Defense: FY2011 Authorization and
Appropriations
Pat Towell, Coordinator
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget
September 17, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41254
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Defense: FY2011 Authorization and Appropriations
Summary
The President’s FY2011 budget request, released February 1, 2010, included $733.3 billion in
new budget authority for national defense. In addition to $548.9 billion for the regular (non-war)
operations of the Department of Defense (DOD), the request included $159.3 billion for ongoing
military operations, primarily funding the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, bringing the total
DOD request for FY2011 to $708.3 billion. The balance of the national defense request amounts
to $25.1 billion for defense-related activities by agencies other than DOD.
The President also requested supplemental appropriations for FY2010 totaling $33.6 billion. This
included $33.0 billion for war costs and $655 million to pay DOD’s share of the cost of
humanitarian relief operations in Haiti, struck on January 12, 2010, by a devastating earthquake.
The $548.9 billion requested for DOD’s so-called “base budget”—that is, all activities other than
war costs—is $18.2 billion higher than the amount appropriated for DOD non-war costs in
FY2010. By DOD’s estimate, this 3.4% increase would amount to a “real” increase of 1.8% in
“purchasing power, after taking into account the cost of inflation. The budget request would
continue the Administration’s policy of increasing the share of DOD’s budget invested in
capabilities for counterinsurgency and other unconventional types of combat, including
helicopters, special operations forces, and unmanned vehicles.
The budget includes no funding to continue production of the C-17 cargo plane or to continue
development of the F-136 alternate engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, two programs
Congress has funded in recent years over the objections of the Bush and Obama Administrations.
On May 28, 2010, the House passed H.R. 5136, the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2011. As reported by the committee (H.Rept. 111-491), the bill would authorize $725.9 billion
for DOD and other defense-related activities, a reduction of $2.7 million from the
Administration’s request for programs covered by that legislation. The House bill would add to
the budget $485 million to continue development of the alternate engine for the Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF), despite warnings by Defense Secretary Robert H. Gates that he would recommend
a veto of any bill that would continue that project. The bill included no funds for the procurement
of additional C-17s. An amendment adopted by the House would repeal a 1993 law that, in effect,
bars from military service those who are openly homosexual.
On June 4, 2010, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported its version of the FY2011
National Defense Authorization Act (S. 3454; S.Rept. 111-201), which would authorize $725.7
billion for DOD and other defense-related activities, a reduction of $240.7 million from the
Administration’s request. The committee bill would repeal the “don’t ask; don’t tell” law and it
would not add funds for either the JSF alternate engine or the C-17.
In July, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees each set funding ceilings for their
respective Defense subcommittees that would cut the requested FY2011 DOD base budget by $7
billion in the case of the House and by $8.1 billion in case of the Senate. Each Defense
Subcommittee complied with the required reduction in the base budget request. On July 27, 2010,
the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee approved a draft FY2011 DOD Appropriations
bill that would provide $513.3 billion for the base budget, a reduction of $7 billion. The full
Senate Appropriations Committee approved September 16 a draft FY2011 DOD bill that would
provide $512.2 billion for the base budget, a reduction of $8.1 billion.
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Defense: FY2011 Authorization and Appropriations
Congressional Research Service
Defense: FY2011 Authorization and Appropriations
Contents
Most Recent Developments......................................................................................................... 1
Status of Legislation.................................................................................................................... 3
FY2011 National Defense Budget Overview (Budget Function 050) ........................................... 4
FY2011 War Costs and FY2010 Supplemental ...................................................................... 5
Real Growth and “Security Agencies” ................................................................................... 6
FY2011 DOD Base Budget ......................................................................................................... 8
Projected Growth Rate and Proposed Efficiencies ................................................................. 9
Defense Budget as Share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ............................................... 13
Long-term Planning: Strategies and Budgets ............................................................................. 14
FY2011 Base Budget Highlights and Potential Issues ................................................................ 16
Military Personnel............................................................................................................... 16
Military Pay Raise ........................................................................................................ 17
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell .................................................................................................... 18
Military Health Care Costs.................................................................................................. 19
Procurement and R&D........................................................................................................ 20
Army Combat Force Modernization Programs .............................................................. 21
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans ................................................................ 21
Aircraft Programs ......................................................................................................... 24
Ballistic Missile Defense............................................................................................... 26
Military Construction .......................................................................................................... 27
Aircraft Carrier Homeport............................................................................................. 27
Marine Corps Relocation to Guam ................................................................................ 28
US CYBERCOM................................................................................................................ 28
State Department Role in Security Assistance...................................................................... 29
Bill-by-Bill Synopsis of Congressional Action to Date .............................................................. 32
FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5136, S. 3454) ...................................... 32
Military Personnel Issues .............................................................................................. 33
Sexual Assault............................................................................................................... 34
Medical Care ................................................................................................................ 35
Fort Hood Shooting Incident ......................................................................................... 36
Ballistic Missile Defense, Strategic Weapons, and the New START Treaty .................... 36
Shipbuilding ................................................................................................................. 39
Aircraft ......................................................................................................................... 41
Brigade Combat Team Modernization ........................................................................... 43
Military Construction: Carrier Homeport and Guam...................................................... 44
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Issues.................................................................................. 45
Security Assistance and the State Department................................................................ 46
Cybersecurity................................................................................................................ 48
FY2011 Defense Appropriations Bill................................................................................... 49
Appropriations Subcommittee “302(b) Allocations” ...................................................... 49
FY2011 Defense Appropriations Bills ........................................................................... 50
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Defense: FY2011 Authorization and Appropriations
Figures
Figure 1. Total DOD Appropriations, FY2001-FY2011 ............................................................... 8
Figure 2. DOD Budget (Excluding Post-9/11 War Costs), FY1948-FY2011................................. 9
Figure 3. Proposed Spending Categories Relevant to a Budget ‘Freeze’..................................... 12
Figure 4. DOD Appropriations as Share of GDP, FY1976-2015................................................. 13
Figure 5. Authorized Active Duty End Strength, FY1987-FY2011 ............................................. 17
Tables
Table 1. Summary: FY2011 DOD Appropriations........................................................................ 1
Table 2. National Defense Authorization Act, FY2011 (H.R. 5136. S. 3454)................................ 3
Table 3. FY2011 DOD Appropriations Bill.................................................................................. 3
Table 4. FY2011 National Defense Budget Request (Function 050) ............................................. 4
Table 5. FY2009-11 DOD Discretionary Appropriations.............................................................. 5
Table 6. DOD War Funding, FY2001-FY2011 Request ............................................................... 5
Table 7. Security Agency and Non-security Agency Discretionary Budget Authority
Enacted and Requested, FY2009-FY2011 ................................................................................ 7
Table 8. Projected and Alternative DOD Base Budgets, FY2011-FY2015 .................................. 10
Table 9. Defense Outlays as Share of GDP, FY2008-11 ............................................................. 13
Table 10. DOD Base Budget Discretionary Funding Request by Title. FY2010-FY2011 ............ 16
Table A-1. Congressional Action on Selected FY2011 Missile Defense Funding:
Authorization......................................................................................................................... 51
Table A-2. Congressional Action on Selected FY2011 Army and Marine Corps Programs:
Authorization......................................................................................................................... 55
Table A-3. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Shipbuilding Programs:
Authorization......................................................................................................................... 58
Table A-4. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force
Aircraft Programs: Authorization ........................................................................................... 59
Appendixes
Appendix. Selected Program Summary Tables........................................................................... 51
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 64
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Defense: FY2011 Authorization and Appropriations
Most Recent Developments
On July 27, 2010, the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee approved for consideration
by the full Appropriations Committee a FY2011 DOD Appropriations bill (unnumbered) that
would provide a total of $671.0 billion for all Pentagon activities except military construction.1
For the base budget, the bill would appropriate $513.3 billion, a reduction of $7.0 billion from the
President’s request, as required by the Defense Subcommittee’s 302(b) allocation. For war costs,
the subcommittee bill would provide $157.7 billion, a reduction of $253 million from the
request.2
The Senate Appropriations Committee approved September 16 a DOD appropriations bill that
would reduce the President’s request by $8.1 billion, as required by the Senate Appropriations
Committee’s overall budget guidance.
Full details were not immediately available for either bill.
Table 1. Summary: FY2011 DOD Appropriations
(amounts in billions of dollars of discretionary budget authority)
House Defense
Appropriations
Senate Defense
Administration
Subcommittee
Appropriations
request
recommendation
recommendation
Base Budget
520.3
513.3
512.2
War Costs (“Overseas
Contingency Operations”)
157.9 157.7 157.7
Total 678.2
671.0
669.9
Source: House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, “2011 Defense Appropriations, Subcommittee Bill:
Summary Table,” accessed September 8, 2010, at
http://appropriations.house.gov/images/stories/pdf/def/FY11_defense_summary.7.28.10.pdf.; Senate Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee, “Summary: FY 2011 Department of Defense Appropriations Bill: Subcommittee
Mark,” accessed September 15, 2010, at
http://www.appropriations.senate.gov/news.cfm?method=news.view&id=5d9a8abc-e3ee-4c49-9649-
1f1311286566.
Notes: Totals may not add due to rounding,
The version of the FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act passed May 28 by the House
(H.R. 5136; H.Rept. 111-491) would authorize $725.9 billion for DOD and other defense-related
activities, which is $2.7 million less than the Administration requested. The version of the bill
1 Funds for military construction and DOD family housing are appropriated in a separate bill that funds those activities
plus the budgets for the Department of Veterans Affairs and certain other agencies. See CRS Report R41345, Military
Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies: FY2011 Appropriations, by Daniel H. Else, Christine Scott, and
Sidath Viranga Panangala. However, military construction funds are authorized, along with the rest of the DOD budget,
in the annual national defense authorization act.
2 See “FY2011 Defense Appropriations Bill” beginning on p. 44.
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reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 4, 2010, (S. 3454; S.Rept. 111-201),
would authorize $725.7 billion, a reduction of $240.7 million from the Administration’s request.3
Table 2. Summary: FY2011 National Defense Authorization (H.R. 5136, S. 3454)
(amounts in billions of dollars of discretionary budget authority)
Senate
committee
House-passed
reported
Administration
H.R. 3156
S. 3454
request
5/28/1
6/4/10
Base Budget
548,871
548.869
550,314
War Costs (“Overseas
Contingency Operations”)
159,336 159,335 157,648
Total 708,207
708,204
707,962
Source: House Armed Services Committee, Report to Accompany H.R. 5136, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, H.Rept. 111-491; Senate Armed Services Committee, Report to
Accompany S. 3454, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, S.Rept. 111-201.
Notes: These amounts exclude funds authorized by the bill for defense-related nuclear energy programs
conducted by the Department of Energy and certain other defense-related federal activities outside of DOD that
the federal budget includes in budget function 050 (“national defense”). Totals may not add due to rounding,
Both the House-passed and Senate committee-reported versions of the authorization bill generally
supported the Administration’s budget request. In particular, both versions supported President
Obama’s position on two contentious issues:
• Neither bill would add to the budget funds to continue production of the C-17
long-range cargo plane; and
• Both would repeal a 1993 law (10 U.S.C. 654) that, in effect, bars from military
service those who are openly homosexual, establishing a policy colloquially
referred to as “don’t ask, don’t tell.”
On two other high profile issues, the House bill challenges Administration positions that were
backed by the Senate Armed Services Committee, with the House bill:
• authorizing a 1.9% increase in basic pay for military personnel instead of the
1.4% increase requested by the President and authorized by the Senate Armed
Services bill; and
• authorizing $485 million not requested in the budget to continue development of
an alternate jet engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, a project the Bush and
Obama Administrations both have tried to terminate.
3 See “FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5136, S. 3454)” beginning on p. 29.
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Status of Legislation
Table 2. National Defense Authorization Act, FY2011 (H.R. 5136. S. 3454)
Conference Report
Approval
House
House
Senate
Senate
Conf.
Public
Report
Passage
Report
Passage
Report
House Senate Law
H.Rept.
S.Rept.
-- -- -- -- --
111-491
229-186
111-201
5/21/10
5/28/10
6/4/10
Table 3. FY2011 DOD Appropriations Bill
Subcommittee
Conference Report
Markup
Approval
House
House
Senate
Senate
Conf.
Public
House Senate Report
Passage
Report
Passage
Report
House Senate Law
9/27/10
9/14/10
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
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Defense: FY2011 Authorization and Appropriations
FY2011 National Defense Budget Overview
(Budget Function 050)
The President’s FY2011 budget request, released February 1, 2010, included $738.7 billion in
new budget authority for the so-called “national defense” function of the federal government
(function 050), which includes the military activities of the Department of Defense (DOD) and
defense-related activities of other agencies, the largest component of which is Energy Department
work related to nuclear weapons and nuclear powerplants for warships.4
Of that total, $733.3 billion is discretionary spending, most of which requires an annual
appropriation.5 The FY2011 budget for the 050 function also includes a net sum of $5.3 billion in
mandatory spending, the largest share of which is for military retirees who are authorized to
receive “concurrent receipt” of their full military pension and a disability pension from the
Department of Veterans Affairs (Table 4).6
Table 4. FY2011 National Defense Budget Request (Function 050)
(amounts are in millions of dollars)
Discretionary
Mandatory
Total
Department of Defense,
Base Budget
548.9 3.9 552.8
Department of Defense,
war costs
159.3 0 159.3
Other “national defense”
activities
25.2 1.4 26.6
Total 733.4
5.3
738.7
Source: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2011
(“The Green Book”), March 2010, Table1-9, “National Defense Budget Authority-Function 050,” pp. 14-15.
In addition to $548.9 billion requested for the regular (non-war) operations of the Department of
Defense (DOD) in FY2011, the budget request included $159.3 billion for ongoing military
operations, primarily funding the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, bringing the total DOD
request for FY2011 to $708.3 billion. The Administration also requested $33 billion in
supplemental DOD appropriations for FY2010 war costs, in order to cover the cost of the
President’s decision, announced on November 30, 2009, to deploy an additional 30,000 troops to
Afghanistan. This “surge” would bring to 98,000 the total number of U.S. troops in that country
at the end of FY2011. Added to the funds previously appropriated for war costs in the FY2010
DOD appropriations bill enacted December 19, 2009 (H.R. 3326/P.L. 111-118), the requested
4 Civil works activities of the Army Corps of Engineers are not included in the “national defense” budget function.
5 Accrual payments to support medical care for military retirees under the so-called Tricare-for-Life program are
counted as discretionary spending, but are funded under a permanent appropriation.
6 Mandatory spending for concurrent receipt and other activities is partially offset by various receipts and income from
trust funds.
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Defense: FY2011 Authorization and Appropriations
supplemental funds would bring the total amount appropriated for FY2010 war costs to $162.6
billion (Table 5).
Table 5. FY2009-11 DOD Discretionary Appropriations
(amounts in billions of dollars)
FY2010
FY2009
FY2010
Supplemental
FY2011
Enacted
Enacted
Request
Requested
Base Budget
513.1
530.7
n/a
548.9
“Economic
Stimulus”
package
7.4 n/a n/a n/a
War Costs/Overseas
Contingency Operations
145.8 129.6 33.0 159.3
Haiti Relief Operations
n/a
n/a
.6
n/a
Total 666.3
660.3
33.6
708.3
Sources: CRS calculations based on National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2011 (“The Green Book”). Office of
the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2010, Table1-9, “National Defense Budget Authority-
Function 050,” pp. 14-15 and CRS Report R40531, FY2009 Spring Supplemental Appropriations for Overseas
Contingency Operations, coordinated by Stephen Daggett and Susan B. Epstein, Table F-1, pp. 62-72. Totals may
not add due to rounding.
Note: Base budget amounts Include accrual payments to support medical care for military retirees under the so-
cal ed Tricare-for-Life program, which is discretionary spending, but is funded pursuant to a permanent
appropriation.
FY2011 War Costs and FY2010 Supplemental
The Administration’s $159.3 billion request for war costs in FY2011 was roughly $3 billion lower
than the FY2010 war budget (including the pending supplemental request that would increase the
FY2010 amount by $33 billion). For the third year in a row, the budget request reflected a shift in
emphasis from operations in Iraq to those in Afghanistan (Table 6).
Table 6. DOD War Funding, FY2001-FY2011 Request
(in billions of dollars and shares of total)
Total:
FY2010
FY2010
FY2001-
FY2010
Supplemental
Total with
FY2011
FY2008
FY2009
Enacted
Request
Request
Request
IRAQ
Funding
$553.5 $92.0 $59.6 $1.0
$60.6 $45.8
Share
of
Total
78% 62% 46% 3%
38% 29%
AFGHANISTAN
Funding
$159.2 $56.1 $69.1 $30.0 $99.1 $113.5
Share
of
Total
22% 38% 54% 97% 62% 71%
TOTAL
Funding
$712.7 $148.2 $128.7 $31.0
$159.7 $159.3
Share
of
Total
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Source: CRS Report R41232, FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs,
coordinated by Amy Belasco, based on Table 8-5 in DOD, FY2011 Budget Request Overview, Febraury 1, 2010;
http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/FY2011_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
Notes: CRS calculations exclude non-war funding in supplementals, and include funds from DOD’s regular
budget used for war needs.
Haiti Operations Supplemental
On March 24, 2010, the Administration amended its FY2010 DOD supplemental funding request
to include an additional $655 million to pay for humanitarian relief operations in Haiti, which was
struck on January 12, 2010, by a devastating earthquake. The DOD relief effort included the
deployment of 18 Navy ships, 830 cargo flights and nearly 21,000 military personnel.
War Funding
For an analysis of some issues raised by the Administration’s funding request for military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan and for congressional action on the FY2010 supplemental appropriations request for war costs, see CRS
Report R41232, FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs, coordinated by Amy
Belasco. For further information on war costs, see CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global
War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco.
Real Growth and “Security Agencies”
DOD is one of the federal agencies the Administration has defined as “security agencies” that are
exempt from the budget freeze on discretionary spending by non-security agencies. Compared
with the amount appropriated for the DOD base budget in FY2010, the requested FY2011 base
budget would be an increase of 3.4%, amounting to a 1.8% “real growth” in purchasing power
(that is, taking account of the cost of inflation).
The budget request also would provide real growth in spending for other “security agencies”—a
category that it defined as including the Department of State and “other international programs,”
the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Homeland Security and the National Nuclear Security
Agency (NNSA) of the Department of Energy.7
In sum, the Administration requested $719.2 billion for discretionary programs of the security
agencies (excluding war costs), which is 5.2% more than was appropriated for those programs in
FY2010. For non-security agencies—that is, all other discretionary programs—the
Administration requested $386.4 billion, a 1.5% decrease from their FY2010 appropriations
(Table 7).
7 For the Energy Department’s Nuclear National Security Agency (NNSA), which was designated as a “security
agency” and, thus, exempt from its budget freeze, the Administration requested $11.2 billion in FY2011, 13.5% more
than was appropriated for the agency in FY2010. However, the administration also requested $6.5 billion for other
defense-related Energy Department activities which OMB designates as part of the “National Security” function of the
budget (Function 050) and which are covered by the annual National Defense Authorization Act, but which the
Administration did not designate as “security agencies” that were exempt from the budget freeze. Office of
Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2011, Table 5.1, “Budget
Authority by Function and Subfunction, 1976-2015,” p. 94, and Department of Energy, “Summary Table: Budget by
Appropriation,” accessed at http://www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/11budget/Content/Apprsum.pdf.
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Table 7. Security Agency and Non-security Agency Discretionary Budget Authority
Enacted and Requested, FY2009-FY2011
(amounts are in billions of dollars)
FY2009
FY2010
FY2011
enacted
enacted
requested
American
Recovery and
Reinvestment
Act
Regular
(“Stimulus
Appropriations
Package”)
Security Agencies
DOD 513.2
7.4
530.8
548.9
National Nuclear Security Administration
9.1 -- 9.9
11.2
(Department of Energy)
Department of Homeland Security
42.1
2.8
39.4
43.6
Department of Veterans Affairs
47.6
1.4
53.1
57.0
State and other International Programs
38.1
0.4
50.6
58.5
Subtotal, Security Agencies
650.1 12.0
683.7
719.2
Subtotal, Nonsecurity Agencies 354.1 253.1 392.1
386.4
Source: Office of Management and Budget, The Budget for Fiscal Year 2011, Table S-7, “Funding Levels for
Appropriated (“Discretionary”) Programs by Agency,” pp. 130-31.
Note: Nonsecurity Agencies are all federal agencies not listed as “Security Agencies.”
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FY2011 DOD Base Budget
The $548.9 billion requested for the FY2011 DOD base budget is $18.2 billion higher than the
$531.0 billion appropriated for DOD non-war costs in FY2010. By DOD’s estimate, this 3.4%
increase would provide a 1.8% increase in real purchasing power, after taking into account the
cost of inflation. The request would continue the relatively steady upward trend in DOD base
budgets since FY1998, which was the low-water mark of the post-Cold War retrenchment in
defense funding (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Total DOD Appropriations, FY2001-FY2011
(dollars in billions)
Source: DOD; Briefing on the FY2011 Budget Request, February 2010, accessed at:
http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/fy2011_BudgetBriefing.pdf
Adjusted for inflation (using DOD deflators), the requested FY2011 base budget would be DOD’s
third largest since the end of the Korean War, after the amounts appropriated for FY1985 and
FY1986 at the peak of the Reagan Administration’s defense buildup (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. DOD Budget (Excluding Post-9/11 War Costs), FY1948-FY2011
amounts in millions of dollars
Source: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2011
(“The Green Book”), Table 6-8, “Department of Defense BA by Title,” pp. 109-114. Data for FY2001-FY2011
from CRS analysis based on distinction between base budget and war costs for those years in DOD; Briefing on
the FY2011 Budget Request, February 2010 (see Figure 1, above).
Notes: Data for FY2010 and FY2011 based on Administration’s February 2010 budget request. Data for the
FY1976 transition quarter are omitted.
Projected Growth Rate and Proposed Efficiencies
For the four years following FY2011 (FY2012-FY2015), the Administration projects annual
increases in the DOD base budget that would exceed inflation, on average, by 0.8%. This falls
short of the 2% real growth rate that Defense Secretary Robert Gates said, in congressional
testimony on May 14, 2009, would be needed to pay for the investments the Department planned
to make through FY2015 (Table 8).8
8Transcript, Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the FY2010 DOD budget request, May 14, 2009. Accessed
at
http://www.cq.com/display.do?dockey=/cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/transcripts/congressional/111/congressionaltrans
cripts111-000003117540.html@committees&metapub=CQ-CONGTRANSCRIPTS&searchIndex=1&seqNum=1.
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Table 8. Projected and Alternative DOD Base Budgets, FY2011-FY2015
(total budget authority, including mandatory, in billions of dollars)
FY2011-
FY2015,
FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 FY2015
total
Administration Plan (current dol ars)
552.8
570.1
585.7
601.8
620.2
2,930.6
Administration Plan (constant FY2011
dollars)
552.8 558.8 562.7 566.3 571.5 2,812.1
percent
real
growth
1.8% 1.1% 0.7% 0.6% 0.9%
n/a
Amount that would provide 2% real
growth, compounded (current dol ars)
553.9 576.4 600.0 624.6 650.7 3,005.6
Amount by which 2% real growth budget
would exceed Administration Plan
1.1 6.3 14.3 22.8 30.5 75.0
(current dol ars)
Source: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2011
(“The Green Book”), Table 6-8, “Department of Defense BA by Title,” p. 114. Data concerning 2% real growth
rate are CRS calculations based on data in Table 6-8. Figures may not add due to rounding.
In a May 8, 2010, speech, Secretary Gates proposed bridging that gap between the cost of
sustaining the current force and the budgets he expected in the future by reducing DOD’s
overhead costs by $10 billion annually, in order to sustain its current forces with the budgets he
expected in the future, given the country’s current difficult economic circumstances. Sustaining
the current force, Secretary Gates said, would require, “real growth in the defense budget ranging
from two to 3% above inflation.... But, realistically, it is highly unlikely that we will achieve the
real growth rates necessary to sustain the current force structure.”9
The solution Secretary Gates proposed is to shift funds within the budget, providing the necessary
real growth in those accounts that directly support combat forces, but offsetting the additional
cost by an equivalent reduction in spending for administrative and support activities such as
personnel management, acquisition oversight, and DOD’s medical program. Phrased in terms of
military jargon, Secretary Gates proposed increasing the amount spent on DOD’s fighting force—
the “tooth”-- by decreasing the amount spent on administrative and support functions—the “tail.”
The goal is to cut our overhead costs and to transfer those savings to force structure and
modernization within the programmed budget: In other words, to convert sufficient “tail” to
“tooth” to provide the equivalent of roughly two to three percent real growth....Simply taking
a few percent off the top of everything on a one-time basis will not do. These savings must
stem from root-and-branch changes that can be sustained and added to over time.10
Citing an estimate by the Defense Business Board11 that DOD’s tail absorbs roughly 40% of the
department’s annual budget,12 Gates told reporters that a shift of about $10 billion from those
9 Secretary Gates delivered this address at the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas. Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Public Affairs), “Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Abilene, KAS, May 8,
2010”, accessed at: http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1467.
10 Ibid.
11 The Defense Business Board, is a federal advisory committee that provides management advice to the Secretary of
Defense.
12 Defense Business Board, Report to the Secretary of Defense: Task Group Report on Tooth-to-Tail Analysis, April
(continued...)
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support functions to the part of the budget that directly supports combat units would provide a
total real increase of about 3% in the “tooth”-related part of the FY2012 DOD budget request.13
On August 9, 2010, Secretary Gates announced several initiatives he said would reduce the cost
of DOD’s headquarters and support bureaucracies. Among these were:
• a 10% reduction in funding for service support contractors in each of the next
three years;
• a reduction in the number of generals and admirals by 50 and a reduction in the
number of senior DOD civilians by 150 over the next two years; and
• elimination of the Joint Forces Command, the Business Transformation Agency
and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and
Information Integration.14
On September 14, 2010, Secretary Gates announced 23 additional initiatives, all of which were
intended to increase the efficiency with which DOD contracts for goods and services—activities
which, he said, account for about $400 billion of the roughly $700 billion the department spends
annually. Among these contracting and acquisition initiatives were:
• a requirement that weapons program managers treat an “affordability target” as a
key requirement of each new system, on a par with the usual performance
requirements such as speed or data transmission rate;
• various contracting revisions intended to reward contractors for managing their
programs more efficiently; and
• several changes in contracting rules intended to reduce the cost of contracts for
services, which account for more than half DOD’s annual contracting budget.15
Some Members of Congress contend that the Administration’s projected real budget increases,
even if realized, would be inadequate, given the steadily rising cost of personnel and operations.
For example, Rep. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon, the ranking minority member of the House
Armed Services Committee, commented in a February 4, 2010, Heritage Foundation lecture that
the planned budgets would force DOD to scale back some planned acquisition programs:
One percent real growth in the defense budget over the next five years is a net cut for
investment and procurement accounts. 16
(...continued)
2008, accessed at http://dbb.defense.gov/pdf/Tooth_to_Tail_Final_Report.pdf.
13 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), “Media Availability with Secretary Gates en route to
Kansas City, MO, May 7, 2010, accessed at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4621.
14 Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “Statement on Department Efficiencies Initiative,” August 9, 2010, Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), accessed at
http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1496
15 See Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Transcript, “DOD News Briefing with Under
Secretary Carter with Opening Remarks by Secretary Gates from the Pentagon,” September 14, 2010, accessed at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4684, on September 16, 2010.
16 Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon, “Building a Robust National Defense,” accessed at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/Building-a-Robust-National-Defense.
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On the other hand, some members object to exempting DOD (and other “security agencies”) from
the Administration-imposed budget freeze on discretionary spending (Figure 3). For example,
Rep. Barney Frank has called for reductions in the DOD budget based on the termination of
unnecessary weapons programs and a retrenchment from some of the overseas military
commitments that DOD cites as justifying its current budget level:
[President Obama’s] announcement that he is going to begin deficit reduction, while
exempting the ever-increasing military budget from the same scrutiny that goes to other
federal expenditures means either that deficit reduction in both the near and long term is
doomed to failure, or that devastating cuts will occur in virtually every federal program that
aims at improving the quality of our lives.17
Figure 3. Proposed Spending Categories Relevant to a Budget ‘Freeze’
amounts in billions of current dollars
Source: Office of Management and Budget, The Budget for Fiscal Year 2011. Data for Security Agencies
(excluding war costs) and Non-Security Agencies drawn from Table S-11, “Funding Levels for Appropriated
(“Discretionary”) Programs by Agency,” p. 174. Data for Mandatory Spending and Net Interest drawn from
Table S-4, “Proposed Budget by Category,” p. 151.
Notes: Besides DOD, the Obama Administration defines as “security agencies” the fol owing: the Department
of Homeland Security, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of State “and other international
programs,” and the National Nuclear Security Administration within the Department of Energy. Ibid.,Table S-11,
“Funding Levels for Appropriated (“Discretionary”) Programs by Agency,” p. 174.
17 Rep. Barney Frank, "You Can't Succeed at Deficit Reduction Without Really Trying," Congressional Record, daily
edition, February 4, 2010, p. E157.http://www.house.gov/frank/speeches/2010/02-02-10-deficit-reduction-military-
speech.pdf.
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Defense Budget as Share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
The FY2011 DOD base budget request amounts to 3.6% of the GDP, by the Administration’s
calculations—the same percentage as the FY2010 base budget (Table 9).
Table 9. Defense Outlays as Share of GDP, FY2008-11
2008
2009
2010
2011
DOD Base Budget
(without war costs)
3.3% 3.5% 3.6% 3.6%
DOD Total Budget
4.1%
4.5%
4.7%
4.7%
Source: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2011
(“The Green Book”), Table 7-7, “Defense Shares of Economic and Budgetary Aggregates,” pp. 223-24, and Office
of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request, briefing slides accessed at
http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/fy2011_BudgetBriefing.pdf.
Viewed over the long haul, the FY2011 request would mark the leveling off of a relatively steady
upward trend in the DOD share of GDP since the attacks of September 11, 2001 (Figure 4).
Figure 4. DOD Appropriations as Share of GDP, FY1976-2015
Source: CRS calculations based on Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptrol er), National Defense
Budget Estimates for FY2011 (“The Green Book”), Table 7-7, “Defense Shares of Economic and Budgetary
Aggregates,” pp. 223-24.
Notes: Discussions of the DOD share of the GDP typical y use data based on DOD outlays for each fiscal year,
as in Table 5, above, This chart is based on annual levels of DOD budget authority, because available outlay data
do not separate war costs from base budget expenditures. Year to year changes in outlays lag corresponding
movements in budget authority, but over a long period, trends in the ratio of DOD budget authority to GDP
should closely track trends in the ratio of DOD outlays to GDP.
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Long-term Planning: Strategies and Budgets
The Administration did not propose in its FY2011 DOD budget request as many significant
changes to major weapons programs as had been incorporated into its FY2010 request.
Nevertheless, the FY2011 budget sustains the initiatives launched in the previous budget.
Moreover, the budget request supports the strategy and force planning assumptions that are
embodied in DOD’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a legislatively mandated assessment of
defense strategy and priorities, the most recent of which was released on February 1, 2010, to
accompany the FY2011 budget request.
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
For a more comprehensive review of the 2010 QDR, see CRS Report R41250, Quadrennial Defense Review 2010:
Overview and Implications for National Security Planning, by Stephen Daggett.
The four QDRs produced in 1997, 2001, 2005, and 2010 document an ongoing evolution of DOD
strategic thinking that has seen a shift away from emphasizing the readiness of U.S. forces to
wage smaller versions of Cold War-era conventional wars, such as the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
Increasingly, U.S. planners have focused on the need for U.S. forces to be ready for a diverse
array of missions.18 Two key assumptions running through the 2010 QDR are particularly relevant
to the Administration’s budgetary priorities.
The first of these key assumptions is that DOD’s top priority is fighting and winning the ongoing
campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Accordingly, the report says, the department must rebalance
its priorities to put more emphasis on support for forces engaged in current operations, and
institutionalize capabilities for counterinsurgency, stability, and counter-terrorism operations,
such as those currently being conducted by U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Among the near-term initiatives recommended by the QDR toward this end are increased funding
to acquire helicopters, UAVs, improved intelligence and analysis capabilities, counter IED
technologies, and AC-130 gunship aircraft.19 The report also recommends some longer-term
initiatives, including the conversion of one heavy Army brigade combat team (BCT) into a
Stryker brigade—such brigades use wheeled Stryker armored vehicles for mobility. The report
says that “several more BCTs” may be converted “as resources become available and future
global demands become clearer.”20
A second basic assumption asserted throughout the 2010 QDR is that no future adversary is likely
to directly confront U.S. conventional, military capabilities as embodied in armored brigades,
aircraft carrier task forces, and squadrons of advanced jet fighters. Instead, the argument goes,
any foe—whether a violent, radical non-state terrorist group or a technologically advanced near-
peer competitor—will try to challenge U.S. forces “asymmetrically,” that is, by using
unconventional tactics and technologies to exploit U.S. limitations. The report challenges the
18 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 2010, at
http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf.
19 “UAVs” refers to unmanned or unpiloted aerial vehicles, particularly used for intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) missions. IEDs are improvised explosive devices, including roadside, car, and truck bombs.
20 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 2010, p. 24 at
http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf.
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widely-held notion that there is a spectrum of conflict, ranging from unsophisticated insurgents or
terrorists at the low end to sophisticated national armies at the high end. Instead, the QDR says,
“low-end” terrorist groups may use advanced technologies such as precision-guided missiles and
near-peer competitors may use guerrilla-like “indirect means” of attack, such as a cyber-war
campaign to degrade the computer networks on which U.S. forces rely heavily.
The 2010 QDR emphasizes the importance of the military’s ability to operate effectively in
cyberspace, which it characterizes as one more domain of operations along with air, sea and
space. The report also asserts that DOD must strengthen its capabilities to actively defend its
cyber-networks. Towards this end, the report calls for several specific steps, including:
developing a more comprehensive approach to DOD operations in cyberspace; developing a
greater cyber expertise and awareness within DOD; centralizing command of cyber operations;
and collaborating more closely with other agencies and levels of government to enhance cyber
security.
The 2010 QDR does not abandon the long-standing policy that U.S. forces should be able to win
two major regional wars that occur nearly simultaneously in widely separated theaters of action.
However, the report assigns equal importance to ensuring that U.S. forces can respond flexibly
and effectively when required to conduct concurrently, at various points around the globe, several
missions of different types. For example, one scenario the QDR said U.S. forces should be able to
handle combined a major operation to stabilize another country, sustaining deterrence of a
potential aggressor in another region, conducting a medium-sized counter-insurgency mission in
yet another country, and providing support to U.S. civil authorities in the wake of some major
disaster or terrorist attack.
The 2010 QDR emphasizes the importance of preparing U.S. forces to deal with one particular
type of asymmetric threat that has potentially significant implications for conventional U.S.
forces: a so-called “anti-access, area-denial” capability that China and other potential adversaries
appear to be developing. The argument is that China or Iran could use a variety of both simple
and sophisticated technologies to target U.S. forward bases in nearby nations and naval forces
operating relatively close to shore, which are the basis of the U.S. ability to project power in
regions far from the U.S. homeland. Such power projection capabilities are the bedrock of U.S.
alliances in Europe and Asia and the key to U.S. efforts to bolster stability in other important
regions as well. Such capabilities are also expensive. The cost of power projection capabilities is
one reason why U.S. defense spending dramatically exceeds that of any other nation.
Those sinews of U.S. power projections may be increasingly vulnerable to attack. Overseas
ground bases may be increasingly vulnerable to ballistic missile, cruise missile, and bomber
attacks. Naval forces, particularly aircraft carriers and other service combatants, may be
increasingly vulnerable to anti-ship cruise missiles; modern, quiet diesel electric submarines;
smart mines that can be activated on command and maneuvered into place; small, fast boats laden
with explosives; or, at the high end of the technological spectrum, ballistic missiles with
maneuverable warheads that can be redirected in flight to strike moving ships.
The QDR makes a number of recommendations for countering anti-access strategies, including
increased reliance on long-range strike weapons and submarines that would be less vulnerable to
such methods. For instance, long-range strike forces might include a new manned or unmanned
bomber, perhaps armed with long-range cruise missiles for stand-off attacks. Measures to defeat
enemy sensors and engagement systems include development of offensive “electronic attack”
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capabilities, which remain highly classified. Missile defense may be a major and expensive part
of measures to protect forward deployed forces.
FY2011 Base Budget Highlights and Potential Issues
The FY2011 base budget request reflects some major initiatives of long standing, and others—
particularly in acquisition—that were launched by the Obama Administration in its FY2010
budget (Table 10). Following are some highlights:
Table 10. DOD Base Budget Discretionary Funding Request by Title. FY2010-FY2011
(current dollar amounts in billions)
Change, FY210-
FY2010
FY2011
FY211
Military Personnel
$135.0 $138.5 +2.6%
Operations and Maintenance
184.5
200.2
+8.5%
Procurement 104.8
112.9
+7.7%
Research and Development
80.1
76.1
-5.0%
Military Construction and
Family Housing
23.3 18.7 -19.6%
Revolving and Management
Funds
3,1 2.4
-23.7%
Total $530.7
$548.9
+3.4%
Source: DOD; Briefing on the FY2011 Budget Request, February 2010, accessed at:
http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/fy2011_BudgetBriefing.pdf
Military Personnel21
The FY2011 budget request would fund 1.43 million active duty personnel in the regular
components.22 This amounts to a 4.7% increase over the end-strength of 1.38 million in FY2000,
which was the low point in a reduction in active-duty manpower that began in FY1987 and
accelerated during the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
From an active-duty end-strength of 2.18 million in FY1987, the high-water mark of the Reagan
defense buildup, active duty end-strength was reduced by about one-third across each of the
services during the drawdown of the early 1990s. Since the start of combat operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq, the end strength of the Army and Marine Corps rebounded to 562,400 and
202,100, respectively. Both goals have been met, three years earlier than had been planned
21 Prepared in collaboration with Charles A. Henning, Specialist in Military Manpower Policy.
22 This total includes 26,000 personnel who comprise what DOD regards as a temporary expansion to fill billets
associated with ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It does not include 79,000 members of the reserve
components (including the National Guard) who are serving full-time, nor does it include the much larger number of
reserve component personnel who have been temporarily called to active duty in connection with ongoing combat
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
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(Figure 5). In 2010, Congress authorized an additional, temporary increase in the Army’s active
duty strength, which is reflected in the FY2011 request for an Army end-strength of 569,400.
Additional Detail on Selected FY2011 Military Personnel Issues
For a more comprehensive review of military personnel issues in the FY2011 budget, see CRS Report R41316,
FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues, coordinated by Charles A. Henning
Figure 5. Authorized Active Duty End Strength, FY1987-FY2011
(end-strength levels in thousands)
2500
2000
s
d
san
u
1500
o
h
t
in
th
g
n
1000
re
-st
d
en
500
0
FY87
FY90
FY93
FY96
FY99
FY02
FY05
FY08
FY11
Air Force
607
567
450
388
371
359
360
330
332
Marine Corps
200
197
182
174
172
173
178
189
202
Navy
587
592
536
428
373
376
366
329
328
Army
781
764
599
495
480
480
502
525
569
Source: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2011
(“The Green Book”), Table 7-5, “Department of Defense Manpower,” pp. 217-18.
Notes: Data does not include temporary end strength authority of 30,000 for the Army and 9,000 for the
Marine Corps, in effect during the period FY2005-FY2009 nor additional temporary end strength authority of
22,000 for the Army and 13,000 for the Marine Corps in effect during FY2009-FY2010.
Data for FY2011 is the Administration’s request.
Military Pay Raise
The budget includes nearly $1 billion to give military personnel a 1.4 % raise in basic pay
effective January 1, 2011. This increase would equal the average increase in private-sector pay
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and benefits as measured by the Labor Department’s Employment Cost Index (ECI), as required
by law.23 In addition, the Basic Allowance for Housing, a non-taxable cash payment to service
members who do not live in government-provided housing (which can add about 20% to a service
member’s basic pay), is scheduled to increase by 4.2% in FY2011.
In each year but one since FY2004, Congress has approved raises in military basic pay that were
0.5% higher than the ECI increase, on the grounds that military pay increases had lagged behind
civilian pay hikes during the 1980s.24
DOD officials contend that service members currently are better paid than 70% of private sector
workers with comparable experience and responsibility and that the $340 million it would cost to
provide the higher 1.9% raise across-the-board would provide more benefit to the department if it
were spent, instead, on reenlistment bonuses and special pays for military personnel in critical
specialties. Military advocacy groups insist, however, that service members need the higher
increase to close a “pay gap” between military personnel and their civilian peers.25
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell
The FY2011 DOD funding bills provide a vehicle for legislative initiatives by supporters and
opponents of President Obama’s decision to revise a 1993 law26 and DOD regulations that, in
effect, bar from military service those who are openly homosexual. Under a compromise policy
reached in 1993, colloquially referred to as “don’t ask, don’t tell,” service members are not to be
asked about nor allowed to discuss their same-sex orientation.
In his January 27, 2010, State of the Union Address, President Obama called for repealing the
1993 legislation and adopting a policy of nondiscrimination against persons with a same-sex
orientation. DOD has begun a study, due for completion by the end of 2010, on how such a
change in law and policy would be implemented. Secretary Gates has opposed repeal of the 1993
law pending completion of that study. On March 25, 2010, he announced changes in the
department’s procedures for enforcement of the current law, providing that only a general or flag
officer would have the authority to initiate an investigation and separate someone who had
engaged in homosexual conduct, and that third party information alleging homosexual conduct by
a service member must be given under oath.
Some Members of Congress contend that the presence in combat units of openly homosexual
personnel would undermine the units’ cohesion and combat effectiveness. Some critics oppose
changing the current policy while the tempo of deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan is imposing
stress on the services. Other legislators have called for immediate repeal of the 1993 law or, at
least, a moratorium in the discharge of service members for violating the don’t ask, don’t tell
policy.27
23 Title 37, United States Code, Section 1009.
24 Congress did not increase the proposed pay raise in FY2007.
25 See CRS Report R41316, FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues,
coordinated by Charles A. Henning.
26 Title 10, United States Code, Section 654.
27 CRS Report R40782, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell:” The Law and Military Policy on Same-Sex Behavior, by David F.
Burrelli and CRS Report R40795, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”: A Legal Analysis, by Jody Feder. Two bills introduced in
the 111th Congress would repeal the law and replace it with a policy of nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual
(continued...)
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In a May 24, 2010, letter to President Obama, Senators Carl Levin and Joseph I. Lieberman and
Representative Patrick J. Murphy proposed an amendment to the FY2011 Defense Authorization
Act that would repeal the 1993 legislation barring openly homosexual persons from military
service after: (1) the current DOD review has been completed: and (2) the President, the Secretary
of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have certified to Congress that policies
and regulations have been prepared that would allow the repeal of the ban to be implemented in a
way that is, “consistent with the standards of military readiness, military effectiveness, unit
cohesion, and recruiting and retention of the armed forces.”28
In a letter responding to the three Members, Office of Management and Budget Director Peter R.
Orzag said that, while the Administration would have preferred that congressional action on the
issue await completion of the current DOD study, the Administration “understands that Congress
has chosen to move forward with legislation now,” and that the Administration supports the draft
amendment.29
In a statement to reporters on May 25, 2010, DOD press spokesman Geoff Morrell reportedly
said:
Secretary Gates continues to believe that ideally, the [Defense Department] review should be
completed before there is any legislation to repeal the ‘don’t ask, don’t tell,’ law. With
Congress having indicated that is not possible, the secretary can accept the language in the
proposed amendment.30
Military Health Care Costs31
The FY2011 budget request includes $50.7 billion for the DOD health care system that employs
85,000 military personnel and 53,000 civilian DOD employees. The system serves 9.5 million
eligible beneficiaries through 56 hospitals, 363 out-patient medical facilities, and 275 dental
clinics.
The system’s cost, which was $19 billion in FY2001, has more than doubled in the 10 years since
then. The cost of the medical program is projected by DOD to increase annually at a rate of 5-7%
through FY2015, when it is projected to account for 10% of the planned DOD budget.
In addition to the cost of general inflation and new developments in medical technology, DOD
officials attribute the steady increase in military health care costs to several factors, including:
• an increase in the number of retirees using DOD’s TRICARE medical insurance
rather than other, less generous insurance plans for which they are eligible; and
(...continued)
orientation—H.R. 1283 and S. 3065.
28 Draft legislative amendment accessed on the White House Press Office website at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/Lieberman_NDAA_DADT_Amendment.pdf.
29 Peter R. Orzag, letter to Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, accessed on the White House Press Office website at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/Sen_Lieberman.pdf.
30 Donna Miles, “Gates Can Accept ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Amendment,” Armed Forces Press Service, May 25, 2010.
accessed at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=59321.
31 Prepared in collaboration with Don J. Jansen, Analyst in Military Health Care Policy.
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• an increase in the frequency with which eligible beneficiaries use DOD medical
services.
• legislatively mandated increases in benefits, such as Tricare-for-Life for
reservists.
• no increase in fees and copayments for Tricare beneficiaries since 1995, when the
Tricare program was created.
The Bush Administration’s DOD budget requests for FY2007, FY2008, and FY2009 proposed to
increase enrollment fees and copayment requirements for those Tricare beneficiaries who were
not eligible for Medicare. Each year Tricare fee increases were proposed, Congress passed
legislation to prohibit them. 32
Although the Obama Administration’s 2011 budget does not include any legislative proposals to
increase TRICARE annual fees or copayments, Secretary Gates stated in a February 1, 2010,
press conference, “We certainly would like to work with the Congress in figuring out a way to try
and bring some modest control to this program .... We absolutely want to take care of our men
and women in uniform and our retirees, but at some point, there has to be some reasonable
tradeoff between reasonable cost increases or premium increases or co-pays or something and the
cost of the program.”33
Procurement and R&D
The FY2011 request would increase the total amount provided for development and procurement
of weapons and equipment from $184.9 billion in FY2010 to $189.0 billion in FY2011. The
proportion of the total DOD budget dedicated to procurement would slightly increase from 56%
to 60%, while the proportion going to R&D would decline from 44% to 40%.
In part, that shift reflects the transition into production of some major programs that have had
relatively large R&D budgets in recent years, the largest of which is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
For that program, a total of $11.2 billion was appropriated in FY2010: $4.0 billion for R&D and
$7.2 billion for procurement. For FY2011, the total budget request is only slightly higher—$11.2
billion—however that total includes $2.3 billion for R&D and $9.0 billion for procurement.34
The Administration has proposed few new cuts in major weapons programs beyond those it
proposed in its FY2010 DOD budget.35 But it has reiterated two of the proposed cuts that
Congress rejected in 2009.The FY2011 budget request includes no funds either for production of
additional C-17 wide-body cargo jets or for development of an alternate jet engine for the F-35.
32 CRS Report RS22402, Increases in Tricare Costs: Background and Options for Congress, by Don J. Jansen; and
CRS Report R40711, FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues,
coordinated by Don J. Jansen.
33Department of Defense, “DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen from the Pentagon,” press
release, February 1, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4549.
34 Figures do not add due to rounding.
35 Opposition to additional procurement of F-22 fighters was not an initiative of the Obama Administration. The
preceding Bush Administration had decided cap the number of F-22s at the 183 planes already funded. There was an
effort to add funding for additional F-22s to the FY2010 DOD appropriations bill, but the effort was dropped after
President Obama threatened to veto any bill funding additional F-22s. See CRS Report RL31673, Air Force F-22
Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Jeremiah Gertler.
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In 2009, when the Obama Administration also requested no funding for either of those programs,
Congress added $2.5 billion to the FY2010 DOD funding bills for 10 C-17s and $465 million to
continue work on the alternate engine.
Army Combat Force Modernization Programs36
Some Members of Congress may question elements of the Administration’s $3.2 billion request
for the Army’s BCT Modernization program, which is intended to develop a new generation of
combat equipment.
This program replaces the Future Combat System (FCS) program, which had been intended to
develop a new generation of combat equipment to replace current systems, such as the M-1
Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. By 2009, FCS involved efforts to
develop 14 manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive communications and
information network. On April 6, 2009, however, Secretary of Defense Gates recommended
cancelling the manned ground vehicle (MGV) component of FCS, which was intended to field
eight separate tracked combat vehicle variants built on a common chassis. Secretary Gates said he
acted because there were significant unanswered questions in the FCS vehicle design strategy and
because, despite some adjustments to the MGVs, the emerging vehicles did not adequately reflect
the lessons of counterinsurgency and close-quarters combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In place of MGV, the Army has launched a Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program intended to
field by 2015-17 a family of fighting vehicles based on mature technologies and designed to
readily incorporate future network capabilities. Another potential oversight question for Congress
is whether the Army is rushing the development of the GCV, thereby inviting undue risk that
would set the stage for another unsuccessful acquisition program.37
While the MGV component of FCS was terminated, other elements of the FCS program including
sensors, unmanned aerial and ground vehicles, and a modified FCS command and control
network were incorporated into the Army’s (BCT) Modernization program under which the
service plans to “spin out” the components, as they become available, to all 73 Army BCTs by
2025. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the FCS components that the
Army plans to deploy under the “spin out” approach have not demonstrated their effectiveness in
field exercises.38
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans39
The Navy’s FY2011 budget submission retains, for the time being at least, the goal of achieving
and maintaining the 313-ship fleet that the Navy first presented to Congress in February 2006.
Although the 313-ship goal remains in place, some elements of Navy force planning that have
emerged since 2006 appear to diverge from the original plan. The Navy’s report on its FY2011
36 Prepared in collaboration with Steve Bowman, Specialist in National Security.
37 CRS Report RL32888, Army Future Combat System (FCS) “Spin-Outs” and Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV):
Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert and Nathan Jacob Lucas.
38 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Position Army's Ground Force
Modernization Effort for Success, GAO-10-406, March 2010.
39 Prepared in collaboration with Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs.
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30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan refers to a forthcoming force structure assessment
(FSA). Such an assessment could produce a replacement for the 313-ship plan. It is not clear
when the FSA might be conducted, or when a replacement for the current plan might be issued.
The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requests funding for the procurement of nine new battle
force ships (i.e., ships that count against the 313-ship goal). The nine ships include two attack
submarines, two destroyers, two Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), one amphibious assault ship, one
Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship (i.e., a maritime prepositioning ship), and one Joint High
Speed Vessel (JHSV). The Navy’s five-year (FY2011-FY2015) shipbuilding plan includes a total
of 50 new battle force ships, or an average of 10 per year. Of the 50 ships in the plan, half are
relatively inexpensive LCSs or JHSVs.
The Navy’s FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan includes 276 ships. The plan
does not include enough ships to fully support all elements of the 313-ship plan over the long run.
The Navy projects that implementing the 30-year plan would result in a fleet that grows from 284
ships in FY2011 to 315 ships in FY2020, reaches a peak of 320 ships in FY2024, drops below
313 ships in FY2027, declines to 288 ships in FY2032-FY2033, and then increases to 301 ships
in FY2039-FY2040. The Navy projects that the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces
will drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan.
The Navy estimates that executing the 30-year shipbuilding plan would require an average of
$15.9 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars. A May 2010 Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) report estimates that the plan would require an average of $19.0 billion per year in
constant FY2010 dollar Su s, or about 19% more than the Navy estimates. The CBO report states:
“If the Navy receives the same amount of funding for ship construction in the next 30 years as it
has over the past three decades—an average of about $15 billion a year in 2010 dollars—it will
not be able to afford all of the purchases in the 2011 plan.”40
Specific shipbuilding issues that have been discussed at hearings this year on the Navy’s proposed
FY2011 budget include the following:
Next Generation Ballistic Missile bmarine SSBN(X)
The Navy is currently conducting development and design work on a planned class of 12 next-
generation ballistic missile submarines, or SSBN(X)s,1 which the service wants to procure as
replacements for its current force of 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines. The SSBN(X)
program, also known as the Ohio-class replacement program, received $497.4 million in research
and development funding in the Navy's FY2010 budget, and the Navy's FY2011 budget requests
an additional $672.3 million in research and development funding for the program. Navy plans
tocall for procuring the first SSBN(X) in FY2019, with advance procurement funding for the boat
beginning in FY2015.
The Navy preliminarily estimates the procurement cost of each SSBN(X) at $6 billion to $7
billion in FY2010 dollars—a figure equivalent to roughly one-half of the Navy's budget each year
for procuring new ships. Some observers are concerned that the SSBN(X) program will
significantly compound the challenge the Navy faces in ensuring the affordability of its long-term
shipbuilding program. These observers are concerned that procuring 12 SSBN(X)s during the 15-
40 Congressional Budget Office, “An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2011 Shipbuilding Plan,” May 2010, p. vii.
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year period FY2019-FY2033, as called for in Navy plans, could lead to reductions in procurement
rates for other types of Navy ships during those years. The Navy's report on its 30-year (FY2011-
FY2040) shipbuilding plan states: "While the SSBN(X) is being procured, the Navy will be
limited in its ability to procure other ship classes."2
Options for reducing the cost of the SSBN(X) program or its potential impact on other Navy
shipbuilding programs include procuring fewer than 12 SSBN(X)s; reducing the number of
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to be carried by each SSBN(X); designing the
SSBN(X) to carry a smaller SLBM; stretching out the schedule for procuring SSBN(X)s and
making greater use of split funding (i.e., two-year incremental funding) in procuring them;
funding the procurement of SSBN(X)s in a part of the Department of Defense (DOD) budget
other than the Navy’s shipbuilding account; and increasing the Navy’s shipbuilding budget.
DDG-51 Destroyers and Ballistic Missile Defense
The FY2010 budget that the Navy submitted to Congress last year proposed ending procurement
of Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers at three ships and resuming procurement of Arleigh
Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers. Congress, as part of its action on the FY2010 defense
budget supported this proposal. The Navy’s FY2011 budget submission calls for procuring two
DDG-51s in FY2011 and six more in FY2012-FY2015.
The Navy’s FY2011 budget also proposes terminating the Navy’s planned CG(X) cruiser
program as unaffordable. Rather than starting to procure CG(X)s around FY2017, as the Navy
had previously envisaged, the Navy is proposing to build an improved version of the DDG-51,
called the Flight III version, starting in FY2016. Navy plans thus call for procuring the current
version of the DDG-51, called the Flight IIA version, in FY2010-FY2015, followed by
procurement of Flight III DDG-51s starting in FY2016. Flight III DDG-51s are to carry a smaller
version of the new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) that was to be carried by the CG(X).
The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requests $228.4 million in research and development
funding for the AMDR.
The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for
conducting BMD operations. Under current MDA and Navy plans, the number of BMD-capable
Navy Aegis ships is scheduled to grow from 20 at the end of FY2010 to 38 at the end of FY2015.
Some observers are concerned—particularly following the Administration’s announcement of its
intention to use Aegis-BMD ships to defend Europe against potential ballistic missile attacks—
that demands from U.S. regional military commanders for BMD-capable Aegis ships are growing
faster than the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships. They are also concerned that demands from
U.S. regional military commanders for Aegis ships for conducting BMD operations could strain
the Navy’s ability to provide regional military commanders with Aegis ships for performing non-
BMD missions.
The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides
additional funding for BMD-related efforts. MDA’s proposed FY2011 budget requests a total of
$2,161.6 million for the Aegis BMD program. The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requests a
total of $457.0 million for BMD-related efforts. FY2011 issues for Congress include whether to
approve, reject or modify the Navy’s proposal to develop the Flight III DDG-51 design and start
procuring it in FY2016, whether to approve, reject, or modify the FY2011 MDA and Navy
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funding requests for the Aegis BMD program, and whether to provide MDA or the Navy with
additional direction concerning the program.
Aircraft Programs41
Fighter aircraft are a major component of U.S. military capability and account for a significant
portion of U.S. defense spending. In early 2009, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps
collectively had an inventory of about 3,500 fighters. Because fighters built in large numbers
during the 1980s are nearing the end of their service lives, there is a concern that the services may
fall short of the number of planes needed because of budgetary limits on the rate at which
replacement fighters can be procured. Air Force officials in 2008 testimony projected an Air
Force fighter shortfall of up to 800 aircraft by 2024. Navy officials have projected a Navy-Marine
Corps strike fighter shortfall peaking at more than 100 aircraft, and possibly more than 200
aircraft, by about 2018.
A key issue for Congress regarding tactical aircraft is the overall affordability of DOD's plans for
modernizing the tactical aircraft force. The issue has been a concern in Congress and elsewhere
for many years, with some observers predicting that tactical aircraft modernization is heading for
an eventual budget "train wreck" as tactical aircraft acquisition plans collide with insufficient
amounts of funding available for tactical aircraft acquisition.42
F-35
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), being procured in different versions for the Air Force, Marine
Corps, and Navy, is the key to DOD’s tactical aircraft modernization plans, which call for
acquiring a total of 2,443 JSFs at an estimated total acquisition cost (as of December 31, 2009) of
about $238 billion in constant (i.e., inflation-adjusted) FY2002 dollars, or more than $300 billion
in current prices. The F-35 program is DOD's largest weapon procurement program in terms of
total estimated acquisition cost. Hundreds of additional F-35s are expected to be purchased by
several U.S. allies, eight of which are cost-sharing partners in the program.43
The Administration's FY2011 budget requests a total of $10.4 billion for the F-35 program,
including $2.5 billion in Air Force and Navy research and development funding and $7.9 billion
in Air Force and Navy procurement funding.44
Although the F-35 was conceived as a relatively affordable strike fighter, some observers are
concerned that in a situation of constrained DOD resources, F-35s might not be affordable in the
annual quantities planned by DOD, at least not without reducing funding for other DOD
programs. As the annual production rate of the F-35 increases, the program will require more than
$10 billion per year in acquisition funding at the same time that DOD will face other budgetary
challenges. Supporters of the F-35 might argue that, as a relatively affordable aircraft that can be
procured in similar, though not identical, versions for the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, the
41 Prepared in collaboration with Jeremiah Gertler, Specialist in Military Aviation.
42 CRS Report RL33543, Tactical Aircraft Modernization: Issues for Congress, by Jeremiah Gertler.
43 CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Jeremiah
Gertler.
44Development and procurement of Marine Corps aircraft are funded through the Navy's budget.
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F-35 represents the most economical and cost-effective strategy for avoiding or mitigating such
shortfalls.
F-35 Alternate Engine
For four successive years, Congress has rejected Administration proposals to terminate the
program to develop the General Electric/Rolls-Royce F136 engine as an alternative to the Pratt &
Whitney F135 engine that currently powers the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The
administration's FY2011 budget submission again proposes to terminate the program.
Through FY2009, Congress has provided approximately $2.5 billion for the Joint Strike Fighter
alternate engine program. The program is expected to need an additional $2.9 billion through
2017 to complete the development of the F136 engine.45
Critics of the proposal to terminate the F136 alternate engine argue that termination was driven
more by immediate budget pressures on the department than the long-term pros and cons of the
F136 program. They argue that engine competition on the F-15 and F-16 programs saved money
and resulted in greater reliability. Some who applaud the proposed termination say that single-
source engine production contracts have been the norm, not the exception. Long-term engine
affordability, they claim, is best achieved by procuring engines through multiyear contracts from
a single source.
Cancelling the F136 engine poses questions on the operational risk—particularly of fleet
grounding—posed by having a single engine design and supplier. Additional issues include the
potential impact this termination might have on the U.S. defense industrial base and on U.S.
relations with key allied countries involved in the alternate engine program. Finally, eliminating
competitive market forces for DOD business worth billions of dollars may concern those who
seek efficiency from DOD’s acquisition system and raises the challenge of cost control in a
single-supplier environment.
Continuing F136 development raises issues of impact on the F-35 acquisition program, including
possible reduction of the numbers of F-35s that could be acquired if program funds are used for
the alternate engine. It also raises issues of the outyear costs and operational concerns stemming
from the requirement to support two different engines in the field.
C-17
The Administration’s proposed FY2011 defense budget would terminate C-17 procurement.
Further, Secretary Gates, in testimony to the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations
Committee, stated, “Should Congress add funds to continue this program, I will strongly
recommend a presidential veto.”46 The Administration argues that enough C-17s have now been
purchased to meet future operational needs. Supporters of procuring additional C-17s in FY2011
contend that additional C-17s will be needed to meet future operational needs. A primary issue for
Congress in FY2011 is whether to acquire additional C-17s.47
45 CRS Report R41131, F-35 Alternate Engine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Jeremiah Gertler.
46 Hearing of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, March 24, 2010.
47 CRS Report RS22763, Air Force C-17 Aircraft Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Jeremiah
(continued...)
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KC-X
The administration's proposed FY2011 defense budget requested $863.9 million in Air Force
research and development funding for its third attempt since 2003 to acquire a new fleet of mid-
air refueling tankers, designated KC-X, that would replace its aging fleet of KC-135 tankers. An
initial effort, that involved leasing new tankers from Boeing, was blocked by Congress. A
subsequent competition pitted Boeing, which offered a tanker based on its 767 jetliner, against the
team of Northrop Grumman and the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS),
which offered a tanker based on the EADS Airbus A330.
On February 24, 2010, the Department of Defense (DOD) released its Request for Proposals for a
program to build 179 new KC-X aerial refueling tankers for the Air Force, a contract valued at
roughly $35 billion.
Bidding closed on July 9, 2010, with three offerors submitting bids. The European Aeronautic
Defense and Space Company (EADS) offered a KC-X design based on the Airbus A330 airliner,
to be built in Mobile, AL. Boeing offered a KC-X design based on its 767 airliner, to be built in
Seattle, WA, and Wichita, KS. A team of the Ukranian airframe maker Antonov and U.S.
Aerospace offered a variant of the An-124 freighter, with production location uncertain; this bid
was excluded for arriving after the deadline, but U.S. Aerospace has protested the exclusion.48
The KC-X acquisition program has been a subject of intense interest because of the dollar value
of the contract, the number of jobs it would create, the importance of tanker aircraft to U.S.
military operations, and because DOD's attempts to acquire a new tanker over the past several
years have been highly contentious. The history of those earlier attempts forms an important part
of the context for DOD's proposed new KC-X competition, particularly in terms of defining the
required capabilities for the KC-X, and designing and conducting a fair and transparent
competition. The issues for Congress in FY2011 are whether to approve, reject, or modify DOD's
new KC-X competition strategy, and whether to approve, reject, or modify the Air Force's request
for FY2011 research and development funding for the new KC-X program. Congress's decision
on these issues could affect DOD capabilities and funding requirements and the aircraft
manufacturing industrial base.
Ballistic Missile Defense
The George W. Bush Administration had planned to deploy in Poland and the Czech Republic a
modified version of the land-based BMD system currently deployed in Alaska and California.
The Obama Administration has dropped that plan in favor of the so-called Phased Adaptive
Approach (PAA), which calls for deploying BMD-capable Aegis ships (and, eventually, a
relocatable, land-based version of the Aegis system and associated Standard missile) to defend
Europe and, eventually, the United States against potential ballistic missile attacks from Iran. The
Administration has said that similar BMD capabilities will be pursued in other regions such as the
Middle East and Northeast Asia.49
(...continued)
Gertler.
48 CRS Report RL34398, Air Force KC-X Tanker Aircraft Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Jeremiah
Gertler.
49 For additional analysis, see CRS Report RL34051, Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe, by Steven A.
(continued...)
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The Administration requested a total of $2.27 billion in FY2011 for programs associated with
PAA, including $712 million for development efforts unique to PAA and an additional $1.56
billion to continue development and procurement of the Aegis ship-borne BMD system that
would be integral to PAA as well as other missile defense missions.
Military Construction50
The $18.7 billion requested in the FY2011 base budget for military construction and family
housing is nearly 20% lower than the corresponding appropriation for FY2010. Most of the
reduction is the result of a decline from $7.9 billion to $2.7 billion in the amount that is being
spent to build new facilities for units that are moving to new sites as a result of the 2005 Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission. Most of that BRAC-related construction was
funded in earlier budgets, since the deadline for completing the moves is September 15, 2011.
In addition, the budget for military family housing would drop from $2.3 billion in FY2010 to
$1.8 billion in the FY2011 request. According to DOD officials, this is a result of a policy, begun
in the late 1990s, of privatizing military family housing. The amounts appropriated for the Basic
Allowance for Housing paid to personnel who do not live in government furnished housing has
increased over the past decade, partly because more service members are paying rent to private
landlords and partly because of a policy decision that housing allowances (which are pegged to
regional home rental and utility costs) should cover a larger proportion of a service member’s
housing costs.
Aircraft Carrier Homeport
The FY2011 DOD bills might provide a vehicle for those Members of Congress opposed to the
Navy’s plan to move to Mayport, Florida, one of the five nuclear powered aircraft carriers
currently homeported in Norfolk, Virginia. The Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) final report on
the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released on February 1, 2010, endorses the Navy’s
desire to establish Mayport as a second Atlantic Fleet carrier home port. The report states:
To mitigate the risk of a terrorist attack, accident, or natural disaster, the U.S. Navy will
homeport an East Coast carrier in Mayport, Florida.
Because all carriers currently in service are nuclear powered, such a move would require the
construction of new, specialized nuclear support facilities at the Mayport site, near Jacksonville.
In addition, such a move would shift from Norfolk to Mayport the local economic activity
associated with homeporting an aircraft carrier, which some sources estimate as being worth
hundreds of millions of dollars per year.51
Certain Members of Congress from Florida have expressed support for the proposal to homeport
an aircraft carrier at Mayport, endorsing the argument made by DOD and the Navy that the
(...continued)
Hildreth and Carl Ek.
50 Prepared in collaboration with Daniel H. Else, Specialist in National Defense.
51 CRS Report R40248, Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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benefits in terms of mitigating risks to the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet CVNs are worth the costs
associated with moving a CVN to Mayport, which the Navy estimates would total $589.7 million.
That total includes $46.3 million for dredging, which Congress approved in its action on the
FY2010 DOD budget, but with the proviso that it was not prejudging the issue of the carrier
homeport.
Certain Members of Congress from Virginia have expressed skepticism regarding, or opposition
to the proposal, arguing that the benefits in terms of mitigating risks to the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet
CVNs are questionable or uncertain, and that the funding needed to implement the proposal could
achieve greater benefits if it were spent on other Navy priorities.
Marine Corps Relocation to Guam
The Administration’s budget includes $139 million for facilities on the U.S. territory of Guam, in
the western Pacific for use by 8,000 Marines, their families, and support personnel slated to move
to that island from the Japanese island of Okinawa. The planned move is the result of extensive
negotiations between the Departments of State and Defense and the Government of Japan. DOD
also plans to move additional military personnel to Guam from their current stations in the United
States. These relocations are expected to be completed by 2014-2016.
Guam is a mountainous island with an area roughly three times that of the District of Columbia,
and a population of about 178,000. Estimates of the permanent increase in population due to the
planned influx of military personnel, their families, DOD personnel, and supporting contractors
have ranged as high as 56,000. In addition, some analysts have estimated that as many as 25,000
temporary workers would be needed to build the planned facilities, a number amounting to 14%
of the population. These analysts question whether Guam’s current transportation, electrical and
utility grid could support such a surge in the island’s population.
The FY2011 defense funding bills may provide a point of leverage for those Members of
Congress who have pressed DOD to submit a comprehensive master plan for development on
Guam, thus far, without success.52
US CYBERCOM
The administration’s budget would support the creation of the U.S. Cyber Command
(USCYBERCOM) as a component of the U.S. Strategic Command that is intended to centralize
command of DOD networks and to coordinate their protection and operation. The reorganization
of cyber forces began in October 2008 when Secretary Gates directed that the Joint Task Force
for Global Network Operations (JTF GNO), which was responsible for defending DOD’s global
information grid against cyber attack, be placed under the operational control of the Joint
Functional Component Command for Network Warfare (JFCC NW), which was responsible for
“offensive” information operations, including cyber attacks on adversaries. This integration into
one organization of responsibility for both offensive and defensive cyber operations marked a
departure from the historical segregation of those two capabilities.53 In June, 2009, Secretary
52 See CRS Report RS22570, Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments, by Shirley A. Kan, and CRS Report R40731, Military
Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies: FY2010 Appropriations, coordinated by Daniel H. Else.
53 For background, see CRS Report RL31787, Information Operations, Cyberwarfare, and Cybersecurity: Capabilities
(continued...)
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Gates took the consolidation of DOD cyber operations one step further, directing the U.S.
Strategic Command to establish U.S. Cyber Command as one of its components with
responsibility for both offensive and defensive cyber operations. The director of the National
Security Agency (NSA) was nominated to lead the new command while retaining the NSA
directorship.54
Some observers contend that co-locating offensive and defensive cyber capabilities represents the
militarization of cyberspace and that NSA involvement will impinge upon the privacy of civilian
information systems. Others maintain that centralized command will better organize and
standardize DOD cyber practices and operations and that the new command will be responsible
only for defending DOD networks, providing support for civil authorities upon request.
The Administration’s FY2011 budget request for Air Force Operations and Maintenance
reportedly includes $139 million to stand up U.S. Cyber Command, an increase of approximately
$105 million above the FY2010 Cyber Command budget that would fund the lease of temporary
facilities and infrastructure at Ft. Meade, Maryland, where the organization is to be located.55 U.S.
Cyber Command is scheduled to be fully operational by October, 2010.
State Department Role in Security Assistance
Some elements of the FY2011 DOD budget request reflect what the Obama Administration
describes as an effort to “rebalance” the roles of DOD and the State Department in providing
foreign assistance, particularly security assistance. The FY2011 NDAA legislation does not
include two programs previously funded by DOD because the Administration requested these
controversial items in the Department of State budget:
• The so-called “Section 1207” program to provide crisis reaction funding for
reconstruction, security and stabilization activities, that are up for funding in the
State Department/USAID Complex Crisis Fund ($100 million in the State
Department budget);56 and
• The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, i.e., the PCCF ($1.2 billion in
the State Department Budget).
In FY2012, the State Department also will take responsibility for Iraq police training. The DOD
budget request for FY2011 includes funding for the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISSF), used for
Iraqi police training, even though the State Department FY2011 budget request also includes
(...continued)
and Related Policy Issues, by Catherine A. Theohary.
54 Cyber Command was officially activated by the Secretary of Defense on May 21, 2010, after the Senate confirmed
the nomination of NSA Director Lt. Gen. Keith B.Alexander to head the new command (while retaining his NSA post)
with the rank of General.
55 Officials in the U.S. Strategic Command have cited the figures that appear in the following article by DOD’s in-
house news service, however, CRS is unable to independently verify the actual numbers from DOD budget documents
with the exception of the approximately $105 million requested covering classified aspects of U.S. Cyber Command
standup. See, “Cybersecurity Seizes More Attention, Budget Dollars,” by John J. Kruzel, Armed Forces Press Services,
February 4, 2010, accessed at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=57871.
56 DOD funding was authorized by Section 1207 of P.L. 109-163 as amended.
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police support funding for the FY2011 transition year. 57 (Funding for the Afghanistan Security
Forces Fund (ASFF) to train the Afghan National Police remains in the DOD budget.)58
In its FY2011 budget request, the Department of State stated that the transfer of the
Section 1207, PCCF, and Iraqi police training will “begin to rebalance the roles between
DOD and State.”59 Nevertheless, within weeks of the Administration’s release of its
FY2011 budget request, statements by some Pentagon officials seemed to call for DOD to
maintain, if not expand, its current role in security assistance. The Administration is
engaged in an extensive interagency review over the appropriate division of security
assistance authorities, which the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) took note of
in the report accompanying its version of the FY2011 NDAA (S.Rept. 111-201), stating it
“welcomes this review and looks forward to any proposals for enhancing U.S. security
assistance that result from this process.”
In a February 24, 2010, speech, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates said that advising
and mentoring foreign security forces is becoming a key military mission. He cited
changes that the armed forces are making in their own organization to facilitate their role
in advising, training and assisting partner nations. His remarks reflect recommendations
contained in the February 8, 2010, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report that
called for all four armed services “to strengthen and institutionalize” their capability to
train and advise the security forces of partner nations.
Secretary Gates’ remarks were reinforced by a March 3, 2010, speech by Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, who urged that military power should not be
considered the last resort of the state, “but as potentially the best, first option” when
combined with diplomacy and other instruments of national power. Both Secretary Gates
and Adm. Mullen, as well as the QDR report, encouraged lawmakers to substantially
bolster civilian capabilities to assist foreign governments in preventing, containing, and
recovering from conflict. All three described a new relationship between defense and
diplomacy, which “are no longer discrete choices…but must in fact, compliment one
another throughout the messy process of international relations,“ according to Chairman
Mullen.
Consistent with this position, the Administration’s FY2011 DOD budget request leaves under
DOD’s control other controversial security assistance programs, notably the so-called “Section
1206” program to train and equip the security forces of other countries threatened by terrorists,
for which the budget included $489.5 million.60 The DOD budget also contains a funding request
for the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program ($33.3 million), and two new DOD security
assistance programs created in FY2010: the Defense Institution Reform Initiative to promote the
institutional development of foreign defense ministries ($5.7 million); and a related program to
57 The Administration’s supplemental appropriations request for FY2010 included $650 million to initiate this transfer.
For further analysis of the FY2010 request, see CRS Report R41232, FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster
Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs, coordinated by Amy Belasco.
58 For details on ISSF and ASFF funding, see CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global
War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco.
59 For additional analysis of the State Department funding request for these programs, see CRS Report R41228, State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2011 Budget and Appropriations, op.cit.
60 DOD funding for this program was authorized by Section 1206 of P.L. 109-163, as amended. For more information
on Section 1206 funding, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background
and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction
Capabilities, by Nina M. Serafino.
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provide legal instruction to foreign military members and civilian government officials ($1.6
million). The FY2011 request also would launch a new program, the Stability Operations
Fellowship Program ($5.0 million), but Congress has turned down this proposal in the past.
While affirming in his February speech that the State Department should maintain the lead,
Secretary Gates described the current national security system as outmoded, with the roles of
defense and diplomacy designed for a different set of threats than those the United States faces
today. According to some defense experts, some members have considered introducing legislation
based on one Gates’ proposal, a pooled fund for security assistance to which DOD, State, and
USAID contribute, but instead are awaiting the Administration’s own proposal.
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Bill-by-Bill Synopsis of Congressional Action to
Date
FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5136, S. 3454)
The version of the FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act approved May 19 by the House
Armed Services Committee (H.R. 5136) would authorize $725.9 billion in discretionary budget
authority, which is $2.7 million less than President Obama requested for programs covered by the
legislation. The total authorized by the bill $566.6 billion for the DOD base budget, $159.3
billion for FY2011 for war costs and $17.7 billion for defense-related nuclear energy programs
administered by the Department of Energy. The Armed Services Committee approved the bill by
a vote of 59-0.
The committee reported the bill to the House on May 24, 2010 (H.Rept. 111-491).
Funding levels authorized by the bill are presented in Table 8. Funding levels authorized for
selected programs are presented in the Appendix.
Table 8. FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5136, S. 3454)
(amounts in millions of dollars)
Senate Armed
Services
Administration
House-passed
Committee reported
request
(H.R. 5136)
(S. 3454)
Division A: DOD Base
Budget (except Military
Construction)
Procurement
111,377 111,246 111,751
Research and Development
76,131
76,473
76,799
Operation and Maintenance
167,879
167,620
168,224
Military Personnel 138,541
138,541 138,541
Other
Authorizations
36,197 36,243 36,265
Subtotal, DOD Base Budget
(except MilCon)
530,124 530,124 531,579
Division B: Military
Construction
(Base Budget)
Military Construction, 14,209
14,649 14,197
Family
Housing
1,823 1,823 1,823
Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC)
2,715 2,715 2,715
General Reductions
0
-441.1
0
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Senate Armed
Services
Administration
House-passed
Committee reported
request
(H.R. 5136)
(S. 3454)
Subtotal, Military
Construction, Base Budget
18,747 18,745 18,735
Total, DOD Base Budget
548,871
548,869
550,314
Division C: Department of
Energy Nuclear National
Security Agency (NNSA)
17,716 17,716 17,721
and Other Authorizations
Total, National Defense
Budget Function (050),
566,587 566,585 568,034
FY2011 Base Budget
FY2011 Overseas
Contingency Operations,
159,336 159,335 157,648
DOD
Grand Total, FY2011
National Defense
725,922 725,920 725,682
Source: House Armed Services Committee, Report on H.R. 5136, the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2011 H Rept. 111-491, pp. 4-13; Senate Armed Services Committee, Report on S. 3454, the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2011, S Rept. 111-201, pp. 5-9.
Following are highlights of H.R. 5136 as passed by the House on May 25 and of S. 3454 as
reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 4.
Military Personnel Issues
As passed by the House and reported by the Senate committee, the two bills each would
authorize, as requested, a total end-strength of 1.43 million members for the active-duty
components of the four armed services. This would be an increase of 7,400 over the end-strength
authorized for FY2010.
Military Compensation
The House-passed bill would authorize a 1.9% military pay raise, rather than the 1.4% raise
included in the budget, an increase the committee said would add $380 million to the FY2011
military personnel costs (Section 601). The Senate committee bill would authorize the 1.4% raise
that was requested by the Administration.
The H.R. 5136 also would authorize an increase in the monthly allowance paid to married
personnel who are separated from their families by deployment, from $250 to $285—a change
estimated to cost $78 million (Section 604), and an increase in the monthly payments to personnel
whose assignments subject them to risk of hostile fire or imminent danger, from $225 to $260—a
change expected to cost $3 million (Section 618). These additional costs would be more than
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offset by a provision of the bill reallocating to the FY2011 personnel accounts $501.5 million
appropriated for personnel accounts in prior years but not obligated.61
In its report to accompany S. 3454, the Senate Armed Services Committee directed the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) to assess DOD’s use of cash incentives to recruit and
retain highly qualified individuals into hard-to-fill specialties that are essential in wartime (Secti.
In particular, it directs GAO to review the process by which DOD identifies specialties for which
such incentives are offered. The Senate committee also directed GAO to assess the efficiency and
accuracy of the process by which DOD determines the size of the housing allowance paid to
service members assigned to any give base who do not occupy government-provided housing.
The Senate committee also urged the Secretary of Defense to consider whether to propose
legislation that would broaden the range of purposes for which the President could mobilize
reserve and National Guard units.
‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’
On May 27, 2011, the House adopted by a vote of 234-194 an amendment to H.R. 5136 by
Representative Patrick Murphy that would repeal the 1993 legislation barring openly homosexual
persons from military service after: (1) the current DOD review has been completed; and (2) the
President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have certified to
Congress that policies and regulations have been prepared that would allow the repeal of the ban
to be implemented in a way that is, “consistent with the standards of military readiness, military
effectiveness, unit cohesion, and recruiting and retention of the armed forces.” This provision,
which was incorporated in the House bill as Section 536, was substantially the language that had
been agreed to in negotiations between proponents of repeal and Administration officials.
On June 1, 2011, the Senate Armed Services Committee voted 16-12 to include in S. 3454 a
substantially identical provision (Section 591).
Alternative Career Track for Officers
The House bill would authorize a pilot program to assess the value of allowing a certain number
of officers pursue a more varied range of mid-career educational programs and assignments
outside of their service for the sake of broadening their experience and strategic judgment. To
allow for this richer mixture of experience, participants would be given leeway to skip or delay
some of the established requirements and deadlines for promotion and might be required to
commit to a longer-than-usual period of service (Section 661).
Sexual Assault
Title XVI of H.R. 5136 includes 28 provisions that would enact many of the recommendations of
a congressionally chartered DOD commission studying the issue of sexual assault in the
military.62 Among these were provisions that would:
61 For background information, see Military Pay Raise, above.
62 The commission was established by Section 576 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2005 (H.R. 4200).
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• require DOD to specifically budget for its sexual assault prevention and response
program;
• create a single hotline over which DOD personnel could report a sexual assault;
• require that the director of the sexual assault prevention and response program be
a flag or general officer or a civilian of the Senior Executive Service; and
• establish the right of military personnel who are sexual assault victims to: (1)
legal counsel; (2) consultation in the prosecution of their alleged assailants; (3)
medical care; and (4) the ability to make a restricted report of a sexual assault so
they may receive support services without involving law enforcement.
The Senate Armed Services Committee bill does not address those issues, but it includes
a provision (Section 561) that would amend the definitions of rape and other
nonconsensual sexual offences that are contained in the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. According to the committee, these changes were recommended by a
congressionally mandated DOD task force.
Medical Care
Both the House-passed and Senate committee-reported bills would authorize substantially all of
the Administration’s $50.7 billion budget request for DOD’s health care program.
Tricare Fee Limitation
Although the budget request did not include increases in Tricare fees and pharmacy copayments,
which the Bush and Obama Administrations had recommended in prior years and which Congress
regularly had rejected, both the House-passed H.R. 5136 and S. 3454 as reported by the Senate
Armed Services Committee contained a provision similar to those Congress had enacted in earlier
years prohibiting any increase in Tricare fees.63
The Senate Armed Services Committee’s bill also directed DOD to prepare a plan to improve the
quality and efficiency of the military health care system and reduce its cost (Section 704). In its
report, the committee acknowledged that DOD leaders favored an increase in Tricare fees, but
said that the Department must, first, “do everything within reason to make the health care system
more efficient, to improve quality and to lower cost, through improvements in business practices
and preventative care, while maintaining high and improving levels of beneficiary satisfaction.”64
Both bills would allow Tricare beneficiaries to extend coverage to their dependent children up to
age 26, an option made available to beneficiaries of private health insurance programs under the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148), the health care reform bill enacted in
April 2010 (Section 702).
63 The relevant provisions are Section 701 of the House bill and Section and 705. In the Senate committee bill, the
relevant provision is For background see “Military Health Care Costs” above.
64 S.Rept. 111-201, report on S. 3454, p. 148.
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The House bill would authorize the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to establish a
unified medical command (Section 903) under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health
Affairs and a new Defense Health Agency to administer the TRICARE program.
As reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee, S. 3454 would:
• Repeal current law prohibiting the performance in DOD medical facilities of
privately funded, legal abortions;65
• Prohibit the involuntary administrative separation of a service member who was
deemed fit for duty by a Personnel Evaluation Board (PEB) but who
subsequently was determined to be unsuitable for deployment based on a medical
condition that had been considered by the PEB.
Fort Hood Shooting Incident
The House bill includes three provisions intended to deal with both the underlying causes and the
immediate consequences of two incidents in which service members and DOD civilian personnel
were killed or wounded in terrorist attacks—one at Fort Hood, Texas in November 2009 in which
an Army psychiatrist opened fire on troops preparing for deployment to Iraq, and one at a
recruiting station in Little Rock, Arkansas on June 1, 2009. These provisions would:
• require the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the training programs for officers
in the services’ medical corps properly document their academic and military
performance (Section 715). There were allegations that the supposed perpetrator
of the Fort Hood attack had a record of substandard and erratic performance.
• provide special compensation to persons killed or wounded in those two
incidents or in any other incident subsequent to November 6, 2009, in which
service members or DOD civilians were targeted because of their affiliation with
the U.S. military (Section 619). These individuals would be awarded the same
compensation as DOD personnel killed or wounded in a combat zone.
• require the Secretary of Defense to earmark up to $100 million in a fund to
implement recommendations of a panel that had been set up by DOD to analyze
the Fort Hood incident.66
Ballistic Missile Defense, Strategic Weapons, and the New START Treaty
Both the bill passed by the House and the one reported by the Senate committee generally support
the Administration’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, including its plan for defending
U.S. troops and allies in Europe against ballistic missiles attacks from Iran.
Both bills would authorize roughly $10.6 billion for missile defenses, with H.R. 5136 adding
$361.6 million to the Administration request and the Senate committee’s version of S. 3454
65 For background, see CRS Report 95-387, Abortion Services and Military Medical Facilities, by David F. Burrelli.
66 An independent panel, established by the Secretary of Defense to review the incident, issued its report, “Protecting
the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood,” in January 2010. The report was accessed at
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/DOD-ProtectingTheForce-Web_Security_HR_13Jan10.pdf on September 15, 2010.
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adding $349.1 million. Funding levels authorized for specific missile defense programs are
presented in Table A-1.
Both bills also affirmed that the pending strategic arms reduction treaty with the Russian
Federation (dubbed “New START) would not restrict U.S. missile defense programs. Some
Russian sources have asserted that the Administration’s plan for defending Europe against long-
range ballistic missiles would undermine the proposed treaty.67
Phased Adaptive Approach (Missile Defense for Europe) and Arms Control
The Administration requested a total of $2.27 billion in FY2011 for programs associated with its
so-called “Phased Adaptive Approach” (PAA) for defending Europe against long-range ballistic
missiles. The budget requested $712 million for development efforts unique to PAA and an
additional $1.56 billion to continue development and procurement of the Aegis ship-borne BMD
system that would be integral to PAA as well as other missile defense missions. Of this total, the
Senate Armed Services Committee bill would authorize the amount requested, while the House-
passed bill would authorize an additional $115 million: $50 million to accelerate production of
SM-3 missiles and $65 million for long lead-time components of the AN/TPY-2 relocatable radar
intended to support both the PAA and the Army’s Theater High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD)
missile defense system.
The House bill would require a DOD report on the PAA plan and an assessment by the GAO of
the DOD report (Section 223). It also would place restrictions on the PAA similar to those that
Congress previously had applied to the Bush plan, namely:
• It limits deployment in Europe of defenses against medium-range and long-range
missiles until the Secretary of Defense certifies that the proposed technology is
operationally effective, based on realistic flight tests; and
• It limits the use of funds for BMD deployments in any country until the host
government has ratified any necessary agreements and until 45 days after
Congress has received a report on alternative BMD systems for Europe required
by the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84).
H.R. 5136 (Section 224) would declare it to be U.S. policy to ensure that future versions of the
Standard missile, when deployed to protect Europe under the PAA plan, would be able to
intercept intercontinental-range missiles launched from Iran at the United States. The House bill
also would declare it to be national policy to continue developing a modified version of the
ground-based BMD interceptor currently deployed in Alaska and California, which the Bush
Administration had planned to field also in Europe. The committee said this two-stage, ground-
based interceptor would provide a hedge in case the improved Standard BMD interceptor falls
short of its performance goals or Iran acquires an ICBM before the Standard BMD interceptor
can be deployed.
The House bill also would express the sense of Congress that there should be no limitations on
the planned PAA missile defense deployment in Europe as a result of the New Strategic Arms
67 For background, see CRS Report R41251, Ballistic Missile Defense and Offensive Arms Reductions: A Review of the
Historical Record, by Steven A. Hildreth and Amy F. Woolf and CRS Report R41219, The New START Treaty:
Central Limits and Key Provisions, by Amy F. Woolf.
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Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and the Russian Federation, signed
April 8, 2010 (Section 1236). Russian officials have said the new treaty would be endangered by
too ambitious a U.S. BMD plan, but U.S. officials have rejected any linkage between the treaty
and U.S. plans.
The House bill would bar the reduction of U.S. nuclear weapons below the limits set by the New
START Treaty until 180 days after the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator for Nuclear
Security of the Nuclear National Security Agency of the Department of Energy submit to
Congress a joint report justifying the proposed cuts in detail (Section 1058). It also expresses the
sense of Congress that the Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, published April 6, 2010,
weakens U.S. security by foreswearing the option of using nuclear weapons to retaliate for
catastrophic attacks on the United States, under certain conditions.68
S. 3454, as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee (Section 231), would endorse
many of those same positions by declaring them to be the sense of Congress, namely (1) that a
future version of the Standard missile be able to intercept Iranian ICBMs aimed at U.S. territory,
(2) that DOD should continue development of the two-stage ground-based interceptor, as hedge
against potential technical challenges with the Standard missile, (3) that the PAA is not intended
to diminish strategic stability with the Russian Federation, and (4) that New START imposes no
constraints on developing or deploying effective U.S. BMD systems.
THAAD (Theater High-Altitude Air Defense)
In its report, the Senate Armed Services Committee commended the Administration for several
missile defense initiatives funded by the FY2011 budget request, including a significant increase
in the number of THAAD interceptors planned for deployment by FY2015. THAAD is intended
to intercept so-called intermediate-range ballistic missiles—those with a range of up to 3,000
miles.
Te Senate committee authorized $833.9 million for THAAD procurement in FY2011, which is
$25 million less than the Administration requested. However, the committee said the reduction
was warranted by delays in THAAD production and by an ongoing investigation of a failure of
one THAAD component and that the cut was made without prejudice to the THAAD system.
H.R. 5136 would authorize the full $858.9 million requested for THAAD procurement.
Airborne Laser (ABL)
H.R. 5316 would add to the budget $50.0 million for research on directed-energy weapons, using
the airborne laser (ABL), an experimental laser-equipped Boeing 747 that the Obama
Administration had decided was not suitable for deployment as a BMD weapon. The Senate bill
includes no corresponding funds.
68 See Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 6, 2010, at
http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf.
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Israeli Short-Range Defenses
The House-passed and Senate committee bills both added funds to the $121.7 million requested
for missile defense development programs funded in cooperation with Israel. H.R. 5136 would
add to the request $88.0 million, of which $38 million is to support Israel’s development of
systems intended to intercept short-range bombardment rockets and artillery shells. The Senate
Armed Services Committee’s bill would add $230 million to support development of such
defenses against short-range attacks, of which $205 million was requested by DOD in mid-May.
Shipbuilding69
Both H.R. 5136 as passed by the House and S. 3454 as reported by the Senate Armed Services
Committee would authorize without significant change the President Obama’s $15.7 billion
request for Navy shipbuilding in FY2011. However, the Senate and House Armed Services
committees each expressed reservations about the Administration’s future shipbuilding plans.
The amounts authorized by the two versions of the defense bill include funds for two DDG-51
Aegis destroyers ($2.92 billion), two Virginia-class attack submarines ($3.44 billion), two Littoral
Combat Ships ($1.23 billion), a high-speed troop and cargo carrier designated an “intratheater
connector” ($180.7 million) and an oceanographic research ship ($88.6 million).70 The total also
includes the fourth and final increment of funding for the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier U.S.S.
Gerald R. Ford ($1.73 billion), the first of two increments for an LHA-class helicopter carrier to
support amphibious landings ($949.9 million), and the third increment of funding for refueling
and overhauling the nuclear-powered carrier U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt ($1.26 billion).
Incremental Funding of Major Warships
Although incremental funding has become the norm in recent years for very expensive ships,
including aircraft carriers and large amphibious assault ships, it is an anomaly in the
congressional appropriations process that, with a few exceptions, requires that the full cost of a
weapons system be budgeted in one year.71 Existing law allows aircraft carriers to be
incrementally funded (for up to four years) and H.R. 5136 includes a provision that would expand
that exception to the “full funding” rule for large amphibious assault ships (Section 121).
Amphibious Landing Fleet
In its report to accompany S. 3454, the Senate committee said that the Navy’s projected
shipbuilding schedule was overly optimistic but, even so, would not purchase enough ships to
sustain the array of commercial shipyards on which DOD relies for the construction of new ships.
The committee directed the Secretary of Defense and the Congressional Budget Office each to
69 For background, see “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans,” above.
70 For several ships that would receive the bulk of their funding in the FY2011 budget, so-called “long-lead” funding
totaling as much as several hundred million dollars has been provided in earlier budgets to buy components needed in
the early stages of construction. Similarly, the $15.7 billion requested for shipbuilding in FY2011 includes more than
$3 billion in long-lead funding for ships slated to receive most of their funding in future budgets.
71 See CRS Report RL31404, Defense Procurement: Full Funding Policy—Background, Issues, and Options for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke and Stephen Daggett.
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conduct a formal assessment of how the Navy’s plans for building new ships and retiring existing
ones would affect the Marine Corps’s ability to conduct major amphibious landings. Navy and
Marine Corps leaders have agreed that, while a fleet of 38 amphibious landing ships would be the
ideal number to support two brigade-sized assault landings, the 33 ships contemplated by the
Navy’s most recent long-range shipbuilding plan would be adequate. But the Senate committee
said that cost increases and construction delays might make it impossible to reach the reduced
goal of 33 amphibious ships.
The House Armed Services Committee took more direct action to sustain the size of the fleet,
including in H.R. 5136 a provision that would specifically bar the retirement of two large
helicopter carriers—U.S.S. Nassau and U.S.S. Pelilieu—until their replacements are in service
(Section 1024). Another provision of the House bill would bar the Navy from retiring more than
two ships for every three new vessels commissioned (except for submarines), until the size of the
fleet reaches the Navy’s current goal of 313 ships (Section 1023).
Ballistic Missile Submarines
In its report, the House Armed Services Committee questioned the Navy’s decision that its 14
Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines should be replaced by a new class of submarines which
also would be large enough to carry the Trident II (D-5) missile carried by the current class.
Because of their expense, these new ships, designated SSBN(X), are expected to absorb a large
share of the Navy’s shipbuilding budgets after 2016, possibly crowding out the construction of
other planned ships.72 While authorizing the $672.3 million requested for SSBN(X) development
in FY2011, the committee barred the Navy from obligating more than half of the money until the
Secretary of Defense submits a repot including certain information about the program.
The Senate Armed Services Committee approved the amount requested for SSBN(X)
development.
Littoral Combat Ships (LCS)
In addition to authorizing two Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), as requested, H.R. 5136 would add
$75.0 million to the $226.3 million requested to develop the interchangeable “mission
modules”—various types of sensors and weapons—that will equip the LCS. The additional funds
are to continue development of the Non-Line of Sight (N-LOS) missile, a precision-guided
weapon being developed by the Army that was intended to allow an LCS to strike land targets
and small, fast speedboats. After spending $1.5 billion on the program, the Army cancelled the N-
LOS program in April, 2010 because of rising costs and technical problems. But, in its report, the
House committee said that an additional year’s spending could salvage the program.
As reported, S. 3454 would authorize the amounts requested for LSC and its mission modules.
The Senate committee ordered the Navy to provide a detailed timeline for the deployment of
LCSs and the ports where they would be stationed. The committee expressed concern that, at
some ports, there will be a gap between the retirement of the small warships they currently host
and the arrival of the LCSs they are slated to receive.
72 See CRS Report R41129, Navy SSBN(X) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Destroyers and Missile Defense
In addition to authorizing the request for two DDG-51-class destroyers armed with the Aegis
ballistic missile defense (BMD) system, the House and Senate Armed Services committees both
approved the request for $228.4 million to continue development of an improved missile defense
radar for those ships (designated the Air and Missile Defense Radar). However, the Senate
committee approved only $205.9 million in new budget authority and directed the Navy to make
up the difference with $22.5 million which, according to the GAO had been appropriated for the
program in FY2010 but would not be needed.
In its report on H.R. 5136, the House Armed Services Committee noted that the demand for Aegis
BMD ships and some other BMD assets to protect various regions would exceed the supply for
some time to come. It directed DOD to report its plans for regional BMD deployments inasmuch
as the demand for Aegis BMD ships is expected to exceed the supply (Section 123).
Aircraft73
H.R. 5136 as passed by the House and S. 3454 as reported by the Senate Armed Services
Committee each would authorize the amounts requested for major aircraft programs with three
major exceptions:
• Neither bill would authorize one F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (of the 43 requested)
for which the Air Force requested funding in the part of the budget covering war
costs;
• The House-passed bill would authorize continued development of the F-136
alternate engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, despite Administration
warnings that any bill continuing that program would draw a presidential veto;
and
• Both versions of the bill would authorize more F/A-18E/F strike fighters for the
Navy than the 22 aircraft requested. Moreover, both bills direct the Navy to
partly offset the additional cost with savings expected to result from the
negotiation of a multi-year contract guaranteeing production of F/A-18E/F
fighters and EF-18G electronic warfare jets for several additional years.
Neither bill would authorize funds to continue production of the C-17 wide-body cargo jet, for
which the Administration requested no funds. Both bills would authorize the $696 million
requested to modify the planes already purchased and to develop further C-17 improvements.
Over the objections of the Bush and Obama Administrations, Congress had added funds to the
FY2009 and FY2010 budgets to continue C-17 production. The Administration has warned that
any bill funding production of additional C-17s would be vetoed.
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and Alternate Engine
For the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, both bills would authorize a total of $11 billion to continue
development of the aircraft and purchase 42 planes. The committee rejected a request for one
73 For background, see “Aircraft Programs,” above.
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additional F-35 ($205 million) that would have been authorized in the part of the bill dealing with
war costs war-costs. The Administration’s rationale for this additional plane was that it was to
replace a fighter that was lost during the currently ongoing combat operations. In its report on
H.R. 5136, the House Armed Services Committee noted that the Air Force could replace the lost
aircraft by continuing to operate another fighter of the same type slated for retirement.
Decrying cost overruns in the F-35 program and delays in its flight test program, the House
Armed Services Committee included in the House bill a provision barring the procurement of
more than 30 F-35s in FY2011 until DOD certifies that the program has met several cost and
performance milestones (Section 141). The Senate Armed Services Committee added to S. 3454 a
provision requiring DOD to create a detailed plan by which the committee could assess the
progress of the F-35 development program.
H.R. 5136 would add to the budget $485 million to continue development of an alternate jet
engine for the F-35. The bill also would bar DOD from spending more than 75% of the funds
authorized for F-35 development until it obligates all the funds for the second engine. The Senate
Armed Services Committee’s bill would bar the expenditure of any additional funds for the
alternate engine unless the Secretary of Defense certifies that that project would reduce the life-
cycle cost and improve the operational readiness of the F-35 fleet while neither disrupting the
plane’s development program nor resulting in a reduction in the number of planes purchased.
In a May 20 Pentagon press conference, Secretary Gates reaffirmed his intention to recommend
that President Obama veto any defense bill that funded the alternate F-35 engine. He also said
that the detailed requirements the committee bill placed on the F-35 test program and production
schedule would make the program “unexecutable.”74
F/A-18E/F and EF-18G
The House and Senate Armed Services Committees each contend that the Navy’s planned aircraft
procurement budgets would result in an unwise drop in the number of carrier-borne fighters
because delays in the F-35 program mean that older F/A-18s will be retired before the planes
meant to replace them are in service. To bridge this, so-called “strike fighter gap,” the House-
passed bill would add eight F/A-18E/F fighters ($630.5 million) to the 22 requested ($1.78
billion). The bill also includes a provision that would offset $130.5 million of the additional cost
with savings the Navy is expected to realize as a result of signing a multi-year contract for F/A-
18E/Fs and EA-18Gs in FY2010 (Section 122).
The Senate Armed Services Committee’s bill would add to the request $325.0 million for six
additional F/A-18E/Fs while reducing the original request by $130.5 million, to take account of
the anticipated multi-year contract savings. Thus, the net increase for F/A-18E/Fs in S. 3454 is
$194.5 million. S. 3454 also would require the Navy to report to Congress on the cost and risks of
dealing with the projected strike fighter gap either by extending the service life of F/A-18s
currently in service or by reducing the number of planes in certain F/A-18 squadrons (Section
123).
74May 20, 2010, DOD press conference accessed at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4625.
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KC-X
The House-passed and Senate committee-reported bills each would authorize, as requested,
$863.9 million to continue development of the KC-X mid-air refueling tanker.
By a vote of 410-8, the House adopted an amendment to H.R. 5136 (Section 839) that would
require DOD to take into account, when considering bids for the KC-X tanker, "any unfair
competitive advantage that an offeror may possess," and to submit a report on such advantages to
Congress. The provision defines an ``unfair competitive advantage' as "a situation in which the
cost of development, production, or manufacturing is not fully borne by the offeror for such
contract." Several House Members speaking in support of the amendment indicated that it was
based on a finding by the World Trade Organization that France-based EADS had received
government subsidies for its commercial airliners that might give it an unfair advantage when
bidding on KC-X.
EADS has proposed a tanker based on its Airbus A-330 to compete with a Boeing bid based on its
767 jetliner. However, the amendment was supported by many avowed supporters of both planes.
Brigade Combat Team Modernization75
Both H.R. 5136 as passed by the House and S. 3454 as reported by the Senate Armed Services
Committee would deny authorization for part of the $3.19 billion requested by the Army for its
Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Modernization program, which has replaced the service’s Future
Combat Systems (FCS) program, an effort to develop an array of digitally-linked manned and
unmanned vehicles which Secretary Gates terminated in 2009 on grounds that it was too complex
and too expensive.
However, while the two bills agree in denying $431.8 billion requested for the Non-Line of Sight
(N-LOS) missile program, which DOD cancelled, the House bill went considerably further in
trimming back the Army’s plan, cutting an additional $347.4 million from the total BCT
Modernization request, whereas the Senate committee cut the request by only $29.7 million
beyond the N-LOS reduction (See Table 9).
Both bills would authorize the $934.4 million requested as part of the BCT Modernization
program to develop a new family of Ground Combat Vehicles. The complexity of the FCS
combat vehicle program was a one reason Secretary Gates had cancelled FCS and, in its report on
H.R. 5136, the House Armed Services Committee urged the Army to take a less technologically
ambitious approach with the new combat vehicle program. It urged the Army to focus on
developing vehicles that could meet basic requirements and be upgraded later. The panel also said
that the Army should consider whether its current fleet of combat vehicles could be upgraded to
meet the basic GCV requirements. It included in the bill a provision that would allow the Army to
spend only half of the FY2011 GCV appropriation until the service provides the committee with a
detailed analysis of its plans for developing the new fleet of vehicles.
75 For background, see “Army Combat Force Modernization Programs,” above.
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Defense: FY2011 Authorization and Appropriations
Table 9. FY2011 Army Brigade Combat Team
(BCT) Modernization Program
Amounts in millions of dollars
SASC
House-Passed
recommended
Administration
Authorization
authorization
Request
(H.R. 5136)
(S.3454)
Procurement
BCT Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
44.2
34.7
44.2
Non-Line of Sight Missile
350.6
0.0
0.0
Unmanned Ground Sensor
29.7
0.0
0.0
Unmanned Ground Vehicle
20.0
21.3
20.0
BCT Network
176.6
0.0
176.6
BCT training, logistics, and
management
61.6 0.0 61.6
subtotal, Procurement
682.7
56.0
302.4
R&D
Non-Line of Sight Missile
81.2
0.0
0.0
FCS “System of Systems”
integration
568.7 497.4 568.7
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
50.3
50.3
50.3
Unmanned Ground Vehicle
249.9
249.9
249.9
Unmanned Ground Sensor
7.5
7.5
7.5
Sustainment and Training
610.4
610.4
610.4
Ground Combat Vehicle
934.4
934.4
934.4
subtotal, R&D
2,502.4
2,349.9
2,502.4
Total 3,185.1
2,405.9
2,804.8
Source: House Armed Services Committee, Report to Accompany H.R. 5136, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, H.Rept. 111-491; Senate Armed Services Committee, Report to
Accompany S. 3454, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, S.Rept. 111-201.
Military Construction: Carrier Homeport and Guam76
The House committee included in H.R. 5136 a provision barring the use of any funds authorized
by the bill to plan and design structures at the Naval Station in Mayport, Florida, to homeport a
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (Section 2201 c. 4). It also directed the GAO to conduct an
assessment of the direct and indirect costs of homeporting a carrier in Mayport, and it directed the
Navy to report on the cost and benefits of various options for using the Mayport naval facilities,
including the stationing of non-nuclear powered ships.
76 For background, see “Military Construction,” above.
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Defense: FY2011 Authorization and Appropriations
The Administration requested, and the House bill would authorize, appropriations for military
construction on Guam in the amount of $566.1 million, of which $426.9 million would be
dedicated to projects related directly to the redeployment of Marine units from the Japanese
Prefecture of Okinawa. The remainder supports Air Force construction related to DOD's global
repositioning of forces, replacement of the territory's military hospital, and the construction of a
new National Guard Readiness Center. In its report, the House committee directed the Navy to
report on its plans for housing and providing medical care for the anticipated 25,000 temporary
construction workers expected to join the 178,000 Guamanian population. The bill would require
the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress on the military facilities needed to support force
redeployment (Section 2825), and the Secretary of the Interior, in consultation with the Secretary
of Defense, the Government of Guam, and the Interagency Group on Insular Affairs, to assess the
civil infrastructure improvements that the increased population will require (Section 2826). A
different bill provision (Section 2822) would authorize the Secretary of Defense to "assist the
Government of Guam in meeting the costs of providing increased municipal services and
facilities required as a result of the realignment" by transferring up to $500 million of
appropriated DOD operation and maintenance funds to any existing federal program available to
Guam. This authority would expire on September 30, 2017.
The Senate committee shared the House committee’s concern about the state of infrastructure in
the territory, estimating that the total population increase would equal 56,000, but took a
somewhat different approach. Noting that several construction projects authorized for Fiscal Year
2010 could not be initiated until Fiscal Year 2011, the committee suggested that the anticipated
pace of construction was unlikely to be sustained and recommended that three requested projects
within the Marine relocation package, totaling $320.0 million, be denied. This would reduce the
total Guam military construction authorization to $246.0 million.
The Senate committee also observed that senior Marine Corps leadership had emphasized the
need for new live-fire exercise areas on Guam as part of the relocation, but had not found a site
that could meet all of the Marines' training requirements. The committee suggested that the Corps
expand its search to include property on Tinian Island in the Commonwealth of the Northern
Marianas Islands, approximately 100 miles distant. The Senate bill contains no provision for
transferring defense appropriations and federal programs for the improvement of civil
infrastructure on Guam.
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Issues77
Both H.R. 5136 as passed by the House and S. 3454 as reported by the Senate committee would
prohibit the release in U.S. territory of any detainee currently held in the U.S. facility at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The House bill also would prohibit through December 31, 2011, the use
of DOD funds to transfer any detainees to the United States or to U.S. possessions until 120 days
after the President submitted to Congress a detailed assessment of the risk such a move would
involve and a plan for mitigating that risk, including a estimate of the cost (Section 1032). The
Senate committee bill includes a similar limitation on detainee transfer, but with the prohibition in
effect for 45 days after the President’s report, rather than 120 days as required by the House bill
(Section 1043).
77 Prepared in collaboration with Anna C. Henning, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division, Congressional
Research Service.
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Defense: FY2011 Authorization and Appropriations
The House bill also includes provisions that would:
• Prohibit the use of funds authorized by the bill to modify or build any facility in
the United States or in U.S. territories to house detainees currently held at
Guantanamo Bay (Section 1034);
• Prohibit the transfer of any Guantanamo Bay detainee to the custody of any
foreign government unless the Secretary of Defense certifies to Congress that
certain conditions are met that are intended to minimize the risk that the detainee
would be released (Section 1033); and
• Require the DOD Inspector General to investigate alleged illegal actions taken by
defense attorneys associated with certain Guantanamo Bay detainees (Section
1037).
The Senate committee bill would authorize $105 million of the $350 million requested for
operations associated with the Guantanamo detainees, and would allow those funds to be used
only for operations at Guantanamo Bay (Section 1531). This would eliminate $245 million
requested to convert a federal penitentiary at Thomson, Illinois, into a detention facility for
detainees currently held at Guantanamo.
The Senate committee bill also would prohibit through FY2011 the use of DOD funds to transfer
Guantanamo detainees to any of five countries, “where al Qaeda has an active presence,” namely
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Yemen (Section 1044).
Security Assistance and the State Department78
Both House and Senate versions of the FY2011 NDAA contain funding for Section 1206, but
they take different tacks on certain conditions. As reported by the House Armed Services
Committee (HASC) and passed by the House, Section 1203 of H.R. 5136, includes a provision to
raise the authorized funding limit from $350 million to $500 million, among other provisions.79
Most importantly, it would require the Secretary of Defense to transfer $75 million to the
Secretary of State to build the counterterrorism forces of the Yemeni Ministry of Interior, if the
Secretary of State can certify by July 31, 2011, that the State Department is able to effectively
provide that assistance. If the Secretary of State cannot issue the certification,80 the Secretary of
Defense may provide the funds subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State and other
Section 1206 procedures. The HASC report accompanying the bill (H.Rept. 111-491) signals the
importance the Committee attaches to this funding, recognizing Yemen as a “strategic partner” in
combating al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula.
78 For background, see “State Department Role in Security Assistance”, above.
79 Section 1206 of H.R. 5136 would also extend Section 1206 authority, currently set to expire in FY2011, through
FY2012. This extension would accommodate a provision raising the limit on funding to build the capacity of foreign
forces to participate in or support military and stability operations from $75 million to $100 million for FY2012.
80 Because the State Department’s 10th annual Trafficking in Persons Report, released June 14, 2010, identifies Yemen
as a country that recruits and uses children in governmental armed forces, Section 1206 funding to Yemen may be cut
for FY2011 under provisions of the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-457, Title IV), absent a
presidential national interest waiver, applicable exception, or a reinstatement of assistance. U.S. Department of State,
Trafficking in Persons Report: 10th Edition, June 2010, p. 10, [http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/1429].
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Defense: FY2011 Authorization and Appropriations
The SASC version, S. 3454, has no corresponding provisions regarding an increase in the
Section 1206 authorized funding limit. The SASC bill addresses the issue of assistance to build
the capacity of Yemen’s Ministry of Interior counterterrorism forces, but as a separate, stand-
alone authority (Section 1203) that would authorize the Secretary of Defense, with the
concurrence of the Secretary of State, to provide up to $75 million (from FY2011 operations and
maintenance funds) in assistance, including equipment, supplies, and training, to the Yemen
Ministry of the Interior counterterrorism unit “to conduct counterterrorism operations against al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and its affiliates.”81 The SASC report accompanying the bill
(S.Rept. 111-201) expressed concern that while Section 1206 funds were going to build various
elements of the Yemeni military, “too little assistance is being provided to the more capable and
responsive” Ministry of Interior (MOI) counterterrorism unit.
The SASC provisions on Yemen maintains Congress’ previous limitation restricting Section 1206
assistance to military forces, with an exception for assistance to maritime security forces, despite
repeated DOD requests since 2006 to expand Section 1206 assistance to other security forces. It
would, however, create a new DOD authority to assist security forces. The House bill, by
requiring that DOD transfer the funds to the Secretary of State, if the Secretary certifies that the
State Department is capable of providing the training, seems to maintain the principle of State
Department primacy, but may be perceived as blurring the line. In explaining its action, the
HASC stated in its report that the Committee “wants to provide the Secretary of Defense
authority to train and equip the Yemeni MOI counter-terrorist forces, but is also aware of the
ongoing interagency effort within the United States Government to take a holistic look at the
security assistance and security cooperation authorities that current law provides both the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State in an effort to determine the proper mix and
design of these authorities in the future.” One defense expert sees the HASC provision as a way
to avoid extending authority for DOD to train security forces, while testing the State
Department’s ability to quickly process Foreign Military Financing (FMF) type funding.
The SASC report notes that S. 3454 does not contain the requested $5 million in funding for the
Stability Operations Fellowship Program, noting its previous refusal to fund the program on the
grounds that DOD has no authority to conduct it and its belief that “the SOFP goal of educating
foreign military personnel in stability operations can be achieved through other security
assistance programs, including the [State Department] International Military Education and
Training program.... The HASC report makes no mention of requested funding for DOD security
assistance authorities other than Section 1206.
DOD Security assistance authorities—which DOD requested and Congress approved in the years
after the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 (9/11)—have pitted those
who seek enhanced flexibility for DOD to act in a preventive manner against those who argue
that the State Department must maintain its lead role in foreign policy direction and oversight. In
81 Section 1203 would require that the assistance be provided, like Section 1206 funding, “in a manner that promotes”
the observance of and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and respect for legitimate civilian authority.
Section 1203 also prohibits, like Section 1206, the use of the authority to provide any type of assistance that is
otherwise prohibited by any provision of law. Like Section 1206, Section 1203 provides for the Secretary of Defense to
notify specified committees 15 days before the obligation of funds. The SASC committee report emphasizes that the
funding is to be used to conduct operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and its affiliates. “The committee
notes that there have been public reports suggesting that the Government of Yemen may have used equipment provided
by the Untied States to conduct operations against government opposition elements in both the North and South. The
committee believes this would be a misuse of this assistance and any other security assistance provided to the
Government of Yemen.”
Congressional Research Service
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Defense: FY2011 Authorization and Appropriations
1961, Congress bestowed this role on the Secretary of State, and specifically cited military
assistance, education, training, and equipment to foreign nations, as under his purview. The
purpose was to ensure that such military assistance programs “are effectively integrated at home
and abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby.”82
Cybersecurity
The House adopted by voice vote an amendment83 to H.R. 5136 that would create a National
Office for Cyberspace with government-wide responsibility for coordinating agencies’
information security programs and security-related requirements for federal information
technology investments. The director of the new office, whose appointment would require Senate
confirmation, would be a member of the National Security Council.
The House amendment would delegate the authorities of the Director of the National Office for
Cyberspace to the Secretary of Defense in the case of systems (1) that are operated by DOD, a
DOD contractor or another entity on behalf of DOD and (2) which process any information the
unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of which would have
a debilitating impact on DOD’s mission.
As reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee, the FY2011 national defense authorization
act includes several provisions related to cybersecurity. Among other things, the committee bill
would:
• direct the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress on the cyber
warfare policy of DoD, including legal, strategy and doctrinal issues;
• require DOD to develop a tailored acquisition process for cyberspace;
• require the Secretary of Defense to implement a policy of continuously
monitoring DOD computer networks to improve security and Federal
Information Security Management Act (FISMA) compliance and reporting;
• require annual reports to Congress on the nature of damages caused by cyber
attacks, as well as net assessments of the cyberwar capabilities of the U.S. and
potential adversaries in order to determine whether the U.S. is making progress in
improving cybersecurity.
82 Section 622(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA, 22 U.S.C. 2382). This section of the FAA
gives the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, responsibility “for the continuous supervision and
general direction of…military assistance, and military education and training programs” including the decision on
whether and how much assistance to provide to each country. The original legislation stated that this provision applied
to assistance programs authorized by the FAA, but a 1976 amendment deleted this limitation. (International Security
Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, P.L. 94-329, Section 543(b)(2)(B)).
83 The amendment, sponsored by Representatives Diane E. Watson and Jim Langevin, is based on provisions of H.R.
4900 and H.R. 5247. The amendment was incorporated into one of several so-called en bloc amendments, each of
which incorporated several non-controversial amendments and all of which were agreed to by voice vote.
Congressional Research Service
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Defense: FY2011 Authorization and Appropriations
FY2011 Defense Appropriations Bill
Appropriations Subcommittee “302(b) Allocations”
Contrary to the provisions of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974
(P.L. 93-344), the House and Senate did not agree on a FY2011 budget resolution that would have
set a ceiling on overall discretionary spending that the two Appropriations Committees could
divide among their subcommittees via so-called “302(b) allocations” to function as ceilings on
each of the 12 annual appropriations bills.
On July 1, 2010, the House adopted a one-year cap on discretionary spending (H.Res. 1493)84
which the House Appropriations Committee used as the basis for setting 302(b) allocations for
each of its subcommittees (H.Rept. 111-565). For the Defense Subcommittee, the allocation was
$523.9 billion, which is $7 billion less than the Administration requested for DOD base budget
programs within the jurisdiction of that subcommittee.85
The Senate Budget Committee approved a FY2011 budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 60). However,
the resolution never was considered by the Senate, nor did the Senate adopt any overall ceiling on
FY2011 discretionary spending, as the House had done. On July 15, 2010, the Senate
Appropriations Committee adopted “discretionary guidance” for the amount that could be
appropriated by each of its subcommittees. For the Defense Subcommittee, the ceiling was
$522.8 billion, which is $8.1 billion less than the President’s request. (See Table 10)
Table 10. FY2011 Appropriations Subcommittee Spending Ceilings
(“302(b) Allocations”)
amounts in millions of dollars
House
Senate
Senate
President’s
Appropriations
House
Appropriations
Change from
Appropriations
Budget (CBO
Committee
Change from
Committee
Budget
Subcommittees
reestimate)
Allocations
Budget
Allocations
Defense 530,870
523,870
-7,000
522,791
-8,079
Homeland Security
43,656
43,656
0
43,536
0
Military Construction/VA 75,997
75,998
+1
75,996
-1
State Department, Foreign Ops
56,656
53,983
-2,673
54,056
-2,600
Total, ‘Security’ Programs
(Base Budget only)
707,159 697,487 -9,672 696,479 -10,680
War Costs
159,337
159,337
0
159,337
0
Source: Data for the CBO re-estimate of the President’s budget is from House Appropriations Committee
press release, “Appropriations Committee Approves 302(b) Al ocations,” July 20, 2010. Data for the House
subcommittee al ocations are from House Appropriations Committee, “Report on the Subal ocation of Budget
84 Such informal substitutes for a budget resolution are referred to as “deeming” resolutions.
85This excludes the President’s $18.7 billion request for military construction, which is overseen by the Subcommittee
on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies. That subcommittee’s 302(b) allocation is $1 million
more than the $76.0 billion which, according to CBO, would be the cost of the President’s request for all the
discretionary programs funded by that agency. The 302(b) allocation does not identify a the DOD share of that total.
Congressional Research Service
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Defense: FY2011 Authorization and Appropriations
Al ocations for Fiscal Year 2011,” H.Rept. 111-565, July 26, 2010; Data for the Senate committee are Senate
Appropriations Committee press release, “FY2011 Subcommittee Spending Guidance,” July 15, 2010.
Notes: “War Costs” include $157.8 billion within the jurisdiction of the Defense subcommitteees, 1.3 billion
within the jurisdiction of the Military Construction and VA subcommittees and $255 million within the
jurisdiction of the Homeland Security subcommittees.
FY2011 Defense Appropriations Bills
On July 27, 2010, the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee approved for consideration
by the full Appropriations Committee a FY2011 DOD Appropriations bill (unnumbered) that
would provide a total of $671.0 billion. For the base budget, the bill would appropriate $513.3
billion, a reduction of $7.0 billion from the President’s request, as required by the Defense
Subcommittee’s 302(b) allocation. For war costs, the subcommittee bill would provide $157.7
billion, a reduction of $253 million from the request.
The subcommittee did not make public the text of the bill, nor the lengthy explanatory report
detailing its specific recommendations. Other than a summary table listing the amount the bill
would provide for each appropriations account and a list of member earmarks as required by
House rules, the only information about the substance of the bill was provided in a statement by
subcommittee chairman Rep. Norm Dicks.86
On September 16, 2010, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved by a vote of 18-12 a
FY2011 DOD Appropriations bill (unnumbered) that would provide a total of $669.9 billion,
including $512.2 billion for the base budget and $157.7 billion for war costs. Selected details
were provided in a press release.87
86 Opening Statement of Chairman Norm Dicks on the FY2011 Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Markup, July
27, 2010, accessed September 16, 2010, at
http://appropriations.house.gov/images/stories/pdf/def/Norm_Dicks_Opening_Statement.7.27.10.pdf
87 Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, “Summary: FY 2011 Department of Defense Appropriations Bill:
Subcommittee Mark,” accessed September 15, 2010, at
http://www.appropriations.senate.gov/news.cfm?method=news.view&id=5d9a8abc-e3ee-4c49-9649-1f1311286566.
Congressional Research Service
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Appendix. Selected Program Summary Tables
Table A-1. Congressional Action on Selected FY2011 Missile Defense Funding: Authorization
(amounts in millions of dollars)
PE Number
Conference
(for R&D
House-
SASC
Agreement
projects
Program Element
FY2011
passed
reported
only)
Title
Request
(H.R. 5136)
(S. 3454)
Comments
0603175C BMD
Technology
132.2
132.2
132.2
0603881C BMD
Terminal
436.5 436.5 436.5
Defense Segment
0603882C BMD
Midcourse
1,346.2 1,346.2 1,346.2
Defense Segment
0603884C BMD
Sensors
454.9
454.9
454.9
0603888C
BMD Test & Targets
1,113.4
1,113.4
1.113.4
0603890C BMD
Enabling
402.8 402.8 402.8
Programs
0603891C
Special Programs -
270.2 245.2 270.2
MDA
0603892C AEGIS
BMD
1,467.3
1,467.3
1,467.3
0603893C
Space Tracking &
112.7 112.7 112.7
Surveillance System
0603895C
BMD System Space
10.9 10.9 10.9
Programs
0603896C BMD
Command
and
342.6 342.6 342.6
Control, Battle
Management and
Communications
0603898C
BMD Joint Warfighter
68.7 68.7 68.7
Support
CRS-51
PE Number
Conference
(for R&D
House-
SASC
Agreement
projects
Program Element
FY2011
passed
reported
only)
Title
Request
(H.R. 5136)
(S. 3454)
Comments
0603904C Missile
Defense
86.2 86.2 86.2
Integration &
Operations Center
(MDIOC)
0603901C Directed
Energy
98.7 148.7 98.7
House
added
$50
million for continued
Research
research using the Airborne Laser
(ABL)
0603906C Regarding
Trench
7.5
7.5
7.5
0603907C Sea-Based
X-Band
153.1 153.1 153.1
Radar (SBX)
0603913C Israeli
Cooperative
121.7 209.7 351.7
The Senate committee bill increased
Programs
the amount authorized within this
program element by $230 million
Israeli “Iron Dome” and other defenses
0 [205.588] (230.0)
including $205 million to support
against short-range rockets
Israel’s Iron Dome system to defend
against short-range rockets and
artillery shells and $25 million for
another Israeli short-range defense
system. The House bill did not increase
the total authorization but gave the
Secretary of Defense discretion to give
Israel up to $205 million for Iron
Dome (H.R. 5136, Section 1507)
0604880C Land-based
SM-3
281.4
281.4
281.4
0604881C
Aegis SM-3 Block IIA
318.8 318.8 318.8
Co-Development
0604883C Precision
Tracking
67.0 67.0 67.0
Space System
0604884C Airborne
Infrared
111.7
111.7
111.7
88 H.R. 5136 gives the Secretary of Defense discretion to transfer up to $205.5 million of funds authorized by the bill to the Israeli government to support continued development
of the “Iron Dome” defense against short-range rockets and artillery shells. This amount is not included in the total or subtotal of this column of the table.
CRS-52
PE Number
Conference
(for R&D
House-
SASC
Agreement
projects
Program Element
FY2011
passed
reported
only)
Title
Request
(H.R. 5136)
(S. 3454)
Comments
0901585C Pentagon
Reservation
20.5
20.5
20.5
0901598C Management
HQ
-
29.8 29.8 29.8
MDA
Subtotal RDT&E, Missile Defense
7,454.8 7,567.8 7,684.8
Agency
Base Realignment and Closure
9.0 9.0 9.0
(BRAC), Missile Defense Agency
THAAD, Fielding
858.9
858.9
833.9
SASC cut $25 million because of
production delays.
Aegis, Block 5 Fielding
94.1
144.1
94.1
House increases the number of SM-3
Standard missiles procured in FY2011
to stabilize the production rate.
AN/TPY-2 radar
0
65.0
0
House funds procurement of long lead-
time components for radars slated for
funding in FY2012.
Subtotal Procurement, Missile
953.0 1,068.0 928.0
Defense Agency
Total, Missile Defense Agency
8,416.8
8,644.8
8,621.8
0603305A
Army Missile Defense
11.5 11.5 22.0
Systems Integration
(non-space)
0603308A
Army Missile Defense
27.6 27.6 27.6
Systems Integration
(space)
0604869A Patriot/MEADS
467.1 467.1 467.1
Combined Aggregate
Program (CAP)
0605456A PAC-3/MSE
Missile
62.5
62.5
62.5
0605457A
Army Integrated Air
251.1 251.1 251.2
and Missile Defense
CRS-53
PE Number
Conference
(for R&D
House-
SASC
Agreement
projects
Program Element
FY2011
passed
reported
only)
Title
Request
(H.R. 5136)
(S. 3454)
Comments
0203801A Missile/Air
Defense
24.3 24.3 24.3
Product Improvement
Program
0102419A Aerostat
Joint
372.5 372.5 372.5
Program Office
(JLENS)
0605126J
Joint Theater Air and
94.6 94.6 94.6
Missile Defense
Organization
Subtotal RDT&E, Army, Joint Staff
1,311.2
1,311.2
1,321.7
Patriot/PAC-3 480.2
480.2
480.2
Patriot modifications
57.2
190.8
190.8
Both bills add $133.6 million to fund
upgrades the Army requested but
DOD did not include in the budget.
Subtotal, Procurement, Army
537.4
671.0
671.0
Total Missile Defense R&D,
10,265.4 10,627.0 10,614.5
MilCon, Procurement, All Agencies
Sources: House Armed Services Committee, Report to Accompany H.R. 5136, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, H.Rept. 111-491; Senate
Armed Services Committee, Report to Accompany S. 3454, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, S.Rept. 111-201.
Notes: The defense authorization act generally does not determine the final amount provided for a program or project. The authorization bill authorizes the appropriation
of funds, but the amount available is determined by the appropriations. An appropriations bill may provide more than or less than the amount authorized, may provide
funds for a program for which no funds are authorized, and may provide funds for a “new start” for which funding has never been authorized.
CRS-54
Table A-2. Congressional Action on Selected FY2011 Army and Marine Corps Programs: Authorization
(amounts in millions of dollars; base budget funding in plain type, OCO funding in italics.)
Request
House-passed SASC
recommended
Final
Bill
Procurement
R&D Procurement
R&D Procurement
R&D Procurement
R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ #
$
$
Comments
Army Helicopters
Light Utility
50 305.3 0.0 50 305.3 0.0 50 305.3 0.0
Helicopter
UH-60 Blackhawk
72 1,414.2 20.6 72 1,431.2 20.6 72 1,414.2 20.6
Helicopter and Mods,
Army
UH-60 Blackhawk
2 40.5
0.0 2 40.5 0.0 2 40.5 0.0
Helicopter and Mods,
Army (OCO)
CH-47 Chinook
40 1,225.3 21.0 40 1,225.5 21.0 40 1,225.3 21.0
Helicopter and Mods,
Army
CH-47 Chinook
2
153.5 0.0 2 153.5 0.0 2 153.5 0.0
Helicopter and Mods,
Army (OCO)
AH-64 Apache Helo
16 887.6 93.3 16 889.6 93.3 16 887.6 93.3
Mods
AH-64 Apache Helo
-- 199.2 0.0 -- 199.2 0.0 -- 199.2 0.0
Mods (OCO)
Combat Vehicles
M-2 Bradley Mods
—
215.1
97.0
—
215.1
97.0
--
215.1
97.0
M-1 Abrams tank
21 413.9 107.5 21 413.9
107.5 21 413.9 107.5
Mods
Stryker Armored
83 890.9 133.8 83 890.9
133.8 83 890.9
133.8
Vehicle and Mods
Stryker Armored
-- 445.0 0.0 -- 445.0 0.0 -- 445.0 0.0
Vehicle and Mods
(OCO)
CRS-55
Request
House-passed SASC
recommended
Final
Bill
Procurement
R&D Procurement
R&D Procurement
R&D Procurement
R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ #
$
$
Comments
Paladin howitzer
-- 105.3 -- 0.0 --
0.0
Mods
Brigade Combat
— 682.7 1,568.1 — 56.0 1,415.4
-- 302.4 1,568.1
Cuts reflect
Team Modernization
termination of the
(not including GCV)
N-LOS missile
system and delay of
other components.
(See )
Army Ground
-- 0.0
934.4 -- 0.0
934.4 -- 0.0
934.4
Combat Vehicle
(GCV)
USMC Expeditionary
— 0.0
242.8 — 0.0 242.8 -- 0.0 242.8
Fighting Vehicle (EFV)
Cargo and Transport Vehicles
HMMWV, Army and
17 4.8
0.0 17 4.8 0.0 17
4.8 0.0
Of the total, $989
USMC, new vehicles
million is to upgrade
and upgrades
9,270 HMMWVs as
they are returned to
HMMWV, Army and
77 1,002.1 0.0 77-- 1,002.1 0.0 77 1,002.1 0.0
U.S. from overseas.
USMC, new vehicles
and upgrades (OCO)
Family of Medium
2,960 929.9 3.7 2,960 929.9 3.7 2,960 929.9 3.7
Number includes
Tactical Vehicles and
only Army vehicles
USMC Medium
Trucks
Family of Medium
1,692 596.9 0.0 1,692 596.9 0.0 1,692 596.9 0.0
Tactical Vehicles and
USMC Medium Trucks
(OCO)
CRS-56
Request
House-passed SASC
recommended
Final
Bill
Procurement
R&D Procurement
R&D Procurement
R&D Procurement
R&D
# $ $ # $ $ # $ $ #
$
$
Comments
Family of Heavy
1,517 994.7 3.7 n/a 944.7 3.7 1,517 994.7 3.7
“Number” column
Tactical Vehicles and
includes truck
USMC Logistics
tractors; Funding
Vehicle System (LVS)
also includes
Replacement
variously equipped
trailer units.
Family of Heavy
702 297.8 0.0 702 297.8 0.0 702 297.8 0.0
Tactical Vehicles and
USMC Logistics Vehicle
System (LVS)
Replacement (OCO)
Source: House Armed Services Committee, press release, FY2011 National Defense Authorization Summary Tables, accessed at
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/PressSummaryTablesFY11.pdf.
Note: The defense authorization act general y does not determine the final amount provided for a program or project. The authorization bill authorizes the appropriation
of funds, but the amount available is determined by the appropriations. An appropriations bill may provide more than or less than the amount authorized, may provide
funds for a program for which no funds are authorized, and may provide funds for a “new start” for which funding has never been authorized.
CRS-57
Table A-3. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Shipbuilding Programs: Authorization
(amounts in millions of dollars)
Request House-passed
SASC recommended
Final Bill
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Comments
# $ $ #
$
$
#
$
$
#
$
$
CVN-21 Carrier
— 2,639.6 93.8 — 2,639.6 93.8 __ 2,639.6 93.8
Includes
$1.73 billion for fourth
(and final) year of incremental
funding for CVN-78 (projected
for commissioning in FY2015) plus
($908 million) in long lead-time
funding for CVN-79.
Carrier Refueling Overhaul
-- 1,664.8 0.0 -- 1,664.8 0.0 -- 1,664.8 0.0
Includes
$1.26 billion for the third
year of incremental funding for
one ships plus $$408 million in
long lead-time funding for
another.
Virginia-class submarine
2 5,132.7 155.5 2 5,132.2 155.5 2 5,132.7 165.8
Includes
$3.4 billion for two ships
plus $1.7 billion for long lead-time
funding for two ships to be funded
in FY2012 and two additional
ships to be funded in FY2013.
DDG-1000 Destroyer
-- 186.3 549.2 -- 186.3 549.2 -- 186.3 549.2
DDG-51 Destroyer
2 2,970.2 0.0 2
2,970.21
0.0 2 2,970.2 0.0
LCS Littoral Combat Ship
2 1,509.3 226.3 2 1,509.3 305.5 2 1,509.3 226.3
Includes
$1.23 billion for two
ships and $278 million for
components that would be used
in construction of future ships.
LHA Helicopter Carrier
1 949.9 0.0 1 949.9 0.0 1 949.9 0.0
A
second
increment of $2.1 billion
to complete the cost of the ship is
slated for inclusion in the FY2012
budget request.
Joint High-Speed Vessel
2
383.5
6.8
2
383.5
6.8
2
383.5
6.8
The Army and Navy each
requested funds for one of these
high-speed troop and cargo ships.
CRS-58
Request House-passed
SASC recommended
Final Bill
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D
Comments
# $ $ #
$
$
#
$
$
#
$
$
Mobile Landing Platform
1
380.0
28.0
1
380.0
28.0
1
380.0
28.0
Based on the design of a
commercial tanker, this ship is
intended to function as a floating
pier on which large ships can
transfer combat equipment to
smaller landing craft.
Sources: House Armed Services Committee, press release, FY2011 National Defense Authorization Summary Tables, accessed at
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/PressSummaryTablesFY11.pdf.
Note: The defense authorization act general y does not determine the final amount provided for a program or project. The authorization bill authorizes the appropriation
of funds, but the amount available is determined by the appropriations. An appropriations bill may provide more than or less than the amount authorized, may provide
funds for a program for which no funds are authorized, and may provide funds for a “new start” for which funding has never been authorized.
Table A-4. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force Aircraft Programs: Authorization
(amounts in millions of dollars; base budget funding in plain type, OCO funding in italics.)
House passed
SASC recommended
Request
(H.R. 5136)
(S. 3454)
Final Bill
Procurement R&D Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D Procurement
R&D
Comments
# $ $ #
$
$
#
$
$
#
$
$
Fighters and Bombers
F-35A Joint Strike Fighter,
22 4,110.1 1,101.3 22
4,023.5 1,343.8
22
4,110.1 1,101.3
Both versions of the bill deny
AF (conventional takeoff
funds for one plane ($204.9
version) and Mods
million) requested by Air Force to
replace fighter lost in current
F-35A Joint Strike Fighter, AF
1
204.9 0.0 0
0.0 0.0 0
0.0 0.0
operations.
(conventional takeoff version)
and Mods (OCO)
House bill includes $485 million
to continue development of an
F-35C Joint Strike Fighter,
13
2,576.1 667.9 13
2,576.1 760.2 13
2,576.1 667.9
alternate engine.
Marine Corps (STOVL
veresion)
F-35B Joint Strike Fighter,
7 1,887.0
707.8 7
1,887.0
800.0 7
1,887.0 707.8
Navy (Carrier-based version)
CRS-59
House passed
SASC recommended
Request
(H.R. 5136)
(S. 3454)
Final Bill
Procurement R&D Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D Procurement
R&D
Comments
# $ $ #
$
$
#
$
$
#
$
$
[F-35 Joint Strike
43 8,778.1 2,477.0 42
8,486.6 2,904.0 42
8,573.2 2,477.0
Fighter, total]
F-22 Fighter Mods
--
492.2
576.3
--
492.2
576.3
--
492.2
576.3
F-15 Fighter Mods
--
302.2
222.7
--
302.2
222.7
--
302.2
222.7
F-16 Fighter Mods
--
161.2
129.1
--
161.2
129.1
--
167.2
129.1
EA-18G Aircraft, Navy
12
1,083.9
22.0
12
1,083.9
22.0
12
1,038.0
22.0
F/A-18E/F Fighter, Navy
22 1,787.2 148.4 30
2,287.2 148.4 28
2,027.6
148.4
Adds $500 million for eight
additional aircraft.
A-10 Attack Plane Mods
--
181.9
5.7
--
181.9
5.7
--
181.9
5.7
A-10 Attack Plane Mods (OCO)
--
16.5 0.0
--
16.5 0.0 --
16.5 0.0
B-1B
Bomber
Mods
--
223.9 33.2 --
223.9 33.2 --
223.9 33.2
B-1B Bomber Mods (OCO)
-- 8.5 0.0
--
8.5 0.0 --
8.5 0.0
B-2A
Bomber
Mods
-- 63.4 260.5 -- 63.4 260.5 -- 63.4 260.5
B-52
Bomber
Mods
-- 69.1 146.1 -- 69.1 146.1 -- 69.1 146.1
Cargo Planes and Tankers
C-130 variants and Mods, AF
17
2,048.6
163.0
17
2,112.1
103.2
17
2,048.6
163.0
C-130 variants and Mods, AF
-- 187.6
0.0 --
187.6
0.0 --
187.6
0.0
(OCO)
[C-130 Total]
17
2,236.2
163.0
17
2,299.7
103.2
17
2,236.2
163.0
C-5 Mods,
--
907.5
59.0
--
907.5
59.0
--
907.5
59.0
C-5 Mods, (OCO)
-- 73.4 0.0 --
73.4
0.0 --
73.4
0.0
C-17 Mods
--
351.6
177.2
--
351.6
177.2
--
351.6
177.2
C-17 Mods (OCO)
-- 224.5
0.0 --
224.5
0.0 --
224.5
0.0
C-27 Joint Cargo Aircraft
8
351.2
26.4
8
351.2
26.4
8
351.2
26.4
KC-X Tanker Replacement,
--
0.0
863.9
--
0.0
863.9
--
0.0
863.9
CRS-60
House passed
SASC recommended
Request
(H.R. 5136)
(S. 3454)
Final Bill
Procurement R&D Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D Procurement
R&D
Comments
# $ $ #
$
$
#
$
$
#
$
$
C-37A executive transport
2
52.0
0.0
2
52.0
0.0
2
52.0
0.0
Gulfstream V used for long-range
transport of senior civilian and
military officials
Helicopter and Tilt-rotor
MV-22 Osprey, Marine
30 2,224.9
46.1 30
2,224.9
46.1 30
2,224.9
46.1
Corps and Mods
MV-22 Osprey, Marine Corps
-- 36.4 0.0 --
36.4
0.0 --
36.4
0.0
and Mods (OCO)
CV-22 Osprey, AF and Mods
5
544.7
18.3
5
544.7
18.3
5
544.7
18.3
CV-22 Osprey, AF and Mods
-- 0.8 0.0
--
0.8
0.0
--
0.8
0.0
(OCO)
[V-22 Osprey Total]
35
2,784.8
64.4
35
2,784.8
64.4
35
2,784.8
64.4
Special Operations
-- 367.1 14.5 -- 367.1
14.5 --
367.1 14.5
helicopter Mods
Special Operations helicopter
-- 9.8
-- 9.8
--
9.8
Mods (OCO)
CH-53K Helicopter
--
0.0
577.4
--
0.0
577.4
--
0.0
577.4
VH-71A Executive
--
0.0
159.8
--
0.0
159.8
--
0.0
159.8
Funds are for development of a
Helicopter
new helicopter, following
termination of VH-71 program.
HH-60M search and rescue
3 104.4
0.0 3
104.4
0.0 3
104.4
0.0
helicopter
HH-60M search and rescue
3 114.0
0.0 3
114.0
0.0 3
114.0
0.0
helicopter (OCO)
UH-1Y/AH-1Z 28
808.1
60.5
28
808.1
60.5
28
808.1
60.5
UH-1Y/AH-1Z (OCO)
3
88.5
0.0
3
88.5
0.0
3
88.5
0.0
MH-60R/MH-60S Helicopter,
42 1,608.7
55.8 42 1,608.7
55.8 42 1,608.7
55.8
Navy
CRS-61
House passed
SASC recommended
Request
(H.R. 5136)
(S. 3454)
Final Bill
Procurement R&D Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D Procurement
R&D
Comments
# $ $ #
$
$
#
$
$
#
$
$
Reconnaissance and Surveillance Aircraft
P-8A Poseidon Multi-Mission
7
1,990.6 929.2 7
1,990.6 929.2 7
1,990.6 929.2
Maritime Aircraft
E-2D Hawkeye Aircraft,
4
937.8
171.1
4
937.8
171.1
4
937.8
171.1
P-3/EP-3 Aircraft Mods
--
312.3
3.6
--
312.3
3.6
--
312.3
3.6
P-3/EP-3 Aircraft Mods (OCO)
--
6.0
0.0
--
6.0
0.0
--
6.0
0.0
E-8 JSTARS ground
-- 188.5
0.0 -- 176.8
0.0 291.0
0.0
surveillance plane Mods
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
MQ-4/RQ-4 Global Hawk
4 739.8 780.6 4
739.8
780.6 4
739.8
780.6
Al procurement for USAF
version (RQ-4). R&D includes
Navy, Air Force
$529.3 million for Navy version
MQ-4/RQ-4 Global Hawk
-- 119.4
0.0 --
119.4
0.0 --
119.4
0.0
(MQ-4).
Mods
MQ-9 Reaper
36 863.6 125.4 48
1,348.9
125.4 36
845.3
125.4
Air Force
MQ-9 Reaper Mods
--
226.3
0.0
--
226.3
0.0
--
226.3
0.0
MQ-9 Reaper (OCO)
12
216.0
0.0
12
216.0
0.0
12
216.0
0.0
MQ-9 Reaper Mods
--
49.4
0.0
--
49.4
0.0
--
49.4
0.0
MQ-1 Warrior/Predator
26 459.3 152.2 26
459.3
152.2 26
459.3
152.2
Army
MQ-1 Warrior/Predator
-- 325.3
0.0 --
325.3
0.0 --
325.3
0.0
Mods
MQ-1 Warrior/Predator (OCO)
--
47.0
0.0
--
47.0
0.0
--
47.0
0.0
MQ-1 Warrior/Predator (OCO)
-- 11.9 0.0 --
11.9
0.0 --
11.9
0.0
Mods
CRS-62
House passed
SASC recommended
Request
(H.R. 5136)
(S. 3454)
Final Bill
Procurement R&D Procurement
R&D
Procurement
R&D Procurement
R&D
Comments
# $ $ #
$
$
#
$
$
#
$
$
RQ-7 Shadow Mods
-- 523.1
8.7 -- 523.1
8.7 -- 523.1
8.7
Army
RQ-7 Shadow Mods (OCO)
--
97.8
14.9
--
97.8
14.9
--
97.8
14.9
RQ-11 Raven
328 54.7 2.1
328 54.7
2.1
328 54.7 2.1
multi-service
RQ-11 Raven (OCO)
--
26.7
0.0
--
26.7
0.0
--
26.7
0.0
BCT UAV Increment 1
-- 44.2 50.3 -- 44.2 50.3 -- 44.2 50.3
Army
MQ-8 Fire Finder
3 47.5 10.7 3 47.5 10.7 3 47.5 10.7
Navy
STUASLO (hand-launched
-- 39.3 44.3 -- 39.3 44.3 -- 39.3 44.3
UAVs)
multi-service
UCAS (carrier-based
-- --
266.4
-- --
266.4
-- --
266.4
bomber)
Navy
Tactical Unmanned Aerial
-- --- 36.2
-- -- 36.2
-- ---
36.2
Vehicle
Navy
Long-Endurance Multi-
--
--
93.0
--
--
93.0
--
--
93.0
Blimp-like UAV intended to carry
Intelligence Vehicle (LEMV)
2,500 lbs. or sensors at 20,000 ft.
for three weeks per mission.
Army
Sources: House Armed Services Committee,press release, FY2011 National Defense Authorization Summary Tables, accessed at
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/PressSummaryTablesFY11.pdf.
Notes: The defense authorization act general y does not determine the final amount provided for a program or project. The authorization bill authorizes the appropriation of
funds, but the amount available is determined by the appropriations. An appropriations bill may provide more than or less than the amount authorized, may provide funds for a
program for which no funds are authorized, and may provide funds for a “new start” for which funding has never been authorized.
CRS-63
Defense: FY2011 Authorization and Appropriations
Author Contact Information
Pat Towell, Coordinator
Daniel H. Else
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget
Specialist in National Defense
ptowell@crs.loc.gov, 7-2122
delse@crs.loc.gov, 7-4996
Amy Belasco
Steven A. Hildreth
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget
Specialist in Missile Defense
abelasco@crs.loc.gov, 7-7627
shildreth@crs.loc.gov, 7-7635
Stephen Daggett
Steve Bowman
Specialist in Defense Policy and Budgets
Specialist in National Security
sdaggett@crs.loc.gov, 7-7642
sbowman@crs.loc.gov, 7-5841
Don J. Jansen
Jeremiah Gertler
Analyst in Defense Health Care Policy
Specialist in Military Aviation
djansen@crs.loc.gov, 7-4769
jgertler@crs.loc.gov, 7-5107
Charles A. Henning
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Military Manpower Policy
Specialist in Naval Affairs
chenning@crs.loc.gov, 7-8866
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
Congressional Research Service
64