China Naval Modernization: Implications for
U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and
Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
July 26, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33153
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

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China Naval Modernization

Summary
The question of how the United States should respond to China’s military modernization effort,
including its naval modernization effort, has emerged as a key issue in U.S. defense planning. The
issue is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy, because many U.S. military programs for
countering improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy’s budget.
Decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for
countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities could affect the likelihood or
possible outcome of a potential U.S.-Chinese military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or some
other issue. Some observers consider such a conflict to be very unlikely, in part because of
significant U.S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could
cause on both sides. In the absence of such a conflict, however, the U.S.-Chinese military balance
in the Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries,
including choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States.
In this sense, decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy
programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces could influence the political
evolution of the Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals
relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere.
China’s naval modernization effort, which began in the 1990s, encompasses a broad array of
weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), submarines, and
surface ships. China’s naval modernization effort also includes reforms and improvements in
areas such as maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education, training,
and exercises.
DOD and other observers believe that the near-term focus of China’s military modernization
effort has been to develop military options for addressing the situation with Taiwan. Consistent
with this goal, observers believe that China wants its military to be capable of acting as a so-
called anti-access force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict involving Taiwan,
or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. naval and air
forces. Some observers believe that China’s military modernization effort, including its naval
modernization effort, is increasingly oriented toward pursuing additional goals, such as asserting
or defending China’s claims in maritime territorial disputes, protecting China’s sea lines of
communications, displacing U.S. influence in the Pacific, and asserting China’s status as a major
world power.
Placing an increased emphasis on U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime
military capabilities in coming years could lead to one more of the following: developing and
procuring highly capable ships, aircraft, and weapons for defeating Chinese anti-access systems;
assigning a larger percentage of the Navy to the Pacific Fleet (and, as a result, a smaller
percentage to the Atlantic Fleet); homeporting more of the Pacific Fleet’s ships at forward
locations such as Hawaii, Guam, and Japan; increasing training and exercises in operations
relating to countering Chinese maritime anti-access forces, such as antisubmarine warfare (ASW)
operations; and increasing activities for monitoring and understanding developments in China’s
navy, as well as activities for measuring and better understanding operating conditions in the
Western Pacific.

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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Issue for Congress................................................................................................................. 1
Scope, Sources, and Terminology.......................................................................................... 1
Background ................................................................................................................................ 2
Overview of China’s Naval Modernization Effort.................................................................. 2
Date of Inception ............................................................................................................ 2
Elements of Modernization Effort ................................................................................... 2
Limitations and Weaknesses............................................................................................ 3
Goals of China’s Naval Modernization Effort ........................................................................ 3
Capabilities for Taiwan Scenarios, Including Acting as Anti-Access Force....................... 3
Additional Goals Not Directly Related to Taiwan ............................................................ 4
Potential Significance of Goals Not Directly Related to Taiwan....................................... 4
Selected Elements of China’s Naval Modernization Effort..................................................... 8
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) ............................................................................. 8
Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs)................................................................................ 9
Submarines ................................................................................................................... 10
Aircraft Carriers............................................................................................................ 14
Surface Combatants ...................................................................................................... 15
Amphibious Ships......................................................................................................... 19
Maritime Surveillance and Targeting Systems ............................................................... 20
Past, Current, and Projected Chinese Ship and Aircraft Force Levels ................................... 20
Chinese Naval Operations Away from Home Waters ........................................................... 22
March 2010 Testimony of Commander, U.S. Pacific Command........................................... 24
Comparing U.S. and Chinese Naval Capabilities ................................................................. 24
Potential Oversight Issues for Congress..................................................................................... 25
China as a Defense-Planning Priority .................................................................................. 25
Summary of Arguments ................................................................................................ 26
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) .................................................................... 27
Potential Implications for U.S. Navy Programs.................................................................... 34
Potential Implications in General................................................................................... 34
Actions Already Taken .................................................................................................. 34
Acquiring Highly Capable Ships, Aircraft, Weapons, and Supporting C4ISR
Systems ..................................................................................................................... 35
Increasing the Pacific Fleet’s Share of the Navy ............................................................ 38
Homeporting Additional Pacific Fleet Ships in Forward Locations ................................ 39
Submission to Congress of 2010 Edition of DOD Report on China Military and
Security Developments .................................................................................................... 39
Legislative Activity for FY2011 ................................................................................................ 40
FY2011 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5136/S. 3454)..................................................... 40
House ........................................................................................................................... 40
Senate ........................................................................................................................... 42

Tables
Table 1. PLA Navy Submarine Commissionings........................................................................ 12
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Table 2. New PLA Navy Destroyer Classes ............................................................................... 16
Table 3. New PLA Navy Frigate Classes ................................................................................... 18
Table 4. Past, Current, and Projected Numbers of Ships and Aircraft ......................................... 21

Appendixes
Appendix A. Prior-Year Legislative Activity.............................................................................. 45
Appendix B. Excerpt from March 2010 Testimony of Commander, U.S. Pacific
Command .............................................................................................................................. 53

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 56

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Introduction
Issue for Congress
The question of how the United States should respond to China’s military modernization effort,
including its naval modernization effort, has emerged as a key issue in U.S. defense planning. The
issue is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy, because many U.S. military programs for
countering improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy’s budget.
Decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for
countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities could affect the likelihood or
possible outcome of a potential U.S.-Chinese military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or some
other issue. Some observers consider such a conflict to be very unlikely, in part because of
significant U.S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could
cause on both sides. In the absence of such a conflict, however, the U.S.-Chinese military balance
in the Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries,
including choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States.
In this sense, decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy
programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces could influence the political
evolution of the Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals
relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere.
Scope, Sources, and Terminology
This report focuses on the potential implications of China’s naval modernization for future
required U.S. Navy capabilities. Other CRS reports address separate issues relating to China.
This report is based on unclassified open-source information, such as the annual Department of
Defense (DOD) report to Congress on China’s military power,1 an August 2009 report from the
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI),2 and published reference sources such as Jane’s Fighting
Ships.
For convenience, this report uses the term China’s naval modernization to refer to the
modernization not only of China’s navy, but also of Chinese military forces outside China’s navy
that can be used to counter U.S. naval forces operating in the Western Pacific, such as land-based
anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), land-based surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), land-based air
force aircraft armed with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and land-based long-range radars for
detecting and tracking ships at sea.

1 U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
2009. Washington, 2009. (Hereafter 2009 DOD CMP. Editions for earlier years cited similarly.)
Section 1246 of the FY2010 defense authorization act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009) amended the
statute requiring DOD to submit an annual report to Congress on China’s military power. Among other things, Section
1246 amended the scope of the report to include “military and security developments involving” China. The 2010
edition of the DOD report consequently is referred to in this CRS report as 2010 DOD CMSD.
2 Office of Naval Intelligence, The People’s Liberation Army Navy, A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics,
Suitland (MD), Office of Naval Intelligence, August 2009. 46 pp. (Hereafter 2009 ONI Report.)
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China’s military is formally called the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA. Its navy is called the
PLA Navy, or PLAN (also abbreviated as PLA[N]), and its air force is called the PLA Air Force,
or PLAAF. The PLA Navy includes an air component that is called the PLA Naval Air Force, or
PLANAF. China refers to its ballistic missile force as the Second Artillery Force.
Background
Overview of China’s Naval Modernization Effort3
Date of Inception
Observers date the beginning of China’s naval modernization effort to various points in the
1990s.4 Design work on some of China’s newer ship classes appears to have begun in the later
1980s.5 Some observers believe that China’s naval modernization effort may have been reinforced
or accelerated by a 1996 incident in which the United States deployed two aircraft carrier strike
groups to waters near Taiwan in response to Chinese missile tests and naval exercises near
Taiwan.
Elements of Modernization Effort
China’s naval modernization effort encompasses a broad array of weapon acquisition programs,
including programs for anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs),
land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), surface-to-air missiles, mines, manned aircraft, unmanned
aircraft, submarines, destroyers and frigates, patrol craft, amphibious ships and craft, mine
countermeasures (MCM) ships, and supporting C4ISR6 systems. In addition, observers believe
that China may soon begin (or already has begun) an indigenous aircraft carrier construction
program. Some of these acquisition programs have attracted particular interest and are discussed
in further detail below. China’s naval modernization effort also includes reforms and
improvements in maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education, and
training, and exercises.7

3 Unless otherwise indicated, shipbuilding program information in this section is taken from Jane’s Fighting Ships
2008-2009, and previous editions Other sources of information on these shipbuilding programs may disagree regarding
projected ship commissioning dates or other details, but sources present similar overall pictures regarding PLA Navy
shipbuilding.
4 China ordered its first four Russian-made Kilo-class submarines in 1993, and its four Russian-made Sovremenny-
class destroyers in 1996. China laid the keel on its first Song (Type 039) class submarine in 1991, its first Luhu (Type
052) class destroyer in 1990, its Luhai (Type 051B) class destroyer in 1996, and its first Jiangwei I (Type 053 H2G)
class frigate in 1990.
5 First-in-class ships whose keels were laid down in 1990 or 1991 (see previous footnote) likely reflect design work
done in the latter 1980s.
6 C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
7 For a discussion of improvements in personnel, training, and exercises, see 2009 ONI Report, pp. 31-40.
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Limitations and Weaknesses
Although China’s naval modernization effort has substantially improved China’s naval
capabilities in recent years, observers believe China’s navy continues to exhibit limitations or
weaknesses in several areas, including capabilities for sustained operations by larger formations
in distant waters, joint operations with other parts of China’s military, C4ISR systems, anti-air
warfare (AAW), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), MCM, and a dependence on foreign suppliers for
certain key ship components.8
The sufficiency of Chinese naval capabilities is best assessed against its intended missions.
Although China’s navy has limitations and weaknesses, it may nevertheless be sufficient for
performing certain missions of interest to Chinese leaders. As China’s navy reduces its
weaknesses and limitations, it may become sufficient to perform a wider array of potential
missions.
Goals of China’s Naval Modernization Effort
Capabilities for Taiwan Scenarios, Including Acting as Anti-Access Force
DOD and other observers believe that the near-term focus of China’s military modernization
effort, including its naval modernization effort, has been to develop military options for
addressing the situation with Taiwan. Consistent with this goal, observers believe that China
wants its military to be capable of acting as a so-called anti-access force—a force that can deter
U.S. intervention in a conflict involving Taiwan, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the
effectiveness of intervening U.S. naval and air forces. ASBMs, attack submarines, and supporting
C4ISR systems are viewed as key elements of China’s emerging anti-access force, though other
force elements—such as ASCMs, LACMs (for attacking U.S. air bases and other facilities in the
Western Pacific), and mines—are also of significance. China’s emerging maritime anti-access
force can be viewed as broadly analogous to the sea-denial force that the Soviet Union developed
during the Cold War to deny U.S. use of the sea or counter U.S. forces participating in a NATO-
Warsaw Pact conflict. One potential difference between the Soviet sea-denial force and China’s
emerging maritime anti-access force is that China’s force includes ASBMs capable of hitting
moving ships at sea.

8 DOD states that:
As China’s capabilities for local and regional operations have increased in certain areas since 2000,
a number of limitations appear to have persisted. The PLA has developed new doctrine for joint
warfighting and implemented organizational changes, such as including service commanders on the
Central Military Commission, to facilitate the transition to a more “joint” force. However, joint
integration still lags. Similarly, PLA air and amphibious lift capacity has not improved appreciably
since 2000 when the Department of Defense assessed the PLA as capable of sealift of one infantry
division. Likewise, China’s current ability to deliver about 5,000 parachutists in a single lift (less if
equipment is carried at the same time) is similar to previous assessments. China’s at-sea
replenishment has improved with experience since 2000, but the PLA Navy today remains limited
by a small number of support vessels – much as it did then. In 2000, the Department of Defense
projected aerial refueling as an operational capability by 2005. Today, while China has a few aerial
refueling aircraft, it does not have the number of tankers, properly equipped combat aircraft, or
sufficient training to employ this capability for power projection.
(2009 DOD CMP, p. viii. For additional discussion of limitations, and weaknesses, see 2009 ONI
Report.)
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Additional Goals Not Directly Related to Taiwan
Some observers believe that China’s military modernization effort, including its naval
modernization effort, is increasingly oriented toward pursuing additional goals not directly related
to Taiwan, including the following:
• asserting or defending China’s maritime territorial claims—including in
particular its claim to most of the South China Sea;
• asserting or defending China’s interpretation of international laws relating
freedom of navigation in exclusive economic zones, or EEZs—an interpretation
at odds with the interpretation held by the United States and most other countries;
• protecting China’s sea lines of communications, including those to the Persian
Gulf, on which China relies for some of its energy imports;
• displacing U.S. influence in the Pacific; and
• asserting China’s status as a major world power.9
Potential Significance of Goals Not Directly Related to Taiwan
In General
The above goals not directly related to Taiwan are potentially significant for at least four reasons:
• First, they imply that if the situation with Taiwan were somehow resolved, China
could find continuing reasons to pursue its naval modernization effort.
• Second, they suggest that if China completes its planned buildup of Taiwan-
related naval force elements, or if the situation with Taiwan were somehow
resolved, the composition of China’s naval modernization effort could shift to
include a greater emphasis on naval force elements that would be appropriate for
supporting additional goals not directly related to Taiwan, such as aircraft
carriers, a larger number of nuclear-powered attack submarines, serial production
of destroyers, larger amphibious ships, underway replenishment ships, hospital
ships, and overseas bases or support facilities.
• Third, they suggest that China’s maritime territorial claims and its interpretation
of international laws relating freedom of navigation in EEZs have the potential
for acting as a continuing cause of friction or tension in U.S.-Chinese relations,
and as an ongoing source of potential incidents at sea between the two countries’
ships and aircraft.
• Fourth, they suggest that even if China’s military were never to engage in combat
with an opposing military, China’s military forces, including in particular its
naval forces, would still be used on a day-to-day basis to promote China’s
political position in the Pacific. This would create an essentially political (as

9 The August 2009 ONI report, for example, states that a 2004 expansion in missions for China’s Navy “levied new
requirements on the PLA(N) to prepare for contingencies beyond the immediacy of Taiwan, such as addressing China’s
economic dependence on sea lines of communication.” 2009 ONI Report, p. 9.
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opposed to combat-related) reason for the United States or other countries to
maintain a competitive presence in the region with naval and other forces that are
viewed by observers in the Pacific as capable of effectively countering China’s
forces. Even if a U.S.-Chinese military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or
some other issue were never to occur, the U.S.-Chinese military balance in the
Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific
countries, including choices on whether to align their policies more closely with
China or the United States. In this sense, decisions that Congress and the
executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for countering improved
Chinese maritime military forces could influence the political evolution of the
Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals
relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere.
Maritime Territorial Claims and Rights When Operating in EEZs
China’s interpretation of international laws relating freedom of navigation in EEZs appears to be
at the crux of incidents on March 23, 2001, and March 8, 2009, in which Chinese ships
confronted and harassed the U.S. naval ships Bowditch (TAGS-62) and Impeccable (TAGOS-23),
respectively, as they were conducting survey and ocean surveillance operations in China’s EEZ,
and an incident on April 1, 2001, in which a U.S. Navy EP-3 electronic surveillance aircraft
flying in international airspace about 65 miles southeast of China’s Hainan Island in the South
China Sea was intercepted by Chinese fighters, collided with one of the fighters, and made an
emergency landing on Hainan Island.10
Regarding the Impeccable incident, one observer states:
the nations of the world should be concerned that the PRC’s [i.e., China’s] actions in the
March 8th [2009] incident reflect an effort by the PRC government to unilaterally renegotiate
a widely-accepted body of international law. This is a concern for all nations, and not merely
the United States or the PRC’s neighbors in the South China Sea and East China Sea.11
Regarding China’s claim to most of the South China Sea, a July 3, 2010, press report states:
American and European experts who assembled here [in Stockholm] in early June [2010] for
the semi-annual Stockholm China Forum were a bit taken aback when their Chinese
colleagues defined the South China Sea as a “core national interest” of the People’s Republic
[of China]. The Chinese have long used this diplomatic term in discussing Tibet and Taiwan
to signify issues that go to the heart of its national sovereignty.

10 For more on the April 1, 2001, aircraft collision, see CRS Report RL30946, China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of
April 2001: Assessments and Policy Implications, by Shirley A. Kan (coordinator) et al.
11 Jonathan G. Odom, “The True ‘Lies’ of the Impeccable Incident: What Really Happened, Who Disregarded
International law, and Why Every Nation (Outside of China) Should Be Concerned,” Michigan State Journal of
International Law, Vol. 18, No. 3 (May 2010), 42 pp. (The quoted passage appears on page 39.) See also Peter A.
Dutton, “Through A Chinese Lens,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2010: 24-29; James Manicom, “China’s
Claims to an Extended Continental Shelf in the East China Sea: Meaning and Implications,” China Brief, July 9, 2009:
9-11; Peter Dutton and John Garofano, “China Undermines Maritime Laws,” Far Eastern Economic Review (online),
April 3, 2009 (available online at http://www.feer.com/essays/2009/april/china-undermines-maritime-laws); and Raul
Pedrozo, “Close Encounters At Sea, The USNS Impeccable Incident,” Naval War College Review, Summer 2009: 101-
111. For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL31183, China's Maritime Territorial Claims: Implications for U.S.
Interests, by Kerry Dumbaugh et al.
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The academics were not speaking out of turn. According to The New York Times, Chinese
leaders told visiting Obama administration officials earlier this spring that Beijing would not
tolerate interference in the South China Sea, a vast expanse that is a major maritime transit
area, because the entire region was a “core interest” of their nation.
Since then, “the Chinese are using this term more often and more expansively,” said Aaron
Friedberg, a China expert at Princeton University. “And they are defining it as a red line, as a
nerve you can't touch.”
Beijing’s decision to test its neighbors and the United States now in this manner has scholars
puzzled. “You would think,” one American analyst living in Beijing observed, that “they
would have an interest in finessing this issue for the time being” given its sensitivity to other
nations bordering the sea, and other, more pressing issues on the international agenda. The
fact that Chinese officials are not masking their ambitions may actually be more important
than Beijing’s specific objectives.
The South China Sea is not just any body of water. At least a third of global maritime
commerce and more than half of Northeast Asia’s imported energy supplies pass through its
1.2 million square miles. U.S. forces traverse the sea between the Pacific and Indian oceans,
including the naval forces that support the war in Afghanistan.
The sea is bounded by Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. All
have overlapping claims in the region. Beijing has asserted that 80 percent of the area is
China’s “historic waters.” Friedberg said that recent Chinese assertions are “a very
significant extension of claims they have made in the past.”12
Another observer states that:
In combination, China’s claims are tantamount to a claim of full sovereignty over the South
China Sea. Were these [claims] to become accepted, they would impede legitimate American
naval operations in support of regional friends and allies, deterrence of regional conflict, and
maintenance of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea’s critical sea lines of
communication.13
Regarding the Yellow Sea—a body of water between China and the Korean Peninsula—a July 8,
2010, press report states that:
China on Thursday [July 8, 2010] said it firmly opposed any foreign warships or planes
entering the Yellow Sea as well as adjacent waters that were engaged in activities that would
impact on its security and interests.
Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang made the remarks in response to a question on a
scheduled joint naval drill between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) at a
regular news conference.14
Two observers of Asian and Pacific security issues state that

12 Bruce Stokes, “China's New Red Line At Sea,” National Journal, July 3, 2010.
13 Peter A. Dutton, “Through A Chinese Lens,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2010: 24-29. (The quoted
passage appears on page 29.)
14 “China Opposes Foreign Warships, Planes Entering Yellow Sea and Adjacent Waters,” Xinhua, July 8, 2010.
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as China has become more influential, it has also become uncharacteristically assertive in the
diplomatic arena. This assertiveness is nowhere more evident than with its naval power, and
is prompting many to ask if it is now verging on the reckless, particularly over the South
China Sea….
It’s increasingly clear that Beijing may have misinterpreted a relatively passive but definitely
welcoming set of international reactions to China’s rise. And the combination of China’s
aggressive naval actions and maritime territorial claims suggests an alarming indicator:
Chinese assertiveness over its region is growing as fast as China’s wealth and perceived
power trajectory. Beijing’s unwelcome intent appears to give notice that China is opting out
of the Global Commons, and that the Western Pacific is not to be accessible to all, but
instead increasingly part of China’s exclusive sphere of influence.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in China’s attitude over the South China Sea, which
recently has been defined as a ‘core interest’—the same phrase Chinese use to refer to Tibet,
Taiwan and Xinjiang. In the process, China is in effect dismissing the international concept
of the Global Commons, which refers to the maritime, air, space and cyberspace domains
that comprise the circulatory system of our globalized world. Because the Global Commons
hold together the international world order based on near-uncontested access, the rule of law
and freedom of manoeuvre, China’s challenging of these principles puts it at direct odds with
the United States.
Indeed, China seems to regard the maritime global commons in a proprietary fashion. For a
given area, the Chinese wish either to dominate it or for others to stay away; in effect, in the
Chinese view, there’s no ‘commons.’ China calling the South China Sea a ‘core concern’ is
an attempt to place clear, Chinese-declared limits on the ability of the international
community to assert its rights under international law.
China has two types of arbitrary claims: an assertion that China’s territorial seas extend into
much of the South China Sea and the more recent claim that they have the right to control
navigation and research activities, not just fishing and seabed resources, within their
Exclusive Economic Zones. If not challenged, China’s assertive incrementalism has
international legal risks, since international law is built on norms.
In contrast, long-standing US diplomatic and military doctrine has been explicit that
navies—including China’s—have every right to operate on the high seas, even including in
the territorial waters of other states. In support of this doctrine, Washington has attempted to
establish a strong and open dialogue with the Chinese military. China, on the other hand,
sees US operations inside the first island chain as impinging on its sovereignty, just as it has
a very expansive interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as to
its authority within its own (and contested) Exclusive Economic Zones. China’s combination
of its international legal strategies with naval force is telling: unlike the other claimants to
the South China Sea, China backs up its words with military force.
The US Navy remains the strongest and only true blue-water naval force in the world and is
the enabler and enforcer of much of the Global Commons, a system of free trade and
unfettered economic and political access. As such, it appears to be the object of a different
Chinese worldview, one of limited access for others and exclusive access for China.
Meanwhile, the result of China’s asymmetric anti-access and area-denial strategy is a
growing Navy-killing array of ever more capable anti-ship missiles and other weapons.
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Beijing is trying to establish the precedent for limited access on its own terms and
diminished freedom of navigation.15
Selected Elements of China’s Naval Modernization Effort
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs)
DOD and other observers believe China is developing and testing anti-ship ballistic missiles
(ASBMs), which are theater-range ballistic missiles16 equipped with maneuverable reentry
vehicles (MaRVs) capable of hitting moving ships at sea. Observers have expressed strong
concern about this development, because such missiles, in combination with broad-area maritime
surveillance and targeting systems, would permit China to attack aircraft carriers, other U.S.
Navy ships, or ships of allied or partner navies operating in the Western Pacific. The U.S. Navy
has not previously faced a threat from highly accurate ballistic missiles capable of hitting moving
ships at sea. Due to their ability to change course, MaRVs would be more difficult to intercept
than non-maneuvering ballistic missile reentry vehicles. DOD states that:
China is developing an ASBM based on a variant of the CSS-5 MRBM [medium-range
ballistic missile] as a part of its anti-access strategy. The missile has a range in excess of
1,500 km, is armed with a maneuverable warhead, and when incorporated into a
sophisticated command and control system, is intended to provide the PLA the capability to
attack ships at sea, including aircraft carriers in the western Pacific Ocean.17
The August 2009 ONI report states:
The PRC [People’s Republic of China] has been conducting advanced research into an anti-
ship ballistic missile (ASBM) program since the 1990s. This ASBM may be a variant of the
DF-21 Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM), with the capability to perform a mid-
course ballistic correction maneuver to update the target’s location, and then guide a
Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle (MaRV) to the target. As ASBM’s long range, high-reentry

15 Patrick Cronin and Paul Giarra, “China’s Dangerous Arrogance,” The Diplomat, July 23, 2010 (available online at
http://the-diplomat.com/2010/07/23/china%e2%80%99s-dangerous-arrogance/).
16 Depending on their ranges, these theater-range ballistic missiles can be divided into short-, medium-, and
intermediate-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs, respectively).
17 2009 DOD CMP, p. 48. See also p. 21. See also 2009 ONI Report, pp. 26-27. For further discussion of China’s
ASBM-development effort and its potential implications for U.S. naval forces, see Craig Hooper and Christopher
Albon, “Get Off the Fainting Couch,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2010: 42-47; Andrew S. Erickson,
“Ballistic Trajectory – China Develops New Anti-Ship Missile,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 4, 2010; Michael
S. Chase, Andrew S. Erickson and Christopher Yeaw, “Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile Force Modernization and
its Implications for the United States,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, February 2009: 67-114; Andrew S. Erickson
and David D. Yang, “On the Verge of a Game-Changer,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 2009: 26-32; Andrew
Erickson, “Facing A New Missile Threat From China, How The U.S. Should Respond To China's Development Of
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Systems,” CBSNews.com, May 28, 2009; Andrew S. Erickson, “Chinese ASBM
Development: Knowns and Unknowns,” China Brief, June 24, 2009: 4-8; Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang,
“Using the Land to Control the Sea? Chinese Analysts Consider the Antiship Ballistic Missile,” Naval War College
Review, Autumn 2009: 53-86; Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin, “China’s Antiship Ballistic Missile, Developments and
Missing Links,” Naval War College Review, Autumn 2009: 87-115; Mark Stokes, “China’s Evolving Conventional
Strategic Strike Capability, The Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Challenge to U.S. Maritime Operations in the Western
Pacific and Beyond, Project 2049 Institute, September 14, 2009. 123 pp.
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speed (Mach 10-12), radical maneuvers, and munitions designed to attach aircraft carrier
sub-systems combine to create a complex threat.18
On March 23, 2010, Admiral Robert Willard, the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, testified
that China is “developing and testing a conventional anti-ship ballistic missile based on the DF-
21/CSS-5 MRBM designed specifically to target aircraft carriers.”19 Some observers believe this
to be the first time that a DOD official stated publicly that China’s ASBM was not only in
development, but that is has reached the testing stage.20 A November 17, 2009, news report stated:
China’s military is close to fielding the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile, according to
U.S. Navy intelligence.
The missile, with a range of almost 900 miles, would be fired from mobile, land-based
launchers and is “specifically designed to defeat U.S. carrier strike groups,” the Office of
Naval Intelligence reported [in its August 2009 report on China’s navy]....
Scott Bray, who wrote the ONI report on China’s Navy, said China has made “remarkable
progress” on the missile. “In little over a decade, China has taken the program from the
conceptual phase” to “near fielding a combat-ready missile,” he said....
China has ground-tested the missile three times since 2006 and conducted no flight tests yet,
Navy officials said....
Bray said China has the initial elements of its new over-the-horizon radar that can provide
the general location of U.S. vessels before launching the new missile....
The radar is supplemented by reconnaissance satellites, another Navy official said,
requesting anonymity. There are 33 in orbit and that number may grow to 65 by 2014, 11 of
which would be capable of conducting ocean surveillance, he said.21
Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs)
Among the most capable of the new ASCMs that have been acquired by China’s navy are the
Russian-made SS-N-22 Sunburn (carried by China’s four Russian-made Sovremenny-class
destroyers) and the SS-N-27 Sizzler (carried by 8 of China’s 12 Russian-made Kilo-class
submarines). China’s large inventory of ASCMs also includes several indigenous designs.

18 2009 ONI Report, p. 26.
19 Statement of Admiral Robert F. Willard, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Before the House Armed
Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture, March 23, 2010, p. 14.
20 See, for example, Wendell Minnick, “Chinese Anti-Ship Missile Could Alter U.S. Power,” Defense News, April 5,
2010: 6; and Greg Torode, “Beijing Testing ‘Carrier Killer,’ U.S. Warns, South China Morning Post, April 3, 2010.
21 Tony Capaccio, “China’s New Missile May Create A ‘No-Go Zone’ For U.S. Fleet,” Blooomberg.com, November
17, 2009.
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Submarines
Types Acquired in Recent Years
China’s submarine modernization effort, which is producing a significantly more modern and
capable submarine force, has attracted substantial attention and concern. The August 2009 ONI
report states that “since the mid-1990s, the PRC has emphasized the submarine force as one of
the primary thrusts of its military modernization effort.”22
China by the end of 2006 completed taking delivery on eight Russian-made Kilo-class non-
nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSs) that are in addition to four Kilos that China purchased
from Russia in the 1990s. China also has recently built or is building four other classes of
submarines, including the following:
• a new nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) design called the Jin
class or Type 094;
• a new nuclear powered attack submarine (SSN) design called the Shang class or
Type 093;23
• a new SS design called the Yuan class or Type 041 (or Type 039A);24 and
• another (and also fairly new) SS design called the Song class or Type 039/039G.
Along with the Kilo-class boats, these four classes of indigenous submarines are regarded as
much more modern and capable than China’s aging older-generation submarines.25 At least some
of these new submarine designs are believed to have benefitted from Russian submarine
technology and design know-how.26
The August 2009 ONI report includes a graph that shows a new Type 095 SSN, along with the
date 2015, which might be the year that ONI projects that this submarine will enter service. The
graph shows that this submarine is projected be quieter than the Shang-class SSN, and also
quieter than the Russian Victor III-class SSN, which entered service in the late 1970s, but not as
quiet as the Russian Akula I-class SSN, which entered service in the late 1980s.

22 2009 ONI Report, p. 20.
23 Some sources state that a successor to the Shang class SSN design, called the Type 095 SSN design, is in
development.
24 Some observers believe the Yuan class to be a variant of the Song class and refer to the Yuan class as the
Type 039A. The August 2009 ONI report states that the Yuan class may be equipped with an air-independent
propulsion (AIP) system. (2009 ONI Report, p. 23.)
25 A graph in the August 2009 ONI report shows that the Jin-class SSBN is quieter than China’s earlier Xia-class
SSBN, but less quiet than Russia’s Delta III-class SSBN, and that the Shang-class SSN is quieter than China’s earlier
Han-class SSN, but less quiet than Russia’s Victor III-class SSN. The graph shows that the Song-class SS is quieter
than the less capable 877 version of the Kilo class, but not as quiet as the more capable 636 version of the Kilo class.
(Two of China’s 12 Kilos are 877 models, the other 10 are 636s.) The graph shows that the Yuan class is quieter than
the Song class, but still not as quiet as the 636 version of the Kilo class. (2009 ONI Report, p. 22.)
26 The August 2009 ONI report states that the Yuan class may incorporate quieting technology from the Kilo class, and
that it may be equipped with an air-independent propulsion (AIP) system. (2009 ONI Report, p. 23.)

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China’s submarines are armed with one or more of the following: ASCMs, wire-guided and
wake-homing torpedoes, and mines. China’s eight recently delivered Kilos are reportedly armed
with the highly capable SS-N-27 Sizzler ASCM. In addition to other weapons, Shang-class SSNs
may carry LACMs. Although ASCMs are often highlighted as sources of concern, wake-homing
torpedoes are also a concern because they can be very difficult for surface ships to counter.
Although China’s aging Ming-class (Type 035) submarines are based on old technology and are
much less capable than China’s newer-design submarines, China may decide that these older
boats have continued value as minelayers or as bait or decoy submarines that can be used to draw
out enemy submarines (such as U.S. SSNs) that can then be attacked by other Chinese naval
forces.
In related areas of activity, China reportedly is developing new unmanned underwater vehicles,27
and has modernized its substantial inventory of mines.28
Submarine Acquisition Rate and Potential Submarine Force Size
Table 1 shows actual and projected commissionings of Chinese submarines by class since 1995,
when China took delivery of its first two Kilo-class boats. The table includes the final nine boats
in the Ming class, which is an older and less capable submarine design. As shown in Table 1,
China was projected to have a total of 30 relatively modern attack submarines—meaning Shang,
Kilo, Yuan, and Song class boats—in commission by the end of 2010. As shown in the table,
much of the growth in this figure occurred in 2004-2006, when 18 boats (including 8 Kilos) were
added.
The figures in Table 1 show that between 1995 and 2010, China placed into service a total of 40
submarines of all kinds, or an average of about 2.5 submarines per year. This average
commissioning rate, if sustained indefinitely, would eventually result in a steady-state submarine
force of 50 to 75 boats of all kinds, assuming an average submarine life of 20 to 30 years.
Excluding the 12 Kilos purchased from Russia, the total number of domestically produced
submarines placed into service between 1995 and 2007 is 28, or an average of 1.75 per year. This
average rate of domestic production, if sustained indefinitely, would eventually result in a steady-
state force of domestically produced submarines of 35 to 53 boats of all kinds, again assuming an
average submarine life of 20 to 30 years.
As shown in Table 1, only four of the submarines placed into service between 1995 and 2010 are
nuclear powered. If the mix of China’s submarine-production effort shifts at some point to
include a greater proportion of nuclear-powered boats, it is possible that the greater resources
required to produce nuclear-powered boats might result in a reduction in the overall submarine
production rate. If so, and if such a reduced overall rate were sustained indefinitely, it would
eventually result in a smaller steady-state submarine force of all kinds than the figures calculated
in the preceding two paragraphs.
The August 2009 ONI report states:

27 Lyle Goldstein and Shannon Knight, “Coming Without Shadows, Leaving Without Footprints,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, April 2010: 30-35.
28 See, for example, 2009 ONI report, p. 29.
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As PLA(N) strategy and capabilities have changed, Chinese submarine procurement has
focused on smaller numbers of modern, high-capability boats. In keeping with the
overarching PLA(N) strategy of the time, the 1980s submarine force featured a relatively
high number of low-technology platforms. Now there are fewer submarines in the PLA(N)
inventory than there were at any point in the 1980s. Currently, the submarine force consists
of six nuclear[-powered] attack submarines [SSNs], three nuclear[-powered] ballistic missile
submarines [SSBNs], and 53 diesel[-electric] attack submarines [SSs]. Over the next 10 to
15 years, primarily due to the introduction of new diesel-electric and [non-nuclear-powered]
air independent power (AIP) submarines, the force is expected to increase incrementally in
size to approximately 75 submarines.29
Table 1. PLA Navy Submarine Commissionings
Actual (1995-2010) and Projected (2011-2014)
Cumu-
Cumu-
lative
Jin
Shang
Yuan
Song
Ming
lative
total for
(Type
(Type
Kilo SS
(Type
(Type
(Type
total for
modern
094)
093)
(Russian-
041)
039)
035)
Annual
all types
attack

SSBN
SSN
made)
SSa
SS
SSb
total
shown
boatsc
1995


2d


1
3 3 2
1996
1
1 4 2
1997
2
2 6 2
1998


1d


2
3 9 3
1999


1d 1 2 11 5
2000
1
1 12 5
2001
2
1
3 15 7
2002
1
1 16 7
2003
2 2 18 9
2004
1 3 4 22 13
2005
4 3 7 29 20
2006
1 3 1
2e

7 36 27
2007
1 1 2 38 28
2008






0 38 28
2009
1 1 2 40 29
2010
1 1 41 30
2011
1 n/af 1 n/a n/a n/a
2012
n/af n/a n/a n/a n/a
2013
1 n/af n/a n/a n/a n/a
2014
1g n/af n/a n/a n/a n/a

29 2009 ONI Report, p. 21. The report states on page 46 that “Because approximately three-quarters of the current
submarine force will still be operational in 10-15 years, new submarine construction is expected to add approximately
10 platforms to the force.” See also the graph on page 45, which shows the submarine force leveling off in size around
2015.
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Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships 2009-2010, and previous editions.
Note: n/a = data not available.
a. Some observers believe the Yuan class to be a variant of the Song class and refer to the Yuan class as the
Type 039A.
b. Figures for Ming-class boats are when the boats were launched (i.e., put into the water for final
construction). Actual commissioning dates for these boats may have been later.
c. This total excludes the Jin-class SSBNs and the Ming-class SSs.
d. First four boats, commissioned in the 1990s, are to be refitted in Russia; upgrades are likely to include
installation of SS-N-27 ASCM.
e. No further units expected after the 12th and 13th shown for 2006.
f.
Jane’s Fighting Ships 2009-2010 states that production of the two Type 093 boats shown in the table may be
fol owed by production of a modified evolutionary SSN design possibly known as the Type 095 class. A
graph on page 22 of 2009 ONI Report suggests that ONI expects the first Type 095 to enter service in 2015.
g. A total of five or six boats is expected. (DOD stated in 2008 that up to five might be built. [2008 DOD CMP,
p. 25])
JL-2 SLBM on Jin-Class SSBN
Each Jin-class SSBN is expected to be armed with 12 JL-2 nuclear-armed submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs).30 DOD estimates that these missiles will enter service in 2009 or
2010,31 and that they will have a range of 7,200 kilometers (about 3,888 nautical miles).32 Such a
range could permit Jin-class SSBNs to attack
• targets in Alaska (except the Alaskan panhandle) from protected bastions close to
China;33
• targets in Hawaii (as well as targets in Alaska, except the Alaskan panhandle)
from locations south of Japan;
• targets in the western half of the 48 contiguous states (as well as Hawaii and
Alaska) from mid-ocean locations west of Hawaii; and
• targets in all 50 states from mid-ocean locations east of Hawaii.

30 2009 DOD CMP, p. 24.
31 2009 DOD CMP, pp. 24 and 48.
32 2009 DOD CMP, p. 25 (Figure 6), 48, and 66 (Figure 22).
33 A map published by DOD (2009 DOD CMP, p. 25 [Figure 6]) shows a range ellipse for the JL-2 which, upon
inspection, appears to show the missile as having a range of no more than about 6,600 kilometers, rather than the 7,200
kilometers indicated in the legend to the map and elsewhere in the DOD report. In addition, the JL-2 range ellipse
appears centered on a launching point that is more or less west of Shanghai and perhaps 200 statute miles inland from
the sea. This combination of apparent range and launching point appears to be why the map shows the JL-2 as having
sufficient range to attack only the western half of the Aleutian island chain and perhaps the western coast of mainland
Alaska (the section of Alaska’s coast that is directly opposite the Russian coast). A similar map appeared in the 2008
DOD CMP. A missile with a range of 7,200 kilometers that is launched from an ocean location close to China’s eastern
coast would have sufficient range to attack all of Alaska except the Alaskan panhandle. The August 2009 ONI report
states that the JL-2 will have a range of about 4,000 nautical miles and that it “is capable of reaching the continental
United States from Chinese littorals.” (2009 ONI Report, p. 23.)
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Aircraft Carriers
Observers believe that China will complete the ex-Ukrainian carrier Varyag, which China
purchased as an unfinished ship in 1998, and place it into service in the near future, probably as
an aviation training ship (although the ship might also be used for operational missions).
Observers also believe China will soon begin building its first indigenous aircraft carrier (or has
begun to do so already), and that China may build a total of one to six indigenous carriers in
coming years. Chinese officials have begun to talk openly about the possibility of China
operating aircraft carriers in the future.34 China reportedly has begun training its first 50 fixed-
wing carrier aviators, has been in negotiations with Russia to purchase up to 50 Russian-made
carrier-capable Su-33 fighter aircraft, and may be developing indigenous carrier-capable fighters.
DOD states that:
China has an active aircraft carrier R&D [research and development] program. The PRC
shipbuilding industry could start construction of an indigenous platform by the end of this
decade. China may be interested in building multiple operational aircraft carriers with
support ships in the next decade.
The PLA Navy has reportedly decided to initiate a program to train 50 pilots to operate
fixed-wing aircraft from an aircraft carrier. The initial program, presumably land-based,
would be followed in about four years by ship-borne training involving the ex-VARYAG,
which was purchased by a Chinese company from Ukraine in 1998.35

34 The August 2009 ONI report states that “Beginning in early 2006, PRC-owned media has reported statements from
high-level officials on China’s intent to build aircraft carriers.”
35 2009 DOD CMP, pp. 48-49. In another part of the report (page 40), DOD states:
China has an aircraft carrier research and design program, which includes continued renovations to
the former Soviet Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier VARYAG. Beginning in early 2006 with the
release of China’s Eleventh Five Year Plan, PRC-owned media reported high-level government and
military official statements on China’s intent to build aircraft carriers. In December 2008, China’s
Ministry of National Defense spokesman Senior Colonel Huang Xueping said “China has vast
oceans and it is the sovereign responsibility of China’s armed forces to ensure the country’s
maritime security and uphold the sovereignty of its coastal waters as well as its maritime rights and
interests,” and added that China is “seriously considering” adding an aircraft carrier to its fleet,
because “the aircraft carrier is a symbol of a country’s overall national strength, as well as the
competitiveness of the country’s naval force.” This was preceded by a November 2008 statement
by the Director of the Ministry of National Defense, Foreign Affairs Office, Major General Qian
Lihua, that “having an aircraft carrier is the dream of any great military power,” and “the question
is not whether you have an aircraft carrier, but what you do with your aircraft carrier.”
China continues to show interest in procuring Su-33 carrier-borne fighters from Russia even though
the ex-VARYAG aircraft carrier has yet to complete refurbishment at Dalian shipyard. In October
2006, a Russian press report suggested early-stage negotiations were underway for China to
purchase up to 50 such aircraft at a cost of $2.5 billion. However, there has been no announcement
of a contract for the aircraft.
The PLA Navy has reportedly decided to initiate a program to train 50 navy pilots to operate fixed-
wing aircraft from an aircraft carrier. The program was reported to be four years long and would be
followed by ship-borne training involving the ex-VARYAG. Analysts in and out of government
project that China will not have an operational, domestically-produced carrier and associated ships
before 2015. However, changes in China’s shipbuilding capability and degree of foreign assistance
to the program could alter those projections. The PLA Navy is considering building multiple
carriers by 2020.
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The August 2009 ONI report states that “China is undertaking a program to both operationalize
[the Varyag] (likely as a training platform) and build an indigenous carrier to join the fleet
between 2015 and 2020.”36
Observers have speculated on the potential size and capabilities of new-construction Chinese
aircraft carriers. Given the technical challenges involved in building and operating carriers, China
might elect to begin by building conventionally powered carriers and then possibly progress to
construction of nuclear-powered carriers. Some observers have speculated that China’s first new-
construction aircraft carriers might displace between 60,000 and 70,000 tons. (The Varyag has an
estimated full load displacement of about 58,500 tons.) A new-construction Chinese carrier with a
displacement of 60,000 to 70,000 tons might be able to operate an air wing of 30 or more aircraft,
including vertical/short takeoff or landing (VSTOL) airplanes and possibly conventional takeoff
and landing (CTOL) airplanes.37
Although aircraft carriers might have some value for China in Taiwan-related conflict scenarios,
they are not considered critical for Chinese operations in such scenarios, because Taiwan is within
range of land-based Chinese aircraft. Consequently, most observers believe that China would
build and operate carriers primarily because of their value in other kinds of operations that are
more distant from China’s shores. Chinese aircraft carriers could be used for power-projection
operations, particularly in scenarios that do not involve opposing U.S. forces. Chinese aircraft
carriers could also be used for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations,
maritime security operations (such as anti-piracy operations), and non-combatant evacuation
operations (NEOs). Politically, aircraft carriers could be particularly valuable to China for
projecting an image of China as a major world power, because aircraft carriers are viewed by
many as symbols of major world power status. In a combat situation involving opposing U.S.
naval and air forces, Chinese aircraft carriers would be highly vulnerable to attack by U.S. ships
and aircraft, but conducting such attacks could divert U.S. ships and aircraft from performing
other missions in a conflict situation with China.
Surface Combatants
China since the early 1990s has purchased four Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia and
deployed nine new classes of indigenously built destroyers and frigates (some of which are
variations of one another) that demonstrate a significant modernization of PLA Navy surface
combatant technology. China has also deployed a new kind of missile-armed fast attack craft that
uses a stealthy catamaran hull design. The August 2009 ONI report states that “the PLA(N)

36 2009 ONI Report, p. 17. The report similarly states on page 1 that China “is refurbishing [the Varyag] and plans to
build its own [aircraft carrier] within the next five to ten years,” and on page 19 that “the PRC will likely have an
operational, domestically produced carrier sometime after 2015.” The report states on page 19 that the Varyag “is
expected to become operational in the 2010 to 2012 timeframe, and will likely be used to develop basic proficiencies in
carrier operations.”
37 For comparison, the U.S. Navy’s Midway (CV-41), Forrestal (CV-59), and Kitty Hawk (CV-63) class conventionally
powered carriers, none of which is still in service, had displacements of 69,000 to 85,000 tons, and could operate air
wings of 70 or more aircraft, most of which were CTOL airplanes. The Navy’s current Nimitz (CVN-68) class nuclear-
powered aircraft carriers displace about 100,000 tons and operate air wings or 70 or more aircraft, most of which are
CTOL airplanes. Additional points of comparison include the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle (commissioned
in 2001), which has a displacement of about 42,000 tons, and aircraft carriers that the United Kingdom and France plan
to commission into service between 2014 and 2016, which are to have displacements of 65,000 to 70,000 tons. The
Charles de Gaulle can operate an air wing of about 36 aircraft, and the future UK and French carriers are to operate air
wings of about 40 to 45 aircraft.
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surface force is one of the largest in the world, and its capabilities are growing at a remarkable
rate.”38
Sovremenny-Class Destroyers
China in 1996 ordered two Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia; the ships entered service in
1999 and 2001. China in 2002 ordered two additional Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia;
the ships entered service in 2005 and 2006. Sovremenny-class destroyers are equipped with the
SS-N-22 Sunburn ASCM, a highly capable ASCM. DOD stated in 2007 that the two ships
delivered in 2005-2006 “are fitted with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and wide-area air
defense systems that feature qualitative improvements over the [two] earlier SOVREMENNYY-
class DDGs China purchased from Russia.”39 In light of these improvements, DOD refers to these
two ships as Sovremenny II class destroyers.40
Five New Indigenously Built Destroyer Classes
China since the early 1990s has built five new classes of destroyers, one of which is a variation of
another. Compared to China’s 14 remaining older Luda (Type 051) class destroyers, which
entered service between 1971 and 1991, these five new destroyer classes are substantially more
modern in terms of their hull designs, propulsion systems, sensors, weapons, and electronics. One
author states that “the new Chinese missile destroyers were apparently designed, at least on the
basic level, at the Russian Northern Design Bureau.”41 A key area of improvement in the new
destroyer designs is their anti-air warfare (AAW) technology, which has been a significant PLA
Navy shortcoming.42 Like the older Luda-class destroyers, these new destroyer classes are armed
with ASCMs. Table 2 summarizes the five new classes.
Table 2. New PLA Navy Destroyer Classes
In service
Class name
Type
Number built
Hull number(s)
(actual or projected)
Luhu 052
2 112,
113 1994,
1996
Luhai 051B
1
167
1999
Luyang I
052B
2
168, 169
2004
Luyang II
052C
2
170, 171
2004, 2005
Luzhou 051C
2
115,
116
2006,
2007
Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships 2009-2010.
As shown in Table 2, China to date has commissioned only one or two ships in each of these five
classes, suggesting that at least some of these classes might have been intended to serve as
stepping stones in a plan to modernize the PLA Navy’s surface combatant technology

38 2009 ONI Report, p. 16. This comment may relate not solely to China’s surface combatants (e.g., destroyers, frigates,
and fast attack craft), but to China’s entire surface fleet, which includes other types of ships as well, such as aircraft
carriers, amphibious ships, and auxiliary and support ships.
39 2007 DOD CMP, p. 3. The DOD report spells Sovremenny with two “y”s at the end.
40 2008 DOD CMP, p. 2.
41 Norman Friedman, “Russian Arms Industry Foundering,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 2009: 90-91.
42 The August 2009 ONI report states that “In recent years, the most notable upgrade to the PLA(N) surface force has
been its shipboard air-air-defense (AAD) capability.” 2009 ONI Report, p. 18.
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incrementally before committing to larger-scale series production of destroyers.43 China did not
commission any new destroyers in 2008 or 2009, and is not expected to commission any in 2010.
The Luhu-class ships reportedly were ordered in 1985 but had their construction delayed by a
decision to give priority to the construction of six frigates that were ordered by Thailand. The
Luhai-class ship is believed to have served as the basis for the Luyang-class designs. Compared
to the Luhai, the Luyang I-class ships appear stealthier. DOD stated in 2008 that the Luyang I
design is equipped with the Russian-made SA-N-7B Grizzly SAM and the Chinese-made YJ-83
ASCM.44
The Luyang II-class ships appear to feature an even more capable AAW system that includes a
Chinese-made SAM system called the HHQ-9 that has an even longer range, a vertical launch
system (VLS), and a phased-array radar that is outwardly somewhat similar to the SPY-1 radar
used in the U.S.-made Aegis combat system.45
DOD stated in 2007 the Luzhou-class design “is designed for anti-air warfare. It will be equipped
with the Russian SA-N-20 SAM system controlled by the TOMBSTONE phased-array radar. The
SA-N-20 more than doubles the range of current PLA Navy air defense systems marking a
significant improvement in China’s ship-borne air defense capability.”46
Four New Indigenously Built Frigate Classes
China since the early 1990s has built four new classes of frigates, two of which are variations of
two others, that are more modern than China’s 29 remaining older Jianghu (Type 053) class
frigates, which entered service between the mid-1970s and 1989. The four new frigate classes,
like the new destroyer classes, feature improved hull designs and systems, including improved
AAW capabilities. Unlike the new destroyer designs, some of the new frigate designs have been
put into larger-scale series production. Table 3 summarizes the four new classes.

43 One observer says the limited production runs of these four designs to date “might be financially related, or may
relate to debate over what ships should follow the Type 051C air defence and Type 052C multi-role classes, or that
once the Type 054A [frigate design] is accepted as the future missile frigate design, three or four of the major warship
shipyards will all be assigned to construction of this design, delaying a future CG/DDG class.” (Keith Jacobs, “PLA-
Navy Update,” Naval Forces, No. 1, 2007: 24.) Another observer stated I 2007 that “It looks like [the] 052C [class]
was stopped for a few years due to [the] JiangNan relocation [and the] sorting out [of] all the issues on [the] 052B/C
[designs]. (“2018—deadline for Taiwan invasion?” a September 22, 2007, entry in a blog on China naval and air power
maintained by an author called “Feng,” available online at http://china-pla.blogspot.com/2007/09/2018-deadline-for-
taiwan-invasion.html.)
44 2007 DOD CMP, pp. 3-4
45 The August 2009 report from the Office of Naval Intelligence states that “the Luyang II DDG possesses a
sophisticated phased-array radar system similar to the western AEGIS radar system.” 2009 ONI Report, p. 1. Another
author states that “the Chinese bought their active-array destroyer radar from the Ukrainian Kvant organization, which
is unlikely to have the resources to develop the project much further.” (Norman Friedman, “Russian Arms Industry
Foundering,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 2009: 90-91.)
46 2007 DOD CMP, p. 3.
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Table 3. New PLA Navy Frigate Classes
Number built
In service
Class name
Type
or building
Hull number(s)
(actual or projected)
Jiangwei I
053 H2G
4
539-542
1991-1994
Jiangwei II
053H3
10
between 521 and 567
1998-2005
Jiangkai I
054
2
525, 526
2005-2006
Jiangkai II
054A
6
530 (lead ship), 529, n/a
2008-2011
Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships 2009-2010
The Jiangkai I-class ships feature a stealthy design that somewhat resembles France’s La Fayette-
class frigate, which first entered service in 1996.47 The Jiangkai II-class ships are a modified
version of the Jiangkai I-class design that features a VLS system for its SAMs. One observer
stated in 2008 that “construction of the Jiangkai II-class frigates, armed with vertically launched
HQ-7 missiles, continues and these [ships] look to be the mainstay of the fleet as the 1970s-
vintage Jianghu class are phased out or adapted for Coast Guard use.”48 Another observer
similarly stated in 2007 that a total of 28 to 30 Type 054A frigates “are believed scheduled” for
production to replace China’s older-generation frigates.49
Houbei (Type 022) Fast Attack Craft
As an apparent replacement for at least some of its 190 older fast attack craft, or FACs (including
37 armed with ASCMs), China in 2004 introduced a new type of ASCM-armed fast attack craft,
called the Houbei (Type 022) class, that uses a stealthy, wave-piercing, catamaran hull. The
Houbei class is being built in at least six shipyards. About 60 were in service as of 2009, and a
total of as many as 100 might be built.50 The August 2009 ONI report states that “the Houbei’s
ability to patrol coastal and littoral waters and react at short notice allows the PLA(N)’s larger
combatants to focus on offshore defense and out-of-[home]area missions without leaving a
security gap along China’s coastline.”51

47 France sold a modified version of the La Fayette-class design to Taiwan; the six ships that Taiwan built to the design
entered service in 1996-1998.
48 Jane’s Fighting Ships 2008-2009, p. 30 (Executive Overview). This source similarly states on page 133: “Under
construction at two shipyards, it is likely that this design will be built in sufficient numbers to replace the ageing
Jianghu class frigates.”
49 Keith Jacobs, “PLA-Navy Update,” Naval Forces, No. 1, 2007: 26.
50 Jane’s Fighting Ships 2008-2009, p. 30 (Executive Overview) and p. 141. One observer stated in 2007 that “In
addition to the Houbei class, one observer stated in 2007 that China in 2005 ordered 24 to 30 Molniya-class ASCM-
armed fast attack craft from Russia. The Molniya class is an upgraded version of the Russian Tarantul-class design that
might be armed with four SS-N-22 ASCMs. The first four, according to this observer, were to have been delivered by
late-2007 or early-2008.” (Keith Jacobs, “PLA-Navy Update,” Naval Forces, No. 1, 2007: 27.)
51 2009 ONI Report, p. 20. For further discussion of the Houbei class, see John Patch, “A Thoroughbred Ship-Killer,”
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2010: 48-53.
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Amphibious Ships
Yuzhao (Type 071) Amphibious Ship
China has built the lead ship of a new class of amphibious ships called the Yuzhao or Type 071
class. The ship entered service in 2008. The design has an estimated displacement of 17,600 tons,
compared with about 15,900 tons to 16,700 tons for the U.S. Navy’s Whidbey Island/Harpers
Ferry (LSD-41/49) class amphibious ships, which were commissioned into service between 1985
and 1998, and about 25,900 tons for the U.S. Navy’s new San Antonio (LPD-17) class
amphibious ships, the first of which was commissioned into service in 2006. The Type 071 design
features a hull with clean, sloped sides—a design that resembles the hulls of modern western
amphibious ships and appears intended to reduce the ship’s visibility to radar. Some observers
believe that a second Type 071 ship may now be under construction, and that China might build a
total of four to six.
Reported Potential Type 081 Amphibious Ship
China reportedly might also begin building a larger amphibious ship, called the Type 081 LHD,
that might displace about 20,000 tons. Such a ship might have, among other things, a greater
aviation capability than the Type 071 design. Some observers believe China may build a total of
three or more Type 081s.
Potential Roles for Type 071 and Type 081 Ships
Although larger amphibious ships such as the Type 071 and the Type 081 might have some value
for conducting amphibious landings in Taiwan-related conflict scenarios, some observers believe
that China would build and operate such ships more for their value in conducting other kinds of
operations that are more distant from China’s shores. Larger amphibious ships can be used for
conducting not only amphibious landings, but humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
(HA/DR) operations, maritime security operations (such as anti-piracy operations),52 and non-
combatant evacuation operations (NEOs). (Some countries are acquiring larger amphibious ships
as much, or more, for these kinds of operations as for conducting amphibious landings.)
Politically, larger amphibious ships can also be used for naval diplomacy (i.e., port calls and
engagement activities).
Other New Amphibious Ships and Landing Craft
Aside from the Type 071 and Type 081 projects, China between 2003 and 2005 commissioned
into service three new classes of smaller amphibious ships and landing craft. Each type was built
at three or four shipyards. Between these three other classes, China commissioned into service a
total of 20 amphibious ships and 10 amphibious landing craft in 2003-2005. Additional units in
some of these classes are possible. China also has numerous older amphibious ships and landing
craft of various designs.

52 On June 30, 2010, it was reported that the Type 071 amphibious ship was one of three ships forming the sixth anti-
piracy naval group sent by China to waters of Somalia for anti-piracy operations. “China Sends Sixth Naval Escort
Flotilla to Gulf of Aden,” Xinhua, June 30, 2010. (The story carries a mistaken dateline of July 30.)
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Change in Amphibious Lift Capability Since 2000
Although China in recent years has deployed new amphibious ships and craft, DOD states that
“PLA air and amphibious lift capacity has not improved appreciably since 2000 when the
Department of Defense assessed the PLA as capable of sealift of one infantry division.”53
Maritime Surveillance and Targeting Systems
China reportedly is developing or deploying maritime surveillance and targeting systems that can
detect U.S. ships and submarines and provide targeting information for Chinese ASBMs and
other Chinese military units. These systems reportedly include land-based over-the-horizon
backscatter (OTH-B) radars, land-based over-the-horizon surface wave (OTH-SW) radars,
electro-optical satellites, radar satellites, and seabed sonar networks.54
Past, Current, and Projected Chinese Ship and Aircraft Force Levels
Table 4 shows numbers of Chinese navy ships and aircraft in past years, in 2009, and numbers
projected for 2015 and 2020. The figures in the table lump older and less capable ships together
with newer and more capable ships discussed above.
As can be seen in the table, ONI projects that, between 2009 and 2020, the total number of
submarines will increase, a small number of aircraft carriers and major amphibious ships will be
added to the fleet, the total number destroyers will remain more or less unchanged, and the total
number of frigates will decline slightly. The total number of larger combat ships in China’s navy
(defined here as submarines, aircraft carriers, destroyers, and frigates) is projected to increase
somewhat, mostly because of the projected increase in attack submarines. As these changes take
place, the overall capability of China’s navy will increase as newer and more capable units
replace older and less capable ones. The August 2009 ONI report states that “as newer and more
capable platforms replace aging platforms, the PLA(N)’s total order of battle may remain
relatively steady, particularly in regard to the surface force.”55
As can also be seen in the table, ONI projects that that the numbers of land-based maritime strike
aircraft, carrier-based fighters, and helicopters, will almost triple between 2009 and 2020, and that
most of this increase will occur between 2009 and 2015.

53 2009 DOD CMP, p. viii.
54 For a recent article discussing these systems, see Andrew S. Erickson, “Eyes in the Sky,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, April 2010: 36-41.
55 2009 ONI Report, p. 46.
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Table 4. Past, Current, and Projected Numbers of Ships and Aircraft
(Figures include both older and less capable units and newer and more capable units)
Projection Projection

1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 for 2015
for 2020
Ships







Ballistic missile submarines
1
1
1
2
3
4 or 5?
4 or 5?
Attack submarines (SSNs and SSs)
80
82
65
58
59
~70
~72
SSNs
5
5
5
6
6
n/a
n/a
SSs
75
77
60
52
53
n/a
n/a
Aircraft
carriers
0 0 0 0 0 1?
2?
Destroyers
14 18 21 25 26 ~26
~26
Frigates
35 35 37 42 48 ~45
~42
Subtotal above ships
130
136
124
127
136
~146 or
~146 or
~147?
~147?
Missile-armed attack craft
200
165
100
75
80+
n/a
n/a
Amphibious
ships
65 70 60 56 58
n/a
n/a
LPDs/LHDs
0
0
0
0
1
~6?
~6?
Other
65
70
60
56
57
n/a
n/a
Mine
warfare
ships
n/a n/a n/a n/a 40
n/a
n/a
Major auxiliary ships
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
50
n/a
n/a
Minor auxiliary ships and support craft
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
250+
n/a
n/a
Aircraft







Land-based maritime strike aircraft
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
~145
~255
~258
Carrier-based
fighters
0 0 0 0 0 ~60
~90
Helicopters
n/a n/a n/a n/a ~34 ~153
~157
Subtotal above aircraft
n/a n/a n/a n/a ~179 ~468
~505
Source: Prepared by CRS. Source for 2009, 2015, and 2020: 2009 ONI report, page 18 (text and table), page 21
(text), and (for figures not available on pages 18 or 21), page 45 (CRS estimates based on visual inspection of
ONI graph entitled “Estimated PLA[N] Force Levels”). Source for 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005: Navy data
provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, July 9, 2010.
Notes: n/a is not available. The use of question marks for the projected figures for ballistic missile submarines,
aircraft, carriers, and major amphibious ships (LPDs and LHDs) for 2015 and 2020 reflects the difficulty of
resolving these numbers visually from the graph on page 45 of the ONI report. The graph shows more major
amphibious ships than ballistic missile submarines, and more ballistic missile submarines than aircraft carriers.
Figures in this table for aircraft carriers include the ex-Ukrainian carrier Varyag, which is likely to enter service
before any new-construction indigenous carrier. The ONI report states on page 19 that China “will likely have
an operational, domestical y produced carrier sometime after 2015.” Such a ship, plus the Varyag, would give
China a force of 2 operational carriers sometime after 2015.
The graph on page 45 shows a combined total of amphibious ships and landing craft of about 244 in 2009, about
261 projected for 2015, and about 253 projected for 2015.
Since the graph on page 45 of the ONI report is entitled “Estimated PLA[N] Force Levels,” aircraft numbers
shown in the table presumably do not include Chinese air force (PLAAF) aircraft that may be capable of attacking
ships or conducting other maritime operations.
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Chinese Naval Operations Away from Home Waters
Chinese navy ships in recent years have begun to conduct operations away from China’s home
waters. Although many of these operations have been for making diplomatic port calls, some of
them have been for other purposes, including anti-piracy operations in waters off Somalia.
In November 2004, a Han-class SSN was detected in Japanese territorial waters near Okinawa.56
DIA states that, as part of the same deployment, this submarine traveled “far into the western
Pacific Ocean.”57 Press reports state that the submarine operated in the vicinity of Guam before
moving toward Okinawa.58
On October 26, 2006, a Song-class SS reportedly surfaced five miles away from the Japan-
homeported U.S. Navy aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk (CV-63), which reportedly was operating at the
time with its strike group in international waters in the East China Sea, near Okinawa. According
to press reports, the carrier strike group at the time was not actively searching for submarines, and
the Song-class boat remained undetected by the strike group until it surfaced and was observed by
one of the strike group’s aircraft.59 The Chinese government denied that the submarine was
following the strike group.60
In December 2008, China deployed two destroyers and a support ship to waters off Somalia to
conduct anti-piracy operations. According to one source, this was only the third deployment of
Chinese naval ships into the Indian Ocean in more than six centuries.61 China since that time has
deployed successive small groups of ships to waters of Somalia to maintain its anti-piracy
operations there.62 U.S. officials have stated that they welcome a Chinese contribution to the
current multi-nation effort to combat piracy off Somalia.

56 Mark Magnier, “China Regrets Sub Incident, Japan Says,” Los Angeles Times, November 17, 2004; Martin Fackler,
“Japanese Pursuit Of Chinese Sub Raises Tensions,” Wall Street Journal, November 15, 2004: 20; Kenji Hall, “Japan:
Unidentified sub is Chinese,” NavyTimes.com (Associated Press), November 12, 2004. See also 2006 DOD CMP, pp.
11-12.
57 Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy,
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement for the Record [before the] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
16 February 2005, p. 16-17. See also Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Vice
Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement For the Record [before the]
Senate Armed Services Committee, 17 March 2005, p. 17.
58 Timothy Hu, “Ready, steady, go ... ,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 13, 2005: 27; “China Sub Tracked By U.S. Off
Guam Before Japan Intrusion,” Japan Times, November 17, 2004.
59 Bill Gertz, “China Sub Secretly Stalked U.S. Fleet,” Washington Times, November 13, 2006: 13; Philip Creed,
“Navy Confirms Chinese Sub Spotted Near Carrier,” NavyTimes.com, November 13, 2006; Bill Gertz, “Defenses On
[sic] Subs To Be Reviewed,” Washington Times, November 14, 2006; En-Lai Yeoh, “Fallon Confirms Chinese Stalked
Carrier,” NavyTimes.com, November 14, 2006; Bill Gertz, “Admiral Says Sub Risked A Shootout,” Washington Times,
November 15, 2006; Jeff Schogol, “Admiral Disputes Report That Kitty Hawk, Chinese Sub Could Have Clashed,”
Mideast Starts and Stripes, November 17, 2006.
60 Associated Press, “China Denies Reports That Sub Followed Kitty Hawk,” NavyTimes.com, November 16, 2006. A
shorter version of the same story was published as Associated Press, “China Denies Sub Followed A Group Of U.S.
Warships,” Asian Wall Street Journal, November 17, 2006: 11.
61 Andrew S. Erickson and Juston D. Mikolay, “Welcome China to the Fight Against Pirates,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, March 2009: 36.
62 For a discussion of China’s anti-piracy operations in waters off Somalia, see Andrew S. Erickson, “Chinese Sea
Power in Action: The Counterpiracy Mission in the Gulf of Aden and Beyond,” which is Chapter 7 (pages 295-376) of
Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, editors, The PLA At Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational
Capabilities of China’s Military, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2010, available at
(continued...)
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In March 2010, Chinese navy ships reportedly entered the Persian Gulf for the first time.63
In April 2010, a group of about 10 Chinese ships, reportedly including two Sovremenny-class
destroyers, three frigates, and two Kilo-class attack submarines, transited Japan’s Miyako Strait
on their way to and from anti-submarine warfare exercises in the Western Pacific. Helicopters
from the formation flew close to Japanese destroyers that were sent to the area to observe the
Chinese ships, prompting a protest from Japan.64
China reportedly is also building port facilities in countries facing onto the Indian Ocean, perhaps
in part to support Chinese naval operations along the sea line of communication linking China to
Persian Gulf oil sources. Some observers have referred to China’s efforts to build these facilities
as a “string of pearls” strategy.65

(...continued)
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=995.
63 Greg Torode, “PLA Navy Ships Enter Gulf For The First Time,” South China Morning Post, March 27, 2010: 1.
64 Mure Dickie, “Japan Seeks Answers Over Chinese Warships,” Financial Times, April 13, 2010; Jay Alabaster,
“Tokyo Wary Of Chinese Military Vessels,” Washington Times, April 14, 2010; Greg Torode, “Exercises Show PLA
Navy’s New Strength,” South China Morning Post, April 18, 2010: 1; “Japan Protests Over Chinese Helicopter’s Fly-
By,” Agence France-Presse, April 21, 2010; “Japan: Protest Over Chinese Helicopter,” New York Times, April 22,
2010; “China’s Naval Drills Near Japan ‘Not A Threat,’” Singapore Straits Times, April 24, 2010: 59; “China Envoy
Says Naval Chopper Fly-By Was Japan’s Fault (Updated),” Agence France-Presse, April 27, 2010; L. C. Russell
Hsiao, “In A Fortnight,” China Brief, April 29, 2010: 1-2.
65 One press report in 2005, for example, stated:
China is building up military forces and setting up bases along sea lanes from the Middle East to
project its power overseas and protect its oil shipments, according to a previously undisclosed
internal report prepared for Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld.
“China is building strategic relationships along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South
China Sea in ways that suggest defensive and offensive positioning to protect China’s energy
interests, but also to serve broad security objectives,” said the report sponsored by the director, Net
Assessment, who heads Mr. Rumsfeld’s office on future-oriented strategies.
The Washington Times obtained a copy of the report, titled “Energy Futures in Asia,” which was
produced by defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton.
The internal report stated that China is adopting a “string of pearls” strategy of bases and
diplomatic ties stretching from the Middle East to southern China.
The press report stated that China is:
• operating an eavesdropping post and building a naval base at Gwadar, Pakistan, near the
Persian Gulf;
• building a container port facility at Chittagong, Bangladesh, and seeking “much more
extensive naval and commercial access” in Bangladesh;
• building naval bases in Burma, which is near the Strait of Malacca;
• operating electronic intelligence-gathering facilities on islands in the Bay of Bengal and near
the Strait of Malacca;
• building a railway line from China through Cambodia to the sea;
• improving its ability to project air and sea power into the South China Sea from mainland
China and Hainan Island;
• considering funding a $20-billion canal that would cross the Kra Isthmus of Thailand, which
would allow ships to bypass the Strait of Malacca and permit China to establish port facilities there.
Bill Gertz, “China Builds Up Strategic Sea Lanes,” Washington Times, January 18, 2005, p.1. See also Daniel J.
Kostecka, “The Chinese Navy’s Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean,” China Brief, July 22, 1010: 3-5;
Edward Cody, “China Builds A Smaller, Stronger Military,” Washington Post, April 12, 2005, p. 1; Indrani Bagchi,
(continued...)
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The August 2009 ONI report contains additional discussion of operations away from home
waters.66
March 2010 Testimony of Commander, U.S. Pacific Command
For additional remarks regarding China’s military modernization effort, including its naval
modernization effort, see the excerpt from the March 2010 testimony of Admiral Robert Willard,
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, presented in Appendix B.
Comparing U.S. and Chinese Naval Capabilities
U.S. and Chinese naval capabilities are sometimes compared by showing comparative numbers of
U.S. and Chinese ships. Although numbers of ships can be relatively easy to compile from
published reference sources, they are highly problematic as a means of assessing relative U.S. and
Chinese naval capabilities, for the following reasons:
• A fleet’s total number of ships (or its aggregate tonnage) is only a partial metric
of its capability. In light of the many other significant contributors to naval
capability,67 navies with similar numbers of ships or similar aggregate tonnages
can have significantly different capabilities, and navy-to-navy comparisons of
numbers of ships or aggregate tonnages can provide a highly inaccurate sense of
their relative capabilities.
• Total numbers of ships of a given type (such as submarines, destroyers, or
frigates) can obscure potentially significant differences in the capabilities of
those ships, both between navies and within one country’s navy.68 The potential
for obscuring differences in the capabilities of ships of a given type is particularly
significant in assessing relative U.S. and Chinese capabilities, in part because
China’s navy includes significant numbers of older, obsolescent ships. Figures on
total numbers of Chinese submarines, destroyers, frigates, and coastal patrol craft
lump older, obsolescent ships together with more modern and more capable
designs.
• A focus on total ship numbers reinforces the notion that increases in total
numbers necessarily translate into increases in aggregate capability, and that

(...continued)
“China Eyeing Base in Bay of Bengal?” Times of India, August 9, 2008, posted online at
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/China_eyeing_base_in_Bay_of_Bengal/articleshow/3343799.cms; Eric Ellis,
“Pearls for the Orient,” Sydney Morning Herald, July 9, 2010.
66 2009 ONI Report, p. 40. See also Dean Chang, “The Chinese Navy’s Budding Overseas Presence,” Heritage
Foundation Web Memo, No. 2752, January 11, 2010, 3 pp; and Wendell Minnick, “Chinese Expeditions Boost Naval
Expertise,” DefenseNews.com, January 11, 2010.
67 These include types (as opposed to numbers or aggregate tonnage) of ships; types and numbers of aircraft; the
sophistication of sensors, weapons, C4ISR systems, and networking capabilities; supporting maintenance and logistics
capabilities; doctrine and tactics; the quality, education, and training of personnel; and the realism and complexity of
exercises.
68 Differences in capabilities of ships of a given type can arise from a number of other factors, including sensors,
weapons, C4ISR systems, networking capabilities, stealth features, damage-control features, cruising range, maximum
speed, and reliability and maintainability (which can affect the amount of time the ship is available for operation).
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decreases in total numbers necessarily translate into decreases in aggregate
capability. For a Navy like China’s, which is modernizing in some ship categories
by replacing larger numbers of older, obsolescent ships with smaller numbers of
more modern and more capable ships, this is not necessarily the case.69 As shown
in Table 4, for example, China’s submarine force today has fewer boats than it
did in the 1990, but has greater aggregate capability than it did in 1990, because
larger numbers of older, obsolescent boats have been replaced by smaller
numbers of more modern and more capable boats. A similar point might be made
about China’s force of missile-armed attack craft. For assessing navies like
China’s, it can be more useful to track the growth in numbers of more modern
and more capable units. This CRS report shows numbers of more modern and
more capable submarines, destroyers, and frigates in Table 1, Table 2, and Table
3, respectively.
• Comparisons of numbers of ships (or aggregate tonnages) do not take into
account maritime-relevant capabilities that countries might have outside their
navies, such as land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), land-based anti-
ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and land-based air force aircraft armed with
ASCMs. This is a particularly important consideration in comparing U.S. and
Chinese military capabilities for influencing events in the Western Pacific.
• The missions to be performed by one country’s navy can differ greatly from the
missions to be performed by another country’s navy. Consequently, navies are
better measured against their respective missions than against one another. This is
another significant consideration in assessing U.S. and Chinese naval
capabilities, because the missions of the two navies are quite different.
Potential Oversight Issues for Congress
China as a Defense-Planning Priority
In U.S. defense planning and programming, how much emphasis should be placed on programs
for countering improved Chinese military forces in coming years?
The question of how much emphasis to place in U.S. defense planning on programs for
countering improved Chinese military forces is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy,
because many programs associated with countering improved Chinese military forces would fall
within the Navy’s budget. In terms of potential impact on programs and spending, the Navy might
have more at stake on this issue than the Army and Marine Corps, and perhaps at least as much, if
not more, than the Air Force.
Decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for
countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities could affect the likelihood or
possible outcome of a potential U.S.-Chinese military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or some
other issue. Some observers consider such a conflict to be very unlikely, in part because of

69 The August 2009 ONI report states with regard to China’s navy that “even if naval force sizes remain steady or even
decrease, overall naval capabilities can be expected to increase as forces gain multimission capabilities.” (2009 ONI
Report, p. 46.)
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significant U.S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could
cause on both sides. In the absence of such a conflict, however, the U.S.-Chinese military balance
in the Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries,
including choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States.
In this sense, decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy
programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces could influence the political
evolution of the Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals
relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere.
Summary of Arguments
Those who argue that relatively less emphasis should be placed on programs for countering
improved Chinese military forces in coming years could argue one or more of the following:
• Preparing for a potential conflict over Taiwan years from now might be
unnecessary, since the situation with Taiwan might well be resolved by then.
• It is highly unlikely that China and the United States will come to blows in
coming years over some other issue, due to the deep economic and financial ties
between China and the United States and the tremendous damage such a conflict
could inflict.
• Placing a strong emphasis on programs for countering improved Chinese military
forces could induce China to increase planned investments in its own naval
forces, leading to an expensive U.S.-China naval arms race.
• Far from coming to blows, Chinese and U.S. naval forces in coming years can
and should cooperate in areas of common interest such as humanitarian
assistance and disaster response (HA/DR) operations, anti-piracy operations, and
other maritime-security operations.
Those who argue that relatively more emphasis should be placed on programs for countering
improved Chinese military forces in coming years could argue one or more of the following:
• Not preparing for a potential conflict over Taiwan years from now could make
such a conflict more likely by emboldening China to use military force to attempt
to achieve its goals regarding Taiwan. It might also embolden China to use its
naval forces more aggressively in asserting its maritime territorial claims and its
interpretation of international laws relating to freedom of navigation in exclusive
economic zones (an interpretation at odds with the U.S. interpretation).
• China’s naval modernization effort may be driven more by internal Chinese
factors than by external factors such as U.S. decisions on defense spending. To
the extent that China’s naval modernization effort might be influenced by U.S.
decisions on defense spending, a decision to not emphasize programs for
countering improved Chinese military forces might encourage China to continue
or even increase its naval modernization effort out of a belief that the effort is
succeeding in terms of dissuading U.S. leaders from taking steps to prevent a
shift in China’s favor in the balance of military forces in the Western Pacific.
• Even if China and the United States never come to blows with one another,
maintaining a day-to-day presence in the Pacific of U.S. naval forces capable of
successfully countering Chinese naval forces will be an important U.S. tool for
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shaping the region—that is, for ensuring that other countries in the region do not
view China as the region’s emerging military leader (or the United States as a
fading military power in the region), and respond by either aligning their policies
more closely with China or taking steps to improve their own military
capabilities that the United State might prefer they not take, such as developing
nuclear weapons.
• Placing a relatively strong emphasis on programs for countering improved
Chinese military forces does not preclude cooperating with China in areas such
as humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR) operations, anti-piracy
operations, and other maritime-security operations.
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
DOD’s report on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states:
China’s growing presence and influence in regional and global economic and security affairs
is one of the most consequential aspects of the evolving strategic landscape in the Asia-
Pacific region and globally. In particular, China’s military has begun to develop new roles,
missions, and capabilities in support of its growing regional and global interests, which could
enable it to play a more substantial and constructive role in international affairs. The United
States welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater global role.
The United States welcomes the positive benefits that can accrue from greater cooperation.
However, lack of transparency and the nature of China’s military development and decision-
making processes raise legitimate questions about its future conduct and intentions within
Asia and beyond. Our relationship with China must therefore be multidimensional and
undergirded by a process of enhancing confidence and reducing mistrust in a manner that
reinforces mutual interests. The United States and China should sustain open channels of
communication to discuss disagreements in order to manage and ultimately reduce the risks
of conflict that are inherent in any relationship as broad and complex as that shared by these
two nations.70
In a section entitled “Deter and Defeat Aggression in Anti-Access Environments,” the 2010 QDR
report states:
U.S. forces must be able to deter, defend against, and defeat aggression by potentially hostile
nation-states. This capability is fundamental to the nation’s ability to protect its interests and
to provide security in key regions. Anti-access strategies seek to deny outside countries the
ability to project power into a region, thereby allowing aggression or other destabilizing
actions to be conducted by the anti-access power. Without dominant U.S. capabilities to
project power, the integrity of U.S. alliances and security partnerships could be called into
question, reducing U.S. security and influence and increasing the possibility of conflict.
In the future, U.S. forces conducting power projection operations abroad will face myriad
challenges. States with the means to do so are acquiring a wide range of sophisticated
weapons and supporting capabilities that, in combination, can support anti-access strategies
aimed at impeding the deployment of U.S. forces to the theater and blunting the operations
of those forces that do deploy forward.

70 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 60.
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North Korea and Iran, as part of their defiance of international norms, are actively testing and
fielding new ballistic missile systems….
As part of its long-term, comprehensive military modernization, China is developing and
fielding large numbers of advanced medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles, new attack
submarines equipped with advanced weapons, increasingly capable long-range air defense
systems, electronic warfare and computer network attack capabilities, advanced fighter
aircraft, and counter-space systems. China has shared only limited information about the
pace, scope, and ultimate aims of its military modernization programs, raising a number of
legitimate questions regarding its long-term intentions.
U.S. power projection forces also confront growing threats in other domains. In recent years,
a number of states have acquired sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles, quiet submarines,
advanced mines, and other systems that threaten naval operations. In addition to these
weapons, Iran has fielded large numbers of small, fast attack craft….
U.S. air forces in future conflicts will encounter integrated air defenses of far greater
sophistication and lethality than those fielded by adversaries of the 1990s.… Several states
have the capability to disrupt or destroy satellites that provide surveillance, communications,
positioning, and other functions important to military operations.…
Because of their extreme lethality and long-term effects, nuclear weapons are a source of
special concern, both for the United States and for its allies and partners in regions where
adversary states possess or seek such weapons.…
DoD is taking steps to ensure that future U.S. forces remain capable of protecting the nation
and its allies in the face of this dynamic threat environment. In addition to ongoing
modernization efforts, this QDR has directed the following further enhancements to U.S.
forces and capabilities:
• Develop a joint air-sea battle concept. The Air Force and Navy together are
developing a new joint air-sea battle concept for defeating adversaries across the range
of military operations, including adversaries equipped with sophisticated anti-access and
area denial capabilities. The concept will address how air and naval forces will integrate
capabilities across all operational domains—air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace—to
counter growing challenges to U.S. freedom of action. As it matures, the concept will
also help guide the development of future capabilities needed for effective power
projection operations.
• Expand future long-range strike capabilities. Enhanced long-range strike capabilities
are one means of countering growing threats to forward-deployed forces and bases and
ensuring U.S. power projection capabilities. Building on insights developed during the
QDR, the Secretary of Defense has ordered a follow-on study to determine what
combination of joint persistent surveillance, electronic warfare, and precision-attack
capabilities, including both penetrating platforms and stand-off weapons, will best
support U.S. power projection operations over the next two to three decades. Findings
from that study will inform decisions that shape the FY 2012-17 defense program. A
number of related efforts are underway. The Navy is investigating options for expanding
the capacity of future Virginia-class attack submarines for long-range strike. It is also
slated to conduct field experiments with prototype versions of a naval unmanned combat
aerial system (N-UCAS). The N-UCAS offers the potential to greatly increase the range
of ISR and strike operations from the Navy’s carrier fleet. The Air Force is reviewing
options for fielding survivable, long-range surveillance and strike aircraft as part of a
comprehensive, phased plan to modernize the bomber force. The Navy and the Air
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Force are cooperatively assessing alternatives for a new joint cruise missile. The
Department also plans to experiment with conventional prompt global strike prototypes.
• Exploit advantages in subsurface operations. The Navy is increasing funding for the
development of an unmanned underwater vehicle that will be capable of a wide range of
tasks.
• Increase the resiliency of U.S. forward posture and base infrastructure. In key
regions, U.S. forces will need to have access to networks of bases and supporting
infrastructures that are more resilient than today’s in the face of attacks by a variety of
means. The Department is studying options to increase the resiliency of bases in
selected theaters and will consult with allies and fund these as promising initiatives are
identified through analysis. Appropriate steps will vary by region but will generally
involve combinations of measures, including hardening key facilities against attack,
redundancy and dispersal concepts, counterintelligence, and active defenses,
complemented by long-range platforms for ISR and strike operations.
• Assure access to space and the use of space assets. The Department, through the
implementation of priorities from the Space Posture Review, will explore opportunities
to leverage growing international and commercial expertise to enhance U.S. capabilities
and reduce the vulnerability of space systems and their supporting ground
infrastructure.... Ongoing implementation of the 2008 Space Protection Strategy will
reduce vulnerabilities of space systems, and fielding capabilities for rapid augmentation
and reconstitution of space capabilities will enhance the overall resiliency of space
architectures.
• Enhance the robustness of key C4ISR capabilities. In concert with improving the
survivability of space systems and infrastructure, U.S. forces will require more robust
and capable airborne and surface-based systems to provide critical wartime support
functions. In particular, airborne ISR assets must be made more survivable in order to
support operations in heavily defended airspace. The Department is also exploring
options for expanding jam-resistant satellite communications and for augmenting these
links with long-endurance aerial vehicles that can serve as airborne communications
relay platforms.
• Defeat enemy sensor and engagement systems. In order to counter the spread of
advanced surveillance, air defense, and strike systems, the Department has directed
increased investments in selected capabilities for electronic attack.
• Enhance the presence and responsiveness of U.S. forces abroad. In consultation with
allies, the Department is examining options for deploying and sustaining selected forces
in regions facing new challenges. For example, selectively homeporting additional naval
forces forward could be a cost-effective means to strengthen deterrence and expand
opportunities for maritime security cooperation with partner navies. The Department
will conduct regional and global reviews of U.S. defense posture to identify key posture
priorities that require consultation with allies and constituents.71

71 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, pp. 31-34. The report on the 2010
QDR uses the terms China, Chinese, anti-access (with or without the hyphen), and area-denial (with or without the
hyphen) a total of 34 times, compared to a total of 18 times in the report on the 2006 QDR, and 16 times in the report
on the 2001 QDR. Subtracting out the uses of anti-access and area denial, the report on the 2001 QDR used the terms
China or Chinese zero times; the report on the 2006 QDR used them 16 times; and the report on the 2010 QDR used
them 11 times.
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In assessing the above section from the 2010 QDR report, potential oversight questions for
Congress include the following:
• Of the various initiatives discussed in the above section, how many are new
initiatives?
• To what degree do the remarks in the above section amount to firm commitments
to provide funding (particularly procurement funding) for the initiatives
mentioned in the above section?
• What net effect will the first of the initiatives above—the development of the air-
sea battle concept—have on Navy and Air Force spending on programs for
countering anti-access forces? Will the air-sea battle concept provide an argument
for increasing Navy and Air Force spending on programs for countering anti-
access forces because development of the concept will identify gaps in Navy and
Air Force capabilities for countering such forces? Will it provide an argument for
not increasing (or reducing) Navy and Air Force spending on programs for
countering anti-access forces because development of the concept will identify
joint efficiencies between the services?72
A February 7, 2010, news report stated:
As the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review moved from a December draft to the February
final version, Pentagon officials deleted several passages and softened others about China’s
military buildup.
Gone is one passage, present in the Dec. 3 draft, declaring that “prudence requires” the
United States prepare for “disruptive competition and conflict” with China.
Altered are passages about Russian arms sales to Beijing and China’s 2007 destruction of a
low-orbit satellite.
Why the changes? One Pentagon official said department and Obama administration officials
worried that harsh words might upset Chinese officials at a time when the United States and
China are so economically intertwined.
Beijing, for example, holds a large chunk of U.S. debt.
“Don’t piss off your banker,” the Pentagon official said.
Both versions contain this passage: “The United States welcomes a strong, prosperous, and
successful China that plays a greater global role.” But the draft version goes on to include the
following passage, which was stripped from the final QDR: “However, that future is not
fixed, and while the United States will seek to maximize positive outcomes and the common
benefits that can accrue from cooperation, prudence requires that the United States balance
against the possibility that cooperative approaches may fail to prevent disruptive competition
and conflict.” Several defense insiders said that latter portion of that section amounts to
strong language.

72 For more on the air-sea battle concept, see Jan van Tol with Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas,
AirSea Battle[:] A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, Washington, Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, 2010, 123 pp.; and Andrew F. Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle?, Washington, Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, 2010, 40 pp.
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In another section, both the final and draft versions discuss Beijing’s military buildup, but
the draft language is more specific.
“Over the past ten years, for example, China has fielded more than one thousand short- and
medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced attack submarines armed with wake-
homing torpedoes, increasingly lethal integrated air defense systems, extensive electronic
warfare and computer network attack capabilities, and counter-space systems,” the draft
says.
Gone from the final version are the estimates on the number of ballistic missiles in China’s
arsenal. Also deleted is a mention of the torpedoes’ “wake-homing” capabilities. And the
wording of the descriptions of Beijing’s air defense and electronic warfare platforms was
softened.
The draft refers directly to alleged Russian surface-to-air missile system sales to China,
while the final QDR refers only to “proliferation of modern surface-to-air missile systems by
Russia and others.” The early version mentions China’s 2007 destruction of one of its
satellites in orbit, but the final version says simply, “Several states have the capability to
disrupt or destroy satellites that provide surveillance, communications, positioning, and other
functions important to military operations.” Retired Air Force Gen. Charles Wald, now with
Deloitte and a former vice president of L-3 Communications, said the 2010 incarnation of
the review featured an unprecedented level of involvement from other U.S. agencies.
Wald, who worked on past QDRs while serving in senior Air Force and Joint Staff posts,
said altering the China language “was definitely a diplomatic issue.” State Department
officials weighed in on the wording, he said.
A DoD spokeswoman did not provide answers to questions about the changes by press
time.73
A February 18, 2010, news report stated:
The Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) makes little overt reference to China’s
military buildup. Missing from the 2010 version are several concerns of the 2006 edition,
such as China’s cyberwarfare capabilities, nuclear arsenal, counterspace operations, and
cruise and ballistic missiles.
Instead, there’s a stated desire for more dialogue with Beijing—and prescriptions for
countering the anti-access and area-denial capabilities of unnamed countries.
Analysts say the QDR attempts to address the threat posed by China without further enraging
Beijing.
“If you look at the list of ‘further enhancements to U.S. forces and capabilities’ described in
the section ‘Deter and Defeat Aggression in Anti-Access Environments,’ those are primarily
capabilities needed for defeating China, not Iran, North Korea or Hizbollah,” said Roger
Cliff, a China military specialist at Rand. “So even though not a lot of time is spent naming
China ... analysis of the China threat is nonetheless driving a lot of the modernization
programs described in the QDR.” Among the QDR’s recommendations: expand long-range
strike capabilities; exploit advantages in subsurface operations; increase the resiliency of
U.S. forward posture and base infrastructure; assure access to space and space assets;

73 John T. Bennett, “China Language Softened In Final Version Of QDR,” Defense News, February 7, 2010: 8.
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improve key intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities; defeat enemy sensors
and engagement systems; and increase the presence and responsiveness of U.S. forces
abroad.
All of these could respond to China’s development of anti-ship and intercontinental ballistic
missiles, ballistic missile defenses, anti-satellite weapons and submarines.
The report does offer concerns about transparency: “The nature of China’s military
development and decision-making processes raise legitimate questions about its future
conduct and intentions within Asia and beyond.” It urges building a relationship with China
that is “undergirded by a process of enhancing confidence and reducing mistrust in a manner
that reinforces mutual interests.” The new emphasis on confidence-building measures
(CBMs) and military dialogue is in tune with President Obama’s strategy of offering an
“open hand rather than a clenched fist,” said Dean Cheng, a Chinese security affairs
specialist at the Heritage Foundation. “This includes, it would appear, a greater emphasis on
CBMs, arms control proposals and the like toward the PRC [People’s Republic of China].”
Compared with the 2006 QDR, the new report makes no reference to Taiwan, but the reasons
might be more pragmatic. “The issue of Taiwan has receded since 2006, as cross-Strait
tensions have distinctly declined,” Cheng said. “The QDR is reflecting that change.” Still,
Beijing reacted with unusual fury to Washington’s Jan. 29 release to Taiwan of a $6.4 billion
arms sale, including Black Hawk helicopters and Patriot missile defense systems.
China canceled military exchanges, threatened sanctions against U.S. defense companies and
publicized calls by some People’s Liberation Army officers to dump U.S. Treasury bonds.
China had already sold off $34.2 billion in U.S. securities in December, lowering its total
holdings from $789.6 billion to $755.4 billion, but that appears unrelated to the arms sale.74
Another February 18, 2010, news report stated:
The Pentagon deleted language expressing concerns about a future conflict with China and
dropped references to Beijing‘s missiles and anti-satellite threats from its major four-year
strategy review release earlier this month.
Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell defended the softening of language that was contained in
an unofficial Dec. 3 draft of the Quadrennial Defense Review, known as the QDR.
Mr. Morrell said that any previous versions of the QDR were “staff-level documents” that
lacked “senior leader input or approval.”
The offensive language that was cut in the final QDR was pulled from the section on how
and why U.S. forces will “deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environment.” The
reference to “anti-access” is terminology often used by the Pentagon to describe key
weapons systems in China’s arsenal, such as its anti-satellite weapons and the maneuvering
warheads on ballistic missiles designed to kill U.S. aircraft carriers that would be called on to
defend Taiwan from a mainland strike.
“Chinese military doctrine calls for pre-emptive strikes against an intervening power early in
a conflict and places special emphasis on crippling the adversary’s [intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance], command and control, and information systems,” the draft

74 Wendell Minnick, “U.S. QDR Uses Veiled Language on China,” DefenseNews.com, February 18, 2010.
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stated. It noted that in January 2007 China carried out a anti-satellite missile test that
“demonstrated its ability to destroy satellites in low-Earth orbit.”
“Accordingly, prudence demands that we anticipate that future conflicts could involve
kinetic and non-kinetic (e.g. jamming, laser ‘dazzling’) attacks on space-based surveillance,
communications, and other assets,” the report said.
Those references were omitted from the final report, dated Jan. 26 and made public Feb. 1.
Another key omission from the Obama administration QDR was any reference to China
being a major competitor of the United States. The 2006 report stated that China “has the
greatest potential to compete militarily” with the U.S.
Both the December draft and the final version contained references to excessive Chinese
secrecy about the “pace, scope, and ultimate aims of its military modernization programs.”…
Mr. Morrell, the Pentagon spokesman, defended the QDR’s treatment of China, noting that
“the QDR provides a clear-eyed assessment of both the challenges and the opportunities that
China presents for the United States and the international community in the twenty-first
century.”
Mr. Morrell then said, quoting President Obama, that U.S.-China relations involved both
cooperation and competition. “And we are under no illusions about the potential challenges
presented by China’s growing military capabilities,” he said. “That is precisely why the QDR
identifies trends that we believe may be potentially destabilizing and why we have repeatedly
pushed China for greater strategic transparency and openness.” The QDR, along with the
forthcoming annual report on China’s military power, due out next month, “provide a fair,
unbiased, and comprehensive assessment.”
A defense official familiar with the QDR deliberations said the deletion was due to pressure
from Obama administration officials who fear angering Beijing.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu said in Beijing Feb. 2 that the QDR made
“irresponsible” statements about China’s military buildup. However, a military commentator,
Li Shuisheng, from the Academy of Military Science, stated Feb. 12 that the QDR
downgraded the Pentagon’s view of the threat posed by China from that of a global rival to a
regional problem more akin to North Korea and Iran.
John J. Tkacik, a former State Department China specialist, said the changes were probably
ordered by the White House.
“By removing references to the breathtaking advances in China’s weaponry and
technologies, the White House is basically ordering the Pentagon not to consider them in the
planning or budgeting stages,” Mr. Tkacik said.
It is a mistake, Mr. Tkacik said, to leave out references on the need for prudence in dealing
with China, and instead focus on welcoming China’s increasing role in world affairs.
“By doing so, the White House national security staff enjoins the military from either
planning for, or budgeting for, a future confrontation with China,” he said.
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“That places foolhardy trust in China’s future goodwill, especially given Beijing’s cynical
support of Iran, North Korea and other American adversaries, and its territorial clashes with
Japan, India, Taiwan and other American friends,” he said.75
Potential Implications for U.S. Navy Programs
What are the potential Navy-related program implications of placing a relatively strong emphasis
on countering improved Chinese military forces in coming years?
Potential Implications in General
A decision to place a relatively strong defense-planning emphasis on countering improved
Chinese military forces in coming years could lead to one more of the following:
• developing and procuring highly capable ships, aircraft, weapons, and supporting
C4ISR systems for defeating Chinese anti-access systems;
• assigning a larger percentage of the Navy to the Pacific Fleet (and, as a result, a
smaller percentage to the Atlantic Fleet);
• homeporting more of the Pacific Fleet’s ships at forward locations such as
Hawaii, Guam, and Japan;
• increasing training and exercises in operations relating to countering Chinese
maritime anti-access forces, such as antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations;
and
• increasing activities for monitoring and understanding developments in China’s
navy, as well as activities for measuring and better understanding operating
conditions in the Western Pacific.
Actions Already Taken
The U.S. Navy and (for sea-based ballistic missile defense programs) the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) have taken a number of steps in recent years that appear intended, at least in part, at
improving the U.S. Navy’s ability to counter Chinese maritime anti-access capabilities, including
but not limited to the following:
• increasing antisubmarine warfare (ASW) training for Pacific Fleet forces;
• shifting three Pacific Fleet Los Angeles (SSN-688) class SSNs to Guam;
• basing all three Seawolf (SSN-21) class submarines—the Navy’s largest and
most heavily armed SSNs—in the Pacific Fleet (at Kitsap-Bremerton, WA);
• basing two of the Navy’s four converted Trident cruise missile/special operations
forces submarines (SSGNs) in the Pacific (at Bangor, WA);76

75 Item entitled “QDR soft on China, in Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring,” Washington Times, February 18, 2010: 8.
76 For more on the SSGNs, see CRS Report RS21007, Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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• assigning most of the Navy’s ballistic missile defense (BMD)-capable Aegis
cruisers and destroyers to the Pacific—and homeporting some of those ships at
Yokosuka, Japan, and Pearl Harbor, HI;
• expanding the planned number of BMD-capable ships from three Aegis cruisers
and 15 Aegis destroyers to 10 Aegis cruisers and all Aegis destroyers;77 and
• increasing the planned procurement quantity of SM-3 BMD interceptor missiles.
In addition, the Navy’s July 2008 proposal to stop procurement of Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class
destroyers and resume procurement of Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers can be
viewed as having been prompted in large part by Navy concerns over its ability to counter
China’s maritime anti-access capabilities. The Navy stated that this proposal was driven by a
change over the last two years in the Navy’s assessment of threats that U.S. Navy forces will face
in coming years from ASCMs, ballistic missiles, and submarines operating in blue waters.
Although the Navy in making this proposal did not highlight China by name, the Navy’s
references to ballistic missiles and to submarines operating in blue waters can be viewed, at least
in part, as a reference to Chinese ballistic missiles (including ASBMs) and Chinese submarines.
(In discussing ASCMs, the Navy cited a general proliferation of ASCMs to various actors,
including the Hezbollah organization.)78
Acquiring Highly Capable Ships, Aircraft, Weapons, and Supporting C4ISR
Systems
Ships
Placing a strong emphasis on countering Chinese maritime anti-access capabilities could involve
maintaining or increasing funding for procurement of Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carriers,79
Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines,80 and Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis
destroyers, including the new Flight III version of the DDG-51, which is to be equipped with a
new radar for improved air and missile defense operations. The Navy wants to starting procuring
the Flight III version in FY2016.81 An emphasis on acquiring highly capable ships could also
involve maintaining or increasing funding for adding a BMD capability to existing Aegis cruisers
and destroyers,82 and for procuring future Virginia-class attack submarines with an enhanced
strike capability.

77 For further discussion, see CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
78 For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
79 For more on the CVN-78 program, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
80 For more on the Virginia-class program, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack
Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
81 For more on the DDG-51 program, including the planned Flight III version, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-
51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
82 For more on the program to add a BMD capability to existing Aegis cruisers and destroyers, see CRS Report
RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
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Some observers, viewing the anti-access aspects of China’s naval modernization effort, including
ASBMs, ASCMs, and other anti-ship weapons, have raised the question of whether the U.S. Navy
should respond by shifting over time to a more highly distributed fleet architecture featuring a
reduced reliance on carriers and other large ships and an increased reliance on smaller ships.
Supporters of this option argue that such an architecture could generate comparable aggregate
fleet capability at lower cost and be more effective at confounding Chinese maritime anti-access
capabilities. Skeptics, including supporters of the currently planned fleet architecture, question
both of these arguments.83
Aircraft
Placing a strong emphasis on countering Chinese maritime anti-access capabilities could also
involve maintaining or increasing funding for a variety of naval aviation acquisition programs,
including F/A-18E/F Super Hornet strike fighters and EA-18G Growler electronic attack
aircraft,84 F-35C carrier-based Joint Strike Fighters (JSFs),85 E-2D Hawkeye early warning and

83 The question of whether the U.S. Navy concentrates too much of its combat capability in a relatively small number
of high-value units, and whether it should shift over time to a more highly distributed fleet architecture, has been
debated at various times over the years, in various contexts. Much of the discussion concerns whether the Navy should
start procuring smaller aircraft carriers as complements or replacements for its current large aircraft carriers.
Supporters of shifting to a more highly distributed fleet architecture argue that that the Navy’s current architecture,
including its force of 11 large aircraft carriers, in effect puts too many of the Navy’s combat-capability eggs into a
relatively small number of baskets on which an adversary can concentrate its surveillance and targeting systems and its
anti-ship weapons. They argue that although a large Navy aircraft carrier can absorb hits from multiple conventional
weapons without sinking, a smaller number of enemy weapons might cause damage sufficient to stop the carrier’s
aviation operations, thus eliminating the ship’s primary combat capability and providing the attacker with what is
known as a “mission kill.” A more highly distributed fleet architecture, they argue, would make it more difficult for
China to target the Navy and reduce the possibility of the Navy experiencing a significant reduction in combat
capability due to the loss in battle of a relatively small number of high-value units.
Opponents of shifting to a more highly distributed fleet architecture argue that large carriers and other large ships are
not only more capable, but proportionately more capable, than smaller ships, that larger ships are capable of fielding
highly capable systems for defending themselves, and that they are much better able than smaller ships to withstand the
effects of enemy weapons, due to their larger size, extensive armoring and interior compartmentalization, and extensive
damage-control systems. A more highly distributed fleet architecture, they argue, would be less capable or more
expensive than today’s fleet architecture. Opponents of shifting to a more highly distributed fleet architecture argue
could also argue that the Navy has already taken an important (but not excessive) step toward fielding a more
distributed fleet architecture through its plan to acquire 55 Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), which are small, fast surface
combatants with modular, “plug-and-flight” mission payloads. (For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report
RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.)
The issue of Navy fleet architecture, including the question of whether the Navy should shift over time to a more highly
distributed fleet architecture, was examined in a report by DOD’s Office of Force Transformation (OFT) that was
submitted to Congress in 2005. OFT’s report, along with two other reports on Navy fleet architecture that were
submitted to Congress in 2005, are discussed at length in CRS Report RL33955, Navy Force Structure: Alternative
Force Structure Studies of 2005—Background for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. The functions carried out by OFT
have since been redistributed to other DOD offices. See also Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., The New Navy Fighting Machine:
A Study of the Connections Between Contemporary Policy, Strategy, Sea Power, Naval Operations, and the
Composition of the United States Fleet, Monterey (CA), Naval Postgraduate School, August 2009, 68 pp.
84 For more on the F/A-18E/F and EA-18G programs, see CRS Report RL30624, Navy F/A-18E/F and EA-18G
Aircraft Procurement and Strike Fighter Shortfall: Background and Issues for Congress, by Jeremiah Gertler.
85 For more on the F-35 program, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Jeremiah Gertler.
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command and control aircraft, the P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA), and the Navy
Unmanned Combat Air System (N-UCAS program) program.86
Weapons and Systems for Countering ASBMs
Countering China’s projected ASBMs could involve operating Navy surface ships in ways that
make it more difficult for China to detect and track those ships, and acquiring weapons and
systems for disabling or jamming China’s long-range maritime surveillance and targeting
systems, for attacking ASBM launchers, for destroying ASBMs in various stages of flight, and for
decoying and confusing ASBMs as they approach their intended targets. Regarding destroying
ASBMs in flight, options include developing and procuring improved versions of the SM-3 BMD
interceptor missile (including the planned Block IIA version of the SM-3), accelerating the
acquisition of the planned successor to the SM-2 Block IV terminal-phase BMD interceptor, 87
and accelerating development and deployment of shipboard high-power free electron lasers
(FELs) and solid state lasers (SSLs). Regarding decoying and confusing ASBMs as they approach
their intended targets, one option that has been discussed is equipping ships with systems for
generating radar-opaque smoke clouds, so as to confuse an ASBM’s terminal-guidance radar.88
Weapons and Systems for Countering Submarines
Countering China’s attack submarines more effectively could involve developing technologies for
achieving a distributed, sensor-intensive (as opposed to platform-intensive) approach to ASW.
Navy officials in 2004-2005 spoke of their plans for achieving such an architecture.89 Such an
approach might involve the use of networked sensor fields, unmanned vehicles, and standoff
weapons. Implementing such an approach to ASW reportedly would require overcoming some
technical challenges, particularly for linking together large numbers of distributed sensors, some

86 The Navy is currently developing a stealthy, long-range, unmanned combat air system (UCAS) for use in the Navy’s
carrier air wings. The demonstration program for the system is called UCAS-D. The subsequent production version of
the aircraft is called N-UCAS, with the N standing for Navy. Some observers, including analysts at the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), believe that N-UCAS would be highly useful, if not critical, for
countering improved Chinese maritime military forces. N-UCASs, they argue, could be launched from a carrier shortly
after the ship leaves port in Hawaii, be refueled in flight, and arrive in the Taiwan Strait area in a matter of hours,
permitting the carrier air wing to contribute to U.S. operations there days before the carrier itself would arrive. They
also argue that N-UCASs would permit Navy carriers to operate effectively while remaining outside the reach of
China’s anti-access weapons, including ASBMs. (Thomas P. Ehrhard and Robert O. Work, The Unmanned Combat Air
System Carrier Demonstration Program: A New Dawn For Naval Aviation?, Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, Washington, 2007. 39 pp. [CSBA Backgrounder, May 10, 2007]. The authors briefed key points from
this document on July 11, 2007, in room S-211 of the Capitol.) Another observer states that China’s deployment of
ASBM’s and supporting surveillance and targeting systems “argues for a stealth long-range attack aircraft as part of the
[carrier] airwing to provide more flexibility on how we employ our carriers.” (James Lyons, “China’s One World?”
Washington Times, August 24, 2008: B1).
87 For more on the SM-3, including the Block IIA version, and the planned successor to the SM-2 Block IV, see CRS
Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
88 Thomas J. Culora, “The Strategic Implications of Obscurants,” Naval War College Review, Summer 2010: 73-84.
For an additional discussion of options for countering ASBMs, see Sam J. Tangredi, “No Game Changer for China,”
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 2010: 24-29. See also Craig Hooper and Christopher Albon, “Get Off the
Fainting Couch,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2010: 42- 47.
89 See, for example, Otto Kreisher, “As Underwater Threat Re-Emerges, Navy Renews Emphasis On ASW,”
Seapower, October 2004, p. 15, and Jason Ma, “ASW Concept Of Operations Sees ‘Sensor-Rich’ Way Of Fighting
Subs,” Inside the Navy, February 7, 2005.
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of which might be sonobuoys as small as soda cans.90 Countering wake-homing torpedoes more
effectively could require completing development work on the Navy’s new anti-torpedo torpedo
(ATT) and putting the weapon into procurement.
Increasing the Pacific Fleet’s Share of the Navy
The final report on the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) directed the Navy “to adjust its
force posture and basing to provide at least six operationally available and sustainable carriers
and 60% of its submarines in the Pacific to support engagement, presence and deterrence.”91 The
Navy has met the 2005 QDR directive of having six CVNs in the Pacific. As of December 31,
2009, 57% of the Navy’s SSNs and SSGNs were homeported in the Pacific. The Navy can
increase that figure to 60% by assigning newly commissioned Virginia-class SSNs to the Pacific,
by moving SSNs or SSGNs from the Atlantic to the Pacific, by decommissioning Atlantic Fleet
SSNs, or through some combination of these actions.
As part of a “strategic laydown analysis” that the Navy performed in support of its January 2009
proposal to transfer a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) to Mayport, FL,92 the Navy
projected that of its planned 313-ship fleet, 181 ships, or 58%, would be assigned to the Pacific
Fleet.93
Placing a strong emphasis on countering Chinese maritime anti-access capabilities could involve
assigning a greater percentage of the Navy to the Pacific Fleet than the percentages reflected in
the previous two paragraphs. Doing this would likely reduce the number of ships assigned to the
Atlantic Fleet, which would reduce the Navy’s ability to maintain forward deployments in, and
surge ships quickly to, the Mediterranean Sea and possibly also the Persian Gulf/Northern
Arabian Sea area.94

90 Jason Ma, “Autonomous ASW Sensor Field Seen As High-Risk Technical Hurdle,” Inside the Navy, June 6, 2005.
See also Jason Ma, “Navy’s Surface Warfare Chief Cites Progress In ASW Development,” Inside the Navy, January 17,
2005. More recent press reports discuss research on ASW concepts involving bottom-based sensors and unmanned
vehicles; see Richard Scott, “GLINT In the Eye: NURC Explores Novel Autonomous Concepts For Future ASW,”
Jane’s International Defence Review, January 2010: 34-35; Richard Scott, “DARPA Goes Deep With ASW Sensor
Network,” Jane’s International Defence Review, March 2010: 13; Richard Scott, “Ghost In The Machine: DARPA Sets
Course Towards Future Unmanned ASW Trail Ship,” Jane’s Navy International, April 2010: 10-11.
91 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, 2006. (February 6, 2006) p. 47.
92 For more on this proposal, see CRS Report R40248, Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
93 Source: Slide entitled “Strategic Laydown Summary,” in Navy briefing entitled “Final Environmental Impact
Statement (FEIS) for the Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station Mayport, FL, dated
November 18, 2008, and presented to CRS on December 5, 2008. For more on the Navy’s proposed 313-ship fleet, see
CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
94 Shifting additional ships from the Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific Fleet might reduce the Navy’s ability to maintain
forward deployments in, and surge ships quickly to, the Persian Gulf/Northern Arabian Sea area because the transit
distance from the U.S. Atlantic Coast to the Persian Gulf/Northern Arabian Sea area using the Suez canal is less than
the transit distance from the U.S. Pacific Coast to the Persian Gulf/Northern Arabian Sea area. If, however, the ships
shifted from the Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific Fleet were homeported at Hawaii, Guam, or Japan rather than on the U.S.
Pacific Coast, there might be no reduction in the Navy’s ability to maintain forward deployments in, and surge ships
quickly to, the Persian Gulf/Northern Arabian Sea area.
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Homeporting Additional Pacific Fleet Ships in Forward Locations
Navy ships homeported in Japan include an aircraft carrier strike group consisting of a CVN and
11 cruisers, destroyers, and frigates; an amphibious ready group consisting of three amphibious
ships; and additional mine countermeasures ships. Navy ships homeported at Guam include three
Los Angeles (SSN-688) class attack submarines and a submarine tender. Navy ships homeported
in Hawaii include 15 Virginia (SSN-774) and Los Angles class SSNs, and 11 cruisers, destroyers,
and frigates.
Placing a strong emphasis on countering Chinese maritime anti-access capabilities could involve
homeporting more of the Pacific Fleet’s ships at forward locations such as Hawaii, Guam, and
Japan. A 2002 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report discussed the option of homeporting a
total of as many as 11 SSNs at Guam.95 Additional cruisers and destroyers could be homeported
in Hawaii, Guam, or Japan. Another option, at least in theory, would be to establish additional
home ports for Navy ships in Singapore or Australia.
Submission to Congress of 2010 Edition of DOD Report on China
Military and Security Developments
Section 1202 of the FY2000 defense authorization act (S. 1059/P.L. 106-65 of October 5, 1999),
as amended by Section 1246 of the FY2010 defense authorization act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of
October 28, 2009), requires DOD to submit an annual report to Congress on military and security
developments involving China. (The report was previously known as the report on Chinese
military power.) DOD is required to submit the report not later than March 1 each year. As of July
23, 2010, the 2010 edition of the report had not been submitted to Congress.
On July 23, 2010, Senators John Cornyn, John McCain, James Risch, Pat Roberts, and James
Inhofe sent a letter to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates concerning the submission to Congress
of the 2010 edition of the report. The letter states in part:
With the [2010 edition of the] Chinese military power report now almost five months
overdue, we ask that you submit it to Congress immediately and provide an explanation as
to the significant delay. It is our understanding that a draft of the report was completed
within the DoD several months ago. If true, the lengthy delay is puzzling. Since the
responsibility for this report lies with the DoD alone, we ask for your assurance that White
House political appointees at the National Security Council of other agencies have not been
allowed to alter the substance of the report in an effort to avoid the prospect of angering
China. The annual report is designed to provide Congress with a candid, objective
assessment of the facts. Anything less would risk undermining its very credibility….
With these concerns in mind, we request that you submit the 2010 Report on the Military
Power of the People’s Republic of China to Congress as quickly as possible. Continued
delay would further hinder Congress’ ability to fully understand the potential threat that
China’s rapidly expanding military poses to U.S. national security.96

95 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Increasing the Mission Capability of the Attack Submarine Force, Washington,
CBO, 2002. (A CBO Study, March 2002), 41 pp.
96 Letter dated July 23, 2010, from Senators John Cornyn, John McCain, James Risch, Pat Roberts, and James Inhofe,
to Secretary of Defense Reobert Gates, available online at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/fp_uploaded_documents/
(continued...)
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Legislative Activity for FY2011
FY2011 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5136/S. 3454)
House
Section 1060 of the FY2011 defense authorization bill (H.R. 5136) as reported by the House
Armed Services Committee (H.Rept. 111-491 of May 21, 2010) states that:
The Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
commanders of the regional combatant commands, submit to the congressional defense
committees, not later than March 15, 2011, a comprehensive strategic assessment of the
current and future strategic challenges posed to the United States by potential competitors
out through 2021, with particular attention paid to those challenges posed by the military
modernization of the People’s Republic of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia.
In discussing Section 1060, the committee’s report states:
The committee notes that it received testimony from the Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) Independent Panel that, although useful, the QDR needs to be a long-term, twenty
year study that addresses the issues that are of concern to Congress. The committee also
received testimony that the 2010 QDR was a budget constrained exercise, which was fiscally
responsible but may have limited more ambitious questioning of assumptions and creative
thinking because basic budget and end-strength assumptions were not challenged. (page 372)
Section 1234 of H.R. 5136 as reported by the committee would require a report on U.S. efforts to
defend against any threats posed by the advanced anti-access capabilities of potentially hostile
foreign countries, and amend the law that requires DOD to submit an annual report on military
and security developments involving China to include a section on China’s anti-access and area
denial capabilities. The text of Section 1234 is as follows:
SEC. 1234. REPORT ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO DEFEND AGAINST
THREATS POSED BY THE ADVANCED ANTI-ACCESS CAPABILITIES OF
POTENTIALLY HOSTILE FOREIGN COUNTRIES.
(a) Congressional Finding- Congress finds that the report of the 2010 Department of Defense
Quadrennial Defense Review finds that `Anti-access strategies seek to deny outside countries
the ability to project power into a region, thereby allowing aggression or other destabilizing
actions to be conducted by the anti-access power. Without dominant capabilities to project
power, the integrity of U.S. alliances and security partnerships could be called into question,
reducing U.S. security and influence and increasing the possibility of conflict.’.

(...continued)
100723_SJC%20letter%20to%20SECDEF%20re%20%20late%20Chinese%20military%20power%20report%20%28J
ULY%202010%29%20-%20signed%20scanned.pdf. See also Bill Gertz, “Senators Rap Pentagon’s Delay On China
Report, Washington Times, July 26, 2010: 8; Wendell Minnick, “U.S. Senators Demand DoD Release China Report,”
DefenseNews.com, July 24, 2010; Josh Rogin, “Where Is The Pentagon Report On The Chinese Military?” The Cable
(thecable.foreignpolicy.com), July 23, 1020.
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(b) Sense of Congress- It is the sense of Congress that, in light of the finding in subsection
(a), the Secretary of Defense should ensure that the United States has the appropriate
authorities, capabilities, and force structure to defend against any threats posed by the
advanced anti-access capabilities of potentially hostile foreign countries.
(c) Report- Not later than April 1, 2011, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report on
United States efforts to defend against any threats posed by the advanced anti-access
capabilities of potentially hostile foreign countries.
(d) Matters to Be Included- The report required under subsection (c) shall include the
following:
(1) An assessment of any threats posed by the advanced anti-access capabilities of potentially
hostile foreign countries, including an identification of the foreign countries with such
capabilities, the nature of such capabilities, and the possible advances in such capabilities
over the next 10 years.
(2) A description of any efforts by the Department of Defense since the release of the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review to address the finding in subsection (a).
(3) A description of the authorities, capabilities, and force structure that the United States
may require over the next 10 years to address the finding in subsection (a).
(e) Form- The report required under subsection (c) shall be submitted in unclassified form,
but may contain a classified annex if necessary.
(f) Modification of Other Reports-
(1) CONCERNING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA- Section 1202(b) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65; 113 Stat. 781; 10
U.S.C. 113 note), as most recently amended by section 1246 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (P.L. 111-84; 123 Stat. 2544), is further amended—
(A) by redesignating paragraphs (10) through (12) as paragraphs (11) through (13),
respectively; and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following:
`(10) Developments in China’s anti-access and area denial capabilities.’.
(2) CONCERNING IRAN- Section 1245(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010 (P.L. 111-84; 123 Stat. 2542) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
`(5) A description and assessment of Iran’s anti-access and area denial strategy and
capabilities.’.
In discussing Section 1234, the committee’s report states:
For the purposes of this section, to the extent possible, the committee encourages the
Department to utilize information provided to Congress in the Annual Report on Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, required by section
1201 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106–65),
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as most recently amended by section 1246 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84;) and the Annual Report on the Military Power of Iran
as required by Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010
(Public Law 111–84). (Page 395)
The committee’s report also states:
Annual Report on Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
Section 1246 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law
111–84) expanded the scope of the Annual Department of Defense Report on the Military
Power of the People’s Republic of China to include information on developments regarding
U.S. engagement and cooperation with China on security matters, including through
military-to-military contacts, and the U.S. strategy for such engagement and cooperation in
the future. The report was due on March 1, 2010. The committee is disappointed that the
report has not been delivered, as the information provided by the Administration in this
report will inform the committee’s assessments on a range of critical matters involving
China. The committee requests that the Department of Defense submit the report to the
committee at the earliest possible date, and in the interim, provide the committee with
complete and timely information on all significant security developments involving China.
(Page 382)
Senate
Section 1064 of the FY2011 defense authorization bill (S. 3454) as reported by the Senate Armed
Services Committee (S.Rept. 111-201 of June 4, 2010) would require a report on U.S. efforts to
defend against any potential future threats posed by the anti-access and area-denial capabilities of
potentially hostile nation-states. The text of Section 1064 is as follows:
SEC. 1064. REPORT ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO DEFEND AGAINST
THREATS POSED BY THE ANTI-ACCESS AND AREA-DENIAL CAPABILITIES OF
CERTAIN NATION-STATES.
(a) Finding- Congress finds that the 2010 report on the Department of Defense Quadrennial
Defense Review concludes that `[a]nti-access strategies seek to deny outside countries the
ability to project power into a region, thereby allowing aggression or other destabilizing
actions to be conducted by the anti-access power. Without dominant capabilities to project
power, the integrity of United States alliances and security partnerships could be called into
question, reducing United States security and influence and increasing the possibility of
conflict’.
(b) Sense of Congress- It is the sense of Congress that, in light of the finding in subsection
(a), the Secretary of Defense should ensure that the United States has the appropriate
authorities, capabilities, and force structure to defend against any potential future threats
posed by the anti-access and area-denial capabilities of potentially hostile foreign countries.
(c) Report- Not later than February 1, 2011, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report on
United States efforts to defend against any potential future threats posed by the anti-access
and area-denial capabilities of potentially hostile nation-states.
(d) Elements- The report required under subsection (c) shall include the following:
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(1) An assessment of any potential future threats posed by the anti-access and area-denial
capabilities of potentially hostile foreign countries, including an identification of the foreign
countries with such capabilities, the nature of such capabilities, and the possible advances in
such capabilities over the next 10 years.
(2) A description of any efforts by the Department of Defense to address the potential future
threats posed by the anti-access and area-denial capabilities of potentially hostile foreign
countries.
(3) A description of the authorities, capabilities, and force structure that the United States
may require over the next 10 years to address the threats posed by the anti-access and area-
denial capabilities of potentially hostile foreign countries.
(e) Form- The report required under subsection (c) shall be submitted in unclassified form,
but may contain a classified annex if necessary.
(f) Definitions- In this section:
(1) The term `anti-access’, with respect to capabilities, means any action that has the effect of
slowing the deployment of friendly forces into a theater, preventing such forces from
operating from certain locations within that theater, or causing such forces to operate from
distances farther from the locus of conflict than such forces would normally prefer.
(2) The term `area-denial’, with respect to capabilities, means operations aimed to prevent
freedom of action of friendly forces in the more narrow confines of the area under a
potentially hostile nation-state’s direct control, including actions by an adversary in the air,
on land, and on and under the sea to contest and prevent joint operations within a defended
battlespace.
Regarding Section 1064, the committee’s report states:
Report on United States efforts to defend against threats posed by the anti-access and
area-denial capabilities of certain nation-states (sec. 1064)
The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, not
later than February 1, 2011, to submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and
the House of Representatives a report on the Department’s efforts to defend against threats
posed by the anti-access and area-denial capabilities of potentially hostile nation states. The
report should include a description of any efforts by the Department to address findings in
the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report regarding advanced anti-access capabilities of
foreign countries. The report should also include a discussion of current and future U.S.
long-range strike capabilities in the context of countering anti-access and area-denial
strategies.
The committee is concerned by the emergence of what the 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review Report described as “anti-access strategies [that] seek to deny outside countries the
ability to project power into a region, thereby allowing aggression or other destabilizing
actions to be conducted by the anti-access power.” The committee believes it is essential that
the U.S. Armed Forces maintain the capability to project power globally in light of growing
anti-access challenges. The global presence and reach of U.S. forces protects U.S. interests,
provides stability and reassures our many allies and security partners. The committee expects
that as anti-access threats emerge, the United States will develop the necessary capabilities
and security partnerships, to meet those threats.
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In this regard, the committee notes that the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force have initiated a
dialogue addressing means by which our air and naval forces may more effectively work
together in the face of anti-access challenges. The committee encourages the Chief of Naval
Operations and Air Force Chief of Staff to work together with the purpose of overcoming
emergent anti-access challenges.
Additionally, the committee notes its displeasure that the Department of Defense has failed
to submit the Annual Report on the Military and Security Developments involving the
People’s Republic of China, as required by Section 1202 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106–65) by the statutory deadline of
March 1. The timely submission of this report is required by law, and the committee expects
it to be presented to Congress as required. (Pages 194-195)

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Appendix A. Prior-Year Legislative Activity
FY2010
FY2010 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-166 of June 18, 2009) on H.R.
2647, states:
The committee welcomes recent positive exchanges between the navies of the U.S. and the
People’s Republic of China. Such exchanges are particularly important given the harassment
of an unarmed U.S. ship, the U.S.N.S. Impeccable, by Chinese ships in international waters
on March 8, 2009. This incident violated China’s requirement under international law to
operate with due regard for the rights and safety of other lawful users of the sea.
The committee urges more U.S.-China engagement and cooperation on maritime issues of
mutual concern. The committee also supports the Administration’s call for Chinese ships to
act responsibly and refrain from provocative activities that could lead to miscalculation or a
collision at sea, endangering vessels and the lives of U.S. and Chinese mariners. (Pages 412-
413)
Section 1233 of H.R. 2647 would amend the current statute requiring DOD to submit an annual
report to Congress on China’s military power. The text of Section 1233 is as follows:
SEC. 1233. ANNUAL REPORT ON MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS
INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Annual Report- Subsection (a) of section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65; 113 Stat. 781; 10 U.S.C. 113 note) is amended—
(1) in the first sentence, by striking `on the current and future military strategy of the
People’s Republic of China’ and inserting `on military and security developments involving
the People’s Republic of China’;
(2) in the second sentence—
(A) by striking `on the People’s Liberation Army’ and inserting `of the People’s Liberation
Army’; and
(B) by striking `Chinese grand strategy, security strategy,’ and inserting `Chinese security
strategy’; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new sentence: `The report shall also address United
States-China engagement and cooperation on security matters during the period covered by
the report, including through United States-China military-to-military contacts, and the
United States strategy for such engagement and cooperation in the future.’.
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(b) Matters to Be Included- Subsection (b) of such section, as amended by section 1263 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181; 122 Stat. 407),
is further amended—
(1) in paragraph (1)—
(A) by striking `goals of’ inserting `goals and factors shaping’; and
(B) by striking `Chinese grand strategy, security strategy,’ and inserting `Chinese security
strategy’;
(2) by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows:
`(2) Trends in Chinese security and military behavior that would be designed to achieve, or
that are inconsistent with, the goals described in paragraph (1).’;
(3) in paragraph (6)—
(A) by inserting `and training’ after `military doctrine’; and
(B) by striking `, focusing on (but not limited to) efforts to exploit a transformation in
military affairs or to conduct preemptive strikes’; and
(4) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
`(10) In consultation with the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of State, developments
regarding United States-China engagement and cooperation on security matters.
`(11) The current state of United States military-to-military contacts with the People’s
Liberation Army, which shall include the following:
`(A) A comprehensive and coordinated strategy for such military-to-military contacts and
updates to the strategy.
`(B) A summary of all such military-to-military contacts during the period covered by the
report, including a summary of topics discussed and questions asked by the Chinese
participants in those contacts.
`(C) A description of such military-to-military contacts scheduled for the 12-month period
following the period covered by the report and the plan for future contacts.
`(D) The Secretary’s assessment of the benefits the Chinese expect to gain from such
military-to-military contacts.
`(E) The Secretary’s assessment of the benefits the Department of Defense expects to gain
from such military-to-military contacts, and any concerns regarding such contacts.
`(F) The Secretary’s assessment of how such military-to-military contacts fit into the larger
security relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.
`(12) Other military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China
that the Secretary of Defense considers relevant to United States national security.’.
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(c) Conforming Amendment- Such section is further amended in the heading by striking
`military power of’ and inserting `military and security developments involving’.
(d) Repeals- Section 1201 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000
(P.L. 106-65; 113 Stat. 779; 10 U.S.C. 168 note) is amended by striking subsections (e) and
(f).
(e) Effective Date-
(1) IN GENERAL- The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of the
enactment of this Act, and shall apply with respect to reports required to be submitted under
subsection (a) of section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2000, as so amended, on or after that date.
(2) STRATEGY AND UPDATES FOR MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS WITH
PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY- The requirement to include the strategy described in
paragraph (11)(A) of section 1202(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2000, as so amended, in the report required to be submitted under section 1202(a) of
such Act, as so amended, shall apply with respect to the first report required to be submitted
under section 1202(a) of such Act on or after the date of the enactment of this Act. The
requirement to include updates to such strategy shall apply with respect to each subsequent
report required to be submitted under section 1202(a) of such Act on or after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
Regarding Section 1233, the committee’s report stated:
This section would amend section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65) by changing the title of the report to ‘‘Annual Report on Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,’’ and by making
certain clarifying and technical changes.
This section would also expand the scope of the report. It would require the Secretary of
Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State and Secretary of Energy, to provide
analyses and forecasts of developments regarding U.S. engagement and cooperation with the
People’s Republic of China on security matters, such engagement and cooperation through
military-to-military contacts, and the U.S. strategy for such engagement and cooperation in
the future. Specifically, the committee requests the Secretary to provide information
regarding U.S.-China engagement and cooperation in the areas of: counter-terrorism;
counter-piracy; maritime safety; strategic capabilities, including space, nuclear and cyber
warfare capabilities; nuclear policy and strategy; nonproliferation, including export controls,
border security, and illicit arms transfers and interdictions; energy and environmental
security; peacekeeping; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, including in the area of
military medicine; crisis management, including use of the ‘‘defense hotline’’; regional
security issues, including in the Taiwan Strait and South and East China Seas and on the
Korean peninsula; and regional security organizations and other mechanisms.
In addition, this section would incorporate the reporting requirement under section 1201 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106–65) on U.S.-
China military-to-military contacts into the reporting requirement under section 1202 of that
Act. It would also include a new requirement for a comprehensive and coordinated strategy
for U.S.-China military-to-military contacts.
This section would further require the Secretary of Defense to provide additional information
regarding military and security developments involving China that the Secretary considers
relevant to U.S. national security. (Page 423)
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Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 111-35 of July 2, 2009) on the
FY2010 defense authorization bill (S. 1390), states:
The Department of Defense’s Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) has included a brief description of the PRC concept of the
‘‘three warfares’’, generally identified as psychological warfare, media warfare, and legal
warfare. These concepts, also referred to as ‘‘nonmilitary warfare concepts’’, have also been
the subject of hearings before the United States-China Economic and Security Review
Commission and were discussed in some detail in the Commission’s 2008 report to
Congress. The March 2009 harassment of the USNS Impeccable by Chinese ships in the
South China Sea stands as a recent example of how the PRC may be using the concept of
‘‘legal warfare’’, for instance, to influence regional events. The committee urges the
Secretary of Defense to examine the implications of the ‘‘three warfares’’ on United States
military affairs in the region and requests the Secretary to provide additional detail on each
of them, including examples and trends, in the 2010 report to Congress. (Page 195)
Conference
Section 1246 of the conference report (H.Rept. 111-288 of October 7, 2009) on H.R. 2647/P.L.
111-84 of October 28, 2009, amends the current statute requiring DOD to submit an annual report
to Congress on China’s military power. The text of Section 1246 is as follows:
SEC. 1246. ANNUAL REPORT ON MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS
INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) ANNUAL REPORT.—Subsection (a) of section 1202 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106–65; 113 Stat. 781; 10 U.S.C. 113
note) is amended—
(1) in the first sentence, by striking ‘‘on the current and future military strategy of the
People’s Republic of China’’ and inserting ‘‘on military and security developments
involving the People’s Republic of China’’;
(2) in the second sentence—
(A) by striking ‘‘on the People’s Liberation Army’’ and inserting ‘‘of the People’s
Liberation Army’’; and
(B) by striking ‘‘Chinese grand strategy, security strategy,’’ and inserting ‘‘Chinese security
strategy’’; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new sentence: ‘‘The report shall also address United
States-China engagement and cooperation on security matters during the period covered by
the report, including through United States-China military-to-military contacts, and the
United States strategy for such engagement and cooperation in the future.’’.
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Subsection (b) of such section, as amended by section
1263 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110–181;
122 Stat. 407), is further amended—
(1) in paragraph (1)—
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(A) by striking ‘‘goals of’’ inserting ‘‘goals and factors shaping’’; and
(B) by striking ‘‘Chinese grand strategy, security strategy,’’ and inserting ‘‘Chinese security
strategy’’;
(2) by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows:
‘‘(2) Trends in Chinese security and military behavior that would be designed to achieve, or
that are inconsistent with, the goals described in paragraph (1).’’;
(3) in paragraph (6)—
(A) by inserting ‘‘and training’’ after ‘‘military doctrine’’; and
(B) by striking ‘‘, focusing on (but not limited to) efforts to exploit a transformation in
military affairs or to conduct preemptive strikes’’; and
(4) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
‘‘(10) In consultation with the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of State, developments
regarding United States-China engagement and cooperation on security matters.
‘‘(11) The current state of United States military-to-military contacts with the People’s
Liberation Army, which shall include the following:
‘‘(A) A comprehensive and coordinated strategy for such military-to-military contacts and
updates to the strategy.
‘‘(B) A summary of all such military-to-military contacts during the period covered by the
report, including a summary of topics discussed and questions asked by the Chinese
participants in those contacts.
‘‘(C) A description of such military-to-military contacts scheduled for the 12-month period
following the period covered by the report and the plan for future contacts.
‘‘(D) The Secretary’s assessment of the benefits the Chinese expect to gain from such
military-to-military contacts.
‘‘(E) The Secretary’s assessment of the benefits the Department of Defense expects to gain
from such military-to-military contacts, and any concerns regarding such contacts.
‘‘(F) The Secretary’s assessment of how such military-to-military contacts fit into the larger
security relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.
‘‘(12) Other military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China
that the Secretary of Defense considers relevant to United States national security.’’.
(c) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Such section is further amended in the heading by
striking ‘‘MILITARY POWER OF’’ and inserting ‘‘MILITARY AND SECURITY
DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING’’.
(d) REPEALS.—Section 1201 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2000 (Public Law 106–65; 113 Stat. 779; 10 U.S.C. 168 note) is amended by striking
subsections (e) and (f).
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(e) EFFECTIVE DATE.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of
the enactment of this Act, and shall apply with respect to reports required to be submitted
under subsection (a) of section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2000, as so amended, on or after that date.
(2) STRATEGY AND UPDATES FOR MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS WITH
PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY.—The requirement to include the strategy described in
paragraph (11)(A) of section 1202(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2000, as so amended, in the report required to be submitted under section 1202(a) of
such Act, as so amended, shall apply with respect to the first report required to be submitted
under section 1202(a) of such Act on or after the date of the enactment of this Act. The
requirement to include updates to such strategy shall apply with respect to each subsequent
report required to be submitted under section 1202(a) of such Act on or after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
Regarding Section 1246, the conference report states:
Annual report on military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of
China (sec. 1246)
The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1233) that would amend section 1202 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106–65) by changing
the title of the report to ‘‘Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China’’ and by making certain clarifying and technical changes.
The provision would also expand the scope of the report to include information regarding
U.S. engagement and cooperation with China on security matters, and information on
additional developments involving China that the Secretary of Defense considers relevant to
national security. In addition, the provision would repeal the reporting requirements on
military-to-military contacts under sections 1201(e) and (f) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 and add these requirements to the reporting
requirements under section 1202 of that Act. Details of the provision’s reporting
requirements are set forth in the report accompanying the House bill (House Report 111–
166).
The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.
The Senate recedes.
The conferees encourage the Secretary to further examine the implications of China’s
concepts of psychological warfare, media warfare, and legal warfare on U.S. military affairs
in the region and include additional detail on each of these concepts, including examples and
trends, in the fiscal year 2010 report to Congress required under this section. (Page 842)
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FY2009
FY2009 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5658/S. 3001)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 110-652 of May 16, 2008) on H.R.
5658, stated the following regarding the development of an anti-air warfare target for simulating
Threat D, which some press reports suggest might be a term that refers to an ASCM with a flight
profile similar that of the SS-N-27 Sizzler:97
The committee is pleased to note the anticipated source selection for the development of a
Threat D missile target development program in the summer of 2008. The committee
remains concerned that the estimated initial operating capability of such a target in 2014
creates substantial risk during the interim period. The committee encourages the Secretary to
accelerate the target development program to the maximum extent practicable. In addition,
the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to notify the congressional defense
committees in writing if the estimated initial operating capability of the Threat D target is
delayed more than 90 days or if the costs associated with such program exceeds 10 percent
of programmed funding. The committee further directs the Secretary to provide such
notification within 30 days, along with the reasons for such delay or cost overrun and a
mitigation plan consisting of actions that could restore the program to its original timeline.
(Page 204)
FY2008
FY2008 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1585/S. 1547/H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181)
House
Section 1244 of the House-reported version of the FY2008 defense authorization bill (H.R. 1585)
stated:
SEC. 1244. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING THE STRATEGIC MILITARY
CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) United States military war-fighting capabilities are potentially threatened by the strategic
military capabilities and intentions of the People’s Republic of China, as demonstrated by—

97 See “United States: The Supersonic Anti-Ship Missile Threat,” Stratfor.com, April 18, available online at
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/united_states_supersonic_anti_ship_missile_threat?ip_auth_redirect=1; Tony
Capaccio, “Navy Can’t Test Defense Against China’s Sizzler,” Until 2014,” Bloomberg.com, April 3, 2008; Chris
Johnson, “Navy Issues Draft Request For Threat-D Target Development,” Inside the Navy, July 30, 2007; Chris
Johnson, “Industry Day Planned To Develop Threat-D Target For Ship Tests,” Inside the Navy, July 9, 2007; and Chris
Johnson, “Pentagon: Lack Of Threat-D Target Hinders Testing For New Vessels,” Inside the Navy, January 22, 2007.
See also the transcript of the March 12, 2008, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on the posture of
the Pacific Command.
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(A) the October 2006 undetected broach of a Chinese SONG-class diesel-electric submarine
in close proximity of the USS Kitty Hawk in international waters; and
(B) the January 2007 test of a direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon, posing a potential
threat to United States military assets in space;
(2) it is in the national security interests of the United States to make every effort to
understand China’s strategic military capabilities and intentions; and
(3) as part of such an effort, the Secretary of Defense should expand efforts to develop an
accurate assessment of China’s strategic military modernization, particularly with regard to
its sea- and space-based strategic capabilities.
Senate
The Senate-passed version of the FY2008 defense authorization bill (S. 1547; S.Rept. 110-77 of
June 5, 2007) did not contain a provision analogous to Section 1244 of the House-passed version
of H.R. 1585 (see above).
Conference
The conference report (H.Rept. 110-477 of December 6, 2007) on H.R. 1585 did not contain a
provision analogous to the Sec. 1244 of the House-passed version of H.R. 1585. The conference
report stated:
The conferees note China’s continued investment in strategic military capabilities that could
be used to support power projection and access denial operations beyond the Asia Pacific
region, and the lack of transparency surrounding the strategic military capabilities and
intentions relating to China’s military modernization. The Pentagon’s 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review Report (QDR) found that China is at a strategic crossroads and that, “of the
major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the
United States.” The conferees note that during the last year, China demonstrated such
potential, including the October 2006 broach of a Chinese SONG-class diesel-electric
submarine in close proximity to the USS Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier in international waters
and the January 2007 test of a direct ascent anti-satellite missile against a Chinese weather
satellite in low-earth orbit.
The conferees encourage the Secretary of Defense to expand efforts to develop an accurate
assessment and understanding of China’s strategic military modernization and strategic
intentions, particularly with regard to its sea- and space-based strategic capabilities.
(Page 1031)
H.R. 1585 was vetoed by the President on December 28, 2008. A new bill, H.R. 4986, was passed
with changes that took into account the President’s objection to certain parts of H.R. 1585. The
President’s objection to certain parts of H.R. 1585 did not relate to the passage quoted above.
H.R. 4986 was signed into law as P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008. Except for the changes made
by Congress to take into account the President’s objection to certain parts of H.R. 1585, H.Rept.
110-477 in effect serves as the conference report for H.R. 4986.
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Appendix B. Excerpt from March 2010 Testimony of
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command
On March 23, 2010, Admiral Robert Willard, the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, testified
that
China’s growing presence and influence in the region create both challenges and
opportunities for the United States and regional countries.
China’s rapid and comprehensive transformation of its armed forces is affecting regional
military balances and holds implications beyond the Asia-Pacific region. Of particular
concern is that elements of China’s military modernization appear designed to challenge our
freedom of action in the region….
The military and government leaders that I have spoken with have also made it clear that we
should not take our level of influence within the region for granted. Many countries, most
notably China, see the same strategic opportunities that we do and are seeking to increase
their level of access and influence throughout the Asia-Pacific by building and expanding
economic, diplomatic and security relationships….
One cannot engage within the region without having a discussion about the Peoples Republic
of China (PRC). Beijing’s national strategy remains primarily focused on economic
development which emphasizes domestic stability and maintaining an international security
environment conducive to continued economic growth. This new found economic wealth is
funding a military modernization program that has raised concerns in the region over the lack
of transparency into Beijing’s emerging military capabilities and the intentions that motivate
them – a concern shared by the United States. China’s interest in a peaceful and stable
environment that will support the country’s developmental goals is difficult to reconcile with
the evolving military capabilities that appear designed to challenge U.S. freedom of action in
the region or exercise aggression or coercion of its neighbors, including U.S. treaty allies and
partners. Reconciling the apparent gap between the PRC’s statements and its observed
military capabilities serves to underscore the importance of maintaining open channels of
communication and of building toward a continuous dialogue with China’s armed forces
based on open and substantive discussion of strategic issues. However, that type of frank and
candid discussion requires a stable and reliable U.S.-China military-to-military relationship–
a relationship that does not yet exist with the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA).
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Modernization. China has continued a rapid,
comprehensive program of military modernization with supporting doctrine and a
professionalization of the officer and enlisted ranks. This program of modernization has been
supported by a military budget that has grown annually by double digits over the last decade.
Beijing publicly asserts that China’s military modernization is “purely defensive in nature,”
and aimed solely at protecting China’s security and interests. Over the past several years,
China has begun a new phase of military development by beginning to articulate roles and
missions for the PLA that go beyond China’s immediate territorial concerns, but has left
unclear to the international community the purposes and objectives of the PLA’s evolving
doctrine and capabilities.
The PLA has placed increasing emphasis on attracting and retaining a professional cadre of
officers and non-commissioned officers. Incentives include advanced training and education,
as well as housing and post-service employment preferences that should lead to a more
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motivated, better trained and professional military capable of a broader range of combined
arms missions.
China continues to develop weapons systems, technologies and concepts of operation that
support anti-access and area denial strategies in the Western Pacific by holding air and
maritime forces at risk at extended distances from the PRC coastline. The PLA Navy is
continuing to develop a “Blue Water” capability that includes the ability to surge surface
combatants and submarines at extended distances from the PRC mainland. Modernization
programs have included development of sophisticated shipboard air defense systems as well
as supersonic sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missiles.
China’s leaders are pursuing an aircraft carrier capability. In 1998 China purchased an
incomplete former Soviet KUZNETSOV class aircraft carrier, which began renovations in
2002 at its shipyard in Dalian. I expect this carrier to become operational around 2012 and
likely be used to develop basic carrier skills.
China continues to field the largest conventional submarine force in the world totaling more
than 60 boats; while the quality of China’s submarine fleet is mixed the percentage of
modern, quiet submarines in the fleet is growing. This fleet also includes a number of
nuclear powered fast attack and ballistic missile submarines. China is also developing a new
submarine launched nuclear ballistic missile, the JL-2, capable of ranging the western United
States.
China fields a growing number of sophisticated multi-role fighter aircraft, including the SU-
27 and SU-30 purchased from Russia and indigenously produced 4th generation aircraft. The
PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and Naval air forces have continued to focus on improving pilot
and controller proficiencies in complex, multi-plane combat scenarios, including operations
over water. The PLA has focused considerable effort on building up its integrated air defense
capabilities and has deployed an increasing number of upgraded Russian SA-20 PMU 2 long
range surface-to-air missile systems along the Taiwan Strait. China is also developing and
testing a conventional anti-ship ballistic missile based on the DF-21/CSS-5 MRBM designed
specifically to target aircraft carriers.
Until recently, “jointness” in the PLA meant that different services operated toward a
common goal in a joint or combined campaign with operations separated by time and
distance. However, years of observing U.S. military operations and modern warfare
campaigns have convinced PLA leadership of the need for greater integration between
services to include enhanced joint operations at the tactical level. The PLA has adopted the
concept of “Integrated Joint Operations” as a goal for the Chinese military to allow it to
conduct integrated operations on a campaign level. Additionally, the PLA has placed
increased emphasis on training in more demanding conditions, such as complex
electromagnetic environments.
China’s Strategic Capabilities. China maintains a nuclear force capable of ranging most of
the world, including the continental United States. This capability has been enhanced
through the development of increasingly sophisticated road mobile delivery systems as well
as the development of the Type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (JIN-class
SSBN). Despite assertions that China opposes the “weaponization” of space, the PLA is
developing a multi-dimensional program to deny potential adversaries the use of space, an
element of which was demonstrated in January 2007 when China intentionally destroyed one
of its own weather satellites with a direct ascent anti-satellite weapon.
U.S. military and government networks and computer systems continue to be the target of
intrusions that appear to have originated from within the PRC. Although most intrusions
focus on exfiltrating data, the skills being demonstrated would also apply to network attacks.
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China’s Ongoing “Sovereignty” Campaigns. Beijing remains committed to eventual
unification with Taiwan, and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve that goal. The
PLA’s continued military advancements sustain a trend of shifting the cross-Strait military
balance in Beijing’s favor. The Taiwan Relations Act provides that it is U.S. policy “to
provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character and to maintain the capacity of the United
States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the
security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.” At the U.S. Pacific
Command, we fulfill these obligations on a daily basis.
Motivated by a need for indigenous natural resources and consolidation of self-proclaimed
sovereignty limits, the PRC has re-asserted its claims to most of the South China Sea and
reinforced its position in the region, including the contested Spratly and Paracel Islands. The
PLA Navy has increased its patrols throughout the region and has shown an increased
willingness to confront regional nations on the high seas and within the contested island
chains. Additionally, China lays claim to the Senkakus, administered by Japan, and contests
areas on its border with India.
As an integral part of its strategy, the PRC has interpreted certain international laws in ways
contrary to international norms, such as the UN Convention for Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
and has passed domestic laws that further reinforce its sovereignty claims.
U.S./China Military Relationship and Security Cooperation. U.S. Pacific Command is
committed to the development of a stable and reliable military-to-military relationship with
the PRC, which is critical to avoiding misperception and miscalculation and, ultimately,
building the type of partnership that leaders in both countries aspire to. Although we are
currently in a period of reduced engagement activity due to the PRC’s reaction to the
notification of arms sales to Taiwan, last year’s military-to-military activities were
highlighted by exchange visits by senior leaders from both sides. During his visit to
Washington, D.C. in November 2009, General XU Caihou, Vice Chairman of the Central
Military Commission, agreed with Defense Secretary Gates to further develop the military
aspect of the U.S. – People’s Republic of China (PRC) relationship. U.S. Pacific Command
looks forward to working with the PLA on concrete and practical measures to strengthen our
military relationship in order to improve the security interests of both the United States and
China. These measures include senior leader visits, humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief exercise observer exchanges, a naval passing exercise, and a military medical
exchange. The PLA leadership has also shown a willingness to expand military engagement
to areas such as counterterrorism, counterpiracy, maritime safety, and non-proliferation.
As the Executive Agent for the U.S.–PRC Military Maritime Consultative Agreement
(MMCA), U.S. Pacific Command co-led senior leader bilateral MMCA discussions last
summer in Beijing. The MMCA forum was initiated in 1998 and is intended to improve
safety for airmen and sailors when our nations’ vessels and aircraft operate in proximity to
one another. During the December 2009 Defense Policy Coordination Talks held in
Honolulu, both sides agreed to reinvigorate the MMCA as a viable diplomatic mechanism
through which we can manage issues related to maritime and air safety.98


98 Statement of Admiral Robert F. Willard, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Before the House Armed
Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture, March 23, 2010, pp. 3, 4, 12-17.
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Author Contact Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610


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