Statutory Damage Awards in Peer-to-Peer File
Sharing Cases Involving Copyrighted Sound
Recordings: Recent Legal Developments

Brian T. Yeh
Legislative Attorney
September 16, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41415
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

Statutory Damage Awards in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Cases

Summary
Peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing networks permit computer users to “share” with others digital files
that are stored on their computers’ hard drives. While P2P file sharing technology could be used
for legitimate purposes, P2P users most often copy and distribute digital files that contain
copyrighted sound recordings, television shows, and motion pictures, without the permission of
(or payment to) the copyright holders; as such, it is a violation of the copyright holders’ exclusive
rights to control the reproduction and distribution of their works. P2P networks such as Napster,
Grokster, Morpheus, Kazaa, and LimeWire have all been sued for copyright infringement or for
inducing their users to commit copyright infringement, and most have shut down or changed their
business models as a consequence of their adjudged legal liability. In addition, many users of P2P
networks have been subjected to copyright infringement lawsuits filed by the motion picture and
music recording industry associations that represent movie and sound recording copyright
holders, respectively. The vast majority of these lawsuits have settled, with the file sharer
agreeing to pay compensation to the copyright holders. However, a few of these cases have gone
to trial, and two cases in particular resulted in substantial jury awards to the plaintiffs. These
awards were based on the Copyright Act’s allowance of statutory damages of between $750 to
$30,000 for each act of infringement, and up to $150,000 in cases where the infringement is
committed willfully. Congress granted the copyright owner the power to choose to recover either
statutory damages or the owner’s actual damages plus additional profits of the infringer at any
time before final judgment is rendered. Statutory damages serve both compensatory and deterrent
purposes: they provide the copyright owner with restitution of profit and reparation for the harm
suffered by the owner in situations where it may be difficult or impossible to submit evidence of
actual damages (such as lost profits), and they also punish the infringer and discourage that
individual, and others, from further infringement.
In 2009, in Capitol Records Inc. v. Jammie Thomas-Rasset, the jury found the defendant guilty of
willful copyright infringement with respect to 24 sound recordings that she had downloaded and
distributed using the P2P file sharing software Kazaa, and awarded $1.92 million in statutory
damages to the plaintiff ($80,000 per infringed song). Also in 2009, the jury in Sony BMG Music
Entertainment v. Tenenbaum
found the defendant guilty of willful infringement for downloading
and distributing 30 sound recordings using Kazaa, and awarded to the plaintiff $675,000 in
statutory damages ($22,500 per infringed song). The defendants in these cases asked their judges
to alter or amend the jury award of statutory damages, arguing that the Copyright Act’s statutory
damages provision, as applied to them, violates the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
In early 2010, the judge in the Thomas-Rasset case reduced the award to $54,000 ($2,250 per
song) using his power under the common law doctrine of remittitur; the court did not reach the
question of the constitutionality of the jury’s damages award. The judge opined that the original
award of nearly $2 million was “monstrous,” “simply shocking,” and “unjust,” and argued that
“statutory damages must still bear some relation to actual damages.” However, the plaintiffs in
Thomas-Rasset refused to accept the remittitur; thus, a new trial on the issue of damages is to be
held on October 4, 2010. On July 9, 2010, the judge in the Tenenbaum case ruled that the
$675,000 award was “unconstitutionally excessive” and reduced the award to $67,500 ($2,250
per song). Both judges admitted that they were drawing arbitrary lines when setting the award
amount at $2,250 per infringed work (three times the statutory minimum for copyright
infringement); however, they viewed treble damages to be a “most reasoned solution” that would
compensate the plaintiffs, deter illegal file sharing, and ensure that the total award is not grossly
excessive. The plaintiffs in the Tenenbaum case have appealed the judgment to the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
Congressional Research Service

Statutory Damage Awards in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Cases

Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
The Basic Structure and Operation of Peer-To-Peer File Sharing Networks............................ 1
Statutory Damages in Copyright Infringement Cases ............................................................. 2
Case Law Surrounding Statutory Damages for Peer-to-Peer File Sharing of Copyrighted
Works ...................................................................................................................................... 4
Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset.................................................................................. 4
Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum .................................................................... 7
Reactions and Implications........................................................................................................ 12

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 14
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 14

Congressional Research Service

Statutory Damage Awards in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Cases

Introduction
Many users of peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing networks have been subjected to copyright
infringement lawsuits regarding the unauthorized uploading and downloading of copyrighted
material. The vast majority of these lawsuits have settled, with the file sharer agreeing to pay
compensation to the copyright holders. Several of the cases have resulted in default judgments
against the defendants or summary judgment motions in favor of the plaintiffs. However, a few of
these cases have gone to trial, and two cases in particular resulted in substantial jury awards to the
plaintiffs. Those jury awards, based on the Copyright Act’s statutory damages provision, were
later reduced by federal judges who found the awards to be grossly excessive and unjust, and
even a violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clause. This report provides an overview
of this type of copyright infringement, explains the Copyright Act’s statutory damages provision,
and reviews the recent P2P file sharing litigation.
Background
Copyright is a federal grant of legal protection for certain works of creative expression, including
books, movies, photographs, and music.1 A copyright holder possesses several exclusive legal
entitlements under the Copyright Act, including the right to control reproduction and distribution
of the protected material.2 Unauthorized use of a copyrighted work by a third party in a manner
that implicates one of the copyright holder’s exclusive rights constitutes infringement.3 The
copyright holder may file a lawsuit against an alleged infringer for a violation of any of the
exclusive rights conferred by copyright. The Copyright Act provides several civil remedies to the
copyright holder that is harmed by infringement, including the possibility of obtaining injunctive
relief,4 actual damages suffered by the copyright owner due to the infringement,5 statutory
damages,6 and costs and attorney fees.7
The Basic Structure and Operation of Peer-To-Peer File Sharing
Networks

File sharing software programs that create P2P network connections between computers enable
the transmission of data and communications over the Internet.8 A variety of P2P programs are
typically available for free download from the distributors’ websites. After installing a P2P
program (called a “client application”) onto the computer, the user runs the application to connect

1 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
2 17 U.S.C. §§ 106. For a detailed description of the major provisions of the Copyright Act, see CRS Report RS22801,
General Overview of U.S. Copyright Law, by Brian T. Yeh.
3 17 U.S.C. § 501.
4 17 U.S.C. § 502.
5 17 U.S.C. § 504(b).
6 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).
7 17 U.S.C. § 505.
8 For further information on this topic, see CRS Report RL31998, File-Sharing Software and Copyright Infringement:
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
, by Brian T. Yeh and Robin Jeweler.
Congressional Research Service
1

Statutory Damage Awards in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Cases

to the computers of other users of that particular P2P software who are currently “on-line.” The
client application allows users to “share” files located on their computer hard-drives. Once users
make files available for sharing with each other, anyone who uses the same company’s software
to connect to the respective P2P network may locate and download desired files easily and at no
cost. For example, a user of the LimeWire software can directly access files saved on another
LimeWire user’s computer hard-drive. Or a user can search for a particular file name, such as an
MP3 song title, across all users’ computers connected to the LimeWire network, and then
download a copy of that file onto his or her computer.
While P2P file sharing technology could be used for legitimate purposes, the overwhelming
majority of files available for sharing on peer-to-peer networks are copyrighted works9—digital
files that are electronic copies of copyrighted sound recordings, television shows, and motion
pictures. Uploading and downloading of these copyrighted works without the authorization of the
copyright holders using P2P file sharing technology is a violation of the copyright holders’
exclusive rights to control the reproduction and distribution of their works.10
Statutory Damages in Copyright Infringement Cases
The Copyright Act imposes a remedy of actual damages “as a result of the infringement, and any
profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement.”11 The copyright holder may also
elect to obtain statutory damages prior to final judgment in the case, rather than actual damages.12
These statutory damages do not require proof of actual damages and create a range of $750 to
$30,000 per infringed work upon a finding of copyright infringement, as the court considers
just.13 If the infringement is found to be willful, the Copyright Act permits “enhanced” statutory
damages of up to $150,000 per infringed work.14
The remedy of statutory damages for copyright infringement was adopted by the First Congress
in the Copyright Act of 1790;15 with subsequent revisions of the Copyright Act, Congress retained
the statutory damages provision and increased the authorized amounts. According to the Supreme

9 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 922 (2005) (citing a study that indicated
nearly 90% of the files available for download on the P2P networks operated by Grokster and StreamCast were
copyrighted works); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001) (the court finding that as
much as 87% of the files available on Napster were copyrighted works).
10 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 923.
11 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). The profits of the infringer may only be taken into account if they are not computed in the
calculation of actual damages. In establishing the infringer’s profits, the copyright owner is required to present proof
only of the infringer’s gross revenue. Elements of profit attributable to areas outside of the copyrighted work and the
infringer’s deductible expenses must be proven by the infringer. See id.
12 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).
13 Id. However, the Supreme Court has determined that “the Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial on all
issues pertinent to an award of statutory damages under § 504(a) of the Copyright Act, including the amount itself.”
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, 523 U.S. 340, 355 (1998). Thus, although the Copyright Act refers to “the
court,” the statutory damages amount must be calculated by the jury, not the judge. See 4-14 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
14.04 [C][2].
14 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). However, if the court finds that the infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that
his or her acts constituted copyright infringement (“innocent infringement”), the court may, in its discretion, reduce the
statutory damages amount to a sum of not more than $200. Id.
15 Feltner, 523 U.S. at 351 (“The Copyright Act of 1790 provided that damages for copyright infringement of published
works would be “the sum of fifty cents for every sheet which shall be found in [the infringer’s] possession…”).
Congressional Research Service
2

Statutory Damage Awards in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Cases

Court, statutory damages “give the owner of a copyright some recompense for injury done him, in
a case where the rules of law render difficult or impossible proof of damages or discovery of
profits.”16 In addition to this compensatory purpose, statutory damages also serve to punish the
infringer and deter others from infringement.17 The most recent increase in the statutory damages
amount range occurred when Congress passed the Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright
Damages Improvement Act of 1999.18 According to the legislative history of this statute,
Congress deemed the increase necessary because,
By the turn of the century the Internet is projected to have more than 200 million users, and
the development of new technology will create additional incentive for copyright thieves to
steal protected works. … Many computer users are either ignorant that copyright laws apply
to Internet activity, or they simply believe that they will not be caught or prosecuted for their
conduct. Also, many infringers do not consider the current copyright infringement penalties a
real threat and continue infringing, even after a copyright owner puts them on notice that
their actions constitute infringement and that they should stop the activity or face legal
action. In light of this disturbing trend, it is manifest that Congress respond appropriately
with updated penalties to dissuade such conduct. …
Courts and juries must be able to render awards that deter others from infringing intellectual
property rights. It is important that the cost of infringement substantially exceed the costs of
compliance, so that persons who use or distribute intellectual property have a strong
incentive to abide by the copyright laws.19
Defendants in cases involving a jury’s award of particularly large statutory damages have
challenged the award as unconstitutional, arguing that a statutory award that far exceeds the harm
suffered by the plaintiff constitutes a deprivation of due process. Historically, judicial review of
statutory damages has been assessed under the standard the Supreme Court outlined in a 1919
decision, St. Louis, I.M. & S. Railway Co. v. Williams.20 This standard is quite deferential and
overrules an award within a statutory range only when it is “so severe and oppressive as to be
wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable.”21 Elements the court
considers are whether Congress has given “due regard for the interests of the public, the
numberless opportunities for committing the offense, and the need for securing uniform
adherence to [the law].”22 In Williams, the plaintiffs had sued a railroad that charged them 66
cents more than the statutorily prescribed fare. The state law under which the plaintiffs brought
suit allowed a statutory damages award of between $50 to $300 for each overcharge. Each
plaintiff was awarded statutory damages of $75, for a violation that resulted in actual damages of
only 66 cents—approximately 114 times greater than the damages each plaintiff had incurred.
The Supreme Court found that the awarded damages did not violate due process and upheld the
constitutionality of the court’s award.23

16 F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 288, 231 (1952) (citation omitted).
17 L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 996 (9th Cir. 1998); Cass County Music Co. v.
C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 643 (8th Cir. 1996).
18 P.L. 106-160.
19 H.Rept. 106-216, at 3, 6 (1999).
20 251 U.S. 63 (1919).
21 Id. at 67.
22 Id.
23 Id.
Congressional Research Service
3

Statutory Damage Awards in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Cases

Case Law Surrounding Statutory Damages for Peer-
to-Peer File Sharing of Copyrighted Works

Recently, federal juries in Minnesota and Massachusetts have returned particularly large verdicts
on non-commercial entities undertaking peer-to-peer file sharing of copyrighted sound recordings
based upon the statutory damages range for copyright infringement. However, the judges in these
cases subsequently decreased the awards based on common law doctrines and also the U.S.
Supreme Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence. These large damages awards by the juries, and
their reduction by the judges, have been the subject of much debate among commentators and
also the courts. These cases will be discussed below.
Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset
In Capitol Records Inc. v. Jammie Thomas-Rasset,24 the defendant Thomas-Rasset had used the
popular peer-to-peer file sharing program Kazaa to download at least 24 copyrighted sound
recordings to her computer and then had made those digitized music files available for “sharing”
(downloading) to other Kazaa users. The jury found her guilty of willful copyright infringement
and awarded to the plaintiff (recording companies that owned or controlled exclusive rights to
copyrights in the sound recordings) $1.92 million in statutory damages ($80,000 per infringed
song).25 Thomas-Rasset appealed the jury’s damages award, arguing that it was either (1)
violative of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, (2) excessive and shocking,
resulting in the necessity of remittitur to the minimum statutory damages amount of $750 per
copyright infringement, or (3) excessive and shocking, resulting in the necessity of a new trial.26
The United States filed a memorandum in the case in defense of the constitutionality of the
Copyright Act’s statutory damages provision. First, the United States argued that the court should
decide the propriety of the verdict based upon non-constitutional grounds before relying upon the
Due Process Clause, unless the constitutional question “is necessary to decide a case before it.”27
These non-constitutional grounds, according to the government, include the admission of further
evidence or the common law doctrine of remittitur.28 Furthermore, even if the Due Process Clause
must be relied upon, according to the government, the proper standard for evaluating the statutory
damages range, and the jury’s award, was the Williams test described above, and not the Supreme
Court’s more recent punitive damages jurisprudence (as the defendant had argued).29 Punitive

24 680 F.Supp. 2d 1045 (D. Minn. 2010).
25 This was the verdict after the second trial in this case. The jury in the first trial on this matter found that Thomas-
Rasset had awarded plaintiffs statutory damages in the amount of $222,000 ($ 9,250 for each willful infringement). The
court had vacated the verdict and granted a new trial based on its conclusion that it had erred in giving jury instructions.
Id. at 1049.
26 Id. at 1050.
27 Brief for the United States of America in Defense of the Constitutionality of the Statutory Damages Provision of the
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c), Capitol Records Inc., v. Jammie Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (D. Minn.
2010) (No. 06-cv-1497), at 6 (citing Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988)).
28 The government maintained that the Copyright Act did not eliminate the discretion of a trial judge under the common
law to remit a jury award of statutory damages. This was, according to government, as long as the remitted damages
remained within the statutory range that the Court deemed to be just. See id. at 7.
29 See id. at 2-3. Other federal courts have followed the Williams test when assessing a statutory damages verdict. See
id. at 14 (citing numerous cases).
Congressional Research Service
4

Statutory Damage Awards in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Cases

damages and statutory damages, according to the government, were distinct because punitive
damages are awarded to punish a wrongdoer, while statutory damages “exist in large part to
compensate victims of wrongdoing in areas where actual damages are difficult to calculate or
prove.”30 As a result, through a “carefully crafted statute,” and based upon the distinct policy
rationale surrounding statutory damages, the government argued that the due process concerns
surrounding punitive damages (namely, fair notice and unconstrained discretion) were not
implicated for copyright infringement because the damages provision put individuals on notice of
a specific range of damages to which they may be subject.31 The government also argued that the
punitive damages “guidepost” analysis provided by the Supreme Court in the BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore
case,32 was ill-fitted to the context of statutory damages for copyright
infringement—the ratio for discerning punitive versus actual damages would be difficult to
discern because statutory damages “are in fact, a substitute or proxy for actual damages … in
which actual damages are hard quantify.”33
Instead, the government argued that the Copyright Act’s statutory damages range satisfies the
Williams test because it
established a regime to protect intellectual property that dates back to before the beginning of
the Republic. The current damages range provides compensation for copyright owners
because … there exist situations in which actual damages are hard to quantify. Furthermore
… Congress took into account the need to deter the millions of users of new media from
infringing copyrights in an environment where many violators believe that they will go
unnoticed.34
As such, the government maintained that the court should defer to Congress’s reasoned judgment.
The court reduced the jury’s award considerably, from $1.92 million down to $54,000, noting that
the award of $54,000 was still “significant and harsh” but is “no longer monstrous and
shocking.”35 In making this decision, the court avoided the constitutional question and instead
employed the common law doctrine of remittitur. Remittitur is ordered when a “verdict is so
grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of the court. A verdict is not considered excessive
unless there is plain injustice or a monstrous or shocking result.”36 This doctrine can be employed

30 Id. at 11 (citing Lowry’s Reports Inc., v. Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F.Supp. 2d 455, 460 (D. Md. 2004)).
31 Id. (citing BMW of North Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996)) (“Elementary notices of fairness enshrined in
our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to
punishment but all of the severity of the penalty.”)
32 This case is discussed in detail infra.
33 Id. at 12. Actual damages are difficult to quantify, according to the government, because of the multiplier effect of
peer-to-peer music sharing, or the distribution of downloaded songs. This distribution, according to some, results in a
loss greater than just the mere cost of the downloaded song. See id. at 12 (citing Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Anderson,
2008 WL 2316551 at * 9 (S.D. Tex. March 12, 2008) (“[T]here is no way to ascertain the precise amount of damages
caused by Defendant’s actions in not only improperly downloading Plaintiff’s Copyrighted Recordings himself but also
subsequently distributing some or all of Plaintiff’s Copyrighted Recordings to a vast community of other persons on
KaZaA.”). The government also argued that BMW’s comparability guidepost was inapplicable to the statutory damages
procedure because Congress had already made a judgment as to what was an appropriate sanction for the conduct at
issue by establishing the statutory damage range in the first place. See id. at 13-14.
34 Id. at 3. See also id. at 15-24 (discussing in greater detail the historic protection of copyright, the difficulty of
quantifying actual damages, and the great public harm that copyright infringement brings about, even outside the
context of commercial gain).
35 Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1057.
36 Id. at 1050 (citing Eich v. Bd. of Regents for Cent. Mo. State Univ., 350 F.3d 752, 763 (8th Cir. 2003)).
Congressional Research Service
5

Statutory Damage Awards in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Cases

based upon the trial court’s own reading of all the evidence presented.37 The court rejected the
plaintiff’s argument that it lacked the power to remit an award of statutory damages because of
the plaintiff’s right under the U.S. Constitution’s Seventh Amendment to a jury trial regarding
statutory damages.38 According to the court, the Seventh Amendment merely requires that if
remittitur is ordered, the plaintiffs be given “the option of choosing to reject the remittitur and
exercise their right to a new jury trial solely on the issue of damages.”39 The court found that
statutory damages for copyright infringement serve both “deterrent and compensatory
components.”40 As such, while the plaintiff did not need to prove actual damages for an award of
statutory damages, “statutory damages should bear some relation to the actual damages
suffered.”41 The court found factual support for an infliction of actual damages as well as
evidence of willfulness and the need for deterrence;42 however, it maintained that “these facts
simply cannot justify a $2 million verdict in this case.”43 Critical to the court’s analysis was the
fact that Thomas-Rasset was not a business acting for profit but an individual consumer acting
illegally “seeking free access to music for her own use.”44
As a result, according to the court, the need for deterrence through a large damages award was not
as essential because of the lack of profits accruing to the defendant. Her infringing conduct was
“for the sole purpose of obtaining free music.”45 The court also found that the damages award was
excessive in relation to the justified expenditures the plaintiffs must undertake in pursuing
infringers.46 As a result, employing the maximum recovery rule to preserve the jury’s wide
discretion, or reducing the damages to the “maximum amount the jury could properly have
awarded,”47 the court chose to award three times the statutory minimum per infringement ($750),
or $2,250 per infringement.48 While such an award formula is not in the express provisions of the
Copyright Act, the court reached this “most reasoned solution” through a process of analogy to
other statutes that make available treble damages from the statutory minimum upon willful
violation, including the Patent Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.49 The court rejected
the defendant’s request for an imposition of the statutory minimum of $750 per infringement.
This was due to the defendant’s far-reaching damage to the recording industry through

37 Schaefer v. Spider Staging Corp., 275 F.3d 735, 738 (8th Cir. 2002).
38 Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1050-51.
39 Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1051 (citing Corpus v. Bennett, 430 F.3d 912, 917 (8th Cir. 2005); Thorne v.
Welk Inv., Inc., 197 F.3d 1205, 1212 (8th Cir. 1999)).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 1052 (quoting Bly v. Banbury Books, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 983, 987 (E.D. Pa. 1986)).
42 Id. at 1052-53 (citing the damage Thomas-Rasset inflicted through not only her downloading but distribution to
millions of users of copyrighted material, her refusal to accept responsibility for her actions, and her admission of
studying Napster in college and learning about the unlawfulness of copying and distributing copyrighted music
recordings over the Internet).
43 Id. at 1053.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 1054.
47 Id. (citing K-B Trucking Co. v. Riss Int’l Corp., 763 F.2d 1148, 1163 (10th Cir. 1985)).
48 Id. at 1056.
49 See id. at 1056-57 (discussing numerous statutes). The court refused to analyze other jury verdicts under the statutory
damages procedure for copyright infringement because “each case must be evaluated as an individual one, within the
framework of its distinctive facts.” Id. at 1055( citing Vanskike v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 725 F.2d 1146, 1150 (8th Cir.
1984)). The court also imposed an injunction on the defendant from downloading or distributing any further
copyrighted material and ordered that she destroy all copyrighted material in her possession. Id. at 1061.
Congressional Research Service
6

Statutory Damage Awards in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Cases

distribution, as well as her willful behavior of denying responsibility and lying on the witness
stand. The $750 minimum, according to the court, was set as a floor, “even without a finding of
willfulness,” 50 resulting in the need for additional deterrence against deliberate online piracy.51
The plaintiffs were given seven days from the date of the court’s order reducing the damages to
decide whether to accept the remittitur or to request a new trial on the issue of damages. The
plaintiffs rejected the remittitur on the grounds that it “could be read to set a new standard for
statutory damages, essentially capping those damages at three times the minimum statutory
amount of $750 ... for any noncommercial individuals who illegally download and upload
music.”52 This, according to the plaintiffs, removes discretion from the jury to award a higher
amount in appropriate circumstances.53 The plaintiffs argued that the Copyright Act did not
distinguish between commercial and non-commercial infringers, and that it was within the
province of Congress, not the courts, to fashion a limit on damages for a particular type of
infringer or type of infringement. Congress, according to the plaintiffs, directly addressed this
issue, and the court’s remittitur “ignores the harm caused by [non-commercial] infringers,”
because they can cause as much damage as commercial infringers through the multiplier effect of
decentralized peer-to-peer services.54 The plaintiffs also argued that the remittitur award did not
take into account the particular facts of Thomas-Rasset’s case. According to the plaintiffs, the
court had improperly relied on statutory authority outside of the Copyright Act to craft a “three
times the minimum statutory damages” provision applicable to the case, in a manner that
Congress did not authorize.55
A new trial on the issue of damages is to be held on October 4, 2010.
Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum
In 2007, several record companies sued Joel Tenenbaum, a student at Boston University, seeking
more than $1 million in statutory damages for his use of peer-to-peer file sharing resulting in the
downloading and distribution of 30 songs. Tenenbaum was found guilty of willful copyright
infringement, and the jury awarded $675,000 in statutory damages. Tenenbaum appealed this
award, arguing that the damages award was unconstitutionally excessive under the Supreme
Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence. He also argued that the award was grossly excessive and
should be lowered under the common law doctrine of remittitur.56
Like in the Thomas-Rasset case, the United States again intervened to defend the constitutionality
of the statutory damages provision. The government stated almost verbatim its arguments from
Thomas-Rasset.57 The United States did, however, add to its argument in stating that the broad

50 Id. at 1055.
51 Id. at 1057.
52 Notice of Plaintiffs’ Decision Re: Remittitur, Capitol Records, Inc., v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (2010)
(No. 06-cv1497-MJD/RLE), at 2.
53 Id. at 5.
54 Id. at 4.
55 Id. at 5.
56 Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68642 (D. Mass. July 9, 2010), at *4-5.
57 Brief for the United States of America in Response to Defendant’s Motion for New Trial or Remittitur and in
Defense of the Constitutionality of the Statutory Damages Provision of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c), Sony
BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68642 (D. Mass. July 9, 2010).
Congressional Research Service
7

Statutory Damage Awards in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Cases

societal undertaking of peer-to-peer file sharing, resulting in copyright infringement,
“demonstrated the necessity of providing strong deterrence towards others who think their actions
go undetected.”58 The defendant, according to the government, exemplified this concern in
continuing to download and share copyrighted music for at least three years, despite his
knowledge that the activity was illegal.59 The government noted that the “Supreme Court has
explicitly recognized that Congress may adjust the amount of statutory damages to the public
wrong rather than the public injury.” 60
The court, however, agreed with the defendant. The court maintained that it was impossible to
avoid the constitutional question because remittitur required the plaintiffs to cooperate, which
they failed to do in the case. According to the court,
The plaintiffs in this case, however, made it abundantly clear that they were, to put it mildly,
going for broke. They stated in open court that they likely would not accept a remitted
award. And at a retrial on the issue of damages, I would again be presented with the very
constitutional issues that the remittitur procedure was designed to avoid.61
As such, the court analyzed the constitutional question and ruled that, in its view, the proper
standard to apply with respect to a due process challenge to a statutory damages award was not
the historically deferential Williams standard (as the plaintiffs and the U.S. government had
argued), but rather the Supreme Court’s more recent punitive damages jurisprudence as expressed
in the BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore case. The court found that,
Although Williams upheld the constitutionality of the Arkansas jury’s awards, it recognized
the possibility that civil damages may in some instances be so excessive as to violate the
Constitution. Over the past two decades, the Supreme Court has built on this insight by
constructing a rather elaborate doctrinal framework for testing the constitutionality of
punitive damages awards.62
In other words, the court ignored the distinction between punitive and statutory damages in
holding that they had the same constitutional underpinnings of due process.63 This led the court to
analyze the jury’s verdict under the Supreme Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence.64 First the
court surveyed this jurisprudence, which is briefly described below.
The Supreme Court’s 1996 decision, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, established three
standards, or guideposts, to “identify constitutionally excessive” punitive damages awards.65 In

58 Id. at 18 (citing H.Rept. 106-216 at 3 (1999)).
59 Id. at 19.
60 Id. at 20 (citing Williams, 251 U.S. at 66)).
61 Tenenbaum, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68642 at *6.
62 Id. at *29.
63 Id. at *47 (discussing how BMW cites Williams). (“At their root, the standards articulated in Williams, BMW … all
aim at providing defendants with some protection against arbitrary government action in the form of damages awards
that are grossly excessive in relation to the objectives that the awards are designed to achieve.”) The court also held that
courts were not uniform in their application of the Williams test for analysis of statutory damages. See id. at *43-44
n.10 (citing numerous cases employing the punitive damages jurisprudence for statutory damages cases).
64 This procedure, the court noted, would still impose deference upon the court for the judgments and legislation of
Congress. Id. at *14 (citing Romano v. U-Haul International, 233 F.3d 655, 673 (1st Cir. 2000)).
65 BMW of North Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 5684 (1996) (citation omitted). For further information on the
constitutionality of grossly excessive punitive damages, see CRS Report RL33773, Constitutional Limits on Punitive
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
8

Statutory Damage Awards in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Cases

this decision, the jury had awarded actual damages of $4,000 and punitive damages of $2 million
because BMW repainted damage on new cars without disclosing the repair to consumers.
According to the Court, the punitive damages award violated the Due Process Clause because, at
500 times greater than the plaintiff’s actual damages, the amount was grossly excessive.66 The
Court reasoned that the Due Process Clause protects against “judgments without notice” of the
unlawful conduct and “the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.”67 The Court then
prescribed three guideposts by which a punitive damages award should be judged to determine if
it is grossly excessive: (1) “the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct,” (2) the
reasonableness of the ratio of the punitive damages award “to the actual harm inflicted on the
plaintiff,” and (3) comparability (i.e., “the difference between this remedy and the civil penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases”).68 The BMW Court held that the degree of
reprehensibility is the “most important indicia of the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award.”69 The Court also determined that a “high degree of culpability” was necessary for
substantial punitive damages.70 Additionally, the Court reiterated the statement that “the proper
inquiry is ‘whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages award and the
harm likely to result from the defendant’s conduct as well as the harm that actually has
occurred.’”71
After reviewing the BMW case and other Supreme Court jurisprudence in punitive damages, the
Tenenbaum court proceeded to apply the BMW guideposts to the statutory damages award in this
case. Before doing so, however, the court acknowledged that unlike a typical case in which
punitive damages are awarded, the jury’s award in this case fell within a range that had been
authorized by Congress, and that the maximum and minimum amount of statutory damages that
could be imposed for each act of infringement was expressly provided by statute.72 Nevertheless,
the court stated that “there should be some nexus between the jury’s statutory damages award and
the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and the profits, if any, obtained by the defendant.”73
In the opinion of the court, the jury’s statutory damages award must not be grossly excessive in
relation to the government’s legitimate interests in prescribing the awards (compensating
copyright owners and deterring infringement).74
Turning to the analysis outlined in BMW, the court held that the third comparability guidepost
was not satisfied. While satisfying a range of damages set forth in the Copyright Act, this range
was for all copyright cases and “does not mean that the members of Congress who approved the
language of section 504(c) intended to sanction the eye-popping award imposed in this case.”75
Looking to the most recent 1999 amendments to the Copyright Act’s statutory damages section,

(...continued)
Damages Awards: An Analysis of Supreme Court Precedent, by Todd Garvey.
66 Id. at 582-83.
67 Id. at 574, n. 22 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 217 (1977) (Stevens, J. concurring)).
68 Id. at 575, 580.
69 Id. at 575.
70 Id. at 580.
71 Id. at 581 (citing TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resource Corp., 509 U.S. 433, 460 (1993)).
72 Tenenbaum, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68642 at *52.
73 Id. at *50-51 (citing Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1048).
74 Id. at *52.
75 Id. (emphasis in original).
Congressional Research Service
9

Statutory Damage Awards in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Cases

the court stated that “it is far from clear that Congress contemplated that a damages award as
extraordinarily high as the one assessed in this case would ever be imposed on an ordinary
individual engaged in” non-commercial peer-to-peer file sharing of music.76 For this
determination, the court cited (1) the fact that the amendments were introduced prior to the
release of Napster77 and (2) the House Judiciary Committee’s report on an early version of the
legislation. The Judiciary Committee report, according to the court, showed that the 1999
amendments were linked to large scale software piracy for the purpose of commercial advantage
or private financial gain, not non-profit individual file sharers.78 According to the court,
“Congress did not foresee that section 504(c) would be used to mulct individual file sharers such
as Tenenbaum in damages.”79 In addition, the court cited the fact that at two separate Senate
Judiciary Committee hearings, Senators Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy, two sponsors of the 1999
amendments, engaged in downloading copyrighted sound recordings for demonstration purposes,
which they described as qualifying as “fair use” because it was carried out for education and
governmental purposes. The senators also marveled at the development of the peer-to-peer
software Gnutella and praised the founder of Napster, Shawn Fanning.80 While acknowledging
that these statements are not authoritative statements of Congress, the court held that the
statements suggest that the Senators “did not view such downloading as particularly
reprehensible” and that they “did not anticipate that the statutory damages scheme over which
[the] committee had jurisdiction would be applied to users of Napster and other peer-to-peer
networks.”81
As a result, the court further inquired and looked to other jury awards of statutory damages for
copyright infringement to discover whether Tenenbaum’s award was significantly out of line with
other awards; if so, the award would not be reasonably related to the government’s objectives and
would be unconstitutionally excessive.82 The court compared the award in Tenenbaum’s case to
the award in Thomas-Rasset and found that the cases were similar based upon the number of acts,
willfulness, and culpability. According to the court, both knew that file-sharing was illegal and
continued, refused to accept responsibility, gave false statements under oath, and tried to shift
blame to others. As a result, the court held the award in Tenenbaum’s case should be roughly the
same as the award in Thomas-Rasset.83 The court also considered the award in Tenenbaum’s case
to be excessive when compared with other peer-to-peer copyright infringement cases where the
parties settled or a default judgment was awarded in cases. In those cases, the court noted, the
infringer did not commit willful conduct and the minimum statutory damage of $750 per
infringed work was often imposed. The court also cited the much lower damages that are
typically imposed on commercial entities, such as restaurants and bars, that have benefitted
financially by broadcasting music in their establishments without first obtaining a license.84

76 Id. at *53.
77 Id. at *55-56.
78 Id. at *59-60.
79 Id. at *63.
80 Id. at *60 (citing Music on the Internet: Is there an Upside to Downloading?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the
Judiciary
, 106th Cong. (2000); Utah’s Digital Economy and the Future: Peer-to-Peer and Other Emerging
Technologies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary
, 106th Cong. (2000)).
81 Id. at *62-63 (bracket added).
82 Id. at *64-65.
83 Id. at *68-69.
84 Id. at *71-72. Often these commercial entities create a more pleasurable aesthetic experience through their copyright
infringement, resulting in greater business and profit. These entities often receive letters to cease and desist their
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
10

Statutory Damage Awards in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Cases

Moving to the second BMW ratio guidepost the court held that while actual damages are difficult
to assess in copyright infringement cases, “there must be some relationship between the jury’s
verdict and the damages the plaintiffs incurred and the benefits Tenenbaum gained through his
infringements.”85 Otherwise, according to the court, (1) a chilling effect would occur, deterring
socially beneficial activities that run some risk of giving rise to liability for copyright
infringement or (2) a risk of unfair and exorbitant settlements could arise. The court held that its
analysis was limited to Tenenbaum’s individual conduct, the benefits he derived from that
conduct, and the harm that he caused, not the harm that other infringers caused.86 The court
viewed Tenenbaum’s conduct in isolation and found that his harm merely constituted the loss in
profit to the record companies had he bought the individual songs in question legally. The court
found the loss in profit in comparison with the damages award to be an excessive ratio and held
that Tenenbaum’s conduct in isolation did not have a significant impact on the plaintiffs’ profit.87
The court surmised that “the individuals who downloaded songs from Tenenbaum’s shared folder
would simply have found another free source for the songs had Tenenbaum never engaged in file-
sharing.”88
The court also ruled that the benefit Tenenbaum received by infringing the copyrights could not
justify the jury’s award. Tenenbaum had received no pecuniary gain; his “profit” was the “ability
to access an essentially unlimited variety of music on demand.”89 This, according to the court, did
not justify the jury’s award, even when the lack of detection for Tenenbaum’s activity is taken
into account, because “most individuals are risk averse, adequate deterrence can undoubtedly be
obtained with an award that is much, much lower.”90 The court also rejected as a basis for the
jury’s award the Copyright Act’s emphasis on compensating copyright owners for the costs
entailed in investigating and detecting infringing behavior. This was because upon the owner’s
devotion of resources and investigation to detect a single act of infringement “the marginal cost
of detecting additional act of infringement is likely low since the investigation of the file sharer’s
account ... will generally reveal a treasure trove of unlawfully downloaded works.”91 Finally, the
court rejected the jury’s verdict on the grounds that the statutory damages scheme of the
Copyright Act was not proportionate in subjecting those that download one song and those that
download 1,000 songs to the same damages.92
Turning lastly to the first and most important BMW guidepost, the court found that several factors
weighed in Tenenbaum’s favor. This included the fact that the harm he caused was economic
rather than physical; the harm did not evince an indifference or recklessness towards the health or
safety of others; and the plaintiffs were not financially vulnerable, but large recording

(...continued)
behavior, which they ignore, showing willful behavior. See EMI Mills Music, Inc., v. Empress Hotel, Inc., 470 F. Supp.
2d 67, 70, 72-73 (D. P.R. 2006).
85 Tenenbaum 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *76 (emphasis added) (citing Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1049).
86 The court held the harm to nonparties could only be assessed regarding reprehensibility. Id. at *77 (citing Philip
Morris, 549 U.S. at 353-55).
87 Tenenbaum, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *80.
88 Id.
89 Id. at *84-85.
90 Id. at *87.
91 Id. at *88.
92 Id. at *89.
Congressional Research Service
11

Statutory Damage Awards in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Cases

companies.93 Other factors, according to the court, however, militated against Tenenbaum,
notably his continued willful conduct and engagement in thousands of acts of infringement
despite knowledge of the acts illegality, lying under oath, and blame shifting.94 While noting that
file sharing was “fairly low on the totem pole of reprehensible conduct,” the court opined that
“among this group of comparatively venial offenders, Tenenbaum is one of the most
blameworthy.” 95
As a result, based upon its analysis using the BMW guideposts, the court held that the jury’s
award violated the Due Process Clause because it had no rational relationship to the government’s
interest in compensating copyright owners and deterring infringement.96 The court also
determined that the award could not be upheld even under the Williams standard because it was
“so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously
unreasonable.”97 The court maintained that the plaintiffs suffered approximately $1 in actual
damages for each song that Tenenbaum had downloaded, yet the jury awarded the plaintiffs
$22,500 per song, resulting in a statutory-to-actual-damages ratio of 22,500:1. With the benefits
that Tenenbaum derived from file sharing taken into account, approximately $1,500, the ratio of
statutory damages to Tenenbaum’s “profits” was 450:1, or about four times the ratio involved in
the Williams case. The court further based its decision upon the fact that “Tenenbaum was an
ordinary young adult engaging in noncommercial file-sharing, not a wealthy railroad bilking
customers for its own profit.”98 Adopting the reasoning of Thomas-Rasset that had embraced the
“long tradition in the law of allowing treble damages for willful misconduct,” the court reduced
the jury’s unconstitutional $675,000 award to three times the statutory minimum, for a total of
$67,500 ($2,250 per song).99 The court attempted to counter anticipated objections to the
adoption of $2,250 as a cap on the statutory damages range in P2P file sharing cases because “this
criticism applies to any line drawing process; it is always possible to argue that the line should
have been drawn a bit differently.”100
The plaintiffs in the Tenenbaum case have appealed the judgment to the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit.
Reactions and Implications
It remains to be seen what standard the Thomas-Rasset court will apply during the new trial on
damages, in evaluating the constitutional challenge to the jury’s award: the Williams standard or
the BMW guideposts? Will it employ a similar constitutional analysis as the Tenenbaum court? In
a case concerning statutory damages in copyright cases (although not involving peer-to-peer file
sharing), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit emphasized that the U.S. Supreme Court
has never decided whether its recent punitive damages jurisprudence (BMW and its progeny)

93 Id. at *90.
94 Id. at *90-91.
95 Id. at *91.
96 Id. at *92.
97 Id. (quoting Williams, 251 U.S. at 66-67).
98 Id. at *93.
99 Id. at *93-94 (citing Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1048, 1056-57, and numerous statutes as well as cases)..
100 Id. at *96 (citing Inter Med. Supplies, Ltd. V. EBI Med. Sys., Inc., 181 F.3d 446, 468 (3rd Cir. 1999))
Congressional Research Service
12

Statutory Damage Awards in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Cases

applies to awards of statutory damages.101 The appellate court stated that until the Supreme Court
applies BMW to an award of statutory damages, the earlier Williams standard is to be used when
evaluating the constitutionality of statutory damage awards.102 However, this appellate decision
from 2007 was not binding on the Thomas-Rasset or Tenenbaum courts, as neither of those courts
are within the Sixth Circuit (they are within the Eighth and First, respectively—the appellate
courts of which have not yet directly addressed the issue).
Some observers have been critical of the legal reasoning of the Tenenbaum opinion103—in
particular, three assumptions that had been made by the judge in reaching her conclusions:
1. There is no constitutional difference between punitive damages and statutory
damages; thus, the BMW case is relevant to a case involving an award of
statutory damages.
2. Congress did not intend statutory damages to be imposed on non-commercial
infringers whose infringement only caused minimal economic harm on copyright
holders.
3. Three times the minimum statutory damages amount is the constitutional limit in
peer-to-peer file sharing cases.104
Critics of the opinion argue that the Tenenbaum decision “significantly erodes Congress’ power to
set the acceptable range of damages in copyright and indeed all civil cases.”105 Others, however,
have praised the Tenenbaum decision as one that “helps bring copyright infringement damages
awards back down to earth.”106
While Tenenbaum is on appeal, the lower court’s decision may have several immediate
consequences for copyright infringement cases. Those that involve statutory damages may well
require more time and money of the litigants, as “every copyright infringement defendant can
advance a non-frivolous argument that statutory damages in [his/her] case would be
unconstitutional.”107 Also, because the Tenenbaum (and Thomas-Rasset) court had ruled that there
must be some relationship between actual damages and the amount of statutory damages that is
awarded, it may be difficult for some copyright plaintiffs to enforce their rights, as they must

101 Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2007).
102 Id. at 588.
103 See Greg Sandoval, A Copyright Ruling No One Can Like, CNET News (July 13, 2010), at http://news.cnet.com/
8301-31001_3-20010428-261.html (“[The] decision is believed by some legal experts to be unprecedented. Not only
are copyright owners attacking [the judge’s] reasoning, but so are well-known lawyers from the pro-technology side.”).
104 See Eric Goldman, Copyright Statutory Damages Award Violates Constitutional Due Process – Sony v. Tenenbaum,
Technology & Marketing Law Blog (July 12, 2010), at http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/07/
copyright_statu.htm (identifying these three assumptions and predicting that they will be “critically tested on appeal”).
105 Ben Sheffner, Due Process Limits on Statutory Civil Damages? Unprecedented Ruling In Copyright Case A
Double-Edged Sword For Businesses
, Washington Legal Foundation Legal Backgrounder (Aug. 6, 2010), available at
http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/legalbackgrounder/8-6-10Sheffner_LegalBackgrounder.pdf.
106 Anjali Bhat, Common Sense Won in the Tenenbaum Decision, Public Knowledge (July 12, 2010), at
http://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/common-sense-prevailed-tenenbaum-decision; see also Corynne McSherry,
Judge Cuts Damages in Sony v. Tenenbaum, Electronic Frontier Foundation Deeplinks Blog (July 9, 2010), at
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/07/judge-cuts-damages-sony-v-tenenbaum (“Kudos to Judge Gertner for
recognizing that ‘no plausible rationale’ could justify the original award, and that our Constitution does not permit
grossly excessive damages—even in copyright cases.”).
107 Goldman, supra note 104.
Congressional Research Service
13

Statutory Damage Awards in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Cases

make some showing of the actual harm that they have suffered from the infringement—a
potentially difficult and expensive task, especially in the context of digital media and file
sharing.108 Thus, some copyright holders may be more reluctant to bring cases against non-
commercial file sharers. Another possible impact of Tenenbaum is that courts may choose to
follow the “three times the statutory minimum damages” formulation as a de facto standard in
determining statutory damages in certain copyright cases—perhaps limited only to the context of
peer-to-peer file sharing, although some courts may extend this standard to other infringing
activity.
As both of these cases await further judicial developments, this area of copyright law promises to
continue to be in an unsettled state. Other federal courts of appeal could also directly address the
issue, or Congress could take action to resolve the matter legislatively—to date, however, no
related legislation has been introduced.


Author Contact Information

Brian T. Yeh

Legislative Attorney
byeh@crs.loc.gov, 7-5182


Acknowledgments
Portions of this report were prepared by Jordan E. Segall, Law Clerk, American Law Division.


108 Derek Bambauer, Tenenbaum and Statutory Damages, Info/Law Blog (July 11, 2010), at
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2010/07/11/tenenbaum-and-statutory-damages/.
Congressional Research Service
14