The Role of Trade Secrets in Innovation Policy
John R. Thomas
Visiting Scholar
August 31, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41391
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
The Role of Trade Secrets in Innovation Policy
Summary
Many businesses have developed proprietary information that provides a competitive advantage
because it is not known to others. As the United States continues its shift to a knowledge- and
service-based economy, the strength and competitiveness of domestic firms increasingly depends
upon their know-how and intangible assets. Trade secrets are the form of intellectual property that
protects this sort of confidential information.
Trade secret law protects secret, valuable business information from misappropriation by others.
Subject matter ranging from marketing data to manufacturing know-how may be protected under
the trade secret laws. Trade secret status is not limited to a fixed number of years, but endures so
long as the information is valuable and maintained as a secret. A trade secret is misappropriated
when it has been obtained through the abuse of a confidential relationship or improper means of
acquisition.
A number of competing innovation policy concerns help shape the particular doctrines that
comprise trade secret law. The availability of legal protection for trade secrets potentially
promotes innovation, encourages firms to invest in employee development, and confirms
standards of commercial ethics and morality. On the other hand, trade secret protection involves
the suppression of information, which may hinder competition and the proper functioning of the
marketplace. An overly robust trade secret law also could restrain employee mobility and promote
investment in costly, but socially inefficient security measures.
Trade secrets are primarily a matter of state law. In 1996, Congress enacted the Economic
Espionage Act (EEA), a statute that criminalizes both “economic espionage” and the “theft of
trade secrets.” The EEA provides for substantial fines and imprisonment penalties, as well as
criminal forfeiture of property and court orders preserving the confidentiality of trade secrets.
Some commentators believe that few prosecutions have occurred under the EEA since its
enactment and have deemed the legislation ineffective.
Patents and trade secrets provide different intellectual property options for many new inventions.
Inventors typically must choose (1) to maintain an invention as a trade secret, (2) to obtain a
patent on the invention, or (3) allow the invention to enter the public domain. As a result, federal
legislation or other developments that are perceived to alter the effectiveness of the patent system
may make the trade secret more or less attractive to industry.
Some commentators have encouraged Congress to supplement the EEA, which is a criminal
statute, with civil federal trade secret legislation. They believe that this step would improve
uniformity within the system. However, others believe that no compelling case has been made to
federalize trade secret law. Other observers assert that the EEA should be amended to involve a
private cause of action for economic espionage and trade secret misappropriation.
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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Trade Secrets and Innovation Policy............................................................................................ 2
An Overview of Trade Secret Law .............................................................................................. 5
Basic Principles .................................................................................................................... 5
Sources of Law ..................................................................................................................... 7
The Economic Espionage Act...................................................................................................... 8
Trade Secrets and Patents ............................................................................................................ 9
Introduction to the Patent System .......................................................................................... 9
Trade Secrets and Patents Compared ................................................................................... 10
Potential Policy Conflicts .................................................................................................... 11
The First Inventor Defense.................................................................................................. 12
Congressional Issues and Options ............................................................................................. 13
Concluding Observations .......................................................................................................... 15
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 15
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 15
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The Role of Trade Secrets in Innovation Policy
Introduction
In recent years the Congress has shown considerable interest in promoting the strength and
international competitiveness of U.S. industry. Several recent legislative proposals have
concerned the intellectual property laws, a widely recognized mechanism for promoting
innovation. In particular, several bills introduced in the 111th Congress address the topic of trade
secrets. For example, both the Electronic Device Recycling R&D Act1 and the Motor Vehicle
Owners Right to Repair Act of 20092 would allow firms to maintain confidential information as
trade secrets. On the other hand, one recently enacted law arguably reduces the value of
information that firms had retained as trade secrets. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act effectively allows manufacturers of follow-on biologics to rely upon the confidential clinical
data generated by the product’s sponsors in order to sell competing products.3 In view of
congressional interest in this form of intellectual property, an overview of trade secret law
appears appropriate.
The term “trade secret” generally refers to secret, commercially valuable information, including
such subject matter as confidential formulae, techniques for manufacturing a product, and
customer lists.4 Trade secret protection is largely a matter of state law.5 Under those laws,
misappropriation of a trade secret may be enjoined by a court and the defendant may also be
liable for compensatory and punitive damages.6 One notable federal statute, the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996,7 makes the theft or misappropriation of a trade secret a federal crime
under certain circumstances.
Trade secrets play a role in U.S. innovation policy. Trade secrets may establish incentives to
innovate because they provide a mechanism for firms to capture the benefits of their inventions.8
Yet trade secrets also have proven controversial because they suppress, rather than disclose,
particular innovations to the public.9 They also may have a significant impact upon the mobility
of highly trained employees between firms.10 Further, because innovators often face a mutually
1 H.R. 1580, § 3(f)(1).
2 H.R. 2057, § 3(d)(1).
3 P.L. 111-148, § 7002.
4 See Uniform Trade Secret Act, § 1.
5 See Michael Traynor and Katy Hutchinson, “Some Open Questions About Intellectual Property Remedies,” 14 Lewis
& Clark Law Review (2010), 453.
6 See Shubha Ghosh, “Open Borders, Intellectual Property & Federal Criminal Trade Secret Law,” 9 John Marshall
Review of Intellectual Property Law (Fall 2009), 24.
7 104th Congress, P.L. 104-294 (Oct. 11, 1996).
8 See Michael Risch, “Trade Secret Law and Information Development Incentives,” in The Law and Theory of Trade
Secrecy: A Handbook of Contemporary Research (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Katherine J. Strandburg, eds., Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2010).
9 See Michael P. Simpson, “The Future of Innovation: Trade Secrets, Property Rights, and Protectionism—An Age-Old
Tale,” 70 Brooklyn Law Review (2005), 1121.
10 See Charles Tait Graves, “Trade Secrets as Property: Theory and Consequences,” 15 Journal of Intellectual Property
Law (2007), 39.
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exclusive choice between patenting their inventions or maintaining them as trade secrets,11
alterations to one of these regimes may alter the perceived attractiveness of the other.12
This report provides an overview of the law and policy of trade secrets. It discusses the role of
trade secrets in U.S. innovation policy. It then reviews the sources of trade secret law and the
substantive rules that they provide. The report then provides a more detailed review of existing
federal legislation that pertains to trade secrets. In its next section, the report then discusses the
relationship between patent law and trade secret law. The report closes with an identification of
congressional issues and options within this field.
Trade Secrets and Innovation Policy
Many businesses have developed proprietary information that provides a competitive advantage
because it is not known to others.13 This category may include “high-tech” information such as
chemical formulae, manufacturing techniques, product design, and technical data. But it may also
include relatively “low-tech” information such as customer lists, business leads, marketing
strategies, pricing schedules, and sales techniques.14 Potentially of additional competitive value is
“negative know-how”: previously attempted, but flawed techniques or “blind alleys” that did not
achieve their intended results.15
As the United States continues its shift to a knowledge- and service-based economy, the economic
strength and competitiveness of firms increasingly depend upon their know-how and intangible
assets. Leonard I. Nakamura, Assistant Vice President and Economist of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia, explains that in the U.S economy over the past half-century, “mass
production and tangible investment have become less important, while new products . . . and
intangible investment have become more important.”16 One recent estimate placed the value of
trade secrets owned by U.S. publicly traded companies at five trillion dollars.17
Another way of measuring the increasing importance of intangible assets is by considering the
value of the Standard & Poor’s 500. The “S&P 500” consists of the marketplace value of 500
large publicly held companies.18 In 1975, 16.8% of the total value of the S&P 500 reportedly
consisted of intangible assets. In 2005, intangible assets reportedly constituted 79.7% of the total
11 See Daniel C. Munson, “The Patent-Trade Secret Decision: An Industrial Perspective,” 78 Journal of the Patent and
Trademark Office Society (1996), 689.
12 See Douglas Lichtman, “How the Law Responds to Self-Help,” 1 Journal of Law, Economics & Policy (Winter
2005), 215 (observing that trade secret law acts “as both a complement to and competitor for patent law.”).
13 See Kurt M. Saunders, “The Law and Ethics of Trade Secrets: A Case Study,” 42 California Western Law Review
(2006), 209.
14 Milton Babirak, Secrets of the Uniform Trade Secret Act, D.C. BAR CLE PROGRAM (Nov. 9, 2005).
15 Charles Tait Graves, “The Law of Negative Knowledge: A Critique,” 15 Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal
(2007), 387.
16 Leonard I . Nakamura, Intangible Assets and National Income Accounting: Measuring a Scientific Revolution,
Working Paper No. 09-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, at 3.
17 See Elizabeth A. Rowe, “Contributory Negligence, Technology, and Trade Secrets,” 17 George Mason Law Review
(2009), 1.
18 See http://www.standardandpoors.com.
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value of these firms.19 According to attorney R. Mark Halligan, “the vast bulk of intangible assets
are trade secret assets.”20
Yet the rise of computer technology, the ubiquity of cell phones and the Internet, and our
transition to the Information Age have increased the difficulty that firms encounter in maintaining
the confidentiality of their proprietary information. Years ago, the theft of trade secrets may have
involved the taking of laboratory notebooks, memoranda, or other papers from a competitor’s
office despite the presence of security personnel or surveillance cameras. Today, a trade secret
misappropriator can download proprietary information from company computers, or take
photographs of confidential documents using a cell phone camera, within moments. As attorney
Victoria A. Cundiff concisely states: “The digital world is no friend to trade secrets.”21
As U.S. firms become increasingly immersed in global competition, some observers believe that
foreign firms and even foreign governments have devoted significant resources towards industrial
espionage.22 According to the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, “[t]he United
States remains the prime target for foreign economic collection and industrial espionage by virtue
of its global technological leadership and innovation.”23 These efforts have been linked not just to
the economic competitiveness of the United States, but also to its national security.24
The legal concept of trade secrets addresses these circumstances. Principles of trade secret law
guard against the misappropriation of information that is not generally known. In view of the
increasing prominence of information, it is unsurprising that Michael Risch, a member of the law
faculty of the West Virginia University College of Law, asserts that trade secrets are “arguably the
most important and most heavily litigated intellectual property right.”25
Framing the trade secret law requires a balancing of competing interests. A robust trade secret law
that provides strong protection to proprietary commercial information potentially holds many
advantages. It may allow firms to capture the benefits of the costs and time it takes to develop the
information, without having to share the benefits of that information with others. Trade secret law
therefore may be seen as providing incentives to innovate.26
Trade secret law may also encourage firms to invest in human capital. A firm is more likely to
invest in employee development if it has some confidence that employee cannot immediately use
19 James E. Malackowski, “The Intellectual Property Marketplace: Past, Present and Future, 5 The John Marshall
Journal of Intellectual Property Law (2006), 605.
20 R. Mark Halligan, “Protection of U.S. Trade Secret Assets: Critical Amendments to the Economic Espionage Act of
1996,” 7 John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law (2008), 656.
21 Victoria A. Cundiff, “Reasonable Measures to Protect Trade Secrets in a Digital Environment,” 49 IDEA: The
Intellectual Property Law Review (2009), 359.
22 Susan W. Brenner and Anthony C. Crescenzi, “State-Sponsored Crime: The Futility of the Economic Espionage
Act,” 28 Houston Journal of International Law (2006), 389.
23 Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection
and Industrial Espionage (2007), 1.
24 Aaron J. Burstein, “Trade Secrecy as an Instrument of National Security? Rethinking the Foundations of Economic
Espionage,” 41 Arizona State Law Journal (2009), 933.
25 Michael Risch, “Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?,” 11 Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review (2007), 1.
26 Oren Bar-Gill, “Law and the Boundaries of Technology-Intensive Firms,” 157 University of Pennsylvania Law
Review (2009), 1649.
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his knowledge in the service of a competitor.27 Firms may also establish a trade secret easily
through self-help measures. Commercially valuable information is protected once a firm makes
reasonable efforts to maintain it in confidence. There is no need for formal government
involvement, in contrast to patents.28
Trade secret law also confirms and regulates standards of commercial ethics and morality.29 The
misappropriation doctrine applies only against wrongdoers—those who have breached a duty of
confidence, engaged in espionage, or otherwise acted in bad faith.30 Trade secret law thus
recognizes that even within a marketplace based open free competition, certain kinds of
competitive behavior step beyond our social norms and should be discouraged.31
On the other hand, trade secret laws potentially have negative aspects. First, although trade secret
law may promote advancement, it might facilitate a particular kind of innovation—the
development of information that is itself amenable to being kept secret.32 In addition, the
protection of trade secrets necessarily requires firms to conceal their new developments. But as
Judge Goldberg observed 40 years ago, “for our industrial competition to remain healthy there
must be breathing room for observing a competing industrialist.”33 Thus, while some degree of
information protection may be needed to promote innovation, some amount of information
sharing may be essential for competition and proper functioning of the market.34
As well, firms must expend resources to maintain information as a trade secret. Employees must
sign confidentiality agreements, locks and safes must be installed, and electronic protection
measures must be in place on computer systems. These measures entail time and expense.35
Employers also may be encouraged to limit access to valuable information to select employees.
Disclosing valuable trade secrets on a “need to know” basis to one’s employees may restrict
employee development and ultimately hinder the operation of the firm.36
Trade secret law may negatively impact employee mobility. Individuals who are unable to take
their knowledge from job to job may be limited in their ability to change employers.37 As
explained by Alan L. Durham, a member of the law faculty of the University of Alabama, an
27 Miles J. Feldman, “Toward a Clearer Standard of Protectable Information: Trade Secrets and the Employment
Relationship,” 9 High Technology Law Journal (1994), 151.
28 Lemley, supra, at 313.
29 See Elizabeth A. Rowe, “A Sociological Approach to Misappropriation,” 58 University of Kansas Law Review
(2009), 1.
30 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, “Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research,” 97 Yale Law
Journal (1987), 177.
31 See James Grimmelmann, “The Ethical Visions of Copyright Law,” 77 Fordham Law Review (2009), 2005.
32 Michael P. Simpson, “The Future of Innovation: Trade Secrets, Property Rights, and Protectionism—An Age-Old
Tale,” 70 Brooklyn Law Review (2005), 1121.
33 E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).
34 Michael J. Garrison and John T. Wendt, “The Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete Agreements: Recent Trends
and an Alternative Policy Approach,” 45 American Business Law Journal (2008), 107.
35 See Douglas Lichtman, “How the Law Responds to Self-Help,” 1 Journal of Law, Economics & Policy (2005), 215.
36 See Bruce Fallick et al., “Job-Hopping in Silicon Valley: Some Evidence Concerning the Microfoundations of a
High-Technology Cluster,” 88 The Review of Economics and Statistics (2006), 472.
37 See Bruce Alan Kugler, “Limiting Trade Secret Protection,” 22 Valparaiso University Law Review (1988), 725.
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overly robust view of trade secret law potentially may “limit individual freedom, weaken
employee bargaining power, and harm society through diminished competition.”38
The various rules that together comprise the discipline of trade secret law may be fashioned in an
effort to maximize the potential advantages of trade secrets while minimizing their disadvantages.
This report next provides a more detailed review of the doctrines that regulate the acquisition and
enforcement of trade secrets.
An Overview of Trade Secret Law
Basic Principles
While it has been written that an “exact definition of a trade secret is not possible,”39 a trade
secret generally consists of secret, commercially valuable information.40 As explained by Henry
Perritt, Jr., a member of the faculty of the Chicago-Kent College of Law, “trade secret subject
matter includes any of the major functions of business enterprise: production and operations,
engineering and research and development, marketing, finance, purchasing, and management.”41
Specific examples of trade secret subject matter include customer lists, manufacturing processes,
marketing strategies, pricing information, product design, recipes, and sales techniques.42 One
court has described trade secrets as follows:
A trade secret is really just a piece of information (such as a customer list, or a method of
production, or a secret formula for a soft drink) that the holder tries to keep secret by
executing confidentiality agreements with employees and others and by hiding the
information from outsiders by means of fences, safes, encryption, and other means of
concealment, so that the only way the secret can be unmasked is by a breach of contract or a
tort.43
Whether information qualifies as a “trade secret” is a question of fact that may be determined by
a jury. Among the factors in assessing whether certain subject matter is a trade secret are:
• the extent to which the information is known outside of the company;
• the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the
company;
• the extent of measures taken by the company to guard the secrecy of the
information;
• the value of the information to the company and to its competitors;
38 Alan L. Durham, “Natural Laws and Inevitable Infringement,” 93 Minnesota Law Review (2009), 933.
39 Restatement (First) of Torts § 757, comment b.
40 Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4).
41 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Trade Secrets: A Practitioner’s Guide § 3:9 (2d ed. 2006).
42 See Babirak, supra.
43 ConFold Pac. v. Polaris Indus., 433 F.3d 952, 959 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
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• the amount of effort or money expended by the company in developing the
information; and
• the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or
duplicated by others.44
The law protects trade secrets from misappropriation by others. Misappropriation is a tort that
may occur in several distinct ways. One is when an individual acquires the trade secret through
improper means, such as theft, bribery, misrepresentation, or espionage.45 Another is when the
individual uses or discloses the trade secret through a breach of confidence. For example, an
employee might switch jobs, and then disclose his previous employer’s trade secrets in violation
of a confidentiality agreement.46
Finally, a trade secret may be misappropriated if it is used or disclosed with knowledge that the
trade secret had been acquired improperly or through mistake. A person who uses information
that he knows to have been stolen by another is therefore also guilty of misappropriation.47
Misappropriation of a trade secret may be enjoined by a court and the defendant may also be
liable for compensatory and punitive damages.48
Conversely, it is not a violation of trade secret law for another firm to discover the subject matter
of a trade secret independently.49 “Reverse engineering” is also considered to be an appropriate
means for one firm to acquire the subject matter of another’s trade secret.50 A firm that discerns
the subject matter of the trade secret by inspecting products available to the public also has not
engaged in misappropriation.51
Trade secret protection may extend indefinitely. So long as information is not generally known to
the public, confers an economic benefit to its holder, and is subject to reasonable efforts to
maintain its secrecy, it may be considered a trade secret.52 However, the trade secret status of
information may be lost if the information is accidentally or intentionally disclosed by an
employee.53 Once a trade secret has been exposed to the public, its protected character is lost and
cannot later be retrieved.54 However, disclosures of trade secrets to third parties for certain limited
reasons do not waive trade secret protections, so long as the trade secret owner took reasonable
measures to maintain its secrecy before and during disclosure, such as requiring non-disclosure or
confidentiality agreements from each recipient of confidential information.55
44 Restatement (First) of Torts § 757, comment b.
45 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 40 (1994).
46 See Jennifer Brockett, “Protecting Intellectual Property During Layoffs,” 32 Los Angeles Lawyer (April 2009).
47 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 40 (1994).
48 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §§ 44, 45 (1994).
49 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 43 (1994).
50 See Kristin L. Black, “Crimes of Fashion: Is Imitation Truly the Sincerest Form of Flattery?,” 19 Kansas Journal of
Law and Public Policy (2010), 515.
51 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 43 (1994).
52 Perritt, supra , at § 2:2.
53 See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1256 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
54 In re Remington Arms Co., 952 F.2d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 1991).
55 1 Roger Milgrim, Milgrim on Trade Secrets § 1.04.
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Sources of Law
The discipline of trade secrets was traditionally developed through state common law. State
courts developed the essential principles of trade secret law through their decisions, which were
then observed as precedent in subsequent litigation. In 1939, the American Law Institute (ALI), a
group of lawyers, judges, and legal scholars, published a treatise titled the “Restatement of Torts.”
The Restatement of Torts included two sections dealing with the law of trade secrets. Section 757
explained the subject matter of trade secrets, while Section 758 spelled out the elements of a trade
secret misappropriation cause of action. Although this treatment was succinct, many
commentators believe that these definitions proved influential in the courts.56
Trade secrets were not addressed in the Second Restatement of Torts published in 1978. The ALI
at that time concluded that trade secret law had grown “no more dependent on Tort law than it is
on many other general fields of law and upon broad statutory developments,”57 and opted not to
house trade secrets there. The ALI addressed this gap in its 1993 Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition, which deals with trade secrets in sections 39–45.
In addition, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law (NCCUSL) issued
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) in 1979. The NCCUSL consists of a group of academics,
attorneys, and judges who draft statutes addressing a variety of issues, and then propose that each
state enact them.58 The NCCUSL lacks direct legislative authority itself. Its uniform acts become
law only to the extent that state legislatures adopt them.
The UTSA has arguably proven successful, as it has reportedly been enacted in 46 states, the
District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands.59 The four states that have reportedly not enacted the
UTSA are Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Texas. These states do recognize trade
secrets, but provide protection through a distinct statute or the common law. As attorney David S.
Almeling reports, those four states represent 22% of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product.60
It should be appreciated that many jurisdictions have enacted the UTSA after making some
changes to the original text of the proposed legislation. Opinions vary on how significant these
modifications have been. While some commentators view state-by-state variations as “generally
minor,”61 others have opined that “they include fundamental differences about what constitutes a
trade secret, what is required to misappropriate it, and what remedies are available.”62
56 See Katarzyna A. Czapracka, “Antitrust and Trade Secrets: The U.S. and EU Approach,” 24 Santa Clara Computer
High Technology Law Journal (2008), 207.
57 ALI, Restatements of Torts (Second), Introduction (1979).
58 For further information about the organization, see http://www.nccusl.org.
59 See David S. Almeling, “A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal Courts,” 45 Gonzaga Law
Review (2009-10), 291.
60 David S. Almeling, “Four Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade Secrets Act,” 19 Fordham Intellectual Property, Media
& Entertainment Law Journal (2009), 769 (hereinafter Almeling, Four Reasons).
61 Babirak, supra, at 3.
62 Almeling, Four Reasons, supra, at 774.
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The Economic Espionage Act
As noted previously, trade secrets have traditionally been the subject of state law. Prior to 1996,
arguably the most significant federal legislation on point was the Trade Secrets Act.63 Although
broadly titled, this 1948 statute is actually of narrow application. It forbids federal government
employees and government contractors from making an unauthorized disclosure of confidential
government information, including trade secrets. The sanctions for violating this criminal offense
are removal from office or employment, and a fine and/or imprisonment of not more than one
year. The law does not apply to state or local government actors or to private sector employees.
In 1996, motivated by concerns over growing international and domestic economic espionage
against U.S. firms, Congress enacted new legislation pertaining to trade secrets. The Economic
Espionage Act (EEA) criminalizes both “economic espionage” and the “theft of trade secrets.”
The “economic espionage” provision punishes those who knowingly misappropriate, or attempt
or conspire to misappropriate, trade secrets with the intent or knowledge that the offense will
benefit a foreign government, instrumentality or agent.64 The “theft of trade secrets” prohibition is
of more general application. The principal elements of an EEA claim for theft of trade secrets are:
(1) the intentional and/or knowing theft, appropriation, destruction, alteration, or duplication of
(2) a trade secret placed in interstate commerce (3) with intent to convert the trade secret and (4)
intent or knowledge that such action will injure the owner.65
The EEA provides for substantial fines and imprisonment penalties. For economic espionage, the
maximum penalties increase to $500,000 for individuals and imprisonment of 15 years, or $10
million for corporations.66 Theft of trade secrets is punishable by a fine of up to $250,000 for
individuals as well as imprisonment of up to 10 years. Organizations can be fined up to $5
million.67 The EEA also provides for criminal forfeiture of property and court orders preserving
the confidentiality of trade secrets.68
The EEA has been subject to critical commentary. Attorney R. Mark Halligan expressed the view
that the legislation was “ineffective” and observed, in 2008, that there had been fewer than 60
prosecutions in keeping with its provisions.69 Susan W. Brenner, a member of the law faculty of
the University of Dayton, and security expert Anthony C. Crescenzi opine that the “paucity” of
prosecutions under the EEA are due to a number of factors, including the complexity of the cases,
the desire of the Department of Justice only to bring cases it can win, the diplomatic
repercussions of bringing such a case, and the unwelcome possibility of additional disclosure of
trade secrets during the litigation.70 Brenner and Crescenzi conclude that the “individual and
63 June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 79 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1905).
64 18 U.S.C. § 1831.
65 18 U.S.C. § 1832.
66 18 U.S.C. § 1831.
67 18 U.S.C. § 1832.
68 18 U.S.C. §§ 1834, 1835.
69 See Halligan, supra.
70 Susan W. Brenner and Anthony C. Crescenzi, “State-Sponsored Crime: The Futility of the Economic Espionage
Act,” 28 Houston Journal of International Law (2006), 389.
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combined effect of the systemic factors discussed above is to erode the EEA’s effectiveness as a
weapon against economic espionage.”71
Trade Secrets and Patents
Trade secrets and patents form two distinct fields within the U.S. intellectual property system. In
one sense, trade secrecy serves as the chief alternative to the patent system. Most inventors must
choose one of three options: (1) maintain a technology as a trade secret, (2) seek patent
protection, (3) or decline to seek intellectual property protection at all and allow the technology to
enter the public domain.72 In view of the close relationship between trade secrets and patents, this
report next provides an overview of the patent system and its interaction with trade secret law.
Introduction to the Patent System
An inventor may seek the grant of a patent by preparing and submitting an application to the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, or USPTO.73 USPTO officials known as examiners then determine
whether the invention disclosed in the application merits the award of a patent.74 The USPTO
examiner will consider a number of legal requirements, including whether the submitted
application fully explains and distinctly claims the invention. In particular, the application must
enable persons skilled in the art to make and use the invention without undue experimentation. In
addition, the application must provide the “best mode,” or preferred way, that the applicant knows
to practice the invention.75
The examiner will also determine whether the invention itself fulfills certain substantive
standards set by the patent statute. To be patentable, an invention must meet four primary
requirements. First, the invention must fall within at least one category of patentable subject
matter.76 According to the Patent Act, an invention which is a “process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter” is eligible for patenting. Second, the invention must be useful, a
requirement that is satisfied if the invention is operable and provides a tangible benefit.77 Third,
the invention must be novel, or different, from subject matter disclosed by an earlier patent,
publication, or other state-of-the-art knowledge.78 Finally, an invention is not patentable if “the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.”79 This requirement
of “nonobviousness” prevents the issuance of patents claiming subject matter that a skilled artisan
would have been able to implement in view of the knowledge of the state of the art. If the USPTO
71 Id. at 439.
72 See generally John S. Paniaguas and Craig William Mandell, “A Practitoner’s Guide to Protecting Technology
Assets,” 20 DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law (2010), 279.
73 35 U.S.C. § 111.
74 35 U.S.C. § 131.
75 35 U.S.C. § 112.
76 35 U.S.C. § 101.
77 Id.
78 35 U.S.C. § 102.
79 35 U.S.C. § 103.
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allows the patent to issue, its owner obtains the right to exclude others from making, using,
selling, offering to sell, or importing into the United States the patented invention.80
Trade Secrets and Patents Compared
Inventors who do not wish to dedicate their technologies to the public domain must, as a general
matter, choose between trade secret and patent protection. A number of factors inform this
decision. One is whether the inventor will practically be able to keep the technology secret. A
knowledgeable observer may readily be able to inspect a motor, machine, or other mechanical
technology in order to learn its design, for example. On the other hand, the composition of a
chemical compound may be much more difficult to discern.81
The costs associated with acquiring and maintaining patents are another factor. In this respect, it
should be appreciated that a U.S. patent provides rights only with the United States. However,
virtually anyone in the world may review a U.S. patent to learn of its contents. As a result, U.S.
inventors may need to obtain patents in many foreign countries in order to secure meaningful
protection.
In addition, the process of acquiring a patent may take many years.82 A USPTO examiner in 2009
would not review a patent application until, on average, 25.8 months after it was filed.83 The “first
action pendency” during 2000 was 13.6 months.84 Many observers believe that if current
conditions continue, the backlog and delay are likely to grow at the USPTO in coming years.85
These delays may prove too lengthy for innovators in fast-moving industries, suggesting that
trade secret protection is the more appropriate choice.
Also, trade secrets may potentially extend indefinitely, so long as the requirements for trade secret
protection are maintained. In contrast, patents expire after a set period of time, normally 20 years
after the date they were filed. On the other hand, trade secret protection may be lost through a
competitor’s reverse engineering or independent discovery. As explained by Dan Burk, a member
of the faculty of the University of California, Irvine School of Law, “the inventor’s choice is an
election between twenty years of certain patent protection or perpetual, but less certain, trade
secret protection.”86
It should also be appreciated that when an inventor obtains a patent on an invention, the USPTO
publishes that patent in a formal document. That publication destroys the trade secret status of
80 35 U.S.C. § 271.
81 See Daniel C. Munson, “The Patent-Trade Secret Decision: An Industrial Perspective,” 78 Journal of the Patent and
Trademark Office Society (1996), 689.
82 See CRS Report R41261, Deferred Examination of Patent Applications: Implications for Innovation Policy, by John
R. Thomas.
83 USPTO, Performance and Accountability Report Fiscal Year 2009 (available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
com/annual/2009/mda_02_02.html).
84 USPTO, 2003 Performance and Accountability Report (available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2003/
040201_patentperform.jsp).
85 See, e.g., Jon Dudas et al., “Let the PTO Pay Its Own Way,” 198 New Jersey Law Journal no. 12 (Dec. 21, 2009),
975; Steven Andersen, “Out of Balance,” Inside Counsel (Nov. 1, 2009).
86 Dan L. Burk, “Legal Constraint of Genetic Use Restriction Technologies,” 6 Minnesota Journal of Law, Science, and
Technology (2004), 335.
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any previously confidential information disclosed within it.87 In addition, the USPTO publishes
many, but not all, pending patent applications “promptly after the expiration of a period of 18
months” after they are filed.88 This measure also destroys the trade secret status of information
contained within the published application, even if the USPTO subsequently rejects the
application and no patent ever issues on that invention.89
Potential Policy Conflicts
The trade secret and patent systems are sometimes viewed as acting in conflicting ways. Trade
secret protection is predicated upon the maintenance of the protected information in confidence.
In contrast, each patented invention is the subject of a formal document, the patent instrument,
which provides a complete description of the invention. As a result, while the patent system
appears to promote the public disclosure of new technologies, the trade secret discourages
disclosure.90 As described previously, it could be argued that trade secret law encourages the
development of technologies that are capable of being kept secret.91
However, some commentators believe that patents and trade secrets generally act in a
complementary manner.92 Mark Lemley, a member of the faculty of the Stanford Law School, has
explained that trade secret law provides valuable incentives to innovate in areas where the patent
law does not reach, such as customer lists and business plans.93 Lemley further explains that
although the law requires that reasonable efforts must be made to maintain secrecy, absent trade
secret law, firms might need to engage in even more physical and contractual measures to prevent
disclosure. As a result, a society without trade secret law might potentially have more, rather than
less secrecy.94
In any event, patent law doctrine may be viewed as disfavoring trade secret holders. Well-
established patent law provides that an inventor who makes a secret, commercial use of an
invention for more than one year prior to filing a patent application at the USPTO forfeits his own
right to a patent.95 This policy is based principally upon the desire to maintain the integrity of the
statutorily prescribed patent term. The patent law grants patents a term of twenty years,
commencing from the date a patent application is filed.96 If the trade secret holder could make
commercial use of an invention for many years before choosing to file a patent application, he
could disrupt this regime by delaying the expiration date of his patent.
87 See BondPro Corp. v. Siemens Power Generation, Inc., 463 F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir. 2006).
88 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1).
89 See BondPro v. Siemens, supra.
90 Michael P. Simpson, “The Future of Innovation: Trade Secrets, Property Rights, and Protectionism—An Age-Old
Tale,” 70 Brooklyn Law Review (2005), 1121.
91 Id.
92 See, e.g., Karl F. Jorda, “Patent and Trade Secret Complementariness: An Unexpected Synergy,” 48 Washburn Law
Journal (2008), 1; Jonathan D. Carpenter, “Intellectual Property: The Overlap Between Utility Patents, Plant Patents,
the PVPA, and Trade Secrets and the Limitations on that Overlap,” 81 North Dakota Law Review (2005), 171.
93 Mark A. Lemley, “The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights,” 61 Stanford Law Review (2008),
131.
94 Id.
95 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). See Metallizing Engineering Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts, 153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946).
96 35 U.S.C. § 154.
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On the other hand, settled patent law principles established that prior secret uses would not defeat
the patents of later inventors.97 If an earlier inventor made secret commercial use of an invention,
and another person independently invented the same technology later and obtained patent
protection, then the trade secret holder could face liability for patent infringement. This policy is
based upon the reasoning that once issued, published patent instruments fully inform the public
about the invention, while trade secrets do not. As between a subsequent inventor who patented
the invention, and thus had disclosed the invention to the public, and an earlier trade secret holder
who had not, the law favored the patent holder.98
An example may clarify this rather complex legal situation. Suppose that Inventor X develops
and makes commercial use of a new manufacturing process. Inventor X chooses not to obtain
patent protection, yet maintains that process as a trade secret. Many years later, Inventor Y
independently develops the same manufacturing process and promptly files a patent application
claiming that invention. In such circumstances, Inventor X’s earlier, trade secret use does not
prevent Inventor Y from procuring a patent. Furthermore, if the USPTO approves the patent
application, then Inventor X faces infringement liability should Inventor Y file suit against him.99
The First Inventor Defense
Congress modified the usual rules governing the relationship between trade secrets and patents
when it established the “first inventor defense” in the American Inventors Protection Act of
1999.100 That statute in part provided an infringement defense for an earlier inventor of a “method
of doing or conducting business” that was later patented by another. By limiting this defense to
patented methods of doing business, Congress responded to the 1998 Federal Circuit opinion in
State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group.101 That judicial opinion recognized
that business methods could be subject to patenting, potentially exposing individuals who had
maintained business methods as trade secrets to liability for patent infringement.
Again, an example may aid understanding of the first inventor defense. Suppose that Inventor X
develops and exploits commercially a new method of doing business. Inventor X maintains his
business method as a trade secret. Many years later, Inventor Y independently develops the same
business method and promptly files a patent application claiming that invention. Even following
the enactment of the American Inventors Protection Act, Inventor X’s earlier, trade secret use
would not prevent Inventor Y from procuring a patent. However, should the USPTO approve
Inventor Y’s patent application, and should Inventor Y sue Inventor X for patent infringement,
then Inventor X may potentially claim the benefit of the first inventor defense. If successful,
Inventor X would enjoy a complete defense to infringement of Inventor Y’s patent.
97 Sharon K. Sandeen, “Kewanee Revisited: Returning to First Principles of Intellectual Property Law to Determine the
Issue of Federal Preemption,” 12 Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review (2008), 299.
98 W.L. Gore & Associates v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
99 See Roger E. Schechter and John R. Thomas, Intellectual Property: The Law of Copyrights, Patents and Trademarks
(Thomson-West 2003), § 16.2.2.
100 The American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, P.L. 106-113, was part of the Intellectual Property and
Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, attached by reference to the Consolidated Appropriations Act for
Fiscal Year 2000. President Clinton signed this bill on November 29, 1999.
101 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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At the time this report was published, no reported judicial opinion considers the first inventor
defense. The most prominent judicial treatment of the first inventor defense arguably occurred in
the 2010 Supreme Court opinion in Bilski v. Kappos.102 There, a plurality of the Supreme Court
concluded that the American Inventors Protection Act evidenced the congressional intent that
business methods were appropriately patented. The concurring opinion of Justice Stevens
expressed a distinct view, stating that “that the 1999 Congress would never have enacted §273 if
it had foreseen that this Court would rely on the provision as a basis for concluding that business
methods are patentable.”103
Legislation before the 111th Congress would modify the first inventor defense. Both H.R. 1260
and S. 515, each titled the Patent Reform Act of 2009, would expand the first inventor defense as
it was established in 1999. The defense currently applies to “the person who performed the acts
necessary to establish the defense....” Both bills would also allow “any other entity that controls,
is controlled by, or is under common control” with that person to claim entitlement to the first
inventor defense.104 A third bill titled the Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 610, does not address the
first inventor defense.
Congressional Issues and Options
A variety of options are available for Congress with respect to trade secrets. If the current
situation is deemed appropriate, then no action need be taken. Alternatively, Congress may wish
to consider the adoption of a federal trade secret law. Several commentators believe that this step
would promote the uniformity of trade secret law throughout the United States.105 As attorney
David S. Almeling asserts:
Trade secrets stand alone as the only major type of intellectual property governed primarily
by state law. Trademarks, copyrights, and patents are each governed primarily by federal
statutes. Trade secrets, by contrast, are governed by fifty state statutes and common laws.
The result is that trade secret law differs from state to state. It is time to eliminate these
differences—and the significant problems they cause—by enacting a Federal Trade Secrets
Act (“FTSA”).106
According to Alemeling, general federal trade secret legislation would establish greater
uniformity in substantive and procedural law than is possible in a state-based regime.
Other commentators have further suggested that the current state-based trade secrets system
places the United States in violation of its obligations under two international agreements: the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS Agreement).107 Both NAFTA and the
102 ___ U.S. ___, 2010 WL 2555192 (2010).
103 2010 WL 2555192 at *29.
104 H.R. 1260 at § 5(c); S. 515 at § 4(c).
105 See, e.g., Marina Lao, “Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an Information Economy,” 59 Ohio State Law Journal
1633 (1998); Rebel J. Pace, “The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act,” 8 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology
(1995), 427.
106See Almeling, supra.
107 See, e.g., Marina Lao, “Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an Information Economy,” 59 Ohio State Law Journal
1633 (1998); Rebel J. Pace, “The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act,” 8 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology
(continued...)
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TRIPS Agreement require member states to provide certain levels of trade secret protection.
Because the portions of NAFTA and the TRIPS Agreement concerning trade secrets were
modeled after the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), those states that have adopted the UTSA
without restrictive modifications likely comply with these international standards. But some states
have not adopted the UTSA, and some states that have done so have arguably included more
restrictive standards. Some commentators have asserted that these states place the United States
in violation of NAFTA and the TRIPS Agreement. However, others have observed that any
shortcomings of U.S. law on this point have yet to be challenged under either international
agreement.108
Still other observers assert that no compelling case has been made to federalize trade secret law.
Some believe that this step might create additional burdens and costs upon the federal judiciary.109
Others cite federalism concerns, believing that the states possess a strong interest in regulating
local economies in view of their own, local norms.110 In addition, variation between the laws of
the different states does not necessarily compel federalization of the field. For example,
meaningful distinctions between the states exist in other areas of law, including such fundamental
disciplines as contract law. Yet these disciplines remain subject to state law.111
A second possibility for Congress is to amend the Economic Espionage Act. Varying
commentators have described the EEA as “seldom enforced,”112 “futile,”113 and of “limited” value
as a deterrent.114 Reforms have been proposed to address these perceived deficiencies. Attorney
R. Mark Halligan has asserted that the EEA, which is currently limited to criminal prosecution,
should include a civil cause of action. According to Halligan, enacting a federal civil cause of
action to protect trade secrets would deter the theft of trade secrets and act to the advantage of
U.S. firms domestically and abroad.115 Halligan does not propose wholly federalizing trade secret
law—under his proposal, trade secret law would remain primarily a matter of state law. Still,
some of the concerns voiced in that context, including burdening the federal judiciary and
decreasing state sovereignty, could potentially arise here as well.
In addition, Congress may wish to remain apprised of the potential effect of current patent reform
efforts upon trade secrets.116 As this report has discussed, trade secrets and patents act in
complementary ways to protect innovation in the United States.117 Further, to some degree the
(...continued)
(1995), 427.
108 See Almeling, supra.
109 See, e.g., American Intellectual Property Law Association, Report of the AIPLA Trade Secrets Committee (2007)
(available at http://www.aipla.org).
110 Id.
111 See generally Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, “Stop Mucking Up Copyright Law: A Proposal for a Federal Common
Law of Copyright,” 35 Rutgers Law Journal (2004), 959.
112 Burstein, supra.
113 Brenner & Crescenzi, supra.
114 Mark E.A. Danielson, “Economic Espionage: A Framework for a Workable Solution,” 10 Minnesota Journal of
Law, Science & Technology (2009), 503.
115 Halligan, supra.
116 See CRS Report R40481, Patent Reform in the 111th Congress: Innovation Issues, by Wendy H. Schacht and John
R. Thomas.
117 See also Scott W. Cummings, “The Role of Trade Secrets in Today’s Nanotechnology Patent Environment,” 5
Nanotechnology Law & Business (2008), 41.
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two forms of intellectual property act as imperfect substitutes for each other. As a result,
legislative reforms that are perceived to make patents more effective may reduce industrial
reliance upon trade secrets. Conversely, amendments to the Patent Act that are believed to reduce
the effectiveness of patents may increase the willingness of firms to retain information as trade
secrets.118
Concluding Observations
Trade secrets form a significant component of the intellectual property system of the United
States. The importance of trade secrets will likely increase as U.S. industry continues to
participate within a knowledge-based, global economy with increasingly sophisticated
competitors. Because trade secrets are currently a matter of state law, congressional influence
over the system has thus far been indirect: Through the enactment of a criminal statute, the
Economic Espionage Act, and through amendment to the patent law. Whether further intervention
is required in the U.S. trade secret system remains a matter of congressional judgment.
Author Contact Information
John R. Thomas
Visiting Scholar
jrthomas@crs.loc.gov, 7-0975
Acknowledgments
This report was funded in part by a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.
118 See Christopher A. Cotropia and Mark A. Lemley, “Copying in Patent Law,” 87 North Carolina Law Review
(2009), 1421 (providing a skeptical discussion of this point).
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