Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive
Vincent Morelli
Section Research Manager
September 10, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41136
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive
Summary
Attempts to resolve the Cyprus problem and reunify the island have undergone various levels of
negotiation for almost 40 years. Nevertheless, in October 2010 the Republic of Cyprus will
celebrate its 50th anniversary as a divided country and with a permanent solution far from being
achieved.
On April 18, 2010, Turkish Cypriot voters selected a new leader, Dervis Eroglu of the National
Unity Party (UBP) in part due to the fact that after almost two years of intense negotiations
between Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat and Cyprus President Dimitris Christofias, a
Greek Cypriot, attempts to reach an acceptable solution for reunification had failed. Eroglu, a 72-
year-old physician, long-time politician, and a negotiator considered more hard-line than Talat,
led a political party that included some who advocated a permanently divided island and
international recognition for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).
Despite predictions of difficult times ahead as a result of the elections in the north, reinforced by
a growing lack of unity among the Greek Cypriot political leadership whose opposition to
Christofias’ negotiating strategy has grown, new talks began on May 26, 2010. Both Christofias
and Eroglu have repeated their desire to reach a solution, although Eroglu has stated that such an
agreement must be achieved by the end of 2010 while Christofias has rejected any such timetable.
The talks continued through several meetings and three informal dinners over the course of the
summer. Several additional meetings, including two all-day sessions have been held in
September. The talks have focused almost entirely on the difficult issue of property where both
sides have had long held and hugely different positions.
Pressure on both Christofias and Eroglu to achieve significant progress toward an agreement has
also come from outside Cyprus. Turkey, facing national elections in early 2011, has called for a
settlement by the end of 2010. This Fall, Turkey also faces the next progress report on its EU
accession negotiations which, in part, will be influenced by Turkey’s role in trying to promote a
Cyprus solution. The United Nations also appears to have adopted the end of 2010 deadline for a
settlement and the Secretary-General has indicated that he will issue a status report on the
progress of the negotiations in November that could determine the future role of the U.N. in the
negotiating process. Finally, the European Commission has introduced a formal regulation
regarding direct trade between the EU and Turkish Cyprus that is currently pending before the
European Parliament and which has caused considerable problems for the Greek Cypriot side.
The United States Congress has continued to maintain its interest in Cyprus partly due to
constituent concern and because the lack of a negotiated settlement continues to effect relations
between Turkey and the EU, Turkey and Greece, the EU and NATO, and overall U.S. interests in
a strong relationship with Turkey. Hearings could be anticipated on the future of the negotiations
as the new round of talks progress.
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Contents
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
Annan Plan ........................................................................................................................... 2
The Christofias -Talat Negotiations: 2008-2010..................................................................... 3
A New Era: Christofias and Eroglu........................................................................................ 6
Issues.............................................................................................................................. 8
EU Trade with North Cyprus............................................................................................... 11
Assessment ............................................................................................................................... 12
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Cyprus ............................................................................................................. 2
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 15
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Background1
The island Republic of Cyprus gained its independence from Great Britain in 1960. Of the total
population living on the island, approximately 77% are of Greek ethnic origin, and roughly 18%
of Turkish ethnic origin. (Maronite Christians, Armenians, and others constitute the remainder.)
At independence, the Republic’s constitution defined elaborate power-sharing arrangements
between the two main groups. It required a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice
president, each elected by his own community. Simultaneously, a Treaty of Guarantee signed by
Britain, Greece, and Turkey ensured the new Republic’s territorial integrity, and a Treaty of
Alliance among the Republic, Greece, and Turkey provided for Greek and Turkish soldiers to
help defend the island. However, at that time, the two major communities aspired to different
futures for Cyprus: most Greek Cypriots favored union of the entire island with Greece (enosis),
while Turkish Cypriots preferred to partition the island (taksim) and possibly unite the Turkish
Cypriot zone with Turkey.
Cyprus’s success as a stable, new republic lasted from 1960-1963. After President (and Greek
Orthodox Archbishop) Makarios III proposed constitutional modifications that favored the
majority Greek Cypriot community in 1963, relations between the two communities deteriorated,
with Turkish Cypriots increasingly consolidating into enclaves in larger towns for safety. In 1964,
Turkish Cypriots withdrew from most national institutions and began to administer their own
affairs. Intercommunal violence occurred between 1963 and 1964, and again in 1967. On both
occasions, outside mediation and pressure, including by the United States, appeared to prevent
Turkey from intervening militarily on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots. On March 4, 1964, the
United Nations authorized the establishment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
(UNFICYP) to control the violence and act as a buffer between the two communities. It became
operational on March 27, 1964, and still carries out its mission today.
In 1974, the military junta in Athens supported a coup against President Makarios, replacing him
with a more hard-line supporter of enosis. In July 1974, Turkey, citing the 1960 Treaty of
Guarantee as a legal basis for its move, deployed its military forces in two separate actions to the
island, and by August 25, 1974, had taken control of more than one-third of the island. This
military intervention2 had many ramifications. Foremost was the widespread dislocation of both
the Greek and Turkish Cypriot population and related governance, refugee, and property
problems.
After the conflict subsided and a fragile peace took root, Turkish Cypriots pursued a solution to
the conflict that would keep the two communities separate in two sovereign states or two states in
a loose confederation. In February 1975, the Turkish Cypriots declared their government the
“Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” (TFSC). In 1983, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash
declared the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC)—a move considered by some to be
a unilateral declaration of independence. At the time, Denktash argued that creation of an
1 Parts of this report are drawn from a more comprehensive history of the Cyprus negotiations found in CRS Report
RL33497, Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations and Related Issues, by Carol Migdalovitz.
2 Turkey officially refers to its action as a “peace operation.” The Greek Cypriots and much of the international
community refer to it as an “invasion.” According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military
Balance—2009, Turkey still has 36,000 troops on the island. However, the Greek Cypriots claim that the figure is
42,000 to 44,000. “Defense Committee: UNFICYP Figures on Occupying Troops are False,” Cyprus News Agency,
February 6, 2009, BBC Monitoring European.
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independent state was a necessary precondition for a federation with the Greek Cypriots.
However, he ruled out a merger with Turkey and pledged cooperation with United Nations-
brokered settlement efforts. Twenty-seven years later, only Turkey has recognized the TRNC.
Between 1974 and 2002, there were numerous, unsuccessful rounds of U.N.-sponsored direct and
indirect negotiations to achieve a settlement. Negotiations focused on reconciling the two sides’
interests and reestablishing a central government. They foundered on definitions of goals and
ways to implement a federal solution. Turkish Cypriots emphasized bizonality and the political
equality of the two communities, preferring two nearly autonomous societies with limited contact.
Greek Cypriots emphasized the freedoms of movement, property, and settlement throughout the
island. The two parties also differed on the means of achieving a federation: Greek Cypriots
wanted their internationally recognized national government to devolve power to the Turkish
Cypriots, who would then join a Cypriot republic. For the Turkish Cypriots, two entities would
join, for the first time, in a new federation. These differences in views also affected the resolution
of issues such as property claims, citizenship of Turkish settlers who had come to the island, and
other legal issues.
Figure 1. Map of Cyprus
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.
Annan Plan
Negotiations for a final solution to the Cyprus issue appeared to take a dramatic and positive step
forward when on November 11, 2002, then-U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented a draft
of The Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, commonly
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referred to as the Annan Plan. The plan called for, among many provisions, a “common state”
government with a single international legal personality that would participate in foreign and EU
relations. Two politically equal component states would address much of the daily responsibilities
of government in their respective communities. The Annan Plan was a comprehensive approach,
and of necessity addressed highly controversial issues for both sides.
Over the course of the next 16 months, difficult negotiations ensued. Turkish Cypriot leader
Denktash was replaced as chief negotiator by a more pro-settlement figure, and newly elected
“prime minister,” Mehmet Ali Talat. Greek Cypriot President Glafkos Clerides was replaced
through an election with, according to some observers, a more skeptical President, Tassos
Papadopoulos. The Annan Plan itself was revised several times in an attempt to effect
compromises demanded by both sides. Complicating the matter even more, on April 16, 2003, the
Republic of Cyprus signed an accession treaty with the European Union to become a member of
the EU on May 1, 2004, whether or not there was a settlement and a reunited Cyprus.
Finally, after numerous meetings and negotiations and despite a lack of a firm agreement but
sensing that further negotiations would produce little else, on March 29, 2004, Secretary General
Annan released his “final revised plan” and announced that the Plan would be put to referenda
simultaneously in both north and south Cyprus on April 24, 2004. The Turkish Cypriot leadership
split, with Denktash urging rejection and Talat urging support. Greek President Papadopoulos, to
the dismay of the U.N., EU, and United States, but for reasons he argued were legitimate
concerns of the Greek Cypriot community, urged the Greek Cypriots to reject the referenda. On
April 24, what remaining hope existed for a solution to the crisis on Cyprus was dashed as 76%
of Greek Cypriot voters rejected the Plan, while 65% of Turkish Cypriot voters accepted it. In his
May 28, 2004, report following the vote, Annan said that “the Greek Cypriots’ vote must be
respected, but they need to demonstrate willingness to resolve the Cyprus problem through a
bicommunal, bizonal federation and to articulate their concerns about security and
implementation of the Plan with ‘clarity and finality.’”
For roughly the next four years, to little avail, Cyprus muddled through a series of offers and
counter-offers to restart serious negotiations even as the Greek Cypriots solidified their new status
as a member of the EU, a status not extended to the Turkish Cypriots despite an EU pledge to try
to help end the isolation of the north.
The Christofias -Talat Negotiations: 2008-2010
On February 24, 2008, 61-year-old Dimitris Christofias of the Progressive Party of Working
People (AKEL) was elected to a five-year term as President of Cyprus. Mr. Christofias was
educated in the Soviet Union and is a fluent Russian-speaker. He joined the communist-rooted
AKEL party at the age of 14 and rose through its ranks to become leader in 1988. Christofias was
elected president of the Cypriot House of Representatives in 2001 and won reelection in 2006.
Christofias’s election had the backing of the Democratic (DIKO) Party and the Socialist (EDEK)
Party. Christofias, in part, tailored his campaign to opposing what he believed was an
uncompromising approach toward the Turkish Cypriots by former Cypriot President
Papadopoulos and the stagnation in the attempt to reach a just settlement of the Cyprus problem.
Although serious differences existed between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides over a
final settlement, Christofias took the outcome of the vote as a sign that Greek Cypriots wanted to
try once again for an end to the division of the island. In his inaugural address, President
Christofias expressed the hope of achieving a “just, viable, and functional solution” to the Cyprus
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problem. He said that he sought to restore the unity of the island as a federal, bi-zonal, bi-
communal Republic, to exclude any rights of military intervention, to provide for the withdrawal
of Turkish troops and, ultimately, the demilitarization of the island. Christofias also reaffirmed
that the 2004 Annan Plan, which he himself opposed at the time, was null and void and could not
be the basis for a future settlement.
After Christofias’s election, Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat, a long-time acquaintance
of Christofias, declared that, “a solution in Cyprus is possible by the end of 2008.”3 He also
declared that “the goal is to establish a new partnership state in Cyprus, based on the political
equality of the two peoples and the equal status of two constituent states.”4 As early as 2004,
Talat, as Turkish Cypriot “prime minister”, was credited with helping convince the Turkish
Cypriots to support the Annan Plan and had been seen as perhaps the one Turkish Cypriot leader
who could move the Greek Cypriots toward a more acceptable solution for both sides. For his
efforts at the time, Talat, on April 17, 2005, was elected “president” of the TRNC over the UBP’s
Dervis Eroglu, receiving 55.6% of the vote in a field of nine.
On March 21, 2008, Christofias and Talat met and agreed to establish working groups to address
issues related to a comprehensive settlement, including governance and power-sharing, EU
matters, security and guarantees, territory, property, and economic matters. They also created
seven technical committees to address day-to-day issues of crime, economic and commercial
matters, cultural heritage, crisis management, humanitarian matters, health, and environment.
On July 2, 2008, the two leaders met and agreed in principle on a single national sovereignty and
citizenship and decided to start full-fledged negotiations by September 3. On July 18, U.N.
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon named former Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer to
be his Special Advisor on Cyprus and to lend the good offices of the U.N. to the negotiation
process. On July 20, 2008, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, perhaps recognizing
that Turkey’s own future as a potential member of the EU was very much tied to a successful
settlement on Cyprus, extended full support to Talat and said that “a comprehensive solution will
be possible in a new partnership where the Turkish Cypriot people and the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus will equally be represented as one of the founder states. This new partnership
will be built upon such indispensable principles as bi-zonality, political equality, and Turkey’s
effective guarantorship.”5 The last part of that statement sent red flags throughout Greek Cyprus
and reignited the ongoing debate over the continued presence of some 30,000 Turkish military
forces on the island and the intense desire on the part of the Greek Cypriots to have all Turkish
troops removed. Nevertheless, on September 11, 2008, substantive negotiations on governance
and power-sharing began.
While the negotiations between Christofias and Talat appeared to get off to a fast start, the
differences in positions quickly became apparent and the talks, although held on a regular basis,
started to bog down. Talat wanted to pursue negotiations on the basis of the provisions of the old
Annan Plan, while Christofias, mindful of the Greek Cypriot rejection of that plan, was keen to
avoid references to it. Old differences quickly resurfaced. As the negotiations dragged on well
3 “I am Hopeful about a Solution, TRNC President Talat,” Anatolia, February 25, 2008, BBC Monitoring European,
February 26, 2008.
4 Letter to the Editor, Financial Times, March 5, 2008.
5 “Erdogan Warns Against Attempts to Water Down Parameters of Cyprus Settlement,” Turkish Daily News, July 21,
2008.
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into 2009, it appeared that impatience, frustration, and uncertainty were beginning to mount
against both Christofias in the south and Talat in the north.
Two political events in the spring of 2009 seemed to have hamstrung the ability of either side to
take the dramatic steps needed to boost the negotiations into a final phase. In March 2009, the
Democratic Party (DIKO), one of the main governing coalition partners of President Christofias,
held party elections in which hard-line candidates won all three posts contested. The new
leadership suggested that the party consider withdrawing from the coalition due in part to a belief
that Christofias was not keeping them informed of his negotiating positions or of the concessions
he may have offered to Talat. The outcome of this vote left many wondering whether Christofias
would face difficulties in gaining approval for any agreement he would reach with Talat that
included concessions unacceptable to the coalition partners. In the north, parliamentary elections
were held on April 19, 2009, in which the opposition UBP won 26 out of the 50 seats in the
parliament. The election propelled UBP Party leader Dervis Eroglu into the forefront of the
presidential elections scheduled for April 2010 and presented Mr. Talat with a less sympathetic
parliament to deal with, one whose disapproval of any agreement would likely play an important
role in any referenda in the north.
By the end of 2009 perspectives on both sides of the island seemed to have begun to change.
Some suggested that the Greek Cypriots sensed that the talks could not produce a desired
outcome before the April 2010 elections in the north, in which Talat was trailing in the polls to
Eroglu, and thus the negotiations were likely to have to begin anew, possibly with an entirely
different Turkish Cypriot leadership. Under that scenario, many Greek Cypriots, including
members within the political parties of the governing coalition, seemed leery of weakening their
hand by offering further concessions. Some Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, appear to have
begun to think that the Greek Cypriot side would not offer Talat a negotiated settlement, betting
from the opinion polls in the north that Eroglu would win the April elections and would pull back
from serious negotiations, at least for a while as he consolidated his new government and re-
ordered his strategy. The Greek Cypriots could then blame the anticipated hard-liners in the north
and their presumed patrons in Ankara if the talks collapsed.
As the negotiations entered 2010, it appeared that the window of opportunity to reach a final
settlement, at least between Christofias and Talat, was closing fast. Despite the fact that the two
sides had been in negotiations for almost 18 months and in close to 60 meetings, they appeared to
have very little to show for their efforts. In his new year message to the Greek Cypriots,
Christofias suggested that while some progress had been made in a few areas, the two sides were
not close to a settlement.
The intensive dialogue between Christofias and Talat resumed on January 11, 2010, but after
three sessions the talks seemed to be at a standstill with the gap between the respective positions
of President Christofias and Mr. Talat on many of the tougher issues seeming to be
insurmountable. On February 9, 2010, Christofias’s coalition partner EDEK quite the coalition
claiming that, in their opinion, “the President has been following a mistaken strategy which the
other side is using to its own advantage.”6 EDEK argued that the concessions Christofias
apparently had made regarding a rotating presidency and the acceptance of 50,000 settlers had to
be withdrawn. Soon after the EDEK decision, some factions within the DIKO party, the other
member of the governing coalition, began agitating for a similar vote to leave the government,
6 “EDEK quits government,” Cyprus Mail, February 9, 2010.
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citing very similar reasons, including their disagreement over a rotating presidency. On February
23, the DIKO central committee met but decided to remain in the coalition for the present.
The last formal negotiating session between Christofias and Talat concluded on March 30, 2010,
with apparently no new developments. In the run-up to the final session there was some
speculation that both sides would issue a joint statement assessing the negotiations up to that
point and perhaps even announcing some of the areas in which “convergences” between
Christofias and Talat had been achieved. Speculation was that Talat, had wanted something
positive to take into the final days of the election campaign and had presented Christofias a report
summarizing what the Turkish Cypriots understood to have been achieved. Christofias, however,
was already under pressure from his coalition partner, DIKO, and former coalition partner,
EDEK, not to issue such a statement that could have been interpreted as an interim agreement.
On March 30, Christofias and Talat issued a short statement suggesting that they had indeed made
some progress in governance and power sharing, EU matters, and the economy, but they did not
go beyond that. On April 1, Talat, feeling he needed to say more to his Turkish Cypriot
constituents about the negotiations, held a press conference at which he outlined his
understandings of what he and Christofias had achieved to that point. Christofias would neither
confirm nor deny what Talat had presented but did indicate that the issues would be considered by
the National Council, the Greek Cypriot political body that advises the President on Cyprus
settlement issues.
A New Era: Christofias and Eroglu
On April 18, 2010, Turkish Cypriot leader Talat lost his re-election bid to his rival Dervis Eroglu
of the National Unity Party (UBP). Observers believe Talat’s defeat was due to a combination of
his failure to secure a settlement of the Cyprus problem after almost two years and his inability to
convince the EU and others to help end what the Turkish Cypriots believed was the economic
isolation of the north. Some observers also noted that an overwhelming number of Turkish
settlers, who continue to identify more with mainland Turkey and who have little interest in
unification with Greek Cyprus, voted for Eroglu because they believed his views were consistent
with theirs.
Eroglu, a 72-year-old physician, and long-time politician, won the election with just over 50% of
the vote. Eroglu was seen as having a style and harder-line views similar to former Turkish
Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, particularly in seeking more autonomy for each community.
Eroglu also headed a party in which some in the party had advocated a permanently divided
island and international recognition for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). It was
reported that during the campaign he may have suggested that perhaps Cyprus should consider a
kind of “soft divorce” similar to what the Slovaks and Czechs did when they separated. During
the campaign, Eroglu also criticized Talat for what he thought were too many concessions to the
Greek Cypriot side, including the agreement that a reunited Cyprus would hold a single
sovereignty through which both sides would reunite. Nevertheless, even while criticizing Talat’s
positions, Eroglu insisted that negotiations would continue under his presidency. Upon assuming
his new office, Eroglu wrote a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressing his
willingness to resume the negotiations under the good offices of the U.N. and at the point where
the negotiations had left off. Despite Eroglu’s position regarding the resumption of talks, it
appears all political elements on the Greek Cypriot side saw Eroglu’s election as a negative
development and expressed their skepticism as to what the future would hold.
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Interestingly, in early March, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan invited Greek Cypriot media
representatives to Turkey to meet with him to discuss Turkish views on the Cyprus peace process.
During the meeting, which was unprecedented, it was reported that Erdogan spoke about his
support for a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation; the eventual withdrawal of Turkish troops from
the island; and a pledge of Turkish support for a “lasting comprehensive settlement” at the earliest
possible time.7 Erdogan’s comments were mostly seen as positive support for the continuation of
the negotiations and read by some in Cyprus as an indication that even if Talat was not reelected
in April, his successor would not be allowed to “walk out of the talks.”8 In his post-election
statement, Eroglu told Turkey’s NTV television that “no one must think that I will walk away
from the negotiating table. The talks process will continue.”9 Subsequently, Turkish Prime
Minister Erdogan congratulated Eroglu on his election and promised to continue to support the
Turkish Cypriots. However, appearing on television right after the vote, Erdogan apparently did
suggest that Eroglu would have to continue negotiations and that Ankara wanted a solution to the
Cyprus issue by the end of 2010.10
This “deadline” of 2010 for both sides to reach an agreement has apparently also been adopted by
the United Nations Secretary-General who stated that he would issue a new report by the U.N.
Good Offices mission in November assessing the progress of the negotiations and suggesting that
the U.N. Good Offices mission could end at that time if no substantial progress in the negotiations
had been made. Many Greek Cypriots interpreted this decision by the Secretary-General as a
subtle warning to the Greek Cypriot President that they may bear the brunt of the blame for any
lack of progress in the talks.
On May 26, 2010 President Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Eroglu held their first formal
negotiating session. They were accompanied by their principle advisors, George Iacovou for the
Greek Cypriots and Kudret Ozersay for the Turkish Cypriots. The meeting was held under the
auspices of the U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Advisor on Cyprus, Alexander Downer and
focused on the difficult issue of property rights which up to this point had not been seen as an
issue that Christofias and Talat had focused on at all.
Although the meeting was described as positive, low-key, and business-like, a controversy arose
when it was reported that Downer apparently read a statement from U.N. Secretary-General Ban
congratulating the parties for starting the talks again from where they left off including the
confirmation of existing convergences agreed to by Christofias and Talat, for agreeing to abide by
U.N. Security Council resolutions on Cyprus, and suggesting that a final agreement could be
reached in the coming months. The first part of the controversy involved criticism from several of
the Greek Cypriot political parties that were concerned that the references to the “convergences”
arrived at by Christofias and Talat were being considered as agreements by the U.N., a position
not shared by the Greek Cypriots. In addition, some Greek Cypriots, including President
Christofias, had expressed concern over the end of 2010 being imposed on the negotiations as an
unofficial time-line to reach a solution. On the other hand, apparently after the May 26 meeting,
Eroglu made a statement that the Turkish Cypriots would not be bound by the statement of the
U.N. Secretary-General, especially with regard to previous U.N. Security Council resolutions,
7 Account of the press conference between representatives of Greek Cypriot media and Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan as reported in the Cyprus Mail, March 2, 2010.
8 “What was the meaning behind Erdogan’s words?,” Cyprus Mail, March 7, 2010.
9 “Nationalist Dervis Eroglu wins northern Cyprus election”, BBC News, April 18, 2010.
10 “Turkey wants Cyprus deal in 2010 after Eroglu win,” Reuters UK, April 18, 2010.
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some of which did include calls for Turkey to withdraw its troops from Cyprus. While Eroglu was
apparently trying to clarify that he accepted U.N. resolutions on the parameters of the
negotiations, some in the Greek Cypriot leadership seem to question whether Eroglu was trying to
redefine the basis under which he would proceed with the negotiations.
Despite the initial bumps that arose with the launch of the new round of negotiations, additional
sessions were held throughout July and into August, all focused on trying to resolve significant
differences over the property issue. After a brief suspension of the talks in mid-August,
Christofias and Eroglu met over dinner (their third) on August 31 and have held several additional
sessions in September. Assessments of the negotiations thus far appear to be mixed. While both
sides continue to talk and to schedule additional sessions, the discussions have apparently not
moved beyond the property issue and neither side has indicated whether any progress is being
made.
Issues
Both sides agreed to begin the new round of negotiations where the Christofias/Talat negotiations
supposedly left off although it was somewhat unclear exactly where Christofias and Talat left off
as neither side revealed any official document listing any of the so called “convergences” that
were apparently arrived at before Talat left office. Nevertheless, it seems most observers point to
statements made by Christofias and Talat on May 23 and July 1, 2008 as the basis for the
negotiations. In those two statements, the leaders affirmed a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation
with political equality and a government with a single citizenship and a single international
personality, and with Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot states with equal status.
Even if Christofias and Eroglu have exchanged their own comprehensive proposals or agreed to
accept the Christofias/Talat “convergences,” as a starting point, neither side would likely
acknowledge them as anything more than unofficial understandings as both sides thus far have
adhered to the idea that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.” However, based on
comments by the two leaders, Talat’s April 1, 2010 press conference, critiques by leaders of the
Greek Cypriot political parties, and other sources, the issues and the problems can be somewhat
stitched together.
In his April 1 press conference former Turkish Cypriot leader Talat stated that 31 “joint
documents” had been prepared addressing a range of issues on which the parties either shared
similar views or where differences still existed. For instance, the federal government would have
powers over external relations, EU relations, citizenship, budget and economic coordination. It
seems that another understanding may have determined that one side would hold the portfolio of
the foreign minister and the other the EU portfolio. The equal constituent states would cover most
of the remainder of the governance issues. It appears that the two sides had agreed on a Senate,
equally represented, and a House proportionally based on population. There may have also been a
“convergence” on a new judicial court that would have equal Turkish and Greek Cypriot
representation and that Cyprus would be represented in the European Parliament by four Greek
and two Turkish Cypriot MPs.
At the same time, both sides continued to differ over how a new united Cyprus would be created.
The Greek Cypriots assumed the new unified state would evolve from the existing Republic of
Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots wanted the new state to be based on two equal “founding states.”
Greek Cypriots proposed the election of a president and vice president for a six-year term on the
same ticket in a direct election with weighted cross community voting. The president would be a
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Greek Cypriot for four years and the vice president would be a Turkish Cypriot; they would then
rotate offices, with the Turkish Cypriot becoming president for two years. Turkish Cypriots
initially proposed that the executive have two alternating presidents elected by the Senate.
Turkish Cypriots were opposed to a single list of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot candidates to
be elected by all of the people principally because Greek Cypriots, by virtue of their majority,
would in effect, elect the Turkish Cypriot candidate. At some point Talat seemed to have made a
significant concession in agreeing to accept the Greek position for the election of a president and
vice president even though he continued to have doubts about direct popular voting. On January
7, 2010, Talat tabled a new proposal calling for a 3:2 rotating presidency (three years for a Greek
Cypriot president and two years for a Turkish Cypriot president) instead of the 4:2 proposal on
the table. Although the idea of a rotating presidency was not new, opposition to the proposal was
vocal on the Greek Cypriot side as many Greek Cypriots apparently could not accept the idea of
being governed by a representative of the Turkish Cypriot minority.11
Similarly, the Talat proposals called for a cabinet that included a 7 (Greek Cypriot): 5 (Turkish
Cypriot) split instead of a 6:3 split. The Talat proposal called for the separate states to administer
ports and airports in their respective territory. It was not clear if any of these proposals were
included in the 31 joint documents.
The thorny issue of property has been the focus of all of the meetings thus far between Christofias
and Eroglu. As in past negotiations, the gap in the respective Cypriot positions has been great and
appears to remain so. As a result of the ethnic strife of the 1960s and the deployment of Turkish
military forces on the island in 1974, it was estimated that over 150,000 Greek Cypriots living in
the north were forced south and close to 50,000 Turkish Cypriots living in the south, fled to the
north, with both communities leaving behind massive amounts of vacated property, including
buildings and land. Greek Cypriots have long insisted that the original and legal owners who lost
properties in the north must have the right to decide how to deal with their property, whether
through recovery, exchange, or compensation. Turkish Cypriots, although apparently recognizing
rights of original ownership, have pointed to recent rulings by the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) and believe that the current inhabitant of a property must have priority and that
the issue should be resolved through compensation, exchange, or restitution. In either case, the
U.N. would work with both sides to find ways to raise the funds necessary to provide adequate
compensation to the original owners, should that be part of the settlement outcome. Press leaks
initially indicated that Eroglu had proposed that property in the south owned by Muslim
charitable foundations be given to Greek Cypriots unable to return to their properties in the north.
He also apparently has suggested that Turkish Cypriot property in the south become part of an
urban development program in which money, presumably from the sale or rent of the property, be
placed in a fund to compensate Greek Cypriots for lost property in the north.12 New leaks
reported in the press in September indicate that Christofias has apparently also suggested that
Turkish Cypriot inhabitants of Greek Cypriot property pay rent to the owners until a settlement of
a property’s status is arranged.
The question of overall territory that would come under the jurisdiction of the two equal states is
also in dispute. The Turkish Cypriot side of the “green line” includes approximately 37% of the
island and includes several areas, such as Varosha, Morphou, and Karpas, that had been almost
11 According to a poll conducted by the EDEK party in the Spring of 2010, over 70% of Greek Cypriots polled
expressed opposition to a rotating presidency.
12 “Property leaks undermine the peace talks”, Cyprus-Mail, September 5, 2010.
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100% Greek Cypriot inhabited before the 1974 division. Greek Cypriots want that territory
returned, which would leave the Turkish Cypriot side controlling about 29% of the territory. In
July, 2010 it was reported that President Christofias has tabled a proposal that would link the
property and territory issues and would include Christofias’ apparent earlier offer to Talat to
include allowing 50,000 Turkish settlers to stay, into one agreement. In that proposal, Christofias
has resurrected an older proposal that would have the Turkish side return the uninhabited city of
Varosha to Greek Cyprus in exchange for opening the sea port of Famagusta for use by the
Turkish Cypriots to conduct international trade. The port would be operated by the EU and a joint
Greek/Turkish administration, thus allowing direct trade between northern Cyprus and the EU.
For a number of reasons, Eroglu has rejected both the linking of the three issues as well as the
Varosha/Famagusta proposal.
Next to the property issue, the issue of security guarantees continues to be one of the most
difficult bridges to cross. The Greek Cypriots had long argued that all Turkish military forces
would have to leave the island. They argued that the European Union (EU) could offer guarantees
to all of its member states and even offer guarantees to third countries. Therefore, once north
Cyprus was part of the EU, they saw no reason for guarantees from third countries such as
Turkey, Greece, or the United Kingdom.13 Turkish Cypriots and Turkey maintain that the 1960
Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance must be reaffirmed in any settlement and Turkish security
guarantees should not be lifted until Turkey joins the EU because, without guarantees, the Turkish
Cypriots would feel insecure based on their history with ethnic violence on the island in the
1960s.
While both sides are now well into the negotiations, it remains unclear if any issues that may have
been resolved by Christofias and Talat have been accepted by Eroglu or re-tabled by Christofias.
This is important for Christofias because he has come under harsh criticism and the loss of
political support from his two governing coalition partners as well as from the opposition for his
positions on issues as volatile as a rotating presidency or the acceptance of any Turkish settlers at
all. This internal difficulty for Christofias was first evident when between May 15 and May 20,
2010, the Greek Cypriot National Council held heated debates over the negotiations and failed to
agree on a joint statement outlining a comprehensive strategy to be pursued by President
Christofias. That rift between President Christofias and the National Council has continued
throughout the summer and the Council has demanded that Christofias consult it before he makes
any additional offers to the Turkish Cypriot side as part of the settlement negotiations. After press
leaks in September indicated that part of Eroglu’s proposals on property may have set minimal
limits on the number of displaced Greek Cypriots that could return to their properties in the north,
several of the Greek Cypriot political parties reacted negatively. Yiannakis Omiirou, leader of
EDEK reportedly called Eroglu’s proposals “infuriating and uncompromising” and not worth
discussing.14
Initially, questions arose over how each leader would define exactly what the term “convergence”
referred to or what the term “starting where things left off” really meant. With over 10 negotiating
sessions already held between Christofias and Eroglu, all focused on the property issue and little
or no discussion of any other issue, these questions appear to remain unresolved.
13 “Cypriot FM: No Derogations from Acquis During a Solution,” Cyprus News Agency, November 14, 2008, BBC
Monitoring European, November 17, 2008.
14 “Christofias: unity needed now, before it’s too late”, Cyprus-Mail, September 9, 2010.
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EU Trade with North Cyprus
During the lull between the last negotiating session between Christofias and Talat on March 30,
2010 and the April 18 elections in the North, a potentially problematic issue rose unexpectedly for
the Greek Cypriot side. It was reported in the news that as early as December 2009, the European
Commission had sent a list of potential regulations to the EU Parliament for consideration as part
of the Parliament’s new authorities under the Lisbon Treaty that took effect on December 1, 2009.
One of those proposed regulations involved direct trade between the EU member states and north
Cyprus, a proposal initially put forward by the EU in 2004 after the Turkish Cypriots agreed to
accept the Annan Plan for reunification. The EU, as an acknowledgment of the positive Turkish
Cypriot vote, had agreed to take measures to help end what some claimed was the isolation of the
north and to stimulate the north’s economy. Since the European Union had taken the position that
the whole of Cyprus was part of the Union, trade with the north had been considered an internal
market issue. Under the EU’s rules, changes to this issue were subject to unanimous vote within
the EU Council and thus the acceptance or veto of the Cyprus government was key. At the time,
the trade proposal was ultimately vetoed by the Government of Cyprus in the EU Council on the
grounds that considering direct trade with the north would effectively recognize the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus and would lessen the urgency in the north to negotiate a final
settlement.
The Republic of Cyprus agues that the Turkish Cypriots are far from “isolated”. They point out
that under Cyprus’ EU Accession Agreement, Turkish Cypriots can travel to the south, apply for
an EU passport, and travel throughout Europe. On trade, they maintain a similar view. Under the
Green Line regulations of 2004, trade between north Cyprus and EU member states can take
place as long as products from the north transited through ports operated by the Government of
Cyprus, the official member of the Union. Although this process provides Turkish Cypriot
products EU trade preferences, Turkish Cypriots argue that certain restrictions placed on the
transit of goods from the north to ports in the south by the Government of Cyprus make it
difficult and more expensive to comply with EU regulations. Direct trade from Turkish Cypriot
ports in the north to EU member states also exits today although products destined for Europe
through the north do not include EU trade preferences and do not carry commercial documents
officially recognized in EU customs territory. Despite these restrictions, exports from the north to
the European market amount to approximately 20% of the north’s total exports making the EU
north Cyprus’ second largest trading partner after Turkey. Easing of the EU’s direct trade
restrictions would clearly have a beneficial impact on the north. According to Kemel Baykalli of
the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (KTTO), “the adoption of the direct trade proposal ...
will increase the competitiveness of Turkish Cypriot products and thus help bridge the economic
gap with Greek Cyprus”.15 others also believe direct trade would serve to convince the Turkish
Cypriots of the benefits of full membership in the EU and thus could become a positive force on
the Turkish Cypriot leaders to reach a final settlement.
News reports in Cyprus on March 1, 2010 indicated that the EU Commission, under the new
provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, sent a formal notification to the EU Parliament asking for
consideration of a Direct Trade Regulation (DTR), a decision that would address trade with north
Cyprus as an issue of international trade with a third party and could avoid a Greek Cypriot veto
15 Turkish Cypriot NGO campaigns for direct trade with EU, Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review, May 13,
2010.
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in the EU Council. The Government of Cyprus claimed that they were never notified by the
Commission, as required, nor were its members in the Parliament briefed.
Accusations and finger pointing grew more intense in Cyprus with representatives of the political
parties accusing the Government of missing this development and claiming that such a decision to
initiate direct trade with the north would circumvent Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol 10 of the
Accession Treaty with Cyprus. This they claim would result in an actual partial lifting of the
suspended acquis in the north, would endanger the unification negotiations, and would give the
Turkish Cypriots less of an incentive to make concessions. The Commission’s proposal also
seems to have been partly behind the offer by President Christofias to open the port of Famagusta
to Turkish Cypriot trade (in exchange for the return of Verosha) as a way to preempt any direct
EU trade with the north without Government of Cyprus participation.
The direct trade issue has also became a difficult legal and political matter in the Parliament as
well. In the Commission’s proposal, the legal basis for considering the DTR would fall to the
Trade Committee. After several weeks of discussions between the Cyprus government, the Greek
Cypriot members of the EU Parliament, and their European People’s Party group leadership, the
majority political group in the Parliament, the Parliament leadership agreed that the issue would
be considered by the Legal Committee which would determine under what legal basis the
Parliament had jurisdiction to act on the DTR. The Legal Committee appointed a rapporteur to
study the question and the Committee is expected to issue some kind of opinion in September.
Because of the controversial nature of the regulation and the impact it could have one way or the
other on the current negotiations in Cyprus, it is unclear whether Parliament would postpone any
further consideration of the direct trade issue no matter the outcome of the Legal Committee’s
opinion, until the end of 2010 pending an assessment of the status of the negotiations by that
time.
Some observers believe the direct trade issue had more to do with Turkey’s EU accession status
than with opening up northern Cyprus. Turkey continues to refuse to open its air and sea ports to
Cypriot commercial operations as required under an Additional Protocol signed between the EU
and Turkey. Turkey, on several occasions has hinted that permitting direct trade between the EU
and north Cyprus could result in Turkey’s compliance with the Protocol. With the EU
Commission and Council assessments of Turkey’s accession progress looming again in the Fall of
2010, the Commission appears to have wanted to take an initiative that would allow Turkey to
respond positively and thus avoid another year in which Turkey has failed to comply with EU
rules. In any case, for some observers, the debate over direct trade has added a negative
distraction to the negotiations on the Greek Cypriot side. Many believe the issue of opening up
more trade opportunities for Turkish Cypriot products should be resolved by the Cypriot parties
and the EU outside of the settlement negotiations. This could be done initially by having the
Greek Cypriots remove any impediments the Turkish Cypriots claim hinder their ability to transit
products through Government ports while the Turkish Cypriots should accept the proposal to
open the port of Famagusta under EU and joint Cypriot administration.
Assessment
The elections of Christofias and Talat in 2008 ushered in a period of higher expectations for a
settlement than at any time since 2004, when the Annan Plan was considered by both Cypriot
communities. The personal relationship between Christofias and Talat and their public
commitments to finding a solution to the Cyprus problem suggested that if these two leaders
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could not achieve a negotiated settlement, not perfect for either side but acceptable to both, then it
might take a long time before two like-minded leaders would again find themselves in a position
to find a way to unify the people of Cyprus.
Yet, after two years and close to 80 meetings and despite the strong commitment, good intentions,
and warm relations between the two leaders, progress in the talks seemed to have fallen victim to
the harsh realities of almost four decades of separation, mistrust, misunderstanding, and in some
cases, indifference to the need for a final settlement and unification of the island. Even a possible
change in leadership in the north, and thus perhaps a different negotiating strategy and more
uncertainty for the future, did not appear to be enough of an incentive to overcome the differences
to find a final solution.
The inability of two pro-solution leaders to reach an acceptable accommodation has led some
observers to question whether a settlement could still be achieved at all or whether, despite all of
the rhetoric, maintaining the status quo could become a less desirable but less disruptive outcome
for both sides. In the fall of 2009, the International Crisis Group (IGC), in a report it published
suggested that after all the fits and starts of the current (Christofias/Talat) round of negotiations,
“the island may be accelerating a slide toward permanent partition and that some elements in both
communities given 36 years of futility and the wide differences of opinion over each item on the
table from property rights to Turkish settlers to governance, may be willing to concede the
possibility of a permanently divided land.”16 This issue has resurfaced, ironically from Christofias
himself, when after the September 8, 2010 negotiating session, Christofias was reported to have
warned that “the fait accompli on the island could soon become a road of no return” and that he
was not willing to become the “last president before partition”.17
Such a final outcome is one many observers feel would be a disaster for all sides on the island, as
well as those with direct interest in a solution, especially the EU and Turkey.
Some believe the lack of a final settlement would not affect the benefits enjoyed by the people of
the Greek Cypriot community as members of the European Union and thus there is less of an
incentive to have their leaders negotiate away parts of their current authority and power to
govern. The emergence of strong opposition to the idea of a rotating presidency and other issues
under discussion, among the leaders of most Greek Cypriot political parties is a case in point. Yet,
without a settlement, it would seem that potential economic opportunities and growth across the
entire island may not materialize. In addition, Greek Cypriots will be less likely to receive fair
compensation for any property they still claim. A recent decision by the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) to recognize the Immovable Property Commission (IPC) in the north
means that in the absence of a settlement, all efforts to settle claims for compensation or
restitution by Greek Cypriots who fled to the south and lost property as a result of events in 1974
would have to be exhausted in the IPC before claims could be filed with the ECHR. It was
initially thought that the decision by the ECHR, would force many Greek Cypriots who had
hoped to avoid dealing with Turkish Cypriots or Turkey in seeking compensation or restitution
for their property, to demand a political settlement that includes fair remedies for property claims.
Thus far, this demand has not materialized although there appears to be growing Greek Cypriot
opposition to reported Turkish Cypriot proposals for a settlement of the property issue. Finally,
16 Cyprus: Reunification or Partition? Europe Report 201, The International Crisis Group, September 30, 2009.
17 Ibid. Cyprus-Mail, September 9, 2010.
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the failure to reach a settlement would mean that Greek Cypriots may forever face a large and
powerful Turkish army just a few kilometers from the “green line.”
For their part, the lack of a settlement for Turkish Cypriots could likely mean continue limited
contact with Europe, little or no recognition for the TRNC, no benefits as an EU member, and
continued dependence on Turkey for financial assistance.
For some on both sides, these may be risks worth taking. As the ICG pointed out in its report,
there appears to be a growing younger generation on both sides of the island who have never
interacted with the other and see no reason to, do not have as much of a stake in the property
issue, and may not wish to face the uncertainties and potential problems that a settlement neither
side likes, but accepts, could create. If these reports are accurate and the negotiations continue to
falter, then a possible division of the island can no longer be seen as the simple musings of a
small group of separatists.
Outside of the island, no one involved in the Cyprus issue wants to see the negotiations end or
take such a significant step backward that it would take years to return to where the negotiations
currently stand, even if many are not sure just how much progress toward a solution had actually
been achieved between Christofias and Talat or is currently being achieved between Christofias
and Eroglu. Although in a speech on August 15, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan suggested that
2010 may be the last chance for the Greek Cypriots to take the steps needed for a solution, and on
August 20, Mr. Eroglu said the end of 2010 could be a turning point, no interested parties
involved in the Cyprus issue want either or both Cypriot sides to conclude that a permanent
separation might be the least painful solution. Such an outcome would likely affect not only
Cypriot-to-Cypriot relations but also Cyprus-Turkey, Greece-Turkey, EU-Turkey, and NATO-EU
relations. Clearly, for the moment, no one can allow either side to entertain that option.
Sensing an earlier period when the talks were faltering, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan
suggested that, as a way to move the negotiations forward, a five-party international conference
be held to try to help settle the major differences between the two Cypriot sides. The initial Greek
Cypriot reaction was that such a conference was not needed and that a solution would have to
come from the Cypriots themselves. However, in a March 18, 2010 speech, Christofias did seem
to suggest that an international conference that included the permanent members of the U.N.
Security Council, the EU, Greece, Turkey, and the two Cypriot sides might be useful if it focused
on what he termed the international aspects of the problem, namely troop withdrawals, settlers,
and future security guarantees. He has since restated his support for such an option. In each case,
however, the Turkish Cypriots have raised concerns over their status at such talks asking whether
they would be represented as a co-equal to the Government of Cyprus or as the Turkish Cypriot
community.
Now that the new round of formal negotiations have resumed, all interested parties will focus on
the relationship that develops between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders and under what
conditions. Thus far the relations between the two leaders seem to be businesslike, yet cordial and
have included the willingness of each leader to cross the green line to have dinners in the others
home. The talks themselves have moved forward, albeit on only one issue and with very little
visible progress. But even if these initial negotiations continue to go fairly smoothly, the difficult
work of finding the elusive settlement that has begun anew will not likely be any easier.
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Author Contact Information
Vincent Morelli
Section Research Manager
vmorelli@crs.loc.gov, 7-8051
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