Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
September 2, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL32724
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

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Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress

Summary
The United States and Mexico have a close and complex bilateral relationship, with extensive
economic linkages as neighbors and partners under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). In recent years, security issues have dominated U.S.-Mexican relations, as the United
States has supported Mexican President Felipe Calderón’s campaign against drug trafficking
organizations (DTOs) through bilateral security cooperation initiatives including the Mérida
Initiative, an anti-crime and counterdrug assistance package first funded in FY2008. Immigration
and border security have also returned to the forefront of the bilateral agenda since Arizona
enacted a controversial state law against illegal immigration (S.B. 1070) on April 23, 2010. In late
July 2010, a federal judge blocked large parts of S.B. 1070 from taking effect pending the results
of a U.S. Department of Justice lawsuit challenging its constitutionality. In response to rising
concerns about border security, President Obama has deployed 1,200 National Guard troops to
support law enforcement efforts along the U.S.-Mexico border and Congress has approved $600
million in supplemental funds for border security (P.L. 111-230).
Now in the fourth year of his six-year term, President Calderón of the conservative National
Action Party (PAN) is focused on restarting the Mexican economy, which contracted by 7% in
2009 (largely as a result of the U.S. recession), and combating drug traffickers and organized
criminal groups. Although the Calderón Administration has arrested several top drug kingpins, the
persistent and increasingly brazen violence committed by the DTOs has led to significant
criticism of Calderón’s anti-drug strategy. As the 2012 presidential elections approach, the
Mexican Congress, which is now dominated by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), could
be reluctant to give President Calderón any major legislative victories. The PRI won nine of the
twelve governorships contested in the July 4, 2010 elections, while the PAN’s alliance with the
leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) captured three governorships.
In recent years, U.S.-Mexican relations have grown stronger as the two countries have worked
together to combat drug trafficking and secure their shared border. On May 19, 2010, President
Calderón traveled to Washington D.C. for a state visit with President Obama during which both
leaders reaffirmed their commitment to working together on a wide range of bilateral issues. The
Obama Administration asked for $346.6 million in assistance for Mexico in its FY2011 budget
request, including $310 million in Mérida Initiative funding.
The 111th Congress has maintained an active interest in Mexico with counternarcotics, border, and
trade issues dominating the agenda. To date, Congress has appropriated some $1.5 billion in
assistance for Mexico under the Mérida Initiative, including $175 million in funds for justice
sector programs included in the FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act (H.R. 4899/P.L. 111-
212). Congress is likely to maintain a keen interest in how implementation of the Mérida
Initiative and related border security initiatives are proceeding, particularly now that National
Guard troops are being sent to the Southwest border. Congress may also consider proposals for
comprehensive immigration reform. On the trade front, Congress is likely to maintain interest in
how the Obama Administration moves to resolve the current trucking dispute with Mexico now
that P.L. 111-117 would permit the resumption of a U.S.- funded pilot program for Mexican
trucks. This report will be updated.
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Contents
Recent Developments.................................................................................................................. 1
Background on Mexico ............................................................................................................... 4
Political Developments ......................................................................................................... 4
Drug Trafficking and Heightened Violence and Crime in Mexico .......................................... 5
Economic Crisis and Nascent Recovery ................................................................................ 7
Foreign Policy Challenges..................................................................................................... 9
Mexican-U.S. Relations ............................................................................................................ 10
Background ........................................................................................................................ 10
Obama Administration ........................................................................................................ 11
U.S. Assistance to Mexico................................................................................................... 12
Bilateral Cooperation on Counternarcotics and Security Efforts..................................... 13
Mérida Initiative ........................................................................................................... 14
New Mérida Initiative Strategy and the FY2011 Budget Request .................................. 17
Department of Defense Assistance to Mexico................................................................ 17
Related Southwest Border Initiatives and FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations
for Border Security .................................................................................................... 18
Human Rights Issues........................................................................................................... 22
Compliance with Human Rights Conditions in the Mérida Initiative.............................. 23
Accountability for Abuses Committed During the “Dirty War” Period ........................... 23
Migration............................................................................................................................ 24
Trends in Mexican Immigration to the United States ..................................................... 24
Mexico’s Immigration Policies...................................................................................... 25
Recent Efforts to Enact Comprehensive Immigration Reform in the United States ......... 26
Reactions to S.B. 1070 .................................................................................................. 27
Environmental Cooperation................................................................................................. 28
Trade Issues ........................................................................................................................ 29
Functioning of NAFTA Institutions ............................................................................... 30
Trade Disputes .............................................................................................................. 30
North American Cooperation on Security and Economic Issues ........................................... 32
Legislation in the 111th Congress ............................................................................................... 32
Enacted and Considered Legislation.................................................................................... 32
Additional Legislative Initiatives......................................................................................... 35

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Mexico, Including States and Border Cities ...................................................... 3

Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Mexico by Account, FY2007-FY2011 ............................................. 12
Table 2. Mérida Initiative Funding for Mexico by Aid Account and Appropriations
Measure ................................................................................................................................. 14

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Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 38
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 38

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Recent Developments
On September 1, 2010, President Felipe Calderón submitted his fourth state of the union address
to the Mexican Congress in writing. The report highlights progress that his government has made
in overcoming the challenges it faced in 2009, including the fact that it has created 500,000 new
jobs, expanded healthcare, and built record numbers of roads. While security challenges have
continued, the report says that the government has made inroads in breaking up the leadership of
organized criminal groups and in weeding out corrupt Mexican police.
On August 30, 2010, Mexican Federal Police captured Edgar Valdes Villareal, a U.S. citizen who
is one of the top leaders of the Beltran Leyva drug trafficking organization (DTO).
On August 30, 2010, Mexico’s Federal Police Commissioner announced that roughly 3,200
officers (9% of the force) had been fired for substandard performance.
On August 29, 2010, armed gunmen murdered Mayor Marco Antonio Leal Garcia of Hidalgo,
Tamaulipas.
On August 26, 2010, the Government of Mexico announced a national strategy and new
legislation to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.
On August 24, 2010, Mexican marines discovered the bodies of 72 migrants from Central and
South America who had been shot by drug traffickers for apparently refusing to participate in
their organized criminal activities at a ranch in Tamaulipas. Mexican officials have since found
the slain body of the state prosecutor who had been investigating the case. (see “Mexico’s
Immigration Policies” below.)
On August 24, 2010, the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Opinion and Expression issued
a preliminary report on his recent visit to Mexico in which he expressed grave concerns about
acts of violence and intimidation against journalists in Mexico, a country in which some 64
journalists have died and 11 have disappeared since 2000.
On August 20, 2010, six municipal policeman in Santiago, Nuevo León were arrested for their
alleged involvement in the August 18, 2010 assassination of Mayor Edelmiro Cavazos.
On August 12, 2010, President Obama signed P.L. 111-230, a measure which provides $600
million in supplemental funds for U.S. law enforcement efforts along the Southwest Border. (See
“Related Southwest Border Initiatives and FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations for Border
Security” below.)
On August 3, 2010, President Calderón announced that more than 28,000 individuals died as a
result of drug trafficking related-violence between December 2006 and July 2010.
On August 1, 2010, roughly 1,200 National Guard troops began the process of deploying to the
Southwest border to serve for one year in law enforcement support roles.
On July 29, 2010, the Mexican army killed Ignacio Coronel Villarreal, one of Mexico’s most
wanted drug traffickers from the Sinaloa DTO.
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On July 29, 2010, a federal judge blocked large parts of S.B. 1070, Arizona’s controversial new
state law against illegal immigration, from taking effect pending the results of a U.S. Department
of Justice lawsuit challenging its constitutionality. (See “Reactions to S.B. 1070” below.)
On July 29, 2010, President Obama signed the FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L.
111-212), which includes $175 million in assistance for justice sector programs in Mexico subject
to the same human rights conditions as in P.L. 111-8 and $5 million in funds for emergency
diplomatic security support in Mexico. (See “Funding the Mérida Initiative” below.)
On July 21, 2010, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report showing
that some $790.9 million of the $1.3 billion in Mérida Initiative funds appropriated for Mexico as
of that time had been obligated ($669.7 billion) or expended ($121.2 billion) by March 31, 2010.
The GAO recommended that the State Department develop better performance measures to track
progress under Mérida (See ““Status of Implementation” below.)
On July 15, 2010, a car bomb exploded in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, raising concerns that
Mexican drug traffickers may be engaging in domestic terrorism or using insurgency tactics.
On July 4, 2010, Mexico held state and local elections amidst continued drug trafficking-related
violence. In the gubernatorial contests, the Institutional Revolutionary Part (PRI) won nine states,
but PAN-Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) alliance candidates won three states long
held by the PRI (Oaxaca, Puebla, and Sinaloa).
On June 28, 2010, armed gunmen assassinated Rodolfo Torre Cantu, the PRI candidate for
governor of Tamaulipas, along with six other individuals.
On June 10, 2010, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that 2,200 individuals had been
arrested in the United States as a result of a 22-month multiagency operation against Mexican
DTOs known as “Project Deliverance.”
On June 7, 2010, a Mexican youth died at the El Paso-Ciudad Juárez border crossing after being
shot by a U.S. Border Patrol Agent. U.S. officials said that the agent was defending himself
against rock throwers who had illegally crossed into the U.S. side of the border.
On May 25, 2010, the Mexican Attorney General’s Office arrested Gregorio Sanchez, the mayor
of Cancún and PRD candidate for governor of Quintana Roo, on charges of colluding with
organized crime and money laundering.
On May 20, 2010, President Calderón addressed a joint session of Congress. During his address,
Calderón thanked lawmakers for supporting the Mérida Initiative, but asked for increased U.S.
cooperation in reducing arms trafficking, including suggesting possible reinstatement of the
assault weapons ban that lapsed in 2004.
On May 19, 2010, President Obama welcomed President Calderón to the White House for a state
visit. President Obama praised Calderón’s “vision and courage,” and said that his visit signaled
“another step forward in a new era of cooperation and partnership between our countries—a
partnership based on mutual interests, mutual respect and mutual responsibility.”
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Figure 1. Map of Mexico, Including States and Border Cities

Source: Map Resources, adapted by CRS.
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Background on Mexico
Political Developments
Over the past decade, Mexico has moved from one-party rule by the PRI to multi-party
democracy. Current PAN President Felipe Calderón won the July 2006 presidential election in an
extremely tight race, defeating Andrés López Obrador of the leftist PRD by less than 234,000
votes. The presidential race was so close that final results were not announced until early
September 2006, when the Federal Electoral Tribunal completed adjudication of all the
challenges to those results. Calderón began a six-year term on December 1, 2006.
In the first half of his term, President Calderón, whose PAN party became the largest party in the
Senate and Chamber of Deputies after the 2006 legislative elections, had some success in turning
to the PRI for help in advancing his legislative agenda. In 2007, he secured passage of long-
awaited fiscal and pension reforms that had stalled under the Fox Administration. In June 2008,
President Calderón signed a judicial reform decree after securing the approval of Congress and
Mexico’s states for an amendment to Mexico’s Constitution. Under the judicial reform, Mexico
will have eight years to move from a closed door process based on written arguments to a public
trial system with oral arguments and the presumption of innocence. In October 2008, the
government secured approval of an energy sector reform intended to improve the transparency
and management flexibility of state-oil company, Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX). Critics
maintained that its watered-down provisions, which provide only limited opportunities for private
investment in the company, would not do enough to encourage new oil exploration.1
In the months leading up to the July 5, 2009 midterm elections, most polls indicated that the PRI
would fare well as compared to the PAN and the PRD. The PRI performed even better than polls
had suggested, capturing 237 of 500 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, five of six governorships,
and several municipalities. Analysts have attributed the PRI’s strong performance to growing
popular concern about the country’s economic downturn, as well as the party’s effective use of its
still formidable national machinery. Although President Calderón remained popular, the PAN lost
seats in the Chamber (from 206 to 147) and two key governorships, with voters expressing
frustration with the party’s failure to distinguish itself from the PRI. (The PAN still controls the
Senate, however.) The PRD fared even worse than the PAN in the mid-term elections, winning
just 72 seats in the Chamber, as internal divisions within the party led Andrés Lopez Obrador to
throw his support behind left-leaning candidates from smaller parties, many of whom won.
The composition of the current Congress, which was sworn in on September 1, 2009, has
complicated President Calderón’s agenda for the second half of his term, which had included
enacting a package of comprehensive political reforms. The PRI, which, combined with the
support of the allied Green Ecological Party (PVEM) party, now controls a majority in the
Chamber, appears to be trying to use its position to gear up for the 2010-2011 gubernatorial
elections and the 2012 presidential election. However, many observers maintain that the PRI is
unlikely to block any major security or economic stimulus initiatives, given the severity of the
drug violence and economic challenges that Mexico is facing. Moreover, the PRI is expected to

1 Alexandra Olson, “Mexico Approves Oil Reform Bill in General Terms, Experts Call it Disappointment for
Investors,” AP, October 28, 2008.
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be more cooperative now than it was after winning a majority in the 2003 elections, for fear of
being dismissed by voters in 2012 as obstructionist.2
This year, political attention in Mexico has focused on the state and local elections being held in
15 states as a harbinger of how the major parties are likely to perform in the 2012 presidential
elections. Despite an electoral campaign marred by drug trafficking-related violence, which
culminated in the June 28, 2010 killing of a popular gubernatorial candidate in Tamaulipas, voters
in most states turned out in larger numbers than had been expected for the July 4, 2010 elections.3
The PRI claimed victory in nine states, but lost three states it had previously controlled (Sinaloa,
Oaxaca, and Puebla) to candidates representing alliances of the PAN, PRD, and other small left-
leaning parties. Although some “Stop the PRI” alliances performed better than analysts had
predicted, the divergent ideological orientations of the parties they involve could make governing
difficult. It remains to be seen whether similar alliances can be formed in other states and at the
national level (either in the Congress or for the 2012 presidential race).4
Drug Trafficking and Heightened Violence and Crime in Mexico5
Mexico is a major producer and supplier to the U.S. market of heroin, methamphetamine, and
marijuana and the major transit country for as much as 90% of the cocaine sold in the United
States. A small number of Mexican drug trafficking organizations, often referred to as “drug
cartels,”6 control the most significant drug distribution operations along the Southwest border.
U.S. government reports have characterized Mexican drug trafficking organizations as
representing the “greatest organized crime threat” to the United States today.7 Mexican DTOs
have expanded their U.S. presence by increasing their transportation and distribution networks, as
well as displacing other Latin American traffickers, primarily Colombians.8 In the past few years,
the violence and brutality of the Mexican DTOs have escalated as an increasing number of groups
have battled each other for control of lucrative drug trafficking routes into the United States.9
Since taking office in December 2006, President Calderón has made combating DTOs a top
priority of his administration. He has called increasing drug trafficking-related violence in
Mexico a threat to the Mexican state and has sent thousands of soldiers and police to drug
trafficking “hot-spots” in throughout Mexico. Joint deployments of federal military and police
officials are just one part of the Calderón government’s strategy against the DTOs. That strategy
involves (1) deploying the military to restore law and order, (2) expanding law enforcement
operations, (3) initiating institutional reform and anti-corruption initiatives, (4) recovering social
cohesion and trust, and (5) building up international partnerships against drugs and crime (like the

2 “Country Report: Mexico,” Economist Intelligence Unit, August 2010.
3 Marc Lacey, “Mexican Democracy, Even Under Siege,” New York Times, July 5, 2010.
4 “Alliance Surpasses Expectations in Mexican Gubernatorial Elections,” Latin American Weekly Report, July 8, 2010.
5 For more information, see CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the Mérida Initiative and
Beyond , by Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea.
6 The term drug cartel remains the term used colloquially and in the press, but some experts disagree with this because
“cartel” often refers to price-setting groups and it is not clear that Mexican drug cartels are setting illicit drug prices.
7 U.S. Department of Justice’s National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), 2009 National Drug Threat Assessment,
December 2008.
8 NDIC, 2010 National Drug Threat Assessment, February 2010.
9 CRS Report R40582, Mexico’s Drug-Related Violence , by June S. Beittel.
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Mérida Initiative).10 President Calderón has also used extradition as a major tool to combat drug
traffickers, extraditing a record 107 individuals in 2009. These efforts, combined with increased
collaboration and intelligence-sharing with U.S. law enforcement agencies, have resulted in some
significant government victories against the DTOs, including the December 2009 killing of
Arturo Beltrán Leyva and the July 2010 killing of Ignacio Coronel Villarreal.
Despite these victories, the persistent and increasingly brazen violence committed by the drug
traffickers, which has occurred partially in response to government pressure, has led to increasing
criticism of Calderón’s aggressive anti-drug strategy. According to recent Mexican government
estimates, more than 28,000 died in drug trafficking related-violence between December 2006
and July 2010.11 That figure, which was released in early August 2010, is substantially higher
than those that have been reported by Mexican media outlets. According to Grupo Reforma, this
year some 7,211 Mexicans have died in drug trafficking-related violence as of August 13, 2010, a
total which is higher than the 6,500 deaths recorded for all of 2009.12
Many experts assert that, in order to regain popular support for its security policies, the Calderón
government will have to show success in dismantling the DTOs, while also reducing drug
trafficking-related violence. Calderón officials consulted with local and state officials to revise
the government’s military-led strategy for Ciudad Juarez after the massacre of 15 civilians, many
of them teenagers, at a private home there in late January 2010. The new strategy that the
Calderón government has developed, “We Are All Juárez”, involves significant federal
government investments in education, job training, and community development programs to
help address some of the underlying factors that have contributed to the violence. It also involved
an April 2010 shift from military to federal police control over security efforts in the city, a
strategy shift which has yielded mixed results.13 Throughout August 2010, President Calderón
conducted a series of consultations with academics, policy makers, and civil society leaders on
the direction that Mexican security policy should take.
U.S. concern about the violence in Mexico has intensified since March 13, 2010, when gunmen
killed an American consular officer and her husband, an El Paso prison guard, after they had
attended a children’s birthday party in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. In a separate incident the same
day, gunmen killed the husband and wounded the two children of a Mexican employee of the
U.S. Consulate who had attended the same party. The Mexican government’s ongoing
investigation into these murders has received significant support from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and other U.S. agencies. Thus far several Barrio Azteca gang members have been
arrested in connection with the deaths.14

10 Embassy of Mexico, Washington, DC. “Mexico and the Fight Against Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime:
Setting the Record Straight,” press release, June 2009, p. ii. President Calderón further expounded on this strategy in an
editorial published in Mexican newspapers on June 13, 2010. It is available in Spanish at
http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/prensa/lucha_seguridad_publica/index.html.
11 “Mexico Revises Murder Toll Upwards,” Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, August 4, 2010.
12 For an explanation of why Reforma data on drug trafficking-related deaths are preferred over other sources, see
Trans-Border Institute (TBI), Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis from 2001-2009, January 2010, available at
http://www.justiceinmexico.org/resources/pdf/drug_violence.pdf; For recent statistics, see TBI, Justice in Mexico:
August 2010 News Report, August 2010.
13 Ken Ellingwood, “Mexico Takes Different Tack on Juárez Violence,” Los Angeles Times, July 12, 2010.
14 The Barrio Azteca (BA) gang is a violent U.S. prison gang that originated in El Paso, Texas in the mid-1980s. By the
late 1990s, BA had begun collaborating with the Sinaloa drug trafficking organization in Mexico. However, when the
Juárez DTO split off from the Sinaloa DTO in 2008, BA maintained an allegiance with the Juárez organization. A
(continued...)
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The prevalence of drug trafficking-related violence within and between the DTOs in Mexico—
and particularly in those areas of Mexico near the U.S.-Mexico border—has generated concern
among U.S. policy makers that this violence might spill over into the United States.15 In
particular, an increase in violence in Mexican cities such as Juárez and Nuevo Laredo has sparked
fears that the violence may spill into the neighboring U.S. “sister cities” of El Paso and Laredo.
Currently, U.S. federal officials deny that the increase in drug trafficking-related violence in
Mexico has resulted in a significant spillover of violence into the United States, but recognize that
incidents of violence have occurred and that the potential for increased violence does exist.16
Economic Crisis and Nascent Recovery17
Mexico’s economy is strongly dependent on economic conditions in the United States because
more than 80% of its exports are destined for the U.S. market and the United States is its primary
source of tourism revenues and foreign investment. The Mexican economy grew 3.3% in 2007,
the first year of the Calderón government. Slower growth was already anticipated for 2008 due in
part to decreasing consumer demand in the United States, declining Mexican oil production, and
slow growth in remittances sent by Mexicans abroad. The global financial crisis, which caused a
run on the Mexican peso, further reduced GDP growth in 2008 to just 1.4%. For 2009, the
Mexican economy contracted by approximately 7%, the worst decline in six decades. Experts do
not expect Mexico’s real GDP to recover 2008 levels until 2011.18
In 2009, the Calderón government struggled to cope with the combined effects of the U.S. and
global recessions, a nationwide outbreak of H1N1 “swine” flu, and declining oil production. The
U.S. recession resulted in steep declines in demand for Mexican exports, particularly in the
manufacturing sector. Mexico’s exports to the United States declined by 18.5% in 2009 as
compared to the previous year.19 The economic decline in the United States also resulted in
declining remittance flows to Mexico. In 2009, remittances to Mexico fell to an estimated $21.2
billion, the lowest level since 2005. These developments were further exacerbated by the
outbreak of pandemic H1N1 “swine flu” in April 2009, which prompted the government to close
restaurants, schools, and retail establishments for nearly two weeks. The tourism industry,
Mexico’s third largest foreign exchange earner, was especially hard hit by the outbreak, with a
50% drop in income earned by foreign visitors in May 2009 as compared to the year before.20

(...continued)
branch of BA is active in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, and is commonly referred to as the “Aztecas” gang. For
information on BA arrests and the U.S. consular killings, see, for example, Adriana Gómez Licón, “Two “Barrio
Azteca” Gang Members Arrested for Murder of U.S. Consulate Employee,” El Paso Times and AP, July 3, 2010,
15 CRS Report R41075, Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence,
coordinated by Kristin M. Finklea.
16 See for example, testimony of Mariko Silver, Assistant Secretary (Acting), DHS, Office of International Affairs,
before a joint House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Terrorism and
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation:
Next Steps for the Mérida Initiative, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., May 27, 2010.
17 For background on the Mexican economy and U.S.-Mexican economic relations, see CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-
Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
18 “Country Report: Mexico,” EIU, January 2010.
19 Based on data from the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) dataweb.
20 “Mexico Foreign Tourism Income Sinks 29% in June,” Reuters, August 10, 2009.
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Declining oil prices and production also provided economic setbacks for Mexico, which depends
on oil proceeds for over one-third of government revenue.
The Calderón government took a number of measures to cushion the Mexican economy from the
fallout of the global economic crisis and the U.S. recession. The government used billions in its
international reserves to shore up the peso, and the Mexican central bank established a temporary
reciprocal currency sway line with the U.S. Federal Reserve for up to $30 billion. The
government also hedged its oil exports for 2009 at a price of $70 a barrel in an effort to protect
the economy from the decline in oil prices. The central government increased liquidity in the
banking system, including multiple cuts in the prime policy lending rate. It also increased its
credit lines with the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Inter-American Development
Bank. In 2009, Mexico’s fiscal stimulus amounted to 2.5% of GDP and was targeted on
infrastructure spending and subsidies for key household budget items, namely those reducing
energy costs. Government programs to support small and medium-sized businesses, worker
training, job creation, and social safety nets were maintained and, in some cases, expanded.21
The Mexican economy has begun to recover from the 2009 economic crisis as a result of stimulus
measures and a resumption in demand for Mexican exports. Economic growth picked up in the
third and fourth quarters of 2009, and experts are predicting that the Mexican economy may grow
by as much as 4.6% in 2010 before slowing to 3.3% in 2011.22 Nevertheless, downgrades of
Mexico’s credit rating in late 2009 (still investor grade) reflect growing concern over Mexico’s
financial position in light of its low tax base and over-reliance on oil revenues. Analysts are also
increasingly concerned that drug trafficking-related violence may deter foreign investment in
some parts of the country, including the business capital of Monterrey and the export processing
zones of northern Mexico.
As elsewhere in Latin America, there are concerns that the economic downturn in Mexico has
negatively impacted the country’s recent progress in reducing poverty. Mexico, with a population
of almost 110 million, is classified by the World Bank as an upper middle income developing
country, with a per capita income level of $9,980 (2008). According to officials from the United
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the percentage of
Mexicans living in poverty fell between 2000 and 2006, but rose again between 2006 and 2008 to
include roughly 45% of the population. ECLAC has also estimated that the number of individuals
living in extreme poverty in Mexico and Central America increased by 800,000 in 2009.23
Mexico’s main poverty reduction program is Oportunidades (Opportunities). The program,
formerly known as Progresa (Progress), began under President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) and
has since expanded to benefit 5 million Mexican families (25 million individuals). Oportunidades
seeks not only to alleviate the immediate effects of poverty through cash and in-kind transfers,
but to break the cycle of poverty by improving nutrition, health standards, and educational
attainment. It provides cash transfers to families in poverty who demonstrate that they regularly
attend medical appointments and can certify that children are attending school. While some have

21 ECLAC. The Reactions of the Governments of the Americas to the International Crisis: An Overview of Policy
Measures up to 31 March 2009. April 2009.
22 “Country Report: Mexico,” EIU, August 2010.
23 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the
Caribbean 2008; “ECLAC: Extreme Poverty Up in 2009 in Mexico, Central America,” Latin American Herald
Tribune, January 23, 2010.
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praised Oportunidades for its positive effects on educational and nutrition outcomes, others have
criticized it for creating dependency on government handouts.24 On April 9, 2009, the World
Bank approved a $1.5 billion loan to Mexico to expand the Oportunidades program in an effort to
relieve the social impact of the economic downturn.
Foreign Policy Challenges
While the bilateral relationship with the United States has continued to dominate Mexican foreign
policy, former President Fox (2000-2006) and current President Calderón have pursued more
diversified foreign policies than their recent predecessors. The Fox Administration pursued other
policy initiatives after the September 2001 terrorist attacks turned U.S. attention away from
Mexico and toward the Middle East. Mexico held a temporary seat on the U.N. Security Council
in 2002 and 2003 and voted against the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which disappointed the Bush
Administration. Fox promoted Plan Puebla-Panama, now called the Mesoamerican Plan, a series
of energy, infrastructure, and regional connectivity initiatives with Central America. He attempted
to revive the G-3 group trade preferences (Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico); however,
Venezuela formally withdrew from the group in November 2006. Fox also sought better ties with
countries in South America. He attempted to expand trade with the European Union under the
EU-Mexico free trade agreement (FTA) that went into effect in July 2000, and with Japan under
the Mexico-Japan FTA that entered into force in April 2005.25
President Calderón has sought to pursue an independent foreign policy with even closer ties to
Latin America. Calderón regularly met with former Colombian President Álvaro Uribe, with
whom he formed a partnership, along with the leaders of Guatemala and Panama, to combat drug
trafficking and organized crime. In 2009, the Colombian government sent dozens of police
trainers to teach courses at Mexico’s federal police training institute. Calderón is likely to
continue close collaboration with Colombia under the new government of Juan Manuel Santos. In
August 2009, President Calderón visited Brazil to discuss the possibility of forming a Brazil-
Mexico FTA, as well as developing greater energy cooperation between PEMEX and Petrobras,
Brazil’s state-owned oil company. Security cooperation between Mexico and the Central
American Integration System (SICA) has also expanded under President Calderón. Progress has
also continued to advance, albeit slowly, on the Mesoamerican Project mentioned above. The
Calderón government attempted to help resolve the political crisis in Honduras after the ouster of
former president Manuel Zelaya in June 2009, and has recognized the new government of
Porfirio Lobo. The Mexican government also sent financial support and humanitarian supplies to
Haiti in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake that hit that country in January 2010.
President Calderón has also tried to mend relations with Cuba and Venezuela, which had become
tense during the Fox Administration. In September 2007, Mexican and Venezuelan ambassadors
presented credentials to the respective governments, restoring full relations for the first time since
November 2005. In May 2004, President Fox recalled Mexico’s ambassador to Cuba;
ambassadors were later restored, but relations between the two countries remained tense through
the remainder of the Fox administration. A Cuban ambassador to Mexico also presented his
credentials to President Calderón in September 2007. In November 2008, a Mexico-Cuba

24 Santiago Levy, Good Intentions, Bad Outcomes – Social Policy, Informality and Economic Growth in Mexico.
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, April 2008.
25 For more information, see CRS Report R40784, Mexico’s Free Trade Agreements, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
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agreement intended to help slow the trafficking of undocumented Cubans passing through
Mexico to the United States took effect.26
Mexican-U.S. Relations
Background
Until the early 1980s, Mexico had a closed and statist economy and its independent foreign policy
was often at odds with the United States. Those policies began to shift, however, under President
Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988), and changed even more dramatically under President Carlos
Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) and President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000). Presidents Salinas
opened Mexico’s economy to trade and investment, while President Zedillo adopted electoral
reforms that leveled the playing field for opposition parties and increased cooperation with the
United States on drug control and border issues.
President Fox (2000-2006) encouraged strong relations with the United States, and called for
greater cooperation under NAFTA and for a bilateral migration agreement that would regularize
the status of undocumented Mexicans in the United States. In the aftermath of the September
2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the focus of relations shifted to border security issues
as the United States became increasingly concerned about homeland security. Relations became
strained during the debate on immigration reform in the United States. After President Bush
approved the Secure Fence Act of 2006, Mexico, with the support of 27 other nations, denounced
the proposed border fence at the Organization of American States.
Under the Calderón government, drug trafficking and violence, border security, and immigration
have continued to define the bilateral relationship. Felipe Calderón made his first official visit to
the United States as President-elect in early November 2006, after first visiting Canada and some
Latin American countries. During his visit, Calderón criticized the authorization of 700 miles of
fencing along the U.S.-Mexico border and noted that it complicated U.S.-Mexico relations. He
asserted that job creation and increased investment in Mexico would be more effective in
reducing illegal migration from Mexico than a border fence. Calderón signaled a shift in Mexican
foreign policy when he noted that while immigration is an important issue in the bilateral
relationship, it is not the only issue, as trade and economic development are also important.
President Calderón reiterated these concerns during President Bush’s March 2007 visit to Mexico.
During the visit, President Calderón also called for U.S. assistance in combating drug and
weapons trafficking. Specifically, Calderón promised to continue his efforts to combat drug
trafficking and called for U.S. efforts to reduced the demand for drugs. Calderón’s willingness to
increase narcotics cooperation with the United States led to the development of the Mérida
Initiative, a multi-year U.S. assistance effort announced in October 2007 to help Mexico and
Central America combat drug trafficking and organized crime.

26 “Cuban Envoy to Mexico Says Migration Agreement to Halt People Trafficking,” BBC Monitoring Americas,
November 20, 2008.
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Obama Administration
U.S.-Mexican relations have continued to be close under the Obama Administration, largely
focusing on cooperation in combating organized crime and drug trafficking. In mid-January 2009,
President Calderón visited then President-elect Obama in Washington D.C. That pre-inaugural
meeting, which has become somewhat of a tradition for recent U.S. presidents, demonstrated the
importance of strong relations with Mexico.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton traveled to Mexico City and Monterrey, Mexico, on March 25-
26, 2009 to discuss a broad range of bilateral issues, including cooperation under the Mérida
Initiative. The Secretary asserted that the U.S. relationship with Mexico “is one of the most
important relationships between any two countries in the world” and that both countries “need a
strong and sustained partnership, one based on comprehensive engagement, greater balance,
shared responsibility, and joint efforts to address hemispheric and global issues.”27 During her
visit, Secretary Clinton and Mexican Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa announced the creation
of a new bilateral implementation office in Mexico where Mexican and U.S. officials will work
together on efforts to combat drug traffickers and associated violence. Perhaps most significantly,
Secretary Clinton criticized the failure of U.S. antidrug policy and acknowledged that an
“insatiable demand for illegal drugs” in the United States “fuels the drug trade.”28
Clinton’s visit to Mexico was followed in early April 2009 with trips by Homeland Security
Secretary Napolitano and Attorney General Holder where they met with Mexican officials and
attended an arms trafficking conference. Both officials emphasized new efforts by their agencies
to combat the drug cartels, including the deployment of additional personnel and resources to
support anti-gun trafficking and interdiction efforts, as well as law enforcement cooperation.
On April 16-17, 2009, President Barack Obama traveled to Mexico to meet with President
Calderón. The two presidents discussed cooperation in the fight against drug-related violence,
immigration reform, and a new bilateral framework on clean energy and climate change. During
the visit, President Obama acknowledged the U.S. demand for drugs was helping to keep the
Mexican drugs traffickers in business, and that “more than 90% of the guns recovered in Mexico
come from the United States.”29
At the North American Leaders’ Summit in Guadalajara, Mexico in August 2009, President
Obama praised Mexico’s response to the H1N1 swine flu outbreak and gave his full support for
President Calderón’s struggle against the drug cartels. Obama stated that he has “great confidence
in President Calderón’s administration applying the law enforcement techniques that are
necessary to curb the power of the cartels, but doing so in a way that’s consistent with human
rights.”30 During the summit, President Obama, President Calderón, and Canadian Prime Minister

27 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks with Mexican Foreign Secretary
Patricia Espinosa After Their Meeting,” Mexico City, Mexico, March 25, 2009.
28 Mark Lander, “Clinton Says Demand for Illegal Drugs in the U.S. ‘Fuels the Drug Trade’ in Mexico,” New York
Times, March 26, 2009.
29 “President Obama and Mexican President Felipe Calderón Hold News Conference,” CQ Newsmaker Transcripts,
April 16, 2009.
30 U.S. Department of State, “Press Release: North American Leaders Discuss Trade, H1N1 Flu, Climate Change,”
August 10, 2009.
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Harper pledged to work together to restore economic growth in North America, combat climate
change, and prepare for the fall flu season.
Thus far in 2010, U.S.-Mexican consultations have continued to occur at the highest levels. On
March 23, 2010, Secretary Clinton chaired a cabinet-level delegation to Mexico that included
Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Michael Mullen,
Homeland Security Secretary Napolitano, and then-Director of National Intelligence Admiral
Dennis Blair. The delegation participated in a Mérida Initiative High-Level Group meeting with
their Mexican counterparts at which they agreed to a new strategy for the Mérida Initiative.
President Obama then welcomed President Calderón to the White House for a two-day state visit
on May 19, 2010 during which the leaders pledged to continue working together to combat the
organized criminal groups that traffic drugs into the United States and illicit weapons and cash
into Mexico. They also reaffirmed their commitment to bilateral efforts to foster economic
competitiveness, produce clean energy, and build a 21st century border
U.S. Assistance to Mexico
Mexico, a middle income country, traditionally has not been a major recipient of U.S. foreign
assistance, but this changed in FY2008 with congressional approval of the Administration’s
request for funding to support the Mérida Initiative (see “Mérida Initiative” section below).
Because of the Mérida Initiative funding, U.S. assistance to Mexico rose from $65 million in
FY2007 to almost $406 million in FY2008. Table 1 provides an overview of recent U.S.
assistance to Mexico funded through State Department aid accounts, while Table 2 provides a
breakdown of Mérida assistance by account. Aside from Mérida-related funding, Mexico receives
development assistance aimed at reducing poverty and inequality and helping the Mexican
economy benefit from the North American Free Trade Agreement. Mexico also benefits from
military training programs funded through the State Department’s International Military
Education and Training Account (IMET), as well as counter-terrorism assistance provided
through the Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism and Related Programs (NADR) account.
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Mexico by Account, FY2007-FY2011
U.S. $ millions
Account FY2007 FY2008a FY2009ab
FY2010 (est.)
FY2011 req.
INCLE
36.7 242.1
454.0e 365.0f 292.0
ESF
11.4 34.7
15.0 15.0 10.0
FMF
0.0 116.5
299.0d
5.3
8.0
IMET
0.1 0.4
0.8
1.1 1.1
NADR
1.3 1.4
3.9
5.7 5.7
CSHc
3.7 2.7
2.9
3.5 0.0
DA
12.3 8.2
11.2
10.0 26.3
TOTAL 65.4 405.9
786.8

405.6 346.6
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2008-FY2011,
FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-212).
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Notes: CSH= Child Survival and Health; DA=Development Assistance; ESF=Economic Support Fund;
FMF=Foreign Military Financing; IMET=International Military Education and Training; INCLE=International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism and Related Programs.
a. FY2008 assistance includes funding from the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252). FY2009
assistance includes FY2009 bridge funding from the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252).
b. FY2009 assistance includes funding from the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 11-32).
c. Beginning with the FY2010 request, the Child Survival and Health Account became known as Global Health
and Child Survival—USAID.
d. $260 million provided under the FY2009 supplemental (P.L. 111-32) and counted here as FY2009 funding
was considered by appropriators “forward funding” intended to address in advance a portion of the FY2010
request.
e. $94 million provided under P.L. 111-32 and counted here as part of FY2009 funding was considered by
appropriators “forward funding” intended to address in advance a portion of the FY2010 request.
f.
$175 million of this funding was provided in the FY2010 supplemental (P.L. 111-212).

On February 1, 2010, the Obama Administration submitted its FY2011 budget request to
Congress. The request includes $346.6 million in total assistance to Mexico, including $310
million in assistance accounts that have funded the Mérida Initiative: $292 million in
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE), $8 million in Foreign Military Financing
(FMF), and $10 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF). Congress is still in the process of
considering the FY2011 request. However, the Senate Appropriations Committee’s version of the
FY2011 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (S.
3676) appears to include $120 million in assistance for Mexico: $85 million in INCLE, $25
million in Development Assistance (DA), and $10 million in ESF. (see “New Mérida Initiative
Strategy and the FY2011 Budget Request ” below.)
Bilateral Cooperation on Counternarcotics and Security Efforts
In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S.-Mexican counternarcotics efforts were often marked by mistrust.
Beginning in 1986, when the U.S. President was required to certify whether drug-producing
countries and drug-transit countries were cooperating fully with the United States, Mexico often
was criticized for its lack of efforts, which in turn led to Mexican government criticism of the
U.S. assessment. Reforms to the U.S. drug certification process enacted in September 2002 (P.L.
107-228) essentially eliminated the annual drug certification requirement, and instead required
the President to designate and withhold assistance from countries that had “failed demonstrably”
to make substantial counternarcotics efforts.31 In the aftermath of these reforms, U.S. bilateral
cooperation with Mexico on counternarcotics efforts improved considerably during the Fox
administration (2000-2006), and as described above, combating DTOs has become a priority of
the current Calderón administration.
Until 2006, Mexico refused to extradite criminals facing the possibility of life without parole to
the United States. However, two decisions by the Mexican Supreme Court facilitated extraditions
to the United States. In November 2005, in a partial reversal of its October 2001 ruling, the Court
found that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is not cruel and unusual

31 See CRS Report 98-174, Mexican Drug Certification Issues: U.S. Congressional Action, 1986-2002, by K. Larry
Storrs.
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punishment. Then the Court ruled in January 2006 that U.S. extradition requests only need to
meet the requirements of the 1978 bilateral extradition treaty, not Mexico’s general law on
international extradition that was promulgated in 1975. That decision made the extradition
process easier. President Calderón has used extradition as a major tool to combat drug traffickers.
Extraditions from Mexico rose from 41 in 2005 to a record 107 in 2009.
The State Department’s 2010 International Narcotics Control Strategy report maintains that
President Calderón’s efforts against drug traffickers in 2009 continued at an “ambitious pace” in
the face of an increasingly violent backlash from the DTOs. According to the report, those efforts
resulted in the arrests of several significant DTO leaders and record methamphetamine seizures.
In 2009, Mexican law enforcement also seized at least 20 metric tons (mt) of cocaine (up from 19
mt in 2008) and 665 kilograms of opium gum (up from 168 kilograms in 2008), while marijuana
seizures were down. Challenges identified in the report include the continued opacity and
inefficiency of the Mexican judicial system, corruption, and declines in government drug crop
eradication efforts.
Mérida Initiative32
The United States and Mexico issued a joint statement on October 22, 2007, announcing a multi-
year plan for $1.4 billion in U.S. assistance to Mexico and Central America to combat drug
trafficking and other criminal organizations. The Mérida Initiative, named for the location of a
March 2007 meeting between Presidents Bush and Calderón, expands bilateral and regional
cooperation to combat organized crime, DTOs, and criminal gangs. The stated objective of the
Mérida Initiative, according to the U.S. and Mexican government joint statement, is to maximize
the effectiveness of efforts against drug, human, and weapons trafficking.33 The Bush
Administration first requested funds for Mérida, $500 million for Mexico and $50 million for
Central America, in its FY2008 supplemental appropriations request.
Table 2. Mérida Initiative Funding for Mexico by Aid Account
and Appropriations Measure
($ in millions)
FY2008
FY2009
FY2009
FY2010
Supp.
Bridge
FY2009
Supp.
FY2010
Supp.
(P.L. 110-
(P.L. 110-
(P.L. 111-
(P.L. 111-
(P.L. 111-
(P.L. 111-
FY2011
Account
Account
252)
252)
8)
32)
117)
212)
Request
Totals
ESF
20.0 0.0 15.0 0.0 15.0 0.0
10.0
50.0
INCLE 215.5 48.0 246.0 160.0 190.0 175.0
292.0
1,034.5
FMF 116.5 0.0 39.0
260.0 5.3 0.0
8.0
420.8
Total
352.0 48.0 300.0 420.0 210.3 175.0
310.0
1,505.3
Sources: U.S. Department of State, FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan, FY2009 Appropriations
Spending Plan, FY2009 Supplemental Spending Plan, and FY2010 Spending Plan,; FY2010 Supplemental
Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-212); Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2011.

32 See CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the Mérida Initiative and Beyond , by Clare Ribando
Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea. For historical information, see CRS Report RS22837, Mérida Initiative: U.S. Anticrime
and Counterdrug Assistance for Mexico and Central America, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
33 U.S. Department of State and Government of Mexico, “Joint Statement on the Mérida Initiative,” October 22, 2007.
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Notes: ESF=Economic Support Fund; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; INCLE=International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement.
Funding the Mérida Initiative
To date, Congress has appropriated a total of $1.5 billion for Mexico under the Mérida Initiative.
Legislative action on Mérida appropriations has included the following:
• In June 2008, the 110th Congress appropriated $352 million in FY2008
supplemental assistance and $48 million in FY2009 bridge fund supplemental
assistance for Mexico in P.L. 110-252, the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations
Act. Congress divided the funding for Mexico in P.L. 110-252 between the
INCLE, FMF, and ESF accounts. Congress limited the amount of FMF and
INCLE available to provide equipment to the Mexican military and made 15% of
FMF and IMET contingent on meeting certain human rights conditions.34
Congress also earmarked $73.5 million for judicial reform, institution building,
rule of law, and anti-corruption activities.
• In March 2009, the 111th Congress passed the Omnibus Appropriations Act, (P.L.
111-8) providing $300 million for Mexico within the INCLE, ESF, and FMF
accounts with not less than $75 million for judicial reform, institution building,
anti-corruption, and rule of law activities. The measure continues human rights
conditions similar to those set forth in P.L. 110-252.35
• In June 2009, the 111th Congress passed the FY2009 Supplemental
Appropriations Act, P.L. 111-32, which includes $160 million in INCLE
assistance and $260 million in FMF for Mexico, $354 million more than the
Administration’s request. The $160 million in INCLE funds can be used to
supply the Mexican federal police with items such as fixed and rotary wing
aircraft (including three requested Blackhawk helicopters). The $260 million in
FMF funding is for expedited aviation assistance to the Mexican Navy (SEMAR)
to enhance air transport ability and aerial surveillance. While the INCLE funds
provided by P.L. 111-32 are subject to the same human rights conditions as in
P.L. 111-8, the FMF funds provided are not subject to human rights conditions.
• In December 2009, Congress passed the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations
Act (H.R. 3288/P.L. 111-117), which allows for $210.3 million for Mexico in the
INCLE, ESF, and FMF accounts subject to the same human rights conditions as
P.L. 111-8. While Congress provided less funding for Mérida-related programs in

34 Human rights conditions for Mexico in P.L. 110-252 include (1) improving transparency and accountability of
federal police forces; (2) establishing a mechanism to conduct regular consultations among relevant Mexican
government authorities, Mexican human rights organizations, and other relevant Mexican civil society organizations, to
make consultations concerning implementation of the Mérida Initiative in accordance with Mexican and international
law; (3) ensuring that civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities are investigating and prosecuting, in accordance with
Mexican and international law, members of the federal police and military forces who have been credibly alleged to
have committed violations of human rights, and the federal police and military forces are fully cooperating with the
investigations; and (4) enforcing the prohibition, in accordance with Mexican and international law, on the use of
testimony obtained through torture or other ill-treatment.
35 P.L. 111-8 also has a provision requiring that prior to the procurement or lease of aircraft, that the Director of the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the Committees on
Appropriations an analysis of alternatives for the acquisition of all aircraft for the Merida Initiative.
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Mexico and Central America than the Administration’s FY2010 request,
Congress had appropriated significantly more for Mexico than requested in the
FY2009 supplemental spending measure, and considered $254 million of the
funds provided in P.L. 111-32 as intended to address in advance a portion of the
FY2010 request.36
• In late July 2010, Congress passed the FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act
(H.R. 4899/P.L. 111-212), which includes $175 million in INCLE assistance for
Mexico for “judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption, and rule of law
activities” subject to the same human rights conditions as in P.L. 111-8. These
funds for Mexico will not be made available until the State Department submits a
multiyear, interagency strategy on how to address the causes of drug trafficking-
related violence and organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean to the
Appropriations Committees. It remains to be seen whether the FY2010
supplemental assistance provided for Mexico is “forward funding” intended to
address in advance a portion of the FY2011 request.
Human Rights Conditions on Mérida Initiative Assistance
The August 2009 submission of the State Department’s human rights progress report for Mexico
met the statutory requirement for the release of the FY2008 supplemental and FY2009 regular
FMF and IMET funds that had been on hold. Those funds totaled roughly $88.5 million. Another
progress report is soon expected to be submitted to congressional appropriators that would meet
the statutory requirements for FY2009 supplemental, FY2010 omnibus, and FY2010
supplemental funding on hold to be released. Those funds on hold total roughly $36 million.37
Status of Implementation
There has been ongoing concern in Congress about the slow delivery of Mérida assistance. On
December 3, 2009, the GAO issued a preliminary report for Congress on the status of funding for
the Mérida Initiative. By the end of September 2009, GAO found that $753 million of the $1.1
billion in Mérida funds appropriated for Mexico as of that time had been obligated by the State
Department, but only $24 million of the funds had actually been spent.38 Progress has been made
in Mérida implementation since the release of the December 2009 GAO report. According to a
follow-up report by the GAO that was released on July 21, 2010, approximately $790.9 million of
the $1.3 billion in Mérida funds appropriated for Mexico as of that time had been obligated
($669.7 billion) or expended ($121.2 billion) by March 31, 2010.39 That total includes
approximately $14 million in new obligations for Mérida programs in Mexico and $97 million in
new expenditures.

36 In the Joint Explanatory Statement to P.L. 111-117, the conferees direct the Secretary of State to submit a report to
within 90 days of the enactment of the act addressing how prior Mérida funds have been used, progress to date, any
planned adjustments in the uses of funds, and post-Merida plans.
37 Email from State Department official, September 1, 2010.
38 GAO, Status of Funds for the Mérida Initiative, 10-253R, December 3, 2009, available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d10253r.pdf.
39 GAO, Mérida Initiative: The United States has Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better
Performance Measures, 10-837R, July 21, 2010, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10837.pdf.
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New Mérida Initiative Strategy and the FY2011 Budget Request 40
Even though the implementation of Mérida-funded programs is likely to continue for several
more years, budgetary support for the Initiative as it was originally conceived ended with the
FY2010 budget cycle. As a result, the Obama Administration and the Mexican government have
agreed to a new strategic framework for security cooperation. The four pillars of the new strategy
are outlined in the FY2011 budget request and include 1) disrupting organized criminal groups; 2)
institutionalizing the rule of law; 3) building a 21st century border; and 4) building strong and
resilient communities. In terms of funding priorities, the Administration plans to move away from
providing equipment to Mexican security forces to supporting institutional reform programs in
Mexico with training and technical assistance. It intends to provide assistance to one or two
border cities as U.S. assistance is expanded from the federal to the state and local levels. The
FY2011 request included at least $310 million for these programs: $292 million in International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE), $8 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and
$10 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF).
Congress is still in the process of considering the FY2011 request, but, as previously noted, the
FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-212) included $175 million funds for judicial
reform in Mexico. It remains to be seen whether those funds, which were appropriated under the
INCLE account, are considered by appropriators as “forward funding” intended to address in
advance a portion of the FY2011 request. If that were the case, it may explain why the Senate
Appropriations Committee’s version of the FY2011 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act (S. 3676) appears to include only $120 million in assistance
for Mexico: $85 million in INCLE, $25 million in Development Assistance (DA), and $10
million in ESF. In S.Rept. 111-237, Senate appropriators urge the State Department to devote a
larger portion of U.S. assistance to strengthening the capacity of Mexican state and local law
enforcement to investigate and prosecute violent crimes.
Department of Defense Assistance to Mexico
Apart from the Mérida Initiative, DOD has its own legislative authorities to provide certain
counterdrug assistance. DOD programs in Mexico are overseen by the U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM), which is located on Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado, whereas programs in
Central America are managed by U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), which is based in
Miami, FL. DOD can provide counterdrug assistance under certain circumstances outlined in Sec.
1004 of P.L. 101-150 as amended through FY2010, and can provide additional assistance to 22
countries as provided for in Sec. 1033 of P.L. 105-85 as amended through FY2010. Under these
authorities, DOD counternarcotics assistance to Mexico totaled roughly $12.1 million in FY2008,
$34.2 million in FY2009, and $34.5 million in FY2010.41
In the FY2006-FY2010 annual Department of Defense (DOD) authorization bills, Congress also
provided DOD with authority to train and equip foreign military forces to perform
counterterrorism operations. DOD used this “Section 1206” authority, as it is known, to provide a

40 CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: the Mérida Initiative and Beyond .
41 These figures reflect both “direct” support (e.g., training, equipment, information sharing, infrastructure and other
categories) and “indirect” support via DOD and other U.S. Government counterdrug operations (e.g., transportation,
communications, intelligence analysis, radar, air and maritime patrol, liaison personnel, and other categories). GAO-
10-827.
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total of $13.9 million in counterterrorism training and equipment to the Mexican military in
FY2007 and FY2008.
On December 16, 2009, Congress appropriated an additional $50 million in funding for
counternarcotics communication equipment for Mexico in the FY2010 Department of Defense
Appropriations Act (H.R. 3326/P.L. 111-118).42
Related Southwest Border Initiatives and FY2010 Supplemental
Appropriations for Border Security43
In March 2009, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano announced a set of Southwest
border initiatives aimed at (1) guarding against violent crime spillover into the United States; (2)
supporting Mexico’s crackdown campaign against drug cartels in Mexico; and (3) reducing the
movement of contraband in both directions across the border.44
Components of the Department of Homeland Security are providing significant assistance to
advance those aims. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has created eleven Border
Enforcement Security Task Forces (BESTs) since 2006, including ten on the Southwest border
and one in Mexico City. The task forces serve as platforms for cooperation among local, state,
and federal agencies as well as a point of cooperation with Mexico’s Secretary of Public Security
(SSP). ICE has also coordinated the establishment of Special Investigative Units in Mexico that
work with ICE special agents on criminal investigations and prosecutions in such areas as money
laundering, human trafficking, and alien smuggling. DHS components such as ICE, Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), and the U.S. Coast Guard have longstanding relationships with their
Mexican counterparts to jointly disrupt the activities of drug trafficking organizations.
In March 2009, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced increased efforts to combat Mexican
drug cartels in the United States and to help Mexican law enforcement battle the cartels in their
own country. Department of Justice components involved in the increased efforts include the FBI,
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
(ATF), U.S. Marshals Service (USM), the Department’s Criminal Division and the Office of
Justice Programs. In October, 2009, agents from several U.S. federal agencies, as well as state
and local police, engaged in a joint operation in 38 U.S. cities against La Familia Michoacana.
The raid resulted in 300 arrests. On June 10, 2010, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that
2,200 individuals had been arrested in the United States as a result of a 22-month multiagency
operation against Mexican DTOs known as “Project Deliverance.”
ATF has begun a new intelligence-driven effort known as Gunrunner Impact Teams (GRITs),
deployed eTrace firearms tracking technology to Mexico, and beefed up its Project Gunrunner

42 Funding for this equipment is listed as “Digital Communications Equipment” on p.352 of the Joint Explanatory
Statement for the FY2010 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 3326/P.L.-111-118).
43 For information on U.S. efforts to combat flows of drugs, weapons, and money into Mexico, see the Appendix of
CRS Report R41075, Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence. For recent
funding information, see the Appendix of CRS Report R41189, Homeland Security Department: FY2011
Appropriations, coordinated by Chad C. Haddal.
44 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Press Release: Secretary Napolitano Announces Major Southwest Border
Security Initiative,” March 24, 2009.
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program as a part of its efforts to stop the flow of guns into Mexico. (For more see “Weapons
Trafficking” section below).
DEA has worked with the Mexican government for decades and has 11 offices in the country. The
agency is increasing its agents allocated to the Southwest border field divisions and is forming
mobile teams to target Mexican methamphetamine trafficking operations. DEA’s cooperation with
Mexico has included Project Reckoning targeting the Gulf Cartel and Operation Xcellerator
targeting the Sinaloa Cartel. DEA also is the lead agency at the El Paso Intelligence Center
(EPIC), a national tactical intelligence center that emphasizes law enforcement efforts on the
Southwest border.
Pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act), the U.S. Department
of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control targets and blocks financial assets, subject to
U.S. jurisdiction, of drug kingpins and related associates and entities. Since October 2009, the
U.S. Treasury Department has designated 38 individuals and 16 entities as tied to the illicit
activities of the Arellano Felix Organization, the Beltran Leyva Organization, the Sinaloa Cartel,
and La Familia Michoacana.
On August 12, 2010, the Senate passed and President Obama signed legislation (H.R. 6080/P.L.
111-230) that will provide $600 million in supplemental funding to strengthen U.S. border
security efforts. That total includes $394 million for DHS: $244 million to hire new CBP officers
and Border Patrol agents, $84 million to hire new ICE agents, $32 million for two unmanned
aerial detection systems, $6 million for bases for Border Patrol agents, $14 million for
communications equipment, and $8 million to train new law enforcement personnel. The
supplemental funds also include $196 million to support DOJ efforts on the Southwest border.
Those funds will enable the creation of seven new ATF Gunrunner units and five FBI Hybrid
Task Forces, as well as support additional DEA agents, federal attorneys, prosecutors, and
immigration judges. The supplemental funds will also enable the U.S. government to provide
increased technical assistance and training for Mexican law enforcement.
Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling
It is estimated that between $19 billion and $29 billion in illicit proceeds flow from the United
States to drug trafficking organizations and other organized criminal groups in Mexico each year,
and that U.S. and Mexican officials together seize perhaps one percent of that total.45 Much of the
money is generated from the illegal sale of drugs in the United States and is laundered to Mexico
through mechanisms such as bulk cash smuggling (the most common method), the Black Market
Peso Exchange (BMPE), wire transfers, and prepaid stored value cards. Illicit funds are also
placed in financial institutions, cash-intensive front businesses, or money services businesses. The
proceeds may then be used by DTOs and other criminal groups to acquire weapons in the United
States and to corrupt law enforcement and other public officials.
In 2005, ICE and CBP launched a program known as “Operation Firewall,” which increased
operations against bulk cash smuggling in the U.S.-Mexico border region. Since 2005, Operation

45 Illicit proceeds estimate is from DHS, United States-Mexico Bi-National Criminal Proceeds Study, June 2010.
Seizure estimate citation is from William Booth and Nick Miroff, “Stepped up Efforts by U.S., Mexico Fail to Stem
Flow of Drug Money South,” Washington Post, August 25, 2010.
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Firewall has resulted in 679 arrests and 3,946 seizures totaling more than $302 million.46
Additionally, in FY2009 alone, CBP seized more than $37.2 million in southbound currency; this
is 270% more than the amount seized in FY2008. Further, in FY2009, over $17 million in
currency was seized as a result of investigatory cooperation between ICE and the Government of
Mexico.47 U.S. efforts against money laundering and bulk cash smuggling are increasingly
moving beyond the federal level as well, as experts have recommended.48 In December 2009, for
example, ICE opened a bulk cash smuggling center to assist U.S. federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies track and disrupt illicit funding flows.
The United States and Mexico have created a Bilateral Money Laundering Working Group to
coordinate the investigation and prosecution of money laundering and bulk cash smuggling. A
recent Bi-national Criminal Proceeds Study revealed that some of the major points along the
Southwest border where bulk cash is smuggled include San Ysidro, CA; Nogales, AZ; and
Laredo, McAllen, and Brownsville, TX.49 Information provided from studies such as these may
help inform policy makers and federal law enforcement personnel and assist in their decisions
regarding where to direct future efforts against money laundering.
Weapons Trafficking50
Mexican DTOs have reportedly used “military-style” firearms, including assault weapons. The
government of Mexico has estimated that more than 80% of the firearms that have been seized
and traced since President Calderón took office originated in the United States.51 While a
significant number of firearms seized by Mexican authorities, some arguably based on “military”
designs, have been traced back to the United States in the past few years, only a handful of those
firearms have been traced back to U.S. military inventories. Mexican DTOs often obtain their
weapons through “straw purchases,” whereby people who are legally qualified to buy the
weapons from licensed gun dealers or at gun shows in U.S. border states sell them to smugglers
who take them across the border. Illicit firearms are used in conflicts between rival DTOs as well
as between the DTOs and the Mexican government, military, and police.
The United States has taken various measures to reduce the illegal flow of weapons into Mexico.
One such initiative is Project Gunrunner, led by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF). It aims to disrupt the illegal flow of guns from the United States to Mexico and
enhance U.S. and Mexican law enforcement coordination. Through another anti-trafficking
initiative, ATF maintains a foreign attaché in Mexico City to administer an Electronic Trace
Submission System (ETSS)—the eTrace program—for Mexican law enforcement authorities.
Additionally, through the Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) Initiative, DHS’

46 See testimony by Janice Ayala, Assistant Director, Office of Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement before the U.S. Congress, Senate United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Drug
Trafficking Violence in Mexico: Implications for the United States, 111th Cong., 1st sess., May 5, 2010.
47 U.S. Department of State, “United States - Mexico Security Partnership: Progress and Impact,” May 19, 2010.
48 Douglas Farah, Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling: Challenges for the Merida Initiative, Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation, May 2010.
49 DHS, United States - Mexico Bi-National Criminal Proceeds Study, 2010, p. 4-2.
50 For more information, see CRS Report R40733, Gun Trafficking and the Southwest Border, by Vivian S. Chu and
William J. Krouse.
51 See, for example, Mexican President Felipe Calderon, “Joint Meeting to Hear an Address by His Excellence Felipe
Calderon Hinojosa, President of Mexico,” Congressional Record, May 20, 2010, p. H3663
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Immigration and Customs Enforcement leads Operation Armas Cruzadas, a multi-agency effort to
disrupt and dismantle weapons smuggling networks. In addition to these programs, DHS has
implemented measures to enhance its outbound/southbound screening procedures including 100%
screening of southbound rail shipments.52 Also, the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) scans
license plates along the Southwest border with the use of automated license plate readers.
During his address to the Joint Meeting of Congress on May 20, 2010, Mexican President
Calderón asked for increased U.S. cooperation in reducing the illegal flow of weapons across the
Southwest border. In particular, he asked Congress to ensure the enforcement of current gun laws
as well as to consider a reinstatement of an assault weapons ban.53 Some argue that reinstating a
ban on certain types of weapons may help curb the flow of these weapons into the hands of DTOs
and their affiliated gangs and may subsequently reduce the level or severity of violence currently
seen in Mexico. Others, however, argue that the DTOs will ultimately circumvent any such
measures in order to procure the weapons they desire from U.S. sources or obtain them from
other countries.
Human Smuggling
CBP and the Mexican government have partnered through the Operation Against Smuggling
Initiative on Safety and Security (OASISS), a bi-lateral program aimed at enhancing both
countries’ abilities to prosecute alien smugglers and human traffickers along the Southwest
border. Through OASISS, the Mexican government is able to prosecute alien smugglers
apprehended in the United States. From the time of its inception in 2005 through the end of
FY2009, OASISS generated 1,579 cases.54 This program is supported by the Border Patrol
International Liaison Unit, which is responsible for establishing and maintaining working
relationships with foreign counterparts in order to enhance border security.
Trafficking in Persons (TIP)
Mexico is a significant source, transit, and destination country for people trafficked for forced
labor or sexual exploitation. According to the Mexican government, some 20,000 children are
trafficked within the country each year for sexual exploitation. Mexico is also a transit country for
Central American TIP victims, among them, an increasing number of child victims. In the State
Department’s Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report, June 2010, Mexico was listed as a Tier 2
country that has taken steps to implement a federal anti-trafficking law passed in late 2007.55

52 Department of Homeland Security, “Fact Sheet: Southwest Border: Next Steps,” press release, June 23, 2010,
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/gc_1240606351110.shtm.
53 Mexican President Felipe Calderon, “Joint Meeting to Hear an Address by His Excellence Felipe Calderon Hinojosa,
President of Mexico,” Congressional Record, May 20, 2010, p. H3663. For more information on the assault weapons
ban, see archived CRS Report RL32585, Semiautomatic Assault Weapons Ban, by William J. Krouse.
54 Data provided to CRS by DHS Congressional Affairs.
55 Since 2001, the U.S. State Department has evaluated foreign governments’ efforts to combat trafficking in persons in
its annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) reports, which are issued each June. Countries are grouped into four categories
according to the U.S. assessment of efforts they are making to combat trafficking. Tier 1 is made up of countries
deemed by the State Department to have a serious trafficking problem but fully complying with the minimum standards
for the elimination of trafficking. Those standards are defined in the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection
Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-386) as amended. Tier 2 is composed of governments not fully complying with those standards
but which are seen as making significant efforts to comply. Tier 2 Watch List, first added as a category in the 2004
report, is made up of countries that are on the border between Tier 2 and Tier 3. Tier 3 includes those countries whose
(continued...)
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Mexico recently opened its first shelter specifically designated for trafficking victims, and
recorded its first TIP convictions in early December 2009 in a case involving five individuals
from Tlaxcala, Mexico accused of trafficking for sexual exploitation.
Human Rights Issues
According to the State Department’s human rights report covering 2009, the Mexican government
generally respected human rights at the national level, but serious problems remained. 56 These
included unlawful killing by security forces; kidnappings; physical abuse; poor and overcrowded
prison conditions; arbitrary arrests and detention; corruption, inefficiency and lack of
transparency that engendered impunity in the judicial system; confessions coerced through
torture; and threats against journalists leading to self-censorship. In 2009, twelve Mexican
journalists died and one disappeared. Societal problems highlighted in the report included
domestic violence; trafficking in persons; social and economic discrimination against some
members of the indigenous population; and child labor. The report also mentions a report by
Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) which found that between September
2008 and February 2009, close to 10,000 unauthorized migrants were kidnapped while attempting
to transit Mexico and cross the U.S.-Mexico border.57
The State Department report maintained that neither the government nor its forces committed any
politically motivated killings, but that there were reports that security forces killed several people
during the year, including youth. The report asserted that the number of allegations of human
rights violations committed by military and police forces engaged in counterdrug efforts brought
before Mexico’s CNDH increased as compared to 2008. Corruption was reported to be a major
problem, particularly at the state and local level, with police involved in kidnapping, extortion, or
providing protection for organized crime and drug traffickers. Impunity was pervasive, according
to the report, and was a reason that many victims were reluctant to file complaints.
The report provided an update on several pending human rights cases, including the 2006 San
Salvador Atenco confrontation between street vendors and state and local police in the state of
Mexico and the 2006 killing of Bradley Will, an American filmmaker who was shot while
documenting civil unrest in Oaxaca. As of December 2009, none of the 2,500 police officers who
had participated in the Atenco operation, which resulted in two deaths and the alleged rape of 47
women by police, had been convicted of any crime. In the Brad Will case, Juan Manuel Martínez
Moreno, an antigovernment protestor who was arrested in October 2008 for the crime, remained
in custody at year’s end as the Mexican Attorney General’s Office planned to appeal a federal
judge’s ruling that the government lacked sufficient evidence to convict him. Mr. Martínez
Moreno was subsequently released in February 2010.

(...continued)
governments the State Department deems as not fully complying with TVPA’s anti-TIP standards and not making
significant efforts to do so. Tier 3 countries have been made subject to U.S. sanctions since 2003.
56 U.S. Department of State, 2009 Human Rights Report: Mexico, March 2010.
57 Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), Informe Especial Sobre los Casos de Secuestro en Contra
de los Migrantes, June 2009, available at http://www.cndh.org.mx/INFORMES/Especiales/infEspSecMigra.pdf.
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Compliance with Human Rights Conditions in the Mérida Initiative
Human rights organizations generally lauded the inclusion of human rights conditions in Mérida
Initiative appropriations legislation. More recently, however, there have been concerns that
Mexico has not been fulfilling the conditions set forth in the legislation. In particular, Mexican
and international human rights groups have criticized the Mexican government for failing to hold
military and police officials accountable for past abuses.58 On July 13, 2009, Human Rights
Watch issued a statement asserting that “Mexican military courts ... have not convicted a single
member of the military accused of committing a serious human rights violation.”59 The head of
the Mexican military’s human rights office held a press conference on July 23, 2009, to dispute
those assertions, but reportedly did not provide details on particular cases that had been
successfully prosecuted in the military justice system.60 In late July, a coalition of U.S. and
Mexican human rights groups sent a letter to the State Department urging it not to issue a
favorable report on the Mexican government’s human rights record.61
On August 13, 2009, the State Department submitted a human rights progress report for Mexico
to Congress, thereby meeting the statutory requirements for FY2008 supplemental and FY2009
regular funds that had been on hold to be released. While acknowledging that serious problems
remain, the report outlined steps that the Mexican government has made to improve police
transparency and accountability, consult with Mexican human rights organizations and civil
society on the Mérida Initiative, investigate and prosecute allegations of human rights abuses by
security forces, and prohibit the use of torture. 62 Human rights groups have criticized the State
Department report, and the release of Mérida funds that were on hold. They have urged the State
Department not to issue another favorable human rights progress report to Congress until
measurable improvements have been made.63
Accountability for Abuses Committed During the “Dirty War” Period
During his administration, President Fox pledged to investigate and prosecute those responsible
for past human rights violations, including the “Dirty War” period from the 1960s to 1980s. The
CNDH presented a report to President Fox in November 2001 that documented human rights
abuses and disappearances of persons in the 1970s and early 1980s, and President Fox named
legal scholar Ignacio Carrillo in January 2002 as a Special Prosecutor to investigate these and
other cases. In November 2006, Ignacio Carrillo presented his final report on the repressive era

58 See, for example, Human Rights Watch, Uniform Impunity, Mexico’s Misuse of Military Justice to Prosecute Abuses
in Counternarcotics and Public Security Operations, April 2009, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/04/29/
mexico-hold-military-account-rights-abuses.
59 Human Rights Watch, “Mexico: U.S. Should Withhold Military Aid: Rights Conditions in Merida Initiative Remain
Unmet,” July 13, 1009, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/07/13/mexico-us-should-withhold-military-aid.
60 Booth and Fainaru, August 5, 2009. In November 2009, Mexico’s Secretary of Governance Fernando Gomez Mont
said that one soldier had been convicted as of that point in the Calderón Administration. U.S. Department of State,
2009 Human Rights Report: Mexico, March 2010.
61 Letter from Amnesty International and Other Human Rights Groups to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “Human
Rights Concerns to Inform the U.S. Department of State’s Merida Initiative Reporting on Mexico, July 24, 2009.
62 U.S. Department of State, “Mexico- Merida Initiative Report,” August 2009.
63 Fundar, et al., “Obama Administration’s Alleged Release of Mérida Funds: A Violation of U.S. Law That Will
Encourage Serious Human Rights Violations in Mexico,” August 2009; Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)
et al., “Joint Letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: Human Rights Concerns to Inform the U.S. Department of
State’s Merida Initiative Reporting on Mexico,” May 27, 2010.
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from the late 1960s to 1982. The report found that the repression was a matter of state policy and
led to the summary execution of over 700 Mexicans, torture, and the razing of villages.
The report was praised by some as an acknowledgment of state responsibility. Others remain
critical since no one has been convicted of charges relating to these alleged crimes. Only one of
the three presidents from this period, Luis Echeverria (1970-1976), is still alive. President
Echeverria faced genocide charges for his role in the repression of a 1968 student protest that left
dozens dead when he was interior minister. Echeverria tried to evade prosecution by claiming the
30-year statute of limitations had expired. A judge rejected this argument and reinstated the arrest
order in November 2006 after he determined that the statute of limitations did not go into effect
until Echeverria left public office in December 1976. In July 2007, the Criminal Tribunal
absolved Echeverria of any responsibility for the 1968 killings. This ruling was upheld by a
Mexican federal court in March 2009, and was criticized by human rights organizations. Amnesty
International maintains that the Mexican government is effectively condoning the abuses of the
past by not effectively prosecuting past human rights cases.64
Migration
Trends in Mexican Immigration to the United States65
Mexico is the leading country of origin of the legal permanent residents (LPR) population and
unauthorized migrant population in the United States. According to the Department of Homeland
Security Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS), Mexico was the leading country of origin of legal
permanent residents (LPRs) in 2009. While the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) sets a
ceiling on immigration from any one country at 7%, many Mexicans are exempt from the
statutory numerical limits as immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. For example, 58% of Mexicans
who became LPRs in FY2009 did so as immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. Only 5% of
Mexicans who became LPRs in FY2009 were employment-based immigrants.66 An estimated 3.4
million or 26.9% of LPRs living in the United States in 2008 had emigrated from Mexico.67
Mexicans made up 62% of the unauthorized aliens living in the United States in 2009 according
to estimates based upon the American Community Survey (ACS) of the U.S. Census Bureau. OIS
demographers estimated from the ACS that there were 6.7 million Mexican nationals among the
estimated 10.8 million unauthorized resident population in 2009.68
According to a 2009 report by the Pew Hispanic Center, migration from Mexico to the United
States has declined sharply since mid-decade, but there is no evidence of an increase in the
number of Mexican-born migrants returning home during this period. This analysis drew on data

64 Amnesty International, “Mexico: Hopes of Justice Vanish,”, March 27, 2009.
65 Ruth Ellen Wasem, Specialist in Immigration Policy, contributed to this section.
66 Office of Immigration Statistics, 2009 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC, 2010, http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm.
67 Nancy Rytina, Estimates of the Legal Permanent Resident Population in 2008, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, October 2009, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/
ois_lpr_pe_2008.pdf.
68 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant
Population Residing in the United States: January 2009, by Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan C. Baker, 2010.
For alternative analyses, see Jeffrey S. Passel and D'Vera Cohn, A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United
States, Pew Hispanic Center, April 14, 2009.
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from Mexico’s National Survey of Employment and Occupation as well as the U.S. Current
Population Survey. The authors concluded: “It remains to be seen whether either trend points to a
fundamental change in U.S.-Mexico immigration patterns or is a short-term response to
heightened border enforcement, the weakened U.S. economy, or other forces.”69
Mexico’s Immigration Policies
The Mexican government has actively promoted migrants’ rights internationally and the rights of
Mexican migrants in the United States, but has been criticized by human rights organizations for
failing to adequately protect migrants from other countries who transit its territory. In February
2006, the Mexican Congress approved a concurrent resolution on migration and border security
calling for the development of a guest worker program in the United States under the principle of
shared responsibility. The resolution commits Mexico to enforcing legal emigration “if a guest
country offers a sufficient number of appropriate visas.”70 In the resolution, Mexico also accepts
the need to revisit its migration policies to consider enforcement along its northern and southern
borders, enforcement of Mexican immigration laws that respect the human rights of migrants, and
the need to combat human trafficking. The Mexican government further acknowledges that
Mexican workers will continue to emigrate until there are more opportunities in Mexico. The
February 2006 resolution remains the most detailed explanation to date of the major principles
behind Mexico’s policy on immigration. President Calderón expressed similar sentiments on
immigration during his address to a joint session of Congress in May 2010.
Mexican officials regularly voice concern about alleged abuses suffered by Mexican workers in
the United States, and for the loss of life and hardships suffered by Mexican migrants as they
utilize increasingly dangerous routes to circumvent tighter border controls. The Mexican
government has been particularly concerned since two Mexican youth were killed by U.S. border
patrol agents within a ten-day span, including one youth shot on June 7, 2010 at the El Paso-
Ciudad Juárez border crossing.71 Despite these concerns, Mexico benefits from unauthorized
migration to the United States in at least two ways: (1) it is a “safety valve” that dissipates the
political discontent that could arise from higher unemployment in Mexico, and (2) it is a source
of remittances sent by workers in the United States to families in Mexico.
In addition to serving as a country of origin for immigrants to the United States, Mexico is also a
transit and destination country for migrants, the vast majority of whom originate in Central
America. Reliable estimates on the number of migrants transiting Mexico on an annual basis are
not available, but Mexico’s National Migration Service has estimated that some 171,000 migrants
transited the country in 2008 (the latest year available), down from roughly 450,000 in 2005. 72 In

69 Jeffrey S. Passel and D'Vera Cohn, Mexican Immigrants: How Many Come? How Many Leave?, Pew Hispanic
Center, July 22, 2009. Similar findings were included in Passel and Cohn, U.S. Unauthorized Immigration Flows are
Down Sharply Since Mid-Decade, Pew Hispanic Center, September 1, 2010.
70 The resolution did not specify how many visas would be appropriate, but says that they should include “the biggest
possible number of workers and their families.” An English translation of the resolution is available at
http://hirc.house.gov/archives/109/Mexico%20Migration%20Phenomenon.pdf.
71 Investigations into both incidents are still ongoing. However, U.S. border patrol officials maintain that the agent in El
Paso was defending himself against rock throwers who had illegally crossed into the U.S. side of the border. Tracy
Wilkinson and Richard A. Serrano, “Mexico Protests Slaying at Border; The Second Such Incident in Two Weeks
Occurred When an Agent Opened Fire in Self-Defense, U.S. Says,” Los Angeles Times, June 10, 2010.
72 Secretaría de Gobernación (SEGOB), “Informe del Estado Mexicano Sobre Secuestro, Extorsión, y Otros Delitos
Cometidos Contra Personas Migrantes en Tránsito por Territorio Mexicano,” July 16, 2010.
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2009, the Mexican government detained approximately 65,134 migrants, of whom some 60,143
were voluntarily repatriated or deported.73
Mexico’s immigration policy is generally reflected in the General Population Act and its
Regulations.74 Under a 2008 legislative reform, violations of the immigration statute – such as
entering the country illegally or overstaying one’s visa – are no longer criminal offenses
punishable by imprisonment, but administrative offenses punishable by fines and voluntary
repatriation or deportation. The Calderón government secured congressional approval of a law
criminalizing human trafficking in 2007 and a measure stiffening penalties for alien smuggling in
2010. An anti-kidnapping law is under consideration in the Mexican Congress. The Mexican
government has also improved conditions in some migration detention centers and reduced the
time migrants spend in those centers prior to being repatriated or deported.75 In 2009,
government-sponsored “Beta Groups” rescued 3,753 migrants in distress, some of whom were
U.S.-bound Mexicans, and others of whom were migrants from other countries.76
Despite these measures, Mexican and international NGOs have continued to document abuses
against migrants in Mexico which often have included intimidation, physical attacks, sexual
violence, and kidnapping. As previously stated, Mexico’s CNDH found that between September
2008 and February 2009, close to 10,000 unauthorized migrants were kidnapped while attempting
to transit Mexico and cross the U.S.-Mexico border.77 An increasing percentage of abuses, the
most violent case of which resulted in the mass murder of 72 U.S.-bound migrants in Tamaulipas,
have been perpetrated by criminal gangs and drug traffickers, sometimes with assistance from
public officials. 78 Amnesty International and other human rights organizations have urged the
Mexican government to develop an action plan to prevent, punish, and remedy abuses of migrants
in Mexico. On August 31, 2010, the Mexican government presented a new strategy to prevent and
combat the kidnapping of migrants. The strategy aims to: 1) target the criminal groups that carry
out such crimes; 2) harness the efforts of all branches of government to treat victims and punish
perpetrators; 3) work with countries of origin and destination to find solutions; and, 4) support the
efforts of civil society and human rights commissions to protect migrants.
Recent Efforts to Enact Comprehensive Immigration Reform in the
United States79
In the 110th Congress, the U.S. Senate voted against cloture on the Comprehensive Immigration
Reform Act of 2007 (S. 1348) in June 2007, and the measure was not considered after that vote.
The bill would have improved border security, established a temporary worker program, and
normalized the status of most illegal immigrants in the United States. Mexico has long lobbied for

73 Ibid.
74 Ley General de Población, as amended, D.O., Jan. 7, 1974, latest amendments published in D.O., July, 2, 2010,
available at http://www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/Documentos/Federal/wo8268.doc.
75 Amnesty International, Invisible Victims: Migrants on the Move in Mexico, April 2010, available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR41/014/2010/en/8459f0ac-03ce-4302-8bd2-3305bdae9cde/
amr410142010eng.pdf.
76 SEGOB, op. cit.
77 CNDH, June 2009, op. cit.
78 Amnesty International, op. cit.
79 CRS Report R40501, Immigration Reform Issues in the 111th Congress, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
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such reforms. Immigration reform legislation also was introduced in the House of Representatives
in March 2007. The House measure, the Security Through Regularized Immigration and Vibrant
Economy Act of 2007 (H.R. 1645), would have set border and document security benchmarks to
be met before normalizing the status of illegal immigrant or the creation of a guest worker
program. A variety of other migration-related legislative initiatives were introduced in the 110th
Congress, but none were enacted.80
It is still unclear whether comprehensive immigration legislation will be considered in the 111th
Congress. During Secretary of State Clinton’s March 2009 visit to Mexico, she maintained that
“President Obama remains committed to comprehensive immigration reform” and that
immigration reform “is and will be a high priority for him and his presidency.” On June 25, 2009,
President Obama announced the formation of a high-level working group headed by DHS
Secretary Napolitano to work with Members from the relevant House and Senate committees that
would be drafting immigration legislation.81 At the North American Leaders Summit in August
2009, President Obama acknowledged that since several of his other major legislative initiatives
were still pending, immigration reform was unlikely to occur until early 2010.82 A bill to enact
comprehensive immigration reform was introduced on December 15, 2009, but few observers
predicted that it would be taken up prior to the 2010 mid-term elections. President Obama
reiterated his support for a comprehensive immigration reform effort during a joint press
appearance with President Calderón on May 19, 2010, but also said that he lacked the votes in
Congress to move a reform bill forward.83
Reactions to S.B. 107084
On April 23, 2010, Arizona enacted S.B. 1070, which is designed to discourage and deter the
entry to or presence of aliens in Arizona who lack lawful status under federal immigration law.
Potentially sweeping in effect, the measure requires state and local law enforcement officials to
facilitate the detection of unauthorized immigrants in their daily enforcement activities. The
measure also establishes criminal penalties under state law, in addition to those already imposed
under federal law, for alien smuggling offenses and failure to carry or complete alien registration
documents. Further, it makes it a crime under Arizona law for an unauthorized alien to apply for
or perform work in the state, either as an employee or an independent contractor.
The enactment of S.B. 1070 has sparked significant legal and policy debate. Supporters argue that
federal enforcement of immigration law has not adequately deterred the migration of
unauthorized aliens into Arizona, and that state action is both necessary and appropriate to
combat the negative effects of unauthorized immigration.85 Opponents argue, among other things,

80 For a brief history of U.S.-Mexican migration policies, see Marc R. Rosenblum, “U.S.-Mexican Migration
Cooperation: Obstacles and Opportunities,” in Migration, Trade and Development: Conference Proceedings, Hollifield
et al, eds., Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 2007.
81 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President After Meeting with Members of
Congress to Discuss Immigration,” June 25, 2009.
82 Karoun Demirjian, “Obama Says Immigration Overhaul Will Slide Until 2010,” CQ Today, August 11, 2009.
83 Michael Muskal, “Obama Calls for Help with Immigration Reform,” Los Angeles Times, May 20, 2010.
84 Chad C. Haddal, Specialist in Immigration Policy, contributed to this section. For background, see CRS Report
R41221, State Efforts to Deter Unauthorized Aliens: Legal Analysis of Arizona’s S.B. 1070, by Michael John Garcia,
Kate M. Manuel, and Larry M. Eig.
85 Kris W. Kobach, “Why Arizona Drew a Line,” The New York Times, April 28, 2010, online edition.
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that S.B. 1070 will be expensive and disruptive, will be susceptible to uneven application, and
can undermine community policing by discouraging cooperation with state and local law
enforcement. President Obama publically criticized S.B. 1070, stating that the law threatened “to
undermine basic notions of fairness that we cherish as Americans, as well as the trust between
police and our communities that is so crucial to keeping us safe.”86 In part to respond to these
concerns, the Arizona State Legislature modified S.B. 1070 on April 30, 2010, through the
approval of H.B. 2162.
In the immediate aftermath of S.B. 1070’s enactment, Mexican President Felipe Calderón
expressed his disapproval of the measure and stated that it “opens the door to intolerance and
hatred.”87 On April 27, 2010, the Government of Mexico issued travel warnings to Mexicans
planning to travel to Arizona and stated that Arizona’s recent immigration changes show “an
adverse political atmosphere for migrant communities and for all Mexican visitors.”88 On May
20, 2010, President Calderón again criticized S.B.1070 during his address to a joint session of
Congress by stating that it creates a dangerous precedent of “using racial profiling as a basis for
law enforcement.”
While President Obama has remained critical of S.B. 1070, he has also acknowledged the
increasing frustration that some states and localities are feeling as a result of the federal
government’s failure to tackle immigration reform. President Obama reiterated his support for
comprehensive immigration reform effort during a joint press appearance with President
Calderón on May 19, but also said that at this time he lacks the votes in Congress to move a
reform bill forward.89 Some analysts have interpreted President Obama’s decision to send 1,200
National Guard troops to the border and to request supplemental funds for border security as
designed to gain support for an immigration reform measure from Members of Congress whose
top priority is border security.90
On July 29, 2010, a federal judge blocked large parts of S.B. 1070, Arizona’s controversial new
state law against illegal immigration, from taking effect pending the results of a U.S. Department
of Justice lawsuit challenging its constitutionality.
Environmental Cooperation91
The U.S.-Mexico border region has been the focal point of bilateral conservation and
environmental efforts, and some argue that it is an appropriate place to intensify U.S.-Mexican
environmental cooperation.92 The 2,000 mile border region includes large deserts, numerous
mountain ranges, rivers, wetlands, large estuaries, and shared aquifers. According to the
Environmental Protection Agency, border residents “suffer disproportionately from many

86 Randal C. Archibold, “Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration,” The New York Times, April 23, 2010, online
edition.
87 Sara Miller Llana, “Mexico Issues Sharp Rebuttal to Arizona Immigration Law,” The Christian Science Monitor,
April 26, 2010.
88 Martha Mendoza, “Mexico Issues Travel Alert over New Arizona Law,” The Washington Post, April 27, 2010.
89 Michael Muskal, “Obama Calls for Help with Immigration Reform,” Los Angeles Times, May 20, 2010.
90 Jennifer Benderyand John Stanton, “Obama Sends Mixed Messages on Immigration,” Roll Call, June 1, 2010.
91 This section was prepared by Jessica Krowsosi, a CRS Research Associate.
92 Duncan Wood, “Environment, Development and Growth: US-Mexico Cooperation in Renewable Energies,”
Working Paper, May 2010.
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environmental health problems, including water-borne diseases and respiratory problems.”93 The
United States and Mexico have been working to address many of these issues through bilateral
programs like Border 2012, which relies on local level input, decision-making, and project
implementation to address environmental challenges, such as water scarcity.
The United States and Mexico have also been collaborating on geothermal energy projects since
the 1970s, but the possibility of expanding joint efforts to produce renewable energy sources has
just recently returned to the bilateral agenda. On April 16, 2009, President Obama and Mexican
President Calderón announced the Bilateral Framework on Clean Energy and Climate Change to
jointly develop clean energy sources and encourage investment in climate-friendly technologies.
Among others, its goals include enhancing renewable energy, further exploring the potential of
carbon markets, and strengthening the reliability of cross-border electricity grids. On January 26,
2010, the U.S. Department of State hosted the framework’s first bilateral meeting, which was
attended by officials from an array of agency officials from both countries. Some maintain that
efforts to advance progress under the bilateral framework may hasten as Mexico prepares to host
the Sixteenth U.N. Climate Change Conference in Cancún from November to December 2010,
while others are less certain.
Many experts have emphasized the mutual benefits that could result for both countries should
Mexico and the United States further integrate their renewable energy markets. With the U.S.
demand for renewable energy increasing, Mexico could position itself to act as a reliable and
somewhat low-cost supplier of wind energy coming from the states of Oaxaca and Baja
California. Some also argue that renewable energy projects could promote development in
Mexico. They maintain that several USAID-funded energy programs introduced in the 1990s
provided new jobs and foreign investment in Mexico.94 For example, the Mexico Renewable
Energy Program (MREP), which was created by USAID in 1994, sought to ensure long-term
partnerships with several U.S. and Mexican organizations. When the program was assessed in
1998, it was noted that MREP helped to bring electricity to remote Mexican communities that
were not connected to the cross-border electricity grid and significantly improved not only quality
of life in the area but also the people’s ability to contribute to the local economy.95
Trade Issues96
Trade between Mexico and the United States has tripled since the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States, Mexico, and Canada entered into force in
1994.97 The United States is Mexico’s most important customer by far, receiving about 80% of
Mexico’s exports, including petroleum, automobiles, auto parts, and winter vegetables, and
providing about 50% of Mexico’s imports. The United States is the source of over 60% of foreign

93 http://www.epa.gov/usmexicoborder/framework/index.html.
94 Woodrow Wilson Center event, “U.S.-Mexico Cooperation in Renewable Energy: Building a Green Agenda,” May
24, 2010.
95 Wood, May 2010.
96 For more information, see CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and
Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
97 The NAFTA agreement was negotiated in 1991 and 1992, and side agreements on labor and environmental matters
were completed in 1993. The agreements were approved by the respective legislatures in late 1993 and went into force
on January 1, 1994. Under the agreements, trade and investment restrictions were eliminated over a 15-year period,
with most restrictions eliminated in the early years of the agreement.
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investment in Mexico, and the primary source of important tourism earnings. Mexico is also the
leading country in Latin America in terms of U.S. investment, with the total stock of U.S.
investment reaching more than $120 billion in 2008 before declining in 2009.98
While NAFTA has increased Mexican trade with the United States and contributed to rising
foreign investment in the country, it has also increased Mexico’s dependence on the U.S.
economy. In 2009, U.S. imports from Mexico decreased by 18.5% to $176.3 billion, while U.S.
exports to Mexico decreased by 19.6% to $105.7 billion. U.S. foreign direct investment also fell
significantly in 2009. According to Mexico’s Central Bank, remittances fell from $25.1 billion in
FY2008 to $21.1 billion in 2009. As a result of these trends, coupled by declining tourism
revenues, the Mexican economy contracted by almost 7% in 2009, the worst performance of any
Latin American country. Some have attributed the severity of the crisis in Mexico to a lack of
diversification in the country’s export markets.
Functioning of NAFTA Institutions
Several NAFTA institutions mandated by the agreements have been functioning since 1994. The
tripartite Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC) was established in Montreal,
Canada; and the Commission for Labor Cooperation (CLC) was established in Dallas, Texas. In
addition, the bilateral Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC), located in Ciudad
Juárez, Mexico; and the North American Development Bank (NADBank), headquartered in San
Antonio, Texas, were created to promote and finance environment projects along the U.S.-Mexico
border. Following up on a March 2002 agreement by Presidents Bush and Fox in Monterrey,
Mexico, to broaden the mandate of the NADBank, Congress agreed in March 2004 to permit the
NADBank to make grants and nonmarket rate loans for environmental infrastructure along the
border. The NAFTA institutions have operated to encourage cooperation on trade, environmental
and labor issues, and to consider nongovernmental petitions under the labor and environmental
side agreements.
Trade Disputes
Outstanding trade disputes between the countries include access for Mexican trucks to operate in
the United States and access for Mexican tuna to the U.S. market. A longstanding dispute
involving sugar and high fructose corn syrup was resolved in 2006.99
Trucking100
Since 1995, the implementation of NAFTA trucking provisions has been in dispute. In March
2009, Congress included a provision in P.L. 111-8, the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, to
terminate a pilot program that had allowed Mexican-registered trucks to operate beyond the 25-
mile border commercial zone inside the United States. This move prompted retaliation from
Mexico, which argued that the U.S. action was protectionist. Mexico imposed tariffs on over 90

98 U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, Mexico, “U.S.-Mexico at a Glance: Foreign Direct Investment,” June 2009.
99 For more information on recent trade disputes, see CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends,
Issues, and Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
100 For further information, see CRS Report RL31738, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
Implementation: The Future of Commercial Trucking Across the Mexican Border, by John Frittelli.
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U.S. agricultural and industrial products. The goods accounted for a value of $2.4 billion in U.S.
exports to Mexico in 2007, and most now face Mexican import duties of between 10-20% of their
value, although in the case of fresh grapes, a 45% duty was imposed.101
Obama Administration officials have repeatedly expressed confidence that a resolution to the
current trucking dispute can be found that will satisfy congressional concerns about the safety of
Mexican trucks, but still fulfill U.S. market access obligations under NAFTA. Transportation
Secretary Ray LaHood submitted a set of principles on how to resolve the issue to the White
House in May 2009. President Obama reiterated his commitment to resolving the issue to
President Calderón at their August 9, 2009 meeting in Mexico, but did not present a proposal. The
FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117), signed into law on December 16, 2009,
did not include language that was in P.L. 111-8 prohibiting the Department of Transportation from
funding a pilot project for Mexican-registered trucks to operate beyond the border commercial
zone. In early May 2010, U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk reportedly said that the Obama
Administration planned to present a proposal for resolving the trucking dispute during President
Calderón’s May 19-20, 2010 state visit. U.S. officials did not unveil a plan during Calderón’s visit
and have yet to do so. As a result, Mexico has recently adjusted its list of retaliatory tariffs to
affect more goods – 99 products as opposed to 89 products listed before – but a similar overall
value of U.S. exports, roughly $2.5 billion.102
Tuna
On tuna issues, the Clinton Administration lifted the embargo on Mexican tuna in April 2000
under relaxed standards for a dolphin-safe label in accordance with internationally agreed
procedures and U.S. legislation passed in 1997 that encouraged the unharmed release of dolphins
from nets. However, a federal judge in San Francisco ruled that the standards of the law had not
been met, and the Federal Appeals Court in San Francisco sustained the ruling in July 2001.
Under the Bush Administration, the Commerce Department ruled on December 31, 2002, that the
dolphin-safe label may be applied if qualified observers certify that no dolphins were killed or
seriously injured in the netting process, but Earth Island Institute and other environmental groups
filed suit to block the modification. On April 10, 2003, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California enjoined the Commerce Department from modifying the standards for the
dolphin-safe label. On August 9, 2004, the federal district court ruled against the Bush
Administration’s modification of the dolphin-safe standards, and reinstated the original standards
in the 1990 Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act. That decision was appealed to the
U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled against the Administration in April 2007,
finding that the Department of Commerce did not base its determination on scientific studies of
the effects of Mexican tuna fishing on dolphins.
In late October 2008, Mexico initiated World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute proceedings
against the United States, maintaining that U.S. requirements for Mexican tuna exporters prevents
them from using the U.S. “dolphin-safe” label for its products. In April 2009, the WTO agreed to

101 Christopher Conkey, Jose de Cordoba, and Jim Carlton, “Mexico Issues Tariff List in U.S. Trucking Dispute,” Wall
Street Journal, March 19, 2009.
102 Stewart M. Powell, “Trucking Dispute Rumbles Toward a Dead End: a Collision of Interests Blocks Progress
Toward a Solution,” Houston Chronicle, August 21, 2010; “New Mexican Retaliatory Tariffs In Trucks Dispute
Designed To Spur U.S.,” Inside U.S. Trade, August 20, 2010.
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set up a dispute panel to rule on Mexico’s complaint. The WTO panel charged with resolving the
dispute has put off making a decision in the case until February 2011.103
North American Cooperation on Security and Economic Issues
In addition to the increased U.S.-Mexican bilateral cooperation that has occurred during the past
two decades, trilateral cooperation between the United States, Mexico, and Canada has also
increased, particularly since NAFTA took effect. During the second George W. Bush
Administration, annual meetings between the North American leaders and their ministers took
place within the framework of the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) of North America,
established in March of 2005. 104 Through the SPP, which consisted of expanded cooperation and
harmonization of policies, the three governments sought to advance the common security and
prosperity of their countries. To make this partnership operational, the leaders established
ministerial-led working groups to develop measurable and achievable goals in priority areas:
competitiveness, smart and secure borders, energy security and environmental protection, food
and product safety, and emergency response. Beginning in June 2005, the SPP working groups
provided annual reports to the three North American leaders on their work and key
accomplishments, with the last SPP report submitted prior to the April 2008 North American
Leaders’ Summit.
Although President Obama and his counterparts in Mexico and Canada no longer refer to
trilateral cooperation as occurring under the SPP initiative, North American cooperation continues
to occur on a wide range of economic and security issues. As previously discussed, the most
recent North American Leaders’ Summit took place in Guadalajara, Mexico on August 9-10,
2009. In addition to important discussions that occurred with respect to combating drug
trafficking and preparing for the fall flu season, the leaders produced, among other things, a list of
energy deliverables aimed at reducing carbon emissions in North America.105 The leaders also
committed to meet again in Canada later this year.
Legislation in the 111th Congress
Enacted and Considered Legislation
P.L. 111-5 (H.R. 1), American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Signed into law
February 17, 2009, the measure provides $220 million for construction for the water quantity
program of the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico. The
measure also provides $40 million in Department of Justice state and local law enforcement
assistance for competitive grants to provide assistance and equipment along the southern border
and in high-intensity drug trafficking areas to combat criminal narcotics activity, of which $10
million is to be transferred to ATF for Project Gunrunner.

103 “WTO Panel Delays Ruling In U.S.-Mexico Tuna Labeling Dispute To February,” Inside U.S. Trade, June 25, 2010.
104 For more information, see CRS Report RS22701, Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America: An
Overview and Selected Issues, by M. Angeles Villarreal and Jennifer E. Lake.
105 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “North American Leaders’ Declaration on Climate Change and
Clean Energy,” August 10, 2009.
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P.L. 111-8 (H.R. 1105), Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009. Signed into law March 11, 2009.
In Division H, the measure appropriates $300 million for Mexico as a second installment under
the Mérida Initiative. Human rights conditions similar to those included in the FY2008
Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-252) apply to 15% of the total funds provided, not
including assistance for judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption, and rule of law
activities. In Division I, Section 136, the measure prohibits funds in the act from being used for a
pilot program granting certain Mexican trucks access to U.S. highways beyond the commercial
zone. In the joint explanatory statement for Division B, not less than $5 million is provided for
Project Gunrunner and other firearms trafficking efforts targeting Mexico and the border region.
P.L. 111-32 (H.R. 2346), Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009. Signed into law June 24,
2009, the measure appropriates $420 million in Mérida Initiative funding for Mexico: $160
million in INCLE assistance and $260 million in FMF assistance. Of the $420 million in FY2009
supplemental assistance to Mexico, 15% of the $160 million in INCLE assistance is subject to the
same human rights conditions set forth in P.L. 111-8, section 7045(e) of Division H. However, the
FMF funds appropriated are not subject to human rights conditions. According to the conference
report (H.Rept. 111-151), the supplemental measure requires a report from the Secretary of State
within 45 days of enactment of the measure detailing actions by the government of Mexico since
June 30, 2008, to investigate and prosecute human rights violations by members of the Mexican
federal police and military forces. The report also calls for a “thorough, independent, and credible
investigation” of the murder of Bradley Will, an American journalist killed while covering a
protest in Oaxaca in 2006.
P.L. 111-84 (H.R. 2647), National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010. Signed into law
October 28, 2009, the measure contains a provision that allows for the Department of Defense to
continue providing support for counter-drug activities in Mexico.
P.L. 111-117 (H.R. 3288), Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2010, Signed into law
December 16, 2009. In Division F, the measure appropriates up to $210.3 million in Mérida
Initiative funding for Mexico: $190 million in INCLE assistance, $15 million in ESF, and $5.25
million in FMF assistance. Human rights conditions apply to 15% of the total funds provided, not
including assistance for judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption, and rule of law
activities. In the Joint Explanatory Statement to P.L. 111-117, the conferees direct the Secretary of
State to submit a report to within 90 days of the enactment of the act addressing how prior Mérida
funds have been used, progress to date, any planned adjustments in the uses of funds, and post-
Merida plans. Apart from the Mérida Initiative, the measure includes $10 million in DA
assistance for Mexico. The measure does not include language prohibiting funds appropriated in
the act from being used for a pilot program granting certain Mexican trucks access to U.S.
highways beyond the commercial zone.
P.L. 111-118 (H.R. 3326), Defense Appropriations Act, FY2010, Signed into law December 19,
2009, the measure appropriates $50 million in funding for counternarcotics communication
equipment for Mexico.
P.L. 111-212 (H.R. 4899), Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010. Signed into law July 29,
2010, the measure includes $175 million in assistance for “judicial reform, institution building,
anti-corruption, and rule of law activities” in Mexico (under the State Department’s INCLE
account) and $5 million in funds for emergency diplomatic security support in Mexico (under the
State DC&P account). The INCLE assistance provided is subject to the same human rights
conditions as in P.L. 111-8. Funds will also not be made available until the State Department
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submits a multiyear, interagency strategy on how to address the causes of drug trafficking-related
violence and crime in Latin America and the Caribbean to the Appropriations Committees.
P.L. 111-230 (H.R. 6080). Signed into law August 12, 2010, the measure provides $600 million
in supplemental funds for law enforcement efforts along the U.S.-Mexico border. That total
includes $394 million for DHS: $244 million to hire new CBP officers and Border Patrol agents,
$84 million to hire new ICE agents, $32 million for two unmanned aerial detection systems, $6
million for bases for Border Patrol agents, $14 million for communications equipment, and $8
million to train new law enforcement personnel. The supplemental funds also include $196
million to support DOJ efforts on the Southwest border. Those funds will enable the creation of
seven new ATF Gunrunner units and five FBI Hybrid Task Forces, as well as support additional
DEA agents, federal attorneys, prosecutors, and immigration judges. The supplemental funds will
also enable the U.S. government to provide increased technical assistance and training for
Mexican law enforcement.
H.R. 2410 (Berman) Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2010 and FY2011. Introduced
May 14, 2009; House Committee on Foreign Affairs held markup and ordered the bill reported
(H.Rept. 111-136). House approved June 22, 2009. Title IX, Subtitle A of the bill, as introduced,
consists of actions to enhance the Mérida Initiative, including the designation of a high-level
coordinator within the Department of State to implement the program; the addition of Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) countries to the Mérida Initiative; the establishment and
implementation of a program to assess the effectiveness of assistance provided under the Mérida
Initiative; within 180 days and not later than December 1 of each year thereafter, a reporting
requirement regarding the programs and activities carried out under the Mérida Initiative. Title
IX, Subtitle B of the bill would require the President to establish an inter-agency task force on the
prevention of illicit small arms trafficking in the Western Hemisphere; increase penalties for illicit
trafficking in small arms and light weapons; and express congressional support for the ratification
by the United States of the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and
Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA).
H.Amdt. 201 (Peters) to H.R. 2410, introduced and agreed to on June 10, 2009, provides that
the Secretary of State shall report to Congress on the flow of people, goods, and services across
the borders shared by the United States, Canada, Mexico, Bermuda, and the Caribbean nations.
H.R. 5975 (Pryce) Emergency Border Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010.
Introduced July 27, 2010. House approved July 28, 2010. Senate approved with an amendment
August 5, 2010. The amended bill was reintroduced as H.R. 6080, which became P.L. 111-230.
H.Res. 1032 (Chu). Introduced January 21, 2010; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs.
House approved March 9, 2010. The resolution expresses support for continued U.S. assistance to
the Mexican government for fighting drug traffickers and curbing the violence they commit
against Mexican and U.S. citizens.
S. 3676 (Leahy), FY2011 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act. Introduced July 29, 2010; Senate Appropriations Committee ordered the
bill reported (H.Rept. 111-237). The bill includes approximately $120 million in assistance for
Mexico: $85 million in INCLE, $25 million in DA, and $10 million in ESF.
S.Res. 535 (Dodd). Introduced May 19, 2010. Senate approved May 19, 2010. The resolution
honors President of Mexico, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, for his service to the people of Mexico,
and welcomes him to the United States.
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Additional Legislative Initiatives
H.R. 495 (Rodriguez)/S. 205 (Bingaman), Southwest Border Violence Reduction Act of 2009.
H.R. 495 introduced January 14, 2009; referred to the Committee on the Judiciary and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs. S. 205 introduced January 12, 2009; referred to the Committee on
the Judiciary. Both bills would direct the Attorney General to expand the resources provided for
the Project Gunrunner initiative of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives to
identify, investigate, and prosecute individuals involved in the trafficking of firearms across the
international border between the United States and Mexico.
H.R. 937 (Filner), Visitors Interested in Strengthening America (VISA) Act of 2009.
Introduced February 10, 2009; referred to Committee on the Judiciary. The bill would waive
certain entry documentary requirements for a non-immigrant child (unmarried and under the age
of 16) who is a citizen or national of Mexico and accompanying parent or adult chaperone in
instances of medical visits, student groups, and/or special community events.
H.R. 1437 (Cuellar), Southern Border Security Task Force Act of 2009. Introduced March 11,
2009; referred to Committees on Homeland Security and the Judiciary. Would establish a task
force to coordinate the efforts of federal, state, and local border law enforcement officials and
task forces to protect U.S. border cites and communities from violence associated with drug
trafficking, gunrunning, illegal alien smuggling, violence, and kidnapping along and across the
international border between the United States and Mexico.
H.R. 1448 (Rodriguez), Border Reinforcement and Violence Reduction Act of 2009.
Introduced March 11, 2009; referred to Committees on the Judiciary, Homeland Security, and
Foreign Affairs. The bill would authorize the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney
General to increase resources to identify and eliminate illicit sources of firearms smuggled into
Mexico for use by violent drug trafficking organizations and for other unlawful activities by
providing for border security grants to local law enforcement agencies and reinforcing Federal
resources on the border. It would authorize: $150 million for FY2010 and each succeeding fiscal
year to the Secretary of Homeland Security for a border relief grant program; $9.5 million for
each of FY2010 and FY2011 for Project Gunrunner (an ATF program) and $15 million for each
of FY2010 and FY2011 for Operation Armas Cruzadas (an ICE program).
H.R. 1900 (Jackson-Lee), Border Security, Cooperation, and Act Now Drug War Prevention
Act. Introduced April 2, 2009; referred to Committees on the Judiciary and Homeland Security.
The bill would authorize the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General to provide
up to 500 additional DEA, ICE, and ATF agents to a state on a U.S. border.
H.R. 2076 (Grijalva), Border Security and Responsibility Act 2009. Introduced April 23,
2009; referred to Committees on Homeland Security, Armed Services, and Agriculture. The bill
would require the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with other federal, state and
local authorities, to submit a new border protection strategy to Congress that, among other
measures, would not involve the construction of border fencing.
H.R. 2083 (Hunter), Border Sovereignty and Protection Act. Introduced April 23, 2009;
referred to Committees on the Judiciary, Homeland Security, and Education and Labor. The bill
would require the completion of at least 350 miles of reinforced fencing along the southwest
border within one year of the enactment of the measure.
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H.R. 3239 (Kirkpatrick). Introduced July 16, 2009; referred to Committees on Homeland
Security and Foreign Affairs. House Committee on Homeland Security ordered the bill reported
March 9, 2010. The bill would require the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with
the Secretary of State, to submit a report on the effects of the Mérida Initiative on the border
security of the United States.
H.R. 3252 (Hinojosa). Introduced July 17, 2009; referred to Committee on Financial Services.
The bill would authorize the President to agree to an amendment to the agreement between the
U.S. and Mexican governments to expand the purposes and functions of the Border Environment
Cooperation Commission and the North American Development Bank to allow the Commission
to certify, and the Bank to finance, any type of border infrastructure project.
H.R. 3308 (Schuler)/S. 1505 (Pryor), Secure America Through Enforcement and
Verification Act of 2009 or SAVE Act of 2009. Introduced July 23, 2009; referred to
Committees on Homeland Security, the Judiciary, Ways and Means, Education and Labor,
Oversight and Government Reform, Armed Services, Agriculture, and Natural Resources. The
bill sets forth a wide range of border security and enforcement provisions.
H.R. 4321 (Ortiz), Comprehensive Immigration Reform for America’s Security and
Prosperity Act of 2009, CIR ASAP Act of 2009. Introduced December 15, 2009; referred to
Committees on the Judiciary, Homeland Security, Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, Natural
Resources, Ways and Means, Education and Labor, Oversight and Government Reform, and
Administration. The bill contains both border enforcement and legalization provisions and would
attempt to address visa backlogs in the current immigration system.
H.R. 4759 (Taylor). Introduced March 4, 2010; referred to Committee on Ways and Means. The
bill would provide for the withdrawal of the United States from the North American Free Trade
Agreement and would direct the President of the United States to provide the governments of
Canada and Mexico with written notice of withdrawal.
H.R. 4966 (Giffords), Stored Value Device Registration and Reporting Act of 2010.
Introduced April 22, 2010; referred to Committee on Financial Services. The bill would impose
new regulations on stored-value devices, a money-transfer mechanism that has been used by
Mexican drug trafficking organizations to launder money.
H.R. 5173 (Tiahrt), Secure the Border Act of 2010. Introduced April 28, 2010; referred to
Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism on May 5,
2010. The bill would amend the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 to require the Secretary of Homeland Security to construct two layers of reinforced fencing
along the entire international land border between the United States and Mexico, in addition to
providing for the installation of additional physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors
along the entire length of the international border between the United States and Mexico and the
United States and Canada within two years.
H.R. 5256 (Kirkpatrick), Southern Border Security Act of 2010. Introduced May 11, 2010;
referred to Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism
on May 13, 2010. The bill would direct the Secretary of Homeland Security (DHS) to hire, train,
and deploy 2,000 additional Border Patrol agents along the southwest border of the United States
by September 30, 2010, and another 1,500 agents by September 30, 2011.
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H.R. 5357 (Mitchell). Introduced May 20, 2010; referred to Committee on Armed Services. The
bill would provide for the deployment of additional National Guard troops along the U.S.-Mexico
border to support the border control activities of CBP and DHS.
H.R. 5675 (Franks), National Border and Homeland Security Act of 2010. Introduced July 1,
2010; referred to Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global
Counterterrorism July 14, 2010. The bill sets forth a wide range of border security and
immigration enforcement provisions.
H.R. 5836 (Graves), Border Security and Employee Verification Improvement Act of 2010.
Introduced July 22, 2010; referred to Committees on Homeland Security, the Judiciary, and
Education and Labor. To provide for improved border security through hiring additional Border
Patrol agents and strengthening border fencing and to ensure that employers that participate in the
E-Verify Program are not subject to unjustified penalties.
S. 91 (Vitter). Introduced January 6, 2009; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations. The bill
would reduce the amount of financial assistance provided to the government of Mexico in
response to the illegal border crossing from Mexico into the United States.
S. 339 (Bingaman), Border Law Enforcement Relief Act of 2009. Introduced January 28,
2009; referred to Committee on the Judiciary. The bill would provide financial aid to local law
enforcement officials along the nation’s borders. It would authorize $100 million for each of
FY2010 through FY2014 for a border relief grant program run by the Attorney General.
S. 1190 (Bingaman), Border Law Enforcement Anti-Drug Trafficking Act of 2009.
Introduced June 4, 2009; referred to Committee on the Judiciary. The bill, related to S. 339,
would authorize the Attorney General to award competitive grants to local law enforcement
agencies and institutions of higher education for combating drug-related criminal activity.
S. 3077 (Cornyn). Introduced March 4, 2010; referred to Committee on the Judiciary. A bill to
authorize the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State to refuse or revoke visas
to aliens if in the security or foreign policy interests of the United States, to require the Secretary
of Homeland Security to review visa applications before adjudication, and to provide for the
immediate dissemination of visa revocation information.
S. 3273 (Cornyn), Southern Border Security Assistance Act. Introduced April 28, 2010,
referred to Committee on the Judiciary. The bill would authorize the Secretary of Homeland
Security to award border security assistance grants to law enforcement entities located in the
Southern Border Region to address drug trafficking, smuggling, and border violence and direct
the President to appoint additional district judges for Arizona, California, New Mexico, and
Texas.
S. 3332 (McCain), Border Security Enforcement Act of 2010. Introduced May 7, 2010;
referred to Committees on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. The bill would direct
the Secretary of Homeland Security to implement a comprehensive border security plan to
combat illegal immigration, drug and alien smuggling, and violent activity along the southwest
border of the United States, particularly in the Tucson and Yuma sectors of Arizona.
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S. 3721 (Schumer). Introduced August 5, 2010; referred to Committee on Appropriations. The
bill would have provided FY2010 supplemental funding for border security efforts offset by
increasing application fees for certain types of visas.

Author Contact Information

Clare Ribando Seelke

Specialist in Latin American Affairs
cseelke@crs.loc.gov, 7-5229



Acknowledgments
Jessica Krowsoski, a CRS Research Associate, contributed to this report.

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