Zazi’s plot may have actually exposed it to greater law
enforcement scrutiny. Authorities likely learned of the plot while monitoring a known Al Qaeda
email account.25
(...continued)
Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai, India, and Implications for U.S. Interests, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
18 Art Keller, “Why Was Faisal Shahzad a Bad Bombmaker?” AfPak Channel, a special project of Foreign Policy and
the New America Foundation, May 14, 2010, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/14/bad_bombmakers. See
also Exclusive Analysis, “North American Quarterly Terrorism Update,” Dec. 2009, p. 5.
19 Stewart, Jihadism.
20 Ibid; Exclusive Analysis, “Global Jihad Quarterly Update,” May 2010, pp 6-7.
21 More than sixty other pages had been corrupted by a virus. Dina Temple-Raston, “Al-Qaida Magazine Draws
Attention, But Few Fans,” National Public Radio, July 19, 2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyId=128572869; Jeremy W. Peters, “Terrorists’ Magazine, Now in English,” The New York Times, July 1, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/02/world/02qaeda.html.
22 For ten years prior to the plot, Zazi, an Afghan immigrant legally present in the United States, lived in the New York
City Borough of Queens. Zazi pled guilty to conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S. persons or
property, conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country, and providing material support to a terrorist organization.
See Department of Justice (DOJ), Press Release, “Najibullah Zazi Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Use Explosives
Against Persons or Property in U.S., Conspiracy to Murder Abroad, and Providing Material Support to al Qaeda,” Feb.
22, 2010, http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/nyfo022210.html. Hereafter: DOJ Press Release, “Najibullah
Zazi Pleads Guilty.” For more on Zazi’s childhood see, Michael Wilson, “From Smiling Coffee Vendor to Terror
Suspect,” The New York Times, Sep. 26, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/26/nyregion/26profile.html?_r=1&
pagewanted=print. Hereafter: Wilson, “From Smiling Coffee Vendor.”
23 William K. Rashbaum, “Al Qaeda Figure to Be Indicted in Subway Plot,” The New York Times, July 7, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/08/nyregion/08terror.html. Hereafter: Rashbaum, July 7, 2010.
24 Ibid. Al Qaeda’s external operations program focuses on targeting the United States and the West.
25 “U.S. Officials Link Al Qaeda Operative to New York Plot,” Daily Times (Pakistan), July 2, 2010,
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\07\02\story_2-7-2010_pg7_39.
Congressional Research Service
9
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
The conventionally-perceived shortcomings of homegrown terrorists may actually pose some
challenges for law enforcement, intelligence, and security officials charged with detecting,
preventing, or disrupting terrorist plots. According to terrorism analyst Steve Emerson, “The
smaller cells tend to be less powerful than a central terrorist organization like Al Qaeda, but they
are harder to detect…When the group of conspirators are [sic] small it’s much more difficult for
the FBI…The larger the group, the greater the chances the FBI can infiltrate.”26 Former Director
of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair noted that many of the terrorist schemes disrupted in
2009—including homegrown activity—relied on short-term planning. These quickly-generated
schemes are harder to identify and disrupt than more traditional and more highly organized
international terrorist conspiracies, which can gestate for years.27
According to at least one study, homegrown terrorists can be nimble adversaries, because as U.S.
citizens or legal permanent residents, they can travel easily between the United States and foreign
countries.28 While abroad, they could receive training from foreign terrorist organizations,
conduct surveillance operations against foreign targets, and plan attacks. In the case of recent
immigrants to the United States, they are particularly comfortable moving between American and
foreign cultural contexts.29 English language skills, the ability to navigate Western culture,
society, and context are likely key ingredients for successful strikes.30 Three recent cases
involving alleged or actual homegrown terrorists illustrate how these factors possibly facilitate
terrorist plotting:
• Colleen LaRose (AKA “Jihad Jane”) was charged in March 2010 with conspiracy
to commit murder outside the United States and provide material support to
terrorism. She allegedly discussed with her co-conspirators how her mainstream
American physical appearance would allow her to “blend in with many people ...
”31
• On March, 18, 2010, David Headley, born Daood Sayed Gilani to an American
mother and Pakistani father, pled guilty to helping plan the 2008 terrorist attacks
in Mumbai, India and for plotting to attack the offices of a newspaper in
Copenhagen, Denmark. Headley was able to use his American citizenship and
Pakistani heritage to move between the United States and abroad for seven years
during which time he received terrorist training in Pakistan and scouted locations
in India and Denmark for terrorist attacks.32
• For ten years prior to his involvement in a September 2009 plot to trigger
explosive devices in New York City’s subways, Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan
26 Rashbaum, July 7, 2010.
27 Blair, Annual Threat Assessment, Feb. 2, 2010, p. 7.
28 Nelson and Bodurian, A Growing Terrorist Threat? p. v.
29 Ibid.
30 Michael Kenney, “Organizational Learning and Islamic Militancy,” National Institute of Justice Journal, no. 265
(Apr. 2010), p. 19.
31 United States vs. Colleen R. LaRose, Grand Jury Indictment in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, filed Mar. 4, 2010, http://intelfiles.egoplex.com/2010-03-04-LaRose-Indictment.pdf.
32 Jane Perlez, “American Terror Suspect Traveled Unimpeded,” The New York Times, Mar. 25, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/world/asia/26pstan.html?scp=1&sq=
American%20Terror%20Suspect%20Traveled%20Unimpeded&st=cse; DOJ Press Release, “Chicago Resident David
Coleman Headley Pleads Guilty to Role in India and Denmark Terrorism Conspiracies,” Mar. 18, 2010,
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-ag-277.html. Hereafter: DOJ Press Release, Mar. 18, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
10
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
immigrant legally present in the United States, lived in the New York City
Borough of Queens and had family in Pakistan.33
The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis warns,
“probable terrorist perception of success in challenging the U.S. even through failed attacks,
suggest[s] Al Qaeda and associated groups will try to conduct operations in the United States with
increased frequency.”34 It appears that for the foreseeable future, American citizens and legal
permanent residents of the United States radicalized within the nation’s borders will continue to
pose a sizeable violent jihadist threat.35
Radicalization and Violent Extremism
Radicalization and violent extremism are terms that are sometimes used interchangeably but do
not mean the same thing. Radicalization has been described as the exposure of individuals to
ideological messages and the movement of those individuals from mainstream beliefs to extremist
viewpoints.36 Others say radicalization consists of changes in belief and behavior to justify
intergroup violence and personal or group sacrifice to forward specific closely held ideas.37 Still
others use the term to more closely link extremist beliefs to violent action as in this working
definition by the DHS, which states that radicalization “entails the process of adopting an
extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a
method to effect societal change.”38
But there is an important distinction between the terms “radicalization” and “violent extremism”
as it relates to the threshold of U.S. law enforcement interest and action. This is because
Americans have the right under the First Amendment to adopt, express, or disseminate ideas,
even hateful and extremist ones. But when radicalized individuals mobilize their views, i.e., they
move from a radicalized viewpoint to membership in a terrorist group, or to planning, materially
supporting, or executing terrorist activity, then the nation’s public safety and security interests are
activated. Thus, the terms may be differentiated as follows:
33 John Marzulli, “Zazi, Al Qaeda Pals Planned Rush-Hour Attack on Grand Central, Times Square Subway Stations,”
New York Daily News, Apr. 12, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2010/04/12/2010-04-
12_zazi_pals_planned_rushhour_attack_on_2_busiest_subway_stations.html; Stephanie Simon, “FBI Again Questions
Immigrant in Terror Probe,” Wall Street Journal, Sep. 18, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB125323086773921349.html.
34 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Intelligence and Analysis Note, IA-0291-10, “Evolution of the
Terrorist Threat to the United States,” May 21, 2010, p.1.
35 Eileen Sullivan and Devlin Barrett, “Recent Cases Show Challenge of U.S. Terrorists,” Associated Press, Mar. 18,
2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hvogWD5bjFT7x-mkAwUu2tpIN_cgD9EGKHJ80.
Hereafter: Sullivan and Barrett, Mar. 18, 2010.
36 Royal Canadian Mounted Police, National Security Criminal Investigations, Radicalization: A Guide for the
Perplexed, Canada, June 2009, p. 1. Hereafter: Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Radicalization.
37 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism,”
Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 20, no. 3 (July 2008), p. 416.
38 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Written Testimony of Charles
E. Allen, Assistant Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis and Chief Intelligence Officer, Department of Homeland
Security, “Threat of Islamic Radicalization to the Homeland,” 110th Cong., 1st sess., Mar. 14, 2007, p. 4. Hereafter:
Allen Testimony, Mar. 14, 2007.
Congressional Research Service
11
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
• “Radicalization” describes the process of acquiring and holding radical,
extremist, or jihadist beliefs.
• “Violent extremism” for this report, describes violent action taken on the basis of
radical or extremist beliefs. For many, this term is synonymous with “violent
jihadist” and “jihadist terrorist.”
From Radicalization to Violent Extremism
As the terrorist threat becomes increasingly homegrown, a key way to fight it is to develop an
understanding of how radicalization works and formulate ways to prevent the radicalization from
morphing into violent extremism.39 In 2007, the New York City Police Department’s (NYPD)
Intelligence Division released a study of domestic jihadist radicalization that has been widely
circulated within the law enforcement community.
The study describes a general four-step process of radicalization leading to violent extremism.
First, individuals exist in a pre-radicalization phase in which they lead lives unaware of or
uninterested in either violent jihad or fundamentalist Salafi Islam.40 Next they go through self-
identification in which some sort of crisis or trigger (job loss, social alienation, death of a family
member, international conflict) urges them to explore Salafism. Third, individuals undergo
indoctrination or adoption of jihadist ideals combined with Salafi views. The study indicates that,
typically, a “spiritual sanctioner” or charismatic figure plays a central role in the indoctrination
process. Finally, radicalizing individuals go through “jihadization,” where they identify
themselves as violent jihadists, and are drawn into the planning of a terrorist attack. 41 At this
point, according to the NYPD, they can be considered violent extremists. The FBI’s own four-
stage model of radicalization closely follows that of the NYPD.42
This model and the process it describes—though useful—should, however, be read with caution,
according to some observers. The radicalization process is best depicted in broad brush strokes.
Terrorism expert Brian Michael Jenkins has suggested that
There is no easily identifiable terrorist-prone personality, no single path to radicalization and
terrorism. Many people may share the same views, and only a handful of the radicals will go
further to become terrorists. The transition from radical to terrorist is often a matter of
happenstance. It depends on whom one meets and probably on when that meeting occurs in
the arc of one’s life.43
Some experts have cautioned against viewing the radicalization process as a “conveyer belt,”
somehow starting with grievances and inevitably ending in violence.44 The NYPD report itself
39 See Sageman, Leaderless Jihad.
40 For a discussion of fundamentalist Islamic beliefs, see CRS Report RS21695, The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism
and Salafiyya, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
41 Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, City of New York Police
Department, Intelligence Division, New York, 2007, pp. 6-8, http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/files/
NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf.
42 Carol Dyer, Ryan E. McCoy, Joel Rodriguez, et al., “Countering Violent Islamic Extremism: A Community
Responsibility,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Dec. 2007, p. 6.
43 Brian Michael Jenkins, Would-Be Warriors, p. 7.
44 Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley, “Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction Between Activism and
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
12
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
acknowledges that individuals who begin this process do not necessarily pass through all the
stages nor do they necessarily follow all the steps in order, and not all individuals or groups who
begin this progression become terrorists.45 Studies by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis
indicate that the radicalization dynamic varies across ideological and ethno-religious spectrums,
different geographic regions, and socio-economic conditions. Moreover, there are many diverse
“pathways” to radicalization and individuals and groups can radicalize or “de-radicalize” because
of a variety of factors.46
Forces and Factors in the Forging of Terrorists
What drives radicalization and spurs the creation of terrorists remains open to debate. Poverty,
alienation, brainwashing, or personal humiliation—commonly seen as factors driving
radicalization and terrorism—may not play particularly significant roles. Likewise, failed
multiculturalism or failed integration into the larger society does not predict radicalization or
terrorist activity.47 The radicalization process and jihadist violence may offer participants
powerful but intangible spiritual incentives such as salvation and paradise in the afterlife.
Other forces are key in radicalization and the evolution of jihadist terrorists. Family ties and
socialization are critical. Moral outrage or perceptions that the West is harming the global
community of Muslims (the Ummah),48 or even waging war against it may also spur
radicalization and violence. And travel to regions featuring terrorist activity can foster
radicalization. Religious conversion plays a key role in the radicalization of some individuals.49
CRS analysis of the 40 plots since 9/11 suggests that 19 of them included converts to Islam
(Figure 1).
As all of this may suggest, in fact, “pre-radicalization” indicators are subtle and may not be
detectable and the forces driving jihadists can be described in only the most general of terms.
Certainly, radicalizing individuals and terrorists connect larger grievances about the world to their
own direct experiences. A study of 2,032 foreign fighters who joined Al Qaeda and its affiliated
organizations broadly suggests that these individuals can be categorized as revenge seekers, status
seekers, identity seekers, or thrill seekers who possessed “an unfulfilled need to define
themselves.”50 Even more broadly and fundamentally, one author has suggested that
(...continued)
Radicalism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 21, no. 2 (Apr. 2009), pp. 239-40.
45 Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, pp. 10, 19.
46 Allen Testimony, Mar. 14, 2007, p. 5.
47 Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Radicalization, pp. 1-9; Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, p. 48, 50-51, 73-88; Aidan
Kirby, “The London Bombers as ‘Self-Starters’: A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and the Emergence of
Autonomous Cliques,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 30, no. 5 (May 2007), p. 422. For more on the spiritual
incentives involved in joining radical Islamic groups see, Quintan Wiktorowicz and Karl Kaltenthaler, “The Rationality
of Radical Islam,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 121, no. 2 (Summer 2006) pp. 295-300.
48 The Qur’an uses the term, ummah, to refer to the community of believers. The term is used to describe both
individual communities, both great and small, of faithful Muslims and to refer to the world-wide community of
believers. See Richard Hooker, World Civilizations, Glossary, 1996, http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/GLOSSARY/
UMMAH.HTM.
49 Ibid.
50 John M. Venhaus, Why Youth Join al-Qaeda, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 236, Washington, DC,
May 2010, p. 1, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR236Venhaus.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
13
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
psychologically, individual terrorists “see the world in Manichean, black-and-white terms; they
identify with others; and they desire revenge.”51
Overall, many scholars and counterterrorism analysts who have studied post-9/11 jihadist terrorist
attacks have noted the prominence of a number of forces impacting radicalization and extremism.
These include intermediaries (the “spiritual sanctioners” identified by the NYPD report on
radicalization), social networks, the Internet, and prisons.
Intermediaries
Intermediaries are critical in the development of terrorist plots and radicalization. They quicken
the formulation of individual or group beliefs regarding violent jihad. Terrorist recruiters from Al
Qaeda or extremist clerics tied to such organizations can play this role in the radicalization
process. They can interact with individuals interested in terrorism either directly (face-to-face
discussion groups) or in online forums. Some of the terrorist plots that came to light in 2009 and
2010 included an intermediary.52 In some cases a key intermediary may be a government
informant or undercover agent. Three charismatic U.S. citizens have taken especially prominent
roles in international jihadist propaganda, but determining the impact—if any—of these and other
intermediaries can be difficult.
Anwar al-Aulaqi is a radical imam and key international charismatic figure in jihadist circles. He
is a U.S. citizen born in New Mexico in 1971 and has been linked to a number of domestic
jihadist plots. He has also been tied to alleged foreign terrorist Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s
failed Christmas Day 2009 bombing attempt.53 However, according to publicly available sources,
his exact connections to these individuals are largely unclear. Accused of propagandizing for Al
Qaeda, Al-Aulaqi has been associated with the group’s Arabian Peninsula offshoot.54 Before his
alleged November 5, 2009 gun rampage at Fort Hood, Texas, U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan
exchanged emails with al-Aulaqi. It remains publicly unknown how the contact influenced Hasan.
After the Fort Hood shootings, al-Aulaqi issued a statement dubbing Hasan a hero.55
The imam likely also influenced members of four other recent domestic violent jihadist plots.
Zachary Chesser, who allegedly tried to join al-Shabaab as late as July 2010 and propagandized
online, emailed al-Aulaqi. The cleric responded twice, according to court documents.56 In July
2010, Paul Rockwood Jr., pled guilty to making false statements in a domestic terrorism
investigation. He closely followed al-Aulaqi’s online pronouncements and developed an
“execution” hit list that included 15 people Rockwood believed had desecrated Islam.57
51 Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York: Random
House, 2006), p. 41.
52 Rick “Ozzie” Nelson, Countering Terrorism and Radicalization in 2010 and Beyond: A New Terrorist Threat?
Assessing 'Homegrown Extremism,’ Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. Jan. 22, 2010,
http://csis.org/publication/homegrown-terrorism-fact-sheet.
53 Greg Miller and Spencer S. Hsu, “Muslim Cleric Tied to Bomb Attempt,” The Washington Post, July 1, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/30/AR2010063005343.html.
54 For details on Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, see CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical
Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins.
55 “Profile: Anwar al-Awlaki,” BBC News, Jan. 3, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8438635.stm.
56 United States. v. Zachary Adam Chesser, Affidavit, Criminal No. 1:10-MJ-504, U.S. District for the Eastern District
of Virginia, July 21, 2010, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1343.pdf
57 DOJ Press Release, “Alaska Man Pleads Guilty to Making False Statements in Domestic Terrorism Investigation,
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
14
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
According to court documents, Shaker Masri encouraged an FBI cooperating source to “review
speeches” by al-Aulaqui.58 Arrested in June 2010 while allegedly trying to join al-Shabaab,
Mohamed Alessa and Carlos Almonte, watched videos of and listened to sermons by al-Aulaqi.59
Other homegrown, violent jihadists possibly have been influenced by al-Aulaqi’s preaching.
According to media sources, Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani immigrant who admitted that he
attempted to detonate an explosives-filled vehicle in New York City’s Times Square on May 1,
2010, cited al-Aulaqi and another cleric, Abdullah Faisal, from Jamaica as key influences on
him.60 Also, a surveillance recording from 2007 captured one of six individuals eventually
convicted of plotting to attack Fort Dix in New Jersey talking about an al-Aulaqi lecture.61
U.S. officials believe al-Aulaqi also had contact with Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the young
Nigerian who concealed an explosive device in his underwear and attempted to detonate it on a
Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009. At an Aspen
Security Forum in June 2010, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center said the U.S.
Government believes al-Alauqi had “a direct operational role” in that attempted attack.62 A U.S.
official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the topic's sensitivity, has told The
Washington Post that al-Aulaqi has become the first U.S. citizen added to a list of suspected
terrorists the CIA is authorized to kill.63
Adam Gadahn has served as a translator and English-language propagandist for Al Qaeda and
has been charged with treason by the United States. He has appeared in a number of the
organization’s videos widely circulated on the Web. Born in 1978 and raised in California,
Gadhan converted to Islam as a teenager and moved to Pakistan by 1999. As a young convert in
California, Gadhan was influenced by two jihadists involved with a discussion group he attended.
One of these men also likely introduced him into Al Qaeda circles in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In
2004, he first appeared in a widely released video threatening attacks on the United States and in
another dispatch, urged Americans to convert to Islam. In a recent video, posted on June 20,
2010, Gadahn rails against President Barack Obama describing him as, “treacherous, bloodthirsty,
and narrow-minded.”64
(...continued)
Spouse Pleads Guilty to Making False Statements,” July 21, 2010, http://anchorage.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/
ak072110.htm.
58 United States v. Shaker Masri, Criminal Complaint 10-CR-0655, U.S. District Court Northern District of Illinois
Eastern Division, Aug. 9, 2010, http://jnslp.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/masri-complaint1.pdf.
59 Anti-Defamation League, “New Jersey Residents Arrested for Attempting To Join Somali-Based Terrorist Group,”
June 7, 2010, updated July 22, 2010, http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/new_jersey_al_shabaab.htm.
60 Dina Temple-Raston, “Jamaican Imam Said to Inspire Times Square Suspect,” National Public Radio, May 19,
2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126962091. For more on Shahzad’s suspected ties to al-
Aulaqi, see, Scott Shane and Mark Mazzetti, “Times Sq. Bomb Suspect Is Linked to Militant Cleric,” The New York
Times, May 6, 2010.
61 Scott Shane, “Born in U.S., a Radical Cleric Inspires Terror,” The New York Times, Nov. 18, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/19/us/19awlaki.html.
62 Jeanne Meserve, “Anti-Terrorism Chief, U.S.-Born Cleric had Major Role in Airline Bombing Try,” CNN.com, June
30, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/06/30/leiter.al.awlaki/index.html.
63 Greg Miller, “Muslim Cleric Aulaqi is 1st U.S. citizen on List of Those CIA is Allowed to Kill,” The Washington
Post, Apr. 7, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/06/AR2010040604121.html.
64 “American-Born al Qaeda Spokesman Appears in New Video,” CNN, June 20, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/
06/20/al.qaeda.video/index.html; Raffi Khatchadourian, “Azzam the American: The Making of an Al Qaeda
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
15
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Omar Hammami, also known as “Abu Mansour al-Amriki” is originally from Daphne,
Alabama. He has emerged as a key figure and international intermediary for the Somali terrorist
group al-Shabaab. The son of a Syrian-born father and an American mother, he has been featured
in propagandist videos distributed by the group. In one he instructs recruits in urban warfare.
Zachary Chesser saw Hammami as a role model. He even imitated Hammami’s adoption of “al-
Amriki” (the American) as part of his own jihadist name—“Abu Talhah Al-Amrikee.” Somali
officials tie Hammami to al-Shabaab recruitment and financial management. He may also have
led battlefield skirmishes. On August 5, 2010, DOJ unsealed a 2009 superseding indictment
against him.65
As a child, Hammami lived between the Christian world of his mother and the Muslim beliefs of
his father. He converted to Islam in high school, and while a student at the University of South
Alabama, led the Muslim Student Association and began adhering to Salafi doctrine. His Salfism
sprang in part from a desire to rebel against his father. In 2002, he dropped out of school, and by
2004 he had found his way to Toronto, Canada, where American combat in Iraq and Afghanistan
encouraged him to reconsider his nonviolent Salafi views. One of his friends alleges that
Hammami began surfing the Web for information on jihad at this time. While in Canada, he
married a Somali woman. In 2005 they moved to Cairo, and by late 2006 he was in Somalia
pursuing violent jihad.66
Social Networks
Social networks appear to be central to the radicalization process and to terrorist plots as well.
Networks can be actual groups—encompassing intimate kinship ties, bonds of friendship, links
forged in student associations, or cliques tied to radical mosques. They may also be virtual and
fostered by the Internet. Group loyalties can form around jihadist messages entailing moral
outrage over the perceived suffering of fellow Muslims and a sense that the West is at war with
Islam. Networks help place these messages into the context of an individual’s personal
experiences.67
Beyond the radicalization experience, the development and strengthening of affective ties with
like-minded individuals may play a prominent role in the formation of terrorist groups.68
(...continued)
Homegrown,” The New Yorker, Jan. 22, 2007, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/01/22/
070122fa_fact_khatchadourian; “Al Qaeda’s ‘American Voice of Islam,” STRATFOR, Sep. 5, 2006,
http://www.stratfor.com/al_qaedas_american_voice_islam?fn=8415719516; Evan Kohlmann, “American Greases al-
Qaida Media Machine,” MSNBC, July 14, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13842265/.
65 Spencer S. Hsu, “Arrest of Va. Man Spotlights al-Qaeda’s New American Recruiter,” The Washington Post, Aug. 1,
2010; DOJ Press Release, “Fourteen Charged with Providing Material Support to Somalia-Based Terrorist
Organization al Shabaab,” Aug. 5, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/August/10-ag-898.html; Andrea Elliott,
“The Jihadist Next Door,” The New York Times Magazine, Jan. 31, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/
magazine/31Jihadist-t.htm; John Goddard, “Terrorist Leader Lived in Toronto,” The Hamilton Spectator, Ontario,
Canada, Jan. 4, 2010; Brendan Kirby, “Report: Former Daphne High and USA Student Has Been Charged in a Secret
Indictment in Mobile with Providing Material to Terrorists,” Mobile Register, Sep. 5, 2009, http://blog.al.com/live/
2009/09/report_former_daphne_high_and.html; The Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation, “Shabaab al-
Mujahideen Releases Footage of ‘Abu Suleim Training Camp,’” Sep. 2009, http://www.nefafoundation.org/
multimedia-prop.html.
66 Ibid.
67 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, pp. 71-85.
68 Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy,” International
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
16
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
According to the New York Times, Faisal Shahzad befriended Shahid Hussain, a fellow Pakistani,
while the two were enrolled at the University of Bridgeport in Connecticut in the early 2000s.
Shahzad appears to have started to radicalize in the United States by 2004. During trips to
Pakistan prior to his attempted Times Square bombing, Shahzad reestablished ties with Hussain.
The latter had also returned to Pakistan. Together, the two grew more militant, especially when, in
2007, Pakistani forces stormed Lal Masjid, the “Red Mosque,” a center of Islamic
fundamentalism. The two friends socialized with a third individual, Muhammad Shouaib Mughal.
The three were keenly interested in global jihad. Mughal eventually trained with the Pakistani
Taliban, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. He brought Shahzad and Hussain into the group’s camps
for training in 2009.69
Intermediaries within Networks
Social networks often feature their own internal intermediaries or charismatic figures. Daniel
Boyd and six other North Carolina residents were indicted on terrorism charges in 2009. In June
2010, another individual, who was living in Mitrovica, Kosovo, was charged in a criminal
complaint linked to the case.70 This small social network included Dylan and Zakariya Boyd, sons
of Daniel Boyd. A charismatic leader, the elder Boyd allegedly led a conspiracy from November
2006 to 2009 to radicalize, recruit, and assist young men interested in overseas terrorism. The
conspiracy also purportedly included fundraising for and provision of material support to terrorist
groups. Using stories of his supposed past violent jihadist exploits in Pakistan and Afghanistan,
Boyd recruited and trained individuals for violent terrorist activity, according to FBI courtroom
testimony. From 1989-1992, Boyd supposedly trained at terrorist camps in Afghanistan and
Pakistan and may have been a fighter in Afghanistan.71
Jihadi Cool
Recent plots suggest that intermediaries and social networks can emphasize persuasive messages
featuring elements outside of jihadist religious rhetoric. Adventurism and romanticized notions of
revolution seem to have some prominence in the radicalization process. A desire to protect the
Ummah against what he perceived as Western incursion may have been more important to Faisal
Shahzad than more overtly religious rhetoric.72 Terrorist recruiters are also promoting “jihadi
cool” by producing rap videos advocating terrorism and releasing them on the Web. In 2007,
Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax, a charismatic recruiter for the Somali terrorist group, al-Shabaab,
enticed young Somali men in Minnesota with a jihadi cool message replete with war stories.
According to federal court documents, he emphasized jihad but also stressed the sense of
brotherhood he had experienced while fighting. He detailed his own experiences in guerilla
(...continued)
Security, vol. 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008), p. 96.
69 Andrea Elliott, “Militant's Path From Pakistan to Times Square,” The New York Times, June 22, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/23/world/23terror.html. Hereafter: Andrea Elliott, June 22, 2010.
70 DOJ Press Release, “Kosovar National Charged with Terrorism Violations,” June 17, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2010/June/10-nsd-706.html.
71 Mike Baker, “Feds Play Audio Tapes at Tense NC Terror Hearing,” Associated Press, cited in SCnow.com, Aug. 5,
2009, http://www2.scnow.com/news/2009/aug/05/feds_play_audio_tapes_at_tense_nc_terror_hearing-ar-350281/; DOJ
Press Release, “Seven Charged with Terrorism Violations in North Carolina,” July 27, 2009, Hereafter: DOJ Press
Release, July 27, 2009, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/July/09-nsd-725.html
72 Andrea Elliott, June 22, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
17
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
combat and reassured his listeners that it was fun and not to be afraid. He further underscored that
recruits would get the chance to use firearms.73
“Jihadi cool” may have also played a role in pushing five young Northern Virginia Muslim men
to travel in 2009 to Pakistan, where they were arrested for allegedly attempting to join jihadist
organizations in the region. On June 24, 2010, the five were convicted on terrorism charges and
sentenced to 10 years in prison in Pakistan.74 Muslim leaders from Alexandria, Virginia indicated
that they had no inkling of radicalization among the five.75 Abroad, as early as 2006, Dutch
officials noted an “intensification of radicalization tendencies” among young Muslims in the
Netherlands and a perception that jihad was “cool.”76
The Internet
The Web may also play a role in the experiences of many would-be and actual terrorists, just as it
does in the lives of so many people. The interactivity of chat rooms, blogs, social networking
sites, message boards, video hosting sites, and e-mail blurs the lines between readership and
authorship that previous generations of terrorists and sympathizers encountered with pamphlets,
newspapers, and newsletters.77 This blurring possibly encourages people who interact in such
forums to more easily see themselves as part of broader jihadist movements and not just casual
readers or online spectators. They may eventually engage in more substantive activity—actual
propagandizing, financial support, or joining a terrorist network.78
The Web’s impact on individual would-be jihadists likely varies. In some cases accessing and
engaging in online jihadist rhetoric possibly prods an individual toward violence. One author
asserts that Internet activity has been central in the development of a “self-starter” phenomenon79
and offers would-be violent jihadists what has been described as a “de-formalized” radicalization
experience.80 “Self-starters” are groups that lack ties to major international terrorist networks and
do not receive orders from such organizations.81 However, instances of solely virtual
73 United States v.Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax and Abdiweli Yassin Isse, Criminal Complaint, U.S. District Court State
and District of Minnesota, Oct. 8, 2009, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/us/20091124_TERROR_DOCS/
faarax.pdf; See also Dina Temple-Raston, “Jihadi Cool: Terrorist Recruiters’ Latest Weapon,” National Public Radio,
Mar. 26, 2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125186382&ft=1&f=1001.
74 Shaiq Hussain and Brigid Schulte, “5 N.Va. Men Convicted on Terrorism Charges in Pakistan, Given 10 Years in
Prison,” The Washington Post, June 25, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2009/12/10/
ST2009121002234.html?sid=ST2009121002234.
75 Mary Beth Sheridan and Spencer S. Hsu, “Arrests Suggest U.S. Muslims, Like Those in Europe, Can Be Radicalized
Abroad,” The Washington Post, Dec. 12, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/11/
AR2009121104404.html
76 Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, The Netherlands, Violent Jihad in the Netherlands: Current Trends
in the Islamist Terrorist Threat, The Hague, Mar. 2006, p. 8, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/netherlands/violent.pdf.
77 Maura Conway, “Terrorism and Mass Communication: Nitro to the Net,” The World Today, vol. 60, no. 8/9
(Aug/Sep 2004), pp. 19-22, http://doras.dcu.ie/513/1/nitro_to_net_2004.pdf.
78 Gilbert Ramsay, “Relocating the Virtual War,” Defence Against Terrorism Review, vol. 2, no. 1 (Spring 2009), p. 34,
http://www.tmmm.tsk.tr/publications/datr3/03_Gilbert%20Ramsay.pdf.
79 Aiden Kirby, “The London Bombers as ‘Self-Starters: A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and the
Emergence of Autonomous Cliques,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 30, issue 5 (May 2007), p. 416,
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/122510_731260637_773633171.pdf.
80 Ibid, p. 425.
81 Ibid, p. 415.
Congressional Research Service
18
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
radicalization without face-to-face interaction seem to be rare. Most radicalization apparently
requires experience with real-world social networks.82
In other instances, terrorist “wannabes” may see online activity as a suitable substitute for direct
violence and face-to-face contact with hard-core terrorists. Simply, individuals interested in
violent jihad no longer have to physically travel to formal terrorist camps for indoctrination and
rudimentary training. One author has also indicated that activity in the virtual realm may even
play a much more profound, “cathartic” role, “allow[ing] aspiring jihadists to be part of the
broader global jihad but crucially without engaging in direct violence.”83 In essence, online
activity may channel individuals away from the violent expression of their radical beliefs by
allowing them to air their grievances. While such activity may be seen in terrorist circles as an
increasingly legitimate option—instead of violent jihad—it does not come without repercussions
for online supporters of terrorism. Individuals absorbed in such activities may run afoul of law
enforcement for materially aiding terrorist organizations.84
Regardless of whether jihadist online activity drives individuals to violence, the Internet arguably
serves in three ways to spur radicalization. First, it allows jihadists to augment their messages
with suggestive audio and video. Second, it makes it easier for would-be jihadists to find and
interact with like-minded people around the world. Finally, the Internet “normal[izes] behaviors
considered unacceptable or inappropriate in real-world environments.”85 Terrorists publish
rhetoric online that displaces culpability for their violent actions, which they commonly describe
as inevitable responses when faced with overpowering enemies such as the West.86
Radicalizing material is readily accessible online, as are virtual communities in which one can
discuss violent jihad. Since 2005, video sharing websites have broadened the availability of jihadi
video material. All sorts of other texts and graphic images supporting violent jihad exist on the
Web, as does a great volume of tradecraft, such as bomb-making guides.
Social networking, now inherently part of the Internet, is likely a tool that is used in the
development of contacts among radicalized individuals and recruitment into violent jihadist
groups. Anwar al-Aulaqi circulated jihadist lectures online and managed his own popular
Facebook page and blog.87 The five Virginia men convicted on June 24, 2010 in Pakistan on
terrorism charges allegedly contacted an Al Qaeda operative via social networking Web sites,
according to press coverage of their trial in the city of Sarghoda.88
Another case that highlights Internet-related issues involves Tarek Mehanna. Mehanna, a twenty-
seven-year-old pharmacist living with his parents in Sudbury, a wealthy Boston, Massachusetts
82 Tim Stevens, “Regulating the ‘Dark Web:’ How a Two-Fold Approach Can Tackle Peer-to-Peer Radicalisation,” The
RUSI Journal, vol. 154, no. 2 (Apr. 2009), p. 29.
83 Akil N. Awan, “The Virtual Jihad: An Increasingly Legitimate Form of Warfare,” CTC Sentinel, vol. 3, no. 5 (May
2010), p. 11, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol3Iss5.pdf. Hereafter: Awan, “The Virtual Jihad.”
84 Awan, “The Virtual Jihad,” p. 12.
85 Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenge (Washington, D.C.: United States
Institute of Peace Press, 2006), p. 116. Hereafter: Weimann, Terror on the Internet; Awan, “The Virtual Jihad,” p. 12.
86 Ibid.
87 NEFA Foundation, “Anwar al Awlaki: Pro Al-Qaida Ideologue with Influence in the West,” Feb. 5, 2009,
http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefabackgrounder_alawlaki.pdf.
88 Brigid Schulte, “5 Va. Men Facing Terrorism Charges in Pakistan Write of ‘Noble’ Motivation,” The Washington
Post, May 16, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/15/AR2010051503548.html
Congressional Research Service
19
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
suburb, was arrested on terrorism charges in October 2009.89 Among other alleged activities,
Mehanna and co-conspirators translated from Arabic to English documents advocating terrorism
and posted them on jihadist websites.90 They viewed themselves as the “media wing” for Al
Qaeda in Iraq. In the eyes of some terrorism experts, the Mehanna case highlights the shift away
from core members of Al Qaeda toward Internet-inspired, homegrown radicalization and self-
starting terrorists. The Mehanna case emphasizes how recruiters from foreign terrorist
organizations no longer seem necessary to shepherd radicalized individuals into terrorist training
abroad. (Mehanna, himself, allegedly tried but failed to get into such camps.) Sam Rascoff, a
former New York Police Department terrorism specialist, notes that, “there is a sense that these
guys are radicalizing on their own.”91 Frank J. Cilluffo notes that the Web has supplanted
mosques as a recruitment venue, especially as terrorists try to draw Westerners into their
organizations.92
Aside from its possible impact on the radicalization process, the Internet potentially offers
terrorists operational capabilities.93 Its decentralized form mirrors the flattened, cellular structures
of most terrorist organizations. Among other things, it could help them to collect intelligence
about their targets, communicate with one another, propagandize, recruit foot soldiers, provide
training, raise funds, and communicate operational direction.94
Jailhouse Jihadism
In the last several years, terrorism experts and some Members of Congress have shown interest in
jihadist prison radicalization.95 But the research is decidedly unclear regarding the threat posed by
radicalization behind bars. A scholar of the prison phenomenon in the United Kingdom notes that
jail time potentially accelerates the radicalization process for many individuals. Prison brings
together disaffected people who may be receptive to anti-social messages offering “clear, albeit
intolerant, solutions to complex problems of identity and belonging.”96 Experts have sounded
89 Denise Lavoie, “Mass. Terror Suspect Taught Kids at Muslim School,” Guardian.co.uk, Associated Press, foreign,
October 21, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8766970.
90 Shelley Murphy, “Taking Refuge Where His Woes Began: Sudbury Terror Suspect Presses Case on Internet,” The
Boston Globe, Feb. 1, 2010, http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/02/01/
web_is_now_refuge_for_man_caught_online/?page=1. Hereafter: Murphy, Feb 1, 2010; Denise Lavoie, Abby
Goodnough, and Liz Robbins, “Mass. Man Arrested in Terrorism Case,” New York Times, Oct. 21, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/us/22terror.html; Superseding Indictment, U.S. v. Tarek Mehanna and Ahmad
Abousamra, Cr. No. 09-CR-10017 GAO, U.S. District Court District of Massachusetts, 2009,
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1121.pdf.
91 Dina Temple-Raston, “Mass. Arrest Spurs Fear of Homegrown Terrorism,” National Public Radio, Oct. 22, 2009,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=114020731.
92 Murphy, Feb. 1, 2010.
93 Weimann, Terror on the Internet ,pp. 56.
94 Weimann, Terror on the Internet, pp. 111-140.
95 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Prison Radicalization: Are
Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks? 109th Cong., 2nd sess. Sep. 19, 2006, S. Hrg. 109–954 (Washington: GPO,
2007), pp. 1-6, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_senate_hearings&docid=f:30597.pdf.
96 James Brandon, “The Danger of Prison Radicalization in the West,” Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel, vol. 2,
no. 12 (Dec. 2009), pp. 1-3, http://ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss12.pdf. Hereafter: Brandon, “The Danger
of Prison.”
Congressional Research Service
20
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
warnings about the unknown level of threat posed by radicalization and terrorist recruitment in
U.S. jails.97
Others are quick to point out, however, that while conversion to Islam and radicalization occur
among incarcerated populations, the jump to terrorist plotting in the United States is rare.98 This is
at least partly due to prison officials’ efforts to counter jailhouse jihadism according to a study
involving interviews with 210 prison officials and 270 inmates mostly from state correctional
systems. 99 The Federal Bureau of Prisons acknowledges the possibility of inmate radicalization
but “do[es] not believe that there is widespread terrorist-inspired radicalization or recruiting in
federal prisons,” where between 5% and 6% of prisoners identify as Muslims.100 Based on CRS
analysis of the 40 violent jihadist plots and attacks since 9/11, only one involved radicalization in
prison. A study of 117 homegrown jihadist terrorists from the United States and United Kingdom
found only seven cases in which prison had a significant impact on an individual’s radicalization
process.101
The lack of conclusive prison-based radicalization among the jihadist terrorism plots and foiled
attacks since 9/11 suggests that the threat emanating from prisons does not seem as substantial as
some experts may fear. One of the recent cases, commonly known as the Newburgh Four plot,
included at least two individuals who converted to Islam while in state prison, but it remains
unclear whether they radicalized behind bars, and the plot, itself, took form outside of jail.102
The most prominent post-9/11 example of domestic violent jihadist activity inspired in prison
implicated the group, Jamiyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS or the “Authentic Assembly of God”).
Kevin James, Levar Washington, Gregory Patterson, and Hammad Samana were arrested and
charged in August 2005 for their participation in a plot to attack Jewish institutions and other
targets in the Los Angeles area, including synagogues, the Israeli Consulate, Los Angeles
International Airport (LAX), U.S. military recruiting offices, and military bases.
According to DOJ, the incarcerated James founded JIS in 1997 based on his interpretation of
Islam. His views are apparent in several of his prison writings, including a 104-page document
97 See George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) and The University of Virginia
Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG), “Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization,” HSPI and
CIAG, Washington, D.C. Sep. 2006, http://www.healthsystem.virginia.edu/internet/ciag/publications/
out_of_the_shadows.pdf.
98 Brandon, “The Danger of Prison.” p. 4; Mark S. Hamm, “Prisoner Radicalization: Assessing the Threat in U.S.
Correctional Institutions,” National Institute of Justice Journal, no. 261 (Oct. 2008), p. 18, http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/224085.pdf.
99 Bert Useem and Obie Clayton, “Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners,” Criminology & Public Policy, vol. 8, no. 3 (Aug.
2009), pp. 586-587, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1745-9133.2009.00574.x/pdf. Hereafter: Useem and
Clayton, “Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners.”
100 Gary Fields and Suzanne Sataline, “Bomb Case Raises Issue of Islam in Jails,” The Wall Street Journal, May 23,
2009; http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124303841574048865.html.
101 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical
Examination of the Radicalization Process, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Center for Terrorism Research,
Washington, D.C., Apr. 2009, pp. 14-15, http://www.defenddemocracy.org/downloads/
HomegrownTerrorists_USandUK.pdf. Hereafter: Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S.
and U.K.
102 Eric Gorski and Rachel Zoll, “Plot Renews Fears of Radical Islam in Prison,” The Associated Press, cited in
msnbc.com, May 22, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30891721/; Daniel J. Wakin, The New York Times, “Imams
Reject Talk That Islam Radicalizes Inmates,” May 24, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/24/nyregion/
24convert.html
Congressional Research Service
21
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
titled the “JIS Protocol.” In this document, James supports the establishment of an Islamic
Caliphate in the United States and describes “Jihad [as] the only true ‘anti-terrorist action[,]’ a
defensive battle against the aggression of theological imposters led by Zionism.” The document
also advocated the killing of “lawful targets,” including non-Muslims. Reportedly, James met
Washington in prison in 2004 and introduced him to JIS and its beliefs. After his release,
Washington, who converted to Islam while he was in prison, recruited Patterson, an employee at
LAX, and Samana at the Jamaat-E-Masijudal mosque in Inglewood, California, where they all
worshipped. Both Patterson and Samana swore allegiance to Washington and pledged to serve as
“mujahideen,” according to court documents.103 One study has pointed out that James’
radicalization manifested itself in prison but may not have been heavily influenced by his
experiences behind bars. Two points suggest that factors outside of prison may have at least partly
driven his radicalization: his “JIS Protocol” does not focus on jailhouse conditions, and his father
had been a member of the Black Panther Party.104
Overview of Post 9/11 Homegrown Jihadist
Terrorism Plots and Attacks
Scholars and law enforcement officials have noted that no workable general profile of domestic
violent jihadists exists. According to the NYPD’s Intelligence Division, there is no effective
profile to predict exactly who will radicalize.105 Another study found only broad trends among
domestic jihadist terrorists, specifically that they are overwhelmingly male and about two-thirds
of them are younger than 30 years old.106 As the above discussion may suggest generalizing about
the individuals involved is problematic.
Indeed, there does not appear to be a common thread connecting the U.S. Army psychiatrist
Major Nidal Hasan with the Caucasian convert, Daniel Patrick Boyd; the Afghan immigrant
Najibullah Zazi with Carlos Bledsoe, an African-American of a happy childhood who converted
to Islam and renamed himself Abdulhakim Muhammed; David Headley, who was born Daood
Gilani to a successful Pakistani immigrant father and American mother; with Talib Islam, who
was born Michael Finton and raised in multiple foster homes; or the educated pharmacist Tarek
Mehanna, with the Somali-American from Minneapolis Shirwa Ahmed, who traveled to the land
of his birth and became the first U.S. citizen suicide bomber. The plots and attacks drew in first-
and second-generation Muslim-American immigrants and native-born Americans who converted
to the faith. Some included individuals acting alone, while others had multiple co-conspirators.
103 DOJ Press Release, “Man Who Formed Terrorist Group that Plotted Attacks on Military and Jewish Facilities
Sentenced to 16 Years in Federal Prison,” Mar. 6, 2009, http://losangeles.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/
la030609ausa.htm. Hereafter: DOJ Press Release, Mar. 6, 2009; Anti-Defamation League, “Two Sentenced in Los
Angeles Terror Plot against Jewish Institutions,” adl.com, August 24, 2008, updated 2009, http://www.adl.org/
main_Terrorism/los_angeles_sentenced.htm; DOJ Press Release, “Man Involved in Domestic Terrorism Plot Targeting
Military and Jewish Facilities Sentenced to 22 Years,” July 23, 2008, http://losangeles.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel08/
la062308usa.htm; DOJ Press Release, “Second Man Involved in Domestic Terrorism Plot Targeting Military, Jewish
Facilities Sentenced to Prison,” July 21, 2008, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/July/08-nsd-634.html; DOJ Press
Release, “Four Men Indicted on Terrorism Charges,” Aug. 31, 2005, http://www.dodig.mil/IGInformation/
IGInformationReleases/fourmen_090105.pdf. Hereafter: DOJ Press Release, Aug. 31, 2005.
104 Useem and Clayton, “Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners,” pp. 581-582.
105 Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, p. 8.
106 Schanzer, et.al, Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim Americans, p. 10.
Congressional Research Service
22
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Some plots were aspirational. Others appear to have been pushed along by government
informants or undercover agents, and still others were serious and calculating until uncovered by
intelligence and/or law enforcement officials (see Appendix A for details on the cases).
Figure 1 provides information about the profile and training of individuals involved in domestic
jihadist terrorist plots and attacks. Figure 2 documents the specific plots and attacks including the
intended endgame (use of firearms, explosives, or fight abroad), target (within/outside the United
States), and tools used by investigators to disrupt the plotting.
Congressional Research Service
23
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Figure 1. Homegrown Jihadist Terrorist Plots and Attacks Since 9/11:
Terrorist Profile and Training
Source: CRS analysis of open source material related to homegrown jihadist plots and attacks since 9/11.
Notes:
a. Listed in chronological order. The four attacks are highlighted in bold and italics.
Congressional Research Service
24
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Figure 2. Homegrown Jihadist Terrorist Plots and Attacks Since 9/11:
Targets, Endgames, and Investigative Tools
Source: CRS analysis of open source material related to homegrown jihadist plots and attacks since 9/11.
Notes:
a. Listed in chronological order. The four attacks are highlighted in bold and italics.
b. As indicated in open-source reporting. It is possible that the use of these tools in some cases remains
classified information and thus is not reflected in this figure.
Congressional Research Service
25
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Overarching Themes
Homegrown violent jihadist activity since 9/11 defies easy categorization. For example,
conventional notions of “homegrown” may suggest plots that are hatched and executed solely
within the United States. But in a globalized environment, many domestic jihadist terrorist plots
have some sort of international dimension. For example, some plotters train abroad. Some receive
cues from terrorist Internet propagandists operating in foreign lands. And as suggested above,
homegrown terrorists can focus their violent plans on domestic or international entities. Since
9/11, 23 homegrown plots featured domestic targets, 15 focused on foreign ones, and two
conspiracies had both domestic and foreign targeting elements. From another perspective, 24
involved intent or actual travel abroad for training or to plan for terrorist attacks. The 40
homegrown jihadist attacks and plots since 9/11 do exhibit four broad themes: a variety of
endgames, little stomach for suicide or martyrdom among plotters, successful attacks by lone
wolves, and varied capabilities among the plots.
A Variety of Endgames
Homegrown violent jihadists pursue a number of endgames. Some seek involvement in foreign
conflicts or insurgencies. Others plan and attempt to execute either bombings or assaults with
firearms. Finally, some jihadists apparently intended from the start only to fund or materially
support the activities of their brethren.
Foreign Fighters
Fifteen of the post-9/11 homegrown plots have featured individuals exclusively seeking to
become foreign fighters with terrorist groups entangled in insurgency-type conflicts. Al-Shabaab-
related cases concerning young men leaving the United States to fight in Somalia are the
paramount example. Other cases include the following:
• In a case mentioned elsewhere in this report, five men from Northern Virginia
(Northern Virginia Five) were arrested in Sarghoda, Pakistan in December 2009.
They purportedly traveled there hoping to join jihadist groups and battle U.S.
troops in Afghanistan. On June 24, 2010, they were convicted of terrorism
charges in a special Pakistani anti-terror court. Prosecutors say the five men also
began planning attacks against a Pakistani nuclear plant and an air base and other
targets in Afghanistan and “territories of the United States.”107
• In February 2006, three residents of Toledo, Ohio—Mohammad Zaki Amawi, a
dual U.S. and Jordanian citizen; Marwan Othman El-Hindi, a naturalized U.S.
citizen from Jordan; and Wassim Mazloum, a legal permanent resident from
Lebanon (Toledo, Ohio Plotters)—were charged with conspiracy to kill or maim
persons in locations outside the United States, to include U.S. armed forces
personnel serving in Iraq.108 On June 13, 2008, a Federal jury convicted all three
107 Jerry Markon, et al, “Pakistan Charges 5 Northern Virginia Men in Alleged Terrorism Plot,” The Washington Post,
Mar. 18, 2010, p. A1, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/17/AR2010031700430_pf.html.
108 United States v. Mohammad Zaki Amawi, et al., Indictment, 3:06CR0719, U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio Western Divison, 2006, p. 2, http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/indictment_22006.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
26
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
of conspiring to commit terrorist acts against Americans overseas and material
support to terrorists. 109
Explosives and Firearms
Seventeen of the 40 homegrown jihadist terrorist plots targeting the United States since 9/11
involved in whole or in part explosives or incendiary devices.110 Historically, most terrorist
incidents in the United States have involved bombs or fires. According to research drawn from
the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’s Global
Terrorism Database, about 83% of all terrorist incidents on U.S. soil between 1970 and 2007—
including violent jihadists as well as non-jihadists—have included explosives or incendiary
devices. Roughly 9% involved firearms.111
The Zazi case (as mentioned elsewhere) and the attempt by Faisal Shahzad to detonate an
explosives-filled 1993 Nissan Pathfinder in New York City’s Times Square stand out as examples
of plots incorporating explosive devices. On May 1, 2010, investigators discovered fireworks,
clocks, wiring, filled propane tanks, gasoline canisters, and fertilizer that Shahzad had rigged for
explosion in his vehicle.112 The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan helped facilitate the failed attack by
training Shahzad and sending him $12,000 in funding.113
Ten plots involved in whole or in part the use of firearms. Four of these intended to use firearms
exclusively, including two of the successful post-9/11 attacks. The deadlier of the two attacks was
the shooting at Fort Hood, Texas on November 5, 2009. U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan was
charged in the attack which killed thirteen and wounded or injured 43 others.114 Abdulhakim
Muhammad was arrested on June 1, 2009, in connection with a shooting at the U.S. Army-Navy
Career Center in Little Rock, Arkansas that killed one soldier and wounded another.115 The two
other plots that centered on firearms are:
109 Anti Defamation League, “Three Men Face Terrorism Charges in Ohio,” adl.org, Oct. 21, 2009, http://www.adl.org/
main_Terrorism/Ohio_men_trial.htm.
110 This includes one case involving a surface-to-air missile (to be supplied by an undercover agent).
111 Gary LaFree, “Terrorist Attacks Against the United States Homeland from 1970 to 2007,” p. 57, in Appendix B,
“Community-Level Indicators of Radicalization: A Data and Methods Task Force,” Report to Human
Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security,”
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, College Park, MD, Feb.16, 2010,
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/START_HFD_CommRadReport.pdf.
112 DOJ Press Release, “Faisal Shahzad Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court to 10 Federal Crimes Arising from
Attempted Car Bombing in Times Square,” June 21, 2010, http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/
nyfo062110.htm. Hereafter: DOJ Press Release, June 21, 2010; DOJ Press Release, “Manhattan U.S. Attorney Charges
Faisal Shahzad with Attempted Car Bombing in Times Square,” May 4, 2010, http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/
pressrel10/nyfo050410a.htm; United States v. Faisal Shahzad, Criminal Complaint 01:10-mj-00928-UA, U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York, June 17, 2010, http://cryptome.org/shahzad/usa-v-shahzad.htm.
113 DOJ Press Release, June 21, 2010; Anne Flaherty, “White House Says Pakistan Taliban Behind N.Y. Bomb,”
Associated Press cited in abcnews.com, May 9, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=10596709.
114 “Fort Hood Shooting Suspect to Remain Confined,” Associated Press State and Local Wire, cited in msnbc.com,
Nov. 21, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34084622; “Fort Hood Shooting Suspect Out of Intensive Care,”
CNN.com, Dec.16, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/12/16/texas.fort.hood.hasan/index.html?iref=allsearch.
115 NEFA, “Target America Series #18: The Little Rock Arkansas Recruiting Station Shooting,” June 2009,
http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/NEFA_littlerockrecruitingshooting.pdf; James Dao, “Man
Claims Terror Ties in Little Rock Shooting,” The New York Times, Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/
us/22littlerock.html.
Congressional Research Service
27
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
• Tarek Mehanna was charged with conspiracy to provide material support to
terrorists on October 21, 2009. Mehanna and his co-conspirators abandoned their
plans to attack a mall and target U.S. politicians because they were unable to
acquire the firearms they wanted.116
• In May 2007, six men (Fort Dix Six) were arrested in a plot against Fort Dix, a
U.S. Army base in New Jersey. The plan included attacking and killing soldiers
using assault rifles and grenades, although the conspirators never purchased
firearms for use in the plot. In December 2008, a jury found five of the six guilty
of conspiring to kill military personnel but cleared them of attempted murder.117
Multiple, Unclear, or Unique Tactics
Twelve attacks and plots incorporated multiple or unique tactics or the tactics were not clear from
the public record. One attack involving multiple tactics occurred abroad but targeted members of
the U.S. armed forces at a base. In that attack, which occurred on March 23, 2003, U.S. Army
Sergeant Hasan Akbar used hand grenades (explosives) and his military-issued M-4 rifle to kill
two fellow U.S. servicemen and wound 14 others at Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait.118 Other
examples of multiple, unique, or unspecified tactics include the following:
• Members of the plot involving Daniel Boyd allegedly attempted to travel abroad
to engage in jihad as foreign fighters and also likely prepared to attack a domestic
site—the U.S. Marine Corps Base in Quantico, Virginia, using firearms.119
• Bryant Vinas, who plotted to blow up (explosives) the Long Island railroad in
New York, admitted to U.S. officials that he met with Al Qaeda leaders in
Pakistan and, between March and July 2008, attended three Al Qaeda training
courses.120 In September 2008, as a foreign fighter he took part in a rocket attack
targeting a U.S. military base in Afghanistan.121
116 Denise Lavoie, “Mass. Terror Suspect Taught Kids at Muslim School,” Associated Press, foreign cited in
Guardian.co.uk, Oct, 21, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8766970; Abby Goodnough and Liz
Robbins, “Mass. Man Arrested in Terrorism Case,” The New York Times, Oct. 21, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/10/22/us/22terror.html; DOJ Press Release, “Massachusetts Man Charged with Conspiracy to Provide Material
Support to Terrorists” Oct. 21, 2009, http://boston.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/bs102109a.htm.
117 Christopher Dela Cruz, “Three convicted in Fort Dix terror plot are sentenced to life in prison,” NJ.com, Apr. 28,
2009, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/04/judge_sentences_fort_dix_defen.html. Hereafter: Dela Cruz, NJ.com
Apr. 28, 2009.
118 Convicted and sentenced to death in military court, Akbar was at least in part motivated by extremist Islamic beliefs.
He had converted to Islam as an adult. Madeline Gruen, “Backgrounder: Sgt. Hasan Akbar,” PowerPoint presentation,
NEFA, Jan 2010, http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefa_akbarbackgrounder.pdf; Manuel Roig-Franzia,
“Army Soldier Is Convicted in Attack on Fellow Troops,” The Washington Post, Apr. 22, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7210-2005Apr21.html.
119 DOJ Press Release, “Superseding Indictment in Boyd Matter,” Sep. 24, 2009, http://charlotte.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/
2009/ce092409.htm; DOJ Press Release, July 27, 2009.
120 Paul Cruickshank, Nic Robertson, and Ken Shiffman, “From Long Island to Lahore: The Plot to Bomb New York,”
cnn.com, May 21, 2010, http://edition.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/05/14/bryant.neal.vinas.part2/index.html; Hereafter:
Cruickshank, Robertson, and Shiffman, “From Long Island to Lahore;” Sebastian Rotella and Josh Meyer, “U.S.-born
Militant Who Fought for Al Qaeda Is In Custody,” Los Angeles Times, July 23, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/
jul/23/nation/na-american-jihad23.
121 Cruickshank, Robertson, and Shiffman, “From Long Island to Lahore.”
Congressional Research Service
28
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
• Even though the plotters discussed using explosives, the four individuals tied to
JIS and arrested in 2005 used firearms in robberies to generate funding for their
scheme. 122
• In a case involving unspecified tactics, Ehsanul Islam Sadequee, a U.S. citizen
born in Virginia, and Syed Haris Ahmed, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Pakistan
scouted targets in Washington D.C. in 2005.123
• In an attack that did not feature guns or bombs, on March 3, 2006, Mohammed
Reza Taheri-Azar, a 22-year-old naturalized U.S. citizen crashed his SUV into a
crowd near the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. No one was seriously
injured in the attack, and he pled guilty to two counts of murder. The assailant
allegedly hoped to avenge the deaths of Muslims abroad that he believed were
caused by the United States.124
Material Support
Although this report largely focuses on radicalization and violent jihadist plotting, there is at least
one other illegal method for individuals to assist terrorists. Radicalization may lead people to help
terrorist organizations by illegally providing them material support unrelated to specific violent
jihadist plots. How frequently this has occurred since 9/11 is difficult to discern, because material
support125 charges are often part of the illegal activity in violent plots. DOJ has publicly released
information on unsealed terrorism convictions between September 11, 2001 and March 18,
2010.126 CRS analysis of this information indicates that homegrown jihadists unconnected to any
specific violent plots were prosecuted for materially supporting terrorists in at least six
schemes.127 The six schemes supported violent jihadist or jihadist-linked groups such as Al
122 DOJ Press Release, Mar. 6, 2009; DOJ Press Release, Aug. 31, 2005.
123 DOJ Press Release, “Terrorism Defendants Sentenced,” Dec. 14, 2009, http://atlanta.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/
at121409a.htm.
124 “Iranian Ex-UNC Student Gets 33 Years in Prison for Plowing SUV into Crowd to Avenge Muslim Deaths,”
Associated Press, cited in FoxNews.com, Aug. 26, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,410904,00.html;
“Driver Charged for Plowing Through Crowd,” msnbc.com, Mar. 5, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11660817/.
125 As described in U.S. Code, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 113B, 2339A and 2339B. For more information, see CRS
Report R41333, Terrorist Material Support: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B, by Charles Doyle.
126 DOJ, “National Security Division Statistics on Unsealed International Terrorism-Related Convictions 9/11/01-
3/18/10,” http://theplumline.whorunsgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/March-26-2010-NSD-Final-Statistics.pdf.
127 For this measure, 1) Homegrown jihadists were convicted under either section 2339A or 2339B of U.S. Code, Title
18, Part I, Chapter 113B, and no other “Category I”*(see definition below) conviction charges were tied to their cases.
2) The scheme or the radicalization of the individuals involved had to have largely occurred after 9/11. 3) The scheme
was jihadist in nature, eliminating material support cases involving non-jihadist terrorist groups. 4) The scheme did not
include a violent plot as reported publicly. So, for example, the August 2004 Albany, New York plot implicating
Yassin M. Aref and Mohammed Mosharref Hossain in an FBI sting involving material support to a Pakistani terrorist
group is not included among the six material support cases. This is because the case involved a scheme to launder
through Hossain’s pizza shop and real estate holdings the proceeds of the sale of a shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile
which was purportedly to be used in a fictitious plot to assassinate Pakistan's United Nation’s envoy.
*The introduction included with DOJ’s “National Security Division Statistics,” enumerates two categories of offenses
involved in the 403 terrorism and terrorism-related prosecutions listed between 9/11/01 and 3/18/10. According to the
Department of Justice document, “Category I Offenses” are “violations of federal statutes that are directly related to
international terrorism and that are utilized regularly in international terrorism matters.” The statistical portion of the
document includes 105 individuals who had material support charges under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A or 18 U.S.C. § 2339B
among their conviction charges. Appendix A in the Department of Justice, “National Security Division Statistics,”
describes the following as Category I Offenses: Aircraft Sabotage (18 U.S.C. § 32); Animal Enterprise Terrorism (18
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
29
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). They included the
following:
• Rahmat Abdhir: A U.S. citizen living in San Jose, California, Abdhir was
indicted in 2007 for providing material support to his brother, Zulkifli Abdhir, a
member of Jemaah Islamiyah based in the Philippines. The U.S. government
accused Rahmat of sending to his brother more than $10,000 in supplies,
including chocolates, underwear, knives, guns, and radios.128
• Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif Mohamed: According to DOJ, during a routine traffic
stop in Goose Creek, South Carolina, on August 4, 2007, law enforcement
officials found explosive materials (PVC pipe containing potassium nitrate and
kitty litter as well as about 20 feet of fuse) during a consensual search of the
trunk of the Toyota Camry Mohamed was driving. A laptop retrieved from the car
yielded a video produced by Mohamed depicting how components from a remote
controlled toy car could be used to fashion a detonator for an explosive device.
Mohamed had uploaded the recording to YouTube. Although no specific terrorist
group was linked to Mohamed, he did admit that he intended the recording as
instruction to “suiciders” on how to spare themselves in attacks. An Egyptian
resident of Tampa, Florida, Mohamed entered the United States on an F-1 student
visa.129
• Tarik Shah, Rafiq Abdus Sabir, Mahmud Faruq Brent: In an investigation
stretching back at least to December 2001, the FBI infiltrated a group of
acquaintances interested in supporting international jihadist terrorist
organizations. Shah and Brent pled guilty to material support in 2007 and Sabir
was convicted of the charge the same year. In 2005, Shah, a Bronx, New York
City jazz musician and martial arts instructor, had sworn allegiance to Al Qaeda
(...continued)
U.S.C. § 43); Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons (18 U.S.C. § § 112, 878, 1116, l201(a)(4)); Use of
Biological, Nuclear, Chemical or Other Weapons of Mass Destruction (18 U.S.C. §§ 175, 175b, 229, 831, 2332a);
Production, Transfer, or Possession of Variola Virus (Smallpox) (18 U.S.C. § 175c); Participation in Nuclear and
WMD Threats to the United States (18 U.S.C. § 832); Conspiracy Within the United States to Murder, Kidnap, or
Maim Persons or to Damage Certain Property Overseas (18 U.S.C. § 956); Hostage Taking (18 U.S.C. § 1203);
Terrorist Attacks Against Mass Transportation Systems (18 U.S.C. § 1993); Terrorist Acts Abroad Against United
States Nationals (18 U.S.C. § 2332); Terrorism Transcending National Boundaries (18 U.S.C. § 2332b) Bombings of
places of public use, Government facilities, public transportation systems and infrastructure facilities (18 U.S.C. §
2332f); Missile Systems designed to Destroy Aircraft (18 U.S.C. § 2332g); Production, Transfer, or Possession of
Radiological Dispersal Devices (18 U.S.C. § 2332h); Harboring Terrorists (18 U.S.C. § 2339); Providing Material
Support to Terrorists (18 U.S.C. § 2339A); Providing Material Support to Designated Terrorist Organizations (18
U.S.C. § 2339B); Prohibition Against Financing of Terrorism (18 U.S.C. § 2339C); Receiving Military-Type Training
from an FTO (18 U.S.C. § 2339D); Narco-Terrorism (21 U.S.C. § 1010A); Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities or Fuel (42
U.S.C. § 2284); Aircraft Piracy (49 U.S.C. § 46502); Violations of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. § 1705(b)) involving E.O. 12947
(Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process); E.O. 13224 (Blocking Property and Prohibiting
Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism or Global Terrorism List); and
E.O. 13129 (Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With the Taliban).
128 Bob Egelko, “Bail Denied for Man Accused of Aiding Brother Tied to Terror,” Feb. 16, 2008; DOJ Press Release,
“Specially Designated Global Terrorist and His Brother Indicted for Providing Material Support to Terrorists,” Aug. 3,
2007, http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Abdhir_DOJPRIndictment.pdf.
129 DOJ Press Release, “Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif Mohamed Pleads Guilty to Providing Material Support to Terrorists,”
June 18, 2008, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/June/08-nsd-544.html; United States v. Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif
Mohamed, Sentencing Memorandum, Case No. U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2008,
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/718.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
30
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
in the presence of an FBI agent who posed as a recruiter for the group. He had
also allegedly offered to train Al Qaeda fighters in hand-to-hand combat. Shah
purported to have been interested in traveling to Afghanistan in 1998 to attend
terrorist training camps.130 Sabir, a doctor from Florida, swore allegiance to Al
Qaeda in the same ceremony as his friend, Shah. Sabir also offered his medical
skills to treat injured Al Qaeda fighters.131 Brent, a Washington, D.C. cab driver,
traveled to Pakistan in 2002 to attend a Lashkar-i-Taiba training camp.132 A fourth
individual was arrested in the investigation but did not get convicted of material
support.133
• Ronald Grecula: In an FBI sting operation, Grecula negotiated to build and sell
an explosive device with individuals he believed were tied to Al Qaeda.134
• Ilyas Ali: In a drugs-for-arms case, Ali, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in India,
admitted to conspiring in 2002 with two Pakistanis to supply Al Qaeda with anti-
aircraft missiles bought using proceeds from the sale of heroin and hashish.135
• Cedric Carpenter and Lamont Ranson: In February 2005, the duo from New
Orleans pled guilty to conspiring to sell false Mississippi Driver’s licenses,
Social Security cards, and birth certificates to undercover informants they
believed were members of the Abu Sayyaf terrorist organization.136
Aside from the convictions derived from the DOJ’s list covering the period between 9/11 and
March 18, 2010, several material support cases have come to light recently. It is unclear what
accounts for this recent flurry of arrests. It may be a parallel to the uptick in violent jihadist
plotting.
• Barry Bujol: Arrested on May 30, 2010, Bujol, a U.S. citizen living in Texas,
allegedly attempted to provide money, pre-paid telephone calling cards, and
global positioning system receivers (among other items), to Al Qaeda in the
130 Joseph Goldstein, “Bronx Man Pleads Guilty to Pledging Fealty to Qaeda,” New York Sun, Apr. 5, 2007,
http://www.nysun.com/new-york/bronx-man-pleads-guilty-to-pledging-fealty/51890/; DOJ Press Release, “Bronx
Martial Arts Instructor Pleads Guilty to Conspiring to Support Al Qaeda,” Apr. 4, 2007, http://www.justice.gov/usao/
nys/pressreleases/April07/shahpleapr.pdf.
131 DOJ Press Release, “Florida Doctor Sentenced to 25 Years for Conspiring and Attempting to Support Al Qaeda,”
Nov. 28, 2007, http://media-newswire.com/release_1058218.html; Stephen W. Smith, “Fla. Doctor Convicted in NY
Terror Case,” CBSNews.com, May 21, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/05/21/terror/main2833349.shtml.
132 DOJ Press Release, “Maryland Man Sentenced to 15 Years for Providing Material Support to Terrorist
Organization,” July 25, 2007, http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/July07/brentsentencingpr.pdf.
133 Larry Neumeister, “Moroccan-Born Bookseller Sentenced to 13 Years in Terror Case by Federal Judge in New
York,” Associated Press cited in Worldstream, April 16, 2007.
134 DOJ Press Release, “Ronald Grecula Pleads Guilty to Attempting to Provide Material Support to Al-Qaeda,” Sep.
22, 2006. http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/US_v_Grecula_DOJPRGuiltyPlea.pdf.
135 Kelly Thornton, “Man Sentenced in Drugs-for-Missiles Plot,” San Diego Union-Tribune, Apr. 14, 2006; Thornton,
“Drugs-for-Arms Plot Nets Prison,” San Diego Union-Tribune, Apr. 5, 2006, http://legacy.signonsandiego.com/
uniontrib/20060405/news_2m5missile.html; ‘“Al-Qaeda Dealers’ Face US Trial,” BBC News, Jan. 6, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2630849.stm.
136 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Press Release, “Two New Orleans Men Admit Offering to Sell False
Identities to Assist Members of Terrorist Organization,” Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.google.com/#hl=en&source=hp&
q=
Two+New+Orleans+Men+Admit+Offering+to+Sell+False+Identities+to+Assist+Members+of+Terrorist+Organization
&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&oq=&gs_rfai=&pbx=1&fp=eb25b226ce9fcffe
Congressional Research Service
31
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Arabian Peninsula after he had communicated with radical cleric Anwar al-
Aulaqi.137
• Khalid Quazzani: On May 19, 2010, Ouazzani, a naturalized U.S. citizen
originally from Morocco and living in Kansas City, Missouri, pled guilty to
participating in a material support scheme that provided more than $23,000 to Al
Qaeda.138
• Syed Hashmi: A Pakistan-born U.S. citizen, Hashmi pled guilty to material
support charges on April 27, 2010. He admitted that while he was a graduate
student in London, he allowed a roommate to store in his apartment ponchos,
sleeping bags, and waterproof socks destined for Al Qaeda. Hashmi also loaned
the individual $300 to travel to Waziristan, Pakistan to deliver the goods.139
• Raja Lahrasib Khan: On March 25, 2010, Khan, a naturalized U.S. citizen born
in Pakistan, was charged with providing material support (in the form of money)
to Al Qaeda. The criminal complaint alleges that Khan accepted $1,000 from an
undercover agent and assured him that the money would be used to purchase
weapons and possibly other supplies.140
• Between November 2007 and March 2010, U.S. citizens Wesam El-Hanafi and
Sabirhan Hasanoff allegedly engaged in a scheme to, among other things,
provide computer expertise to and purchase seven Casio digital watches for Al
Qaeda.141
Little Stomach for Suicide or Martyrdom
Few of the terrorist conspiracies examined in this report clearly contained suicidal or martyrdom
overtones. Two terrorist plots clearly had suicide missions as core elements. Najibullah Zazi and
his associates planned their attack on New York’s subways as suicide missions. Also, at least one
American recruited into al-Shabaab has committed a suicide attack. On October 29, 2008, al-
137 Evan Perez, “U.S. Terror Suspect Arrested,” The Wall Street Journal, June 3, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703340904575285310199323440.html; DOJ Press Release, “Texas Man Indicted for Attempting
to Provide Material Support to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” June 3, 2010, http://houston.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/
pressrel10/ho060310.htm.
138 DOJ Press Release, “Al Qaeda Supporter Pleads Guilty to Supporting Terrorist Organization,” May 19, 2010,
http://kansascity.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/kc051910.htm. Terry Frieden, “U.S. Citizen Pleads Guilty to Sending
Funds to al Qaeda,” CNN, May 19, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/05/19/missouri.al.qaeda.funding.plea/
index.html.
139 DOJ Press Release, “U.S. Citizen Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court to 15 Years in Prison for Conspiring to
Provide Material Support to Al Qaeda,” June 9, 2010, http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/nyfo060910.htm;
Benjamin Weiser, “Former Brooklyn College Student Admits He Conspired to Help Al Qaeda,” The New York Times,
Apr. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/nyregion/28hashmi.html; Allison Gendar, “Plea Gets Terror Thug
15 Years,” New York Daily News, Apr. 28, 2010.
140 Mike Robinson, “Chicago Terrorism Suspect Pleads Not Guilty,” Associated Press, Apr. 5, 2010,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5i8cDBcu_QALQpoeOTNk3X03l3L9AD9ET4U6O0; DOJ
Press Release, “Chicago Man Charged with Providing Material Support to Al Qaeda by Attempting to Send Funds
Overseas,” Mar. 26, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2010/pr0326_01.pdf.
141 DOJ Press Release, “Manhattan U.S. Attorney Charges Two Brooklyn Men with Conspiring to Provide Material
Support to al Qaeda,” Apr. 30, 2010, http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/nyfo043010.htm; Benjamin
Weisser, “2 Ex-Brooklyn Men Charged in Terror Plot,” New York Times, Apr. 30, 2010; http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/05/01/nyregion/01terror.html.
Congressional Research Service
32
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Shabaab recruit Shirwa Ahmed who became the first known American suicide bomber when he
drove an explosives-laden truck into a government building in Somalia, one of five simultaneous
assaults that killed 22 U.N. aid workers and others.142 Reportedly, the FBI is also investigating
whether a Seattle man was responsible for a suicide truck bombing in Mogadishu, Somalia on
September 17, 2009 that killed 21 peacekeepers and himself. 143
Four others expressed a willingness to perform a suicide mission. Daniel Maldonado told
authorities that he would be willing to become a suicide bomber if he were wounded and could
not otherwise fight.144 Al Qaeda member and U.S. citizen, Bryant Neal Vinas, agreed to become a
suicide bomber but was rebuffed by the group.145 In emails intercepted by law enforcement
authorities, Colleen LaRose (“Jihad Jane”) wrote that she was prepared to be a martyr. And, in
recordings of his conversations with an informant, Shaker Masri stated that he would be willing
to walk up to a group of U.S. Army soldiers and blow himself up as a martyr.146
The Success of Lone Wolves
Lone wolves (Nidal Hasan, Abdulhakim Muhammad, Hasan Akbar, and Mohammed Taheri-
Azar) have conducted the four successful homegrown attacks since 9/11. The remaining disrupted
or failed plots have involved two or more participants in a group or network of one type or
another. Three of the four lone wolf attacks involved firearms and they targeted U.S. military
personnel.
It is difficult to generalize from such a small pool of cases. However, the success of four solo
actors may highlight two contrasting points. First, law enforcement may face significant
challenges in identifying and stopping lone wolf terrorists involved in technically uncomplicated
plots unconnected to terrorist groups. Second, U.S. Law enforcement has been successful in
disrupting and dismantling homegrown terrorist groups or networks since 9/11. Bolstering this
point, undercover agents or cooperating witnesses infiltrated and monitored groups involved in
fourteen of the plots.
Varied Capabilities
Among the 40 homegrown plots since 9/11, the operational capabilities of participants diverge
greatly. Some evinced terrorist tradecraft such as bomb making skills. Others appeared to be far
less experienced. For instance, long before Derrick Shareef was apprehended in 2006, he likely
142 DOJ Press Release, “Terror Charges Unsealed in Minnesota Against Eight Defendants,” Nov. 23, 2009,
http://minneapolis.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/mp112309.htm.
143 Mike Carter, “Somali Bomb Suspect Tied to Seattle,” The Seattle Times, Sep. 24, 2009.
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2009930567_somalia24m.html.
144 United States v. Daniel Joseph Maldonado, Superseding Criminal Complaint , Case Number: H-07-125M, U.S.
District Court, Southern District of Texas, Feb. 13, 2007, pp. 4-5, http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/
Maldonado_Complaint.pdf.
145 Michael Powell, “U.S. Recruit Reveals How Qaeda Trains Foreigners,” The New York Times, July 23, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/24/nyregion/24terror.html.
146 United States v. Shaker Masri, Affidavit in support of Criminal Complaint 10-CR-0655, U.S. District Court
Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division, Aug. 9, 2010, p. 22, http://jnslp.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/masri-
complaint1.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
33
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
intended to commit terrorist acts. However, he appears not to have possessed the capability to do
so on his own until he was approached by an undercover FBI informant.
Shareef, a Muslim convert and 22 years old at the time of his arrest, plotted to set off hand
grenades at a shopping mall in Rockford, Illinois. FBI informant William “Jamaal” Chrisman
played a central part in the plot. At the behest of authorities, Chrisman befriended Shareef in
September 2006 while the latter was working in a video store and had nowhere to live. Chrisman
invited the young man to move in with him and began reporting to his law enforcement handlers
regarding Shareef’s jihadist tendencies.147 Shareef was unaware that Chrisman secretly recorded
their conversations. The duo talked about violent jihad against civilians, public buildings, and a
judge in DeKalb, Illinois.148 They concocted a plan to attack a local shopping mall. Chrisman told
the young jihadist of a friend who could procure weapons for them. Unknown to Shareef, the
“friend” was an undercover FBI agent.149 On December 6, 2006, the duo met the undercover FBI
agent in the mall’s parking lot where Shareef attempted to trade stereo speakers for hand grenades
and was arrested.150 Shareef, who pled guilty to one count of attempting to use a weapon of mass
destruction, was sentenced in September 30, 2008 to 35 years in prison.151
Conversely, two of the homegrown jihadist terrorist plots appear to stand out for the capability
their plotters. Both came to public attention in 2009. Both involved homegrown jihadists who had
strong ties to foreign terrorist organizations. Attorney General Eric Holder characterized one of
those plots—Najibullah Zazi’s plan to blow up explosives on the New York City subway—as:
one of the most serious terrorist threats to our nation since September 11th, 2001, and were it
not for the combined efforts of the law enforcement and intelligence communities, it could
have been devastating. This attempted attack on our homeland was real, it was in motion,
and it would have been deadly. We were able to thwart this plot because of careful analysis
by our intelligence agents and prompt actions by law enforcement.152
While a complete picture of Zazi’s radicalization process is not publicly available, some details
regarding his plot have emerged. In his youth, he may have listened to the radical messages of
Saifur Rahman Halimi, an imam who advocated jihad, attended the same mosque as Zazi’s
family, and lived in the same Queens building.153 Regardless, Zazi pled guilty on February 22,
2010, to a number of terrorism charges. As mentioned above, the young man admitted to
receiving Al Qaeda training in the Waziristan region of Pakistan in 2008. There, he learned about
explosives and discussed specific targets with Al Qaeda members. He returned to the United
147 Michael Mayko, “FBI Informant Testifies in Terror Case,” Connecticut Post, Nov. 30, 2007, quoted in NEFA
Foundation, “The Illinois Shopping Mall Plot,” Dec. 2007, p. 2, http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/
ChicagoPlot1207.pdf; John Christoffersen, “After Sept. 11, 3 Muslim Converts Take Different Paths,” Associated
Press, Dec. 2, 2007. Hereafter: Christoffersen, Dec. 2, 2007.
148 Pierre Thomas and Jason Ryan, “‘Lone Wolf’ Charged With Plotting Attack During Christmas Rush,”
abcnews.com, Dec. 8, 2006. http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=2710776&page=1.
149 United States v. Derrick Shareef, Affidavit, 06-CR-919, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
2006, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/348.pdf.
150 Melissa Bailey, “Ode to Osama,” New Haven Independent, Nov. 28, 2007. http://www.newhavenindependent.org/
index.php/archives/entry/ode_to_osama/; Thomas and Ryan, “‘Lone Wolf’ Charged.”
151 Anti-Defamation League, “Illinois Man Sentenced for Planning Holiday Mall Attack,” Oct. 13, 2008,
http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/darrick_shareef.htm.
152 DOJ Press Release, Feb. 22, 2010.
153 Samantha Gross, David Caruso, and Michael Rubinkam, “Radical Influences All Around NYC Terror Suspect,”
Associated Press, cited in abcnews.com, Oct. 4, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=8741604.
Congressional Research Service
34
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
States in January 2009 and moved to Denver. He also traveled to New York to discuss the timing
for the attacks with a network of conspirators. In July and early September in Denver, he gathered
materials for detonator components and assembled them based on the detailed training he had
received in Afghanistan. Zazi admitted to bringing the explosive Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP)
into New York on Thursday September 10, 2009. He intended to finish bomb construction over
the weekend and planned to target New York’s subway lines early the next week.154
On March 18, 2010, David Headley pled guilty to terrorism charges. He admitted that he helped
plan two plots for the Pakistani terrorist group, Lashkar-i-Taiba (LET)—the November 2008
Mumbai attack and an un-executed conspiracy targeting a Danish newspaper. He received
training from LeT and claimed membership in the organization. Headley attended the group’s
training camps five times between 2002 and 2005. These stints in Pakistan provided him with
weapons training, indoctrination in jihad as well as instruction in close combat, survival skills,
and counter-surveillance, among other things.
Between 2005 and 2008, he received extensive direction from LeT members and engaged in
reconnaissance for the group in preparation for its Mumbai attack. To provide cover for his
surveillance activity, Headley encouraged a co-conspirator in Chicago, who owned an
immigration services business, to open a satellite office in Mumbai. Headley conducted video
surveillance of potential Mumbai targets for LeT, and using a global positioning system device,
he pinpointed landing sites for a waterborne assault. At the behest of LeT, Headley also
conducted reconnaissance of the offices of the Danish newspaper Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten.
Representatives of both LeT and Al Qaeda schemed with him to strike the newspaper after it had
published unflattering cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad.155
Combating Homegrown Terrorism: Enforcement
Activities
The spate of recent arrests and other counterterrorism successes should not obscure the challenges
facing law enforcement in disrupting homegrown terrorist plotting. Counterterrorism efforts exist
within two broad contexts. Many of the legal behaviors associated with radicalization occur in the
open marketplace of ideas where consumers weigh competing ideologies within the context of
free speech. Conversely, the operational aspects of violent jihadist plots largely involve illegal
activity. In this secretive realm involving criminality, law enforcement pursues terrorists in a real-
world version of hide-and-seek.
The divergent nature of these two contexts may imply a distinct wall between the public realm
and the secretive operational realm. In reality, the barrier is far from distinct. What happens
operationally has significant impacts in the marketplace of ideas (Figure 3). The success of
terrorist plots may spur radicalization, while effective policing may make terrorism a less popular
154 Zazi pled guilty to conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S. persons or property, conspiracy to
commit murder in a foreign country, and a provision of material support to a terrorist organization. See DOJ Press
Release, Feb. 22, 2010. For more on Zazi’s childhood, see Michael Wilson, “From Smiling Coffee Vendor.”
155 United States v. David Coleman Headley, Plea Agreement, 09 CR 830-3. U.S. District Court, Northern District of
Illinois, 2010, http://www.hindu.com/nic/headleyplea.pdf; DOJ Press Release, Mar. 18, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
35
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
option for radicals. High levels of radicalization may expand the potential pool of terrorist
recruits.
Figure 3. Counterterrorism Context
Source: CRS
Intelligence Approaches
A group of intelligence and terrorism experts argues that “to infiltrate terrorist conspiracies,
identify and head off future terrorist attacks, and build the knowledge base required to rapidly
investigate when terrorist incidents do occur requires human intelligence.”156 The DOJ and FBI
operate 106 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) in the United States—71 created since 9/11.
These interagency entities include 4,433 federal, state, and local law enforcement officers and
agents who “investigate acts of terrorism that affect the U.S., its interests, property and citizens,
including those employed by the U.S. and military personnel overseas.”157 As this suggests, their
operations are highly tactical and focus on investigations, developing human sources
(informants), and gathering intelligence to thwart terrorist plots.
JTTFs offer an important conduit for the sharing of intelligence developed from FBI-led
counterterrorism investigations with outside agencies. These task forces also connect state and
local law enforcement with the U.S. Intelligence Community on terrorism-related matters. To
help facilitate this, especially as the threat of homegrown jihadists has emerged, the number of
156 America’s Domestic Intelligence is Inadequate: The Country Still Lacks A Coherent National Domestic Intelligence-
Collection Effort, Notes prepared by Brian Michael Jenkins, acting chair of a group of unofficial, non-partisan acting
and former senior intelligence and law enforcement officials, practitioners, and terrorism analysts devoted to
intelligence issues. The group serves without compensation or political agenda and does not seek to influence
government, although its observations are circulated among government officials. Hereafter: America’s Domestic
Intelligence is Inadequate, June 2010.
157 Brig Barker and Steve Fowler, “The FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force Officer,” The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,
vol. 77, no. 11 (November 2008), pp. 12-15; FBI, “Protecting America Against Terrorist Attack: A Closer Look at Our
Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” May 2009, http://www.fbi.gov/page2/may09/jttfs_052809.html.
Congressional Research Service
36
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
top-secret security clearances issued to local police working on JTTFs has increased from 125 to
878 between 2007 and 2009.158
A significant dilemma for law enforcement and intelligence officials who straddle the public
realm of ideas and the secretive realm of terrorist operations is how to sift the law-abiding, non-
violent radical attracted to jihadist rhetoric from the would-be terrorist who merits targeting. The
vast amount of terrorist-related material available on the Internet in a relatively anonymous
setting attracts homegrown individuals open to radicalization. Many of these individuals may
show great interest in radical content, engage in radical discourse, but not become terrorists. 159 A
growing pool of those who view jihadism as “cool” and engage in online “talk” may make it
harder for police to identify actual terrorists.
Preventive Policing
Since the 9/11 attacks, law enforcement has taken a more proactive, intelligence-driven posture in
its investigations. While serving as Deputy Attorney General, Paul McNulty described the Justice
Department’s aggressive, proactive, and preventative course as
the only acceptable response from a department of government charged with enforcing our
laws and protecting the American people. Awaiting an attack is not an option. That is why
the Department of Justice is doing everything in its power to identify risks to our Nation’s
security at the earliest stage possible and to respond with forward-leaning—preventative—
prosecutions.160
One observer has described intelligence gathering in this context as “driven by a theory of
preventive policing: in order to anticipate the next terror attack, authorities need to track legal
activities …It focuses not on crime, but on the possibility that a crime might be committed at
some future date.”161
The FBI and DOJ emphasized their forward-leaning approach with its September 29, 2008
revision of the Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations which they claim
“make the FBI’s operations in the United States more effective by providing simpler, clearer, and
more uniform standards and procedures.”162 This revision went into effect on December 1, 2008.
In large part, the guidelines sprang from the post-9/11 national security context in which the FBI
surmised that it could not simply react to crimes. It had to preemptively search for criminal,
158 Kevin Johnson, “FBI Issues More Top Secret Clearance for Terrorism Cases,” USA Today, August 12, 2010,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-08-12-secret-clearances_N.htm; STRATFOR, A Decade of Evolution in
U.S. Counterterrorism Operations, Special Report, December 2009, http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/150745/
analysis/20091216_us_decade_evolution_counterterrorism_operations?ip_auth_redirect=1; CRS Report RL33033,
Intelligence Reform Implementation at the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Issues and Options for Congress, by
Alfred Cumming.
159 Gilbert Ramsay, “Relocating the Virtual War,” Defence Against Terrorism Review, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2009), p.
35, http://www.tmmm.tsk.tr/publications/datr3/03_Gilbert%20Ramsay.pdf.
160 Prepared Remarks of Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington,
D.C., May 24, 2006, http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/speeches/2006/dag_speech_060524.html.
161 Thomas Cincotta, “From Movements to Mosques, Informants Endanger Democracy,” The Public Eye, Summer
2009. http://www.publiceye.org/magazine/v24n2/movements-to-mosques.html. Hereafter: Cincotta, “From Movements
to Mosques.”
162 DOJ Press Release, “Memorandum for the Heads of Department Components: The Attorney General's Guidelines
for Domestic FBI Operations,” Sep. 29, 2008, http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines-memo.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
37
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
counterintelligence, and terrorist threats to the homeland.163 As FBI General Counsel Valerie
Caproni stated in congressional testimony:
We believe that this will allow the FBI to take additional necessary steps to becoming a more
proactive organization. One of the key issues that we think the FBI needs to be able to do is
assess potential risks and vulnerabilities. Having these additional techniques available at the
assessment level, we think, will be key to the FBI’s ability to efficiently and effectively
answer those questions and assess risks.164
The most prominent changes to the guidelines concern “assessments” that agents and analysts
may now use outside of investigations. Investigations require some level of factual predication,165
while an assessment does not.166 However, assessments are to follow a specifically articulated
purpose. The guidelines have established six authorized purposes:167
• check leads on individuals or activities,
• check leads on groups or organizations,
• collect information to analyze potential threats and vulnerabilities,
• gather information for intelligence analysis or planning,
• vet and manage the agency’s confidential human sources (informants), and
• collect foreign intelligence.
Assessments are not to be based on “arbitrary or groundless speculation, nor can an assessment be
based solely on the exercise of First Amendment protected activities or on the race, ethnicity,
163 Prepared Statement of Elisebeth Collins Cook, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Policy, DOJ and Valerie
Caproni, General Counsel, FBI, U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Attorney General Guidelines
for FBI Criminal Investigations, National Security Investigations, and the Collection of Foreign Intelligence, 110th
Cong., 2nd sess., Sep. 23, 2008, S. HRG. 110–846 (Washington: GPO, 2009), p. 10, http://intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs/
110846.pdf.
164 Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Criminal Investigations,
National Security Investigations, and the Collection of Foreign Intelligence, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., Sep. 23, 2008, S.
HRG. 110–846 (Washington: GPO, 2009), p. 17, http://intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs/110846.pdf.
165 Ibid. Factually predicated investigations include preliminary and full investigations. Preliminary investigations can
be opened with “‘allegation or information’ indicative of possible criminal activity or threats to the national security.”
Opening a full investigation requires an “‘articulable factual basis’ of possible criminal or national threat.” See FBI,
Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, (DIOG) redacted, Dec. 16, 2008, pp. 76, 85, available at
http://www.eff.org/fn/directory/8364/354. Hereafter: DIOG, redacted.
166 According to the DIOG, “Although difficult to define, ‘no particular factual predication’ is less than ‘information or
allegation’ as required for the initiation of a preliminary investigation. For example, an assessment may be conducted
when there is a basis to know: (i) whether more information or facts are required to determine if there is a criminal or
national security threat; and (ii) there is a rational and articulable relationship between the stated authorized purpose of
the assessment on the one hand and the information sought and the proposed means to obtain that information on the
other. Regardless of whether specific approval or specific documentation is required, an FBI employee should be able
to explain the purpose of an assessment and the reason for the methods used to conduct the assessment. Those FBI
employees who conduct assessments are responsible for assuring that assessments are not pursued for frivolous or
improper purposes and are not based solely on First Amendment activity or on the race, ethnicity, national origin, or
religion of the subject of the assessment.” DIOG, redacted, p. 39.
167 DIOG, redacted, pp. 44-56. See also, Andrew Kalloch, “FBI General Counsel Defends New Guidelines,” Harvard
Law Record, Dec. 4, 2008, updated Sep. 29, 2009, http://www.hlrecord.org/2.4463/fbi-general-counsel-defends-new-
guidelines-1.577396.
Congressional Research Service
38
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
national origin or religion of the subject.”168 Assessments offer terrorism investigators a variety of
techniques, including public surveillance and the use of confidential informants to penetrate
conspiracies.169
Civil libertarians and Muslim community organizations have voiced broad concerns about the
new guidelines. According to media reporting, Farhad Khera, executive director of the nonprofit
Muslim Advocates, has suggested that the Attorney General Guidelines are invasive and based on
“generalized suspicion and fear on the part of law enforcement, not on individualized evidence of
criminal activity.”170 Under the Freedom of Information Act, in late July 2010, the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) requested information from the FBI regarding the agency’s amassing of
racial and ethnic data based on the new guidelines.171 As written, the guidelines allow for the
collection of information about ethnic or racial communities and justify the gathering of such
information for proactive purposes. The guidelines state that it should be done if it “will
reasonably aid the analysis of potential threats and vulnerabilities, and, overall, assist domain
awareness for the purpose of performing intelligence analysis.”172
Detecting the Shift from Radical to Violent Jihadist
A major challenge for law enforcement is to gauge how quickly and at what point individuals
move from radicalized beliefs to violence.173 Because not all terrorist suspects follow a single
radicalization roadmap on their way to executing plots, U.S. law enforcement also faces the task
of discerning exactly when radicalized individuals become real threats.
Among the tools employed by law enforcement is the monitoring of Internet and social
networking sites. The USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) authorizes the FBI to use National
Security Letters to obtain a range of information including data pertaining to email and Internet
use from Internet Service Providers.174 In addition, according to an internal Justice Department
document obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the Electronic Frontier Foundation,
law enforcement agents may also go undercover into social networking sites with false online
profiles to exchange messages with suspects, identify a target’s friends or relatives, and browse
private information such as postings, personal photographs and video clips.175 The Obama
Administration is seeking approval from Congress to expand FBI authority to obtain records
related to the context of emails and other Internet-based communications without first obtaining a
168 DIOG, redacted, p. 39.
169 Charlie Savage, “Wider Authority for F.B.I. Agents Stirs Concern,” The New York Times, Oct. 29, 2009.
170 Yost, July 27, 2010.
171 Brent Jones, “ACLU Seeks Information About FBI Racial, Ethnic Data Collection,” Baltimore Sun, July 28, 2010,
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-07-28/news/bs-md-aclu-fbi-20100728_1_ethnic-data-profiling-aclu-
representatives; Pete Yost, “FBI Defends Guidelines on Eve of Senate Testimony,” Associated Press, cited in
boston.com, July 27, 2010. Hereafter: Yost, July 27, 2010. http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/
2010/07/27/fbi_defends_guidelines_on_eve_of_senate_testimony/
172 DIOG, redacted, p. 32.
173 Eileen Sullivan and Devlin Barrett, “Recent Cases Show Challenge of US Terrorists,” Associated Press, cited in
abcnews.com, Mar. 17, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=10121734.
174 For a discussion of the use of National Security Letters, see Laura K. Donohue, The Costs of Counterterrorism:
Power, Politics, and Liberty, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 236-243.
175 Richard Lardner, “Break the Law and Your New ‘Friend’ May Be the FBI,” Associated Press cited by
abcnews.com, Mar. 16, 2010. http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=10111664.
Congressional Research Service
39
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
warrant from a judge. “The proposal would add ‘electronic communication transaction records’—
like email addresses used in correspondence and Web pages visited—to a list of the categories of
information that FBI agents can demand.”176
A review of criminal complaints and indictments in terrorism cases reveal that the FBI has
exploited the Internet and/or email communications to build cases against defendants in at least
twelve of the post-9/11 cases studied in this report. Although much is said about terrorist use of
the Internet for recruitment, training, and communications, these cases suggest that terrorists and
aspiring terrorists will not find the Internet a uniformly permissive environment.
The case involving 24-year-old Mohamed Alessa and 20-year-old Carlos Almonte highlights the
complexities in detecting transitions from radicalization to violent extremism. Investigators
arrested the duo on June 5, 2010 at John F. Kennedy Airport (JFK) in New York as they allegedly
tried to fly to Egypt. They hoped to eventually link up with the Somali terrorist organization, al-
Shabaab.177 The case started with an email tip to the FBI on October 9, 2006, which stated,
[e]very time [Alessa and Almonte] access the Internet all they look for is all those terrorist
videos about the Islam holly [sic] war and where they kill US soldiers and other terrible
things ... . They keep saying that Americans are their enemies, that everybody other than
Islamic followers are their enemies ... and they all must be killed. 178
This statement suggests that in 2006, the two young men engaged in radical behavior, perusing
jihadist websites and discussing terrorist activity.
Between 2006 and 2010, investigators monitored the duo’s actions as their beliefs arguably
morphed into something more dangerous. Initially it was unclear whether the pair was just
engaged in radical talk or actually planning for violent jihad.179 In 2006 and 2007, investigators
debated the level of threat posed by Alessa and Almonte. A key shift occurred when law
enforcement discovered after the fact that the duo had travelled to Jordan in 2007 but failed to get
recruited as mujahedeen fighters. This helped convince authorities of the two plotters’ actual
intent to do harm. By 2009, the case included an undercover investigator from the NYPD
interacting with the two suspects.180
The U.S. government’s criminal complaint against Alessa and Almonte lays out the alleged overt
activities marking the duo’s change from radicals to terrorist suspects worthy of arrest. Back in
New Jersey, Alessa and Almonte supposedly trained for jihad by lifting weights and rehearsing
combat techniques using paintball guns. The government claims that they gathered equipment,
176 Charlie Savage, “White House Seeks to Clarify F.B.I. Powers vis-à-vis E-Mail,” The New York Times, July 29,
2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/30/us/30fbi.html.
177 Richard Esposito, “Terror Raids at JFK Airport Net American Alleged Terror Plotters Headed for Somalia,”
abcnews.com, June 6, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/terror-raids-jfk-airport-net-alleged-terror-plotters/story?id=
10839045.
178 U.S. v. Mohamed Alessa and Carlos E. Almonte, Criminal Complaint, Magistrate No. 10-8109 (MCA), U.S. District
Court, District of New Jersey, June 4, 2010, p. 11, http://www.scribd.com/doc/32643121/US-v-Alessa-and-Almonte.
Hereafter: U.S. v. Alessa and Almonte, Criminal Complaint.
179 Peter Finn and Jerry Markon, “N.J. Men Arrested Are Latest From U.S. Tied To Terrorist Groups,” The Washington
Post, June 7, 2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/06/AR2010060600418.html.
Hereafter: Finn and Markon, June 7, 2010.
180 Ted Sherman, “FBI Followed Every Move of Two N.J. Terror Suspects for Years, Culminating in Airport Arrests,”
Star-Ledger, June 13, 2010, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/06/authorities_followed_every_mov.html.
Congressional Research Service
40
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
including tactical-brand flashlights and combat boots. The pair also purportedly saved over
$7,000 to fund their foreign violent jihad. The criminal complaint describes how the two
discussed violent jihad and downloaded jihadist rhetoric. For example, Almonte is said to have
kept a lecture by radical imam Anwar al-Aulaqi on his cell phone. The U.S. government contends
that Alessa viewed a video including scenes of Al-Qaeda spokesperson Adam Gadahn praising
Nidal Hasan, the alleged Ft. Hood shooter. Also, according to the criminal complaint, Almonte
possessed computer files of violent jihadist documents authored by Osama Bin Ladin and his
second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri. For the government, Alessa and Almonte’s
transformation from radicals to terrorists likely culminated when the two allegedly booked
reservations for separate flights to Egypt scheduled for June 5, 2010.181
Two other successful plots emphasize the difficulty inherent in discerning when radicals become
terrorist threats. Even if a suspect comes to the attention of law enforcement, evaluating the
person’s intent and capability remains challenging. Prior to the Fort Hood shooting, over the
course of several months, Nidal Hasan sent a number of emails to radical cleric Anwar al-Aulaqi
(who replied to only two of them). The email exchange was assessed by JTTF investigators to be
in line with the psychiatrist’s research into Muslim U.S. soldiers’ reactions to the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, thus, presumably protected speech.182 In retrospect it appears Hasan’s intentions
were far more menacing.
Prior to Abdulhakim Muhammed’s arrest for the June 1, 2009, shooting incident in Little Rock,
Arkansas, the FBI interviewed him on several occasions. Muhammad spent 16 months in Yemen
starting in the fall of 2007. While there, he married a woman from the southern part of the
country. He allegedly taught English and learned Arabic during his time in the country. Yemeni
officials imprisoned him in November 2008 on a visa overstay. He also supposedly possessed a
fraudulent Somali visa.183 Yemen deported him to the United States in January 2009.184 The FBI is
reported to have interviewed him before the shooting, including while he was in prison in Yemen
and then again in Nashville soon after he returned. 185 According to law enforcement officials, the
episode in Yemen prompted a preliminary investigation by the FBI and other American law
enforcement agencies into whether he had ties to extremist groups. But that investigation was
inconclusive, leaving the FBI with insufficient evidence to wiretap his phone or put him under
surveillance.186
181 Finn and Markon, June 7, 2010.
182 David Tarrant, “Suspects in Dallas Plot, Fort Hood Shootings Were on FBI’s Radar, But Only One Was Taken
Down,” The Dallas Morning News, Nov. 22, 2009, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/
texassouthwest/stories/112209dnentlonewolf.450512f.html Hereafter: Tarrant, Nov. 22, 2009; Ann Scott Tyson and
Dana Priest, “Army Sought Ways to Channel Hasan’s Absorption with Islam,” The Washington Post, Nov. 12, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/11/AR2009111128106.html
183 Ibid.
184 James Dao, “Man Claims Terror Ties in Little Rock Shooting” The New York Times, Jan. 22, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/22littlerock.html, Hereafter: Dao, Jan. 22, 2010.
185 See Ibid; and Dina Temple-Raston, “FBI Encountered Accused Ark. Shooter In Yemen,” National Public Radio,
June 8, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105128523.
186 James Dao and David Johnson, “Suspect in Soldier Attack was Once Detained in Yemen,” The New York Times,
June 3, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/04recruit.html.
Congressional Research Service
41
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement
A terrorist attack in the United States, whether committed by homegrown or foreign terrorists,
will occur in a community within a state or tribal area. Since the plotting and preparation for
domestic terrorist attacks (such as surveillance of a target, acquisition and transport of weapons or
explosives, and even the recruitment of participants) will also occur within local communities,
preventing such attacks is not only a federal responsibility but also a state, local, and tribal one. In
2010 testimony to Congress, Brian Michael Jenkins says that
The diffuse nature of today’s terrorism threat and the emphasis on do-it-yourself terrorism
challenge the presumption that knowledge of terrorist plots will come first to federal
authorities, who will then share this information with state and local authorities. It is just as
likely—perhaps more likely—that local law enforcement could be the first to pick up clues
of future conspiracies.187
Every day, officers at over 17,000 state and local law enforcement agencies collect and document
information regarding behaviors, incidents, and other suspicious activity associated with crime
including terrorism.188 A joint study by the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, and
senior law enforcement officials concluded that “[t]he gathering, processing, reporting, analyzing,
and sharing of suspicious activity is critical to preventing crimes, including those associated with
domestic and international terrorism.”189 A former police chief observed that
On the beat or mobile, cops are sensitive to things that do not look right or do not sound right
... [r]emember, it was a rookie cop on a routine check that resulted in the arrest of Eric
Robert Rudolph in North Carolina despite the enormous commitment of federal resources.190
Another example is the case of Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh. He was arrested after a
traffic stop when Oklahoma State Trooper Charles J. Hanger noticed that McVeigh’s yellow 1977
Mercury Marquis had no license plate.191 Using his home state as an example, a former U.S.
187 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment, Internet Terror Recruitment and Tradecraft: How Can We Address an Evolving Tool
While Protecting Free Speech?, Written Testimony of Brian Michael Jenkins, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., May 26, 2010, p.
7. http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20100526101532-91592.pdf. Hereafter: Jenkins Testimony, May 26,
2010.
188 Findings and Recommendations of the SAR Support and Implementation Project, Final Draft, June 2008, p. 6. The
SAR Support and Implementation Project was a joint effort of the Department of Justice (DOJ) Bureau of Justice
Assistance; the Major Cities Chiefs Association, DOJ’s Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global), the
Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council, and DHS to develop recommendations to be used by law enforcement
agencies to improve identification and reporting of suspicious activity and the sharing of that information with fusion
centers and Joint Terrorism Task Forces. See pp. 1-2. http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/
mccarecommendation-06132008.pdf.
189 Ibid, p. 2.
190 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment, Homeland Security Intelligence: Its Relevance and Limitations, Statement of John W.
Gaissert, Chief of Police; Commerce, Georgia, 111th Cong., 1st sess., Mar. 18, 2009, http://homeland.house.gov/
SiteDocuments/20090318101123-58795.pdf.
191 Trooper Hanger had no reason to suspect a connection between McVeigh and the bombing in Oklahoma City. But,
the trooper’s suspicions were raised when the driver looked at his bumper when told why he had been pulled over. Says
Trooper Hanger: “I thought if he knew he didn’t have a tag, why did he look at the back of the car like that? It just
didn’t seem right.” In addition, McVeigh was unable to provide proof of insurance and a bill of sale for the vehicle and
then disclosed that he had a firearm. Trooper Hanger arrested McVeigh for five misdemeanors and took him into
custody. McVeigh was awaiting arraignment when the FBI connected him to the bombing. See National Law
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
42
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Attorney maintains that “ ... evidence of a potential terrorist threat or organized criminal
enterprise is far more likely to be found in the incidental contact with the 10,000 police officers in
the state of Washington than by the less than 150 FBI agents assigned to the Seattle Field
Division.”192
The role of state, local, and tribal law enforcement in detecting nascent terrorist plotting is
particularly important considering the challenges noted elsewhere in this report in detecting
terrorist lone wolves. The four successful homegrown jihadist terrorist attacks that have occurred
since 9/11 were all committed by lone wolves. Jenkins believes that preventing future terrorist
attacks requires effective domestic intelligence collection that is best accomplished by local
authorities.193
Integrating state, local, and tribal law enforcement into the national counterterrorism effort
continues to be an abiding concern of policymakers. After the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) cited breakdowns in information sharing and
the failure to fuse pertinent intelligence, i.e., “connecting the dots,” as key factors in the failure to
prevent the 9/11 attacks 194 several efforts were made to improve the sharing of terrorism
information between federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies:
• States and major urban areas established intelligence fusion centers.195 Congress
has defined fusion centers as a “collaborative effort of two or more Federal, state,
local, or tribal government agencies that combines resources, expertise, or
information with the goal of maximizing the ability of such agencies to detect,
prevent, investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity; ...
”196 At the end of 2009, there were 72 DHS/FBI designated state and Urban Area
Security Initiative (UASI) fusion centers.197
• In the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458),
Congress mandated the creation of an Information Sharing Environment
(commonly known as the “ISE”)198 to provide and facilitate the means of sharing
terrorism information among all appropriate Federal, state, local, and tribal
(...continued)
Enforcement Officers Memorial at http://www.nleomf.com/TheFund/programs/OOM/hanger_oct01.htm.
192 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment, A Report Card on Homeland Security Information Sharing, Statement of John McKay,
Former U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Washington, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., September 24, 2008. Hereafter:
McKay Testimony, Sep. 24, 2008, http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20080924102041-86400.pdf.
193 Jenkins Testimony, May 26, 2010, p. 5.
194 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, July 22, 2004,
pp. 353-356 and 416-418. http://www.9-11commission.gov. Hereafter: 9/11 Commission Report.
195 For a full discussion of fusion centers, see CRS Report RL34070, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress,
by John Rollins. For an informative discussion of one of the earliest efforts at local law enforcement collaboration and
intelligence fusion and analysis, see John Sullivan and Alain Bauer, Los Angeles Terrorist Early Warning Group,
published by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department in 2008.
196 P.L. 110-53, §511, 121 STAT. 322. Amends Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding §210A(j).
197 National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center; Tallahassee, Florida; Nov. 4, 2009.
198 P.L. 108-458, Dec. 17, 2004, §1016(b), 118 STAT. 3665
Congressional Research Service
43
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
entities, and the private sector through the use of policy guidelines and
technologies.199
• Congress made information sharing a priority of the new DHS intelligence
organization, requiring it “to disseminate, as appropriate, information analyzed
by the Department within the Department, to other agencies of the Federal
government with responsibilities related to homeland security, and to agencies of
State and local government and private sector entities, with such responsibilities
in order to assist in the deterrence, prevention, preemption of, or response to,
terrorist attacks against the United States.”200
• Congress mandated that DHS support fusion centers in the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53).201 DHS
supports these centers through its State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center
Initiative by providing operational, analytic, reporting, and management advice
and assistance; training; information technology systems and connectivity; and
intelligence officers and analysts.202
The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report Initiative (NSI)203 is a program to push terrorism-
related information generated locally between and among federal, state, local, and tribal levels.
Specifically, it is a framework to support the reporting of suspicious activity—from the point of
initial observation to the point where the information is available in the information sharing
environment.204 It is a standardized, integrated approach to gathering, documenting, processing,
analyzing, and sharing information about suspicious activity that is potentially terrorism-related
while protecting the privacy and civil liberties of Americans.205 The intent is for this locally-
generated suspicious activity reporting to be combined in a systematic way with other sources of
intelligence at the federal level to uncover criminal activity, including terrorism.
Investigative Approaches
As suggested, timing is everything. To preemptively stop terrorists, law enforcement requires
accurate and timely intelligence. To counter violent jihadist plots, U.S. law enforcement has
employed two tactics that have been described by one scholar as the “Al Capone” approach and
the use of “agent provocateurs.”206 The Capone approach involves apprehending individuals
linked to terrorist plots on lesser, non-terrorism-related offenses such as immigration violations.
199 Ibid.
200 Ibid., §201d(1), 116 STAT. 2146.
201 P.L. 110-53, §511, 121 STAT. 318. Amends Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding §210A(a).
202 Ibid. 121 STAT. 319. Amends Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding §210A(b) and (c).
203 For a details on the NSI, see CRS Report R40901, Terrorism Information Sharing and the Nationwide Suspicious
Activity Report Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress, by Mark A. Randol.
204 NSI Project Overview Briefing by Russ Porter, Chairman of the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council of the
Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative.
205 See Ibid, p. A1-6, and PM-ISE, Fact Sheet: Nationwide Suspicious Activities Reporting Initiative, Dec. 23, 2008,
p. 1, http://www.ise.gov/docs/sar/Fact_Sheet_NSI_-_December_23_2008_Final.pdf National Strategy for Information
Sharing,
206 Lorenzo Vidino, “Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism in the United States: A New and Occasional Phenomenon?”
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 32, no. 1, Jan. 2009, p. 13, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/
738522_731260637_907926062.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
44
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
In agent provocateur cases—often called sting operations—government undercover operatives
befriend suspects and offer to facilitate their activities. As the “Al Capone,” moniker suggests,
historically, these tactics have been employed against many types of targets such as mafia bosses,
white-collar criminals, and corrupt public servants. While these techniques combined with the
cultivation of informants as well as surveillance (especially in and around Mosques) may be
effective in stymieing rapidly developing terrorist plots, their use has fostered concern within
U.S. Muslim communities.
The Capone Approach
As mentioned, the Capone approach involves apprehending individuals linked to terrorist plots on
lesser, non-terrorism-related offenses such as immigration violations. This approach fits within a
preventative mode of counterterrorism prosecution and has received media scrutiny.207 Experts
have noted that immediately after 9/11, DOJ often leveled lesser charges against terrorist suspects
to preemptively squelch potential attacks. However, according to the Center on Law and Security
at New York University School of Law, DOJ has moved toward trying suspected terrorists as
terrorists instead of leaning heavily on lesser charges. In 2001 and 2002, 8% of defendants
labeled as terrorists in the media were charged under terrorism statutes, this figure rose to 47% in
2006 and 2007.208 Regardless, the Capone approach is still used in terrorism cases.
Lying to an FBI Special Agent is one of the violations that falls under the Capone approach.209 A
recent example stands out. On July 21, 2010, Paul Rockwood, Jr., a U.S. citizen and Muslim
convert, pled guilty to making false statements to the FBI. Rockwood’s wife, Nadia Rockwood,
also pled guilty to making false statements related to her husband’s case. By early 2010, while
living in King Salmon, Alaska, Paul Rockwood had developed a list of 15 people he planned to
kill, believing that they had desecrated Islam. He had also researched explosives and shared with
others ideas about mail bombs or using firearms to kill his targets. It appears that prosecutors
could not pursue a case based on more substantive terrorism charges and opted to neutralize a
threat—someone apparently preparing to kill people—by using the Capone approach.
The utility of this preventative technique coupled with actual terrorism charges was exhibited by
the FBI in its case against Najibullah Zazi. As mentioned above, Zazi arrived in New York on
September 10, 2009 with explosive material and plans to detonate bombs in New York’s subway
system. Zazi feared authorities had caught up to him and returned to Denver on September 12th.
Between September 10th and 19th, the FBI monitored his activities and bolstered its case with
searches of a vehicle and locations linked to him in New York and Denver. Zazi also agreed to
interviews with the FBI in Denver. On September 19, Special Agents first arrested Zazi in Aurora,
Colorado for knowingly and willfully lying to the FBI. Presumably this was done because he
207 Dan Eggen and Julie Tate, “U.S. Campaign Produces Few Convictions on Terrorism Charges,” The Washington
Post, June 12, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/11/AR2005061100381.html;
Andrew Adams, “FBI's New Approach: Minor Charges Now Stop Terrorism Later,” Lodi News-Sentinel, June 17,
2005.
208 The Center on Law and Security New York University School of Law, Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11,
2001-September 11, 2009, New York, NY, Jan. 2010, p. ii, http://www.lawandsecurity.org/publications/
TTRCFinalJan142.pdf.
209 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
Congressional Research Service
45
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
might flee. Four days later, a grand jury returned a more substantive one-count indictment against
him on weapons of mass destruction charges.210
DOJ used similar charges against Ahmad Wais Afzali, an imam from Queens. He was arrested for
tipping off Zazi to the FBI’s investigation. On March 4, 2010, Afzali pled guilty to lying to
federal officials. He admitted that he warned Zazi that the FBI had asked about him. Afzali also
stated that during the phone conversation he simply cautioned Zazi not to “get involved in
Afghanistan garbage.”211 He stated in court that he misled the FBI about a telephone conversation
he had with Zazi. Afzali claimed that by lying to investigators he had hoped to protect himself,
not Zazi. Afzali had been a source of information for federal and New York City investigators in
the past.212
In another instance of the Capone approach, in 2008 the federal government charged Tarek
Mehanna for lying to FBI agents regarding his relationship to Daniel Maldonado, subsequently
convicted and jailed for terrorism-related offenses. Mehanna’s 2008 arrest occurred at Boston’s
Logan International Airport as he was preparing to leave the country, according to news reports.
He was subsequently released on bail. His defense attorney claimed that the FBI wanted Mehanna
to become an informant, and his refusal precipitated his 2009 indictment and re-arrest on
terrorism charges.213
Agent Provocateur Cases
Agent provocateur cases rely on expert determination by law enforcement that a specific
individual or group is likely to move beyond radicalized talk and engage in violent jihad. The
ultimate goal is to catch a suspect committing an overt criminal act such as pulling the proverbial
trigger but on a dud weapon. By engaging in such strategy, investigators hope to obtain ironclad
evidence against suspects.
As mentioned above, FBI undercover employees or informants played central roles in twelve
terrorist plots since 9/11. Two recent FBI investigations exemplify the utility of this approach. On
September 24, 2009, 19-year-old Jordanian immigrant Hosam Smadi was arrested for attempting
to detonate what he thought was a car bomb in the parking lot of a 60-story skyscraper in Dallas,
Texas. On May 26, 2010, he pled guilty to one count of attempted use of a weapon of mass
destruction.214 Smadi’s apprehension resulted from an FBI operation including at least three
undercover employees. The operation duped Smadi into believing he was planning an attack with
Al Qaeda operatives. It ended with Smadi driving a truck he believed to contain a live bomb into
the underground garage of 60-story Fountain Place in Dallas, Texas. He used a cell phone to try
210 DOJ Press Release, “Najibullah Zazi Pleads Guilty,” Feb 22, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/February/
10-ag-174.html; Nicole Vap, “Timeline of Terror Plot Investigation,” KUSA TV, NBC affiliate, September 2009,
http://www.9news.com/news/specials/terrorplot/article.aspx?storyid=123658&catid=207.
211 A.G. Sulzberger, “Imam Snared in Terror Plot Admits He Lied to the F.B.I.” The New York Times, Mar. 4, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/05/nyregion/05terror.html.
212 Al Baker, Karen Zraick, “Lawyer Defends Queens Imam Arrested in Terror Inquiry,” The New York Times, Sep. 21,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/21/nyregion/21imam.html.
213 Laura Crimaldi, “Many Rally for Alleged Terrorist,” The Boston Herald, Nov. 13, 2009,
http://bh.heraldinteractive.com/news/regional/view.bg?articleid=1211567&srvc=next_article.
214 DOJ Press Release, “Man Admits Attempting to Use a Weapon of Mass Destruction to Bomb a Skyscraper in
Downtown Dallas,” May 26, 2010, http://dallas.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/dl052610.htm.
Congressional Research Service
46
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
and trigger the dud.215 The same day of Smadi’s arrest, the FBI apprehended Michael C. Finton in
Springfield, Illinois on similar but unrelated charges. Finton’s case also relied heavily on
undercover FBI personnel. Allegedly they supplied him with a van Finton believed contained
almost one ton of high explosives. According to the DOJ, he drove and parked the van near the
Paul Findley Federal Building and Courthouse in downtown Springfield. FBI Special Agents
arrested Finton after he tried to detonate the bogus bomb using a cell phone.216
Initially the FBI appears to have just tracked the activities of both Finton and Smadi. However,
both investigations likely reached tipping points encouraging the Bureau to initiate much more
proactive agent provocateur-type operations. Finton had converted to Islam while in prison on
aggravated robbery and battery charges. According to court documents, he was released in 2006
but in 2007 was re-arrested and returned to prison because of a parole violation. At the time, a
search of Finton’s vehicle revealed passages he wrote that championed martyrdom as well as
attempted correspondence with John Walker Lindh, a U.S. citizen who pled guilty in federal court
to serving in the Taliban army and carrying weapons. In 2008, after Finton was released from
prison for his parole violation, members of the FBI’s Springfield JTTF interviewed him. The
JTTF also used an informant to monitor Finton, who engaged in radical rhetoric after his release.
In January 2009, the informant reported that Finton planned to travel to the Gaza strip to fight
Israelis. At this juncture in the investigation, the FBI allegedly initiated its agent provocateur
strategy to nab Finton.217
The tipping point in the Smadi investigation is a little less specific. He allegedly had come to the
agency’s attention because the jihadist sentiment he displayed among an online group of
extremists supposedly “stood out.”218 As a result, an FBI undercover employee communicated
with Smadi. More than ten exchanges between the two emphasized Smadi’s desire to conduct
violent jihad on behalf of Al Qaeda. Thus, the FBI determined he was a “legitimate threat,”
introduced him to another undercover employee who posed as a senior member of an Al Qaeda
sleeper cell, and ostensibly set the sting in motion.219
Affidavits in the Smadi and Finton cases allege that FBI undercover employees tested both
suspects to ascertain the depth of their intent to do harm. In each case, the suspects received
reassurances that if they quit the schemes, they would face no repercussions from their fellow
(sham) plotters. FBI undercover operatives repeatedly tried to discourage Smadi’s violent jihadist
sentiments. In July 2009, an undercover employee (the fictitious senior member of an Al Qaeda
sleeper cell), offered Smadi a way out of the plot. The mock Al Qaeda operative counseled Smadi
215 United States v. Hosam Maher Husein Smadi, Affidavit, 3: 09-MJ-286, U.S. District Court Northern District of
Texas, Sep. 24, 2009, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1074.pdf. Hereafter: U.S. v. Smadi,
Affidavit; Jon Nielsen, “Officials: Teen Cut Video for bin Laden Tape, Other Evidence Leads Magistrate to Continue
Smadi’s Case,” The Dallas Morning News, Oct. 6, 2009; “Timeline of Dallas Terror Case,” Fort Worth Star-Telegram,
Oct. 5, 2009, http://www.star-telegram.com/2009/10/05/1662752/timeline-of-dallas-terror-case.html.
216 DOJ Press Release “Illinois Man Arrested in Plot to Bomb Courthouse and Murder Federal Employees: Vehicle
Bomb Placed at Scene Was Inactive and Posed No Danger to Public,” Sep. 24, 2009, http://springfield.fbi.gov/
dojpressrel/2009/si092409.htm.
217 Bruce Rushton, “Man Accused in Bombing Plot Known for Strong Stance on Islam,” pjstar.com, Sep. 24, 2009,
http://www.pjstar.com/archive/x1800826354/Man-accused-in-bombing-plot-known-for-strong-stance-on-Islam; United
States v. Michael C. Finton, Affidavit, 09: 3048-M, U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois, Sep. 24,
2009, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1073.pdf. Hereafter: U.S. v. Finton, Affidavit.
218 U.S. v. Smadi, Affidavit.
219 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service
47
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
by saying that different types of jihad existed, and he did not have to follow through on the plot if
he was uncomfortable with it. He reassured Smadi by stressing that if he backed out, he would
remain part of Al Qaeda’s “brotherhood.” Regardless, Smadi steadfastly believed in the plot and
refused to quit.220 Like Smadi, Finton was given at least one opportunity to abandon his scheme.
He allegedly understood that, “anytime he felt uncomfortable, he could walk out the door and still
be a brother.”221
The “Bind” for Law Enforcement
Not all agent provocateur cases appear as thorough in their efforts to reveal the harmful intent of
suspects. Some cases have raised controversy about the extent to which government informants or
agents have entrapped suspects and/or supported or pushed along terrorist plots. These instances
illustrate what Philadelphia Inquirer reporter and author, Stephan Salisbury, describes as the
“bind” the FBI finds itself in. “On one hand it is being charged by the Justice Department to go
out and stop this stuff [terrorism] before it happens. But on the other, it is getting criticized for the
techniques it is using to do that.”222 The 2008 Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI
Operations address the same competing forces, and as mentioned their implementation has
spurred concerns among civil liberties groups.
Investigations of the so-called Newburgh Four and Liberty City Seven plots illustrate this bind. In
each, law enforcement has been criticized for its use of undercover informants. To counter this, in
both cases, officials emphasized the importance of prevention—neutralizing threats posed by the
groups involved. For example, in a press conference related to the Newburgh plot, New York City
Mayor Michael Bloomberg reassured the public by stating that the plotters did not have ties to a
larger terrorist organization. However, he went on to stress the preemptive aspects of the case,
“I’ve always thought of our police department’s primary job, not as first responders but as first
preventers.”223 Cognizant of criticisms that the Liberty City men neither were competent nor their
plotting viable, former Attorney General Gonzalez cautioned that
our philosophy here is that we try to identify plots in the earliest stages possible, because we
don't know what we don't know about a terrorist plot ... it’s dangerous for us to make an
evaluation case by case ... well, this is a really dangerous group, this is really not a dangerous
group. And we felt that the combination of the planning and the overt acts taken were
sufficient to support this prosecution.224
Newburgh Four
The Newburgh Four case has kindled controversy regarding the use of an agent provocateur. In
the investigation, an FBI informant allegedly offered plotters $250,000 and a luxury car, among
other inducements to trigger explosives near a synagogue and to shoot down military aircraft.225
220 Ibid.
221 U.S. v. Finton, Affidavit.
222 Stephan Salisbury, “Leather Glove,” Audio Interview, tomdispatch.com, July 5, 2010.
http://tomdispatch.blogspot.com/2010/07/leather-glove.html. Hereafter: Salisbury, “Leather Glove.”
223 Chris Dolmetsch and Edvard Pettersson, “N.Y. Bomb Suspects Said to Have No Terror Group Link,” Bloomberg,
May 21, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aj43cfOgpp_A.
224 Salisbury, “Leather Glove.”
225 Chris Herring, “Bomb Case Bail Hearing,” The Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
48
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
On June 14, 2010, the federal judge hearing the trial delayed its start, because prosecutors may
have failed to provide to defense attorneys relevant case information. Days earlier the defense
received an FBI document suggesting that the lead plotter, James Cromitie, was not a threat.226
News accounts suggest the plotters may have been heavily influenced by the FBI’s informant.227
They have also raised questions about the informant in the case, alleged to be a man named
Shahed Hussain.228 According to the Village Voice, Hussain duped the Newburgh Four into their
plot. The Voice suggested that the quartet of smalltime felons had no grand terrorist ambitions,
and Hussain had plied them with cash and suggestions.229
The Newburgh Four were arrested in May 2009. They purportedly had attempted to detonate
explosives near a synagogue in the Riverdale section of the Bronx in New York City. The federal
government asserts the plotters also planned to shoot down military airplanes at the New York Air
National Guard Base at Stewart Airport in Newburgh, New York. Hussain allegedly passed
himself off as a member of a Pakistani terrorist organization, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and provided
the four suspects with inert C-4 explosives and an inactive Stinger surface-to-air missile.230
According to other news reports, Hussain, a Pakistani immigrant, became an FBI informant in
2002 to win leniency and avoid deportation on fraud charges. They stemmed from when he
worked as a translator for the New York Department of Motor Vehicles. Hussain pled guilty to
production and transfer of false government identification documents—illegally helping
immigrants obtain licenses. He had also served as the key informant in the 2003 and 2004 FBI
sting operation implicating Mohammed Hossain and Yassin Aref in a plot to launder money
related to the sham sale of surface to air missiles to terrorists.231
(...continued)
SB10001424052748704256304575321131297175098.html?mod=WSJ_hpp_sections_newyork; A.G. Sulzberger,
“Defense Cites Entrapment in Terror Case,” The New York Times, Mar. 17, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/18/
nyregion/18newburgh.html.
226 Chris Dolmetsch, “Synagogue Bomb Plot Trial Delayed for Medical Review,” Bloomberg Businessweek, September
13, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-09-13/synagogue-bomb-plot-trial-delayed-for-medical-
review.html; William Glaberson, “Newburgh Terrorism Case May Establish a Line for Entrapment,” The New York
Times, June 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/16/nyregion/16terror.html.
227 Timothy O’Connor, “Lawyers for 4 Accused in Synagogue Terror Plot Say Government Informant Enticed Them
with Cash, Food,” The Journal News (Westchester County, NY), Sep. 18, 2009, http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/lohud/
access/1865253521.html?FMT=ABS&date=Sep+18%2C+2009; Jim Fitzgerald, “NYC Synagogue Bomb
Defendants May Claim Entrapment,” Associated Press cited in abcnews.com, Sep. 17, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/
US/wireStory?id=8606330.
228 Graham Rayman, “The Alarming Record of the FBI’s Informant in the Bronx Bomb Plot,” The Village Voice, July
8, 2009, http://www.villagevoice.com/2009-07-08/news/the-alarming-record-of-the-f-b-i-s-informant-in-the-bronx-
bomb-plot/Hereafter: Rayman, “July 8, 2009; Tony Allen-Mills, “FBI ‘Lured Dimwits’ into Terror Plot,” The Sunday
Times, London, May 24, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article6350389.ece
229 Graham Rayman, July 8, 2009.
230 A.G. Sulzberger, “Defense Cites”; Murray Weiss, Dan Mangan, “Informant Fingered $$ Launderer Duo,” New York
Post, May 22, 2009, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/regional/
item_6C8LbZXechQkuNGyAkHfGL;jsessionid=D864E8F8E05AB7CE4443B7C98281CEF1; Brendan Lyons,
“Mosque Welcomed in Informant,” Albany Times Union, Aug. 8, 2004, http://www.timesunion.com/ASPStories/
story.asp?StoryID=273922.
231 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service
49
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Liberty City Seven
Like the Newburgh Four case, the Liberty City Seven investigation also generated questions
regarding informant use by the FBI. Seven Miami-area men were arrested in 2006 for allegedly
plotting to blow up the Sears Tower (now called Willis Tower) in Chicago, the FBI building in
North Miami Beach, and other government buildings in Miami-Dade County. Defense attorneys
called the case an outrageous example of government entrapment claiming that the men had
neither the will nor the means to carry out the crimes.232 An FBI informant posing as an Al Qaeda
member in the case, offered the men $50,000 as part of their plot. He also obtained warehouse
space for the group’s activities, led a ceremony in which the conspirators swore allegiance to Al
Qaeda, gave the group video cameras for surveillance activities, and suggested targeting Miami’s
FBI offices.233
One of the two FBI informants in the investigation, Abbas al-Saidi, was jailed after reportedly
having extorted $7,000 from a friend who raped his girlfriend and then, after accepting the
money, beat her up.234 The other informant, Elie Assad, also had a domestic battery charge on his
record. According to FBI agents, Assad failed a polygraph test administered while he was
working for them on a previous case in Chicago. A 35-year veteran of the FBI, who was hired as
an expert witness by the Liberty City defense team, stated that Assad never should have been
authorized to work on the [Liberty City] case at all. However, at trial, the former FBI agent was
not allowed to testify nor did the judge permit the testimony about Assad's failed polygraph
test.235 After juries in the first two trials failed to reach a verdict, six of the seven Liberty City
men were convicted at a third trial and sentenced to long prison sentences.
Combating Homegrown Terrorism: Building Trust
and Partnership
Following the 9/11 attacks, law enforcement agencies came to realize the prevention of terrorist
attacks would require the cooperation and assistance of American Muslim, Arab and Sikh
communities. “Embedded within these communities,” notes Professor Deborah Ramirez, “are the
linguistic skills, information, and cultural insights necessary to assist law enforcement in its
efforts to identify suspicious behavior. In order to have access to these critical tools and
information, law enforcement recognized the need to build bridges required for effective
communication with these groups.”236 At the same time, Muslim, Arab, and Sikh Americans
232 Carol J. Williams, “A Case of Terror or Entrapment,” Los Angeles Times, Nov. 30, 2007, http://articles.latimes.com/
2007/nov/30/nation/na-liberty30.
233 “5 Convicted in 'Liberty City' Terror Trial,” CNN.com, May 12, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/05/12/
liberty.seven/index.html “Sears Tower Bomb Plot Leader Narseal Batiste Jailed,” BBC News, Nov. 20, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8371671.stm; Amanda Ripley, “Preemptive Terror Trials: Strike Two,” TIME Magazine,
Dec. 13, 2007, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1694430,00.html; “Seven Charged over ‘Chicago
Plot,’” BBC News, June 23, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5110342.stm. Walter Pincus, “FBI Role in
Terror Probe Questioned,” The Washington Post, Sep. 2, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2006/09/01/AR2006090101764.html.
234 Ibid.
235 Ibid.
236 Deborah A. Ramirez, Sasha Cohen O’Connell, and Rabia Zafar, The Partnering for Prevention and Community
Safety Initiative, A Promising Practices Guide Executive Summary, 2004, p. 2, http://www.cps.neu.edu/pfp/downloads/
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
50
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
recognized the need to define themselves as distinctly American communities who, like all
Americans, desire to help prevent another terrorist attack.237
Scholars who have studied the circumstances that are associated with voluntary cooperation by
Muslim-Americans in anti-terror policing efforts have identified strong evidence that when
authorities are viewed as more legitimate, their rules and decisions are more likely to be
accepted.238 Engagement is one strategy by law enforcement to build trust and enhance
community perceptions of legitimacy.
Engagement with Communities
The concept of building trust through engagement and partnership is rooted in the community
policing model developed by law enforcement professionals in the 1990’s. The Justice
Department defined community policing as “a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies,
which support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques, to proactively
address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social
disorder, and fear of crime.”239 One of its key features is the establishment of collaborative
partnerships between law enforcement agencies and individuals and organizations they serve to
develop solutions to problems and increase trust in police.240
A study by the Homeland Security Institute found that “[c]ommunity policing has been applied
with notable success in places such as New York City, Chicago, Boston, and San Diego, and has
been widely adopted (at least in name) throughout the United States.”241 A Homeland Advisory
Council (HSAC) working group242 chaired by Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley found that
Community-Oriented Policing works:
(...continued)
PFP_Executive_Summary__cover.pdf.
237 Ibid
238 Tom R. Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer, and Aziz Huq, “Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counter-Terrorism
Policing,” New York University School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 10-15, Feb. 23, 2010, p. 2,
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1182&context=nyu_plltwp.
239 DOJ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Community Policing Defined. Apr.3, 2009., p. 3,
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/RIC/Publications/e030917193-CP-Defined.pdf.
240 Ibid
241 Rosemary Lark (Task Lead), Richard Rowe, and John Markey, Community Policing Within Muslim Communities:
An Overview and Annotated Bibliography of Open-Source Literature, Homeland Security Institute, Dec. 27, 2006, p.
iii. This study, prepared for the DHS Science and Technology Directorate, sought to identify the literature that
examined community policing initiatives underway within Muslim Communities in the U.S., and the extent to which
they were successful in achieving the objectives of (1) inclusiveness, promoting integration, and potentially minimize
the disaffection that can lead to radicalization, particularly among Muslim youth; (2) serve as early warning to identify
incipient radicalization or terrorist activities; and (3) open a new channel of communication with individuals who can
navigate the linguistic and cultural complexities of Islam, providing needed context to inform intelligence analysis,
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/hsireports/Task_06-99_Community_Policing_within_Muslim_Communities.pdf.
242 The Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary of
Homeland Security. The chair of the council is Judge William Webster, former Director of the CIA and Director of the
FBI. Other members include leaders from state and local government, first responder communities, the private sector,
and academia. The Countering Violent Extremism Working Group originated from a tasking by Secretary Napolitano
to the HSAC in Feb. 2010 to work with state and local law enforcement and relevant community groups to develop and
provide recommendations on how DHS can better support community-based efforts to combat violent extremism
domestically. See Countering Violent Extremism Working Group, Spring 2010, p. 2.
Congressional Research Service
51
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
“Effective public-private partnerships, designed to enable civic engagement, problem-
solving, and violent crime mitigation provide the foundation for efforts to prevent, protect
against and respond to violent criminal activity—including that which may be motivated by
ideological objectives.”243
Federal, State, and Local Government Activities
Currently, numerous U.S. government agencies conduct outreach, engage, and partner with
Muslim-American communities. For a summary of these activities, see Appendix B. In addition
to federal engagement efforts, state and local governments also have active programs. Just one
example is the Muslim Community Affairs unit of the Los Angeles Sheriff Department. This unit
was established in August 2007 under the direction of Sheriff Lee Baca with the purpose of
developing an outreach program for the Muslim Community in Los Angeles County. It has grown
to include a training program for the Muslim community on law enforcement issues such as hate
crimes, domestic violence, gangs and identity theft. A Young Muslim American Leaders Group
engages with and provides education for the young Muslim professionals in the Los Angeles area.
It meets on a monthly basis to discuss issues that concern the Muslim youth and young
professionals. In addition to training and engaging with the community, the Muslim Community
Affairs unit also trains department members about Islam and Muslims along with their culture,
customs, and beliefs.244
Muslim Community Activities
As Attorney General Eric Holder has stated publicly, “Members of the American Muslim
community have been—and continue to be—strong partners in fighting this emerging threat [of
terrorism]. They have regularly denounced terrorist acts and those who carry them out. And they
have provided critical assistance to law enforcement in helping to disrupt terrorist plots and
combat radicalization.”245 “One of the most important benefits of trusted partnerships,” says
Alejandro Beutel of the Muslim Public Affairs Council, “is the ability of community members to
feel comfortable enough to step forward and provide critical information to prevent any crime,
including terrorism,”246 In a May 2010 background paper, he documents 16 terrorist plots
disrupted with Muslim community assistance, nine of which involved homegrown jihadist
cases.247
A partial list of other community initiatives to tackle the problem of violent extremism includes
the following:
• Muflehun. Describing itself as an “independent think-and-do tank, Muflehun
seeks to use faith-based values for empowerment and continued integration of the
243 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Countering Violent Extremism Working Group, Spring 2010, p. 5. Hereafter:
HSAC CVE Working Group, Spring 2010.
244 Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, “About the Muslim Community Affairs Unit,”
http://la-sheriff.org/sites/muslimoutreach/about.html.
245 Attorney General Eric Holder, DOJ Press Release, Aug. 5, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2010/ag-
speech-100805.html.
246 Alejandro Beutel, Data on Post 9/11 Terrorism in the United States, Muslim Public Affairs Council, June 11, 2010,
p. 6, http://www.mpac.org/publications/post-911-terrorism-data/MPAC-Post911-Terrorism-Data.pdf.
247 Ibid, pp. 6-7.
Congressional Research Service
52
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Muslim community within the larger society. It focuses on two main research
areas: radicalization prevention in the United States, and horizon scanning for
emerging trends within the Muslim American community.248
• The Straight Path Initiative. Founded by The Muslim American Society, the
initiative seeks to engage all components of the Muslim American community,
with a special focus on youth ages 15-30. It seeks to pinpoint the roots of
extremism, the ways in which individuals are radicalized, and the tools needed to
address these challenges, including an honest and open dialogue about
radicalization and extremism in Muslim American communities; research to
pinpoint the root causes of radicalization and extremism among Muslim
American youth in particular; engagement with the Muslim American
community in monitoring and detecting extremist trends and their impact on
vulnerable members of the community.249
• National Grassroots Campaign to Fight Terrorism. An initiative of The Muslim
Public Affairs Council (MPAC), it seeks to: (1) [raise] religious awareness and
education to create a strong Islamic environment that does not allow terrorism to
be considered as a form of struggle in Islam; (2) control the inter-mosque
environment and activities to prevent intruders and unauthorized, unknown
persons from exploiting the open environment of [mosques]; and (3) acquire
skills to detect any potential criminal activity to be able to thwart them.250
Risks and Challenges
Although there is considerable support among public officials for community engagement, some
experts warn of significant challenges in the development of programs that foster substantive
relationships rather than token discussions or community relations events. A study of policing in
Arab-American communities sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, for example,
highlighted four key obstacles hindering outreach between U.S. Arabs (Christian and Muslim)
and law enforcement: “Distrust between Arab communities and law enforcement, lack of cultural
awareness among law enforcement officers, language barriers, and concerns about immigration
status and fears of deportation.”251
Terrorism expert Marc Sageman cautions that engagement can be a sign of government focus on
Muslim communities when instead it should be stressed that Muslims are Americans just like
everyone else.252 He sees another challenge arise when engagement on the government side is led
by federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. “It can send the message that we are only
248 Humera Khan and Mohamed Magid, Muflehun: Community Building Through Values, Social Responsibility, and
Civic Engagement, http://www.muflehun.org.
249 The Muslim American Society, The Straight Path Initiative, http://muslimamericansociety.org/main/content/
straight-path-initiative.
250 Muslim Public Affairs Council, National Grassroots Campaign to Fight Terrorism Handbook, 2005, p. 7,
http://www.mpac.org/publications/campaign-to-fight-terrorism/campaign-to-fight-terrorism-brochure.pdf.
251 Nicole J. Henderson et al., Policing in Arab-American Communities After September 11, National Institute of
Justice, Washington, DC, July 2008, p. ii. For the full study, see Nicole J. Henderson et al., Law Enforcement and Arab
American Community Relations After September 11, 2001: Engagement in a Time of Uncertainty, Vera Institute of
Justice, New York, NY, June 2006, http://www.vera.org/policerelations. As its title clearly suggests, this project
examined the experiences of Arab-Americans, two thirds of whom are Christian.
252 Discussion with CRS, Apr. 7, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
53
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
interested in Muslims because they are potential law breakers. No other foreign or religious
communities in the United States get this type of scrutiny.”253
Mohamed Elibiary, the President of the Freedom and Justice Foundation, a Muslim community
group based in Carrollton, Texas has told Congress that “while the government has publicly
claimed a desire for ‘partnership’ with the mainstream American Muslim community, law
enforcement has only offered the community a conduit to ‘inform’ on community members of
concern.”254 He argues that this “securitization” of government interactions with Muslim-
American communities would be counterproductive.
Outreach may be most effective when U.S. Muslim communities initiate it and community-
government contact revolves around countering the extremist messages popular among
homegrown violent jihadists.255 Marc Sageman suggests it would be more appropriate for local
authorities, such as a mayor’s office, to perform the engagement role because they know these
communities better than federal officials. An important role at the federal level is to lead efforts to
combat discrimination against Muslim-Americans,256 an activity in which the Civil Rights
Division of the Department of Justice is currently engaged.257
The Tension Between Enforcement and Engagement Activities
A further challenge to efforts to build trust and partnership are law enforcement investigative
activities and tactics that are perceived to unfairly target law-abiding members of the community
or infringe on speech, religion, assembly, or due process rights. The HSAC Countering Violent
Extremism (CVE) Working Group found that
There can be tension between those involved in law enforcement investigations and those
collaborating to establish local partnerships to stop violent crime. Community policing can
be impeded if other enforcement tactics are perceived as conflicting with community
partnership efforts.258
This challenge is evident in law enforcement efforts to recruit and manage informants. One
Muslim community leader who has published widely on domestic terrorism, states that “many
Muslim Americans fear that paid FBI informants specifically target impressionable youth and that
law enforcement agents coerce community members to become informants themselves to avoid
complications with immigration procedures.”259
253 Ibid.
254 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment, Hearing: “Working with Communities to Disrupt Terror Plots,” Testimony of Mohamed
Elibiary, President and CEO of the Freedom and Justice Foundation, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., Mar. 17, 2010, p. 2,
http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20100317103442-74422.pdf. Hereafter: Elibiary Testimony, Mar. 17, 2010.
255 Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K, p. 60.
256 Discussion with CRS, Apr. 7, 2010.
257 DOJ Civil Rights Division, “Initiative to Combat Post-9/11 Discriminatory Backlash,” July 25, 2008,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/legalinfo/nordwg_mission.php.
258 HSAC CVE Working Group, Spring 2010, p 6.
259 Alejandro J. Beutel, “Muslim Americans and U.S. Law Enforcement: Not Enemies, But Vital Partners,” The
Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 30, 2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2009/1230/Muslim-
Americans-and-US-law-enforcement-not-enemies-but-vital-partners..
Congressional Research Service
54
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Community leaders report numerous attempts by the FBI to recruit Muslims as informers. In
virtually all cases, the Muslims in question had immigration and other legal problems or were
applying for green cards according to Shakeel Syed of the Islamic Shura Council of Southern
California, an umbrella organization of 68 area mosques. Syed said the FBI told Muslims, “We
will make your problems vanish if you cooperate.” He goes on to say that “For some individuals
who have refused recruitment, there is startling evidence that the FBI has actually retaliated
against them.”260
Two cases that are often cited to support these allegations are those of Foad Farahi and Yassine
Ouassif. Farahi is an imam at a mosque in North Miami Beach, Florida who has lived in the
United States since 1993. Although an Iranian citizen, he does not speak Farsi because he grew up
as a Sunni Muslim in Kuwait speaking Arabic. He applied for political asylum in the United
States in 2002 after it was determined that he could be removed from the country because he had
failed to maintain his student status. He sought asylum based upon a fear of persecution if
deported to Iran because he is a Sunni Muslim and Iran is overwhelmingly Shia.
In 2004, when he was first approached by the FBI, Farahi said he told them that he was willing to
work with them, but the relationship would need to be public. He claimed the FBI wanted him to
be a secret informant instead and promised him residency and money for school.261 But Farahi
declined saying “People trust you as a religious figure, and you’re trying to kind of deceive them.
That’s where the problem is.”262
In the summer of 2007, Farahi declined a second request from the FBI to become a secret
informant. The consequences for this followed later that year at a hearing on his asylum case.
Four Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents, armed and wearing bullet proof vests,
followed him into the Miami Immigration Court. They allegedly told his attorney they had a file
with evidence that he was supporting or involved in terrorist groups and gave him an ultimatum:
Drop the asylum case and leave the United States voluntarily or be charged as a terrorist. Farahi
reported that these threats led to the involuntary and coerced withdrawal of his asylum application
before the Immigration Court.263
According to Farahi’s attorneys, the government has never shared any information or evidence
that he was involved in terrorism, nor has the government charged him for any terrorist offenses.
He has appealed the withdrawal of his asylum application to the U.S. Court of Appeals. Farahi
believes that “People have two choices. Either they end up working with the FBI or they leave the
country on their own. It’s just sometimes when you’re in that situation, not many people are
strong enough to stand up and resist and fight—to reject their offers.”264
Farahi's assertion that the government tried to coerce him to become an informant cannot be
verified independently because the FBI won't comment on his case. When asked by a journalist
260 Council on American-Islamic Relations, Greater Los Angeles Chapter, “The FBI’s Use of Informants, Recruitment
and Intimidation Within Muslim Communities,” Mar. 26, 2009. p. 1, http://ca.cair.com/losangeles/campaign/
fbi_instigators_in_the_american_muslim_community.
261 Trevor Aronson, “FBI Tries to Deport Muslim Man for Refusing to be an Informant,” miaminewtimes.com, Oct 8,
2009, http://www.miaminewtimes.com/2009-10-08/news/unholy-war-fbi-tries-to-deport-north-miami-beach-imam-
foad-farahi-for-refusing-to-be-an-informant/. Hereafter: Aronson, Oct. 8, 2009.
262 Ibid.
263 Ibid.
264 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service
55
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
who has written on the case, a Miami FBI Special Agent stated: “It is a matter of policy that we
do not confirm or deny who we have asked to be a source.”265
In a case reported by The Wall Street Journal, a 24-year-old Moroccan, Yassine Ouassif, was
stopped in November 2005 and questioned for several hours by immigration officials as he
crossed into New York from Canada. His legal permanent resident card was taken from him and
he was told to contact an individual when he returned home to San Francisco. Ouassif complied
with the immigration officials’ instructions and the individual he contacted turned out to be an
FBI agent. The agent told him that he had been monitoring Ouassif and his friends for many
months.266
According to Ouassif, the FBI agent offered him the opportunity to become an informant and
regularly report to the FBI on what his Muslim friends in San Francisco were saying and doing.
In exchange, his legal permanent resident card would be returned and he could resume his
education, bring his Moroccan wife to America, and pursue his dream of buying a car, moving to
Sacramento and becoming an engineer. If he refused, according to an account written by Ouassif
soon after the meeting, the FBI agent told him, “I will work hard to deport you to Morocco as
soon as possible.”267
According to the Los Angeles Times, “this account of Ouassif's ordeal is based largely on
interviews with him and his lawyer, as well as his own written chronicle. Immigration officials
declined to comment, since no formal action was taken against Ouassif. FBI officials also
declined to discuss the investigation, saying it is classified.”268
Another case has roiled the Muslim-American community in Southern California.269 The FBI
employed a convicted con man, Craig Monteilh, as an informant in an investigation called
“Operation Flex.” Monteilh claimed in interviews and court documents that he served the FBI as
a paid informant from July 2006 to October 2007 and used concealed audio and video equipment
to record thousands of hours of conversations with Muslims in homes, restaurants and mosques in
Irvine, Tustin, Mission Viejo and elsewhere.270
Posing as a new convert, Monteilh arrived at the Irvine Islamic Center in 2006 wearing robes and
a long beard, using the name Farouk Aziz. Monteilh had a criminal record that included serving
16 months in state prison on two grand theft charges. Members of the Islamic Center of Irvine
were reportedly alarmed about Monteilh and his talk of jihad and plans for a terrorist attack. The
265 Aronson, Oct. 8, 2009.
266 Peter Waldman, “A Muslim’s Choice: Turn U.S. Informant or Risk Losing Visa,” The Wall Street Journal, July 11,
2006, http://www.legalsanctuary.org/doc/article13970.pdf.
267 Ibid.
268 Lee Romney, “Immigrant Says FBI Tried Threats to Make Him Spy,” Los Angeles Times, Aug. 12, 2006.
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/front/4112103.html.
269 Teresa Watanabe and Paloma Esquivel, “L.A. area Muslims say FBI surveillance has a chilling effect on their free
speech and religious practices.” Los Angeles Times, Mar. 1, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/01/local/me-
muslim1. Hereafter: Watanabe and Esquivel, Mar. 1, 2009.
270 Salvador Hernandez, “Release terms eased for man accused of lying about alleged terrorist ties,” The Orange
County Register, June 11, 2010, http://www.ocregister.com/articles/niazi-252994-fbi-case.html?pic=1. Hereafter:
Hernandez, June 11, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
56
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
local chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations reported him to the Irvine police and
obtained a three-year restraining order against him.271
Monteilh’s role as an FBI informant came out in a bail hearing for Ahmadullah Niazi, a U.S.
citizen born in Afghanistan, who was accused of lying about ties to terrorist groups on
immigration applications, because he is alleged to have failed to disclose that his brother-in-law
was Osama bin Laden’s bodyguard and that he traveled to Pakistan in 2005 where he allegedly
met bin Laden. However, Hussam Ayloush, executive director of the Los Angeles chapter of the
Council on American-Islamic Relations, has a different view. He said Niazi, who had been under
FBI surveillance since 2006, had come to him because the FBI was attempting to recruit Niazi as
an informant. Ayloush suggested the case against Niazi may have been brought in retaliation for
his refusal to cooperate.272
An editorial in the Orange County Register, the largest circulation newspaper in the Southern
California county where Monteilh’s activities occurred, made the following points:
Everyone understands the need for legitimate undercover activities in response to credible
evidence. But we cannot fathom the justification for fishing expeditions and entrapment
…Muslims are afraid to talk about politics or civil liberties issues within their mosques or
even among their friends because of fear that it will draw attention from undercover
agents…there should not be a presumption of guilt among an entire community…”273
The use of informants can be a controversial issue, especially those with criminal records who
may be working on behalf of authorities in exchange for reduced jail time. According to open
source reports, confidential informants were used in 18 of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist
cases. In eight of those cases, the informants had criminal histories. The use of informants poses
the following risks:
Informants do not merely observe and collect data. They make things happen…Informants
can cause confusion and dissatisfaction among members of groups and communities they
infiltrate, discrediting leaders, and fostering factionalism as people wonder if any of their
colleagues are spies. Their handlers’ structure of incentives—raises, promotions, transfers,
financial rewards, waived jail time—creates a system where informants consciously or
subconsciously create and then destroy terrorist threats that would not otherwise exist. These
pressures can push them from passive observer to aggressive actor, with serious
consequences for constitutionally protected free speech. Another unplanned result:
government loses legitimacy and support in the eyes of targeted communities, if they feel
they have been manipulated.274
Acknowledging the challenge, FBI Director Robert Mueller said in 2009, “Oftentimes, the
communities from which we need the most help are those who trust us the least. But it is in these
communities that we ... must redouble our efforts.”275 Then-FBI spokesman, John Miller, has said
271 Thomas Cincotta, “From Movements to Mosques, Informants Endanger Democracy,” The Public Eye, Summer
2009, http://www.publiceye.org/magazine/v24n2/movements-to-mosques.html. Hereafter; Cincotta, “From Movements
to Mosques.”
272 Hernandez, June 11, 2010.
273 “FBI Creates Climate of Fear” An Orange County Register Editorial, Mar. 22, 2009, http://www.ocregister.com/
articles/fbi-18893-ocprint-fear-.html.
274 Cincotta, “From Movements to Mosques.”
275 Quoted in Matthai Kuruvila, “U.S. Muslims Debate How Much to Help FBI,” San Francisco Chronicle, Apr. 6,
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
57
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
the agency values its relationships with Muslims and has worked hard on outreach efforts that
range from town hall meetings to diversity training for FBI agents.276 Miller said there is no
factual basis for claims the FBI infiltrates mosques or conducts blanket surveillance of Muslim
leaders. “Based on information of a threat of violence or a crime, we investigate individuals, and
those investigations may take us to the places those individual go.”277
Former FBI agents and federal prosecutors note that informants are “…still one of the
government's best weapons to thwart terrorists and that the benefit to national security is likely to
far outweigh any embarrassment to the agency.” They claim that “although the law places almost
no constraints on the use of informants, the agency takes sending an informant into a mosque
very seriously and imposes a higher threshold for such requests.” 278 Former FBI counterterrorism
chief Robert Blitzer, states that “What matters to the FBI is preventing a massive attack that
might be planned by some people ... using the mosque or church as a shield because they believe
they're safe there. That is what the American people want the FBI to do. They don't want some
type of attack happening on U.S. soil because the FBI didn't act on information.”279
Maher Hathout from the Muslim Public Affairs Council counters by saying that “People cannot
be suspects and partners at the same time. Unless the FBI's style changes, the partnership with the
Muslim community will not be fruitful.”280 The Homeland Security Advisory Council’s
Countering Violent Extremism Working Group also cautions that “Law enforcement should be
sensitive to the fact that perceptions regarding enforcement actions and intelligence gathering can
impact community-oriented policing goals.”281
In considering the tradeoff between security and liberty, policy makers face a choice in those
cases where an investigative tactic might inflame members of a particular community: Is the
impact of that tactic counterproductive in the long run, or is it necessary, short-term collateral
damage?
Policy Considerations for Congress
Unifying the National Effort to Combat Homegrown
Jihadist Terrorism
Since 9/11, there have been only four homegrown jihadist attacks in the United States and one
“near-miss.” Fortunately, none of the attacks were close to the scale of destruction experienced on
(...continued)
2009, http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-04-06/news/17193854_1_american-muslim-taskforce-muslim-community-
american-islamic-relations.
276 Quoted in Samantha Henry, “Some Muslims Rethink Close Ties to Law Enforcement,” Associated Press, May 4,
2009, http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D97VH09O0&show_article=1.
277 Ibid.
278 Gillian Flaccus, “Calif. Case Highlights Use of Mosque Informants,” Associated Press, Mar. 1 2009,
http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D96LD2A81&show_article=1.
279 Ibid.
280 Watanabe and Esquivel, Mar. 1, 2009.
281 HSAC CVE Working Group, Spring 2010, p. 6.
Congressional Research Service
58
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
that tragic day in 2001. Yet, in spite of this overall record, the increase of arrests in the past 15
months suggests that homegrown jihadist terrorism remains a danger. “The United States has
made great strides,” says one federal counterterrorism official, “in what might be called tactical
counterterrorism—taking individual terrorists off the streets, and disrupting cells and their
operations…an effective counterterrorism strategy must go beyond this…(to address) the threat
of violent extremism.”282
U.S. Government efforts to combat violent extremism include investigative, prosecution, and
intelligence activities as well as engagement with communities to build trust and enhance
collaboration. Many also believe that combating violent extremism must include efforts to
counter the extremist radicalization that fuels hatred and violence283 in an effort to “prevent young
American Muslims from embracing extremist ideas in the first place.”284 Asra Nomani, author of
Standing Alone in Mecca: An American Woman’s Struggle for the Soul of Islam, writes that “we
have to fundamentally challenge the interpretations of Islam that are claiming our youth…if that’s
not part of our strategy, we are dead in the water….”285 Thus, such a strategy should include
“efforts to contest the extremist narrative of radicalizers, empower and network mainstream
voices countering extremism, promote diversity of ideas and means of expression, and challenge
extremist voices and ideas in the public domain.”286
Should any of these activities be included in a national effort to combat homegrown violent
extremism? How should these activities be unified into a coherent national effort? Although many
agencies at all levels of government are engaged in counterterrorism activities, there is currently
no unified strategy, plan, or framework specifically focused on violent extremism as it manifests
itself in homegrown jihadist terrorism.287 The Obama Administration has articulated a broad
National Security Strategy,288 and continues to operate with a counterterrorism strategy and plan
developed in the last Administration predominantly focused on the foreign terrorist threat to U.S.
interests in the homeland and abroad. 289
282 Robert F. Godec, Principal Deputy Director for Counterterrorism at the Department of State, “U.S. Counterterrorism
Policy,” an address before the Global Young Leaders Conference, Washington, DC; June 30, 2010,
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2010/143809.htm.
283 J. Scott Carpenter, Matthew Levitt, Steven Simon, and Juan Zarate, Fighting the Ideological Battle: The Missing
Link in U.S. Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism, (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
2010). p. 1. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC04.php?CID=332 Hereafter: Carpenter, et.al., Fighting the
Ideological Battle.
284 Vidino, 2009, p. 14.
285 Asra Nomani quoted in Ron Scherer, “Can Islamic Leaders Rein In Youths?” The Christian Science Monitor, July
12, 2010, p. 20.
286 Carpenter, et.al., Fighting the Ideological Battle, p. 1.
287 Vidino, 2009.
288 National Security Strategy, The Office of the President, Washington, D.C., May 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. Hereafter: National Security Strategy, 2010.
289 The strategy, National Security Presidential Directive-46 / Homeland Security Directive-15, “U.S. Policy and
Strategy in the War on Terror,” Mar. 6, 2006; and the associated plan, “National Implementation Plan” (NIP), (2nd
version, 2008), are both classified documents. According to an unclassified Sep. 2006 Fact Sheet, the NIP coordinates,
integrates, and synchronizes all instruments of national power for fighting the War on Terror. It is focused around four
strategic goals: (1) Protecting and Defending the United States and Its Interests; (2) Attacking Terrorists and Their
Capability to Operate Effectively in the US and Abroad; (3) Countering Violent Extremism; (4) Preventing Terrorist
Acquisition or Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The Plan assigns direct responsibility and identifies
specific tasks to be accomplished by specific agencies and departments of the U.S. Government.
Congressional Research Service
59
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
The May 2010 National Security Strategy addresses the threat of violent extremism in the United
States, but only in general terms and as part of a broad counterterrorism effort:
Empowering Communities to Counter Radicalization: Several recent incidences of violent
extremists in the United States who are committed to fighting here and abroad have
underscored the threat to the United States and our interests posed by individuals radicalized
at home. Our best defenses against this threat are well informed and equipped families, local
communities, and institutions. The Federal Government will invest in intelligence to
understand this threat and expand community engagement and development programs to
empower local communities.290
Engage with Communities and Citizens: We will emphasize individual and community
preparedness and resilience through frequent engagement that provides clear and reliable risk
and emergency information to the public. A key part of this effort is providing practical steps
that all Americans can take to protect themselves, their families, and their neighbors.291
Prevent Attacks on and in the Homeland: To prevent acts of terrorism on American soil, we
must enlist all of our intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security capabilities. We
will continue to integrate and leverage state and major urban area fusion centers that have the
capability to share classified information; establish a nationwide framework for reporting
suspicious activity; and implement an integrated approach to our counterterrorism
information systems to ensure that the analysts, agents, and officers who protect us have
access to all relevant intelligence throughout the government. We are improving information
sharing and cooperation by linking networks to facilitate Federal, state, and local capabilities
to seamlessly exchange messages and information, conduct searches, and collaborate.292
The National Security Strategy is a broad outline of the priorities and goals of the nation’s
national security effort. It may be claimed that it is not intended to include specifics about the
roles of individual government agencies and how they will coordinate, integrate, and harmonize
their activities. But for many other counterterrorism and homeland security activities—disrupting
terrorist travel, combating specific threats such as those from biological and other weapons of
mass destruction, securing the homeland, and sharing terrorism-related information, there are
discreet strategies that outline specific activities and responsibilities.293 However, there is no such
strategy for combating the homegrown jihadist terrorism threat.
Past Initiatives
A department-level effort to develop a strategy to counter domestic radicalization was attempted
by DHS in 2008. A fully-coordinated draft of the strategy was completed but not adopted before
the change of administrations. That strategy defined ‘radicalization’ “as the process of adopting
290 National Security Strategy, 2010; p. 19.
291 Ibid.
292 Ibid, p. 20.
293 These strategies include the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (2002), National Strategy to
Combat Terrorist Travel (2006), National Homeland Security Strategy (2007), National Information Sharing Strategy
(2007), National Strategy to Combat Biological Threats (2009), and the National Framework for Strategic
Communication (2010).
Congressional Research Service
60
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a
method to effect societal change.”294 It included four strategic goals:
• Enhance the capacity of the Department and its partners to counter and respond
to domestic radicalization.
• Conduct outreach and engage with key communities.
• Facilitate communication and promote public awareness and public participation
in countering radicalization.
• Continue to advance the Department’s understanding of radicalization.
It has been reported that DHS has resumed an effort to develop a framework for a DHS
Radicalization Strategy through its Directorate of Policy.295
In 2007, the House of Representatives passed the Violent Radicalization and Homegrown
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007 (H.Res. 1955). Among actions that would have been required
in the act was the establishment of a National Commission on the Prevention of Violent
Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism. This commission would be tasked to examine and
report on facts and causes of violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based
violence in the United States; and build upon, bring together, and avoid unnecessary duplication
of related work done by other entities toward such goal. It would have also required the Secretary
of Homeland Security to conduct a survey of methodologies implemented by foreign nations to
prevent violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism. The Senate did not, however, vote on the
bill.
A National Strategy for Combating Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism
Congress may wish to consider another approach to unifying U.S. Government efforts to combat
homegrown jihadist terrorism. It could legislatively mandate a strategy, framework, or plan for
this effort. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has found that
Achieving meaningful results in many national security–related interagency efforts requires
coordinated efforts among various actors across federal agencies; foreign, state, and local
governments; nongovernment organizations; and the private sector. Given the number of
agencies involved in U.S. government national security efforts, it is important that there be
mechanisms to coordinate across agencies296…Strategies can help agencies develop mutually
reinforcing plans and determine activities, resources, processes, and performance measures
for implementing those strategies.297
A clearly-articulated national strategy or framework can prioritize activities, assign responsibility
for specific tasks among departments and agencies at the Federal level, and harmonize those
294 DHS, Draft Strategy for Preventing and Countering Domestic Radicalization, Jan. 2008, p. 1.
295 DHS Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Briefing for CRS, Apr. 29, 2010.
296 Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination,” 14
GAO-06-15 and GAO/GGD-00-106, (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2000), pp. 6-7, http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/
gg00106.pdf.
297 GAO, “Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism,”
GAO-04-408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004), p. 4, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04408t.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
61
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
efforts. Consider one challenging issue described elsewhere in this report and by a working group
of the Homeland Security Advisory Council that is advising the Secretary of Homeland Security.
“There can be an inherent tension between federal law enforcement investigations and local
partnerships to stop violent crime. While this tension may be healthy or unhealthy, it must be
managed by senior officials.”298 A strategy that clearly articulates long-term objectives, priorities,
and ‘lanes in the road’ can go a long way to managing this tension.
Since combating violent extremism is not only a federal responsibility, a national strategy can
also clarify the roles of state, local, tribal, and non-governmental organizations It is consistent
with the National Security Strategy’s call for a “Whole of Government Approach” which reminds
us that “work remains to foster coordination across departments and agencies. Key steps include
more effectively ensuring alignment of resources with our national security strategy… reviewing
authorities and mechanisms to implement and coordinate assistance programs, and other policies
and programs that strengthen coordination.”299 Participants at a conference hosted by the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to assess whether elements of the United Kingdom’s
counterradicalization strategy could be used in the United States, agreed that “a coherent,
coordinated strategy that cuts across government departments and agencies is needed to facilitate
cooperation and limit redundancy or efforts.”300
Not everyone, however, supports the idea of a national strategy to combat violent extremism
(CVE). Mohamed Elibiary, a Texas Muslim community leader who has partnered with U.S.
Government agencies on domestic terrorism issues, testified that Congress should not legislate a
comprehensive CVE strategy, because that would surely ‘securitize the relationship.’” Instead, he
calls for the establishment of “coordinated micro-strategies.”301 But he does say that DHS should
establish its own CVE strategy.
Issues a National Strategy Could Address
Should a decision be reached to produce a national strategy, a model to consider is the
Administration’s 2010 National Framework for Strategic Communication. 302 In succinct terms,
this framework defines terms, outlines strategy, assigns roles and responsibilities, establishes a
mechanism for determining the allocation of resources, and identifies methods for measuring
success. In a national strategy to combat violent extremism domestically, there are specific issues
that could be addressed—regardless of the policy vehicle. These include the follwing:
Identifying Radicalization and Interdicting Attempts at Recruitment
It has not been entirely settled which agencies have which responsibilities in this area. The
terrorism scholar, Professor Bruce Hoffman, asks if these tasks are best done by federal law
enforcement (e.g., the FBI), or state and local jurisdictions working closely with federal
298 HSAC CVE Working Group, p. 17.
299 National Security Strategy, 2010, p. 14.
300 Report of the conference “Towards a Domestic Counterradicalization Strategy,” hosted by the National
Counterterrorism Center, June 26-27, 2008. Report dated Aug. 2008, p. 19.
301 Elibiary Testimony, Mar. 17, 2010, p. 2.
302 The Office of the President, National Framework for Strategic Communication, 2010, http://www.fas.org/man/
eprint/pubdip.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
62
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
authorities? Is it a core mission for a modernized, post-9/11 FBI? Or for DHS? Can it be done by
NCTC? What is the role of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in home-
grown terrorism and recruitment and radicalization?303
Countering Radicalization
What role is there for government, if any, in countering radicalization before it manifests itself in
violence? In a report published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a group of
scholars and former counterterrorism and intelligence officials called for the United States to
“Explicitly recognize the impact of ideology as a key driver framing, motivating, and justifying
violent extremism….and [m]obilize government to counter this impact.”304
Should the government be in the business of contesting the radical ideology and extremist
narratives? If so, what is the appropriate role for the federal government? Is there a role for state
and local governments? Alternatively, is this strictly an activity for the American Muslim
community? If this is an appropriate role for the government, the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy study group points out that “this will require a more explicit expression of the
ideological challenge that individual agencies and offices are trying to tackle. Otherwise the unity
of purpose and whole-of-government integration essential to counter radicalization will prove
elusive.”305
Enhancing Domestic Intelligence
The production of timely and actionable intelligence is essential to the effort to combat violent
extremism and could also be addressed within or concurrent with a national strategy. This is
important if one considers the concerns of a group of terrorism experts and former and current
intelligence and law enforcement officials:
Despite the expansion of the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) and the proliferation of
fusion centers, the United States still lacks a coherent national domestic intelligence
collection effort. There is no national estimate of domestic terrorist threats. Creating one
could admittedly be a politically perilous undertaking, but without all parts of the federal
government having a common understanding of the threat, domestic intelligence efforts will
continue to flounder. There is no national, as opposed to local or regional, domestic
intelligence-collection plan, no national domestic intelligence collection requirements, no
priorities, no national or regional coordination. A national domestic intelligence effort seems
unlikely to emerge in the absence of some central direction.306
These experts believe that local police are in the best position to collect domestic intelligence and
so their role in the national effort—as well as that of federal agencies such as the FBI and DHS—
needs to be carefully delineated. The results they say would be “a more coordinated, better
303 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment, Hearing: Internet Terror Recruitment and Tradecraft: How Can We Address an Evolving
Tool While Protecting Free Speech?, Written Testimony of Professor Bruce Hoffman, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., May 26,
2010, p. 9, http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20100526101502-95237.pdf.
304 Carpenter, et.al., Fighting the Ideological Battle, p. 10.
305 Ibid.
306 America’s Domestic Intelligence is Inadequate, June 2010.
Congressional Research Service
63
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
connected national domestic intelligence effort [that] would better protect the nation against a
continuously morphing jihadist foe, possible surges in terrorist capabilities, and potential future
domestic terrorist threats from other directions.”307
Congress, therefore, may also wish to consider requiring the Director of National Intelligence to
examine whether and how to develop a national domestic intelligence framework or plan as part
of a unified strategy to combat violent extremism within the United States.
In Appendix A that follows, details about each of the 40 post-9/11 homegrown jihadist plots and
attacks are provided in chronological order. Appendix B summarizes engagement and partnership
activities by federal agencies with Muslim-American communities.
307 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service
64
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Appendix A. Summary of Post 9/11 Homegrown
Violent Jihadist Terrorist Plots308
Omar Hammami—al-Shabaab Figure—August 2010
In an indictment unsealed in August 2010,309 Omar Hammami, an American citizen from Daphne,
Alabama, was accused of supporting al-Shabaab, a designated foreign terrorist organization.310
According to public reports, Hammami has appeared in several propaganda videos on behalf of
al-Shabaab that have been distributed worldwide. One shows him allegedly instructing recruits in
urban warfare. Somali officials believe he is involved with al-Shabaab’s recruitment strategy and
financial management. He is also believed to be a ranking member of the al-Shabaab organization
with operational responsibilities.311
As a child, Hammami lived between the Christian world of his American mother and the Muslim
beliefs of his Syrian-born father. He converted to Islam in high school, and while a student at the
University of South Alabama, led the Muslim Student Association and began adhering to Salafi
doctrine. His Salafism sprang in part from a desire to rebel against his father. In 2002, he dropped
out of school, and by 2004 he had found his way to Toronto, Canada where the American
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan encouraged him to reconsider his nonviolent Salafi views.
One of his friends alleges that Hammami began surfing the web for information on jihad. While
in Canada, he married a Somali woman. In 2005 they moved to Cairo, and by late 2006 he was in
Somalia in pursuit of violent jihad.312
Jehad Mostafa—Attempted Travel to Somalia to Fight—August
2010
Few details are publicly available about Jehad Mostafa, a 28-year-old U.S. citizen who grew up in
San Diego, California, and allegedly left the United States to fight with al-Shabaab in Somalia.
308 Appendix A is based on unsealed Department of Justice (DOJ) indictments and other open source reporting.
309 United States v. Omar Shafik Hammami, Criminal No. 07-00384KD, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Alabama Southern Division, Sep. 24, 2009 (unsealed Aug. 5, 2010), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/
Hammami%20Indictment%208-5-10.pdf
310 Al-Shabaab is a group on the Department of State’s list of designated terrorist organizations. It is waging an
insurgency in Somalia.
311 DOJ Press Release, “Fourteen Charged with Providing Material Support to Somalia-Based Terrorist Organization al
Shabaab,” Aug. 5, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-100805.html; Spencer S. Hsu, “Arrest of
Va. Man Spotlights al-Qaeda’s New American Recruiter,” The Washington Post, Aug. 1, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/31/AR2010073102680.html; Andrea Elliott, “The
Jihadist Next Door,” New York Times Magazine, Jan. 31, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/magazine/
31Jihadist-t.html; John Goddard, “Terrorist Leader Lived in Toronto,” The Hamilton Spectator, Ontario, Canada, Jan.
4, 2010; Brendan Kirby, “Report: Former Daphne High and USA Student Has Been Charged in a Secret Indictment in
Mobile with Providing Material to Terrorists,” Mobile Register, Sep. 5, 2009, http://blog.al.com/live/2009/09/
report_former_daphne_high_and.html; The Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation, “Shabaab al-
Mujahideen Releases Footage of ‘Abu Suleim Training Camp,’” Sep. 2009, http://www1.nefafoundation.org/
multimedia-prop.htm.
312 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service
65
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
The indictment in Mostafa’s case mentions little specifically about his alleged terrorist activity
but ties him to al-Shabaab between March 2008 and June 2009. News sources suggest that he left
the United States in December 2005.313
Shaker Masri—Attempted Travel to Somalia or Afghanistan to
Fight—July 2010
Shaker Masri, a 26-year-old U.S. citizen born in Alabama but raised abroad, was arrested by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on August 3, 2010, just before he was allegedly planning to
travel to Somalia or Afghanistan to join either al-Shabaab or Al Qaeda. The FBI used a
cooperating source who met Masri in November 2008 and subsequently consensually recorded
conversations with him for the investigation. According to court documents,314 Masri encouraged
the cooperating source to “review speeches” by Anwar al-Aulaqi.
Zachary Chesser—Attempted Travel to Somali to Fight—July 2010
Twenty-year-old U.S. citizen Zachary Chesser was arrested on terrorism-related charges on July
21, 2010. According to the Department of Justice (DOJ), Chesser told FBI agents that twice, he
tried to travel to Somalia to join al-Shabaab. In his last attempt, Chesser allegedly brought his
infant son with him to John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) in New York City to
potentially disguise his intentions.315
According to the DOJ affidavit, Chesser first showed interest in Islam in 2008 and developed a
fascination with extremist views, sending Anwar al-Aulaqi emails and receiving two replies from
the radical cleric. He also started his own YouTube.com account and operated his own blog where
he promoted violent jihad.316
Paul Rockwood, Jr. and Nadia Rockwood—Plot to Kill People on a
Hit List—July 2010
On July 21, 2010, Paul Rockwood, Jr., a U.S. citizen and Muslim convert, pled guilty to making
false statements to the FBI in connection with a terrorism investigation. On the same day,
Rockwood’s wife, Nadia Rockwood, also pled guilty to making false statements related to her
husband’s case.
313 Greg Moran, “Former SD Man Among 14 Charged with Aiding Terror Group,” San Diego Union-Tribune, Aug. 5,
2010, http://www.sandiegounion-tribune.com/news/2010/aug/05/san-diegan-among-those-charged-aiding-somalian-ter/
; United States v. Jehad Serwan Mostafa, Indictment, 09-CR-3726 U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California, Oct. 2009 (unsealed Aug. 6, 2010).
314 United States v. Shaker Masri, Criminal Complaint 10-CR-0655, U.S. District Court Northern District of Illinois
Eastern Division, Aug. 9, 2010, http://jnslp.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/masri-complaint1.pdf.
315 DOJ Press Release, “Fairfax County Man Accused of Providing Material Support to Terrorists,” July 21, 2010,
http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae/Pressreleases/07-JulyPDFArchive/10/20100721chessernr.html; United States. v.
Zachary Adam Chesser, Affidavit, Criminal No. 1:10-MJ-504, U.S. District for the Eastern District of Virginia, July
21, 2010, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1343.pdf. Hereafter: U.S. v. Chesser, Affidavit.
316 U.S. v. Chesser, Affidavit.
Congressional Research Service
66
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
According to DOJ, Paul Rockwood, Jr. converted to Islam in late 2001 or early 2002 while living
in Virginia and followed the teachings of radical cleric Anwar al-Aulaqui.317 They allege that after
he moved to Alaska in 2006, he visited websites to research explosive components, construction
of remote triggering devices, such as cell phones, and construction of bombs to be delivered by
common mail carriers. Authorities also said that in late 2009, he began discussing using mail
bombs and possibly killing targets by gunshot to the head. They said that by early this year, he
had formalized his list of targets for execution.”318
Paul Rockwood received the maximum sentence of eight years in prison, consistent with his plea
agreement. His 36-year-old wife, who is five months pregnant, will be allowed to return to the
United Kingdom and serve five years of probation there and may not return to the United States
without prior approval.319
Mohamed Alessa and Carlos Almonte—Attempted Travel to
Somalia To Fight—June 2010
On June 5, 2010, two New Jersey residents—24-year-old Mohamed Alessa (a U.S. citizen from a
Palestinian-American family) and 20-year-old Carlos Almonte (a Dominican-American and
Muslim convert)—were arrested at JFK in New York prior to boarding separate flights to Egypt.
Authorities allege the two had hoped to eventually link up with al-Shabaab in Somalia.320 The
following day, they were charged with conspiracy to kill Americans abroad. They are alleged to
have vowed to “slice up” troops in “a thousand pieces,” according to the criminal complaint
which cites conversations secretly-recorded by a New York Police Department (NYPD)
undercover officer.321 The two face life in prison if convicted.
Law enforcement interest in Alessa and Almonte began when an email tip was received by the
FBI on October 9, 2006. It suggested that the two young men were engaged in radical behavior,
perusing jihadist websites, and discussing terrorist activity.322 They were then monitored by
authorities for the next four years. Initially it was unclear whether the pair was just engaged in
radical talk or actually planning for violent jihad. However, in 2007, the two traveled to Jordan
where they wanted to be recruited to fight in Iraq, but were rejected and “were upset at the
317 DOJ Press Release, “Alaska Man Pleads Guilty to Making False Statements in Domestic Terrorism Investigation,
Spouse Pleads Guilty to Making False Statements,” July 21, 2010, http://anchorage.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/
ak072110.htm.
318 Mary Pemberton, “Alaska Couple Accused of Terrorism Pleads Guilty to Charges of Lying About Alleged Hit
List,” Associated Press, July 21, 2010, http://www.newser.com/article/d9h3qhh80/alaska-couple-accused-of-terrorism-
pleads-guilty-to-charges-of-lying-about-alleged-hit-list.html#ixzz0wOUH9tRq.
319 Colleen Kelly, “Alaskan Couple in Domestic Terrorism Plot Sentenced, ktva.com (Anchorage, Alaska), Aug. 23,
2010, http://www.ktva.com/ci_15870578
320 Richard Esposito, “Terror Raids at JFK Airport Net American Alleged Terror Plotters Headed for Somalia,” ABC
News, June 6, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/terror-raids-jfk-airport-net-alleged-terror-plotters/story?id=
10839045.
321 U.S. v. Mohamed Alessa and Carlos E. Almonte, Criminal Complaint, Magistrate No. 10-8109 (MCA), U.S. District
Court, District of New Jersey, June 4, 2010, p. 11, http://www.scribd.com/doc/32643121/US-v-Alessa-and-Almonte.
Hereafter: U.S. v. Alessa and Almonte, Criminal Complaint.
322 Peter Finn and Jerry Markon, “New Jersey Men Arrested Are Latest From U.S. Tied to Terrorist Groups ”
Washington Post, June 7, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/06/
AR2010060600418.html. Hereafter: Finn and Markon, June 7, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
67
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
individuals who failed to recruit them.”323 By 2009, the case included an undercover investigator
from the NYPD interacting with the two suspects.324
Since January 2010, according to the criminal complaint, the two allegedly participated in several
activities that had officials concerned that they were moving further from radicalization to violent
extremism. This included lifting weights and rehearsing combat techniques using paintball guns,
and gathering equipment, including tactical-brand flashlights and combat boots, among other
things.325 According to officials, when they booked separate flights in June 2010 to Egypt, they
were arrested because they were preparing to leave the country to fight overseas.326
Faisal Shahzad—Attempted Car Bombing in Times Square, New
York City—May 1, 2010
On May 1, 2010, 30-year-old, Faisal Shahzad—a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Pakistan—
parked his Nissan Pathfinder sport utility vehicle (SUV) containing a crude incendiary device
along West 45th Street near Times Square in New York City. A t-shirt vendor in the area observed
smoke coming from the vehicle and alerted police. The device within the SUV did not explode or
ignite and was subsequently rendered safe by the New York City Police bomb squad.327
Shahzad was arrested three days later at JFK after he had boarded an Emirates Air flight bound
for Dubai. At a news conference to announce the arrest, Attorney General Eric Holder stated “[i]t
was clear that the intent behind this terrorist act was to kill Americans.” Law enforcement
officials reported that the information that led to Shahzad’s arrest centered on evidence gathered
about the sale of the Nissan Pathfinder that was used in the attempted attack. Police discovered
that Shahzad had purchased the vehicle through an Internet listing. Although he gave the seller a
false name, police were able to trace back to him a disposable cell phone number that he also
gave the seller.328
On June 21, 2010, Shahzad pled guilty to ten terrorism charges that were contained in a
superseding indictment handed down by a grand jury in New York and which added five
additional counts to the original May 5, 2010 indictment.329 He was charged with attempting to
use a weapon of mass destruction, acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries, use of a
destructive device in connection with criminal violence, transporting and receiving explosives,
and damaging and destroying property by means of fire.330 Since his arrest, DOJ reports that
323 Ibid.
324 Ted Sherman, “FBI Followed Every Move of Two N.J. Terror Suspects for Years, Culminating in Airport Arrests,”
Star-Ledger, June 13, 2010, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/06/authorities_followed_every_mov.html.
325 Ibid, pp. 8-9.
326 Finn and Markon, June 7, 2020.
327 New York City Police Department (NYPD) Counterterrorism Bureau, “Times Square Car Bomb,” May 2, 2010.
328 Anne E. Kornblut, Jerry Markon, and Spencer Hsu, “U.S. Citizen from Pakistan Arrested in Times Square Bomb
Case.” The Washington Post, May 4, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/03/
AR2010050300847.html.
329 Benjamin Weiser, “Guilty Plea in Times Square Bomb Plot,” The New York Times, June 21, 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/22/nyregion/22terror.html. Hereafter: Weiser, June 21, 2010.
330 United States of America vs. Faisal Shahzad, Criminal Complaint 10 MAG 928, U.S. District Court, Southern
District of New York, May 5, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/shahzad.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
68
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Shahzad has not only admitted his role in the plot, but continued to cooperate with authorities,
and provided valuable intelligence.331
Shortly after the failed attack, the Pakistan Taliban group Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
claimed responsibility in a message on an audiotape posted on the Internet.332 Days later, U.S.
officials said that investigators had developed evidence to support the TTP claim.333 Pakistani
authorities have arrested or detained at least 13 people in Pakistan in connection with the case.
One of those arrested was reported to have provided an “independent stream” of evidence that the
Pakistani Taliban was behind the attempt and has admitted to helping Faisal Shahzad travel into
Pakistan's tribal belt for bomb training.334
In the courtroom where he pled guilty, Shahzad admitted to having received explosives training
from the TTP at a camp in Pakistan's Waziristan region.335 However the device found inside the
Nissan Pathfinder was crudely constructed. It consisted of three 20-gallon propane tanks, 152 M-
88 (consumer-grade) fireworks, one 4-foot by 2-foot metal gun locker filled with 250 pounds of
urea-based fertilizer, and two alarm clocks connected by wires.336 The fertilizer was inert and not
usable as an explosive. Had the device been viable, police say it could have produced a
“significant fireball” and sprayed shrapnel with enough force to kill pedestrians and knock out
windows in the crowded theater district in midtown Manhattan.337
It has been reported that no plea deal in exchange for Shahzad’s guilty plea was made by the U.S.
Government in the case. The U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York released a letter
sent to Shahzad’s attorneys making it clear that there was no plea deal and that their client would
face a mandatory life term, the maximum sentence in this case. Shahzad is scheduled to be
sentenced in October 2010.338
Another individual indicted in this terrorist plot was Mohammad Younis, 44, of Long Island,
New York. On September 15, 2010, Younis was arrested and accused of operating an unlicensed
money transmitting business which provided funds to Faisal Shahzad. There are no allegations,
however, that Younis was aware of the intended use of the money. In the indictment, he was
charged with operating an unlicensed money transfer business between the United States and
331 See “Times Square Suspect Charged, Admits Role in Failed Attack, ” wync.com, May 4, 2010.
http://www.wnyc.org/news/articles/154447; and DOJ Press Release, “Faisal Shahzad To Appear In Manhattan Court,”
May 18, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/May10/shahzadfaisalcourtpr.pdf.
332 NEFA Report, May 2010.
333 Anne Kornblut and Karin Brulliard, “U.S. Blames Pakistani Taliban For Times Square Bomb Plot,” The Washington
Post, May 10, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/09/AR2010050901143.html.
334 Greg Miller, “Pakistan Arrests Man With Militant Ties Who Says He Aided Times Square Bomb Suspect” The
Washington Post, May 14, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/13/
AR2010051305032.html.
335 CNN, “Times Square Suspect Had Explosives Training, Documents Say” cnn.com, May 5, 2010,
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/05/04/new.york.car.bomb/?hpt=T2.
336 Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation, “The 2007 London and 2010 Times Square Bomb Plots,” May
2010, http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/londontimesq0510.pdf. Hereafter: NEFA Report, May 2010.
337 Tom Hays and Colleen Long, “NYC Bomb Suspect Nabbed Aboard Dubai-bound plane, Associated Press, cited in
standard.net, May 4, 2010, http://www.standard.net/topics/crime/2010/05/02/nyc-bomb-suspect-nabbed-aboard-dubai-
bound-plane.
338 Weiser, June 21, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
69
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Pakistan and conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money transfer business. If convicted, Younis
faces a maximum sentence of five years in prison on each of the charges.339
Colleen LaRose (“Jihad Jane”)—Conspiracy to Kill and Material
Support to Terrorism—March 2010
On March 4, 2010, a Pennsylvania woman, Colleen LaRose, was charged with providing material
support to terrorism, conspiracy to commit murder outside the United States, lying to Federal
agents, and transferring a U.S. passport for the purposes of facilitating a terrorist act. 340 LaRose
was arrested in October 2009, but her case was kept under seal. She is alleged to have used the
Internet to recruit others to “wage violent jihad” where she was known by the aliases, “Jihad
Jane” and “Fatima LaRose.” She has also been tied to a plot to assassinate a Swedish cartoonist
who depicted the prophet Muhammad atop the body of a dog.341 LaRose is believed to be
cooperating with Federal authorities.342
A Colorado woman has also been charged in the case. Jamie Paulin-Ramirez pled not guilty on
April 8, 2010 to a charge of conspiracy to support terrorists. According to the indictment, LaRose
recruited Paulin-Ramirez, 31, to join the plot to kill the Swedish cartoonist and invited her to
Europe to attend a “training camp.”
Five Northern Virginian Men Convicted of Terrorism Offenses in
Pakistan—December 2009
Five men from Northern Virginia were convicted of terrorism charges on June 24, 2010 by a
special Pakistani anti-terrorism court and sentenced to ten years in prison.343 They were arrested
in Sarghoda (near Lahore), Pakistan in December 2009, where they are alleged to have traveled
hoping to work with jihadist groups and battle U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Prosecutors say they
were in the planning stages of attacks against a Pakistani nuclear plant, an air base, and other
targets in Afghanistan as well as “territories of the United States.”344 Police reportedly recovered
jihadist literature, laptop computers, and maps of parts of Pakistan when the men were arrested
near Lahore. The maps included areas where the Taliban train.
339 U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, Press Release, “Manhattan U.S. Attorney Charges
Long Island Man with Engaging in Hawala Activity That Funded Attempted Times Square Bomber,” Sep. 15, 2010,
http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/nyfo091510a.htm.
340 United States vs. Colleen R. LaRose, Grand Jury Indictment in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, filed Mar. 4, 2010, pp. 3-4, http://intelfiles.egoplex.com/2010-03-04-LaRose-Indictment.pdf
341 Charlie Savage, “Pennsylvania Woman Tied to Plot on Cartoonist,” The New York Times, Mar. 9, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/10/us/10pennsylvania.html
342 Derrick Nunnally et al., “’Jihad Jane’ Said to Have Confessed, Philly.com, Mar. 18, 2010, http://www.philly.com/
philly/news/breaking/88307227.html
343 Shaig Hussain and Brigid Schulte, “5 N.Va. Men Convicted on Terrorism Charges in Pakistan, Given 10 years in
Prison,” The Washington Post, June 25, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/24/
AR2010062400843.html?hpid=topnews
344 Jerry Markon, et.al, “Pakistan Charges 5 Northern Virginia Men in Alleged Terrorism Plot,” The Washington Post,
Mar. 18, 2010, p. A1. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/17/AR2010031700430_pf.html
Congressional Research Service
70
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
The story of the five men from the Alexander, Virginia area—Uman Chaudhry, 24; Ramy
Zamzam, 22; Ahmad A. Minni, 20; Waqar Khan, 22; and Aman Hassan Yemer, 18—became
public when the Council on American-Islamic Relations got their families in touch with the FBI
after the five left the United States without telling their families. The men were arrested at the
home of Chaudhry's father, Khalid Farooq Chaudhry, and the terror allegations began
immediately.345
Attorneys for the men mounted an aggressive defense contending that the five were tortured by
Pakistani jailers.346 In addition, they allege that police in Pakistan fabricated incriminating
evidence. 347 They have appealed the convictions to the Lahore High Court.
The motives for the group’s trip to Pakistan are unclear. Zamzam claimed in a Pakistani court that
the young men were in the country for jihad, not terrorism and wanted to provide medical and
financial assistance to Afghan Muslims.348 The group reportedly met with representatives from
two militant organizations, Jaish-e-Muhammad (tied to Al Qaeda) and Jamaat-ud-Dawa.349 They
were arrested in a house allegedly tied to Jaish-e-Muhammad in Sargodha, Pakistan after failing
to link up with any terrorists. It has been reported that the two groups they approached rejected
them because they lacked references from other trusted terrorists.350 According to a news report
citing Pakistani investigators, the five communicated online and visited Web sites that included
footage of reputed terrorist attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Families, neighbors, and friends
of the five young men are reported to have had difficulty believing that the five had tried to link
up with terrorist groups.351
Al-Shabaab Minnesota Recruits—2007-2010
As of August 5, 2010, the DOJ had charged nineteen352 individuals in an ongoing investigation of
al-Shabaab-related recruitment of individuals in Minnesota—the Minneapolis, Minnesota area
has the largest community of Somali-Americans in the United States. Reportedly, some of the
indicted individuals began their terrorism-related activities in 2007, around the time al-Shabaab
stepped up its insurgency against Somalia's transitional government and its Ethiopian supporters.
345 Ibid.
346 Ibid.
347 Saeed Shah, “American Jihadi Suspects ‘Set Up’ by Police, Say Lawyers,” The Guardian (London), Apr. 11, 2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/11/us-pakistan-jihadi-suspects-set-up
348 Kamran Haider, “Pakistani court rejects Americans' bail request,” Reuters, Feb. 17, 2010,; “Americans detained in
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61F1IQ20100217Pakistan defend 'jihad' plans,” USA Today, Jan. 4, 2010,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-01-03-pakistan-americans-court_N.htm (AP).,
349 Waqar Gillani, “Pakistani Court Approves Arrests of 5 Americans,” New York Times, Dec. 16, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/16/world/asia/16inquire.html.http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/16/world/asia/
16inquire.html.
350 Margaret Neighbour, “Al-Qaeda ‘Rejected US Muslims Because They Lacked References,’” The Scotsman, Dec.11,
2009, http://news.scotsman.com/world/AlQaeda-39rejected—US-Muslims.5903482.jp; Lolita C. Baldor, “Americans
Held in Pakistan Straddled 2 Worlds,” The Guardian, Dec. 12, 2009, (AP), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
feedarticle/8854274. Hereafter: Baldor, Dec. 12, 2009.
351 Baldor, Dec. 12, 2009.
352 DOJ Press Release, “Fourteen Charged with Providing Material Support to Somalia-Based Terrorist Organization,”
August 5, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/August/10-ag-898.html. Hereafter: DOJ Press Release, Aug. 5,
2010; DOJ Press Release, “Terror Charges Unsealed Against Eight Defendants,” Nov. 23, 2009,
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/November/09-nsd-1267.html. Hereafter: DOJ Press Release, Nov. 23, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
71
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
The Minnesota recruits who traveled to Somalia received weapons training alongside individuals
from other countries, including Britain, Australia, Sweden and Canada.353 The indicted American
recruits face a variety of accusations including recruiting and raising funds for the trips, engaging
in terrorist acts in Somalia, and perjury. Nine individuals have been arrested by U.S. or foreign
law enforcement. Five defendants have pled guilty to charges.354
Documents associated with the ongoing federal investigation into the recruitment of these
individuals from the Minneapolis area reveal the importance of a local al-Shabaab support
network that provided the organization financing and foot soldiers. It included older individuals
who helped in the radicalization process and aided in supplying the young men with equipment
and money to go to Somalia. At least five individuals appear to have played important roles:355
• Two women, Amina Ali and Hawo Hassan, allegedly helped raise money for al-
Shabaab by soliciting funds door-to-door and via teleconferences. According to
DOJ, in some instances, Ali raised money by misleading donors into believing
the funds were destined for “the poor and needy.”356 Ali, age 33, and Hassan, age
63, are both naturalized U.S. citizens from Somalia.357
• Mohamud Said Omar is a Somali citizen who was granted permanent U.S.
resident status in 1994. He is accused of providing money to young men to travel
from Minneapolis to Somalia to train with and fight for al-Shabaab. He also
allegedly visited an al-Shabaab safe house and provided hundreds of dollars to
fund the purchase of AK-47 rifles for the men.358 Omar has been held in a high-
security Dutch prison since his arrest at the request of the U.S. government in
November 2009. On May 31, 2010, a Rotterdam District Court ruled that Omar
may be extradited to the United States. His attorney, who says that his client
never intended to help terrorists, will appeal the extradition ruling to the Dutch
Supreme Court, a process that could take many months.359
• Abdiweli Yassin Isse is a legal resident of the United States. An October 9, 2009
criminal complaint charged Isse with encouraging others to travel to Somalia to
fight Ethiopians. At a gathering of co-conspirators, he purportedly described his
plans to wage jihad against Ethiopians. He also raised money to buy airplane
tickets for others to make the trip to Somalia for the same purpose. In raising that
353 Anti-Defamation League (ADL), “Al Shabaab’s American Recruits: Introduction,” June 7, 2010,
http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/al_shabaab_american_recruits.htm. Hereafter: ADL, All Shabaab’s American
Recruits.
354 DOJ Press Release, “Fourteen Charged”; “Netherlands Terror Suspect Fights U.S. Extradition,” Associated Press
cited in FOXNews.com, Feb. 22, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/02/22/netherlands-terror-suspect-fights-
extradition/.
355 Raffaello Pantucci, “American Jihad: New Details Emerge About al-Shabaab Recruitment in North America,” The
Jamestown Foundation, Dec. 3, 2009, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?
tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35797&cHash=f6e78a6e93.
356 DOJ Press Release, Aug. 5, 2010.
357 Ibid.
358 DOJ Press Release, Nov. 23, 2009.
359 “Terror Suspect’s Extradition to the U.S. to be Appealed,” Associated Press, June 1, 2010, http://www.google.com/
hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5heU1OoqeTWyr3O1YtURr-yIeZv8QD9G2J1QG1.
Congressional Research Service
72
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
money, he allegedly misled community members into thinking they were
contributing money to send young men to Saudi Arabia to study the Koran.360
• Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax is a Somali-born naturalized U.S. citizen. An
affidavit filed in support of an October 9, 2009 criminal complaint states that in
the fall of 2007, Faarax attended a meeting with co-conspirators at a Minneapolis
residence, where he encouraged others to travel to Somalia to fight and told them
how he had experienced true brotherhood while fighting a jihad in Somalia.361 He
detailed his own experiences in guerilla combat and reassured his listeners that it
was fun and not to be afraid. He further underscored that recruits would get the
chance to use firearms.362
There is some suggestion that interest among young U.S. citizens in joining al-Shabaab may be
waning from a high point in 2007-2008 as reports of recruits who had died in terrorist actions
reached U.S. Somali communities.363 The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center has
told Congress that at least seven Americans have been killed in fighting in Somalia.364 Among
those killed was Shirwa Ahmed, 27, a college student from Minneapolis. On October 29, 2008,
Ahmed became the first known American suicide bomber when he drove an explosives-laden
truck into a government building in Somalia, one of five simultaneous attacks that killed 22 U.N.
aid workers and others.365 The FBI is also reportedly investigating whether a Seattle man was
responsible for a suicide truck bombing in Mogadishu, Somalia on September 17, 2009 that killed
21 peacekeepers and himself.366
Nidal Malik Hasan—Fort Hood, Texas Shooting—November 5,
2009
A mass shooting took place on November 5, 2009, at the Soldier Readiness Center at the U.S.
Army’s Fort Hood, located outside Killeen, Texas. Thirteen people were killed and 43 others were
wounded or injured.367
The accused perpetrator is Nidal Malik Hasan, a U.S. Army major who was serving as a
psychiatrist. He is reported to have fired 100 rounds at soldiers processing through cubicles in the
Center. He was seriously wounded in an exchange of gunfire during the incident. Hasan was
360 DOJ Press Release, Nov. 23, 2009.
361 Ibid.
362 Criminal Complaint, U.S. v.Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax and Abdiweli Yassin Isse, (D. Minn. 2009). See also Dina
Temple-Raston, “Jihadi Cool: Terrorist Recruiters’ Latest Weapon,” National Public Radio, Mar. 26, 2010,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125186382&ft=1&f=1001.
363 Eric Schmitt, “Islamic Extremist Group Recruits Americans for Civil War, Not Jihad,” The New York Times, June 6,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/nyregion/07shabaab.html.
364 “The Threat from Somalia,” The Washington Post, Nov. 2, 2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/11/01/AR2009110101774.html.
365 DOJ Press Release, Nov. 23, 2009.
366 Mike Carter, “Somali Bomb Suspect Tied to Seattle,” The Seattle Times, Sep. 24, 2009,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2009930567_somalia24m.html.
367 Department of Defense (DOD), Report of the DOD Independent Review, Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort
Hood,” January 2010, p. 1.
Congressional Research Service
73
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
armed with an FN FiveseveN® 5.7 millimeter pistol368 and an older model Smith and Wesson
.357 revolver. However, law enforcement officials do not believe the latter gun was fired by
Hasan.369 He has been charged with 13 counts of premeditated murder and 32 counts of attempted
murder under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.370 He may face additional charges at court
martial.
Hasan is the son of Palestinian immigrants and was born and grew up in Virginia.371 He is
reported to have expressed radical beliefs on several occasions during his Army career. In a 2007
presentation to Walter Reed physicians, Hasan said that the Army should allow Muslim soldiers
to claim conscientious objector status to forgo fighting other Muslims. However, there is no
record of disciplinary action having been taken by the U.S. Army nor did they ever consider him
unfit for duty or a security threat. A Pentagon review found that officers failed to comply with
applicable policies in Hasan’s career evaluations.372
Two Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) discovered email correspondence between Hasan and
Anwar al-Aulaqi, a radical Imam accused of recruiting for Al Qaeda. Over the course of several
months, Hasan sent 16 emails to al-Aulaqi (who reportedly replied to only two of them). The
email exchange was assessed by the FBI to be in line with the psychiatrist’s research into Muslim
U.S. soldiers’ reactions to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.373 A Defense Department analyst on
one of the JTTFs assessed the email correspondence as innocent and in line with Hasan’s research
interests.374 After the Fort Hood shootings, al-Aulaqi issued a statement dubbing him a hero but
denying that he had incited Hasan.
David Headley—Plots to Attack Offices of Newspaper in
Copenhagen and Support Mumbai Terrorist Attacks—October 2009
On March 18, 2010, David Coleman Headley pled guilty to numerous criminal charges including
a plot to attack employees of the Jyllands-Posten newspaper in Copenhagen, Denmark; helping
plan the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack; and providing material support to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT),
a militant Pakistani Islamist group. As part of the plea agreement, prosecutors would not pursue
the death penalty against him if he cooperates with law enforcement and intelligence officials.375
368 The FN Five-seveN® single-action autoloading pistol is designed and manufactured in Belgium by FN Herstal. It
fires the low-recoil 5.7x28mm cartridge.
369 “Ft. Hood shooter Nidal Hasan used private, legally-bought pistol - not military weapon - in rampage,” Associated
Press cited in the New York Daily News, Nov. 7, 2009. http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2009/11/07/2009-
11-07_ft_hood_shooter_nidal_hasan_used_private_legallybought_pistol__not_military_weap.html
370 “Hasan Charged with 32 More Counts,” The Washington Post, Nation Digest, Dec.3, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/02/AR2009120204120.html
371 Elisabeth Bumiller and Scott Shane, “Pentagon Report on Fort Hood Details Failures, The New York Times, Jan. 16,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/16/us/politics/16hasan.html.
372 William H. McMichael, “Review of Ft. Hood Slayings Faults Hasan's Supervisors,” Army Times, January 25, 2010.
373 Tarrant, Nov. 22, 2009.
374 Ann Scott Tyson and Dana Priest, “Army Sought Ways to Channel Hasan’s Absorption with Islam,” Washington
Post, Nov. 12, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/11/AR2009111128106.html.
375 Carrie Johnson, “U.S. Citizen, David Coleman Headley Admits Role in Mumbai Attacks,” The Washington Post,
Mar. 19, 2010, p. A16. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/18/AR2010031805407.html.
Congressional Research Service
74
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
The 49-year old Headley was born Daood Sayed Gilani in Washington D.C. to a Pakistani father
and an American mother. He reportedly changed his Muslim name to a Judeo-Christian name to
hide his Muslim identity. Arrested in October 2009, Headley allegedly attended LeT terrorism
training camps in Pakistan in 2002 and 2003 and also conducted extensive surveillance for both
the Copenhagen and Mumbai plots. In late 2005 a LeT handler and another LeT-linked individual
conspired with Headley to have him perform advanced surveillance and scouting for the Mumbai
attacks. The LeT personnel discussed the idea of opening an immigration office in Mumbai as
cover for his scouting activities. Using the sham office as cover, between September 2006 and
July 2008, Headley made five trips to the city, photographed and videotaped potential targets
following the instructions of LeT. He also received an additional $3,000 and a GPS device from
LeT. In November 2008, LeT attacked Mumbai targets killing 164 individuals.376
Headley was also involved in a plot to attack the facilities of Danish newspaper, Morgenavisen
Jyllands-Posten. The plot involved attacking an editor and a cartoonist involved in the publication
of controversial editorial cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad which sparked protests
throughout the Muslim world. Headley met with an LeT member in Pakistan in 2008 to discuss
surveillance of the newspaper. In January 2009 he cased the newspaper and met with its
representatives. In July and August 2009, he met in Europe with contacts of Ilyas Kashmiri, a
member of a terrorist organization in Pakistan, to conduct additional surveillance.377
Three others alleged to have collaborated with Headley have been charged by U.S. authorities in
the Mumbai and Copenhagen plots:
• Tahawwur Hussain Rana is a 49-year-old Canadian citizen who immigrated
from Pakistan, was trained as a physician, and resided in Chicago until his arrest
in October 2009. He was allegedly involved in both the Danish plot and the
Mumbai attacks, but has pled not guilty to the charges claiming he was duped by
Headley. However, according to Headley's plea agreement, he shared with Rana
details of his trips to Pakistan and his association with LeT. In turn, according to
media reporting, Rana extensively helped him carry out the attacks in Mumbai.378
• Ilyas Kashmiri is an alleged leader of Harakat-ul Jihad Islami a terrorist
organization in Pakistan and is believed to be in contact with Al Qaeda leaders. In
February 2009, he met with Headley in Waziristan. He reviewed Headley’s
Denmark surveillance footage and suggested the use of a truck bomb. He met
with Headley again in May 2009 and directed him to link up with his operatives
in Europe. He also advised cutting out LeT from the operation. LeT reportedly
agreed.379 Kashmiri has been charged in the plots but is not in U.S. custody.
376 DOJ Press Release, “Two Chicago Men Charged in Connection with Alleged Roles in Foreign Terror Plot That
Focused on Targets in Denmark,” Oct. 27, 2009, http://chicago.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/cg102709.htm; DOJ
Press Release, “Chicagoan David Headley Charged with Conspiracy in 2008 Mumbai Attacks in Addition to Foreign
Terror Plot in Denmark,” Dec. 7, 2009, http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2009/pr1207_01.pdf; DOJ Press
Release, “Chicagoans Tahawwur Rana and David Headley Indicted for Alleged Roles in India and Denmark Terrorism
Conspiracies: Ilyas Kashmiri and Retired Pakistani Major Charged in Denmark Plot,” Jan. 14, 2010,
http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2010/pr0114_01.pdf. Hereafter: DOJ Press Releases, dated Oct. 27, 2009;
Dec. 7, 2009; and Jan. 14, 2010.
377 Ibid.
378 “Tahawwra Hussain Rana’s Pre-Trial Conference Tomorrow,” zeenews.com (India), Mar. 28, 2010,
http://www.zeenews.com/news614664.html
379 DOJ Press Releases, dated Oct. 27, 2009; Dec. 7, 2009; and Jan. 14, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
75
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
• Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed is a retired major in the Pakistani military and is
alleged to have coordinated Headley’s travel to Denmark and helped plan the
attack. He connected Headley with Kashmiri.380 Like Kashmiri, Syed has been
charged in the plot but is not in U.S. custody.
Apparently Headley’s life swung widely between the strictures of conservative Islam and the
wide-open excesses of the West. Born in 1960 in Washington, D.C., he is the son of a Pakistani
father, Syed Saleem Gilani, who worked at the Pakistani Embassy. Headley’s mother, Serrill
Headley, a Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania native, also worked at the embassy. Soon after
David/Daood was born, the family moved to Pakistan. But Serrill left Syed and Pakistan in 1968,
because she could not abide by their conservative views of married women. She returned to
Philadelphia in the early 1970s and opened up a bar called Khyber Pass.
In 1977, after Pakistan suffered a military coup, Headley’s mother brought David/Daood back to
the United States. He struggled to fit in, at times espousing extremist views while developing a
heroin habit. In 1985, his mother made him manager of the bar she owned. He reportedly failed at
this role and his mother was forced to sell the bar. That same year, he married a bartender whom
he divorced in 1987 because of cultural differences. His wife at that time said that David/Daood
was torn between two cultures—calling Indians “infidels,” for example. A Khyber Pass employee
remembered him discussing infidels and Islam taking over the world. The Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) nabbed him twice (1988 and 1997) on heroin smuggling charges, and he
worked as an informant for them and served prison sentences.381
Tarek Mehanna—Plot to Assassinate Politicians and Attack
Shopping Malls—October 2009
Tarek Mehanna, a dual U.S. and Egyptian citizen,382 from the Boston suburb of Sudbury,
Massachusetts, was arrested on October 21, 2009, on charges that he plotted to kill two prominent
U.S. politicians and shoot people at American shopping malls. He was accused of conspiring with
two other men—Ahmad Abousamra, a friend from childhood who authorities say is now in
Syria, and an unnamed man who is reported to be cooperating with authorities.
Mehanna graduated from the Massachusetts College of Pharmacy in 2008 where his father is a
professor. Mehanna and his co-conspirators were said to have found inspiration in the 2002
Washington D.C. sniper attacks.383 Mehanna taught math and religion at a Muslim school in
Worcester, MA.384
380 Ibid.
381 Joseph Tanfani, John Shiffman, and Kathleen Brady Shea, “American Suspect in Mumbai Attack Was DEA
Informant,” McClatchy Washington Bureau, Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/12/14/v-pring/80622
american-suspect-in-mumbai-attack.html; Ginger Thompson, “A Terror Suspect With Feet in East and West,” The New
York Times, Nov. 22, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/22/us/22terror.html.
382 Denise Lavoie, “Mass. Terror Suspect Taught Kids at Muslim School,” Associated Press foreign, cited in
guardian.co.uk, Oct. 21, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8766970. Hereafter: Denise Lavoie, Oct.
21, 2009.
383 Abby Goodnough and Liz Robbins, “Mass. Man Arrested in Terrorism Case,” The New York Times, Oct. 21, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/us/22terror.html.
384 Denise Lavoie, Oct. 21, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
76
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Abousamra is the son of a physician who worked at Massachusetts General Hospital for 21 years
and was president of the Islamic Center of New England before moving to the Detroit area in
2007. Abousamra was named in an FBI affidavit filed on October 21, 2009, in federal court in
Boston as a conspirator with Mehanna, but was not charged. He allegedly fled to Syria three years
ago after being questioned by the FBI. The FBI affidavit alleges Abousamra tried to join a
terrorist training camp in Pakistan in 2002 and 2003, but was rejected by the Taliban because of a
“lack of experience.’’385
Much of the case against Mehanna involves material support to terrorism.386 According to DOJ,
“Beginning in or about 2001, and continuing until in or about May 2008, Mehanna conspired
with Ahmad Abousamra, and others to provide material support and resources for use in carrying
out a conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim or injure persons or damage property in a foreign country
and extraterritorial homicide of a U.S. national.” 387 Specifically, the complaint affidavit alleges
that Mehanna and co-conspirators discussed their desire to participate in violent jihad against
American interests and that they would talk about fighting jihad and their desire to die on the
battlefield. The complaint further alleges that the coconspirators attempted to radicalize others
and inspire each other by, among other things, watching and distributing jihadi videos.388
At the time of his arrest Mehanna was free on bail from an earlier arrest, in November 2008, at
Logan International Airport in Boston, when he was charged with lying to federal investigators in
a 2006 interview about his ties to Daniel Maldonado, who subsequently pled guilty to
participating in terrorism training in Somalia. Maldonado is serving a 10-year prison sentence on
that charge.389
“According to the complaint affidavit, Mehanna and the coconspirators had multiple
conversations about obtaining automatic weapons and randomly shooting people in a shopping
mall, and that the conversations went so far as to discuss the logistics of a mall attack, including
coordination, weapons needed and the possibility of attacking emergency responders. It is alleged
that the plan was ultimately abandoned, because of their inability to obtain the automatic weapons
they deemed necessary to effectively carry out the attacks.”390
Hosam Smadi—Plot to Bomb a Dallas, Texas Skyscraper—
September 2009
On September 24, 2009, Hosam Maher Husein Smadi, a 19-year-old Jordanian citizen who is
reported to have remained in the United States illegally for one year after his visa expired, parked
an SUV packed with what he thought were explosives outside Fountain Place, a 60-story office
385 Shelley Murphy and Milton J. Valencia, “Details Emerge on Plot Suspects,” The Boston Globe, Oct. 23, 2009.
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2009/10/23/details_emerge_on_plot_suspects/. Hereafter:
Murphy and Valencia, Oct. 23, 2009.
386 U.S. Code, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 113B, Section 2339A. For more information on this statute, see CRS Report
R41333, Terrorist Material Support: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B, by Charles Doyle.
387 DOJ Press Release, “Massachusetts Man Charged with Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Terrorists” Oct.
21, 2009. http://boston.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/bs102109a.htm.
388 Ibid.
389 Murphy and Valencia, Oct. 23, 2009.
390 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service
77
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
tower at Ross Avenue and Field Street in Dallas, Texas. When Smadi dialed a cellphone that he
thought would detonate the “truck bomb,” he was arrested by undercover FBI agents who had
been posing as fellow anti-American terrorists.
The arrest was part of an FBI sting operation that began after an agent, monitoring an online
extremist website, discovered Smadi espousing jihad against the United States. Smadi was
charged on October 7, 2009, with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction. On May 26,
2010, Smadi pled guilty to one count of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction. Under
the terms of the plea agreement, Smadi faces 30 years in prison when he is sentenced in October
2010.
After Smadi was indicted, David Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security, reported
that “The Criminal complaint alleges that Hosam Smadi sought and attempted to bomb the
Fountain Place office tower, but a coordinated undercover law enforcement action was able to
thwart his efforts and ensure no one was harmed.” 391 Smadi made clear his intention to serve as a
soldier for Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, and to conduct violent jihad. Undercover FBI agents,
posing as members of an Al Qaeda “sleeper’ cell” were introduced to Smadi, who repeatedly
indicated to them that he came to the U.S. for the specific purpose of committing “Jihad for the
sake of God.” Smadi clarified that he was interested in ‘self-jihad’ because it was “the best type
of jihad.” The investigation determined Smadi was not associated with other terrorist
organizations.392
DOJ also claims that “undercover FBI agents repeatedly encouraged Smadi to reevaluate his
interpretation of jihad, counseling him that the obligation of jihad can be satisfied in many ways.
Every time this interaction occurred, Smadi aggressively responded that he was going to commit
significant, conspicuous acts of violence as his jihad.”393
In late August 2009, while meeting with one of the undercover FBI agents in Dallas, authorities
allege that
Smadi discussed the logistics and timing of the bombing, stating that he would have
preferred to do the attack on “11 September,” but decided to wait until after the month of
Ramadan, which ended on September 20, 2009. At the conclusion of the meeting, Smadi
decided that a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) would be placed at the
foundation of the Fountain Place office tower. Unbeknownst to Smadi, the FBI ensured the
VBIED contained only an inert/inactive explosive device which contained no explosive
materials.394
Dallas Mayor Tom Leppert said local authorities were notified of the operation before it
happened. “We were clearly communicated to that there was not going to be danger to anybody,”
he said.395
391 DOJ Press Release, “FBI Arrests Jordanian Citizen for Attempting to Bomb Skyscraper in Downtown Dallas,” Sep.
24, 2009, http://dallas.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/dl092409.htm.
392 Ibid
393 Ibid
394 Ibid.
395 Jason Trahon, Todd J. Gillman, and Scott Goldstein, “Dallas Bomb Plot Suspect Told Landlord He Was Moving
Out,” The Dallas Morning News, Sep. 26, 2009, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/
092409dnmetbombarrest.1b177db8b.html
Congressional Research Service
78
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Michael Finton—Plot to Bomb the Springfield, Illinois Federal
Building—September 2009
On September 23, 2009, Michael C. Finton, who had converted to Islam and changed his name to
Talib Islam, was arrested after he was alleged to have driven a van he thought was loaded with
explosives—but was actually provided to him by the FBI—to the Paul Findley Federal Building
in Springfield, Illinois. Prosecutors say he parked and locked the vehicle, then moved a few
blocks away before twice making cell phone calls he believed would trigger a blast that would
kill or injure people inside the building. He was charged with attempted murder of federal
employees and attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction (explosives) in connection with a
plot to detonate a vehicle bomb at the federal building in Springfield, Illinois.396
Finton reportedly had converted to the Islamic faith while in an Illinois prison from 2001 to 2006,
serving a sentence for aggravated robbery and aggravated battery. He came to the attention of
federal authorities in August 2007 when a search of his vehicle turned up a letter about his dreams
of being a shahid, or martyr.
According to the affidavit filed in support of the criminal complaint, “after his arrest it was
discovered that Finton had written a letter to John Walker Lindh, an American who was captured
fighting for the Taliban and is imprisoned on terrorism violations. In a January 2008 interview
with the FBI after his release from prison on a parole violation, Finton allegedly explained that he
idolized Lindh. The affidavit further alleges that, in March 2008, Finton received funds from an
individual in Saudi Arabia that he used to travel to Saudi Arabia the following month. He returned
to the United States in May 2008.”397
In February 2009, Finton was introduced to an undercover FBI special agent posing as a low-
level Al Qaeda operative. Finton expressed his desire to receive military training at a camp and to
fight in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia or other locations. The undercover agent told Finton
several times that it was Finton’s decision and that he could walk away from the decision
anytime. According to the affidavit, Finton indicated that he was excited and had no second
thoughts about attending a camp.”398
In the ensuing months, the affidavit alleges that Finton discussed possibly targeting locations in
the United States and ultimately suggested the Paul Findley Federal Building and Courthouse in
downtown Springfield as a primary target. He conducted surveillance of the building and
proposed a remotely-detonated car bomb for the attack. Further, according to the affidavit, Finton
observed that U.S. Congressman Aaron Schock’s office, located at the corner of East Monroe and
6th Streets, would be a secondary target.”399
On Sept. 1, 2009, Finton met with the undercover FBI officer and was told the vehicle for the
attack would be carrying close to one ton of explosives. According to the affidavit, Finton
indicated an awareness that the bomb would cause civilian casualties, but expressed his view that
396 DOJ Press Release, “Illinois Man Arrested in Plot to Bomb Courthouse and Murder Federal Employees Vehicle
Bomb Placed at Scene Was Inactive and Posed No Danger to Public,” Sep. 24, 2009, http://springfield.fbi.gov/
dojpressrel/2009/si092409.htm.
397 Ibid.
398 Ibid.
399 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service
79
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
such casualties were justified. Unbeknownst to him, the FBI ensured that the vehicle for the
attack contained no actual explosive materials.400
Najibullah Zazi—Plot to Bomb the New York City Subway—
September 2009
Twenty-four year old, Najibullah Zazi, a citizen of Afghanistan and a legal resident of the United
States, has admitted that he plotted to bomb New York City subway trains in September 2009.
Zazi told investigators that he and two friends planned to strap explosives to their bodies, board
trains at the Grand Central and Times Square stations—two of the busiest in New York City—and
explode their bombs during the crowded rush hour.401
On February 22, 2010, Zazi pled guilty to conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction,
conspiracy to commit murder overseas, and providing material support for a terrorist
organization. There is no complete picture of Zazi’s radicalization process, but there are details
regarding his plot. In his youth, he may have listened to the radical messages of Saifur Rahman
Halimi—an Imam who advocated jihad, attended the same mosque as Zazi’s family, and lived in
the same Queens building.402 Zazi has admitted that he and others agreed to travel to Afghanistan
to join Taliban forces. In August 2008, he and others flew from Newark to Peshawar, Pakistan,
and instead of training with the Taliban, Al Qaeda recruited and trained them in the Waziristan
region of Pakistan. Al Qaeda asked Zazi and his companions to return to the United States and
engage in suicide operations.403
While training, Zazi received instruction on explosives, discussed specific targets, and took
detailed notes. He returned to the United States in January 2009 and moved to Colorado, taking a
job driving a shuttle bus at Denver International Airport. Between July and early September, he
and others purchased chemicals at beauty supply stores in Denver. Investigators suggest that Zazi
used the same hotel suite twice to try and produce bomb-making chemicals using handwritten
bomb making notes developed while in Pakistan to guide his production of triacetone triperoxide
(TATP).404 He even supposedly called an individual for production guidance. In the hotel’s
ventilation system, the FBI gathered residue from the chemicals Zazi had heated. Beauty store
400 Ibid.
401 John Marzulli, “Zazi, Al Qaeda Pals Planned Rush-Hour Attack on Grand Central, Times Square Subway Stations,”
New York Daily News, Apr. 12, 2010. http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2010/04/12/2010-04-
12_zazi_pals_planned_rushhour_attack_on_2_busiest_subway_stations.html.
402 Samantha Gross, David Caruso, and Michael Rubinkam, “Radical Influences All Around NYC Terror Suspect,”
Associated Press, Oct. 4, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=8741604. For more on Zazi’s childhood see,
Michael Wilson, “From Smiling Coffee Vendor to Terror Suspect,” New York Times Sep. 26, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/26/nyregion/26profile.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print. Hereafter: Wilson, Sep. 26,
2009.
403 Ibid.
404 TATP (also known as acetone peroxide) has been used by suicide bombers in Israel, as a detonator by the thwarted
“shoe bomber” Richard Reid, and as the explosive in the July 7, 2005 London public transport system bombings. TATP
is relatively easy to make compared to other explosives. Although it is highly susceptible to heat, friction, and shock, it
can be prepared in a basement lab using commercially-available materials obtained from hardware stores, pharmacies,
or stores selling cosmetics. See GlobalSecurity.org. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/tatp.htm,
and Philippe Naughton, “TATP is suicide bombers' weapon of choice,” Times Online (London), July 15, 2005,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article544334.ece.
Congressional Research Service
80
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
surveillance footage also recorded Zazi’s activities. 405 He also searched the website of a Queens
store that carried muriatic acid which can be used to develop TATP.
On September 8, 2009, Zazi rented a car and departed for New York the next day. Upon arriving
in New York City on September 10, Zazi’s car was stopped by Port Authority of New York Police
at the behest of the FBI as he crossed the George Washington Bridge. It has been reported that to
avoid tipping him off, the police pretended the stop was a random drug checkpoint.406 Authorities
initially stated that they found nothing incriminating. However, court papers indicated that law
enforcement subsequently found a laptop in the car containing an image of nine pages of
handwritten notes on how to make and handle bombs. When FBI agents interviewed Zazi, he
claimed that he drove to New York from Aurora, Colorado to deal with an issue involving a
coffee cart business his family operated in Manhattan. He then falsely stated he had never seen
the notes.407 Zazi has subsequently admitted that he planned to finish bomb construction over the
September 12-13 weekend, and then target New York’s subway lines on September 14, 15, or 16.
However when he suspected that the police were on to him, he claimed he shut down the
operation.408
During this time, the NYPD was showing Zazi’s photograph to people in his old neighborhoods
in Queens and, at one point, the police towed Zazi’s car. The New York Times reported that with
their interest exposed, “law enforcement agents feared that some part of a plot they had not yet
uncovered might be aborted and evidence destroyed. They moved fast, raiding four homes in
Queens beginning late in the night on Sept. 20.”409 Zazi was arrested and charged on September
24, with one count of conspiring with others to use weapons of mass destruction, including
bombs or other explosives.410
Others arrested in this case are:
• Mohammed Wali Zazi, 54, Zazi’s father, a naturalized U.S. citizen, was arrested
in the Fall of 2009 for lying to investigators. On February 1, 2010, he was
indicted for conspiring to dispose of his son's bomb-making materials and
chemicals. He has subsequently been released on bail and allowed to return to his
home in Colorado where he is under house arrest and must wear an electronic
bracelet.411
• Ahmad Wais Afzali, a Queens Imam, was arrested for tipping off Zazi to the
FBI investigation. Afzali had been a source of information for federal and New
405 William K. Rashbaum, “Terror Suspect Is Charged with Preparing Explosives,” The New York Times, Sep. 25, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/25/nyregion/25terror.html.
406 Sean Gardiner, “Police Let Terrorist Slip Through,” The Wall Street Journal, Apr. 26, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052748703441404575205954118455716.html?mod=
WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsSecond.
407 David Johnston and William K. Rashbaum, “Terror Suspect Had Bomb Guide, Authorities Say,” The New York
Times, Sep. 21, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/21/us/21terror.html.
408 Ibid.
409 Times Topics, “Najibullah Zazi,” The New York Times, Feb. 22, 2010. Hereafter: “Zazi,” The New York Times, Feb.
22, 2010, http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/z/najibullah_zazi/index.html.
410 Ibid. Zazi was originally arrested on the charge of making false statements to the FBI.
411 John Marzulli, “Mohammed Wali Zazi, Father of Terror Suspect Najibullah Zazi, Free On Bail,” New York Daily
News, Feb. 18, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2010/02/18/2010-02-
18_terror_suspect_zazis_dad_free_on_bail.html.
Congressional Research Service
81
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
York City investigators in the past.412 On March 4, 2010, Afzali, pled guilty to
lying to federal officials. He stated in court that he lied about a conversation he
had with Zazi tipping him off to FBI’s investigation. Afzali hoped to protect
himself, not Zazi. Afzali claimed that during his phone conversation with Zazi,
he simply cautioned him not to “get involved in Afghanistan garbage.”413 During
sentencing on April 15, 2010, Afzali told the Judge, “Honest to God, it was never
my intention to help those idiots for what they do in the name of Islam.” 414 On
July 5, 2010, he left the United States as specified in his plea agreement. He may
not return without special permission.415
• Naqib Jaji, 38, Zazi’s uncle, was secretly arrested in the case. Mr. Jaji, who in
his public remarks had indicated some antipathy toward Mr. Zazi, but also said it
was “impossible” that he was a terrorist, was arraigned on January 14, 2010 in a
sealed federal courtroom in Brooklyn. The New York Times reports that Court and
federal prison records and interviews with a family member indicate Mr. Jaji was
indicted on a felony charge, which remains sealed. The court docket on the case
lists him as “John Doe,” a standard practice in cases where a defendant is
cooperating.416
• Zarein Ahmedzay and Adis Medunjanin, who were classmates of Zazi’s at
Flushing High School in Queens, New York, were also indicted in the case. They
allegedly accompanied Zazi on a flight from Newark to Peshawar, Pakistan in
late August 2008 where it is claimed they received military-style training from Al
Qaeda. Ahmedzay and Medunjanin, both U.S. citizens, were charged in a five-
count superseding indictment unsealed on February 25, 2010, with conspiracy to
use weapons of mass destruction (explosive bombs) against persons or property
in the United States. Specifically, they are charged with conspiring with Zazi to
conduct an attack on Manhattan subway lines that would take place on Sept. 14,
15, or 16, 2009.417 On April 23, 2010, Ahmedzay pled guilty to the charges and
faces a sentence of up to life in prison. On August 6, 2010, Medunjanin pled not
guilty to charges in the plot and an additional charge of “trying to take out
another car in a desperate suicide bid on the Whitestone Expressway when
authorities tried to arrest him in January 2010.”418
412 Al Baker and Karen Zraick, “Lawyer Defends Queens Imam Arrested in Terror Inquiry,” The New York Times, Sep.
21, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/21/nyregion/21imam.html.
413 A.G. Sulzberger, “Imam Snared in Terror Plot Admits He Lied to the F.B.I.” New York Times, March 4, 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/05/nyregion/05terror.html.
414 A.G. Sulzberger, “Imam and Informant Tells Why He Lied,” The New York Times, Apr. 15, 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/16/nyregion/16imam.html?scp=1&sq=
%E2%80%9CImam%20and%20Informant%20Tells%20Why%20He%20Lied,%E2%80%9D%20&st=cse
415 Colleen Long, “Imam Entangled in Terrorism Case Leaves U.S.” Associated Press, cited in CBSNews.com, July 6,
2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/07/06/national/main6650661.shtml?utm_source=feedburner&
utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+FromTheRoadCBSNews+(From+The+Road%3A+CBSNews.com).
416 William K. Rashbaum, “Uncle Who Vouched for Terror Suspect Arrested,” The New York Times, Jan. 27, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/28/nyregion/28zazi.html.
417 DOJ Press Release, “Two Charged with Terror Violations in Connection with New York Subway Plot,” Feb. 25,
2010, http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/nyfo022510a.html.
418 Janon Fisher, “Suspect in Subway Terror Plot Pleads Not Guilty,” New York Post, Aug. 6, 2010,
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/queens/
suspect_in_subway_terror_plot_pleads_ul5seb9NDPmxETe4ewIyBK#ixzz0wUo8qs77.
Congressional Research Service
82
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
• On April 13, 2010, it was reported that Pakistani authorities are holding another
suspect in the case. U.S. prosecutors have disclosed previously in court
proceedings that the man, whose identity was not disclosed, has been in custody
for months. It is unknown whether he will be turned over to American
authorities.419
On July 7, 2010, DOJ announced the indictments of five additional men in the plot and revealed
that it was directed by senior al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan, and was related to a scheme by al-
Qaeda plotters in Pakistan to use Western operatives to attack a target in the United Kingdom.420
The superseding indictment charged Adnan El Shukrijumah, Adis Medunjanin, Abid Naseer;
Tariq Ur Rehman; and a fifth defendant known as “Ahmad,” “Sohaib” or “Zahid” with several
terrorism offenses.
It is alleged that the plot was organized by el-Shukrijumah and two others—Saleh al-Somali and
Rashid Rauf, who were described as leaders of Al Qaeda’s “external operations” program
dedicated to terrorist attacks in the United States and other Western countries.421 The Saudi-born,
El-Shukrijumah, is a naturalized U.S. citizen who has been sought for several years by U.S.
authorities who have offered $5 million for information leading to his capture.422 Specifically he
is alleged to have recruited Zazi and Zazi’s co-conspirators, Adis Nedunjanin and Zarein
Ahmedzay. Al-Somali and Rauf are believed to have been killed in U.S. drone attacks. 423
Abid Naseer, a British citizen, is alleged to have exchanged coded emails with the same account
that “Ahmad,” was using to communicate with the Zazi cell. He and Rehman were arrested in
Britain in April 2009. A search of their residences yielded large amounts of flour and oil in
addition to surveillance photos and maps of public areas of Manchester, England.424 Naseer is in
custody in Britain and federal authorities say they will seek his extradition.425 Rehman is no
longer in custody.
Daniel Boyd and others—Plot to Attack Quantico Marine Base and
Conspiracy to Commit Murder Abroad—July 2009
In two separate indictments in 2009, Daniel Patrick Boyd, members of his family, and others
residing in North Carolina have been charged with plotting to attack the U.S. Marine base at
Quantico, Virginia and for providing material support to terrorists and conspiring to murder
persons abroad.
419 Evan Perez and Keith Johnson, “New Arrest in Plot to Bomb Subway,” The Wall Street Journal,” Apr. 13, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303828304575180133111701068.html.
420 DOJ Press Release, “Charges Unsealed Against Five Alleged Members of Al-Qaeda Plot to Attack the United States
and United Kingdom,” July 7, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/July/10-nsd-781.html. Hereafter: DOJ Press
Release, July 7, 2010.
421 Ibid.
422 William K. Rashbaum, “Qaeda Leader Indicted in Subway Plot,” The New York Times, July 7, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/08/nyregion/08terror.html.
423 Dina Temple-Raston, “Feds: N.Y. Subway Bomb Plot Included U.K. Targets,” National Public Radio, July 8, 2010,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128368594. Hereafter: Temple-Raston, July 8, 2010.
424 Julia Love, “Alleged Al Qaeda Operatives in New York Plot,” Los Angeles Times, July 8, 2010,
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/08/nation/la-na-ny-terror-20100708. Hereafter: Love, July 8, 2010.
425 DOJ Press Release, July 7, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
83
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
On July 22, 2009, a Federal grand jury in North Carolina returned a seven-count indictment
against the following seven individuals charging them with conspiring to provide material support
to terrorists and conspiring to murder, kidnap, maim, and injure persons abroad:
• Daniel Patrick Boyd, 39, a U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina
• Hysen Sherifi, 24, a native of Kosovo and a U.S. legal permanent resident
located in North Carolina
• Anes Subasic, 33, a naturalized U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina
• Zakariya Boyd, 20, a U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina
• Dylan Boyd, 22, a U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina
• Mohammad Omar Aly Hassan, 22, a U.S. citizen and resident of North
Carolina
• Ziyad Yaghi, 21, a U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina
The indictment alleges that Daniel Boyd is a veteran of terrorist training camps in Pakistan and
Afghanistan who, over the past three years, has conspired with others to recruit and help young
men travel overseas in order to kill.426
According to the indictment, during the period from 1989 through 1992, Daniel Boyd traveled to
Pakistan and Afghanistan where he received military-style training in terrorist training camps for
the purpose of engaging in violent jihad. Following this training, he allegedly fought in
Afghanistan. From roughly November 2006 through at least July 2009, the indictment alleges that
Daniel Boyd and the other defendants conspired to provide material support and resources to
terrorists, including currency, training, transportation and personnel. The defendants also
conspired to murder, kidnap, maim and injure persons abroad during this period. The object of the
conspiracy, according to the indictment, was to advance violent jihad, including supporting and
participating in terrorist activities abroad and committing acts of murder, kidnapping or maiming
persons abroad.427 The indictment also alleges that Daniel Boyd obtained a variety of weapons in
furtherance of the conspiracy to murder persons overseas and provide material support to
terrorists.
In a superseding indictment unsealed on September 24, 2009, additional charges were made
against Boyd, his son Zakariya, and Hysen Sherifi. They are accused in a plot to attack the
Marine Corps Base at Quantico, Virginia. Charges included conspiracy to murder U.S. military
personnel, possession of weapons in furtherance of a crime of violence, and providing weapons to
a convicted felon. The superseding indictment alleges, among other things, that as part of the
conspiracy, Boyd undertook reconnaissance of the Marine Corps Base in Quantico, and obtained
maps of the base in order to plan an attack. It also alleges that Boyd possessed armor piercing
ammunition, stating it was “to attack the Americans.”428
426 DOJ Press Release, “Seven Charged with Terrorism Violations in North Carolina,” July 27, 2009,
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/July/09-nsd-725.html.
427 Ibid.
428 DOJ Press Release, “Superseding Indictment in Boyd Matter Charges Defendants with Conspiring to Murder U.S.
Military Personnel, Weapons Violations,” Sep. 24, 2009, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/September/09-nsd-
1023.html.
Congressional Research Service
84
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
In an April 19, 2010 criminal complaint unsealed in June 2010, a ninth person, Bajram Asilani,
was charged with being a member of the conspiracy involving the above defendants. He was
arrested by authorities in Kosovo on June 17, 2010, at the request of the United States which
sought his extradition to Raleigh, North Carolina to stand trial.429 However, a Judge of the
European Union Rule of Law Mission denied the extradition request, ruling that Kosovo does not
have an extradition treaty with the United States.430
Abulhakim Muhammad—Shooting at the Little Rock, Arkansas
Military Recruiting Center—June 1, 2009
On June 1, 2009, Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad was arrested in connection with a shooting at
the U.S. Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, Arkansas, that killed one soldier and wounded
another. The police recovered from Muhammad's sport utility vehicle (SUV) a Mossberg rifle
with a scope and rifle sight, an SKS assault rifle,431 and a Lorcin L380 semiautomatic handgun.432
The 24-year-old Little Rock resident and Muslim convert who changed his name from Carlos
Leon Bledsoe, was charged with capital murder, attempted capital murder, and ten counts of
unlawful discharge of a firearm. Prosecutors have said they will seek the death penalty on the
capital murder charge.433
Abdulhakim Muhammad called the June 1, 2009 shooting another “Jihadi Attack.” “I wasn’t
insane or post traumatic nor was I forced to do this Act,” he stated in a January 12, 2010
handwritten note to the presiding judge in his court case. In the letter, he claimed ties to Al Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and dubbed himself a soldier for them. His father is a Memphis
businessman who doubts that his son had ties to AQAP but could have been radicalized in
Yemen.434 His sister, who was stunned by the shooting, has stated publicly that a week before the
shooting he seemed upbeat. In press reporting, his family has described Muhammad as a “happy-
go-lucky” teen who had become a “deeply observant Muslim in college.”435
Muhammad spent 16 months in Yemen starting in the fall of 2007. While he was in the country,
he married a woman from South Yemen. He allegedly taught English and learned Arabic while
there. Yemeni officials imprisoned him in November 2008 on a visa overstay, and he also
429 DOJ Press Release, “Kosovar National Charged with Terrorism Violations,” June 17, 2010, http://charlotte.fbi.gov/
dojpressrel/pressrel10/ch061710.htm.
430 Kelcey Carlson, “Report: Judge Denies Extradition of Triangle Terrorism Suspect,” wral.com, June 21, 2010,
http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/7821448/.
431 The Russian-designed Simonov SKS (Samozariadnyia Karabina Simonova) is a gas operated, self-loading, semi-
automatic rifle that fires the 7.62 mm cartridge.
432 The NEFA Foundation, “Target America Series #18: The Little Rock Arkansas Recruiting Station Shooting,” June
2009, http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/NEFA_littlerockrecruitingshooting.pdf.
433 James Dao, “Man Claims Terror Ties in Little Rock Shooting,” The New York Times, Jan. 22, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/22littlerock.html. Hereafter: Dao, Jan. 22, 2010.
434 Ibid.
435 James Dao, “A Muslim Son, a Murder Trial, and Many Questions,” The New York Times, Feb. 16, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/17/us/17convert.html. Hereafter: Dao, Feb 16, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
85
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
supposedly possessed a fraudulent Somali visa.436 Yemen deported him to the United States in
January 2009.437
The FBI is reported to have interviewed him before the shooting, including while he was in
prison in Yemen and then again in Nashville soon after he returned. 438 According to law
enforcement officials, the episode in Yemen prompted a preliminary inquiry by the FBI and other
American law enforcement agencies into whether he had ties to extremist groups. But that
investigation was inconclusive reportedly leaving the FBI with insufficient evidence to wiretap
his phone or place him under surveillance.439
On April 26, 2010, Muhammad was also charged with aggravated assault and making terroristic
threats for allegedly trying to stab one jail deputy and threatening to kill another during his
incarceration awaiting trial on the murder charge.440
The Newburgh Four—Plot to Bomb Bronx, New York Synagogue
and Jewish Center, and Attack Stewart Air National Guard Base—
May 2009
On May 20, 2009, the FBI and the NYPD arrested four men for plotting to blow up a Bronx
synagogue and Jewish Center while simultaneously shooting a plane out of the sky. The men
allegedly parked car bombs wired to cell phones outside the Riverdale Temple and nearby
Riverdale Jewish Center in the Bronx. They were also heading to Stewart Air National Guard
Base in Newburgh, New York.441 However, the explosives in the car bombs and Stinger missile
they intended to use in the attack were phony. The explosives had been supplied by undercover
agents posing as Pakistani militants linked to Al Qaeda. The four “were petty criminals who
appeared to be acting alone, not in concert with any terrorist organization,” according to the New
York City Police Commissioner.442
The suspects were three U.S.-born citizens—James Cromitie, David Williams, and Onta
Williams (no relation to David); and one Haitian immigrant, Laguerre Payen. At least three of
the four were said to be jailhouse converts to Islam and were reportedly angry about the deaths of
Muslims in Afghanistan.
436 Ibid.
437 Dao, Jan. 22, 2010.
438 See Dao, Feb. 16, 2010; and Dina Temple-Raston, “FBI Encountered Accused Ark. Shooter In Yemen,” National
Public Radio, June 8, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105128523.
439 James Dao and David Johnson, “Suspect in Soldier Attack was Once Detained in Yemen,” The New York Times,
June 3, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/04recruit.html.
440 Anti Defamation League, “Soldier Killed at Arkansas Army Recruiting Center,”, adl.com, Apr. 26, 2010,
http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/arkansas_army_recruit_center_shooting.htm.
441 United States v. James Cromitie, David Williams, Onta Williams, Laguerre Payen, Indictment 09-Cr558, U.S.
District Court, Southern District of New York (undated). http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/
990.pdf. Hereafter: U.S. v. Cromitie, et al.
442 Javier C. Hernandez and Sewell Chan, “N.Y. Bomb Plot Suspects Acted Alone, Police Say,” The New York Times,
May 21, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/22/nyregion/22terror.html?ref=nyregion.
Congressional Research Service
86
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
An FBI cooperating witness played a key role in the quartet’s efforts to obtain the explosives and
missile components for the planned attacks. According to the indictment in the case,443 the four
defendants met with the cooperating witness repeatedly beginning in October 2008 and discussed
attacking military aircraft at the Air National Guard base. Starting in April 2009, the four selected
the synagogue, the Jewish community center, and the air base as targets. They cased their targets,
taking photographs and developing plans. Together with the cooperating witness, they purchased
cell phones and a handgun for the operation. The cooperating witness also helped them obtain
three improvised explosive devices (IED) containing fake C-4 explosives and gave the group an
inactive stinger missile, informing them that it came from Jaish-e-Mohammed, a Pakistan-based
terrorist group.444
Some have questioned whether the Newburgh Four were actually capable of pulling off the
terrorist plot without the involvement of the cooperating witness, a Pakistani man named Shahed
Hussain, who agreed to work for the FBI to obtain leniency after he was arrested in 2002 for
fraud.445 One commentator has described the Newburgh Four as a group of struggling, disaffected
petty criminals, who bonded at a Newburgh mosque over having spent time in prison and were
taken in by a Pakistani immigrant looking to win leniency for a crime of his own. “There's little
doubt the bumbling would-be bombers went far enough with the plot to demonstrate that they had
the intention to commit terror, and for that they'll pay the price. But the whole tale comes off
perhaps more as a sad glimpse into the lives of a loose group of aimless and obscurely embittered
Americans than as a dire illustration of the threat of home-grown terrorism.”446
Graham Ravman, writing in the Village Voice, suggests that the Newburgh Four were smalltime
felons who had no grand terrorist ambitions until Hussain plied them with cash and suggestions.
Moreover, this was not the first time [Hussain] went undercover to help the government. “He
played a similar role four years ago in an Albany case, in which he helped the FBI arrest a man
named Mohammed Hossain, a cash-poor pizzeria owner, and his Imam, Yassin Aref, after
persuading them to launder $50,000 in a made-up plot to bring a missile to the United States and
assassinate a Pakistani prime minister [the target of the invented plot was actually against the
Pakistani United Nations Representative]…In both cases, it is claimed that [Hussain] did not
stumble upon active terror cells plotting to bring destruction on American soil [rather he] needed
long periods of time to recruit his Muslim contacts, spin elaborate tales about his terror contacts,
and develop solid plans of action, all the while providing the defendants with large amounts of
resources and cash incentives.”447
The trial of the four began on August 24, 2010. It had been delayed earlier in the summer by the
federal judge in the case saying prosecutors had failed to turn over information that should have
been given to the defense. In June 2010, prosecutors turned over to defense attorneys a 2008
memorandum from the FBI written by the lead agent on the case. The agent reportedly wrote that
443 U.S. v. Cromitie, et al.
444 DOJ Press Release, “Four Arrested for Plot To Bomb Synagogue and Jewish community center and to Shoot
Military Planes with Stinger Missiles,” May 20, 2009, http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/nyfo052009.htm.
445 Graham Rayman, “The Alarming Record of the FBI’s Informant in the Bronx Bomb Plot,” The Village Voice, July
8, 2009, http://www.villagevoice.com/2009-07-08/news/the-alarming-record-of-the-f-b-i-s-informant-in-the-bronx-
bomb-plot/3. Hereafter: Ravman, July 8, 2009.
446 Zachary Roth, “The Newburgh Four—And The Government Mole Who Betrayed Them,” TPM Muckraker, May
22, 2009. http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/05/the_newburgh_four_—
_and_the_goverment_mole_who_be.php?ref=m1.
447 Ravman, July 8, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
87
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
he had told officials at Stewart Airport that James Cromitie, the alleged leader of the Newburgh
Four, would be looking over the airport for a potential attack but that he would pose no danger
without the assistance of the informant. U.S. District Court Judge Colleen McMahon said the
memorandum should have been turned over to the defense months earlier.448
Bryant Neal Vinas—Plot to Bomb Long Island Railroad, Rocket
Attack on U.S. Base in Afghanistan—September 2008
In a November 22, 2008 sealed indictment449 (unsealed on July 22, 2009), Bryant Vinas, a 26-
year-old American Muslim convert who grew up on Long Island, New York, was charged with
conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals, providing material support to Al Qaeda, and receiving
military-type training from Al Qaeda. He pled guilty to all three counts on January 28, 2009.450
He faces life in prison on the charges.
The charges stem from Vinas’ activities in Pakistan from his arrival in the Fall of 2007 until his
arrest by Pakistani police in November 2008 following a tip provided by U.S. authorities. Vinas
was subsequently extradited to the United States and has cooperated extensively with
counterterrorism officials.451 Vinas has admitted that he met with Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan
and, between March and July 2008, attended three Al Qaeda training courses focused on
weapons, explosives, and rocket-based or propelled weaponry.452 In September 2008, he took part
in firing rockets at a U.S. military base in Afghanistan. He told officials, “Although we intended
to hit the military base and kill American soldiers, I was informed the rockets missed and the
attack failed.”453 Vinas also testified in court, “I consulted with a senior Al Qaeda leader and
provided detailed information about the operation of the Long Island Railroad system,” which I
knew because I had ridden the railroad on so many occasions…The purpose of providing
information was to help plan a bomb attack on the Long Island Railroad system.”454 This led U.S.
officials to issue a security alert in November 2008 and beefed up security on the New York area
commuter rail system.455
The arrest of Vinas was kept secret until his indictment was unsealed in July 2009 probably
because of the significance of the information he has provided to U.S. counterterrorism
authorities. That information has reportedly helped U.S. forces target Al Qaeda camps with drone
448 William Glaberson, “Trial of Newburgh Men Accused of Terror Plot Delayed,” The New York Times, June 14,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/15/nyregion/15terror.html.
449 United States v. John Doe, Cr. No. 08-823, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York, Nov. 22, 2008,
http://intelfiles.egoplex.com/2009-07-22-Bryant-Neal-Vinas-Court-Docs.pdf.
450 United States against Bryant Neal Vinas, Cr. No. 08-823 (NGG, Unsealing Application, U.S. District Court, Eastern
District of New York, July 22, 2009, http://intelfiles.egoplex.com/2009-07-22-Bryant-Neal-Vinas-Court-
Docs.pdf#page=13.
451 Sebastian Rotella and Josh Meyer, “U.S.-born Militant Who Fought For Al Qaeda Is In Custody,” Los Angeles
Times, July 23, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/23/nation/na-american-jihad23.
452 Paul Cruickshank, Nic Robertson, and Ken Shiffman, “From Long Island to Lahore: The Plot to Bomb New York,”
CNN.com, May 21, 2010, http://edition.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/05/14/bryant.neal.vinas.part2/index.html. Hereafter:
CNN, May 21, 2010.
453 Ibid.
454 Ibid.
455 Anti Defamation League, “New Yorker Pleads Guilty to Providing NYC Transit Information to Al Qaeda,” July 23,
2009, http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/vinas_guilty_plea.htm.
Congressional Research Service
88
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
attacks as well as information about how Al Qaeda provides its members with training in
assassinations, poison, kidnappings, forgery, and advanced bomb-making.456 Vinas has also
submitted a witness statement that was entered into evidence in the trial of an alleged Belgian Al
Qaeda cell in Brussels.457
Vinas is the son of immigrants from Peru and Argentina, who was raised as a Catholic and loved
to play baseball. After 9/11, he joined the Army but was discharged before completing basic
training. Reportedly dispirited after returning to Long Island, he met the relative of a friend who
was a Muslim convert. Shortly thereafter, Vinas also converted. He eventually began visiting
extremist websites and was reported to have become increasingly influenced by another
religiously-conservative acquaintance. One of the websites led Vinas to the Islamic Thinkers
Society, an extremist group in New York reportedly supportive of Al Qaeda. His deeply religious
acquaintance was already a member and Vinas began to move within its circles.458
Mitch Silber, the director of intelligence analysis for the NYPD, has expressed the belief that
“there has been an acceleration in radicalization in the United States.” He notes that “Vinas is
almost a poster child for the process, the unremarkable nature of the people who might go
through this process and frankly the potential to link up with Al Qaeda and the danger that
presents.”459
Plot to Bomb Jet Fuel Artery at Kennedy International Airport in
New York—June 2007
On June 2, 2007, authorities announced they had broken up a plot by four men to blow up a jet
fuel artery that runs through residential neighborhoods to the JFK Airport in New York. Russell
Defreitas, a U.S. citizen originally from Guyana, was arrested as the ring leader of the plot. The
63-year-old Defreitas had worked as a cargo handler at JFK until 1995, but was described as
hapless and episodically homeless and whom friends say supported himself by selling incense on
street corners and collecting welfare.460 According to court documents filed on January 5, 2010,
Defreitas allegedly admitted to being the “brain of everything.”461
The others charged in the plot are Abdul Kadir, a citizen of Guyana and former member of its
parliament, Kareem Ibrahim, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago; and Abdel Nur, a citizen of
Guyana.462 The latter three were arrested in Trinidad and eventually extradited to the United
States in June 2008. All four were indicted with conspiracy to cause death, serious bodily injury
and extensive destruction.463
456 Ibid.
457 CNN, May 21, 2010.
458 Ibid.
459 Ibid.
460 Carol Eisenberg, “JFK Terror Plot: Credibility of Case in Question,” Newsday, June 6, 2007. Hereafter: Eisenberg,
June 6, 2007.
461 John Marzulli, “”I Was Brain of It All ... ” New York Daily News, Jan. 6, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/
ny_crime/2010/01/06/2010-01-06_untitled__pipeline06m.html.
462 Chris Michaud, “Four Charged in Plot to Blow Up JFK Airport,” Reuters, June 2, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/
article/idUSN0238499820070602.
463 “4 indicted in terror plot to blow up JFK airport,” Newsday, June 29, 2007.
Congressional Research Service
89
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
The FBI said the alleged plot never got beyond the planning stages464 and there is some dispute
over how serious any attack against the 40-mile pipeline would have been. The pipeline
originates in Linden, New Jersey, crosses Staten Island, and goes underwater to Brooklyn
traveling mostly along the Long Island Rail Road right-of-way to the airport. Because of their
thickness and safeguards, such pipelines are difficult to damage, an official said.465
However, at a news conference announcing the arrests, U.S. Attorney, Roslynn Mauskopf called
it “one of the most chilling plots imaginable. Had the plot been carried out, it could have resulted
in unfathomable damage, deaths and destruction.” But safety experts have criticized the
government’s description of the plot’s danger. John Goglia, a former member of the National
Transportation Safety Board, describes the plot as a ‘fantasy’ saying “You could definitely reach
the tank, definitely start a fire, but to get the kind of explosion they were thinking they were going
to get ... this is virtually impossible to do.”466
The Washington Post reported that the alleged conspirators were initially detected via information
gathered by the CIA in South America and the Caribbean. That led federal and local authorities in
the New York region to launch a 16-month sting operation focused on the activities of Defreitas.
According to the complaint filed in the case, Defreitas conducted surveillance of the airport four
times in January, focusing on fuel tanks, noting security precautions and reviewing an escape
plan.467
Defreitas was apparently unaware that one of the plotters with him much of the time was a law
enforcement informant who recorded much of what he said. It has been reported that Defreitas
said in one recorded conversation, “Any time you hit Kennedy, it is the most hurtful thing to the
United States....To hit John F. Kennedy, wow ... they love John F. Kennedy like he's the man ... if
you hit that, this whole country will be mourning. You can kill the man twice.”
According to The Smoking Gun, which obtained and posted on its website a copy of the criminal
complaint in the case, a paid “confidential source” was credited with infiltrating the terror cell
and gathering critical information on the alleged plot—via tape recordings, documents, videos,
and photographs. The government informant is a longtime New York City drug trafficker who
began cooperating with federal investigators after NYPD detectives arrested him on a Bronx
street and charged him with possession of about $2 million in cocaine. A footnote in the criminal
complaint notes that the source had two prior drug convictions and was, through his cooperation,
seeking leniency in sentencing on the drug trafficking charge.468
On June 29, 2010, one of the defendants, Abdel Nur, pled guilty to a separate charge of material
support to terrorism and faces up to 15 years in prison. His lawyer said he will not testify against
464 “Four Charged over JFK Bomb Plot, BBC News, June 3, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6715443.stm.
Hereafter: BBC News, June 3, 2007.
465 Anthony Faiola and Steven Mufson, “NY Airport Target of Plot, Officials Say,” The Washington Post, June 3, 2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/02/AR2007060200606_pf.html. Hereafter: The
Washington Post, June 3, 2007.
466 John Goglia quoted in “Plot to Destroy New York Airport Considered Overhyped,” History Commons., June 2,
2007, http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=russell_defreitas_1.
467 The Washington Post, June 3, 2007.
468 “Meet the JFK Informant,” The Smoking Gun.com, June 14, 2007, http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/years/
2007/0614071jfkplot1.html.
Congressional Research Service
90
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
the other defendants. A second man accused in the case, Kareem Ibrahim, is to be tried separately
due to health reasons.469
In opening arguments in the July 2010 at the trial of the remaining two defendants—Defreitas and
Kadir—Defreitas’ attorney accused prosecutors of being “overzealous.” The government, he said,
took a “poor lonely, bitter old man that talked big game,” and, through an informant, nudged him
into incriminating himself. “Without the government, Russell Defreitas is nothing. His words
were ‘all sizzle and no steak.’”470 After five days of deliberation, however, the jury convicted both
men of five counts of conspiring to commit acts of terrorism. They face possible life sentences in
prison when they are sentenced in December 2010.471
Plot to Attack Soldiers at Fort Dix, New Jersey—May 2007
Six men were arrested in a plot against Fort Dix, a U.S. Army base in New Jersey. The plan
included attacking and killing soldiers using assault rifles and grenades. In December 2008, a jury
found five of the six guilty of conspiring to kill military personnel but cleared them of attempted
murder. Four received life sentences without parole and the other received a 33-year sentence. A
sixth man pled guilty to a lesser charge and was sentenced to 20 months in prison. As far as is
known, the group had no connection to any foreign terrorist organization.
The arrests were made after a 16-month FBI operation that included infiltrating the group. The
investigation began in January 2006 with a tip from an electronics store clerk in Mount Laurel,
Pennsylvania. Two men dropped off an 8-millimeter tape and wanted it converted to a DVD. The
tape showed the defendants firing rifles and shouting Islamic battle cries. The clerk called police.
FBI agents and two paid informants who had criminal records spent the next 15 months
shadowing the suspects, recording conversations and searching their computers. During the
investigation, authorities recorded hundreds of conversations with the defendants with help from
the two informants.472
The plotters and verdicts in their cases:
• Mohamad Ibrahim Shnewer, a U.S. citizen born in Jordan. Guilty of conspiracy to kill
military personnel, not guilty of attempted murder and guilty of possession or attempted
possession of a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy. Sentenced to life in prison
without parole.473
469 A.G. Sulzberger, “3 Years Later, Trial to Start in JFK Bomb Plot,” The New York Times, June 29, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/30/nyregion/30terror.html.
470 Basil Katz, “Trial Opens for Accused NY Airport Bomb Plotters,” Reuters, June 30, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/
article/idUSTRE65T6PK20100630.
471 A.G. Sulzberger, “Two Men Convicted in Kennedy Airport Plot,” The New York Times, Aug. 2, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/nyregion/03kennedy.html?_r=1&ref=russell_m_defreitas.
472 Christopher Dela Cruz, “Three convicted in Fort Dix terror plot are sentenced to life in prison” NJ.com, Apr. 28,
2009, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/04/judge_sentences_fort_dix_defen.html. Hereafter: Dela Cruz, NJ.com
Apr. 28, 2009.
473 “Raw Data: Charges in Fort Dix Terror Trial,” Associated Press cited in FoxNews.com, Dec. 22, 2008,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,470897,00.html. Hereafter: “Raw Data in Fort Dix Trial,” Dec. 22, 2008; and
Dela Cruz, NJ.com Apr. 28, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
91
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
• Dritan “Tony” Duka, illegal immigrant born in the former Yugoslavia. Guilty of
conspiracy to kill military personnel, not guilty of attempted murder, guilty of possession
or attempted possession of a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy, guilty of possession
or attempted possession of a machine gun and guilty of two counts of possession or
attempted possession of a firearm by an illegal alien. Sentenced to life in prison without
parole.474
• Eljvir Duka, illegal immigrant born in the former Yugoslavia. Guilty of conspiracy to
kill military personnel, not guilty of attempted murder, not guilty of possession or
attempted possession of a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy and guilty of
possession or attempted possession of a firearm by an illegal alien. Sentenced to life in
prison without parole.475
• Shain Duka, illegal immigrant born in the former Yugoslavia. Guilty of conspiracy to kill
military personnel, not guilty of attempted murder, guilty of possession or attempted
possession of a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy, guilty of possession or attempted
possession of a machine gun and guilty of two counts of possession or attempted
possession of a firearm by an illegal alien. Sentenced to life in prison without parole.476
• Serdar Tatar, a Turkish-born legal permanent resident of the United States. Guilty of
conspiracy to kill military personnel and not guilty of attempted murder. Sentenced to 33
years in prison.477
• Agron Abdullahu, a Kosovo-Albanian who arrived with his family as a refugee from
Kosovo (ironically, first arriving in the United States at a refugee center at Fort Dix). He
was charged with letting the brothers Dritan, Eljvir and Shain Duka shoot various
weapons at a firing range in Pennslyvania. The indictment states that the weapons used
were an SKS semi automatic rifle, a Baretta Storm semi automatic rifle, a Mossberg 12-
gauge pump and a 9mm Baretta handgun. These were all firearms that Abdullahu owned
legally. However, it is a crime to allow illegal immigrants like the Duka brothers to
possess guns. He pled guilty to the charge and was sentenced March 31, 2008, to 20
months in prison.478
Daniel Maldonado—Training with Al Qaeda in Somalia—February
2007
An indictment unsealed on February 14, 2007 charged Daniel Joseph Maldonado, then 28, with
receiving training from a foreign terrorist organization and conspiring to use an explosive device
outside the United States. According to a Justice Department official, “This case represents the
474 Ibid.
475 Ibid.
476 Ibid.
477 “Raw Data in Fort Dix Trial,” Dec. 22, 2008 and “The fifth man convicted of plotting to kill military personnel at
Fort Dix in New Jersey has been sentenced to 33 years in prison.” Associated Press cited in FoxNews.com Apr. 29,
2009, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,518337,00.html.
478 Geoff Mulvihill, “Man sentenced in Fort Dix plot case” Associated Press cited in USA Today, Mar. 31, 2008.
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-03-31-619191134_x.htm.
Congressional Research Service
92
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
first criminal prosecution of an American suspected of joining forces with Islamic extremist
fighters in Somalia.”479
Maldonado had been captured by the Kenyan military on January 21, 2007 as he fled into Kenya
to avoid Ethiopian and Somalian forces. He was turned over to American authorities the
following month. On April 19, 2007, Maldonado pled guilty to receiving training from a foreign
terrorist organization in exchange for prosecutors agreeing not to file any more federal charges
against him.480 In June 2007, Maldonado was sentenced to ten years in prison.481
According to DOJ, Maldonado admitted that in November 2005 he had traveled from Houston,
Texas, to Africa eventually making it to Somalia in December 2006 to join the Islamic Courts
Union (ICU)482 and elements of Al Qaeda to fight “jihad” against the Somali Transitional Federal
Government. While in Somalia, authorities say Maldonado was provided an AK-47, equipped
with military combat uniforms and boots in Mogadishu, and participated in training camps in
Kismaayo and Jilib, Somalia. The camps included physical fitness, firearms and explosives
training all in preparation to go to the front to fight for the ICU. Al Qaeda members were present
at the training camps. The ICU and Al Qaeda worked together to train fighters in the camps to
fight jihad to establish an independent Islamic state in Somalia.483
The criminal complaint in the case alleges that Maldonado admitted that while training at camps
in Somalia, he watched and learned techniques for manufacturing small explosive devices. He
also admitted to participating in the interrogation of a spy who was later killed—a flight attendant
who had a cell phone camera and was observed taking pictures of jihadis as they arrived by
airplane in Kismaayo, Somalia. Maldonado also admitted that he would be willing to become a
suicide bomber if he were wounded and could not otherwise fight.484
Derrick Shareef—Plot to Attack Shopping Mall in Rockford,
Illinois—December 2006
On December 6, 2006, Derrick Shareef, a 22-year-old American Muslim convert, was arrested in
Rockford, Illinois after he attempted to swap two stereo speakers for four (non-functioning) hand
479 U.S. Attorney Southern District of Texas, Press Release, “U.S. Citizen Pleads Guilty to Training to Fight Jihad,”
Apr. 19, 2007, http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Maldonado_DOJPR_GuiltyPlea.pdf.
Hereafter: U.S. Attorney Press Release, Apr. 19, 2007.
480 “American Citizen Charged With Training in Somalia With Al Qaeda, Learning to Become Homicide Bomber,”
Foxnews.com, Feb. 14, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,251820,00.html.
481 Shelley Murphy and Milton J. Valencia, “Details Emerge on Plot Suspects,” The Boston Globe, Oct. 23, 2009,
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2009/10/23/details_emerge_on_plot_suspects/.
482 Following the collapse of the Somali government in the 1990’s, a group of Sharia Courts functioned as quasi-
governmental entities. In the late 1990’s, they united to form the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a rival administration to
the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia. Until the end of 2006, they controlled most of southern
Somalia and the capital, Mogadishu. In December 2006, they lost several battles and were driven from Mogadishu by
Somali forces supporting the TFG and the Ethiopian army which intervened to support the TFG against the ICU.
Hardline Islamists broke ranks from the ICU and formed other militant groups, such as al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, to
continue the war against the government. The less-militant members of the ICU went into exile.
483 U.S. Attorney Press Release, April 19, 2007.
484 United States v. Daniel Joseph Maldonado, Superseding Criminal Complaint , Case Number: H-07-125M, U.S.
District Court, Southern District of Texas, Feb. 13, 2007, pp. 4-5, http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/
Maldonado_Complaint.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
93
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
grenades, a 9mm handgun, and several rounds of (non-functioning) ammunition with an
undercover FBI agent posing as a weapons dealer. Prior to his arrest, Shareef had plotted to set
off hand grenades in a garbage can at the CherryVale Shopping Mall near Rockford on the Friday
before Christmas 2006. Shareef was charged with attempting to use a weapon of mass
destruction against persons and property and with attempting to maliciously damage and
destroy, by means of fire and an explosive, a building and real and personal property used in
interstate commerce.485
The case began in September 2006, when the FBI assigned a cooperating witness, William
“Jamaal” Chrisman, to befriend Shareef. Chrisman had converted to Islam in prison where he
served time for armed robbery and car theft convictions.486 Chrisman claimed that he decided to
help the government because “after 9/11 Muslim scholars in Saudi Arabia and Morocco said that
it was incumbent on Muslims to stop terrorists.”487 They met at the video store where Shareef was
working and hours later moved into Chrisman’s home. According to Chrisman, “He was
supposed to move in with his manager. I told him he was better off staying with me, a Muslim
staying with a Muslim.”488
Shareef was unaware that Chrisman was secretly recording their conversations which included his
confiding to Chrisman that he wanted to commit acts of violent jihad against civilians. Shareef
also discussed shooting a judge in DeKalb, Illinois, and attacking local buildings including city
hall, the federal courthouse and the shopping center.489 Shareef also told Chrisman that he wanted
to obtain weapons to commit violent jihad. Chrisman said he had a friend who could do so and
would introduce them. However, the “friend” was an undercover FBI agent.490
On November 30, and December 1, 2006, Shareef and Chrisman cased the CherryVale mall and
allegedly plotted a grenade attack. The following day, Shareef and Chrisman made video tapes
that included a last will and testament for each. On the video, Shareef again mentioned jihad and
said, “This is a warning to those who disbelieve, that we are here for you and I am ready to give
my life.”491 On December 6, 2006, Shareef and the undercover agent met in the mall parking lot
to exchange the speakers for four dud grenades and the handgun and ammunition. After the
exchange, Shareef was arrested.
During an FBI interview on December 7, 2006, Shareef told FBI agents that he had been
“pushing himself to conduct the attack on the mall” and that “no one could have stopped” him,
“not even his mother.” He believed “it was the right jihad.” But he also told the agents that he
485 United States vs. Derrick Shareef, No. 06 CR 919, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern District,
Jan. 4, 2007, http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/indict/2007/us_v_shareef_indictment.pdf.
486 Melissa Bailey, “Ode to Osama,” New Haven Independent, Nov. 28, 2007, http://www.newhavenindependent.org/
index.php/archives/entry/ode_to_osama/.
487 Michael Mayko, “FBI Informant Testifies in Terror Case,” Connecticut Post, Nov. 30, 2007, quoted in NEFA
Foundation, “The Illinois Shopping Mall Plot,” Dec. 2007, p. 2, http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/
ChicagoPlot1207.pdf. Hereafter: NEFA Foundation, Dec. 2007.
488 Ibid.
489 Pierre Thomas and Jason Ryan, “’Lone Wolf' Charged With Plotting Attack During Christmas Rush,” abcnews.com,
Dec. 8, 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=2710776&page=1. Hereafter: Thomas and Ryan, Dec. 8, 2006.
490 Affidavit of Jared Ruddy, FBI, filed Dec. 8, 2006 regarding criminal complaint, United States vs. Derrick Shareef,
No. 06 CR 919, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern District, http://www.thesmokinggun.com/
archive/1208061shareef1.html.
491 Thomas and Ryan, Dec. 8, 2006.
Congressional Research Service
94
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
“viewed his arrest by the FBI as a blessing from Allah because the FBI stopped him from doing
something that Allah would have chastised him for.” Aware that “he does not have the authority to
speak on behalf of Islam,” Shareef asserted that he would “rather spend the rest of his life in jail
than live with the torment of having killed innocent people and having acted against Allah’s
desires.”492
On November 28, 2007, Shareef pled guilty to one count of attempting to use a weapon of mass
destruction. He was sentenced on September 30, 2008 to 35 years in prison.
Houston Taliban Plot—November 2006
In November 2006, the government alleged that four men—Kobie Diallo Williams, an American
Muslim convert; and three foreign national students, Adnan Baber Mirza, Syed Maaz Shah, and
Shiraz Syed Qazi—conspired to support the Taliban, unlawfully possess firearms, and to train
with firearms to prepare to join the Taliban “to engage in battlefield jihad.”493 Specifically they
were accused of meeting at shooting ranges and camp sites in Texas on at least eight occasions in
2005 and 2006 “for the purpose of conducting firearms and paramilitary training to hone their
skills with weapons and to assist fighters engaging United States forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and Iraq.” They were also accused of making a contribution of goods and services to the
Taliban.494
The government used two informants to build the case against the four. One of the informants
told federal agents he was concerned that some of the men were preparing for armed conflict
overseas. A 2005 camping trip was part of a government setup using the informants to catch the
men.495
• Kobie Diallo Williams, a former University of Houston student, pled guilty soon
after his arrest to conspiring to unlawfully possess firearms and supporting the
Taliban. On August 7, 2009, he was sentenced to 4-1/2 years in prison.496
• Syed Maaz Shah, a Pakistani national studying at the University of Texas,
Dallas, was convicted on May 24, 2007 on firearms charges and was sentenced to
six years in prison and will be deported after he has served his sentence.497
• Shiraz Syed Qazi, a Pakistani national who was a student at Houston
Community College, was convicted on January 21, 2007 on a firearms charge
492 United States v. Hassan Abujihaad, U.S. District Court for Connecticut, Crim. No. 3:07-CR-57; Exhibit 3, Federal
Bureau of Investigation FD-302 of Derrick L. Shareef, Interview conducted Dec. 7, 2006; cited in NEFA Foundation,
Dec. 2007, p. 5.
493 Anti Defamation League, “Houston Man Sentenced for Supporting the Taliban, adl.com, May 27, 2010,
http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/houston_taliban.htm. Hereafter: ADL, May 27, 2010.
494 United States vs. Kobie Diallo Williams and Adnan Babar Mirza, Criminal No. H06-421, U.S. District Court,
Southern District of Texas, Nov. 22, 2006 (unsealed Nov 28, 2006), http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/
FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Williams_Indictment.pdf.
495 Mary Flood, “Houston Taliban Supporter Gets 4-1/2 Years in Prison,” Houston Chronicle, Aug 7, 2009,
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/6564474.html.
496 Ibid.
497 Jason Trahan, “UTD Student Convicted for Having Weapon,” The Dallas Morning News, May 24, 2007,
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/localnews/stories/052507dntexterrorcharges.271768e.html.
Congressional Research Service
95
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
and sentenced to 10 months in prison. He was released in September 2007 after
credit for time served.498
• Adnan Baber Mirza, a Pakistani national who was a student at Houston
Community College but had overstayed his student visa, was convicted on May
27, 2010, of two conspiracy counts and seven firearms violations. He faces up to
five years in prison on each conspiracy count and 10 years on the weapons counts
when he is sentenced.499
The Liberty City Seven—Plot to Bomb Sears Tower in Chicago—
June 2006
On June 22, 2006, seven men—Narseal Batiste, Patrick Abraham, Stanley Grant Phanor,
Naudimar Herrera, Burson Augustin, Lyglenson Lemorin, and Rotschild Augustine—were
arrested for allegedly plotting to blow up the Sears Tower in Chicago, the FBI building in North
Miami Beach, and other government buildings in Miami-Dade County. Five of the men are U.S.
citizens, Abraham is a legal permanent resident from Haiti, and Lemorin is a Haitian national
illegally present in the United States. Each were charged with four counts: conspiracy to provide
material support to a terrorist organization, namely Al Qaeda; conspiracy to provide material
support and resources to terrorists; conspiracy to maliciously damage and destroy buildings by
means of an explosive device; and conspiracy to levy war against the government of the United
States.500
The indictment alleges that Batiste intended to recruit and supervise individuals to organize and
train for a mission of war against the United States, which included a plot to destroy by
explosives the Sears Tower in Chicago, Illinois.501 It also alleges that Batiste and his co-
conspirators attempted to obtain the support of Al Qaeda for their plot.502 The indictment further
alleges that Batiste detailed (to an FBI informant posing as an ‘Al Qaeda representative’) “his
mission to wage a ‘full ground war’ against the United States in order to ‘kill all the devils we
can,’ in a mission that would ‘be just as good or better than 9/11,’ beginning with the destruction
of the Sears Tower.”503
The arrests resulted from an investigation involving two FBI informants and recordings and
videotapes of the conspirators discussing their plot. The Washington Post cites court papers that
indicate that one of the informants took a key role in the plotting. “Not only did government
informants provide money and a meeting place for Batiste and his followers, but they also gave
them video cameras for conducting surveillance, as well as cell phones, and suggested that their
498 ADL, May 27, 2010.
499 Mary Flood, “Ex-HCC Student Convicted of Trying to Help Taliban,” Houston Chronicle, May 28, 2010,
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/7026012.html.
500 DOJ, “Transcript of Press Conference Announcing Florida Terrorism Indictments,” June 23, 2006. Hereafter: DOJ
Press Conference, June 23, 2006. http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/Miami_Plot.pdf.
501 United States v. Narseal Batiste, et al., Case No. 06-20373, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, June
22, 2006, p. 3, http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Batiste_GovtsResponse.pdf.
502 Ibid, p.4.
503 Ibid, pp. 5-6.
Congressional Research Service
96
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
first target be a Miami FBI office ... ”504 Both informants were paid for their services and one was
given approval of his petition for political asylum in the United States.505
Defense attorneys for the Liberty City Seven men called the case an outrageous example of
government entrapment claiming they had neither the will nor the means to carry out the
crimes.506 In 2007, the jury in the first trial of the defendants acquitted Lyglenson Lemorin of all
charges, but could not reach a verdict on the others. Lemorin was subsequently taken into
immigration custody and was ordered deported in 2009. A second trial was held in 2008 and
again the jury failed to reach verdicts against the six remaining defendants.
A third trial was held in 2009. The jury in that trial acquitted Naudimar Herrera of all charges, but
convicted alleged ringleader Narseal Batiste on all four counts; Patrick Abraham on three counts;
and Stanley Grant Phanor, Burson Augustin, and Rotschild Augustine on two counts each.507 In
November 2009, Narseal Batiste was sentenced to 13-1/2 years in prison. Burson Augustin and
Rotschild Augustine were sentenced to six and seven years, respectively. Stanley Phanor and
Patrick Abraham were sentenced to eight and nine years, respectively.
Ehsanul Islam Sadequee and Syed Haris Ahmed—Plot to Attack
Buildings in Washington, D.C.—April 2006
Two men living in Atlanta, Georgia—Ehsanul Islam Sadequee, a U.S. citizen born in Virginia,
and Syed Haris Ahmed, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Pakistan, were charged in April 2006 with
conspiracy to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization and lying to
the FBI. Prosecutors alleged that in 2005, when Ahmed and Sadequee were age 18 and 20
respectively, they discussed violent jihad on several web forums which later grew into an active
conspiracy to commit terrorist acts. Specifically, they were accused of traveling to Canada to
discuss potential terrorist targets with members of the “Toronto 18,”508 a group alleged by the
Government of Canada to be members of an Islamic terrorist cell that had plotted a series of
attacks against targets in Ontario until their arrests in June 2006.509
According to a Canadian Security Intelligence Service informant, the two Americans also
discussed with the group whether they would be able to hide in Canada if they were to carry out
attacks in the United States.510 Sadequee and Ahmed were also alleged to have videotaped
potential targets in the Washington, D.C. area including the U.S. Capitol and the World Bank
504 Pincus, Sep. 2, 2006.
505 Walter Pincus, “FBI Role in Terror Probe Questioned,” The Washington Post, Sep. 2, 2006,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/01/AR2006090101764.html. Hereafter: Pincus, Sep.
2, 2006,
506 Carol J. Williams, “A Case of Terror or Entrapment,” Los Angeles Times, Nov. 30, 2007, http://articles.latimes.com/
2007/nov/30/nation/na-liberty30.
507 Damien Cave and Carmen Gentile, “Five Convicted in Plot to Blow Up Sears Tower,” The New York Times, May
13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/13/us/13miami.html.
508 For an overview and status of the “Toronto 18” cases, see “Toronto 18: Key Events in Case,” CBC News,
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/06/02/f-toronto-timeline.html.
509 DOJ Press Release, “Terrorism Defendants Sentenced in Atlanta,” Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2009/December/09-nsd-1338.html. Hereafter: DOJ Press Release, Dec. 14, 2009.
510 PBS, Frontline, “Canada: The Cell Next Door,” Jan. 30, 2007, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/about/episodes/
602_transcript.html.
Congressional Research Service
97
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
headquarters, the Masonic Temple, and a fuel farm. Later, Sadequee sent several of the videos to
Younis Tsouli, a propagandist and recruiter for Al Qaeda and Asbid Hussein Khan, a facilitator
for Lashkar-e-Taiba, both of whom are serving prison sentences in Great Britain for terrorism-
related offenses.511
The two men pled not guilty to the charges, but were convicted in separate trials in August 2009.
In December, Sadequee was sentenced to 17 years and Ahmed to 13 years in prison.
Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar—Attempted Vehicular Murder at the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill—March 2006
On March 3, 2006, Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar, a 22-year-old naturalized American citizen
from Iran, drove his sport utility vehicle (SUV) into a crowd at The Pit, a popular student
gathering spot at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The SUV struck several people
although none were injured seriously. Taheri-Azar was charged the next day with nine counts of
attempted murder.
It was reported that police found a letter in Taheri-Azar’s apartment that said he wanted revenge
for the deaths of Muslims overseas that he said were caused by the United States. He said he
rented a Jeep Cherokee because it was better equipped for what he planned to do.512 The chief of
the University’s police department confirmed that Taheri-Azar told investigators that he wanted to
“avenge the deaths or murders of Muslims around the world.”513
Taheri-Azar pled guilty to two counts of attempted murder. On August 26, 2008, he was
sentenced to 33 years in prison.514
Toledo, Ohio Plotters—Travel Abroad to Kill Americans—February
2006
On February 21, 2006, three residents of Toledo, Ohio—Mohammad Zaki Amawi, a dual U.S.
and Jordanian citizen; Marwan Othman El-Hindi, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Jordan; and
Wassim I. Mazloum, a legal permanent resident from Lebanon, were charged with conspiracy to
kill or maim persons in locations outside the United States, to include U.S. armed forces
personnel serving in Iraq.515 The indictment alleges several overt acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy. These acts included meeting another individual called “the trainer”(who was actually
an undercover informant) to discuss and plan violent jihadist training. Following those meetings,
the informant engaged in an instructional session on the construction and use of improvised
511 DOJ Press Release, Dec. 14, 2009.
512 Ibid.
513 “Driver Charged for Plowing Through Crowd,” msnbc.com, Mar. 5, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
11660817/.
514 Associated Press, Aug. 26, 2008.
515 U.S.A. vs. Mohammad Zaki Amawi, et al., Indictment 3:06CR0719, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio, Western Division, Feb. 16, 2006, p. 2, http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/indictment_22006.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
98
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
explosive devices and timing devices, sought explosives, and participated in weapons training and
practiced target shooting on several occasions.”516
During a news conference announcing the charges, the Cleveland FBI Director credited the
Muslim- and Arab-American community for passing along the information that ultimately lead to
the arrest of the three. He said individuals within Toledo's Muslim community contacted the FBI
about what he termed the “violent and radical views” the suspects were articulating.517
On June 13, 2008, a Federal jury convicted all three of conspiring to commit terrorist acts against
Americans overseas and material support to terrorists. On October 21, 2009, Amawi was
sentenced to 20 years in prison, El-Hindi to 12 years in prison, and Mazloum to eight years, four
months in prison.518
Two cousins from Illinois, Zubair Ahmed and Khaleel Ahmed, who had connections to the
three Toledo men, pled guilty on January 15, 2009, to one count of conspiracy to provide material
support or resources to terrorists. It was alleged that Marwan Othman El-Hindi introduced the
two men to the undercover informant known as “the trainer.” During this meeting, the cousins
allegedly discussed sniper tactics and surveillance techniques, and said they were willing to travel
abroad to carry out terror attacks.519 In 2004, both had traveled to Cairo hoping to eventually go
to Afghanistan or Iraq, but returned home after Zubair’s father, Haris Ahmed, learned of their
intentions. On July 12, 2010, Zubair Ahmed was sentenced to ten years in prison while Khaleel
Ahmed received an eight-year, four-month sentence.520
Jamiyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS)—Plot to Attack Targets in
Southern California—August 2005
Kevin James, Levar Haley Washington, Gregory Vernon Patterson, and Hammad Riaz Samana,
were arrested and charged in August 2005 for their involvement in a plot to attack Jewish
institutions and other targets in the Los Angeles area, including synagogues, the Israeli Consulate,
Los Angeles International Airport, U.S. military recruiting offices and military bases.
• Kevin James, the apparent leader of the terror cell, pled guilty to conspiring to levy war
against the United States and was sentenced on March 6, 2009 to 16 years in prison.
• Levar Washington pled guilty to levy war against the United States through terrorism
and conspiracy to possess and discharge firearms and was sentenced to 22 years in prison.
He was sentenced to an additional 22 years in prison on August 25, 2008, on related
robbery and weapons charges.
516 Ibid, p. 4.
517 “Toledo's Arab Community Called “Crucial” to Terrorism Investigation,” wtol.com, Feb. 21, 2006,
http://www.wtol.com/Global/story.asp?S=4533250.
518 Anti Defamation League, “Three Men Face Terrorism Charges in Ohio,” adl.org, Oct. 21, 2009, http://www.adl.org/
main_Terrorism/Ohio_men_trial.htm.
519 Anti Defamation League, “Chicago Cousins Plead Guilty in Terrorism Case,” adl.org, Jan. 26, 2009,
http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/ahmed_cousins_guilty.htm.
520 Richard A. Serrano, “Cousins Sentence in Ohio on Terrorism Charges,” latimes.com. July 12, 2010,
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/wire/sc-dc-0713-ohio-terror.-20100712,0,6294758,print.story.
Congressional Research Service
99
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
• Gregory Patterson pled guilty to conspiracy to levy war against the United States
through terrorism and conspiracy to possess and discharge firearms and was sentenced to
12 years in prison.
• Hammad Samana, a legal U.S. resident from Pakistan, conducted Internet-based
research of the targets and was the getaway driver for at least one of the gas station
robberies (see below), according to a U.S. federal judge. He was later convicted and
sentenced in August 2009 to 70 months in prison.
In 1997, James founded Jam'iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS)—Arabic for Assembly of Authentic
Islam—a group based on his interpretation of Islam, according to court documents. James' views
are apparent in several documents he wrote in prison, including a 104-page document titled the
JIS Protocol. In this document, James supports the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in the
U.S. and describes “Jihad [as] the only true 'anti-terrorist action' [,] a defensive battle against the
aggression of theological imposters led by Zionism.”521 The document also advocated the killing
of “lawful targets,” including non-Muslims.
James met Washington in prison in 2004 and introduced him to JIS and its beliefs. Washington,
who converted to Islam while he was in prison, recruited Patterson, an employee at Los Angeles
International Airport, and a fourth defendant, Hammad Riaz Samana, at the Jamaat-E-Masijudal
mosque in Inglewood, California, where they all worshipped. Both Patterson and Samana swore
allegiance to Washington and pledged to serve as “mujahideen,” according to court documents.522
According to the indictment, in July 2005, the men engaged in firearms training and physical
training at a park in Los Angeles in preparation for the attacks. In addition, the defendants
purchased weapons or otherwise tried to acquire weapons in furtherance of their terrorist
conspiracy and made efforts to raise money by robbing gas stations. The indictment alleges that
eleven times beginning on May 30, 2005, the defendants—armed with shotguns - robbed or
attempted to rob gas stations in the several cities and towns in Southern California, including Los
Angeles, Torrance, Playa Del Ray, Bellflower, Pico Rivera, Walnut, Orange, Playa Vista and
Fullerton.523
Part of the funds obtained in these robberies was directly linked by the FBI to Patterson's
purchase of a .223 caliber rifle. The men were arrested by the Torrance police after Patterson
dropped his cell phone at the scene of one of the robberies in July 2005. Police were able to
connect the robberies to the larger terror plot after authorities searched Washington and
Patterson's apartment and discovered various Jihadist documents.524
521 Anti-Defamation League, “Two Sentenced in Los Angeles Terror Plot against Jewish Institutions,” adl.com, Aug.
24, 2008, http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/los_angeles_sentenced.htm. Hereafter: Anti-Defamation League, Aug.
24, 2008.
522 Ibid.
523 DOJ Press Release, “Four Men Indicted on Terrorism Charges Related to Conspiracy to Attack Military Facilities,
Other Targets,” Aug. 31, 2005, http://www.dodig.mil/IGInformation/IGInformationReleases/fourmen_090105.pdf.
524 Anti-Defamation League, Aug. 24, 2008.
Congressional Research Service
100
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Lodi, California Case—The Hayats—Travel to Terrorist Training
Camp—June 2005
In Lodi, California, Umer Hayat and Hamid Hayat, a Pakistani immigrant and his American
son, were arrested on June 5, 2005 after allegedly lying to the FBI about the son's attendance at a
terrorist training camp in Pakistan. The son, Hamid Hayat, age 23, was found guilty on April 25,
2006, of one count of providing material support or resources to terrorists, and three counts of
making false statements to the FBI in matters related to international/domestic terrorism.
Prosecutors alleged that between October 2003 and November, 2004, Hayat attended a jihadi
training camp in Pakistan and ultimately returned to the United States with the intent to wage
violent jihad upon receipt of orders.525 Hayat confessed to FBI agents that he had attended a
terrorist training camp but his attorneys later argued that his admissions were fabrications
intended to appease the federal agents he hoped would let him go home. The nine-week trial was
reported to rely on that contested confession and conversations secretly taped by an FBI
informant who had been paid $200,000 to infiltrate Lodi's large Muslim community after the 9/11
attacks.526
DOJ issued a press release stating:
According to evidence adduced at trial, between March, 2003 and August, 2003, defendant
Hayat, during the course of numerous recorded conversations with a cooperating witness,
pledged his belief in [violent] jihad, indicated that jihad was the duty of every Muslim,
indicated that he had knowledge of jihadi camps including Jaish-e-Muhammed camps in the
Balakot/Mansehar area, pledged to go to a jihadi training camp, and indicated that he, in fact,
was going to jihadi training after Ramadan in 2003 (which was to occur at the end of
November, 2003).527
In his closing comments to the jury, the Assistant U.S. Attorney stated: “Hamid Hayat had a jihadi
heart and a jihadi mind.”528 In interviews, several jurors said Hayat's confession and evidence of
what the jury foreman called “un-Americanism” convinced them that he posed a danger.529 In
September 2006, Hamid Hayat was sentenced to 24 years in prison.
Umer Hayat, age 49, Hamid’s father, was tried by a separate federal jury in early 2006 for two
counts of making false statements to the FBI about having first-hand knowledge of terrorist
training camps in Pakistan and that his son had attended a jihadist training camp in Pakistan. That
proceeding ended in a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. Umer
Hayat later pled guilty to making a false statement to the FBI and U.S. Customs and Border
Protection about his attempt to carry $28,000 into Pakistan. He was sentenced to time served.530
525 DOJ Press Release, “Hamid Hayat Sentenced to 24 Years in Connection with Terrorism Charges,” Sep. 10, 2007,
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/September/07_nsd_700.html. Hereafter: DOJ Press Release, Sep. 10, 2007.
526 Eric Bailey “Lodi man gets 24 years in terrorism case” Los Angeles Times, September 11, 2007,
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/sep/11/local/me-lodi11. Hereafter: Bailey, Sep. 11, 2007.
527 DOJ Press Release, Sep. 10, 2007.
528 Bailey, Sep. 11, 2007.
529 Ibid.
530 DOJ Press Release, Sep. 10, 2007.
Congressional Research Service
101
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Albany, New York Mosque Plot—August 2004
Two Albany, New York residents, Yassin M. Aref, an Imam at the Masjid As Salam mosque in the
city, and Mohammed Mosharref Hossain, a pizzeria owner, were convicted of conspiring to aid a
terrorist group and provide support for a weapon of mass destruction, as well as money-
laundering and supporting a foreign terrorist organization. They were sentenced to 15 years in
prison. Aref is a refugee from Iraqi Kurdistan and Hossain is an immigrant from Bangladesh who
has lived in the United States for over two decades.
The case was the result of a sting operation by the FBI which had been watching the Masjid As
Salam mosque since 2002 after one of its founders had been deported following the 9/11 attacks.
The FBI had an undercover informant befriend Hossain, a member of the mosque who was
reported to be having financial problems with his pizza business. The informant was a Pakistani
immigrant facing a long prison sentence and deportation after he had pled guilty to one felony
count of engaging in the production and transfer of false government identification documents.
After a period of time, Hossain asked the informant for a loan. The informant proposed a scheme
to launder through Hossain’s pizza shop and real estate holdings the proceeds of the sale of a
shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile which was purportedly to be used in a fictitious plot to
assassinate Pakistan's United Nation’s envoy. 531
According to court records, the Kurdish Imam, Yassan Aref, was not approached by the
informant. Rather, Aref was enlisted by Hossain to witness the transactions under Muslim
tradition.532 However, Federal authorities admitted that Aref was the “ultimate target” of the sting
operation. Two months after the sting began, American military forces found Aref’s name and
phone number in a notebook at a bombed out encampment in Iraq that the government contended
was occupied by “terrorists.” The notebook was said to contain a reference in the Kurdish
language to Aref as “commander” which led prosecutors to believe that Aref might be connected
to the Ansar al-Islam terrorist group. It was also cited by the judge in the case as grounds for
denying bail to the defendants.533
Later, however, Federal prosecutors admitted to making an error and acknowledged that the word
in question could be translated as “brother,” rather than “commander.” The U.S. attorney for the
Northern District of New York, was quoted as saying that the translation discrepancy was not
terribly significant. He said the heart of the case had to do with Mr. Aref's and Mr. Hossain's
failure to turn away from the fake plot even after they knew the intentions of the government
informer.534
531 Brendan Lyons, “Mosque Welcomed In Informant,” timesunion.com, (Albany, NY), Aug. 8, 2004,
http://www.timesunion.com/AspStories/story.asp?storyID=273922.
532 Brendan Lyons, “Terror Suspect Wants Own Trial,” timesunion.com, Dec. 10, 2005, http://www.timesunion.com/
AspStories/story.asp?storyID=428450&category=REGIONOTHER&BCCode=LOCAL&newsdate=12/10/2005&
TextPage=1.
533 Marc Santora, “Key Evidence Cast in Doubt on a Claim of Terrorism,” The New York Times, Aug 18, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/18/nyregion/18missile.html.
534 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service
102
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Aref and Hossain were arrested on August 5, 2004, on a 19-count indictment charging them with
money laundering. The government subsequently added more charges, including allegations the
men conspired to provide material support to a Pakistani terrorist group.535
The case was not without controversy. Aref and Hossain maintained their innocence throughout
their trials. Defense attorneys claimed the two were entrapped. Pakistan angrily protested to
Washington over the FBI sting operation describing it as “a bizarre mission.” Albany’s two
main daily newspapers—the Albany Times Union and the Schenectady Daily Gazette—ran
editorials at the time of the sentencing asking for extreme leniency.536 Two of the columnists who
had followed the trial closely were also very critical of the prosecution.537 And several inmates at
the Rensselaer County Jail, where Aref and Hossain were being held, wrote letters to the judge in
the case vouching for the defendants’ good character and benign influence.538
After the indictment, an article in The New York Times quoted government officials as saying that
Aref’s case resulted from evidence gathered by the warrantless National Security Agency
domestic wiretapping program. On January 5, 2006, defense attorneys filed a motion to suppress
evidence and dismiss the indictment as the fruit of illegal surveillance.539 The district court denied
that motion in a sealed ex parte opinion based on a sealed ex parte submission by the
government. In July 2008, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York affirmed the district
court’s ruling.
Shahawar Matin Siraj and James Elshafay—Plot to Bomb Herald
Square Subway Station in New York City—August 2004
Days before the 2004 Republican National Convention, which was held in New York City, James
Elshafay, a U.S. citizen, and Shahawar Matin Siraj, a Pakistani immigrant, were arrested for
plotting to bomb the Herald Square subway station in New York City. The station, near Madison
Square Garden, is the third busiest in the city’s transit system. The investigation was largely
conducted by the NYPD’s Intelligence Division which used a paid informant, Osama Eldawoody,
a 50-year-old Egyptian-born nuclear engineer. Eldawoody testified that he volunteered to troll the
city’s mosques and Muslim communities out of patriotism and a desire to show that violent
extremists are the exception rather than the rule in Islam.540 Prosecutors at the Siraj’s trial played
tapes secretly-recorded by Eldawoody in which Siraj discusses the plot to bomb the subway
station “at length and with great zeal.”541
535 Lyons, Jan. 5, 2006.
536 The FBI responded by running an op-ed piece in the Daily Gazette upholding the sting operation as legitimate.
537 See Carl Strock, “The View from Here,” Schenectady Daily Gazette, Feb. 4, 2007, http://www.nepajac.org/
Strock.htm; and Fred LeBrun, “History Will Remember Albany Terrorism Sting As A Witch Hunt,” Albany Times
Union, Jan. 12, 2007, http://www.nepajac.org/FredLeBrun.htm.
538 Carl Strock, “Inmates Go To Bat for Aref and Hossain,” Schenectady Daily Gazette, Mar. 22, 2007,
http://www.yassinaref.com/news/03-22-07_Strock.htm.
539 United States v. Aref and Hossain, Brief of Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the New York
Civil Liberties Union, 07-0981-CR, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Aug. 24, 2007,
http://www.nyclu.org/node/1051.
540 William K. Rashbaum, “Guilty Verdict in Plot to Bomb Subway Station,” The New York Times, May 25, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/25/nyregion/25herald.html. Hereafter: Rashbaum, May 25, 2006.
541 William K. Rashbaum, “Staten Island Man Describes Shattered Life, Then Plot to Bomb Subway Station,” The New
York Times, May 19, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/10/nyregion/10herald.html.
Congressional Research Service
103
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
James Elshafay, who was 19 years old when he was arrested, immediately agreed to cooperate
with the government and pled guilty to involvement in the plot. Elshafay testified against Siraj at
the latter’s trial. He acknowledged taking medication for depression and schizophrenia and
described the delusions that landed him in a psychiatric ward just months before he conspired
with Siraj to bomb the subway station.542 Elshafay was sentenced to five years in prison.
Siraj, who was 22 years old when he was arrested, rejected a plea agreement and went to trial. His
attorneys argued that he was entrapped by the police informant, Osama Eldawoody. They also
attacked the credibility of the informant on the grounds that he was paid a total of $100,000 by
the police. However, prosecutors called an undercover detective who testified that he had had
frequent conversations with Siraj long before he met Eldawoody. “The conversations, the
detective said, were filled with Mr. Siraj’s approval of suicide bombings and Osama bin
Laden.”543 The jury rejected the defense argument of entrapment and convicted Siraj on four
counts of conspiracy, including plotting to bomb a public transportation system. He was
sentenced in January 2007 to 30 years in prison.
Iyman Faris—Plot Against Brooklyn Bridge—June 2003
Iyman Faris, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Kashmir, Pakistan and living in Columbus, Ohio,
pled guilty on May 1, 2003, to casing the Brooklyn Bridge in New York City for Al Qaeda, and
researching and providing information to Al Qaeda regarding the tools necessary for possible
attacks on U.S. targets. According to DOJ, “Faris admitted that in April 2002, he researched “gas
cutters”—the equipment for severing bridge suspension cables—and the New York City bridge
on the Internet. Between April 2002 and March 2003, he sent several coded messages indicating
he had been unsuccessful in his attempts to obtain the necessary equipment. Faris admitted to
traveling to New York City in late 2002 to examine the bridge, and said he concluded that the plot
to destroy the bridge by severing cables was unlikely to succeed because of the bridge’s security
and structure. In early 2003, he sent a message that “the weather is too hot”—a coded message
indicating that the bridge plot was unlikely to succeed.”544 He was sentenced to 20 years in
prison.
TIME magazine reports that government officials were led to Faris by Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed, the high-ranking Al Qaeda operative and alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks
who is in U.S. custody. Reportedly, after Mohammed's capture in Pakistan, agents discovered the
coded, “the weather is too hot” e-mail sent from the U.S. to one of his associates. The e-mail was
one of the factors that helped investigators pull Faris’ name out of Mohammed during his
interrogations by U.S. authorities. Faris was then secretly detained two weeks later. Faris
acknowledged that he wrote the e-mail and was referring to the impossibility of an Al Qaeda plot
to bring down the sturdy, well-guarded Brooklyn Bridge by cutting its suspension cables.545
Sometime in March 2003, according to DOJ officials, FBI agents persuaded Faris to cooperate
with the government. TIME quotes law-enforcement officials who say that he was brought to a
542 Ibid.
543 Rashbaum, May 25, 2006.
544 DOJ Press Release, “Iyman Faris Sentenced for Providing Material Support to Al Qaeda,” Oct 28, 2003,
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2003/October/03_crm_589.htm.
545 Daniel Eisenberg, et al., “The Triple Life of a Qaeda Man,” TIME, June 30, 2003, http://www.time.com/time/
printout/0,8816,1005104,00.html.
Congressional Research Service
104
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
safe house in Virginia. “Faris sent messages to his bosses via cell phone and e-mail. ‘He was
sitting in the safe house making calls for us,’ says a senior Administration official. ‘It was a huge
triumph for law enforcement.’”546
Ahmed Omar Abu Ali—Plot to Assassinate President Bush—June
2003
Abu Ali, an American-born Muslim raised in Northern Virginia, was convicted on November 22,
2005 on nine terrorism charges, including conspiracy to assassinate President George W. Bush,
conspiracy to commit air piracy, and providing material support to Al Qaeda. Ali was originally
arrested by Saudi Arabian authorities in June 2003, while he was studying at the Islamic
University of Medina.547 The arrest came one month after an Al Qaeda attack on three residential
compounds in Riyadh had killed 27 foreign workers. He was held in Saudi custody for 20 months
without charges or access to an attorney. U.S. officials did not request extradition; however, FBI
agents participated in some of the interrogations.548
In the summer of 2004, Abu Ali’s family brought a civil suit in U.S. District Court seeking a writ
of habeas corpus. While that suit was pending, Abu Ali was returned to the United States and on
February 22, 2005, an indictment was unsealed charging him with six terrorism counts.549 Later, a
superseding indictment added additional charges.
The government’s case against Abu Ali was based primarily on evidence gathered by Saudi
authorities which included a videotaped confession. Although the assassination and hijacking
plots never got past the talking stage, it was alleged that between September 2002 and June 2003,
Abu Ali had met with several unnamed co-conspirators, two of whom were later revealed to be
leaders of an Al Qaeda cell in Medina—Sultan Jubran Sultan al-Qahtani, and Ali Abd al-
Rahman al-Faq’asi al-Ghamdi.550 Among the discussions with the co-conspirators were “ ...
options for assassinating President Bush: (1) an operation in which Abu Ali would get close
enough to the President to shoot him on the street, and (2) an operation in which Abu Ali would
detonate a car bomb.”551 At trial, Abu Ali’s attorneys countered that while in Saudi custody their
client had been beaten and whipped repeatedly until he agreed to confess.552 But, the judge, jury,
and appellate court rejected that argument. A juror said after the trial that Abu Ali’s videotaped
confession was “chilling” and showed no sign of coercion.553
546 Ibid.
547 Larry Abramson, “Jury Finds Abu Ali Guilty on Terrorism Charges,” National Public Radio, Nov. 22, 2005,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5024013. Hereafter: Abramson, NPR, Nov. 22, 2005.
548 Spencer Ackerman, “Suspect Policy,” The New Republic, March 14, 2005, http://www.tnr.com/article/suspect-
policy-0.
549 United States v. Abu Ali, Criminal No. 1:05CR53, In the U.S. District for the Eastern District of Virginia, Feb. 3,
2005, http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/AliIndictment.pdf. Hereafter: U.S. vs. Ali, Feb. 3, 2005.
550 United States v Abu Ali, No. 06-4334 and No. 06-4521, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Jun. 6, 2008,
http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/064334.P.pdf.
551 U.S. vs. Ali, Feb. 3, 2005.
552 Abramson, NPR, Nov. 22, 2005.
553 Jerry Markon, “Falls Church Man’s Sentence in Terror Plot is Increased to Life,” The Washington Post, July 28,
2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/27/AR2009072701384.html.
Congressional Research Service
105
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Abu Ali was originally sentenced to 30 years in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit upheld the conviction and sent the case back for resentencing. The U.S. District judge
increased the sentence to life in prison which he is serving at the Federal “Supermax” prison in
Florence, Colorado.
Virginia “Jihad” Network—June 2003
Eleven men from Northern Virginia were charged on June 27, 2003, with a variety of offenses
including weapons counts, providing material support to terrorist groups, and for violating the
Neutrality Act of 1939554 which prohibits U.S. citizens and residents from attacking countries
with which the United States is at peace. The men were accused of being part of a jihadist
network whose objective was to wage holy war against nations deemed hostile to Islam. They
were dubbed by some in the media as the “Paintball” terrorists because they were alleged to have
used paintball games in the woods near Fredericksburg, Virginia in 2000 and 2001 as military
training.555
After the indictment, four of the eleven men pled guilty and cooperated with the government. In a
superseding indictment on September 25, 2003, additional charges were levied against the seven
remaining defendants, including conspiracy to support terrorist organizations, namely Al Qaeda
and Lashkar-e-Taiba, (LeT) a Kashmiri-based group that has been designated by the U.S.
Government as a terrorist organization.556 Two of these remaining defendants pled guilty in
January 2004.
In 2004 and 2005, charges were brought against two additional Northern Virginia residents. The
alleged spiritual leader of the group, Ali al-Timimi, was indicted in September 2004 for
counseling and inducing several of the other defendants to conspire to levy war against the United
States along with other charges. He was found guilty on April 26, 2005 on ten counts and
sentenced to life in prison.557
The Washington Post reported that the heart of the government's evidence against al-Timimi was
a meeting he attended in Fairfax, Virginia five days after the 9/11 attacks. Al-Timimi told his
followers that ‘the time had come for them to go abroad and join the mujaheddin engaged in
violent jihad in Afghanistan,’ according to court papers.558 Defense lawyers claimed his rhetoric
merely reflected his right to free speech. After seven days of deliberation, the jury rejected that
argument. At sentencing, the judge said she was satisfied that the case did not ‘violate any of al-
Timimi's First Amendment rights. This is not a case about speech. This is a case about intent.’”
554 The text of the act may be found within U.S. Department of State Publication 1983, Peace and War: United States
Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943, pp. 494-505.
555 “Two ‘Paintball’ Terrorists Sentenced, Associated Press cited in foxnews.com, Apr. 9, 2004,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,116729,00.html.
556 Jerry Markon and Mary Beth Sheridan, “Indictment Expands Va. ‘Jihad’ Charges,” The Washington Post, Sep. 26,
2003, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2730-2003Sep25.html.
557 U.S. Attorneys' Office, Eastern District of Virginia; News Release, Apr. 26, 2005,
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/73.pdf.
558 Jerry Markon, “Muslim Lecturer Sentenced to Life,” The Washington Post, July 14, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/13/AR2005071302169.html.
Congressional Research Service
106
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
On September 15, 2005, prosecutors also charged Ali Asad Chandia as part of the Virginia Jihad
Network conspiracy. Chandia, a former teacher at a Muslim school in Maryland, was accused of
assisting a LeT operative, Mohammed Ajmal Khan, in procuring military-purpose equipment
for use against India. Evidence was presented at trial that Chandia made a three-month trip to
Pakistan in 2001-2002 where he met and allied with Khan who is currently serving a nine-year
sentence in Britain for his terrorist activities.559 Chandia was convicted on June 6, 2006 and
sentenced to 15 years in prison.
The following is a summary of the disposition of all of the accused defendants:560
• Ali Al-Timimi—an Iraqi-American U.S. citizen, was convicted on April 26,
2005, and sentenced to life in prison for soliciting treason, counseling and
inducing others to wage war against the United States, and using firearms and
explosives in furtherance of those offenses.
• Ali Asad Chandia—a Pakistani-American U.S. citizen, was convicted on June 6,
2006, and sentenced to 15 years, for providing material support to the LeT.
• Masaud Khan—a Pakistani-American U.S. citizen, was convicted on March 4,
2004, and sentenced to life in prison for conspiring to wage war against the
United States, providing material support to LeT, and using automatic weapons in
furtherance of crimes of violence.
• Seifullah Chapman—a U.S. citizen, was convicted on March 4, 2004, and
sentenced to 85 years (later reduced to 65 years) in prison for conspiring to
provide material support to LeT, violating the Neutrality Act of 1939, using
firearms in furtherance of crimes of violence, and using an automatic weapon in
furtherance of crimes of violence.
• Caliph Basha Abdur-Raheem—a U.S. citizen, was acquitted of all charges on
February 20, 2004.
• Randall Royer—a U.S. citizen, pled guilty in January 2004 and was sentenced
to 20 years in prison for aiding and abetting the use and discharge of a firearm
during and in relation to a crime of violence, and of aiding and abetting the
carrying of an explosive during the commission of a felony.
• Ibrahim Al-Hamdi—a Yemeni national, pled guilty in January 2004, and was
sentenced to 17 years in prison for unlawfully possessing a firearm, possessing a
firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and carrying an explosive—
specifically, a rocket-propelled grenade—during the commission of a crime.
• Yong Ki Kwon—a naturalized U.S. citizen from Korea, pled guilty in August
2003, and was sentenced to 11 years, six months for conspiring to commit an
offense against the United States, using a firearm in connection with a crime of
violence, and transferring a firearm for use in a crime of violence.
559 The Times of India, “Teacher Jailed for Aiding LeT,” Aug. 26, 2006, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/
1929483.cms.
560 Sources: U.S. Attorneys' Office, Eastern District of Virginia; News Release, Apr. 26, 2005,
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/73.pdf; U.S. Attorneys' Office, Eastern District of Virginia;
Press Release, “’Virginia Jihad’ Member Sentenced to 121 Months in Prison,” July 24, 2007, http://www.usdoj.gov/
usao/vae/Pressreleases/07-JulyPDFArchive/07/20070724benkahlanr... 7/25/2007.
Congressional Research Service
107
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
• Sabri Benkhala, a U.S. citizen, was acquitted in March 2004 of charges related
to the original June 2003 indictment. He was then granted statutory immunity
and testified twice before the grand jury, and submitted to interviews with the
FBI. He was subsequently convicted in February 2007 of making materially false
statements in 2004, both in his grand jury appearances and to the FBI. He was
sentenced to 10 years, one month in prison.
• Khwaja Mahmood Hasan—a naturalized U.S. citizen from Pakistan, pled guilty
in August 2003, and was sentenced to 11 years, three months in prison for
conspiring to commit an offense against the United States, and using a firearm in
connection with a crime of violence.
• Muhammed Aatique—a legal resident from Pakistan, pled guilty in September
2003, and was sentenced to 10 years, two months, for aiding others in
commencing a military expedition against a friendly nation and using and
discharging a firearm in relation to a crime of violence.
• Hammad Abdur-Raheem—a U.S. citizen (and no relation to acquitted
defendant Caliph Basha Abdur-Raheem), was convicted on March 4, 2004, and
was sentenced to 52 months in prison for conspiring to provide material support
to LeT and violating the Neutrality Act of 1939.
• Donald Thomas Surratt—a U.S. citizen, pled guilty in August 2003, and was
sentenced to three years, 10 months for conspiring to commit an offense against
the United States and transporting a firearm in interstate commerce with reason
to know a felony would be committed with it.
Hasan Akbar—Attack on Soldiers at U.S. Army Post in Kuwait—
March 23, 2003
On March 23, 2003, two days after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, U.S. Army Sergeant Hasan Akbar
killed two U.S. Army officers and wounded 14 others at Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait, 25 miles
from the Iraq border. At approximately 1:30 a.m., Akbar shut off the generator that lit the camp,
then tossed grenades into three tents where officers were asleep or preparing for bed. He is
reported to have yelled, “We are under attack.” As men rushed outside, he then opened fire with
an M-4 automatic rifle.561
Akbar was born Mark Fidel Kools in 1971. His mother said she changed his name to Hasan
Akbar after she remarried when he was a young boy. The family into which she married were
members of the Nation of Islam. In 1988, Akbar enrolled at the University of California, Davis,
with a double major in aeronautical and mechanical engineering. He graduated nine years later
with a bachelor's degree and joined the Army in 1998.562
The attacks have been attributed to various motivations. Military criminal investigators reported
that Akbar had been recently reprimanded for insubordination and was told he would not join his
561 NEFA Backgrounder: Hasan Akbar, Jan. 2010.
562 “Akbar Convicted of Murder,” Associated Press, cited in FoxNews.com, Apr. 22, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/
story/0,2933,154220,00.html. Hereafter: “Akbar Convicted of Murder,” Apr. 22, 2005.
Congressional Research Service
108
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
unit's push into Iraq. An Army spokesmen said Akbar had been having “an attitude problem.”
Another spokesman stated that the motive in the attack “most likely was resentment.”
At his April 2005 court martial, Akbar’s attorney argued that Akbar was concerned the invasion
of Iraq would result in the deaths of Muslims and that U.S. soldiers would rape Iraqi women. He
said the prosecution's depiction of Akbar as a cold-blooded killer ignored that the defendant was
sufficiently mentally ill—though not insane—to be confused and fearful about the impending
invasion of Iraq.563
But writing of his fellow soldiers in a diary entry dated February 4, 2003:
I suppose they want to punk me or just humiliate me. Perhaps they feel that I will not do
anything about that. They are right about that. I am not going to do anything about it as long
as I stay here. But as soon as I am in Iraq, I am going to try and kill as many of them as
possible.
I will have to decide to kill my Muslim brothers fighting for Saddam Hussein or my battle
buddies. I am hoping to get into a position so I don't have to take any crap from anyone
anymore. 564
On April 22, 2005, after two and one-half hours deliberation, a military jury at Fort Bragg
convicted Akbar of two counts of premeditated murder and three counts of attempted
premeditated murder. He was sentenced to death one week later. Akbar is the first American since
the Vietnam era to be prosecuted on charges of murdering a fellow soldier during wartime. His
case is currently under automatic appeal.
Lackawanna Six –Training at Al Qaeda Camp –September 2002
Six American citizens of Yemeni descent were arrested on September 13, 2002 and later charged
with providing material support to a terrorist organization. The press dubbed the six suspects—
Sahim Alwan, 29; Yahya Goba, 25; Shafal Mosed, 24; Yasein Taher, 24; Faysal Galab, 26;
and Mukhtar al-Bakri, 22—the “Lackawanna Six” (also the “Buffalo Six” or “Buffalo Cell”)
because five of them were born and raised in Lackawanna, a suburb of Buffalo, New York.
Prosecutors alleged that in the Spring of 2001, the men traveled to Afghanistan where they
attended Al Farooq training camp. Three of the men—Taher, Galab, and Mosed—traveled in one
group in April 2001, going from Canada to Pakistan via London and the United Arab Emirates.
The four others—Alwan, Goba, al-Bakri,and Elbaneh—allegedly traveled from New York to
Pakistan in May 2001. Once in Pakistan, they allegedly crossed over the border in Afghanistan to
attend the training camp. The men stayed for five to six weeks, except for Alwan, who left after
10 days.565 The men later admitted to authorities that while at Al Farooq camp they were trained
563 Akbar Convicted of Murder,” Apr. 22, 2005.
564 Quoted in Daniel Pipes, “Hasan Akbar’s Chilling Diary Entries,” Apr. 15, 2010, http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/
2005/04/hasan-akbars-chilling-diary-entries.
565 Susan Candiotti, “Prosecutors: No bail for six accused of helping al Qaeda,” CNN.com, Sep. 19, 2002,
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW/09/18/buffalo.terror.probe/.
Congressional Research Service
109
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
in the use of automatic weapons, including Kalashnikovs, M-16 rifles, rocket-propelled grenade
launchers, and explosives. They also met Osama bin Laden.566
The Lackawanna Six first came to the attention of authorities in the Spring of 2001 when the FBI
received an anonymous, handwritten letter apparently from someone in Lackawanna's Yemeni
community. The letter said that a group has traveled to “meet bin Laden and stay in his camp for
training.”567 Subsequently, the FBI interviewed one of the men, Sahim Alwan, when he returned
from abroad. Alwan, however, told the FBI that he only traveled to Pakistan for religious training.
Another member, Mukhtar Al-Bakri, came under increased surveillance after the U.S.
government reviewed and analyzed an e-mail he sent while traveling in Saudi Arabia. The e-mail
referred to an upcoming “big meal” that authorities interpreted as a code for an impending
terrorist attack.568 Additional intelligence information was later received that suggested the
Lackawanna suspects were the targets of an Al Qaeda recruitment operation.569 In the tense
atmosphere after the 9/11 attacks, this led to concerns that the group may be a sleeper cell.570
When the FBI learned that al-Bakri had traveled to Bahrain to get married, they asked authorities
there to detain him. During an interview with an Arabic-speaking FBI agent, a-Bakri admitted to
having attended Al Farooq camp and named the other members of the Lackawanna Six, who were
then subsequently arrested on September 13, 2002.
In their joint report, “Chasing the Sleeper Cell,” 571 The New York Times and Public
Broadcasting Service’s (PBS) Frontline summarized the disposition of the Lackawanna
Six and others associated with the case:
• Sahim Alwan was a college-educated, married man with three children. After he
arrived at Al Farooq camp, Alwan claimed he quickly had a change of heart and
begged the camp authorities to let him return home. He was allowed to leave, but
first was taken to a personal meeting with bin Laden, in which Al Qaeda’s leader
asked about the status of Muslims in the U.S. He was also asked by a bin Laden
associate to deliver two copies of a videotape showing the bombing of the USS
Cole to a contact in Pakistan which he did. After being confronted with
information obtained from the arrest and interrogation of Mukhtar al-Bakri,
Alwan confessed to the FBI and in April 2003, pled guilty to material support of
terrorism. He was sentenced to nine and a half years in prison.
• Yahya Goba did not grow up in Lackawanna. He was born in The Bronx, was
raised for a while in Yemen, and moved to Western New York in the late 1996. In
his March 2003 guilty plea, Goba admitted having trained to use firearms,
566 DOJ Press Release, “U.S. Attorney’s Office Successfully Concludes Terrorism Case, With Sixth Conviction of Al
Qaeda Supporter,” May 19, 2003, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/898.pdf.
567 PBS, “Chasing the Sleeper Cell,” Oct. 16, 2003, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/etc/
synopsis.html. Hereafter: PBS, Oct. 16, 2003.
568 Ibid.
569 Ibid.
570 Dina Temple-Raston, “How Great a Threat Were the Lackawanna Six?,” Morning Edition, National Public Radio,
Sep. 10, 2007, based on the book: Dina Temple-Raston, The Jihad Next Door: The Lackawanna Six and Rough
Justice in the Age of Terror, (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007). http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=
14285994.
571 PBS, Oct. 16, 2003.
Congressional Research Service
110
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
including a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, as well as explosives. He also said
that Osama bin Laden had spoken at the camp of men “willing to become martyrs
for the cause.” In December 2003, Goba was sentenced to 10 years in prison.
• Shafal Mosed pled guilty in March 2003 to providing material support to Al
Qaeda and was sentenced to eight years in prison.
• Yasein Taher pled guilty in May 2003 to providing material support to Al Qaeda
and was sentenced to eight years in prison.
• Faysal Galab was the first of the Lackawanna Six to pled guilty to material
support of terrorism in January 2003. In his plea, he admitted to traveling to the
camp, knowing that the trip was illegal, and receiving weapons training. He also
acknowledged Osama bin Laden had spoken at the camp. He was sentenced to
seven years in prison.
• Mukhtar al-Bakri was arrested on his wedding night in a hotel room in
Manama, Bahrain. During his FBI interview, he was the first to admit that the
group had not attended religious training in Pakistan, but rather traveled to the
terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. His confession paved the way for the FBI
to bring charges against the Lackwanna men. He also admitted that he trained in
the use of weapons and explosives at an Al Qaeda camp. In June 2003, he was
the last of the six to pled guilty to material support and was sentenced to 10 years
in prison.
Three other men were also implicated in the Lackawanna Six case. Authorities believe the three
played roles in the recruitment of the Lackwanna Six:
• Kemal Derwish was born in Buffalo and raised in Saudi Arabia. He reportedly
had trained in Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and fought with Muslims in
Bosnia. U.S. intelligence sources say the Saudi government deported Derwish in
1997 for alleged extremist activities. He spent a year in Yemen before heading
back to his hometown of Lackawanna in 1998 where he began giving informal
talks at a local mosque. The group met in his apartment, where he reportedly told
them that attacks on Muslims around the world obligate them to train for jihad to
defend their Muslim brothers. Authorities believe that the trip by the group to
Afghanistan grew out of religious discussions led by Derwish. He was reportedly
killed in 2002 by a CIA Predator drone that was tracking Qaed Salim Sinan al
Harethi, known as “Abu Ali,” and believed to be one of the planners of the USS
Cole bombing.572
• Juma Al Dosari is described as a Muslim fighter and itinerant Imam from Saudi
Arabia, who is believed to have fought with Derwish in Bosnia. Upon his arrival
in Lackawanna, the reportedly charismatic Al Dosari gave a sermon railing
against Arab governments who do nothing while Muslims die on a daily basis.
According to people in the community, the leaders of the Lackawanna mosque
were so troubled by Al Dosari's militant tone that he was not invited back. Two
weeks after the 9/11 attacks, Al Dosari left Lackawanna to fight with the Taliban
in Afghanistan. He was captured sometime in the fall of 2001 and declared an
enemy combatant. He was subsequently sent to the special prison camp at the
572 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service
111
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
U.S. Naval Base on Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. His interrogation there led to the
information that the Lackawanna Six were the targets of an Al Qaeda recruitment
operation. In 2007, after five years of the detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, he
was released to Saudi Arabia, with no charges against him.573
• Jaber A. Elbaneh, a Yemeni-American also attended Al Farooq training camp
with al-Bakri, Alwan and Goba. At the camp, Elbaneh told Alwan that he wanted
to fight with the Taliban and was willing to become a martyr. He never returned
to the U.S. after his trip to Afghanistan and eventually fled to Yemen. In May
2003, the U.S. government unsealed an indictment charging him with providing
material support to Al Qaeda. The FBI also put him on its list of world’s most
wanted terrorism suspects.574 It has been reported that he is in Yemeni custody,
but because there is no extradition treaty between the United States and Yemen, it
is not clear whether he will be returned for trial.575
Jose Padilla—Alleged “Dirty Bomb” Plot—May 2002
Jose Padilla, a former Chicago gang member and convert to Islam, was arrested on May 8, 2002,
at O'Hare Airport in Chicago for suspicion of planning to explode a radiological dispersion
device, or “dirty bomb” (an explosive containing radioactive material) in the United States. A
month later, he would become the first American citizen arrested on U.S. soil to be declared an
“enemy combatant,” and then was held indefinitely without trial or charging him with a crime.
This led to a legal confrontation between the Bush Administration and Padilla’s attorneys as well
as various civil liberties groups that lasted several years and reached all the way to the U.S.
Supreme Court. The constitutional issues involved the extent to which the President, as
commander-in-chief has the authority to take extraordinary measures for the security of
Americans even if those measures infringe on an accused citizen’s access to legal counsel and
relief from unlawful detention (habeas corpus).576
The government’s initial suspicions about Padilla were based on information provided to
interrogators by Abu Zubaydah, a senior official of Al Qaeda who was in American custody at
an undisclosed location overseas. He did not name Mr. Padilla but described him physically and
referred to him as a Latin American man who went by a Muslim name. Intelligence agents then
were able to link the name given by Abu Zubaydah to “an Arab alias not mentioned by the
detainee.” That “alias” led the agent to Mr. Padilla's Florida driver's license. The photo on that
license was shown to “a detainee,” presumed to be Abu Zubaydah, who confirmed that Mr.
Padilla was the “Latin American” he had been describing.577
Padilla remained in custody for one month after his arrest in May 2002 on a material witness
warrant. But, Justice Department officials faced a deadline to release him pursuant to laws that
573 Ibid.
574 Ibid.
575 Dan Herbeck, “Yemen Holds Lackawanna 6 Figure,” Buffalo News, Jan 20, 2010, http://www.buffalonews.com/
2010/01/20/929584/yemen-holds-lackawanna-6-figure.html.
576 For a detailed discussion, see CRS Report RL33180, Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in
Federal Court, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Michael John Garcia.
577 Deborah Sontag, “Terror Suspect's Path From Streets to Brig,” The New York Times, Apr. 25, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/25/us/terror-suspect-s-path-from-streets-to-brig.html. Hereafter: Sontag, Apr. 25,
2004.
Congressional Research Service
112
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
protect U.S. citizens from indefinite detention. They were also confronted with the challenge of
making a case against Padilla that would stand up in court without bringing Abu Zubaydah or
other captured Al Qaeda officials into an American courtroom.578 Instead, on June 9, 2002,
President George W. Bush approved Padilla's reclassification as an “enemy combatant,” which
would not entitle him to trial in civilian courts. He was transferred after midnight to the brig of a
South Carolina naval base where he was held incommunicado, not even allowed visits from his
attorney, for over 3-1/2 years, most of which was spent in solitary confinement.579
In announcing Padilla’s May arrest, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft announced at a June 10,
2002, news conference, “We have disrupted an unfolding terrorist plot to attack the United States
by exploding a radioactive dirty bomb.” He added that the government's suspicions about
Padilla's plans came from “multiple, independent, corroborating sources.”580
But shortly thereafter, CBS News reported that FBI sources were “backing off” Ashcroft’s
assertion that there was a specific, developed and real plan to use a “dirty bomb” in the U.S.
According to one law enforcement official speaking on condition of anonymity, “FBI's
investigation has produced no evidence that Padilla had begun preparations for an attack and little
reason to believe he had any support from Al Qaeda to direct such a plot.”581
Dale Watson, who was then FBI’s executive assistant director for counterterrorism, read the
complete file on Padilla and later said, “My recollection was that this was a rather weak case.
There was some information, but it needed a lot more work on the investigative side to flesh out
all the facts.”582
On June 1, 2004, DOJ responded to a written request by Senator Orrin Hatch, then the chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, “asking the Department of Justice and the Department of
Defense to supply whatever information [they] could about American citizens being held as
enemy combatants here in the United States.”583 In addition, then-Deputy Attorney General James
Comey held a news conference where he laid out a detailed summary of the government’s case
against Padilla. The case was largely derived from statements made by Padilla himself while he
was interrogated in military custody, but which Comey claimed was substantiated by other
sources. At the news conference, Comey traced Padilla’s travel through Egypt, Yemen,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan. He identified Al Qaeda officials he met, which included not only Abu
Zubaydah, but Al Qaeda military commander Mohammed Atef and 9/11 mastermind Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed. He also described the training Padilla received and terrorist plots discussed
including one to blow up apartment buildings in the United States using natural gas as well as an
attack using a dirty bomb.584
578 This factor was acknowledged by then-Deputy Attorney General James Comey. See CNN, “Transcript of News
Conference on Jose Padilla,” June 1, 2004, http://edition.cnn.com/2004/LAW/06/01/comey.padilla.transcript/.
Hereafter: Transcript of News Conference, June 1, 2004.
579 The New York Times, “Times Topics: Jose Padilla,” Mar. 6, 2009, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/
timestopics/people/p/jose_padilla/index.html.
580 Dan Collins, “'Dirty Bomb' Suspect A Nobody?” CBS News, Aug 14, 2002, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/
08/27/attack/main519996.shtml.
581 Ibid.
582 Sontag, Apr. 25, 2004.
583 Transcript of News Conference, June 1, 2004.
584 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service
113
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Comey also noted that the government could not make a case against Padilla through the criminal
justice system when he was originally arrested two years before “without jeopardizing
intelligence sources.”585 But, he went on to say that the questioning of Padilla was not undertaken
to try and make a criminal case against him. “It was done to find out the truth about what he knew
about Al Qaeda and threats to the United States.”586
Soon after Padilla was declared an enemy combatant, his appointed counsel filed a habeas corpus
petition on his behalf. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court, which held that Padilla
had filed his habeas petition in the wrong court. In 2004, Padilla’s counsel filed a new habeas
corpus petition in the U.S. District Court for South Carolina. The District Court ruled that
Padilla’s detention had not been authorized by Congress and was therefore unlawful. The
government appealed to the Fourth Circuit. On September 9, 2005, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Richmond, Virginia reversed the trial court's decision and held that the president was
authorized to detain enemy combatants under the Authorization of Use of Military Force passed
by Congress in the wake of September 11. Padilla then filed a petition for certiorari587 in the
United States Supreme Court.588
In November 2005, while the Supreme Court was considering Padilla's petition for review, the
Bush Administration suddenly announced that criminal charges had been filed against him in
federal court in Miami. The new indictment made no mention of the dirty bomb or most of the
other original charges. Instead, Padilla was charged with being part of a “North American support
cell” that worked to support violent jihad campaigns in Afghanistan and elsewhere overseas from
1993 to 2001.589
The government then asked the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals to vacate its decision upholding
Padilla's confinement.590 The 4th Circuit refused to vacate its order or approve of Padilla's transfer
from military to civilian custody. In an opinion by Judge J. Michael Luttig, the 4th Circuit worried
about “an appearance that the government may be attempting to avoid consideration of our
decision by the Supreme Court.”591 Judge Luttig also “chastised the administration for using one
set of facts to justify holding Padilla without charges and another set to persuade a grand jury in
Florida to indict him.”592
Padilla’s attorneys, in the meantime, sought to have the criminal charges against him dismissed
on the grounds that the psychological damage he suffered during his confinement from abuse and
extreme isolation had left him incompetent to stand trial. The judge in the case denied the motion,
585 Ibid.
586 Ibid.
587 Certiorari is the name given to certain appellate proceedings for re-examination of actions of a trial court, or inferior
appeals court.
588 Padilla v. Hanft, American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia, Nov. 30, 2006, http://www.acluva.org/docket/
padilla.html.
589 See Michael McGough, “How Do You Solve a Problem Like Padilla?” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Jan. 2, 2006,
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06002/631159-108.stm#ixzz0pA44Cy40. Hereafter, McGough, Jan. 2, 2006.
590 For more information on this case, see CRS Report R41156, Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant
Detainees: Major Court Rulings, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Michael John Garcia.
591 Padilla v. Hanft, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, CA-04-2221-26AJ, Dec. 21, 2005, p. 4.
592 McGough, Jan 2, 2006.
Congressional Research Service
114
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
without ruling on the merits of the defense accusations of abuse. The criminal trial began in
September 2006.593
Padilla was convicted on Aug. 16, 2007, along with two co-defendants, Adham Amin Hassoun
and Kifah Wael Jayyousi, of conspiracy to murder, kidnap and maim people in a foreign country.
In January 2008, Padilla was sentenced to 17 years and four months in prison while his co-
defendants were given shorter sentences. Padilla is serving his sentence at the Federal
“Supermax” prison in Florence, Colorado.594
Portland Seven—Attempted Travel to Afghanistan to Support the
Taliban—October 2001
In the days following the 9/11 attacks, six men reportedly met at various times in the Portland,
Oregon area where they made plans to travel to Afghanistan to fight against the armed forces of
the United States. They also conducted weapons training on two occasions at a gravel pit in
Washougal, Washington. A seventh person, October Martinique Lewis, admitted that she
transferred funds for the purpose of assisting her ex-husband who was one of the conspirators.
The group, who came to be known as the “Portland Seven”—called themselves, Katibat al
Mawt—“The Squad of Death.” They were:595
• Habis Abdulla Al Saoub, 36, a Jordanian-born man and reputed militant jihadist,
was considered to be the de facto leader of the group.
• Patrice Lumumba Ford, 30, is a U.S. citizen who converted to Islam during a
trip to China. He has been described as an intelligent, gentle, exemplary young
man, well-known in Portland's African-American community. But prior to the
events of 9/11, was so upset by this country's Middle Eastern policy that he sent
an email to Portland Mayor Vera Katz's office that was troubling enough in its
anti-Semitism to be forwarded to the police.
• Ahmed Ibrahim Bilal, 25, and Muhammad Ibrahim Bilal, 22, are American-
born brothers of Saudi descent.
• Jeffrey Leon Battle, 32, is a former cosmetics salesman who moved to the
Portland area from Houston.
• Maher “Mike” Hawash, is a 38-year-old software engineer and naturalized
American citizen from the West Bank who grew up in Kuwait.
• October Martinique Lewis, 25, Battle’s ex-wife, who moved with him from
Houston.
Al Saoub, Ford, and Battle first came to the attention of law enforcement authorities on
September 29, 2001, after they were seen engaged in shooting practice in a gravel pit in Skamania
County, Washington, near Washougal. The group was discovered by a Deputy Sheriff who was
593 Amanda Ripley, “The Case of the Dirty Bomber” TIME Magazine, Jun. 16, 2002, http://www.time.com/time/nation/
article/0,8599,262917,00.html#ixzz0p9fME32v.
594 Ibid.
595 Nick Budnick, “The Making of a ‘Terrorist,’” Williamette Week Online, Oct.16, 2002, http://www.wweek.com/
story.php?story=3246.
Congressional Research Service
115
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
acting on a tip from a neighbor who had heard gunfire in the pit. Deputy Mercer let the men go
after taking their names and reported the incident to the FBI.596
Sometime after February 2002, the FBI reportedly linked a confidential informant with a member
of the group, Jeffrey Battle. The informant was reported to be Khalid Mustafa, a small-time
criminal who agreed to become a confidential FBI informant after being charged with drug and
weapons offenses. Mustafa befriended Battle at the mosque where he prayed and then secretly-
recorded numerous conversations with Battle that included details about the group’s trip to China.
Battle is also recorded on tape talking about retaliating against Jews in Portland, “So if every time
they hurt or harm a Muslim over there, you go into that synagogue and hurt one over here.”597
Hundreds of e-mail exchanges between Battle and other members of the Portland Seven provided
further evidence of the conspiracy. The e-mails were reportedly obtained through provisions of
the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) that allow prosecutors access to the data files of Internet
service providers. In court documents, prosecutors acknowledged having taped at least 271
conversations and obtained 31 separate orders from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
court.598
In October 2002, five of the men were indicted on multiple charges of aiding or attempting to join
Al Qaeda. Maher Hawash was arrested in March 2003, on a material witness warrant and initially
held without charges. He was subsequently charged with conspiring with the others to travel to
China and join the Taliban. Lewis, the ex-wife of co-defendant Jeffrey Battle, was charged with
money laundering.
Hawash pled guilty on Sept. 6, 2003 to conspiracy to provide material support to the Taliban and
agreed to cooperate with federal prosecutors. At his sentencing in February 2004, he said, “I do
not blame anyone else but myself. This action was done by me, based on a misguided judgment at
the time, a high emotional time for me in my life.”599 He was sentenced to seven years in prison
and was released in early 2009.
Muhammad and Ahmed Bilal, pled guilty on September 18, 2003 to conspiracy to contribute
services to the Taliban, as well as federal weapons charges.600 They received eight and ten year
sentences respectively.
October Martinique Lewis pled guilty on September 26, 2003, to six counts of money laundering
for transferring money from the United States to a place outside of the country for the purpose of
assisting her ex-husband, Jeffrey Battle, in willfully supplying services to the Taliban.601 She
received a three-year sentence.
596 Ibid.
597 Howlett, July 24, 2005.
598 Ibid.
599 Ibid.
600 DOJ Press Release, “Two Defendants in ‘Portland Cell’ Case Plead Guilty to Conspiracy to Contribute Services to
the Taliban, Federal Weapons Charges,” Sep. 18, 2003, http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel03/portland092203.htm.
601 DOJ Press Release, “October Martinique Lewis Pleads Guilty to Money Laundering in Portland Cell Case, Sep. 26,
2003, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_crm_532.htm.
Congressional Research Service
116
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Jeffrey Battle and Patrice Lumumba Ford pled guilty on Oct. 16, 2003, to the first of a 15-count
indictment, a charge of conspiracy to levy war against the United States. Both defendants
admitted that they and the other defendants flew to China in an unsuccessful attempt to gain entry
into Pakistan, en route to Afghanistan. They also admitted in their plea that the purpose of the
conspiracy was to travel to Afghanistan to fight alongside Al Qaeda and the Taliban against
American and allied forces. They were each sentenced to 18-year prison terms.602
Habis al Saoub reportedly joined an Al Qaeda cell and was killed by Pakistani forces in
Afghanistan in October 2003.
602 DOJ Press Release, “Jeffrey Battle, Patrice Lumumba Ford Sentenced to 18 Years in Prison for Seditious
Conspiracy,” Nov. 23, 2003, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_pjus/is_200311/ai_2497879968/.
Congressional Research Service
117
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Appendix B. Federal Engagement and Partnership
Activities With Muslim-American Communities
Several U.S. Government departments and agencies conduct outreach, engage, and partner with
Muslim-, Arab-, Sikh-, and South Asian-American communities over issues relating to civil
rights, civil liberties, and domestic terrorism issues. A summary of the activities of principal
organizations is listed below.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
DHS has stated that public outreach and engagement initiatives with American Arab, Muslim,
Sikh, South Asian, Somali, Middle Eastern, and other ethnic and religious communities play
major roles in the department’s mission.603 Engagement activities are centered in its Office of
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) whose mission impacts counterterrorism but is broader.
The office is also responsible for: 604
• Advising Department leadership, personnel, and partners about civil rights and
civil liberties issues.
• Communicating with individuals and communities whose civil rights and civil
liberties may be affected by Department activities, informing them about policies
and avenues of redress, and promoting appropriate attention within the
Department to their experiences and concerns.
• Investigating and resolving civil rights and civil liberties complaints filed by the
public.
CRCL has established an engagement team currently active in eight metropolitan areas: Boston,
Chicago, Columbus (and other metropolitan areas of Ohio), Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles,
Minneapolis/St. Paul, and Washington, D.C. Their major outreach and engagement initiatives
include the following:605
• Incident Communication Coordination Team (ICCT). This team provides a venue
for government officials and community leaders to work together to exchange
information and resolve issues immediately after terrorist attacks or other
significant incidents. ICCT members include officials from DHS, the
Departments of State and Justice, the FBI; and leaders of the Arab-, Muslim-,
Sikh-, Middle Eastern-, Somali-, and South Asian-American communities. When
an incident occurs, the ICCT is assembled via conference call. It has been
activated numerous times since its establishment including after the Fort Hood
incident in November 2009 and the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines
flight #253 in December 2009.
603 DHS Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, “Engagement with Key Communities Team.” Aug. 14, 2009,
http://www.dhs.gov/xcitizens/gc_1249415146102.shtm. Hereafter: DHS CRCL Engagement Team, Aug. 14, 2009.
604 The mission of the DHS Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties is outlined in 6 U.S.C. 345, see
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0481.shtm.
605 DHS CRCL Engagement Team, Aug. 14, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
118
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
• Community and youth roundtables in key cities that serve as a point of inquiry
and redress for individuals concerned about their rights as Americans.
• Cultural competency training for DHS personnel.
• Promoting diversity hiring and critical language skills within the department and
at job fairs, conferences, and in media outlets serving ethnic and religious
communities promotion. The National Security Internship Program, a partnership
between the FBI and the Department, seeks to bring Arabic speakers into public
service positions within federal intelligence and security agencies.
Department of Justice (DOJ)
According to its website, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the Civil Rights
Division of DOJ has placed a priority on prosecuting bias crimes and incidents of discrimination
against Muslims, Sikhs, and persons of Arab and South-Asian descent, as well as persons
perceived to be members of these groups. The Division has also engaged in extensive outreach
efforts to these communities to educate people about their rights and available government
services.606
This outreach has included meetings of senior Civil Rights Division officials with community
leaders to address backlash-related civil rights issues, providing speakers and information booths
at national and regional conventions and other community events, and hosting a bi-monthly
meeting that brings together leaders from these communities with officials from a variety of
federal agencies including the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, the Department of
Transportation, and others, to address civil rights issues in a comprehensive way.607
The Justice Department’s Community Relations Service has held more than 250 town and
community meetings around the country addressing backlash-related issues.608 In addition, the
Community Relations Service:609
• Provided technical assistance and targeted training efforts towards establishing
dialogue between government officials and Arab, Muslim, and Sikh communities
in the United States.
• Developed the Arab, Muslim, and Sikh Cultural Awareness Program for law
enforcement officials, and have provided this training to well over 500 law
enforcement departments and agencies across the country.
• Conducts Train-the-Trainer programs, often in conjunction with the Cultural
Awareness Program, to train volunteers from the Arab, Muslim, and Sikh
communities. These volunteers then conduct trainings for law enforcement
officials and first responders, providing them with an understanding of Arab,
606 DOJ Civil Rights Division, “Enforcement and Outreach Following the September 11, 2001 Attacks,” Feb. 2, 2010,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/legalinfo/discrimupdate.php.
607 Ibid.
608 Ibid.
609 Ondray T. Harris, Director, DOJ Community Relations Service, “Creating Positive Perception of Sikh Identity in the
U.S. Public,” speech at the 2nd Global Sikh Civil Rights Conference in Toronto, Canada; Dec. 19, 2009,
http://www.justice.gov/crs/united-sikhs.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
119
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Muslim, and Sikh cultures that will enable them to more effectively work in these
communities.
• The Community Relations Service provides training to law enforcement
officials on racial profiling to identify best practices to prevent illegal
discrimination against Arabs, Muslims, and Sikhs and to improve daily
contact and strengthen mutual trust and effective policing practices in these
communities.
• Developed two films for law enforcement officers that can be downloaded from
its website: The First Three to Five Seconds - Law Enforcement Roll Call
Training Video on Arab and Muslim Cultural Awareness, and On Common
Ground - Law Enforcement Training Video on Sikhism.610
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
There is limited information in open sources about FBI engagement activities in Muslim-
American communities, the objectives of those activities, or how they are harmonized with its
other counterterrorism efforts. The FBI has suggested that since 9/11, it has been formulating an
“extensive program” to bolster its relationship with Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian
communities in the United States.611 Also, in March 2010, Brett Hovington, the Chief of the
Community Relations Unit of FBI’s Office of Public Affairs, told Congress that the primary
purpose of the agency’s outreach program was “to enhance public trust and confidence in the
FBI.” 612 This involves fostering a positive image of law enforcement among U.S. organizations
that have condemned terrorism and violent radicalization.
Hovington suggested that the FBI relies on general programs at the field office level to foster
interaction with a wide variety of local groups. In 2003, the FBI Washington Field Office (WFO)
established one such program, the Arab, Muslim, and Sikh Advisory Council (AMSAC) to create
transparency and stronger communication between its office and multiple religious communities.
According to the WFO, on a quarterly basis its officials and AMSAC executives share cultural,
linguistic, and contextual expertise and work to prevent hate crimes by building relationships with
community members who are not afraid to come forward with information.613 In his testimony,
Hovington equated jihadist-inspired terrorism with gangs or groups like the Ku Klux Klan and
underscored that FBI counterterrorism-related community engagement had to be decentralized:
It is very important to make sure that we engage with a number of different communities,
because terrorism really is just fear, and that fear comes in different shapes, forms and
fashion depending on what environment that you’re—that you’re looking at. So whether
you’re talking about gang activity, whether you’re talking about Klan activity, the bottom
610 Ibid
611 Scott Atran, Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities: Countering Violent
Extremism: Statement for the Record, Addendum-2, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., Mar. 10, 2010, http://armed-
services.senate.gov/statemnt/2010/03%20March/Atran%2003-10-10.pdf. Hereafter: Atran Testimony, Mar. 10, 2010.
612 Brett Hovington, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment: Working with Communities to Disrupt Terror Plots: Statement for the Record, 111th Cong.,
2nd sess., Mar. 17, 2010, http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20100317103507-03554.pdf. Hereafter: Hovington
Testimony, Mar. 17, 2010.
613 FBI, “Building Trust: The Arab, Muslim, and Sikh Advisory Council,” June 1, 2009, http://washingtondc.fbi.gov/
trust060109.htm.
Congressional Research Service
120
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
line—it’s terrorism. And that’s one of the things I—we do at the FBI. We take a look at the
various communities. And it—I would say it’s a customized outreach program. What I mean
by that is we have 56 FBI field offices that serve, again, across this country, and they have to
tailor their outreach efforts based on the demographics of the area of responsibilities that
they serve. That’s the only effective way to do engagement, because there is not one shoe fits
all.614
An outreach program developed by the Community Relations Unit at FBI Headquarters is the
Specialized Community Outreach Team (SCOT). It is described as an effort to, “engage
communities that are particularly insular or where barriers of fear or suspicion of law
enforcement exist.” The SCOT was piloted with Somali-American communities in Minneapolis;
Denver; Columbus, Ohio; San Diego; Seattle; and Washington, DC.615 This effort helped the FBI
address a Somali-linked threat to the 2009 Presidential Inauguration and, in this instance, SCOT
outreach in Columbus facilitated FBI investigative work.616
Aside from the FBI’s inclusion of Muslim Americans in outreach programs devised for all types
of local constituencies,617 some FBI field offices have formally interacted with local Muslim
communities regarding specific cases. One case involved the agency’s top official at the New
York Field Office meeting with 40 community leaders regarding Najibullah Zazi, who has
confessed to plotting to bomb subway trains in New York City. Other field offices have held town
hall meetings to interact with the communities.618 At the national level, the FBI headquarters
representatives have engaged in liaison with Arab and Muslim American advocacy groups and
have regular issue-focused conference calls with community leaders.619 The FBI is also a member
of the Incident Coordination Communications Team managed by DHS CRCL. Finally, CRS
discussions with Muslim community leaders revealed that the FBI has partnered with community
members in specific cases where the FBI has detected radicalization in an effort to prevent those
individuals from transitioning to acts of violent extremism.620
Department of the Treasury (Treasury)
As part of its counterterrorism efforts, the U.S. Government seeks to identify, disrupt, and
dismantle illicit financial networks that support terrorists and terrorist groups. This is one of the
core missions of Treasury. The department has identified cases where terrorist organizations have
established or infiltrated the charitable sector and exploited charitable funds and well-intentioned
donors in order to provide cover or support terrorist activities or agendas. Section 1702 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (P.L. 95-223)and Executive Order (E.O.)
614 Hovington Testimony, Mar. 17, 2010.
615 Ibid.
616 Atran Testimony, Mar. 10, 2010.
617 Programs such as the FBI’s Citizens’ Academy acquaint local civic leaders with FBI operations. The Citizens’
Academy, sponsored by FBI Field Offices, has given thousands of local community leaders a chance to learn about the
FBI mission and capabilities. See “FBI Citizens’ Academies: An Eye-Opening Experience,” Oct. 26, 2009,
http://www.fbi.gov/page2/oct09/citizens_academies_102609.html; and “In Your Community: FBI Citizens’ Academy,”
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/ood/opca/outreach/academy.htm.
618 Hovington Testimony, Mar. 17, 2010.
619 Atran Testimony, March 10, 2010.
620 Discussions with CRS held on May 12 and 18, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
121
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
13224,621 provide the executive branch with tools to investigate and disrupt terrorist networks by
designating them and blocking their assets. Since 2001, Treasury has designated eight charities
under E.O. 13224.622
“Though Treasury actions with respect to Muslim charities have been relatively infrequent, and
none have occurred for three years,” Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Daniel Glaser,
told Congress in May 2010, these actions, “…have had the unfortunate and unintended
consequence of causing a chilling effect on well-intentioned donor activity within Muslim-
American communities.”623 This is a particularly important issue for Muslims due to their
religious obligation of zakāt. 624 In his speech in Cairo in 2009, President Obama recognized the
challenge, when he said, “…in the United States, rules on charitable giving have made it harder
for Muslims to fulfill their religious obligation. That’s why I’m committed to working with
American Muslims to ensure that they can fulfill zakāt.”625
Treasury maintains that overcoming the challenges noted above requires a strong partnership with
the charitable sector and frames its efforts to (1) conduct outreach, (2) issue guidance, and (3)
develop a partnership with the charitable sector. Treasury meets frequently and collaborates on
projects with specific communities and organizations, including Muslim- American communities,
as well as with representatives from the broader charitable sector. It also participates in
interagency outreach events with DHS, DOJ, and the FBI.626 Finally, Glaser notes that guidance
has been developed to assist the charitable sector in adopting protective measures against terrorist
abuse of charities, including its “Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices
for U.S.-Based Charities.”627
In an effort to protect and promote charitable activity in places where terrorist organizations are
particularly active, Treasury has also discussed with Muslim communities the feasibility of
developing alternative relief mechanisms. One example is the American Charities for Palestine
(ACP) founded in June 2007 for the purpose of creating a secure mechanism for distributing
contributions that improve the quality of life for Palestinians living in the West Bank. In August
2008, ACP signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) ensuring that all recipients of ACP donations in Palestine are
fully vetted and approved by USAID to ensure that funds will be distributed in compliance with
U.S. law.628
621 Executive Order 13224, “Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten to
Commit, or Support Terrorism,” signed by President George W. Bush on Sep. 23, 2001, http://www.treas.gov/offices/
enforcement/ofac/programs/terror/terror.pdf.
622 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Anti-
Money Laundering: Blocking Terrorist Financing and Its Impact on Lawful Charities, Testimony of Daniel L. Glaser,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Treasury (Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes), 111th Cong., 2nd sess., May 26,
2010, p. 7. Hereafter: Glaser Testimony, May 26, 2010.
623 Ibid., p. 2.
624 Zakāt or “alms giving,” is one of the Five Pillars of Islam. It consists of giving a small percentage of one's
possessions to charity, usually the poor or otherwise needy.
625 Quoted in Glaser Testimony, May 26, 2010, p. 2.
626 Ibid., pp. 8-10.
627 For a list of all these documents, go to: http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/key-issues/protecting/index.shtml.
628 See Glaser Testimony, May 26, 2010, pp. 12-13; and American Charities for Palestine website at
http://www.acpus.org/about-us.
Congressional Research Service
122
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
NCTC is the primary U.S. Government organization for integrating and analyzing all intelligence
pertaining to counterterrorism (except for information pertaining exclusively to domestic
terrorism).629 Through its Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning, it is also the executive
branch lead agency for counterterrorism planning.
Within NCTC, there is a Global Engagement Group that engages with Muslim-American
communities within the United States and counterpart agencies abroad, but there is limited
information in open sources about those activities.630 According to the 2010 National Framework
for Strategic Communication, the Global Engagement Group “coordinates, integrates, and
synchronizes United States Government efforts to counter violent extremism and deny terrorists
the next generation of recruits.”631 However it is not clear what the Group’s responsibilities are
within the domestic domain or how they are distinguished from those of other agencies. In a
March 2009 hearing before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee,
the NCTC Deputy Director for Intelligence testified:
To coordinate Federal, State, and local engagement efforts within Somali-American
communities, the NCTC Global Engagement Group chairs the Somali Community Outreach
Forum. This working group includes representatives from the FBI Community Relations
Unit; the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties; the DHS Office of Intelligence
and Analysis; the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service; Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; the Department of Justice Civil Rights and National Security
Divisions; and the Department of the Treasury. This working group provides a forum to
coordinate community outreach meetings in Columbus, Ohio and Minneapolis, Minnesota
and other venues, and serves as a central point for collaboration that is designed to increase
the effectiveness and coordination of activities…632
The Deputy Director also stated that “NCTC last year produced a ‘best practices primer’ for state
and local law enforcement officials that addresses cultural sensitivity issues and lessons learned
in government outreach to American Muslim communities.”633 These activities suggest that this
intelligence agency element has an important role in the domestic aspects of the countering
violent extremism mission.
629 NCTC was established by Executive Order 13354 in Aug. 2004 and codified in Section 1021 of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-548). See NCTC, About the National Counterterrorism
Center, http://www.nctc.gov/about_us/about_nctc.html.
630 NCTC declined a request from CRS to discuss the activities of the Global Engagement Group and did not respond to
written questions about it.
631 The Office of the President, National Framework for Strategic Communication, 2010., p. 12, http://www.fas.org/
man/eprint/pubdip.pdf.
632 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Violent Islamist Extremism:
Al-Shabaab Recruitment in America, Testimony of Andrew Liepman, Deputy Director of Intelligence, National
Counterterrorism Center, 111th Cong., 1st sess., Mar. 11, 2009, p. 5, http://www.nctc.gov/press_room/speeches/sfr-
20090311.pdf.
633 Ibid., p. 6.
Congressional Research Service
123
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat
Author Contact Information
Jerome P. Bjelopera
Mark A. Randol
Analyst in Organized Crime and Terrorism
Specialist in Domestic Intelligence and Counter-
jbjelopera@crs.loc.gov, 7-0622
Terrorism
mrandol@crs.loc.gov, 7-2393
Congressional Research Service
124