Turkmenistan: Recent Developments and U.S.
Interests

Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
August 13, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
97-1055
CRS Report for Congress
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repared for Members and Committees of Congress

Turkmenistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

Summary
This report examines the political, economic, and foreign policies undertaken by Turkmenistan’s
President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, who came to power in late 2006. The report discusses
U.S. policy and assistance and provides basic facts and biographical information. Related
products include CRS Report RL33458, Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications
for U.S. Interests
.


Congressional Research Service

Turkmenistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

Contents
U.S. Policy.................................................................................................................................. 1
Contributions to Counter-Terrorism............................................................................................. 3
Foreign Policy and Defense......................................................................................................... 3
Political Developments ............................................................................................................... 4
Economic Developments............................................................................................................. 6
Energy .................................................................................................................................. 7

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Turkmenistan ................................................................................................... 1

Contacts
Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................ 9

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Turkmenistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

U.S. Policy
According to the Obama Administration, “Assistance and cooperation from the United States are
needed to help Turkmenistan continue to move forward, rather than freeze its transition at a place
where the rights of its citizens are severely restricted. Life expectancy, health, and education
statistics in Turkmenistan are among the worst in the former Soviet region. Even with its
significant resources, Turkmenistan remains a challenging environment, and reform will require
time and significant effort to take hold.” The Administration states that it
hopes to encourage democratic reforms that will increase the rights of Turkmenistan's
citizens as well as strengthen the sovereignty and stability of the country. Acute challenges
continue to confront Turkmenistan, including border security issues, a potential rise of
radical violent Islam, failed educational and healthcare systems, and a legacy of Soviet
repression. The United States will use assistance funds to help Turkmenistan meet
international human rights standards, facilitate citizen involvement in governmental
decision-making, promote private sector growth, and improve government delivery of health,
education, and law enforcement services. In addition, the United States will continue to
support Turkmenistan’s efforts to develop the oil and gas extraction industry and increase
export options.1
Figure 1. Map of Turkmenistan

Source: Map Resources

1 U.S. Department of State. Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2010: Annex, Regional
Perspectives,
March 2010.
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Turkmenistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

Cumulative U.S. aid budgeted for Turkmenistan in FY1992-FY2008 was $298.5 million
(FREEDOM Support Act and other agency funding), most involving food aid and training and
exchanges. Turkmenistan’s lack of progress in economic and political reforms under its late
president was cited by successive Administrations as a reason why only limited U.S. aid was
provided (compared with other Central Asian states). Budgeted aid for FY2009 was $8.85
million, estimated aid for FY2010 was $16.35 million, and the Administration requested $13.325
million for FY2011 (FREEDOM Support Act and other Function 150 foreign aid, excluding
Defense and Energy Department funds).
During his July 2009 visit to Turkmenistan, Under Secretary of State William Burns stated that
his meetings with President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow and other officials and civil society
representatives were “a reflection of the high priority that President Obama attaches to our
relationship.” He announced that a bilateral commission would be formed to “make progress in
economic cooperation, in energy cooperation, and working together against the spread of
narcotics and terrorism, in contribut[ing] to stability in Afghanistan and across the region, and
also in [discussing] issues related to civil society, education, cultural exchanges and human
rights.”2
The first U.S.-Turkmenistan Annual Bilateral Consultations were held in Ashkhabad in June
2010. Hailing the beginning of the annual meetings, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake
stated that they “represent a new beginning to the relationship between the United States and
Turkmenistan. We believe that today marks a new chapter in initiating an important dialog on all
aspects of the bilateral relationship.” He stressed that “the United States is committed to working
with Turkmenistan in the development of strong, prosperous ties between our two countries and
to developing Turkmenistan into an independent country that is founded on the rule of law. We
hope to do this within the context of a constructive relationship based on the principles of mutual
respect and mutual trust.” He later reported that the talks had included
our common concerns about stability in Afghanistan and what we both can do to contribute
to progress in that important country. We also talked about opportunities for further
cooperation in the economic and energy sectors, including efforts to expand U.S. trade and
investment and efforts to assist Turkmenistan with economic development and
diversification…. we also talked about joint efforts to combat the spread of terrorism and
narcotics. We talked about cooperation in humanitarian affairs, including educational and
cultural matters, as well as a good discussion on human rights issues. An important
dimension of our visit was the opportunity to meet with civil society leaders.3

2 U.S. Embassy, Ashgabat, Turkmenistan. Remarks to the Press by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
William J. Burns
, July 11, 2009.
3 U.S. Department of State. Remarks at the Opening Session of Inaugural U.S.-Turkmenistan Annual Bilateral
Consultations
, June 14, 2010; Press Conference, July 15, 2010; Assistant Secretary Blake's Participation in the U.S.-
Turkmenistan Business Council
, June 16, 2010.
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Contributions to Counter-Terrorism
Immediately after the terrorist attacks on the
Basic Facts
United States on September 11, 2001, the
Area and Population: Land area is 188,457 sq. mi.;
Turkmen foreign ministry stated that
slightly larger than California. The Kara Kum desert
Turkmenistan’s policy of neutrality and its
covers about 80% of land area. Population is 4.94 million
friendship with the Taliban precluded
(The World Factbook, mid-2010 est.).
cooperation in a U.S.-led military campaign.
Ethnicity: 85% are Turkmen, 5% are Uzbek, 4% are
After Russia’s then-President Vladimir Putin
Russian, and others (The World Factbook, 2003 est.).
acceded to an expanded U.S. military
Turkmen clans include the Tekke, Ersary, and Yomud.
presence in Central Asia, however, former
About 150,000 ethnic Turkmen reside elsewhere in the
former Soviet Union, approximately 1.3 million in Iran,
Turkmen President Saparamurad Niyazov on
and over 900,000 in Afghanistan.
September 24, 2001, gave his consent for
Gross Domestic Product: $33.58 billion; per capita
ground transport and overflights to deliver
GDP is about $6,900 (The World Factbook, 2009 est.,
humanitarian aid to support U.S.-led anti-
purchasing power parity).
terrorism efforts in Afghanistan because “evil
Political Leaders: President and Prime Minister:
must be punished.” Turkmenistan also
Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow; Chairman of the Mejlis
permitted refueling privileges for
(legislature): Akja Nurberdiyewa; Foreign Minister (and
humanitarian flights and reportedly sold and
deputy prime minister): Rashid Meredow; Minister of
transported jet fuel by rail to Afghanistan.
Defense: Yaylym Berdiyew.
Land transport reportedly was ramped down
Biography: Berdimuhamedow was born in 1957 in the
or ended in recent years.4 In February 2009,
Ashkhabad Region. He graduated from the Turkmen
President Berdimuhamedow agreed in
Medical Institute in 1979 and undertook graduate work in
Moscow. Until 1995, he was a junior member of the
principle that the country would again
dentistry department, an associate professor, and the
facilitate the land transit of humanitarian
dean of the dentistry faculty of the Turkmen Medical
cargoes to Afghanistan. There have been
Institute. In 1995-1997, he was an official in the Turkmen
reports that authorities have blocked or
Ministry of Health and was minister 1997-2006. In 2001-
hampered some NATO overflights to
2006, he also was a deputy prime minister. He was named
acting president on December 21, 2006, and was elected
Afghanistan. In late August 2009,
president on February 11, 2007.
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan reportedly
refused permission for German Airborne
Warning and Control System (AWAC) aircraft to transit to Afghanistan.
Foreign Policy and Defense
Turkmenistan’s “neutral” foreign policy is enshrined in its constitution, and the U.N. General
Assembly in 1995 recognized Turkmenistan’s neutrality. Berdimuhamedow has eschewed joining
political or military alliances and has pursued good relations with both East and West.
Turkmenistan has pursued close ties with both Iran and Turkey. In addition to trade ties with Iran,
Turkmenistan is also interested in cultural ties with the approximately 1.3 million Turkmen
residing in Iran. Turkmenistan has cooperated with Russia in some areas while seemingly
resisting other Russian influence. In 1992, the two states signed a Friendship and Cooperation
Treaty containing security provisions. Although Turkmenistan joined the post-Soviet

4 Deirdre Tynan, “Turkmenistan: Ashgabat Hosts US Military Refueling, Resupply Operations,” Eurasia Insight, July
8, 2009; Deirdre Tynan, “Pentagon Paid Airport Fees to Turkmenistan, But Can’t Say How Much,” Eurasianet, July
12, 2010.
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Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), it did not sign the Collective Security Treaty and
refused to sign other CIS agreements viewed as violating its sovereignty and neutrality. Relations
with Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan have been tense but have improved somewhat during
Berdimuhamedow’s leadership. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have vied for regional influence
and argued over water sharing. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have rival claims to some Caspian
Sea oil and gas fields.
Turkmenistan’s armed forces number about 22,000, including 18,500 ground, 3,000 air, and about
500 naval/coast guard forces.5 Other forces include police and security troops, a presidential
guard, and border troops. In late 1999, Russia’s 1,000 border troops in Turkmenistan pulled out at
Turkmenistan’s request (some “special border troops” reportedly remain), and by 2002,
Turkmenistan had replaced its officer corps with ethnic Turkmen. In 1994, Turkmenistan became
the first Central Asian state to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP). Turkmen officers have
participated in or observed several PFP exercises. In January 2009, a new defense doctrine was
released that calls for Turkmenistan to be able to provide for its own national security.
Turkmenistan reportedly is actively purchasing military equipment in accordance with the new
doctrine. In August 2009, President Berdimuhamedow decreed that the navy/coast guard base of
Turkmenbasy would be upgraded and coastal radars and ships would be purchased “to fight
effectively against smugglers, terrorists and any other forces who try to illegally use our state sea
border or create an unstable situation.”6
Political Developments
During Berdimuhamedow rule, Turkmenistan has continued to be the most authoritarian of the
Central Asian states, according to the State Department. Turkmenistan’s May 1992 constitution
set up a “secular democracy” and granted the president overwhelming powers to rule by decree.
The constitution includes an impressive list of individual rights, but emphasizes that the exercise
of rights must not violate public order or damage national security. It created a 2,500-member
People’s Council (Halk Maslahaty or HM) with mixed executive and legislative powers,
consisting of the president, ministers, the 50 legislators of the Supreme Council (Mejlis),
“people’s representatives,” and others. The HM has served as an occasional forum and rubber
stamp for the president’s policy initiatives. The Mejlis routinely has supported presidential
decrees and has little legislative initiative. All judges are appointed by the president without
legislative review. In December 1999, members of the HM and Niyazov’s National Revival
Movement (a civic group) met in a joint session to approve changes to the constitution, including
naming Niyazov president for life. In August 2003, the HM approved constitutional changes
making it the supreme legislative and executive body and greatly expanding its size. Niyazov
explained that it would be harder for coup plotters to take over such a large body.
Exile groups opposed to the regime have included those formed by former officials who have fled
the country. Such groups include the United Democratic Opposition, headed by former Foreign
Minister Awdy Kulyyew (Kuliyev); the Watan Social-Political Movement, headed by former
Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank Annadurdy Hajyyew (Khadzhiyev); the Republican Party,
headed by former Ambassador to Turkey Nurmuhammet Hanamow (Khanamov); and the
Fatherland movement, founded by former Prime Minister Hudayberdi Orazow (Orazov). The

5 International Institute of Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, February 3, 2010.
6 Open Source Center. Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter CEDR), August 31, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950194.
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latter three leaders received life sentences in absentia on charges of instigating the 2002 coup
attempt. Another alleged coup plotter, former Foreign Minister Boris Orazowic Syhmyradow
(Shikhmuradov), supposedly remains imprisoned.
President Niyazov died on December 21, 2006, at age 66, ostensibly from a heart attack. The
morning of his death, the government announced that Berdimuhamedow, then the deputy prime
minister and health minister, would serve as acting president. The HM convened on December 26
and changed the constitution to legitimize Berdimuhamedow’s position as acting president. It
quickly approved an electoral law and announced that the next presidential election would be held
on February 11, 2007. The HM designated six candidates for the presidential election, one from
each region, all of whom were government officials. Exiled politicians were banned from
participation. Reportedly, nearly 99% of 2.6 million voters turned out, and 89.23% endorsed
acting President Berdimuhamedow.
An OSCE needs assessment mission visited during the campaign. It praised some provisions of a
new presidential election law, such as those permitting multiple candidacies and access by
electoral observers, but criticized others, including those permitting only citizens approved by the
legislature and who had served as state officials to run. A small OSCE delegation on election day
reportedly was not allowed to view vote-counting. According to the U.S. State Department, the
election “represent[ed] a modest step toward political electoral change that could help create the
conditions in the future for free, fair, open and truly competitive elections.”7
In his inaugural address on February 14, 2007, Berdimuhamedow pledged to continue to provide
free natural gas, salt, water, and electricity and subsidized bread, gasoline, and housing to the
populace, and to uphold the foreign policy of the previous government. Berdimuhamedow was
acclaimed head of the HM in late March 2007, thus assuming all the top posts held by the late
Niyazov. Berdimuhamedow has removed some of Niyazov’s statues from Ashkhabad and other
symbols of Niyazov’s cult of personality, but Niyazov’s spiritual guide, the Ruhnama, remains
required reading in the schools. Berdimuhamedow appears to be the subject of an emerging cult
of personality, which includes a monument built in part to glorify his proclamation of a “new
revival era” for Turkmenistan.
A constitutional commission unveiled a draft constitution in July 2008 that after public debate
was approved by the HM on September 26, 2008. The new constitution abolished the HM and
divided its powers between the Mejlis and the president. It enlarged the Mejlis from 65 to 125
members. An early legislative election was held on December 14, 2008. An OSCE pre-election
needs assessment mission stated that “a lack of distinction between civil society organizations,
the party, and the State,” had resulted in only government-approved candidates running for seats,
so that a democratic election was not possible.8 At least two approved candidates ran in each
district, but campaigning was muted and noncontroversial. The Turkmen Central Electoral
Commission reported that almost 94% of the electorate voted on December 14, but some
observers reported a light turnout. President Berdimuhamedow hailed the election as advancing
Turkmen democracy.9

7 Open Source Center. Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter CEDR), February 12, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950160.
U.S. Department of State. Daily Press Briefing, February 15, 2007.
8 OSCE. ODIHR. Turkmenistan, Early Parliamentary Elections: OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report,
October 20, 2008.
9 Annette Bohr, “Turkmenistan,” Nations in Transit 2009, Freedom House, June 30, 2009; CEDR, December 19, 2008,
(continued...)
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In February 2010, Berdimuhamedow called for the creation of a multi-party system, and in April
2010 he ordered the legislature to consider a law creating such a system. In the meantime, he
ended the monopoly of the ruling Democratic Party by approving the registration of a new
Farmers’ Party. This new party, however, appeared to be a creation of the government.10
According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009,
“although there were modest improvements in some areas, the [Turkmen] government continued
to commit serious abuses, and its human rights record remained poor.” The State Department
reported that there was evidence that citizens continued to be subject to arbitrary arrest, tortured,
held incommunicado for prolonged periods in violation of law, and denied due process and a fair
trial. It also reported that there continued to be
arbitrary interference with privacy, home, and correspondence; restrictions on freedom of
speech, press, assembly, and association; restrictions on religious freedom, including
continued harassment of religious minority group members; restrictions on freedom of
movement for some citizens, including increased restrictions on those intending to study
abroad; violence against women; and restrictions on free association of workers.”11
Economic Developments
According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, Turkmenistan’s GDP declined 6% in 2009 because
of the global economic downturn and a contract dispute with Russia that largely halted gas
shipments to Russia for most of 2009. Consumer price inflation was 10%.12
Turkmenistan was among the world’s top cotton producers, but in recent years poor harvests have
greatly reduced export earnings. About one-half of the employed population works in agriculture.
State ownership continues in the oil and gas industry, electrical power generation, and the textile,
construction, transport, and communications sectors. These sectors account for about 75% of
GDP. According to the World Bank, Turkmenistan’s underlying fiscal position has weakened over
the years as public sector deficits have ballooned (including subsidies for consumer goods and
industry and agriculture). About one-third of the population lives in poverty, and about 60% are
unemployed (leaving an employed labor force of less than 1.3 million), although a few necessities
of life are provided free or at low cost. Some observers allege that government corruption is
exacerbated by official involvement in drug trafficking.
In the face of the global economic downturn, in October 2008 President Berdimuhamedow
decreed the establishment of a stabilization fund. Turkmenistan introduced a re-denominated
currency, the new manat, in January 2009. The decline of the Turkmen economy in 2009,
including the fall-off in gas sales to Russia, necessitated transfers from the stabilization fund to
support the budget. In May 2010, Berdimuhamedow unveiled a National Socio-Economic

(...continued)
Doc. No. CEP-950107.
10 CEDR, May 14, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-37001.
11 U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009, March 11, 2010.
12 Country Report: Turkmenistan, Economist Intelligence Unit, July 2010. The CIA’s World Factbook reports that the
Turkmen economy grew 6% in 2009, but it notes that Turkmenistan’s statistics are unreliable and that “the rate of GDP
growth is uncertain.”
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Development Program for 2011-2030 that aims to diversify the economy away from reliance on
raw materials exports, including by developing textiles and other industries, as well as liquefied
natural gas (LNG). He has launched a large-scale building program
to turn Ashkhabad into one of the most beautiful cities of the world where the most favorable
conditions for life and constructive activity of Turkmen citizens are created. The
comprehensive concept for development of the Turkmen capital stipulated that construction
of comfortable apartment houses will be continued, reliable power supply system will be
built, advanced communications technologies will be adopted and motor highways will be
built.13
Turkmenistan continues to construct a massive lake that it claims will recycle irrigation water and
ameliorate the regional climate, but which critics condemn as likely to siphon water from the
Amu Darya River and to become concentrated with salts and pesticides.
Energy
The U.S. Department of Energy in early 2008 reported estimates of 600 million barrels of proven
oil reserves and 100 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of proven natural gas reserves in Turkmenistan (which
is less than 1% of the proven world oil reserves and less than 4% of the proven gas reserves in the
Persian Gulf). In the late 1980s, Turkmenistan was the world’s fourth-largest natural gas
producer. It was long largely dependent on Russian export routes, and gas and oil production
were held back by aging infrastructure, inadequate investment, and poor management. In 1993,
Russia halted Turkmen gas exports to Western markets through its pipelines, diverting Turkmen
gas to other Eurasian states that had trouble paying for the gas. In 1997, Russia cut off these
shipments because of transit fee arrears and as leverage to obtain Turkmenistan’s agreement to
terms offered by Russia’s state-owned gas firm Gazprom.
The late President Niyazov signed a 25-year accord with then-President Putin in 2003 on
supplying Russia up to 211.9 billion cubic feet (bcf) of gas in 2004 (about 12% of production at
that time), rising up to 2.83 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 2009-2028 (perhaps amounting to the bulk
of production). Turkmenistan halted gas shipments to Russia at the end of 2004 in an attempt to
get a higher gas price but settled for all-cash rather than partial barter payments. Turkmenistan
and Russia continued to clash in subsequent years over gas prices and finally agreed in late 2007
that gas prices based on “market principles” would be established in 2009. Turkmenistan,
Kazakhstan, and Russia signed accords in May and December 2007 on building a new gas
pipeline that was planned to carry 353 bcf of Turkmen and 353 bcf of Kazakh gas to Russia.
However, the Turkmen government appeared to have reservations about building another pipeline
to Russia.
Seeking alternatives to pipeline routes through Russia, in December 1997 Turkmenistan opened
the first pipeline from Central Asia to the outside world beyond Russia, a 125-mile gas pipeline
linkage to Iran. Turkmenistan provided 282.5 bcf of gas to Iran in 2006 and reportedly a larger
amount in 2007. At the end of 2007, however, Turkmenistan suddenly suspended gas shipments,
causing hardship in northern Iran. Turkmen demands for higher payments were the main reason
for the cut-off. Gas shipments resumed in late April 2008 after Iran agreed to a price boost. In

13 CEDR, August 13, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-964017.
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mid-2009, Turkmenistan reportedly agreed to increase gas supplies to up to 706 bcf per year.14 At
the end of 2009, a second gas pipeline to Iran was completed—from a field that until April 2009
had supplied gas to Russia (see below)—to more than double Turkmenistan’s export capacity to
Iran.
As another alternative to pipelines through Russia, in April 2006, Turkmenistan and China signed
a framework agreement calling for Chinese investment in developing gas fields in Turkmenistan
and in building a gas pipeline with a capacity of about 1.0 tcf per year through Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan to China. All three Central Asian states plan to send gas through this pipeline to
China. Construction of the pipeline began in August 2007 and gas began to be delivered through
the pipeline to Xinjiang and beyond in December 2009.
Perhaps in an additional attempt to diversify gas export routes, Berdimuhamedow first signaled in
2007 that Turkmenistan was interested in building a trans-Caspian gas pipeline. Turkmenistan
signed a memorandum of understanding in April 2008 with the EU to supply 353.1 bcf of gas per
year starting in 2009, presumably through a trans-Caspian pipeline that might at first link to the
SCP and later to the proposed Nabucco pipeline. Berdimuhamedow also revived Niyazov’s
proposal to build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India, but investment
remains elusive.
On the night of April 8-9, 2009, a section of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Russia
exploded, halting Turkmen gas shipments. Russia claimed that it had notified Turkmenistan that it
was reducing its gas imports because European demand for gas had declined, but Turkmenistan
denied that it had been properly informed.15 After extended talks, visiting President Medvedev
and President Berdimuhamedow agreed on December 22, 2009, that Turkmen gas exports to
Russia would be resumed, and that the existing supply contract would be altered to reduce
Turkmen gas exports to up to 1 tcf per year and to increase the price paid for the gas.
Turkmenistan announced on January 9, 2010, that its gas exports to Russia had resumed. The
incident appeared to further validate Turkmenistan’s policy of diversifying its gas export routes.
Russia’s Gazprom gas firm plans to purchase only 353 bcf of Turkmen gas in 2010.
At a late April 2009 Turkmen energy conference, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George
Krol reportedly stressed that Turkmenistan and other states should continue to diversify their
energy export routes.16 Turkmen President Berdimuhamedow pledged to continue such
diversification. At an EU energy summit in Prague in early May 2009, U.S. Special Envoy for
Eurasian Energy Richard Morningstar endorsed further development of the “southern corridor”
for the shipment of gas and oil to Western markets. However, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan balked at signing a communique pledging the states to back the Nabucco pipeline.
Despite this move, Berdimuhamedow asserted on July 10, 2009, that there are “immense volumes
of natural gas in Turkmenistan [that] make it possible for us to carry out certain work related to
the implementation of various [gas export] projects, including the Nabucco project.”17 In

14 Iran: Daily Report, January 21, 2008, Doc. No. IAP-11017; January 24, 2008, Doc. No. IAP-950014; April 26, 2008,
Doc. No. IAP-950049; and May 6, 2008, Doc. No. IAP-950052.; CEDR, July 12, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950097.
15 Open Source Center. OSC Feature, April 14, 2009, Doc. No. FEA-844966; CEDR, April 14, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-
950339; ITAR-TASS, April 3, 2009; Sergey Blagov, “Turkmenistan: Ashgabat Wonders Whether Russia Still Has Deep
Pockets,” Eurasia Insight, March 26, 2009.
16 Alexander Vershinin, “U.S. Urges Central Asia to Boost Gas Export Routes,” Associated Press, April 24, 2009.
17 CEDR, July 11, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950124.
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September 2009, he further suggested that Turkmenistan could provide even more gas than
previously mentioned in 2008 for Nabucco—1.1 tcf per year—because an audit indicated that the
South Yoloten-Osman and Yaslar offshore gas fields held vast reserves.18 Russia and Iran remain
opposed to trans-Caspian pipelines, ostensibly on the grounds that they could pose environmental
hazards to the littoral states. In May 2010, Morningstar suggested that “some might question
whether gas exports from Turkmenistan to China come at the expense of Nabucco or other
Southern Corridor projects meant to supply Europe.… It is not yet clear where Turkmen gas for
European energy projects might come from, but given the economics, they are much more likely
to be supplied with gas from Turkmenistan’s offshore blocks.”19

Author Contact Information

Jim Nichol

Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
jnichol@crs.loc.gov, 7-2289



18 The latest estimate based on drilling control wells indicates reserves of 16 tcf in the South Yoloten-Osman field.
Trend News, May 12, 2010.
19 U.S. Department of State. Office of the Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy. Pipeline Politics in Asia: The
Intersection of Demand, Energy Markets, and Supply Routes
, Richard Morningstar, Special Envoy for Eurasian
Energy, May 4, 2010.
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