Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments
Shirley A. Kan
Specialist in Asian Security Affairs
July 30, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS22570
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments
Summary
Since 2000, the U.S. military has been building up forward-deployed forces on the U.S. territory
of Guam to increase deterrence and power projection for possible responses to crises and
disasters, counter-terrorism, and contingencies in support of South Korea, Japan, the Philippines,
Taiwan, or elsewhere in Asia. The defense buildup on Guam has been moderate. Nonetheless,
China has concerns about the defense buildup, suspecting it to be directed against China. Guam’s
role has increased with plans to withdraw some U.S. forces from Japan and South Korea.
In 2006, the United States and Japan agreed on a “Roadmap” to strengthen their alliance,
including a buildup on Guam to cost $10.3 billion, with Japan contributing 60%. Primary goals
were to start the related construction on Guam by 2010 and to complete relocation of about 8,000
marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. In Tokyo on February 17, 2009, the Secretary of State
signed the bilateral “Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Japan Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III Marine
Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents From Okinawa to Guam” that reaffirmed
the “Roadmap” of May 1, 2006. The two governments agreed that of the estimated $10.27 billion
cost of the facilities and infrastructure development for the relocation, Japan will provide $6.09
billion, including up to $2.8 billion in direct cash contributions (in FY2008 dollars). The United
States committed to fund $3.18 billion plus about $1 billion for a road.
However, in September 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) became the ruling party. This
political change raised uncertainty as Japan sought to re-negotiate the agreement, even while the
United States sought its implementation. The dispute over the location on Okinawa of the
Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) to replace the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma raised
implications for the relocation of marines from Okinawa to Guam. In January 2010, Japan
promised to decide by May on the location of the FRF. Then, North Korea’s attack on South
Korea’s naval ship (Cheonan) in March, and China’s deployment of its Navy near Okinawa
which confronted Japan’s forces in April, catalyzed Japan to resolve the dispute in favor of
deterrence. On May 28, the Secretaries of Defense and State and their counterparts in Japan
issued a “2+2” Joint Statement, in which they reaffirmed commitment to implement the 2006
Roadmap and the 2009 Agreement. In July, the Navy issued the final Environmental Impact
Statement on the buildup on Guam, while planning to start construction by the end of FY2010.
The Navy estimated that Guam’s population would increase by a total of 30,190, including 8,552
Marines.
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 (enacted as P.L. 111-84 on October 28,
2009) authorized the first substantial incremental funding for the relocation of about 8,000
marines from Okinawa to Guam, but conditioned upon the Defense Department’s submission to
Congress of a Guam Master Plan. Among a number of provisions related to Guam in the
legislation and conference report, Congress designated the Deputy Secretary of Defense to lead a
Guam Executive Council and coordinate interagency efforts related to Guam. Congress also
required a report on training, readiness, and movement requirements for Marine Forces Pacific,
with a sense of Congress that expansion of Marine Corps training should not impact the
implementation of the U.S.-Japan agreement on relocation from Okinawa to Guam. Congress
authorized a total amount (including for Defense-wide, Army, Navy, and Air Force) of almost
$733 million. Updated as warranted, this CRS Report discusses major developments and policy
issues. On appropriations related to military construction on Guam, see CRS Report R40731,
Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies: FY2010 Appropriations.
Congressional Research Service
Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments
Contents
Strategic Significance of Guam for Defense Buildup ................................................................... 1
Force Relocations and Deployments from the U.S. Mainland ...................................................... 1
U.S. Force Relocations from Japan and South Korea ................................................................... 2
Concerns and Issues for Congress ............................................................................................... 5
Rationales ............................................................................................................................. 5
Concerns............................................................................................................................... 6
Alliances............................................................................................................................... 7
China .................................................................................................................................... 8
Major Legislation.................................................................................................................. 9
Tables
Table 1. Illustrative Sailing Distances and Time........................................................................... 6
Contacts
Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................ 9
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Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments
Strategic Significance of Guam for Defense Buildup
Guam is a U.S. territory long valued as strategically significant to U.S. forward deployments in
the Western Pacific. In the Pacific Ocean, Hawaii is about 2,400 miles west of California, and
Guam is about 3,800 miles further west of Hawaii. Guam has two important U.S. military bases:
Apra Naval Base and Andersen Air Force Base. The island, three times the size of Washington,
DC, is home to about 171,000 residents. As the Defense Department has faced increased tension
on the Korean peninsula and requirements to fight the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Pacific
Command (PACOM), since 2000, has built up air and naval forces on Guam to boost U.S.
deterrence and power projection in Asia. Concerns include crisis response, counter-terrorism, and
contingencies in the Pacific. The defense buildup on Guam has been moderate.
Visiting Guam in May 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that Guam’s buildup will be
“one of the largest movements of military assets in decades” and will help to “maintain a robust
military presence in a critical part of the world.”1 Under President Obama, Secretary Gates issued
the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in February 2010, in which the United States noted the
importance of implementing the U.S.-Japan Realignment Roadmap of 2006 that will ensure the
deployment of U.S. forces in Japan and transform Guam into a regional security hub. The QDR
also announced the development of a new joint Air-Sea Battle Concept, to integrate the air, sea,
land, space, and cyberspace forces of the Air Force and Navy to counter challenges to U.S.
freedom of action, defeat adversaries with sophisticated anti-access and area-denial capabilities,
and improve power projection operations. Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn III visited
Guam in July and stressed Guam’s value, saying “from bases here, our forces can ensure the
security of our allies, quickly respond to disaster and humanitarian needs, safeguard the sea lanes
that are so vital to the world economy, and address any military provocation.”2
Force Relocations and Deployments from the U.S.
Mainland
In 2000, the press reported that the Air Force wanted to base elements of an Air Expeditionary
Force in Guam and had sent B-2 stealth bombers to Guam to broaden the range of U.S. options
for possible contingencies involving North Korea. As PACOM’s Commander, Admiral Dennis
Blair acquired approval to forward deploy air-launched cruise missiles on Guam for the first time
in August 2000. The Air Force moved precision munitions to be stockpiled on Guam, including
Joint Direct Attack Munitions and Joint Standoff Weapons.3 In early 2001, the Navy announced
that it would station up to three nuclear attack submarines at Guam, in order to shorten the transit
time compared to traveling from homeports in Hawaii or California to the western Pacific and to
shorten deployments for sailors. The first sub to be based at Guam arrived in October 2002. In
July 2007, the USS Buffalo joined USS Houston and USS City of Corpus Christi as the three
forward-deployed nuclear-power attack submarines (SSN) permanently based at Guam. In 2010,
1 Donna Miles, “Gates Views Growth Under Way in Guam,” American Forces Press Service, May 30, 2008.
2 Quoted by American Forces Press Service, July 27, 2010.
3 Thomas Ricks, “For Pentagon, Asia Moving to Forefront,” Washington Post, May 26, 2000; “Inside the Ring,”
Washington Times, August 25, 2000; Robert Burns, “Air Force Plan Could Place Bombers Closer to Targets,” Seattle
Times, November 30, 2000.
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the USS Oklahoma City was scheduled to replace the USS City of Corpus Christi at Guam. The
three submarines based at Guam formed part of the Navy’s deployment of 31 of 53 (or 59%) of
attack submarines in the Pacific (a greater presence than that in the Atlantic) by the end of 2009.
Moreover, in mid-2010, three Ohio-class guided-missile submarines (SSGN), USS Michigan,
USS Ohio, and USS Florida, showed their presence in the Asian-Pacific region and used Guam to
support their operations.4
In 2002, the Commander of Pacific Air Forces publicly detailed his request for basing aircraft in
Guam. In addition to munition stockpiles and jet fuel, he reportedly requested F-22 stealth
fighters, 767 tankers, C-17 transports, bombers, and Global Hawk reconnaissance drones.5 In
March 2003, after a new Air Expeditionary Wing was activated at Guam’s Andersen Air Force
Base, B-1 and B-52 bombers deployed temporarily on a rotational basis from air bases in Texas
and Louisiana as U.S. forces prepared for war against Iraq. Beyond rotation of aircraft, the Air
Force began continuous deployment of aircraft into Guam. As part of this build-up, the first B-52
bombers (stationed out of Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota) to deploy to Andersen arrived
in February 2004.6 In April 2005, the Commander of Pacific Air Forces said that B-2 stealth
bombers started to fly out of Andersen. In April 2005, F-15 fighters temporarily deployed to
Andersen from Idaho. An Air Force official said in 2006 that the Air Force planned to station KC-
135 tankers on Guam. In May 2007, the Air Force announced the deployment of 18 F-16 fighters
to Guam for four months. In the summer of 2008, several F-22 fighters, based in Alaska since
2007, began deployments to Guam. Also, Andersen Air Force Base planned to have four to six
Global Hawks for an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Strike Task Force by
2009. However, in March 2007, the Navy decided not to homeport the aircraft carrier USS Carl
Vinson at Guam. Nonetheless, by 2009, the Navy had a plan for a transient berth in Apra Harbor
to support an aircraft carrier for up to three weeks at least twice a year.7
U.S. Force Relocations from Japan and South Korea
In May 2006, the United States and Japan signed a detailed “Roadmap” to broaden military
cooperation, mostly dealing with changes and additions to U.S. forces in Japan. It provides for the
relocation of the headquarters of the III Marine Expeditionary Force and 8,000 U.S. marines from
Okinawa to Guam by 2014. Approximately 7,000 marines will remain on Okinawa. The cost of
4 Christian Bohmfalk, “Navy Decides to Homeport Up to Three Attack Submarines in Guam,” Inside the Navy, January
29, 2001; Nathan Hodge, “Navy Basing Subs in Guam,” Defense Week, October 1, 2002; Navy Newsstand, July 12,
2007; Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, December 4, 2009; South China Morning Post, July 4, 2010.
5 Jim Wolf, “U.S. General Urges Warplanes Be Sent to Guam,” Reuters, August 23, 2002.
6 PACOM, “B-1Bs, B-52Hs Arrive in Guam,” March 6, 2003; Robert Burns, “Air Force Wants to Put Fighters and
Bombers Back on Guam in Pacific,” AP, January 13, 2004; Michael Sirak, “U.S. Considers Bomber Presence on
Guam,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 21, 2004; PACOM, “Bomber Deployment to Guam,” February 2, 2004;
“Bombers Arrive At Andersen,” AFN; Katie Worth, “B-52 Bombers Arrive,” Pacific Daily News, February 23, 2004.
7 Martin Matishak, “Hester: Air Force to Bolster Presence in Asia-Pacific Region,” Inside the Air Force, April 29,
2005; Natalie Quinata, “Fighter Squadron Arrives on Guam,” Pacific Daily News, April 30, 2005; Gregg Kakesako,
“U.S. Military to Beef Up Its Presence on Guam,” Honolulu Star-Bulletin, June 21, 2006; “United States to deploy 18
F-16s to Guam,” Reuters News, May 24, 2007; Frank Whitman, “No Big Changes at Andersen Right Away, New 36th
Wing Commander Says,” Stars and Stripes, November 18, 2006; Nelson Daranciang, “Senators Hope Naval Presence
Will Grow,” Honolulu Star-Bulletin, March 31, 2007; Audrey McAvoy, “Air Force to Deploy Alaska-based F-22
Raptors to Guam,” AP, May 21, 2008, quoting the Commander of Pacific Air Forces, General Carrol Chandler; Navy
Secretary Donald Winter, Report on Department of Defense Planning Efforts for Guam, September 15, 2008; “Rear
Admiral Addresses Business Leaders on Guam’s Military Importance,” KUAM, February 25, 2009.
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the relocation is estimated at $10.27 billion. Of this amount, Japan pledged to contribute $6.09
billion, including direct financing of facilities and infrastructure on Guam.8
Visiting South Korea in June 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced that U.S. troops
there would remain at about 28,000, instead of carrying out the plan of 2004 to restructure U.S.
forces by reducing troop strength from 37,000 to 25,000 by September 2008. U.S. officials
indicated that further withdrawals of Army forces would be possible, primarily to support the
requirements of the Army and Marine Corps in the active theaters of Iraq and Afghanistan. The
U.S. Air Force planned to relocate expeditionary combat support units from South Korea and
Japan to consolidate them on Guam.
On February 5, 2009, Admiral Timothy Keating, Commander of the Pacific Command (PACOM)
told Reuters that the transfer of 8,000 marines to Guam might be delayed and cost more, but
observers questioned his authority for the statement. Indeed, PACOM clarified the next day that
the goals remain to start the related construction by 2010 and to complete relocation by 2014.
Soon after, on February 17, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Tokyo and signed the
bilateral “Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Japan Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III Marine
Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents From Okinawa to Guam” that reaffirmed
the “Roadmap” of May 1, 2006. The two governments agreed that of the estimated $10.27 billion
cost of the facilities and infrastructure development for the relocation, Japan would provide $6.09
billion, including up to $2.8 billion in direct cash contributions (in FY2008 dollars). The United
States committed to fund $3.18 billion plus about $1 billion for a road. Under the agreement,
about 8,000 personnel from the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and about 9,000 of their
dependents would relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014.
In addition to Japan’s financial contribution, the relocation to Guam would be dependent upon
Japan’s progress toward completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). In the
“Roadmap,” the United States and Japan agreed to replace the Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS)
Futenma with the FRF constructed using landfill and located in another, less populated area of
Okinawa (at Camp Schwab). The FRF would be part of an interconnected package that includes
relocation to the FRF, return of MCAS Futenma, transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, and
consolidation of facilities and return of land on Okinawa.
In April 2009, the lower house of Japan’s parliament, the Diet, voted to approve the bilateral
agreement, and the Diet ratified it on May 13, 2009. The next day, the Department of State
welcomed the Diet’s ratification of the agreement and reiterated the U.S. commitment to the
completion of the relocation of 8,000 marines to Guam from Okinawa, host to about 25,000 U.S.
military personnel and their dependents.
However, on September 16, 2009, Yukio Hatoyama of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)
became Prime Minister. This political change raised uncertainty when Japan sought to re-
negotiate the agreement even as the United States sought its implementation. The DPJ had called
for the Futenma air station to be relocated outside of Okinawa, with concerns about the impact on
the local people and environment. (On U.S. discussions with Japan and its domestic dispute over
Futenma, see CRS Report RL33436, Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress.) In Tokyo on
8 Karl Eiselberg, “Finalized U.S.-Japan Defense Accord Masks Some Deeper Concerns in Security Alliance,” Daily
Report, May 5, 2006; Linda Sieg, “U.S.-Japan Security Overhaul Gives Tokyo Bigger Role,” Reuters, May 16, 2006.
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October 21, Defense Secretary Robert Gates stressed to Japan’s Defense Minister Toshimi
Kitazawa the importance of implementing the agreement by “moving forward expeditiously on
the roadmap as agreed.” Gates said at a news conference that “without the [FRF], there will be no
relocation to Guam. And without relocation to Guam, there will be no consolidation of forces and
return of land in Okinawa.” But by the time of President Obama’s visit on November 13, 2009,
the two leaders could only announce a “working group” to discuss differences. The U.S. side
agreed to discuss the agreement’s “implementation,” but Japan sought to “review” the agreement.
Still, Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa said on December 8 that Japan would earmark about
US$535 million in the 2010 budget for the transfer of U.S. marines to Guam. At a meeting in
Honolulu on January 12, 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stressed moving on the
implementation of the agreement but also acknowledged that the alliance had lots of other
business to conduct. She expressed an expectation of a decision on the FRF by May, after Foreign
Minister Katsuya Okada conveyed Hatoyama’s promise to decide by that time. Visiting Tokyo on
January 15, Senator Daniel Inouye said Hatoyama reiterated this promise to decide by May.
Meanwhile, on May 20, 2010, the Republic of Korea (ROK), or South Korea, announced that an
international investigation found that an attack on March 26 by the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, sank the ROK’s naval ship, Cheonan, and killed 46 sailors.
President Obama condemned that “act of aggression.” The crisis provoked by the DPRK
catalyzed Japan’s resolution of the dispute over the realignment.
Moreover, in April, Japan said that China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) deployed
ships and submarines near Japan’s southern islands of Okinawa and Miyakojima and dangerously
confronted Japan’s surveillance forces, including pointing guns from a PLAN destroyer at Japan’s
maritime patrol plane and flying a helicopter in close approach to Japan’s destroyer in at least two
incidents. The next month, China’s maritime survey ship approached and chased away Japan’s
Coast Guard survey ship in the East China Sea, demanding that Japan’s ship stop its surveys.
While the crisis with the DPRK involved an attack that sank the ROK’s ship and killed its sailors,
the PLA’s aggressiveness did not result in conflict at that time. Nonetheless, later in July,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and Pacific Security Affairs Wallace Gregson testified to
Congress that both the actions by North Korea and China (the PLAN’s deployment of a Surface
Action Group near Okinawa) prompted Japan’s recognition of vital U.S. deterrence.9
On May 28, 2010, in Tokyo, Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of State Clinton along
with their counterparts in Japan issued a “2+2” Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security
Consultative Committee. Thus, Japan reaffirmed its commitment to implement the 2006
Roadmap and 2009 Agreement on relocation of marines from Okinawa to Guam. The following
month, Japan’s new Prime Minister Naoto Kan affirmed the bilateral agreement. The two
countries are to decide on details concerning Okinawa by August. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy
reportedly has questioned the completion of the relocation of Marines to Guam by 2014.10
9 Before a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, July 27, 2010.
10 Yomiuri, July 23, 2010.
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Concerns and Issues for Congress
Rationales
One rationale for the military build-up on Guam is its status as a U.S. territory. Thus, the United
States is not required to negotiate with sovereign countries on force deployments or face the risks
of losing bases or access. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited Guam in November 2003
and expressed support for building up Guam as he considered a new round of base closings.11 In
contrast, the United States had to close Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base in the
Philippines in 1992, and countries like South Korea could restrict the use of U.S. forces based
there. U.S. forces based in Guam also do not have to contend with political sensitivities over
nuclear powered vessels. Moreover, some countries, including allies, have raised doubts about
their support for U.S. forces in a possible conflict between the United States and China.
Another rationale is the expansion of options that Guam offers to the evolving U.S. force
structure. As Commander of PACOM, Admiral William Fallon expressed his vision for Guam as
a staging area from which ships, aircraft, and troops can “surge” to the Asian theater. He stressed
“flexibility,” saying “we need to have forces ready to react,” and we must have built-in
flexibility” to meet emergencies (including disaster relief).12 In 2004, the Navy held “Summer
Pulse 04,” its first exercise to increase readiness to “surge” operations in response to a crisis or
emergency. In June 2006, PACOM held the “Valiant Shield” exercise that brought three aircraft
carriers to waters off Guam.
A third rationale is the need to counter what commanders call the “tyranny of distance.” PACOM,
headquartered in Honolulu, has an area of responsibility that encompasses almost 60% of the
world’s population, over 50% of the earth’s surface, the Pacific and Indian Oceans, 16 time zones,
and five of seven U.S. defense treaties. U.S. forces on Guam are much closer to East Asia, where
the United States has alliances with Australia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines.
The United States also has concerns in Asia about threats to peace and stability in the East China
Sea, South China Sea and over terrorist threats in Southeast Asia, humanitarian crises, and
security for sea lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly through the Straits of Malacca.
Combat aircraft on Guam can reach Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, or the Korean peninsula in two to
five hours.13 Moreover, Table 1 presents the shorter sailing distance and time from Guam to
Manila in East Asia, compared to that from Honolulu, Seattle, and San Diego.
11 James Brooke, “Looking for Friendly Overseas Base, Pentagon Finds it Already Has One,” New York Times, April 7,
2004.
12 Richard Halloran, “Guam Seen as Pivotal U.S. Base,” Washington Times, March 11, 2006.
13 Donna Miles, “Gates Views Massive Growth Under Way in Guam,” AFPS, May 30, 2008.
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Table 1. Illustrative Sailing Distances and Time
To Manila, from:
Statute miles
Days at 20 knots
Days at 30 knots
Guam 1,724
3.1
2.1
Honolulu 5,482
9.9
6.6
Seattle 6,853
12.4
8.3
San Diego
7,595
13.8
9.2
Notes: Sailing distances in statute miles were calculated using nautical miles reported by “Distances Between
Ports,” 2001, published by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. Also, 1 nautical mile equals 1.15 statute
miles, and 1 knot equals 1.15 mph.
Concerns
As U.S. forces relocate to Guam, the state of its infrastructure has been of concern to some
policymakers. Also, Guam’s political leaders have expressed concerns about the impact of
additional deployments on its infrastructure, including utilities, roads, and water supplies. Guam’s
location in the Western Pacific also requires construction of protection for U.S. forces and assets
against typhoons. In the fall of 2006, PACOM officials briefed Guam on some aspects of an
undisclosed draft plan for military expansion, the Integrated Military Development Plan, with
possible military projects worth a total of about $15 billion.14 In addition, Guam’s size and
remoteness and conditions raised more questions about hosting and educating military
dependents, training on Guam and with other units in Asia, Hawaii, or the west coast, and costs
and time for extended logistical support and travel. Addressing another concern, a former
commander of Marine Forces Pacific urged in 2007 that Guam’s buildup include more than
infrastructure to develop also human capital, communities, and the environment.15 In 2009,
Wallace Gregson became Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs.
Guam’s higher military profile could increase its potential as an American target for terrorists and
adversaries during a possible conflict. China is believed to have deployed ballistic missiles that
could target Guam. In addition, in 2008 North Korea started to deploy its intermediate range
ballistic missile (Taepodong-X) with a range of about 1,860 miles that could reach Guam,
according to South Korea’s 2008 Defense White Paper.16 Any such vulnerabilities could raise
Guam’s requirements for both counterterrorism and missile defense measures.
Moreover, some say that Guam is still too distant from flash points in the Asia and advocate
closer cooperation with countries such as Singapore, Australia, the Philippines, and Japan.17
Building up the U.S. presence in those countries could enhance alliances or partnerships, increase
interoperability, and reduce costs for the United States.
In July 2010, the U.S. Navy’s Joint Guam Program Office issued the Final Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) on implications of the defense buildup on Guam.18 The detailed study estimated a
14 KUAM News, September 12, 2006; Pacific Daily News, September 13, 2006; Stars and Stripes, September 17, 2006.
15 W. C. “Chip” Gregson, “New Thinking Needed on Pacific Frontier,” Honolulu Advertiser, December 7, 2007.
16 Sam Kim, “N. Korea Deploys Medium-Range Missiles, Bolsters Special Forces,” Yonhap, Seoul, February 23, 2009.
17 Thomas Donnelly, “Rebasing, Revisited,” American Enterprise Institute, December 2004.
18 Joint Guam Program Office, “Final Environmental Impact Statement: Guam and CNMI Military Relocation,” public
release on July 29, 2010. This followed the Draft Environment Impact Statement issued in November 2009.
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higher population increase than the move of 8,000 marines to Guam. A total of 8,552 Marines
plus 630 Army soldiers would form the 9,182 permanent military personnel to relocate to Guam.
The total military population on Guam would increase by 30,190 (including 9,182 permanent
military personnel, 9,950 dependents, 9,222 transient military personnel, and 1,836 civilian
workers). In addition, construction workers and others would mean a total increase in population
of about 79,000 at the peak in 2014.
The study also found that Guam cannot accommodate all training for the relocated marines, and
the nearby island of Tinian (100 miles away) would help to provide land for their training. There
would be a challenge for sustaining operational readiness in training while limiting the time and
expense to travel to train. The study found that “the training ranges currently planned for Guam
and Tinian only replicate existing individual-skills training capabilities on Okinawa and do not
provide for all requisite collective, combined arms, live and maneuver training the Marine Corps
forces must meet to sustain core competencies. As with Marine Corps forces currently in
Okinawa who must now travel to mainland Japan, other partner nations, and the U.S. to
accomplish this requisite core competency training, the Marine Corps forces relocating from
Okinawa to Guam would also have to use alternate locations to accomplish requisite core
competency training.” In addition, the Navy would need a new deep-draft wharf at Apra Harbor
to support a transient aircraft carrier. Third, the Army would relocate about 600 military personnel
to establish and operate an Air and Missile Defense Task Force (AMDTF).
Alliances
The Guam Integrated Military Development Plan, parts of which were reported in October 2006,
indicated that U.S. Army units withdrawn from South Korea were not likely to be stationed on
Guam.19 The Pentagon’s restructuring plan reportedly intended to maintain U.S. air power in
South Korea, particularly the three squadrons of F-16 fighters based at Osan Air Base. An
emphasis on U.S. offshore forces in South Korean security could affect decisions regarding the
mix of U.S. forces based on Guam and rotated into Guam from other bases. This might especially
be true of heavy bombers, which the Air Force rotates into Guam from bases in the United States.
Concerns about maintaining deterrence after U.S. reductions of ground forces might lead
PACOM to increase exercises of heavy bombers and/or aircraft carrier strike groups near Korea.20
Under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, U.S. concerns involved possible conflict between China
and Japan over their competing claims to the Senkaku islands (called Diaoyu islands by China) in
the East China Sea. The United States administered the islands after World War II and turned
them over to Japanese administration in 1972. Clinton and Bush Administration officials stated
that the Senkakus fall under the scope of the U.S.-Japan alliance.21 In September 2005, the PLA
Navy deployed five naval ships to the disputed area in the East China Sea with competing
territorial and oil claims. For training, Guam has provided valuable and less constrained airspace
and bombing ranges for the air forces of Japan, Thailand, Singapore, South Korea, and Australia.
19 Murayama Kohei, “U.S. to Triple Troops in Guam, but No Earlier Than 2010 for Marines,” Kyodo, October 3, 2006.
20 Bill Gertz, “More Muscle, With Eye on China,” Washington Times, April 20, 2006; Robert Burns, “U.S. Air Power
in East Asia Has Grown,” Associated Press, October 11, 2006.
21 “U.S.-Japan Treaty Covers Disputed Isles,” Reuters, November 28, 1996; and Yoichi Funabashi, “Maintain the
Armitage Doctrine Quietly,” Asahi Shimbun, February 2, 2004.
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China
China’s civilian and military commentators commonly have suspected that the U.S. defense
build-up on Guam partly has been aimed at China, which has threatened to use the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) against Taiwan. U.S. policy on helping Taiwan’s self-defense is governed
not by a defense treaty but by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8. Some concerns about
the PLA’s accelerated modernization since the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996 also have
expanded beyond a focus on Taiwan to include PLA preparations for possible conflicts with the
United States, Japan, and others. In Southeast Asia, China claims much of the South China Sea as
well as the disputed Spratly and Paracel Islands in that sea as its “sovereign territory.” The PLA
has increased attention to Guam and has been building up its submarine force (both nuclear-
powered and diesel-electric). In November 2004, the PLA Navy sent a Han-class nuclear attack
submarine to waters off Guam before intruding into Japan’s territorial water.22 In 2007, PACOM
Commander Admiral Timothy Keating visited Guam and acknowledged that its defense buildup
was partly due to concerns about tension over Taiwan and deterrence of North Korea. At the same
time, he stressed U.S. transparency, saying the buildup was not “under the cover of darkness.”23
Under President Obama, the QDR issued in February 2010 announced the development of a new
joint Air-Sea Battle Concept, as noted above. The QDR’s discussion of that concept did not name
China. Nevertheless, some analysts discussed Air-Sea Battle as a way to counter the PLA’s rising
capabilities in anti-access and area-denial (to prevent U.S. forces from entering into a theater of
operations and to prevent U.S. freedom of action in an area under an adversary’s control).24
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia Michael Schiffer testified to Congress in
March 2010 that the implementation of the 2006 Realignment Roadmap would help meet shared
security challenges, including the threat posed by North Korea and uncertainty posed by the
PLA’s “rapid” modernization. Testifying to Congress in the same month, PACOM Commander
Admiral Robert Willard cited the PLA Air Force’s fighters and air defense systems for U.S.
deployment of F-22 fighters in the Pacific, including at Guam’s Andersen Air Force Base.25
Still, a policy challenge has been to deter any aggression by China as well as to assure it that a
U.S. goal is cooperation with this rising power as a “responsible stakeholder.” The Commander of
Pacific Air Forces said in May 2005 that the PLA’s modernization gave him “pause for interest”
but did not make a difference in significant force redeployment.26 Also, in 2006, Guam became a
focal point for improving military-to-military relations with China. To blunt charges that Guam’s
build-up targeted China, PACOM’s Commander, Admiral Fallon, invited PLA observers to the
U.S. “Valiant Shield” exercise that brought three aircraft carriers to waters off Guam in June
2006. The PLA Navy sent a Deputy Chief of Staff and specialist in submarine operations to lead
the observers, who also boarded an aircraft carrier and visited Guam’s air and naval bases. Two
C-17 transport aircraft flew supplies from Guam to China for earthquake relief in May 2008.
22 Kyodo World Service, November 16, 2004.
23 Audrey McAvoy, “U.S. Pacific Commander Says Taiwan is Factor in Guam Buildup,” AP, April 15, 2007.
24 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, “AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept,” May
18, 2010; Bruce Rolfsen, “Air Force-Navy Team May Counter China Threat,” Navy Times, May 23, 2010.
25 Testimonies before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment,
March 17, 2010; and Senate Armed Services Committee, March 26, 2010.
26 General Paul Hester, interview with Inside the Air Force, May 6, 2005.
Congressional Research Service
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Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments
Major Legislation
In July 2006, the Senate Appropriations Committee issued a report (S.Rept. 109-286) on the
Military Construction and Veteran Affairs Appropriations Act, which expressed concerns about a
construction program on Guam estimated to cost $10.3 billion (with Japan paying 60%) and
expectations of a master plan for Guam from the Defense Secretary by December 29, 2006. In the
Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2008 (that became P.L. 110-161 on December 26, 2007),
the Appropriations Committees decided against a Senate provision that would have required the
Defense Secretary to submit the master plan by December 29, 2007 and provided more time for a
report by September 15, 2008. In response, the Navy Secretary reported on planning for Guam,
with initiatives for the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. Also, he reported that the
Pentagon was developing the Guam Joint Military Master Plan.27 The National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2009 (that became P.L. 110-417 on October 14, 2008), inter alia,
authorized a total of about $180 million for Guam’s military construction projects, established a
Treasury account for all contributions for military realignment and relocations, and required the
Defense Secretary to report on military construction projects by February 15 of each year.
On May 7, 2009, days before Japan’s Diet ratified the relocation agreement with the United
States, Defense Secretary Gates submitted the proposed defense budget for FY2010. As part of
the realignment of the Global Defense Posture, he requested $378 million to start construction in
Guam to support the relocation of 8,000 marines from Japan in order to strengthen the U.S.-Japan
alliance. This amount would contribute to the total U.S. cost of $4.18 billion for the relocation.
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 (H.R. 2647, enacted as P.L. 111-84 on
October 28, 2009) authorized the first substantial incremental funding for the relocation of
marines from Okinawa to Guam, but conditioned upon the Defense Department’s submission to
Congress of a Guam Master Plan. Among a number of provisions related to Guam in the
legislation and conference report, Congress designated the Deputy Secretary of Defense to lead a
Guam Executive Council and coordinate interagency efforts related to Guam. Congress also
required a report on training, readiness, and movement requirements for Marine Forces Pacific,
with a sense of Congress that expansion of Marine Corps training should not impact the
implementation of the U.S.-Japan agreement on relocation from Okinawa to Guam. Congress
authorized a total amount (including for Defense-wide, Army, Navy, and Air Force) of almost
$733 million. (On appropriations related to military construction on Guam, see CRS Report
R40731, Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies: FY2010 Appropriations.)
Author Contact Information
Shirley A. Kan
Specialist in Asian Security Affairs
skan@crs.loc.gov, 7-7606
27 Donald Winter, “Department of Defense Planning Efforts for Guam,” September 15, 2008.
Congressional Research Service
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