Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
July 28, 2010
Congressional Research Service
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www.crs.gov
RL34170
CRS Report for Congress
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repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations
Summary
With limited natural resources, a crippling illiteracy rate, and high population growth, Yemen
faces an array of daunting development challenges that some observers believe make it at risk for
becoming a failed state. In 2009, Yemen ranked 140 out of 182 countries on the United Nations
Development Program’s Human Development Index, a score comparable to the poorest sub-
Saharan African countries. Over 43% of the population of nearly 24 million people lives below
the poverty line, and per capita GDP is estimated to be between $650 and $800. Yemen is largely
dependent on external aid from Persian Gulf countries, Western donors, and international
financial institutions, though its per capita share of assistance is below the global average.
As the country’s population rapidly rises, resources dwindle, terrorist groups take root in the
outlying provinces, and a southern secessionist movement grows, the Obama Administration and
the 111th Congress are left to grapple with the consequences of Yemeni instability. Traditionally,
U.S.-Yemeni relations have been tepid, as the lack of strong military-to-military partnership, trade
relations, and cross cultural exchanges has hindered the development of close bilateral ties.
During the early years of the Bush Administration, relations improved under the rubric of the war
against Al Qaeda, though Yemen’s lax policy toward wanted terrorists and U.S. concerns about
governance and corruption have stalled large-scale U.S. support.
Over the past several fiscal years, Yemen has received on average between $20 and $25 million
annually in total U.S. foreign aid. In FY2010, Yemen is receiving $58.4 million in aid. The
Defense Department also is providing Yemen’s security forces with $150 million worth of
training and equipment for FY2010. For FY2011, the Obama Administration requested $106
million in U.S. economic and military assistance to Yemen.
As President Obama and the 111th Congress reassess U.S. policy toward the Arab world, the
opportunity for improved U.S.-Yemeni ties is strong, though tensions persist over
counterterrorism cooperation. In recent years, the broader U.S. foreign policy community has not
adequately focused on Yemen, its challenges, and their potential consequences for U.S. foreign
policy interests beyond the realm of counterterrorism.
The failed bomb attack against Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on Christmas Day 2009 once again
highlighted the potential for terrorism emanating from Yemen, a potential that periodically
emerges to threaten U.S. interests both at home and abroad. Whether terrorist groups in Yemen,
such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, have a long-term ability to threaten U.S. homeland
security may determine the extent of U.S. resources committed to counterterrorism and
stabilization efforts there. Some believe these groups lack such capability and fear the United
States might overreact; others assert that Yemen is gradually becoming a failed state and safe
haven for Al Qaeda operatives and as such should be considered an active theater for U.S.
counterterrorism operations. Given Yemen’s contentious political climate and its myriad
development challenges, most long-time Yemen watchers suggest that security problems
emanating from Yemen may persist in spite of increased U.S. or international efforts to combat
them.
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Contents
Country Overview....................................................................................................................... 1
A Perpetually Failing State: Yemen and the Dilemma for U.S. National Security
Policy ................................................................................................................................ 2
Manifestations of State Failure in Yemen..................................................................................... 4
Terrorism and Al Qaeda ........................................................................................................ 4
U.S.-Yemeni Counterterrorism Cooperation: 2009 to the Present ..................................... 4
Profiles of AQAP Leaders and Other Radical Yemeni Islamists ....................................... 8
Tribal Support for AQAP?............................................................................................... 9
AQAP’s Threat to the Homeland and Attempts to Radicalize Foreign Nationals
and American Citizens ............................................................................................... 11
The Al Houthi Revolt in Northern Sa’da Province ............................................................... 13
Unrest in the South.............................................................................................................. 15
The Major Challenges: Subsidies, Water Depletion, Declining Oil Revenues, and Qat ......... 17
Poor Governance and Uncertainty over Presidential Succession .......................................... 20
Foreign Relations ...................................................................................................................... 22
Somalia: Piracy, Terrorism, and Refugees............................................................................ 22
Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) ........................................................... 23
Saudi Arabia ....................................................................................................................... 23
U.S. Relations and Foreign Aid ................................................................................................. 24
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Yemen ....................................................................................... 25
Military Aid .................................................................................................................. 26
Economic Aid ............................................................................................................... 29
Yemeni Detainees at Guantanamo Bay ................................................................................ 30
Recent Legislation .............................................................................................................. 30
FY2011 Defense Authorization Bills ............................................................................. 30
Other Recent Legislation............................................................................................... 31
International Aid and Calls for Reform in Yemen ...................................................................... 32
Conclusion and U.S. Policy Options.......................................................................................... 35
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Yemen.............................................................................................................. 2
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Aid to Yemen .......................................................................................... 26
Table 2. 1206 Department of Defense Funding for Yemen FY2006-FY2010 .............................. 28
Table 3. International Pledges to Yemen: London Donors Conference 2006 ............................... 33
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Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 36
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Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations
Country Overview
Located at the southwestern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen is an impoverished Arab country
with a population of 23.8 million. The country’s rugged terrain and geographic isolation, strong
tribal social structure, and sparsely settled population has historically made it difficult to centrally
govern (and conquer), a feature that has promoted a more pluralistic political environment, but
that also has hampered socioeconomic development. Outside of the capital of Sana’a, tribal
leaders often exert more control than central and local government authorities. Kidnappings of
Yemeni officials and foreign tourists have been carried out mainly by dissatisfied tribal groups
pressing the government for financial largesse or for infrastructure projects in their districts.
A series of Zaydi1 Islamic dynasties ruled parts of Yemen both directly and nominally from 897
until 1962. The Ottoman Empire occupied a small portion of the Western Yemeni coastline
between 1849 and 1918. In 1839, the British Empire captured the port of Aden, which it held,
including some of its surrounding territories, until 1967.
The 20th century political upheavals in the Arab world driven by anti-colonialism and Arab
nationalism tore Yemen apart in the 1960s. In the north, a civil war pitting royalist forces backed
by Saudi Arabia against a republican movement backed by Egypt ultimately led to the dissolution
of the Yemeni Imamate and the creation of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). In the south, a
Yemeni Marxist movement became the primary vehicle for resisting the British occupation of
Aden. Communist insurgents eventually succeeded in establishing their own socialist state
(People's Democratic Republic of Yemen or PDRY) that over time developed close ties to the
Soviet Union and supported what were then radical Palestinian terrorist organizations.
Throughout the Cold War, the two Yemeni states frequently clashed, and the United States
assisted the YAR, with Saudi Arabian financial support, by periodically providing it with
weaponry.
By the mid-1980s, relations between North and South Yemen improved, aided in part by the
discovery of modest oil reserves. The Republic of Yemen was formed by the merger of the
formerly separate states of North Yemen and South Yemen in 1990. However, Yemen’s support
for Iraq during Operation Desert Storm crippled the country economically, as Saudi Arabia and
other Gulf states expelled an estimated 850,000 expatriate Yemeni workers (The United States
also cut off ties to the newly unified state). In 1994, government forces loyal to President Ali
Abdullah Saleh put down an attempt by southern-based dissidents to secede. Many southerners
still resent what they perceive as continued northern political economic and cultural domination
of daily life.
1 The population of Yemen is almost entirely Muslim, divided between Zaydis, found in much of the north (and a
majority in the northwest), and Shafi’is, found mainly in the south and east. Zaydis belong to a branch of Shi’a Islam,
while Shafi’is follow one of several Sunni Muslim legal schools. Yemen’s Zaydis take their name from their fifth
Imam, Zayd ibn Ali. They are doctrinally distinct from the Twelvers, the dominant branch of Shi’a Islam in Iran and
Lebanon. Twelver Shiites believe that the 12th Imam, Muhammad al Mahdi, has been hidden by Allah and will reappear
on Earth as the savior of mankind. For more information, see CRS Report RS21745, Islam: Sunnis and Shiites, by
Christopher M. Blanchard.
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Figure 1. Map of Yemen
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS (July 2010)
President Saleh, a former YAR military officer, has governed Yemen since the unified state came
into being in 1990; prior to this, he had headed the former state of North Yemen from 1978 to
1990. In Yemen’s first popular presidential election, held in 1999, President Saleh won 96.3% of
the vote amidst allegations of ballot tampering. In 2006, Saleh stood for reelection and received
77% of the vote. The President’s current and last term expires in 2013, barring any future
constitutional amendments.
A Perpetually Failing State: Yemen and the Dilemma for U.S.
National Security Policy
Throughout his decades of rule, President Saleh has balanced various political forces—tribes,
political parties, military officials, and radical Islamists—to create a stable ruling coalition that
has kept his regime intact. He has also managed relations with a changing coterie of international
supporters, including other Arab states, the Soviet Union, the United States, European countries,
and numerous international organizations, seeking support in times of crisis and leveraging
external assistance to meet internal challenges. Throughout this period, experts have periodically
warned about the impending collapse of the Yemeni state and its potential consequences for
regional or international security. President Saleh has consistently overcome obstacles to his
continued rule, even as Yemen’s overall political and economic situation has deteriorated. In
recent years, a series of events, including more numerous and sophisticated Al Qaeda attacks, an
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insurgency in the north, and civil unrest in the south, have led some experts to conclude that
Yemen may be on the verge of collapse, particularly given its increasingly precarious economic
condition.
As the country’s population rapidly rises, water and oil resources dwindle, terrorist groups take
root in the outlying provinces, and the southern population becomes increasingly restless, the
Obama Administration and Congress are left to grapple with the consequences of Yemeni
instability. Some experts suggest that the United States should focus more attention on Yemen
because of the risks that state failure would pose to U.S. national security. Some advocates also
note that instability in Yemen would affect more than just U.S. interests—it would affect global
energy security, due to Yemen’s strategic location astride the Bab al Mandab strait between the
Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Others assert that, while increased lawlessness in Yemen most
likely will lead to more terrorist activity, U.S. involvement in Yemen should stem from basic
humanitarian concerns for a poverty-stricken population desperately in need of development
assistance. Still other analysts suggest that Yemen is not of major significance to U.S. interests
and is far more important to the Gulf Arab states, notably Saudi Arabia. U.S.-Yemeni trade is
marginal, Russia and China are its major arms suppliers, and many of its conservative, tribal
leaders are suspicious of U.S. policy in the region.
With so many other pressing issues in the region to address (Iraq, Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, Somalia), Yemen is often overlooked by U.S. policymakers and opinion leaders.
However, the failed bomb attack against Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on Christmas Day 2009
thrust Yemen back into the public spotlight and heightened its relevance for global U.S.
counterterrorism operations in a way that other attacks, including failed attacks on the U.S.
Embassy in Sana’a during 2008, did not. Whether the United States can or should remain focused
on Yemen over the long term remain open questions, even as some observers criticize
policymakers for overlooking the country and underestimating the terrorist threat there.
Many analysts suggest that policymakers focus on whether terrorist groups in Yemen, such as Al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), have a sustainable ability to directly threaten U.S.
homeland security. Such a determination, some argue, should dictate the extent of U.S. resources
committed to counterterrorism and stabilization efforts there. Some argue that these groups lack
such a capability or can be denied such a capability with relatively limited U.S. support, and
contend that the United States might overreact and jeopardize the Yemeni government’s stability
through increased direct assistance. Others assert that Yemen is a failing state, and suggest that
since security problems emanating from Yemen may persist for some time that the U.S.
government should adequately prepare for Yemen to become another theater for continuing U.S.
counterterrorism operations. For many analysts, the reliability of the Yemeni government as a
partner for the United States remains an open question.
By all accounts, U.S. policymakers would benefit from taking into consideration the Yemeni
government’s views of its own interests and goals when considering potential U.S. policy
responses. The diverse views of Yemen’s citizens may also affect the outcome of U.S. policy.
Recent history suggests no clear answers to the question of how best to achieve U.S. security
objectives vis-à-vis Yemen while pursuing parallel U.S. development, governance, and human
rights goals.
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Manifestations of State Failure in Yemen
Terrorism and Al Qaeda
U.S.-Yemeni Counterterrorism Cooperation: 2009 to the Present2
Throughout 2009 and particularly since the attempted attack against Northwest Airlines Flight
253 on Christmas Day 2009, U.S.-Yemeni intelligence cooperation has expanded.3 The nature and
extent of cooperation is a delicate issue. In order to arrest AQAP members and strike AQAP
targets inside Yemen’s vast remote governorates, the United States requires access to Yemeni
security agencies and officials and their cooperation in taking the lead on military operations in
order to minimize any U.S. military footprint. In recent times and in previous periods of
heightened U.S.-Yemeni cooperation, President Saleh’s government has shown some willingness
to share intelligence and even attack AQAP targets with reported U.S. assistance, provided that
the United States contributes some equipment, training, and financial assistance to Yemen’s
military and economy respectively.4
Whether U.S.-Yemeni security cooperation can be sustained over the long term is the key
question for U.S. lawmakers and policymakers. Inevitably, at some point, disagreements arise
over Yemen’s tendency to release alleged terrorists from prison in order to placate tribal leaders
and domestic Islamist politicians who oppose U.S. “interference” in Yemen and U.S. policy in the
region in general. One report suggests that in the fall of 2009, U.S. officials met with President
Saleh and showed him “irrefutable evidence that Al Qaeda was aiming at him and his relatives,”
and “that seems to have abruptly changed Saleh's attitude.”5 At times, the United States
government itself shares the blame for limiting its bilateral cooperation with Yemen. In the past,
high level U.S. policymakers have shifted focus to what have appeared to be more pressing
counter terrorism fronts or areas of the Middle East. Yemeni leaders have grown adept at sensing
U.S. interest and have adjusted their level of cooperation accordingly. According to Abdel-Karim
al Iryani, a former prime minister, “The trust between the U.S. and Yemen comes and goes….
Everyone has his own calculations on what they want from this relationship.”6
The Role of the U.S. Military inside Yemen
In 2010, U.S.-Yemeni counterterrorism cooperation appeared to reach its apex. According to one
account of U.S. Special Operations forces worldwide, “The Special Operations capabilities
2 For more background on AQAP see, CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global
Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins
3 In May 2010, the New York Times reported that former CENTCOM commander General David H. Petraeus signed a
classified directive, known as the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Execute Order, on September 30, 2009
authorizing an expansion of clandestine military activity throughout some parts of the Middle East, including Yemen.
See, “U.S. Is Said to Expand Secret Military Acts in Mideast Region,” New York Times, May 24, 2010.
4 According to one article, after the attacks of September 11, 2001, former CIA Director George Tenet “won Saleh's
approval to fly Predator drones armed with Hellfire missiles over the country.” See, "U.S. Playing a Key Role in
Yemen Attacks; Providing data, weapons Six top leaders of al-Qaeda affiliate killed," Washington Post, January 27,
2010.
5 "Is Yemen the Next Afghanistan?," New York Times, July 6, 2010.
6 "Yemen Walks Fine Line in Aiding U.S," Washington Post, January 5, 2010.
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requested by the White House go beyond unilateral strikes and include the training of local
counterterrorism forces and joint operations with them. In Yemen, for example, ‘we are doing all
three.’”7 According to various reports, the United States has provided satellite and surveillance
imagery and intercepted communications to help Yemeni security forces carry out air raids
against AQAP. 8 Other unclassified sources report that several dozen troops from Joint Special
Operations Command (JSOC) are assisting Yemen’s security forces in planning missions and
developing tactics, in addition to providing weapons.9 According to one Reuters article, U.S.
intelligence is being shared with Yemeni security forces to facilitate their strikes against AQAP, as
one unnamed intelligence official noted, “There is a tremendous amount of focus on that
country.”10 President Saleh has stressed that any U.S. military presence in Yemen is minimal. In
one interview, he stated that:
Those reports are unfounded and there is no U.S. presence on the land of Yemen and there is
no treaty or agreement allowing the U.S. presence on our territory, but there is Yemeni-US
security cooperation in the field of counterterrorism within the framework of international
partnership in this regard…. There are no more than 50 experts contributing to the training of
the Yemeni anti-terrorism forces.11
The challenges of confronting an Al Qaeda-affiliated local terrorist group are no different in
Yemen than they are in other underdeveloped countries with weak central governments and age-
old tribal systems of governance in rural areas outside of direct state control. Yemeni public
opposition to the presence or activities of foreign military forces is well established and further
complicates matters for President Saleh and the United States government. U.S. counterterrorism
policy in Yemen, as in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere, poses a number of difficult
challenges for policymakers; namely, how does the U.S. government combat Al Qaeda-inspired
affiliates who live among the local population without creating more radicals? This question is
particularly relevant because Al Qaeda seeks to exploit for propaganda purposes any collateral
damage inflicted upon civilians.
Collateral Damage and Civilian Casualties
As the United States seeks to weaken the AQAP organization, policymakers have been careful not
to alienate local civilian populations. However, inevitably, counterterrorism operations have
resulted in some civilian casualties. On December 17, 2009, Yemeni security forces carried out
several raids and air strikes in Abyan governorate against AQAP terrorists and training camps,
and though an estimated 14 AQAP members were killed in those air strikes, an estimated 35-42
civilians (mostly women and children) also were killed, many of whom were the relatives of
AQAP members staying at the training camps. On December 19, the New York Times reported
that the United States provided firepower, possibly missile strikes, intelligence, and other support
7 "U.S. 'secret war' Expands Globally," Washington Post, June 4, 2010.
8 "US to Expand Yemen's Air Forces to Counter Al Qaeda," Reuters, February 25, 2010.
9 Op.cit., "U.S. Playing a Key Role in Yemen Attacks; Providing data, weapons Six top leaders of al-Qaeda affiliate
killed," Washington Post, January 27, 2010. The Yemeni government allowed U.S. personnel to launch a missile strike
from an unmanned aircraft against an automobile in eastern Yemen in November 2002, killing six alleged terrorists,
including Qaid Salim Sinan al Harithi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Yemen and a key planner of the attack on the USS
Cole.
10 "U.S. Expands Intelligence Operations in Yemen," Reuters, May 25, 2010.
11 Open Source Center, "No US Military Presence In Yemen: Saleh," SABA Online in English, GMP20100319950047,
March 19, 2010.
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to the government of Yemen as it carried out these strikes against AQAP.12 On June 7, 2010,
Amnesty International published a report that included photographs of a U.S.-made cruise missile
and an unexploded cluster bomblet it claimed were used in the December 17 strikes.13 According
to one Yemeni researcher:
Many consider the strike that happened in Abyan to have been American, and that the
Yemeni government faces much pressure, and even threats, to accept this American
pressure…. The most important issue is that there is a general view of semi- hostility toward
the United States, especially among religious groups and tribes, and even some national
forces. Any direct interference by the US will cause some of these powers to have sympathy
with Al Qaeda.14
The United States and Yemeni governments again suffered “blowback” from the mistaken May
24 killing of Jabir Ali al Shabwani, a deputy governor from Marib governorate who allegedly had
been killed along with four bodyguards in an air strike. Shabwani reportedly was serving as an
intermediary between the government and AQAP and may have been en route to meet with
AQAP operatives over their possible surrender.15 Some Yemenis have charged that he was killed
by a missile fired from a U.S. drone. However, the Yemeni government has taken full
responsibility and, in order to ease the anger of Shabwani’s tribe, President Saleh apologized and
formed a committee to investigate the incident. According to Foreign Minister Abubakr al Qirbi,
“If there was a drone, and we don't know, then we have to find out if this was used by the Yemeni
security forces or by others, but we don't know how the incident happened. We will have to wait
for the results of the investigation.”16 Nevertheless, for several days following the attack,
Shabwani’s larger tribe, the Ubaydah/Abidah, attacked local oil pipelines, set up roadblocks,
attacked government buildings, and clashed with the Yemeni army.
Success in Weakening AQAP
Although it nearly impossible to qualitatively assess whether the United States and Yemen have
significantly weakened AQAP, many analysts believe that the 2009-2010 campaign has, at the
minimum, put the organization on the defensive. During the past six months, Yemeni units have
arrested or killed several mid-level AQAP operatives.17 Nevertheless, AQAP remains intact and
relevant. On April 26, 2010, the group carried out an unsuccessful assassination attempt against
British Ambassador to Yemen Timothy Torlot,18 an operation that many experts believe was
12 "U.S. Aids Yemeni Raids on Al Qaeda, Officials Say," New York Times, December 19, 2009.
13 Amnesty International, Yemen: Images of Missile and Cluster Munitions Point to US role in Fatal Attack , June 7,
2010, http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/yemen-images-missile-and-cluster-munitions-point-us-role-fatal-
attack-2010-06-04.
14 "US Cluster Bombs in Yemen: The Right Weapon in Al Qaeda Fight?," Christian Science Monitor, June 7, 2010.
15 "Yemen Tribe in new Pipeline Blast over Airstrike," Reuters, May 27, 2010.
16 "INTERVIEW-Yemen may Review Methods in Al Qaeda Fight -formin," Reuters, May 31, 2010.
17 According to Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, State Department Coordinator For Counterterrorism, “This intensified
engagement has paid off. In the last month, Yemen has conducted multiple air and ground operations designed to
disrupt AQAP's operational planning and deprive its leadership of safe haven within Yemen's national territory. Yemen
has significantly increased the pressure on Al Qaida, and the United States commends the Yemeni government on these
successful operations.” See, U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional
Threats and Capabilities, Threats Posed by Al Qaeda, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., January 20, 2010.
18 A suicide bomber detonated his explosive belt moments after the ambassador passed by in an armored convoy just
outside the British Embassy in Sana’a.
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designed to demonstrate the group’s resilience in the face of pressure. In June 2010, AQAP
gunmen attacked a Political Security Organization (PSO) administration building in Aden, killing
seven military personnel, three women and a seven-year-old boy. Yemeni authorities also accused
AQAP of carrying out several other deadly attacks against government soldiers and policemen in
Shabwa and Abyan provinces in July 2010.
According to one report, the Yemeni government claims that an estimated 30 AQAP leaders have
been killed since January 2010, though these claims are often unsubstantiated. In several
instances, AQAP leaders have resurfaced after having been pronounced dead by the
government.19 In June 2010, the governor of the vast Marib province claimed to a Saudi
newspaper that the top leadership of AQAP “have been monitored in the governorate.”20 Though
the top leadership of AQAP remains intact, many of its sub-commanders have been killed,
captured, or have surrendered to authorities. The following are some recent examples:
• In June 2010, Yemeni authorities claimed that Hamza Saleh al Dayan, one of the
23 Al Qaeda operatives who escaped from a Yemeni jail in 2006, surrendered to
provincial authorities in Marib governorate. A week earlier, another operative,
Ghalib al Zayedi, surrendered to authorities in Marib governorate.21
• In May 2010, AQAP released a video tape confirming earlier deaths of several of
its senior operatives, including Abdallah al Mihdar, age 47, killed January 2010,
who led the organization in the Shabwa governorate, Muhammad Umayr al
Awlaqi who was killed in an air raid on his hideout in Abyan late December
2009, and Muhammad Salih al Kazimi, a 38-year-old former Afghanistan fighter,
killed during the air strike in Abyan in mid December 2009.22
• In May 2010, AQAP leaders announced in an audio tape that a March 2010
airstrike had killed Jamil Nasser Abdullah al Anbari (alt. sp. Ambari), a local
leader of AQAP in Abyan governorate. They also verified that another senior
leader, Nayyif bin Muhammad al Qahtani, who ran the media arm of AQAP, also
had been killed in a separate incident. On May 11, the Secretary of State
designated another two other AQAP leaders as terrorists under Executive
Order13224.23
19 "Al Qaeda's hive stings Yemen," Washington Times, April 2, 2010.
20 Open Source Center, "Yemeni Sources Report AQAP Leaders, Wanted Saudi Fugitives in Ma'rib Governorate,"
Jedda Ukaz Online in Arabic, June 14, 2010, GMP20100614614002.
21 "Yemen 'al-Qaeda man' surrenders," BBC News Middle East, June 7, 2010.
22 BBC Monitoring Middle East, "Al-Qa'idah video identifies new Saudi leader in Yemen," Al Arabiya TV, May 27,
2010.
23 On January 19, 2010, Secretary of State Clinton designated AQAP as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under
Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (INA). In addition, the Secretary also designated
AQAP and its two top leaders Nasir al Wahishi and Said al Shihri under E.O. 13224, which would, among other things,
block “all property and interests in property” of these designated terrorists and individuals and entities materially
supporting them. On May 11, the Secretary designated another two other AQAP leaders under E.O.13224, Qasim al
Rimi (Raymi) and Nayif al Qahtani (now deceased).
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Profiles of AQAP Leaders and Other Radical Yemeni Islamists
Nasir al Wuhayshi
According to a number of sources, the leader of AQAP is a former secretary of Osama bin Laden
named Nasir al Wuhayshi (alt. sp. Wahayshi). Like other well-known operatives, Al Wuhayshi
was in the 23-person contingent who escaped from a Yemeni prison in 2006. Al Wuhayshi’s
personal connection to Bin Laden has reportedly enhanced his legitimacy among his followers.
After the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, he escaped through Iran, but was arrested
there and held for two years until deported to Yemen in 2003. He led Al Qaeda in Yemen until it
assumed the mantle of its Saudi counterpart and predecessor organization in January 2009 when
he became the overall leader of AQAP, though he is not considered as charismatic as his Saudi
counterparts.
Sa’id al Shihri
Al Shihri (alt. sp. Shahri), who is the deputy commander of AQAP, is a Saudi national and former
Guantanamo detainee (#372). After his release in 2007, he participated in Saudi Arabia’s
deradicalization rehabilitation program. After leaving the kingdom and forming AQAP in Yemen,
it was believed that his presence in Yemen would boost Al Qaeda’s financing and operational
capabilities. Al Shihri's family also has been active in AQAP. His wife reportedly was married to
an AQAP militant killed by Saudi security forces in 2005. As mentioned earlier, his brother-in-
law died in a shootout with Saudi police in Jizan in October 2009. In June 2010, he called for
abductions of Saudi ministers and royals.
Qasim al Rimi
Qasim al Rimi is AQAP’s senior military commander and spokesman. Al Rimi is a Yemeni
national who is known for his recruitment of new operatives. In AQAP video and audio tapes, he
has praised attacks against the United States and threatened more. On May 11, 2010, Secretary of
State Clinton designated Rimi a terrorist under E.O. 13224.
Ibrahim Suleiman al Rubaysh
Ibrahim Suleiman al Rubaysh (alt. sp.Rubaish) is a Saudi citizen who is described as AQAP’s
theological guide. Rubaysh is a former detainee at Guantanamo Naval Station, Cuba. He was
incarcerated there until Dec. 13, 2006, when he was transferred to Saudi Arabia and placed in the
Saudi rehabilitation program for jihadists. At some point afterward, he fled to Yemen.
Uthman Ahmad al Ghamidi
Uthman Ahmad al Ghamidi (alt. sp. Othman Ahmed al Ghamdi) is one of the new Saudi leaders
of AQAP. He also is a former detainee at Guantanamo who participated in Saudi Arabia’s
rehabilitation program. He was a soldier in the Saudi military before he went to Afghanistan to
train with Al Qaeda and fight the Northern Alliance.
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Anwar al Awlaki
Yemeni-American Awlaki (alt. sp. Aulaqi) is infamous for his role in radicalizing Major Nidal M.
Hasan in the months prior to the mass shooting at Fort Hood Army Base in Texas. After the failed
Christmas Day airline bombing, information suggested that Awlaki also may have played a role in
radicalizing Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. Awlaki was born in New Mexico in 1971, and he hails
from a prominent tribal family in the southern governorate of Shabwa. Awlaki lived in Britain and
in the United States where he worked as an Imam and lecturer at several mosques, including in
Falls Church, VA. He traveled to Yemen in 2004 where he became a lecturer at Al Iman
University. He was arrested by Yemeni authorities in 2006 and interrogated by the FBI in
September 2007 for his possible contacts with some of the 9/11 hijackers. According to various
reports, he began openly supporting the use of violence against the United States after his release
from prison. On July 16, the U.S. Treasury Department designated Awlaki, pursuant to Executive
Order 13224, for supporting acts of terrorism and for acting for or on behalf of AQAP.
Shaykh Abd al Majid al Zindani
One source of strain in U.S.-Yemeni relations is the status of Shaykh Abd al Majid al Zindani, an
alleged Al Qaeda financier and recruiter whom the U.S. Treasury Department designated in
February 2004 as a U.S. Specially Designated Global Terrorist. Al Zindani is the leader of Al
Iman University located in the capital of Sana’a. U.S. officials have accused Al Zindani of using
the university as a recruiting ground for Al Qaeda, as some student groups openly advocate for a
violent jihad against the West. According to one report, the university has “a small contingent of
students that veer away from the quietist trend of their colleagues. They tend to be foreign
students that are drawn to Al Iman by Al Zindani's radical reputation.” Yemen has refused to turn
Al Zindani over to U.S. authorities, as many observers believe that President Saleh is protecting
him for political purposes.
Tribal Support for AQAP?
For many U.S. observers, of greatest concern is the ability of AQAP to transform itself from what
is believed to be a group of between 100 to 400 hard-core militants into a mass movement
embedded into Yemen’s age-old tribal structure. Some policymakers fear that if AQAP were to
form permanent alliances with rural tribes, then U.S. objectives in Yemen may have to shift from
providing limited support for the Yemeni government’s counterterrorism efforts to helping
President Saleh combat a much broader and more dangerous nation-wide insurgency.
Determining the triangular relationship between the government, AQAP, and tribes may be key to
assessing the relative strength of AQAP inside Yemeni society over the long term.
One school of thought rejects the idea that Yemen is becoming more like Pakistan, where the
central government faces several revolts from Pakistani Taliban groups which have drawn their
inspiration for fighting from Al Qaeda central in Afghanistan, but who are not subordinate to the
commands of Osama Bin Laden and other top Al Qaeda leaders. According to Sarah Phillips, an
expert on Yemen from the Centre for International Security Studies at Sydney University:
The more they [AQAP] require control of territory, the more likely they are to be in
competition with the tribes; this is why al-Qaeda groups are unlikely to pose a systemic
challenge to the states in which they exist. That changes, however, if the cells are prepared to
accept client status of the tribe, as they have partially done in Pakistan. Even if al-Qaeda
attempts to discursively and operationally align itself with the Yemeni tribes against the
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state, one of the group’s broader objectives—establishing political control—consigns tribes
to a subordinate status. This exclusion would likely put AQAP in confrontation with the
tribes.24
Others assert that while a permanent AQAP-tribal alliance is doubtful, there are many factors that
could serve as the foundation for closer AQAP-tribal ties in the short to medium terms. Although
central governing power in Yemen has always remained weak, many observers in recent years
have suggested that President Saleh’s ability to secure tribal support in outlying provinces (such
as Al Jawf, Marib, Abyan, Shabwa, and Hadramawt) has diminished considerably. This is true
particularly in areas where oil is extracted, as local tribes often claim that they rarely receive
revenues generated from oil produced on their lands. According to one Yemeni expert, “There is,
as in Pakistan, some intertwining of politics, society and the security forces with Al Qaeda.... It
can happen.... The enemy of my enemy is my friend, and you can turn it into the Kandahar of
Yemen.” 25 In addition to economic grievances, some analysts believe that AQAP has toned down
its ideological extremism and adapted itself to local tribal customs and culture. According to
Gregory Johnsen, a Yemen expert at Princeton University, “They've [AQAP] worked hard to put
deep, and what they hope are lasting, roots that will make it very difficult for them to be rooted
out of Yemen…. They've done a good job of looking at the mistakes that other versions of al
Qaeda have made elsewhere.”26
Some analysts reject outright the hypothesis that AQAP will develop mass tribal support in
Yemen that will enable it to control territory and strike beyond the country’s borders. Although
many AQAP members are Yemenis, a significant portion are Saudi citizens and foreign fighters,27
who may be treated as temporary guests by a host tribe, but who would have to marry into the
tribe to be considered full-fledged members. Although such marriages do occur, there is no public
evidence that they are dramatically increasing, particularly between foreign nationals and Yemeni
women.28 Furthermore, there is no indication that large numbers of Yemeni tribesmen are open to
Al Qaeda’s ideological appeal. According to former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen Edmund Hull:
In 2002, Abu Ali al Harithi, then Al Qaeda's leader in Yemen, was killed by an American
drone in a strike that was coordinated with the Yemeni government. By tribal custom, any
perceived illegitimate killing would have been grounds for a claim by the tribe against the
government. No such claim was made. In fact, when receiving the body for burial, one of his
kinsmen noted that ‘'he had chosen his path, and it had led to his death.'’ This was not an
24 Sarah Phillips, What Comes Next in Yemen? Al Qaeda, the Tribes, and State-Building, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, March 2010.
25 "Yemen’s Chaos Aids the Evolution of a Qaeda Cell," New York Times, January 2, 2010.
26 "Al Qaeda's Deep Tribal Ties Make Yemen a Terror Hub," Wall Street Journal, January 22, 2010.
27 According to one analyst, based on a rudimentary analysis of known members of the organization, Yemenis make up
56% of the AQAP’s total membership, Saudis 37%, and foreigners 7%. See, Murad Batal al Shishani, Terrorism
Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, vol. 8, issue 9, March 5, 2010. Yemen's national security agency director, Gen.
Mohammed al Anisi, says that AQAP is approximately 90% Yemeni, with only 10% foreign fighters rounding out the
ranks. See, op.cit., Wall Street Journal, January 22, 2010.
28 Experts note that one factor that led Sunni tribes in Iraq to break away from Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and cooperate
with U.S. forces was AQI’s attempts to replace tribal customs with its own extreme version of Islamic law (Sharia) and
arrange forced marriages between its members and local Iraqi women. According to one expert, “Al Qa’ida in Iraq
pushed too hard against the Sunni tribes that they relied on for support when they insisted on extracting oaths from the
sheikhs to reject tribal legal traditions – a blatant infringement of tribal autonomy. Al Qa’ida leaders also alienated
themselves by attempting to impose themselves in marriage to prominent tribal families, despite cultural norms against
women marrying beyond the clan.” See, Sarah Phillips, “Yemen’s Postcards from the Edge: al Qa’ida, Tribes, and
Nervous Neighbours,” Centre for International Security Studies, Sydney University.
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anomaly. In my experience, there is no deep-seeded affinity between Yemeni tribes and the
Al Qaeda movement. Tribes tend to be opportunistic, not ideological, so the risk is that Al
Qaeda will successfully exploit opportunities created by government neglect. There are also
family affinities—cousins, linked to uncles, linked to brothers. These do matter. But what
matters most is the ‘mujahedeen fraternity’—Yemenis with jihadist experience in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia or elsewhere. Finally, what would matter—and
significantly—would be innocent casualties resulting from counterterrorism operations,
which could well set off a tribal response.29
To a certain extent, a connection between some of Yemen’s tribes and AQAP already exists.
Yemeni AQAP members tend to operate in their home provinces where they receive a certain
level of protection from their host tribe. Protection is granted out of custom and not necessarily
due to ideological affinity. Furthermore, this protection is not guaranteed and can become
problematic if the tribe’s security and well being are put at risk by government reprisals or attacks
against AQAP suspects harbored locally, particularly if those suspects are foreign fighters.
Overall, it appears that at present, tribal leaders are using AQAP as a temporary lever to pressure
the government for benefits, settle scores with rival, neighboring tribes, or to strike back against
the government to avenge some perceived historical injustice. According to one observer, “All
view AQAP as a means to pressure the regime, like kidnapping and blocking roads. They hope
the damage the government suffers will persuade it to adopt policies more amenable to the tribe.
The tribes also exploit the group to keep the regime weak. By putting the government on the
defensive, al Qaeda attacks help the tribes preserve their coveted autonomy in regional affairs.”30
Al Qaeda in Afghanistan/Pakistan and AQAP seem to be acutely aware of the need for tribal
support. Their media propaganda continually attempts to persuade certain tribes to back them
against the central government. In February 2009, Ayman al Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s second-in-
command, released an audio tape in which he said, "I call on the noble and defiant tribes of the
Yemen and tell them: Don't be less than your brothers in the defiant Pashtun and Baluch tribes.”
After the May 24 killing of a local official in Marib governorate set off a series of reprisal attacks
from a prominent tribe, postings on jihadist websites began imploring tribes in Marib to fight
central government authorities. One posting read, “O People of the Proud Marib [Province]: For
God's sake, who is it that destroys your mosques and kills your women and children? Is it the
mujahidin, or Ali Abdallah Salih? Who is it that violates the sanctity of your houses and bombs
your farms and homes? Is it the mujahidin, or Ali Salih?”31
AQAP’s Threat to the Homeland and Attempts to Radicalize Foreign Nationals
and American Citizens
Though AQAP continues to threaten American and other Western targets inside and around
Yemen,32 it is the ability of Yemeni and Saudi Islamist radicals to recruit foreigners to conduct
29 "Al Qaeda's Shadowland," New York Times, January 12, 2010.
30 Barak Barfi, Yemen on the Brink? The Resurgence of Al Qaeda in Yemen, New America Foundation, January 2010.
31 Open Source Center, “AQAP Statement Condemns Airstrikes in Yemen, 'Silence' From Tribes,” Al-Fallujah Islamic
Forums in Arabic, June 17, 2010, GMP20100618836001.
32 In March 2010, the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration issued a warning stating that
“Information suggests that Al Qaeda remains interested in maritime attacks in the Bab Al Mandab strait, Red Sea, and
the Gulf of Aden along the coast of Yemen.”
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attacks abroad that may ultimately be of greater concern to U.S. policymakers. In assessing the
AQAP threat to the American homeland, a May 2010 Senate Intelligence Committee report
concluded that U.S. intelligence agencies previously saw AQAP (before the 12/25/2009 attempted
airline bombing) as a threat to American targets in Yemen, not to the United States itself.33 In
February 2010, then Director of National Intelligence Admiral Dennis C. Blair testified in his
annual threat assessment that “We are still exploring the genesis of this plot and what other
Homeland plots AQAP and associated Yemeni extremists may have planned. We are concerned
that they will continue to try to do so, but we do not know to what extent they are willing to direct
core cadre to that effort given the group`s prior focus on regional operations.”34
39-year-old Yemeni-American preacher Anwar al Awlaki has been either directly or indirectly
linked to radicalizing Major Nidal M. Hasan (committed the November 2009 mass shooting at
Fort Hood Army Base in Texas), Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (the Nigerian suspect accused of
trying to ignite explosive chemicals to destroy Northwest/Delta Airlines Flight 253 from
Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009), and Faisal Shahzad (alleged Times Square failed
car bomb), who allegedly told U.S. investigators that Awlaki’s online lectures urging jihad helped
inspire him to act.35 According to several reports, the Obama Administration has added Awlaki, an
American citizen, to the CIA’s list of suspected terrorists who may be captured or killed.36 To
date, Yemen has refused to extradite Awlaki (Article 44 of the Yemeni constitution states that a
Yemeni national may not be extradited to a foreign authority), and his tribe has vowed to protect
him.37 Another Muslim-American who claims to have been in contact with Awlaki, 26-year-old
New Jersey resident Sharif Mobley, was arrested by Yemeni authorities in March 2010. After his
arrest, Mobley shot two security guards in a hospital while attempting to escape. There is some
concern that Mobley, who worked as a low-level maintenance worker for six years at several
nuclear power plants in New Jersey, could have passed on basic details about American nuclear-
plant security to Al Qaeda.38 In May 2010, the FBI arrested a Texas man who had exchanged
emails with Awlaki and was accused of attempting to obtain and deliver global positioning system
devices, telephone calling cards, and a military compass for AQAP. He was arrested after
boarding a ship bound for the Middle East with the equipment.39
In June 2010, multiple reports surfaced suggesting that the Yemeni government has detained
dozens for foreign nationals suspected of ties to AQAP, including several Americans, some of
whom are believed to be students studying Arabic at Yemeni universities and language schools.
On June 7, 2010, U.S. State Department spokesman, Philip J. Crowley said that “'If the question
33 U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, ATTEMPTED TERRORIST ATTACK ON NORTHWEST
AIRLINES FLIGHT 253, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., May 24, 2010, 111-199 (Washington: GPO, 2010).
34 U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, ANNUAL THREATS ASSESSMENT - DENNIS
C. BLAIR, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., February 3, 2010.
35 "Imam’s Journey from Messenger of Peace to Voice of Jihad," International Herald Tribune, May 10, 2010.
36 "U.S. Approves Targeted Killing of American Cleric," New York Times, April 6, 2010.
37 Awlaki’s tribe publicly stated that “the Al Awlak tribes are renown for their bravery and for the protection of all their
sons. Therefore, we are warning anyone of the consequences of his collaboration with the Americans by giving
information about him.” See, Open Source Center, “Yemeni Tribe Extends Protection to Al-Awlaki, Rejects US
Accusations,” Al Quds Al Arabi (London, in Arabic), April 12, 2010, GMP20100412825007. Yemeni Foreign Minister
Abu Bakr al Qirbi said that “Anwar al Awlaki has always been looked at as a preacher rather than a terrorist and
shouldn't be considered as a terrorist unless the Americans have evidence that he has been involved in terrorism.” See,
“Yemen Balks at Possible US strike on Cleric Anwar al-Awlaki,” Christian Science Monitor, April 12, 2010.
38 "Al Qaeda’s Nuclear Plant," New York Times, May 6, 2010.
39 "Texas: Man Accused of Aiding Al Qaeda," New York Times, June 4, 2010.
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is, are we aware that there are Americans in custody in Yemen, we are…. 'We're trying to find out
more information.”40
The Al Houthi Revolt in Northern Sa’da Province
Although combating Al Qaeda in Yemen may be a top priority for the United States, the Yemeni
government faces two other domestic insurgencies that pose a more immediate risk to regime
survival. One revolt, which has been raging for nearly six years in the northernmost governorate
of Sa’da, is known as the Al Houthi conflict. Its name is derived from the revolt’s leaders, the Al
Houthi family, a prominent Zaydi religious clan who claim descent from the prophet Muhammad.
The late head of the family, Shaykh Hussein Badr ad din al Houthi, believed that Zaydi Shiism
and the Zaydi community were becoming marginalized in Yemeni society for a variety of reasons,
including government neglect of Sa’da governorate and Saudi Arabian “Wahhabi” or “Salafi”
proselytizing in Sa’da. Perhaps in order to seize the attention of central government authorities
more forcefully, Shaykh Hussein formed a radical organization called the Organization for
Youthful Believers as a revivalist Zaydi group for Al Houthi followers who dispute the legitimacy
of the Yemeni government and are firmly opposed to the rule of President Saleh.41 President Saleh
is a Zaydi himself, though with no formal religious training or title.
Shaykh Hussein Badr ad din al Houthi was killed by Yemeni troops in 2004. His son, Abdul
Malik al Houthi, is now the leader of the group. The Yemeni government claims that Al Houthi
rebels seek to establish a Zaydi theocratic state in Sa’da with Iranian assistance, though some
analysts dispute Iranian involvement in northern Yemen, asserting that the Yemeni authorities are
using the specter of Iranian interference to justify large-scale military operations against the
insurgents and calls for assistance from neighboring Gulf states.42
On February 12, 2010, three weeks after a major international donor conference on Yemen was
held in London, the Yemeni government and Al Houthi rebels in the northern province of Sa’da
signed yet another cease-fire, the sixth agreement since fighting began in 2004. This last round of
fighting, dubbed “Operation Scorched Earth” by the government, resulted in, according to
observers on the ground, far more damage to civilian infrastructure than previous episodes. Some
international human rights groups, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have
called for investigations into atrocities committed by both sides during the war, and many experts
believe that the government may have used a disproportionate amount of force in order to deter
the rebels from launching future attacks. As a result of Operation Scorched Earth, which, for the
first time, was accompanied by a major Saudi military intervention43 on the side of the Yemeni
40 "12 Americans Arrested in Yemen," New York Times, June 8, 2010.
41 According to Yemen expert Philip McCrum, historical Zaydi doctrine believes that rebelling against an unjust ruler is
a religious duty. This belief originated from the actions of the sect’s founder, Zayd bin Ali, who led an unsuccessful
uprising against Umayyad Caliph Hisham in 740 because of the Caliph’s despotic rule. See, Juan Cole’s blog Informed
Comment, “The Houthi Rebellion in Yemen,” available online at http://www.juancole.com/2009/09/huthi-rebellion-in-
yemen.html
42 In a February interview with the Arabic language pan-Arab daily Al Hayat newspaper, Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman stated that “We do not see the degree of Iranian interference that some have
suggested. Yet we are still open (to listening to the evidence) but quite simply we do not have at present the evidence
that the Iranian interference with the Huthists is as deep as the one with (the Lebanese) Hezbollah.” See, BBC
Monitoring Middle East, “USA's Feltman denies presence of US forces inside Yemen fighting Al-Qa'idah,” Text of
report by London-based newspaper Al-Hayat website on 31 January, published February 1, 2010.
43 Saudi Arabia launched a three month air and ground campaign along the border of its southernmost province of Jizan
(continued...)
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government, an estimated 250,000 people were internally displaced, with up to 30,000 living in
temporary camps run by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). USAID
has provided emergency food aid to assist refugees in the north.44
Since the cease-fire started, there have been several violent incidents, but both sides have shown
restraint, signaling possible exhaustion on the part of the rebels and acknowledgement by the
government that its armed forces are overstretched. The two sides have exchanged prisoners, and
the Al Houthis have removed road blocks and ceded captured areas to local authorities. However,
thousands of landmines remain undetected, making the former war zone a difficult challenge for
reconstruction activities.
In July 2010, clashes between government-aligned tribes and Al Houthi fighters killed dozens,
though President Saleh had pledged earlier that month that “There are no indicators for a seventh
war....That would be totally unacceptable.” Overall, the fundamental grievances that started the
conflict in the first place have not been resolved. Sa'da remains one of the poorest areas of Yemen
and, without the government’s political will to develop it, Al Houthi leaders may continue to
protest against their cultural, religious, economic, and political marginalization in Yemeni society.
Looking ahead, many observers suggest that it is merely a matter of time before the conflict in the
north resumes. Should this assumption hold true, possible key questions for policymakers
include:
• In the absence of central government political will to resolve the conflict
diplomatically, do the Yemeni armed forces have the capability to wage a
counter-insurgency campaign indefinitely in an economic climate of diminishing
state resources?
• How would a resumption of hostilities in Sa’da affect the government’s ability to
combat AQAP?
• How would a resumption of hostilities in Sa’da affect Yemen’s domestic politics,
particularly in light of a possible presidential succession in the near future? 45
• If the conflict festers and President Saleh and his immediate relatives are
delegitimized as a result, could a more radical leader take his place who would be
less amenable to cooperate with the United States?
• What about the role of Saudi Arabia and the U.S.-supported Saudi military?
(...continued)
and Sa’da in an attempt to repel reported Houthi infiltration of Saudi territory. It is estimated that Saudi Arabia lost 133
soldiers in its war against the Al Houthis. Saudi Arabia agreed to a ceasefire with the Houthis in late February 2010
after an exchange of prisoners and remains.
44 USAID’s Bureau For Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) and Office Of U.S. Foreign
Disaster Assistance (OFDA) have provided $15.8 million in FY2010 disaster aid for displaced Yemenis in the north.
45 Some analysts see the conflict tied to the behind-the-scenes-struggle for presidential succession in Yemen between
two of the front-runners, the President’s son Ahmed and head of the Republican Guards and Ali Mohsen al Ahmar, the
commander of the army’s northern forces. According to one New York Times article, “The tension between the two old
comrades [President Saleh and Ali Mohsen] is visible in the criticism of the way the war in the north is being handled,
with government officials sometimes complaining that Mr. Mohsen set off renewed fighting there by occupying or
destroying the mosques and holy places of the Houthis and building Sunni mosques and schools in the area. Mr.
Mohsen’s supporters have countered that the war has not been fully supported by the central government.” See, “In
Yemen, U.S. Faces Leader Who Puts Family First,” New York Times, January 5, 2010.
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According to a recent RAND study:
Additionally, the regime itself has cultivated Salafi-leaning elements, either as ideological
defenders of the GoY approach or as volunteer fighters. This is not a positive development
for the United States. It increases the influence of those who, unlike the Huthis, go beyond
rhetoric in their anti-U.S. vehemence. Likewise, at a practical level, it may decrease U.S.
influence in San’a as well as the quality of U.S.-Yemeni collaboration on a variety issues,
from domestic security to regional cooperation.46
Unrest in the South
For years, southern Yemenis have been disaffected because of their perceived second-class status
in a unified state from which many of their leaders tried to secede during the civil war in 1994.
After the 1990 unification, power sharing arrangements were established, but in practice, north
and south were never fully integrated, and the civil war effectively left President Saleh and his
allies in no mood for further compromise. As a result, southern Yemen’s political and economic
marginalization gradually worsened. Although the former People’s Democratic Republic of
Yemen (PDRY) government had already ruined South Yemen’s economy with its socialist
policies and was essentially bankrupt due to the loss of its Soviet patron at the time of
reunification, historians note that the PDRY, like the British rule of parts of South Yemen before
it, had advanced educational development, women’s rights, and stamped out tribalism. According
to one Yemeni academic, “They [the North] want to push us into backwardness so we are like
them…. Aden was tolerant: there were Jews, Christians, Muslims all living together here. The
North is not.”47
Civil unrest in Yemen’s southern governorates reemerged in 2007, when civil servants and
military officers from the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) began
protesting low salaries and lack of promised-pensions. Since then, what started as a series of
demonstrations against low or non-existent government wages has turned into a broader
“movement” channeling popular southern anger against President Saleh and his inner circle.
The key demands of south Yemenis include equality, decentralization, and a greater share of state
welfare. Many southerners have felt cut off from services and jobs and see persistent infiltration
of central government influence in their local area. Southerners have accused Saleh’s government
of selling off valuable southern land to northerners with links to the regime and have alleged that
revenues from oil extraction, which is mostly located in the south, disproportionately benefit
northern provinces.48 In addition, the once prosperous and liberal port city of Aden has
deteriorated, as most business must now be conducted in the capital of Sana’a. Furthermore,
southerners complain of corruption, as each major southern province is ruled by a military
governor with close ties to the president. According to a December 2009 Human Rights Watch
report:
The security forces, and Central Security in particular, have carried out widespread abuses in
the south—unlawful killings, arbitrary detentions, beatings, crackdowns on freedom of
46 Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Houthi
Phenomenom, RAND, 2010.
47 "In Yemen’s South, Protests Could Cause More Instability," New York Times, February 27, 2010.
48 "Yemen: Southern Secession Threat Adds to Instability," Oxford Analytica, May 27, 2009.
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assembly and speech, arrests of journalists, and others. These abuses have created a climate
of fear, but have also increased bitterness and alienation among southerners, who say the
north economically exploits and politically marginalizes them. The security forces have
enjoyed impunity for unlawful attacks against southerners, increasing pro-secessionist
sentiments in the south and plunging the country into an escalating spiral of repression,
protests, and more repression. While the government publicly claims to be willing to listen to
southern grievances, its security forces have responded to protests by using lethal force
against largely peaceful protestors without cause or warning, in violation of international
standards on the use of lethal force. Protestors occasionally behaved violently, burning cars
or throwing rocks, usually in response to police violence.49
After more than three years, calls for southern autonomy and secession have grown louder,
though observers have described southern demands as more of a cacophony, and competition
among southern elites has forestalled the creation of a unified agenda to redress grievances with
the central, northern-Yemen dominated government in Sana’a.
The Southern Mobility Movement (SMM or, in Arabic, Al Harakat al Janubi) is the official title
of a decentralized movement set on achieving either greater local autonomy or outright secession.
The SMM is organized into local committees, and there is a rudimentary central body to
coordinate protest activities. In 2009, 71-year-old former Southern secessionist leader Ali Salim
al Bidh (alt. sp. Bid or Beidh)50 announced in a televised speech from Germany that he was
resuming his political activities after nearly two decades in exile in Oman. He then declared
himself leader of the southern separatist movement and called for the resurrection of the PDRY.
He has many supporters, but there are enough rivals to his claimed mantle of leadership to keep
the SMM divided and, therefore, less effective in its stance against the government.
Some analysts assert that the April 2009 defection of a former Saleh ally, 42-year-old Shaykh
Tariq al Fadhli (alt. sp. Tareq al Fadhli),51 from the regime to the cause of the southern movement,
was a major development that could portend trouble for the central government should other
prominent elites follow suit. Shaykh al Fadhli has openly called for separation of the south during
rallies in his southern home province of Abyan. Since his defection to the southern cause, his
loyalists clashed with government troops until both sides agreed to halt the violence. Then, in
June 2010, Al Fadhli declared “I will resume the Southern Movement's activities in the city
Zanjabar, but with different means and forms…. We are looking for new mechanisms and
potentials that render the Southern Movement's activities successful.”52
49 Human Rights Watch, In the Name of Unity: The Yemeni Government’s Brutal Response to Southern Movement
Protests, December 14, 2009.
50 Al Bidh also was the former leader of the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) and led the unsuccessful southern revolt
against the north in the 1994 civil war in which an estimated 3,000 people were killed.
51 After the British withdrawal from Yemen in 1967 and the formation of the socialist PDRY in southern Yemen, Al
Fadhli’s prominent family (his father was a Sultan) in Abyan lost its vast estates, and he moved to Saudi Arabia where
he was raised. At age 19, Al Fadhli left to fight in Afghanistan alongside Osama Bin Laden against the Soviet army
largely to exact retribution on a Communist country. When he returned to Yemen, he regained much of his family’s
holdings and helped recruit jihadists to fight for the north in the civil war of 1994. His sister is married to Ali Mohsen,
one of the country’s top military commanders. For a full profile, see, “Ex-Jihadist Defies Yemen’s Leader, and Easy
Labels,” New York Times, Feb 26, 2010.
52 Open Source Center, "Yemen: Southern Movement Figure Declares End of Truce With Govt," London Quds Press
(in Arabic) , June 18, 2010, GMP20100618615001.
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Unrest in the south has grown with each passing year. To date, several hundred have been killed
in protest-related violence and many more have been arrested.53 Nevertheless, with the
international community primarily focused on AQAP, President Saleh may have calculated that
he has more freedom to suppress dissent in the south. He may exploit the SMM’s divisions to his
advantage while continuing to use physical repression to stifle further rumblings. It is unclear
whether this strategy will work in the long term. Overall, the viability of southern Yemen as an
independent entity also is uncertain, leading some experts to believe that some sort of
compromise solution is inevitable.
In May 2010, President Saleh’s motorcade came under fire in the Radfan district of southern
Lahij governorate. Two officers were killed, but the President was not in the car and had already
returned to the capital. An assassination attempt against a deputy prime minister had occurred just
days earlier. A few weeks after the attack, President Saleh pledged to release some southern
protestors, called for the resumption of a national dialogue, and promised more infrastructure
investment in the south and in Aden port.
The Major Challenges: Subsidies, Water Depletion, Declining Oil
Revenues, and Qat
Fuel Subsidies
Although terrorism, provincial revolts, and unrest in the south are all serious concerns related to
Yemeni stability, they pale in comparison to the long-term structural resource and economic
challenges facing a country with a rapidly growing population. To an outsider, these problems
seem almost intractable, as bad government policies and crippling poverty exacerbate existing
shortages, creating a feedback loop. For example, the central government subsidizes diesel fuel at
a cost to the treasury of several billion dollars annually (nearly 11% of GDP). The diesel subsidy
not only drains government revenue but distorts commodity prices, and makes water pumping
and trucking costs artificially low, thereby giving farmers no incentive to conserve water.
Furthermore, the subsidy encourages smuggling (via the sale of reduced cost fuel at inflated rates
to international buyers), which may be officially sanctioned at the highest levels. According to
one report, “Diesel smuggling is a facet of elite corruption that has led one international
economist working in Yemen to complain that more and more people are being pushed into
destitution while a handful of people are living as if there is no tomorrow.”54 However, when the
government attempted to lift the diesel subsidy in 2001 and 2005, riots ensued, and the policy was
swiftly reversed. In the winter and spring of 2010, the government reduced subsidies on diesel,
kerosene, and other oil derivatives by 8%-16% without incident. Nevertheless, according to the
World Bank, local energy prices are 60% less than international averages.55
53 In an official Interior Ministry report to parliament, the government itself claims that 18 people had been killed and
120 injured in violence in the south of Yemen during the first quarter of the 2010. See, Economist Intelligence Unit,
Country Report - Main report: May 1, 2010.
54 Ginny Hill, Yemen: Fear of Failure, Chatham House, Middle East Programme, November 2008.
55 Open Source Center, "Yemeni Govt Raises Fuel Prices for 2nd Time in 3 Months; Riots Expected ," Yemen Times,
May 13, 2010, GMP20100514054001.
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Water Scarcity
Water scarcity is perhaps the greatest long term concern. According to Yemeni government
statistics, domestic consumption exceeds renewable fresh water resources by nearly 1 billion
cubic meters annually. That deficit stands to double by 2025 when it is estimated the population
will have almost doubled to 44 million people. Current inefficient usage is unsustainable, as many
of the country’s poor in cities such as Ta’izz must obtain water from private truck deliveries,
spending a large percentage of their income on fresh water.56 Public systems only provide water a
few days a week in the capital and perhaps as little as a few days a month in other cities. Well
drilling has become prohibitively expensive. As farmers drill deeper wells to access freshwater,
the water table drops and drinking water becomes contaminated with minerals. Yemenis may now
be using fossil water to irrigate crops.
Most analysts believe that if Yemen’s major aquifers are depleted, the only realistic solution to the
country’s water crisis would be a strategy based on increased water-use efficiency and the
construction of several large-scale, expensive desalination plants. How such a massive investment
in the infrastructure would be financed remains unknown. Although predictions vary as to when
underground aquifers will run dry, solutions portend problems for the country’s majority of small
farmers. For example, if Yemen were to construct desalination plants and pump water from the
Red Sea over highlands to the capital, the cost would be affordable enough for household use but
too costly to support irrigation for agriculture. According to one Yemen water expert, “Increasing
awareness of the country’s water scarcity has resulted in a race to the bottom—every man for
himself.”57
Qat Production/Consumption
The cultivation of qat, a stimulant whose leaves are widely chewed throughout the Horn of
Africa, also drains Yemen’s scarce underground water resources. Qat is a cash crop,58 and its
harvests surpass local coffee and wheat production, which has led to increased demand for food
imports. Qat also may use as much as 40% of water resources consumed by local agriculture.
Though it is an age-old tradition and ingrained in Yemeni culture, qat chewing also cripples
attempts at promoting sustainable development. Not only does it deplete the country’s water
resources and reduce food security, low-income chewers spend significant portions of their time
and salaries (between 10% and 30%) on qat. According to social critics, “No development can be
achieved in Yemen as long as this plant called qat takes up 90 percent of the spare time of the
Yemeni people.... Some may argue that this is an old tradition of Yemen just like the arms and
jambiyas (traditional daggers). But even if that were so, harmful traditions must be thrown
away.”59 According to the World Bank, the culture of spending extended afternoon hours chewing
qat is inimical to the development of a productive work force, with as much as one-quarter of
usable working hours allocated to qat chewing. Chewing qat also suppresses the appetite, and its
widespread consumption has been linked to growing child malnutrition rates. Qat chewing also
56 "Alarm as Water Taps Run Dry," The National (UAE), September 24, 2009.
57 Gerhard Lichtenthaeler, "Water Conflict and Cooperation in Yemen," Middle East Report, Spring 2010.
58 The World Bank estimates that qat cultivation employs one out of every seven Yemeni workers.
59 Lenard Milich and Mohammed Al-Sabbry, “The “Rational Peasant” vs Sustainable Livelihoods: The Case of Qat in
Yemen,” Development - Society for International Development, 1995.
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reinforces social and political practices that exclude women, as prominent male politicians and
business elites often conduct their business during an afternoon qat chew.
Oil Production/LNG
The loss of oil revenue is another major challenge facing Yemen. Revenue from oil production
accounts for nearly all of Yemen’s exports and up to 65% of government revenue, yet most
economists predict that, barring any new major discoveries,60 Yemen will deplete its modest oil
reserves at some point between 2017 and 2021. Production has dropped precipitously since
reaching its peak nearly a decade ago, dropping from 440,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 2001 to an
estimated 260,000 bpd in 2010. As consumption has increased, exports have subsequently
dropped and, according to the Central Bank of Yemen, state oil receipts fell from $4.4 billion in
2008 to $1.96 billion in 2009. In June 2010, President Saleh announced that the combined impact
of falling oil production and rising domestic consumption had made Yemen a net importer of oil.
The Balhaf $4.5 billion liquefied natural gas plant (operated by the Yemeni government in
partnership with Total, Hunt Oil, and three South Korean firms: SK Corporation, Korea Gas, and
Hyundai), is now online, though experts believe that revenue generated from the project will only
slightly stem the hemorrhaging of government funds. It is expected to generate approximately
$30 billion to $50 billion in revenue for Yemen’s treasury over the next 25 years. However, in the
short term, government revenue from LNG sales is expected to reach $370 million in 2010 and
will not reach its full level until 2017.61
In terms of diversifying its economy, though the government has developed alternative strategies,
in reality, Yemen may become even more dependent on international assistance and worker
remittances in the future. Its tourism industry suffers from chronic instability and frequent tribal
kidnappings of foreigners as well as underdeveloped infrastructure. Growth in non-hydrocarbon
sectors of the economy has been stagnant in recent years and is projected to reach a mere 4.4% in
2010.
National Budget
In 2010, the government’s fiscal position has weakened, as the national currency, the riyal, has
rapidly depreciated, forcing the central bank to spend nearly as much as it did in all of 2009 ($1
billion est.) to stabilize the currency. As previously mentioned, fuel subsidies cost the treasury
nearly $1.6 billion annually (about 20% of all budgetary expenditures), though to its credit, the
government has modestly reduced some fuel subsidies.62 Public sector salaries also serve as
another drain on the national budget, accounting for another 35% of domestic spending, with
perhaps hundreds of thousands of payroll positions unaccounted for. Government jobs are a key
source of patronage for President Saleh’s government, and positions are routinely dispensed to
key elites, though they exist in name only.
60 With the exception of the French firm Total, most major international oil companies have avoided investing in
Yemen due to the lack of government transparency and the security situation in its remote governorates.
61 "2010 could be the Year for an Upturn in Yemen’s Economy," Yemen Times, May 13, 2010.
62 At current prices, fuel subsidies could reach as high as $2.2 billion in 2010. See, “Yemen raises Diesel Prices by 13
percent,” Reuters, June 7, 2010.
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In order to buttress its finances, the Yemeni government is seeking assistance from the World
Bank and International Monetary Fund and debt relief from its creditors. With food imports
rising, its currency devalued, and oil revenue down, many economists are concerned that the
Yemeni government is taking on too much debt in order to stem its fiscal hemorrhaging. Many
experts believe that the government must pursue alternative means of revenue generation and
expand its domestic tax base.
Poor Governance and Uncertainty over Presidential Succession
Although governance issues are far less tangible than the current military conflicts and resource
shortages engulfing the Yemeni state, they are at the heart of all of Yemen’s major problems.
Although President’s Saleh’s government does not resemble those of all-controlling, totalitarian
regimes in places like North Korea and Myanmar, critics charge that despite Yemen’s
decentralized political culture, political and economic power has become far more concentrated in
the President’s inner circle, a trend that has exacerbated tensions in the north, south, and with
tribal leaders whose support is critical in combating Al Qaeda.
President Saleh has been in power for over 30 years and, like many long-serving leaders, has
filled the top ranks of his military and intelligence services with extended family members in
order to consolidate power. Barring any new constitutional amendments, his term expires in 2013.
As mentioned earlier, Saleh’s son Ahmed is commander of the Republican Guards and a possible
presidential successor. Ali Mohsen al Ahmar, the President’s fellow tribesman, is a brigadier
general whose forces have fought in Sa’da and who is charged with protecting the capital. He also
is considered a potential successor to Saleh and may be in competition with Ahmed Saleh.
According to one report, “Mr. Mohsen has signaled that he does not favor a direct succession of
Ahmed Saleh to the presidency, diplomats and analysts said. Mr. Mohsen believes, they said, that
the younger Mr. Saleh lacks the personal strength and charisma of his father and cannot hold the
country together.”63 Another report suggests that Mohsen has close ties to religious extremists
and, while such reports have arisen in the past, media speculation over Mohsen’s alleged radical
ties helps to boost President Saleh’s image of moderation and mercurial cooperation with the
West.64 With succession looming as a major uncertainty, juxtaposing Mohsen against more
moderate Yemeni leaders may reinforce Western desires to see the status quo maintained in
Yemeni domestic politics.
President Saleh’s three nephews also hold senior positions in the military and intelligence
services. His nephew Colonel Amar Saleh is Deputy Chief of the National Security Bureau
(NSB), an intelligence agency formed in 2002 designed to work in closer cooperation with
foreign governments.65 Another nephew, Yahya Mohammed Abdullah Saleh, is Chief of Staff of
63 New York Times, January 5, 2010, op.cit.
64 One senior Yemeni official who spoke on the condition of anonymity remarked that Mohsen/Muhsin is “building up
his ambitions. If he becomes president, it will be a bad sign…. Muhsin sides more with the religious extremists, not
necessarily al-Qaeda, but with extremists like Sheik Abdul Majid al Zindani.” See, “Yemen's Alliance with Radical
Sunnis in Internal War Poses Complication for U.S.,” Washington Post, February 11, 2010.
65 According to one recent report, the NSB was established to “provide Western intelligence agencies with a more
palatable local partner than the Political Security Organization (PSO). The NSB is now responsible for dispensing $3.4
million of U.S.-provided tribal engagement funds to support the campaign against AQAP. See, Michael Knights,
“Strengthening Yemeni Counterterrorism Forces: Challenges and Political Considerations,” Policywatch #1616, The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 6, 2010. In general, due to previous allegations of PSO sympathy
and direct support of Al Qaeda, the United States government deeply distrusts that security agency and does not work
(continued...)
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the Central Security Organization (CSO), a division of the Ministry of the Interior which
maintains an elite U.S.-trained Counter-Terrorism Unit (CTU).66 Tariq Saleh is head of the
Presidential Guard, the Yemeni equivalent of the U.S. Secret Service. Finally, the President’s half-
brother, Ali Saleh al Ahmar, is commander of the Air Force.67
Yemen’s parliamentary elections have been postponed from April 2009 until 2011 in the hope that
disagreements over electoral reform and possible amendments to the Constitution can be
resolved. The Obama Administration noted the decision “with deep concern and disappointment,”
and argued that the United States finds it “difficult to see how a delay of this duration serves the
interests of the Yemeni people or the cause of Yemeni democracy.”68 In December 2009 by-
elections to fill several vacant seats in parliament, the ruling General People’s Congress (GPC)
captured 10 seats, while independent candidates won two seats. The opposition coalition, named
the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), which includes both Islamist and more secular-oriented parties,
boycotted the elections. Among many issues, the JMP has protested against the composition of
the Supreme Election Committee for Elections and Referendums (SCER), a quasi-governmental
body responsible for overseeing elections. The tasks of this independent body include drawing
constituency boundaries, engaging in voter education and registration measures, and ensuring that
elections proceed according to the law. The SCER is composed of seven members appointed by
the President from a list of 15 candidates nominated by the House of Representatives. Candidates
must receive nominations from at least two-thirds of parliamentarians. Opposition members
accuse the GPC of nominating Saleh loyalists to the committee’s board.
One powerful opposition figure in Yemen is Hamid al Ahmar, a son of the late Shaykh Abdullah
al Ahmar, who during his lifetime headed Hashid tribal federation (the most powerful tribal
coalition in Yemen), was president of the quasi-opposition party known as Islah (Reform), and
served as speaker of the parliament. Hamid was a major supporter of the primary opposition
candidate in the 2006 presidential election. In the summer of 2009, Hamid appeared on Al
Jazeera television and called on President Saleh to step down from his office. With the death of
his father, Hamid along with his brothers became the primary shareholders in the Al Ahmar
Group, a Yemeni conglomerate with interests in the banking, telecommunications, oil, and
tourism sectors.
On July 17, 2010, the GPC and JMP agreed to engage in a “national dialogue,” a process
designed to bring about political reconciliation between the ruling and opposition coalitions.
Some analysts have speculated that, if successful, the process could lead to the formation of a
limited coalition government in 2011. Others cynically assert that the process is designed to
satisfy foreign donors which are calling for political reform and successful elections next year.
(...continued)
with its units which are responsible for day-to-day security inside the country. See, “Yemen Security Agency Prone to
Inside Threats, Officials Say,” Washington Post, February 10, 2010.
66 Andrew McGregor, Yemen and the U.S.: Different Approaches to the War on Terrorism, The Jamestown
Foundation, Terrorism Monitor, May 10, 2007.
67 New York Times, January 5, 2010, op.cit.
68 U.S. Acting Deputy State Department Spokesman Gordon Duguid, “Statement on Yemen Parliamentary Elections
Postponement,” Washington, DC, March 3, 2009.
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Foreign Relations
Somalia: Piracy, Terrorism, and Refugees
Somalia is a source of hundreds of thousands of refugees who flee to Yemen each year over
treacherous waters, and now a haven for pirates threatening vital international shipping lanes in
the Bab al Mandab strait, which oil tankers transit carrying an estimated 3 million barrels per day.
Yemen’s ability to combat piracy beyond its immediate shoreline and major ports is extremely
small. Although the United States helped build Yemen’s coast guard after the 2000 USS Cole
attack, the country’s shoreline is vast, and the number of patrol and deep water vessels in its fleet
is limited.
Each year, tens of thousands of Somalis cross the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea in smugglers'
boats to reach the shores of Yemen. Many observers believe that as smuggler boats unload
destitute Somali refugees in Yemen, and then return to Somalia with weapons, fuel, and other
cargo purchased inside Yemen. Many refugees die at sea in storms or when forced overboard by
accidents or smugglers seeking to avoid security forces.
In 1992, United Nations Security Council Resolution 733 established an arms embargo against
Somalia and, according to the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, Yemen remains a primary
source of arms flowing into the war-torn country. In its March 2010 report to the Security
Council, the Monitoring Group reports that: “Puntland remains the primary gateway for arms and
ammunition into Somalia, owing to its Gulf of Aden coastline, historical arms trading relationship
with dealers in Yemen, and largely unpoliced territory. The Monitoring Group has learned that
arms markets still exist in most major towns, although — as elsewhere in Somalia —they are
generally fragmented, informal and run by businessmen with connections to Yemen.”69
Al Shabaab
Some Western analysts have begun to examine potential linkages between terrorist threats
emanating from Somalia and Yemen. To date, the only indication that Al Shabaab (translated as,
“The Youth”), a radical Somali Islamist group which is a U.S. State Department-designated
Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), maintains close ties to AQAP is rhetorical. On January 1,
2010, an Al Shabaab official, Shaykh Mukhtar Robow Abuu Mansuur, said the group was ready
to send reinforcements to AQAP should the United States attack its bases in Yemen. Leaders on
both sides have pledged mutual support, and Yemeni and Somalian officials claim that they are
providing each other with arms and manpower.70 Another report suggests that Yemenis “make up
a sizeable part of a foreign contingent that fights with Al Shabaab’s Somali rank and file and
supplies bomb-making and communications expertise.”71 Other observers see less of a direct
connection. According to one report, “Shabaab has only recently turned to Al Qaeda, and then it
69 United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 10 March 2010 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee
pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the
Security Council, S/2010/91, March 10, 2010.
70 "Somalis fleeing to Yemen prompt new worries in fight against al-Qaeda," Washington Post, January 12, 2010.
71 "Q+A-Somali-Yemeni Militant Ties in the Spotlight," Reuters, January 6, 2010.
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was only from the East Africa cell of Al Qaeda, not from Yemen.... Shabaab has its own major
conflict looming with Somalia's Transitional Federal Government.”72
Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
Yemen desires to join the 29-year-old Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a sub-regional
organization which groups Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and
Oman in an economic and security alliance. GCC members have traditionally opposed accession
of additional states. Currently, Yemen has partial observer status on some GCC committees, and
observers believe that full membership is unlikely. Others assert that it is in the GCC’s interest to
assist Yemen and prevent it from becoming a failed state, lest its instability spread to neighboring
Gulf countries.73 The impediments to full GCC membership are steep. Reportedly, Kuwait, still
bitter over Yemen’s support for Saddam Hussein during the first Gulf War, has blocked further
discussion of membership. Meanwhile, Yemen needs to export thousands of its workers each year
to the Gulf in order to alleviate economic burdens at home.74 Foreign remittances are, aside from
oil exports, Yemen’s primary source of hard currency. According to one report, “Unless Yemen is
the focus of coherent and sustained GCC action, then Yemen's membership of the GCC will
remain a rhetorical ambition rather than a potentially powerful tool to effect change.”75
Saudi Arabia
By far, Yemen’s most important bilateral relationship is with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its
wealthier, more powerful, and concerned northern neighbor which in recent years has taken a
more active role in attempting to stabilize Yemen. Over decades, Saudi Arabia’s perception of
Yemen and its interventions there domestically have dramatically shifted from a policy aimed at
deliberately weakening the central government to propping up President Saleh’s rule in the midst
of multiple crises.
Although Saudi Arabia’s role in Yemeni domestic affairs is opaque to most Western observers,76
Saudi goals appear to be geared toward containing threats emanating from Yemen both physically
and ideologically. AQAP is a direct threat to the Saudi royal family, as was vividly illustrated by a
failed assassination attempt in August 2009 against Assistant Interior Minister Prince Mohammed
bin Nayef bin Abdelaziz Al Saud, the director of the kingdom's counterterrorism campaign.
According to one report, two of Saudi Arabia’s most powerful intelligence agencies, the Saudi
General Intelligence Presidency (GIP) headed since October 2005 by Prince Muqrin bin
Abdulaziz and the General Security Services (GSS) which is attached to the Saudi Interior
Ministry, have been working with Yemen’s military and special forces units.77 Though the Al
Houthi conflict also physically threatened Saudi Arabia after Houthi rebels crossed the Saudi
72 "Is Al Qaeda in Yemen connected to Al Qaeda in Somalia?," Christian Science Monitor, January 7, 2010.
73 Bernard Haykel, “Act locally: why the GCC needs to help save Yemen,” The National (UAE), January 7, 2010.
74 Yemeni expatriates are to a large extent located in Saudi Arabia. There are smaller communities in Bahrain and the
UAE.
75 Oxford Analytica, GULF STATES: GCC lacks policy coordination for Yemen, March 24, 2010.
76 According to experts, Crown Prince and Defense Minister Sultan bin Abdel Aziz al Saud, his son Prince Khalid bin
Sultan, Interior Minister Prince Nayef Abdel Aziz al Saud, and his son Prince Mohammed bin Nayef are the four
primary Saudi leaders charged with managing the Yemen portfolio.
77 Ed Blanche, "Saudis lead the Charge against Al Qaeda," The Middle East, February 1, 2010.
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border78 and seized territory in November 2009 sparking a major Saudi military intervention
there, Saudi leaders fear that the Sunni-Shiite sectarian tinge of the Al Houthi conflict could also
spark tensions at home and throughout the Gulf region.
U.S. Relations and Foreign Aid
Historically, close U.S.-Yemeni relations have been hindered by a lack of strong military-to-
military ties and commercial relations, general Yemeni distrust of U.S. policy in the Middle East,
and U.S. distrust of Yemen’s commitment to fighting terrorism. Since Yemen’s unification, the
United States government has been primarily concerned with combating Al Qaeda-affiliated
terrorist groups inside Yemen. Al Qaeda’s attack against the USS Cole in 200079 coupled with the
attacks of September 11, 2001, a year later officially made Yemen a front in the so-called war on
terror. Though Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist groups operated in Yemen nearly a decade before the
2000 Cole bombing, the United States had a minimal presence there during most of the 1990s.
After President Saleh lent his support to Iraq during the first Gulf War, the United States
drastically reduced its bilateral aid to Yemen. USAID virtually ceased all operations inside Yemen
between 1996 and 2003 with the exception of small amounts of food aid (P.L.480) and democracy
assistance to support parliamentary elections.80 In the late 1990s, though differing views over
policy toward the late Saddam Hussein’s Iraq continued to divide Yemen and the United States,
U.S.-Yemeni military cooperation was revived as policymakers grew more concerned with Al
Qaeda.81
During the early years of the George W. Bush Administration, relations improved under the rubric
of the war on terror, though Yemen’s lax policy toward wanted terrorists and U.S. concerns about
corruption and governance stalled additional U.S. support. Yemen harbored then and continues to
harbor now a number of Al Qaeda operatives and has refused to extradite several known militants
on the FBI’s list of most wanted terrorists. In 2007, after reports surfaced that one of the USS
Cole bombers had been released from prison, the Millennium Challenge Corporation canceled a
ceremony to inaugurate a $20.6 million threshold grant, which was canceled a few years later.
In 2009, the Obama Administration initiated a major review of U.S. policy toward Yemen. That
review, coupled with the attempted airline bombing over Detroit on Christmas Day 2009, led to a
new U.S. strategy toward Yemen referred to as the National Security Council's Yemen Strategic
78 The boundary between Yemen and Saudi Arabia was partially defined by the 1934 Treaty of Taif. The permanent
(and current) definition of the border took place as a result of a June 2000 treaty between the two countries.
79 In 1999, the Clinton Administration reached a naval refueling agreement with Yemen at Aden harbor. After the Cole
bombing a year later, some critics charged that this refueling agreement had placed U.S. vessels at risk in order to
improve U.S.-Yemeni relations. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, former CENTCOM
commander and retired Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni said that “The refueling of that ship in Aden was my
decision…. I pass that buck on to nobody…. I don't want anyone to think we ever in any instance, anywhere, in any
evolution or event that took place in CENTCOM ever took a risk for the purpose of a better relationship with a country
and put soldier, sailor, airman, marine at risk for that reason. Absolutely not…. At no time was this a gratuitous offer to
be made just to improve relations with the Yemenis.” See, “Retired Commander takes Responsibility for Decision to
Refuel Ships in Aden,” Agence France Presse, October 19, 2000.
80 Edward Prados, The US and Yemen: A Half-Century of Engagement, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies,
Georgetown University, 2005.
81 "For Yemen, an Evolving U.S. Relationship; As Both Seek to Improve Ties, Sanctions Against Iraq Remain a Point
of Division," Washington Post, October 24, 2000.
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Plan. This strategy is essentially three-fold, focusing on combating AQAP in the short term,
increasing development assistance to meet long term challenges, and marshalling international
support in order to maximize global efforts to stabilize Yemen.
However, the United States remains concerned over Yemen’s deteriorating human rights record,
particularly as President Saleh’s government combats terrorism and domestic insurgencies. There
is concern that should violations continue, Yemen’s reliability as a U.S. partner could come into
question. According to the U.S. State Department’s 2009 report on human rights in Yemen:
Serious human rights problems increased significantly during the year. Severe limitations on
citizens' ability to change their government included corruption, fraudulent voter registration,
administrative weakness, and close political-military relationships at high levels. The ruling
and opposition parties denied opportunities for change when they agreed to postpone for two
years April's parliamentary elections after the two sides failed to reach an agreement on
electoral reform. There were reports of arbitrary and unlawful killings by government forces,
politically motivated disappearances, and torture in prisons. Prison conditions were poor.
Arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention, and other abuses increased, particularly with the
ongoing protest movement in the southern governorates, where authorities reportedly
temporarily jailed thousands of southerners during the year. The judiciary was weak, corrupt,
and lacked independence. The government significantly increased restrictions on freedom of
speech, press, and assembly, and there were reports of government use of excessive force
against demonstrators. Journalists and opposition members were harassed and intimidated.
Academic freedom was restricted, and official corruption was a problem. International
humanitarian groups estimated that more than 175,400 persons were internally displaced as a
result of the Saada conflict. Pervasive and significant discrimination against women
continued, as did early marriage, child labor, and child trafficking. The right of workers to
associate was also restricted.82
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Yemen
Over the past two years, U.S. military and economic assistance to Yemen has dramatically
increased. For FY2011, the Administration is seeking $106.6 million in foreign assistance for
Yemen, a request well above previous amounts ($42 million in FY2009 and $67 million in
FY2010). U.S. 1206 Department of Defense (DoD) assistance to Yemen also has increased in
recent years. In FY2010, DoD is providing an estimated $150 million in assistance to Yemen,
well above the FY2009 level ($66.8 million). Though the Obama Administration has increased
aid substantially, it is worth noting that when compared to other regional recipients such as Israel
($2.8 billion in FY2010), Egypt ($1.55 billion in FY2010), Jordan ($842 million in FY2010), and
even the Palestinians ($500.4 million in FY2010), U.S. aid to Yemen lags far behind.
82 See, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136083.htm
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Table 1. U.S. Foreign Aid to Yemen
(current year $ in millions)
Aid Account (Foreign
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008 FY2009
FY2010
FY2011
Operations)
Request
Economic Support Fund (ESF)
7.920
12.000
1.500
19.767a 5.000 34.0
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 8.415 8.500 3.952 2.800
12.500 35.0
Development Assistance (DA)
—
—
4.913
11.233
35.000
—
Non-Proliferation, Anti-
1.441 3.751 4.034 2.525 —
4.5
Terrorism,
De-mining, and Related Programs
(NADR)
Global Health Child Survival
—
—
2.833
3.000
4.800
21.0
International Military Education
.924 1.085 .945 1.000 1.100 1.1
and Training (IMET)
International Narcotics Control
— — — — — 11.0
and Law Enforcement (INCLE)
Totals
18.700
25.336
18.177
30.325
58.400
106.600
a. Congress appropriated an additional $10 million in ESF for Yemen in P.L. 111-32, the Supplemental
Appropriations Act, FY2009
Military Aid
U.S. military assistance to Yemen is divided between State Department-administered FMF funds
and Department of Defense-administered 1206 funds. Overall FMF aid to Yemen is modest by
regional standards and helps to maintain U.S. equipment provided to Yemen over several decades.
In 2008, both countries signed a first-ever bilateral End Use Monitoring Agreement. The
agreement is designed to allow for the verification of articles and services provided to Yemen
under U.S.-sponsored military and security assistance, thus preventing the misuse or illicit
transfer of these items and services. In November 2009, just days before a series of strikes against
AQAP targets inside Yemen, the official news agency of Yemen reported that the United States
and Yemen signed a new cooperation agreement to combat terrorism, smuggling, and piracy.83
The Obama Administration has not divulged the details of any such cooperation agreement to
date.
For several years, the United States has provided training to Yemen’s elite Counter-Terrorism
Unit (CTU) using funds from the State Department-controlled Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) accounts.84 Provisions in the
83 "Yemen signs military deal with US," The National Newspaper (UAE), November 11, 2009.
84 In testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs
Jeffrey Feltman remarked that “On the security front, the Departments of State and Defense provide training and
assistance to Yemen's key counterterrorism units. Through Diplomatic Security Antiterrorism Assistance (DS/ATA)
programs we provide training to security forces in the Ministry of Interior, including the Yemeni Coast Guard and the
Central Security Force's Counterterrorism Unit (CTU).” See, Yemen on the Brink: Implications for U.S. Policy, Jeffrey
D. Feltman Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Ambassador, House Foreign Affairs Committee,
February 4, 2010.
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FY2011 defense authorization bills seek to expand funding for the CTU (see below), and the
House and Senate versions differ over which agency, State or DoD, should manage the CTU
training program. To some extent, this same debate occurred in 2009 over proposed new
counterinsurgency funding for Pakistan; ultimately, the State Department was given the
responsibility for its management.
1206 Defense Department Assistance
In recent years, the Defense Department’s 1206 train and equip fund has become the major source
of overt U.S. military aid to Yemen. Section 1206 Authority is a Department of Defense account
designed to provide equipment, supplies, or training to foreign national military forces engaged in
counter-terrorist operations. Between FY2006 and FY2007, Yemen received approximately $30.3
million in 1206 funding. In the last two fiscal years, it has received $221.8 million. As of mid-
FY2010, Yemen is the largest global 1206 recipient, receiving $252.6 million. Pakistan is the
second largest recipient with $203.4 million.
In general, 1206 aid aims to boost the capacities of Yemen’s air force, its special operations units,
its border control monitoring, and coast guard forces. Approximately $38 million of the FY2010
1206 assistance will be used to provide Yemen’s Air Force with one CASA CN-235 medium-
range twin-turbo-prop aircraft to transport its special operations units. The United States also has
used 1206 funds to provide special operations units with training, helicopters with night-vision
cameras, sniper rifles, secure personal radios, and bullet-proof jackets. Yemen’s Coast Guard has
received through 1206 funding patrol boats and radios and border security personnel have
received armored pickup trucks.
Some observers and lawmakers have concerns regarding increased U.S. military aid to Yemen.
Some fear that, despite required U.S. human rights training and vetting of Yemeni units, abuses
committed by security forces may still occur or even increase. Others, particularly lawmakers, are
concerned that U.S. equipment could be diverted by the Yemeni government away from
combating terrorism and toward fighting domestic insurgencies. One January 2010 Senate
Foreign Relations Committee report concluded that it was “likely that U.S. counter-terrorism
assistance had been diverted for use in the government’s war against the Houthis in the north and
that this temptation will persist.” The report stated that
This potential misuse of security assistance underscores the importance of enhancing the
current end-use monitoring regime for U.S.-provided equipment. Indeed, the existing end-
use monitoring protocols in place have revealed discrepancies between U.S. records of
security assistance and those that are in the possession of Yemeni defense forces. The
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the Department of State, and Embassy’s
Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) should work to reconcile these differences. In
addition, they should conduct a thorough review of physical security and accountability
procedures at the Yemeni Special Operations Forces (YSOF) compound.85
85 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Following the Money in Yemen and Lebanon: Maximizing
the Effectiveness of US Security Assistance and International Financial Institution Lending, committee print, 111th
Cong., 1st sess., January 5, 2010 (Washington: GPO, 2010).
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Table 2. 1206 Department of Defense Funding for Yemen FY2006-FY2010
($ in millions)
1206
Program
FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010
Cross
4.3 — — — —
Border
Security and
CT Aid
Yemeni
— 26.0
— — —
Special
Operations
Capacity
Development
to Enhance
Border
Security
Air Force
— — — 5.9 —
Aerial
Surveillance
Initiative
Coast Guard
— — — 29.9
—
Maritime
Security
Initiative
Increased
— — — 25.4
—
Border
Security CT
Initiative
Explosive
— — — 5.8 —
Ordnance
Disposal
Initiative
Special
— — — — 34.5
Operations
Forces CT
Enhancement
Package
Fixed-Wing
— — — — 38.0
Aircraft and
Support for
Yemeni Air
Force to
Support CT
Units
Rotary-Wing
— — — — 52.8
Aircraft (4
Huey II) and
Support for
Yemeni Air
Force to
Support CT
Units
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1206
Program
FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010
Upgrades
— — — — 30.0
and Parts for
approx. 10
existing
Yemeni Air
Force
Helicopters
Total
4.3
26.0
0
67.0
155.3
Source: CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, by
Nina M. Serafino.
Economic Aid
Yemen receives U.S. economic aid from three primary sources, the Economic Support Fund
(ESF), the Development Assistance (DA) account, and the Global Health Child Survival account
(GHCS). In September 2009, the United States and Yemen signed a new bilateral assistance
agreement to fund essential development projects in the fields of health, education, democracy
and governance, agriculture and economic development. The agreement, subject to Congressional
appropriations, provides a total of $121 million from FY2009 through FY2011.
USAID’s new country stabilization strategy for Yemen for 2010-2012 features, among other
activities, two main programs, the Community Livelihoods Project (CLP) and the Responsive
Governance Project (RGP). The CLP seeks to work with NGOs in local communities in Yemen’s
rural governorates in order to expand access to freshwater, healthcare, and education. Its
estimated budget is $80 million for three years, plus up to $45 million for each of two additional
option years, for a total of $125 million over five years. The RGP seeks to work with, according
to USAID, “key Yemeni ministries, including Health, Education, Agriculture, Planning, Industry
& Trade, among others, to address related but broader government policy, institutional, and
capacity issues that will help the Government of Yemen be more responsive to the needs of its
citizens.”86 Its estimated budget is $27 million for three years, plus up to $16 million for both
additional option years, for a total of up to $43 million over five years. The governance program
was awarded to Counterpart International.
In FY2010, USAID obligated an additional $12.8 million to support a containment and
stabilization program for northern Yemen. According to USAID, funds will “provide immediate
community-based assistance in the governorates surrounding Sa’ada (Hajjah, Amran, northern
districts of Al Jawf) in order to contain the Sa’ada conflict from spilling into these areas, support
the current ceasefire, mitigate the possibility for a renewed outbreak of violence, and position
USAID to enter Sa’ada to deliver similar assistance as the basis for future reconstruction should
access open up.”87
86 USAID, Fact Sheet: USAID New Strategy for Yemen, February 5, 2010.
87 USAID, United States Agency For International Development, Advice of Program Change, CN#58, June 10, 2010.
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Democracy Assistance/Tribal Outreach
U.S. economic aid to Yemen also supports democracy and governance programming. For several
years, U.S. democracy promotion organizations have run programs in Yemen’s outlying provinces
to support conflict resolution strategies designed to end revenge killings among tribes. Some
NGOs receive U.S funding to facilitate discussions between tribal leaders in Mareb province and
government officials, donors, and the private sector. US assistance also works to monitor voter
registration issues in anticipation of parliamentary elections scheduled for April 2011, enhance
the electoral competitiveness of Yemen’s main political opposition parties, train members of
parliament, and provide technical assistance to parliamentary oversight and budget committees.
The State Department’s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) also provides small grants to a
number of local Yemeni NGOs.88
Yemeni Detainees at Guantanamo Bay
A large portion (between 60 and 90) of the estimated 181 detainees who remain incarcerated in
the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo Naval Base, Cuba are Yemenis. The Obama
Administration suspended repatriations to Yemen after the December 25 failed airline bomb
attack. In April 2010, Spain accepted one Yemeni detainee. The United States is seeking other
third party countries to accept the remaining prisoners, as there is a widespread belief, particularly
among U.S. lawmakers, that many of them would return to militancy if under Yemeni government
custody.
In recent months, federal judges in separate cases ordered that two Yemeni detainees be freed. In
May 2010, one judge ordered that Mohamed Mohamed Hassan Odaini be repatriated. In June
2010, another court ordered the Administration to release Hussain Salem Mohammed Almerfedi,
who had been incarcerated for eight years without trial. In May, the Administration reaffirmed its
commitment to its moratorium on transfers to Yemen, stating that “We are not lifting the overall
suspension on detainee transfers to Yemen, and this should not be viewed as a reflection of a
broader policy for other Yemeni detainees.”89 Prior to the moratorium, an Administration
interagency task force on Guantanamo had cleared 29 Yemenis to return home and conditionally
cleared another 30 if Yemen's security conditions improve.
Recent Legislation
FY2011 Defense Authorization Bills
Both House and Senate FY 2011 defense authorization bills feature significant policy directives
on Yemen. Section 1203 of S. 3454, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011,
would authorize the Secretary of Defense to use up to $75 million (from FY2011 DoD operations
and maintenance funds) to enhance the ability of the Yemen Ministry of Interior counterterrorism
forces to conduct counterterrorism operations against AQAP.90 According to the Senate Report
accompanying the bill:
88 For a list of ongoing MEPI grants in Yemen, see [http://www.abudhabi.mepi.state.gov/abstracts/yemen.html]
89 "Rulings Raise Doubts on Policy On Transfer Of Yemenis," New York Times, July 9, 2010.
90 Section 1203 of H.R. 5136, the House-passed National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011, also authorizes $75
(continued...)
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The committee recognizes the importance of the ongoing efforts by the Department of
Defense (DOD) to use `section 1206' train and equip assistance to build the capacity of
various elements of the Yemeni military. However, the committee is concerned that too little
assistance is being provided to the more capable and responsive Counter Terrorism Unit
(CTU) of the Government of Yemen's Ministry of Interior. The Department has indicated
that the ongoing `section 1206' train and equip efforts are critical, but the committee is
concerned that the results of this effort will not be demonstrated in the near term. With this in
mind, the committee believes it is critical to provide DOD with the authority to expand its
train and equip efforts to include CTU. This assistance will help to ensure that DOD has a
reliable partner to rely on for counterterrorism operations in this very sensitive area of the
world and provide the Department with additional flexibility and agility in dealing with the
threats emanating from Yemen. The committee notes explicitly in the provision that these
funds shall be used to enhance the ability of CTU to conduct operations against `al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula and its affiliates.' The committee notes that there have been public
reports suggesting that the Government of Yemen may have used equipment provided by the
United States to conduct operations against government opposition elements in both the
North and South. The committee believes this would be a misuse of this assistance and any
other security assistance provided to the Government of Yemen.91
In addition to supporting Yemen’s CTU, S. 3454 also calls for a comprehensive audit and report
on U.S. assistance to Yemen. The bill would direct the Comptroller General to report on the
following issues:
(1) the amount and types of assistance the United States has provided to the Government of
Yemen to include support from the U.S. Department of State, Department of Defense, U.S.
Agency for International Development, and other U.S. Government departments and
agencies; (2) an assessment of the effectiveness of U.S. assistance to the Government of
Yemen; (3) an assessment of the extent to which the Government of Yemen has been able to
utilize U.S. assistance to counter the AQAP threat; (4) a discussion of the capability and
reliability of security forces units within the Government of Yemen; (5) an assessment of
how effectively the United States coordinated its assistance among the various federal
agencies and other major donors and regional allies; and (6) other issues deemed appropriate
by the Comptroller General. The Comptroller General shall provide this report to the
appropriate congressional committees no later than January 31, 2011.92
Other Recent Legislation
• H.Res. 1288. Urges that a certificate of loss of nationality should be issued by the
appropriate diplomatic or consular officer for approval by the Secretary of State
and forwarded to U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services finding that Anwar al
Awlaki voluntarily relinquished his status as a United States citizen by, among
other things, voluntarily participating in and collaborating with Armed Forces
seeking to carry out hostilities against the United States. Bill Status: Referred to
(...continued)
million in 1206 funding for U.S. assistance to Yemeni Ministry of Interior forces with the stipulation that the funds be
transferred to the Department of State, which would assume responsibility for the program. The SASC version of the
bill, S. 3454, would provide a new, separate, and discrete authority for DOD to train and equip the Yemini Ministry of
Interior forces.
91 S. 3454
92 S. 3454
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the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and
International Law, House Committee on the Judiciary, 6/15/2010.
• S.Res. 400. Among other things, requests that the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence submit a joint,
comprehensive strategy for Yemen, in classified and unclassified form, to the
Senate, including (a) counterterrorism cooperation; (b) development,
humanitarian, and security assistance; (c) regional and international diplomatic
coordination; and (s) democracy, human rights, and governance promotion. Bill
Status: Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar.
• H.R. 4464. States that no individual who is detained at Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, may be
transferred or repatriated, for the purposes of release or detention, into a nation or
region that is recognized by the Department of State or the Department of
Defense as a haven of any manner, kind, or fashion for terrorist activity or that
has been classified as a state sponsor of terrorism. Bill Status: Referred to House
Committee on Armed Services, 1/19/2010.
• S.Res. 341. Among other things, calls on the President to give sufficient weight
to the situation in Yemen in efforts to prevent terrorist attacks on the United
States, United States allies, and Yemeni civilians and calls on the President to
promote economic and political reforms necessary to advance economic
development and good governance in Yemen. Bill Status: Passed in the Senate,
12/4/2009.
International Aid and Calls for Reform in Yemen
Despite increased economic and military aid, the Administration recognizes that the United States
cannot be solely responsible for Yemen’s development and security. In order to increase donor
coordination and widen the scope of support, the United States and Great Britain helped form the
Friends of Yemen Group, a multilateral forum of 24 concerned countries that was launched at a
January 2010 conference in London.93 Since then, a meeting between Yemen and Arab donors
was held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in order to accelerate the delivery of pledges made at an earlier
2006 conference in London. In March, the Friends of Yemen group convened in Abu Dhabi,
where Yemeni officials stated that the country requires $44 billion in aid and investment over the
next five years to support development. The Friends of Yemen are scheduled to meet again in
New York in September.
In general, Yemen is not a large recipient of official development assistance. According to the
World Bank, in 2008 the country received $305.4 million from donors worldwide, though most
experts agree that figure does not include unofficial cash transfers from Yemen’s wealthy Gulf
Arab neighbors. Countries attending the 2006 London Donors Conference pledged $5.7 billion
for Yemen, and since the 2009 Christmas Day attempted airline bombing, the Administration and
others have recognized that the fulfillment of these pledges would be critical not only for
93 Traditional foreign donors to Yemen include the United States, GCC states, United Kingdom, Germany, France,
Netherlands, Italy, Japan, South Korea, the World Bank, European Commission, various United Nations agencies
(UNDP, HCR, WFP, UNFPA, UNICEF, FAO, WHO, UNHCR), and Arab multilateral development funds (Arab Fund
for Economic and Social Development, the Islamic Development Bank, the OPEC Fund, the Arab Monetary Fund).
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development purposes, but for demonstrating to Yemeni leaders that there is international political
will to stabilize the country. As of early 2010, a mere 10% of the 2006 pledges had been actually
disbursed.
Table 3. International Pledges to Yemen: London Donors Conference 2006
$s in millions
Donor
Pledge (in U.S. $)
GCC Bilateral Countries
Saudi Arabia
1,181
UAE 650
Qatar 500
Kuwait 200
Oman 100
Total
2,631
Multilateral Regional Agencies
Arab Fund for Social Development
785
Word Bank (IDA)
400
Arab Monetary Fund
220
Islamic Development Bank
200
UN System
90
European Commission
100
IFDA 70
OPEC Fund for International Development
20
Global Fund
32
Total
1,917
Traditional Bilateral Countries
United Kingdom
230
Germany 190
France 130
Netherlands 91
South Korea
40
Spain 26
United States
21
Japan 15
Italy 12
Denmark 9
Total 764
Grand Total
5,312
Source: http://www.yemencg.org/library/2008/goverment_report08_en.pdf
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Note: Media reports indicate that donors pledged a total of $5.7 billion, and therefore this table does not
include the sources for an additional $400 million in pledged aid.
In essence, Yemen requires external aid, both political and financial, to improve its capacity to
provide security, governance, and economic development, but donors are hesitant to commit to
Yemen, fearing that its government’s lack of capacity to absorb aid will inevitably lead to their
funds being squandered. Furthermore, though the United States has taken a leading role in
marshalling international support for Yemen in recent years, Western countries are constantly
pushing for Yemen’s Arab neighbors to take a more active and positive role in the country’s
development; However, many Gulf countries themselves lack the human expertise or desire to
implement aid projects on the ground in Yemen, preferring to donate cash to Yemen’s coffers or
outsource development work to Western aid agencies. According to one report, “The GCC states
do not discuss common developmental approaches. In part this reflects a lack of national capacity,
highlighted by a leading GCC official's suggestion at the February 2010 Riyadh meeting of
paying “outside experts” (Western aid agencies) to meet Yemen's developmental needs. No
individual GCC state has an aid office in Sana'a, nor is there a collective GCC one, despite
Yemeni encouragement of on-the-ground Arab support. At present this is limited to a few Saudi
and Egyptian experts advising on economic management in Aden.”94
Overall, though it is not nearly at the level desired by the Yemeni government, foreign countries
have increased their aid to Yemen out of growing fear of state failure. In December 2009, the Abu
Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD) made a $650 million commitment to fund over a dozen
projects inside Yemen. The World Bank has disbursed several hundred million dollars for dozens
of projects inside the country for its five-year program. Yemen’s Social Fund for Development is
a primary recipient of foreign aid and is well regarded by the international community for its
transparency and wide reach outside the capital. It spent $218 million on projects inside Yemen in
2009.
Reform in Yemen
Many observers believe that the international community is willing to assist Yemen in boosting its
internal capacity to take necessary political and economic reforms that would somewhat alleviate
the country’s woeful state of development; however, it is unclear whether or not the Yemeni
government itself is seriously committed to tackling difficult challenges.
At present, Yemen is negotiating with the International Monetary Fund in order to launch an
economic reform plan. After Yemen’s latest Article IV Consultation with the IMF that concluded
in January 2010, the IMF recommended that:
Given the sizable increase in domestic debt to finance the 2009 budget deficit, including use
of central bank financing, Directors encouraged ambitious fiscal consolidation, focusing on
aligning expenditures with revenues, reducing structural rigidities in expenditures and
boosting non-oil revenue. Key priorities in this regard include full implementation of the
General Sales Tax and reducing fuel subsidies. At the same time, Directors stressed the need
for larger and better-targeted direct transfers to protect the poor. Continued efforts to reform
the income tax regime, eliminate exemptions and strengthen public financial management
are also crucial.95
94 "GULF STATES: GCC lacks policy coordination for Yemen," Oxford Analytica, March 24, 2010.
95 IMF Executive Board Concludes 2009 Article IV Consultation with Yemen, Public Information Notice (PIN) No.
(continued...)
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President Saleh himself has initiated his own ten-point reform plan that includes, among other
things, fuel subsidy reductions, land reform, civil service reform, and enhanced water-use
efficiency. In response, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton remarked that:
President Salih has a 10-point economic plan, and we have made clear that we have
expectations and we have the right to work with the Government of Yemen as we do provide
development [aid] because we want it to go for the benefit of the people of Yemen. We want
to see results on the ground. We’re seeing results in the counterterrorism efforts and we want
to see similar results when it comes to development. But I believe that the foreign minister
and other high officials in Yemen understand that. They’re committed to this new course and
we want to assist them in being successful.96
The government of Yemen insists that is committed to making difficult choices. As mentioned
earlier, fuel subsides have been modestly reduced in 2010. According to Yemen’s Deputy
Minister of Planning and International Cooperation Hisham Sharaf, “Our emergency and urgent
program includes such reforms. The brother president considers that the reforms will emerge
before the world, and that this developing country which is said to have corruption and problems
should follow a course of reform that would attract the others as investors, donors, and also as
countries to deal with us. These reforms will not be mere ink on paper, or postponed from one
year to another.”97
Conclusion and U.S. Policy Options
There are a number of challenges to expanded U.S. military and non-military action in Yemen,
including limited local political support, limited local capacity to absorb or effectively administer
U.S. assistance, a strong public antipathy to U.S. security cooperation, a local government that
does not identify Al Qaeda as its primary domestic problem, limited U.S. government knowledge
of Yemen’s internal political dynamics, and a precarious security situation on the ground that
prohibits direct U.S. support in outlying areas. Given these challenges, many observers have
suggested that the range of options before Congress and the Obama Administration for dealing
with AQAP and Yemen’s long-term viability as a nation-state is limited. The following summaries
describe some options that have been proffered; the selection is not exhaustive:
• Condition U.S. Assistance. There is some concern that just like after the 2000
U.S.S. Cole bombing in Aden harbor, the United States might repeat a familiar
pattern—an attack occurs, the United States scrambles to react, and then
gradually the U.S. government loses focus, as the Yemeni government reduces
the capabilities of Al Qaeda-inspired militants to an internationally tolerable level
without eliminating them. In this regard, some argue that, in crafting his
government’s response, President Saleh is likely to seek to avoid exacerbating
political opposition at home while meeting the demands of the United States or
other potential donors. This time, some suggest that the United States condition
additional U.S. aid, either overtly or behind closed doors, on political and
(...continued)
10/15, January 27, 2010.
96 U.S. Department of State, Remarks by Clinton with Yemeni Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi, January 21, 2010.
97 Open Source Center, "Yemeni Deputy Planning Minister Hisham Sharaf on New Yemeni Economic Plan," London
Al-Sharq al-Awsat Online in Arabic , February 28, 2010, GMP20100228001007 .
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economic reform in order to improve Yemen’s long-term prospects and stabilize
existing political crises. Based on other cases, it is likely that the Administration
would seek waiver authority for any congressionally mandated conditions or
certification requirements on U.S. assistance.
• Internationalize Assistance. For years, the United States has advocated for more
development assistance for Yemen at the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund. However, some analysts suggest that due to the political sensitivities of
greater U.S. involvement in Yemen, the United States should work multilaterally
with Saudi Arabia, the EU, and other countries in both expanding military and
economic cooperation there. The potentially competing short-term priorities of
regional, international, and multilateral parties may make it less likely that
external assistance would affect Yemen’s long term prognosis in a decisive way.
• The Minimalist Approach. Despite the flurry of recent media attention since the
Flight 253 incident, some observers anticipate that the AQAP threat to the U.S.
homeland is not nearly as dire as advertised and that the United States risks
exacerbating the problem by becoming too involved in Yemen. While doing
nothing may not be an option, these same observers suggest that a quiet,
sustained, and deliberate approach focused on minimizing short term threats and
addressing long term systemic challenges may be best.
Author Contact Information
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
jsharp@crs.loc.gov, 7-8687
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