Federalism, State Sovereignty, and the
Constitution: Basis and Limits of
Congressional Power
Kenneth R. Thomas
Legislative Attorney
July 12, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL30315
CRS Report for Congress
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repared for Members and Committees of Congress

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Federalism, State Sovereignty, and the Constitution

Summary
The lines of authority between states and the federal government are, to a significant extent,
defined by the United States Constitution and relevant case law. In recent years, however, the
Supreme Court has decided a number of cases that would seem to reevaluate this historical
relationship. This report discusses state and federal legislative power generally, focusing on a
number of these “federalism” cases. The report does not, however, address the larger policy issue
of when it is appropriate—as opposed to constitutionally permissible—to exercise federal powers.
The U.S. Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations and among the various states. This power has been cited as the constitutional basis
for a significant portion of the laws passed by Congress over the last 50 years, and, in conjunction
with the Necessary and Proper Clause, it currently represents one of the broadest bases for the
exercise of congressional powers. In United States v. Lopez and subsequent cases, however, the
Supreme Court did bring into question the extent to which Congress can rely on the Commerce
Clause as a basis for federal jurisdiction.
Another significant source of congressional power is the Fourteenth Amendment, specifically the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. Section 5 of that amendment provides that Congress
has the power to enforce its provisions. In the case of Flores v. City of Boerne, however, the Court
imposed limits on this power, requiring that there must be a “congruence and proportionality”
between the injury to be remedied and the law adopted to that end.
The Tenth Amendment provides that “powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.” While this language would appear to represent one of the most clear examples of a
federalist principle in the Constitution, it has not had a significant impact in limiting federal
powers. However, in New York v. United States and Printz v. United States, the Court did find that,
under the Tenth Amendment, Congress cannot “commandeer” either the legislative process of a
state or the services of state executive branch officials.
The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State.” Although this text is limited to preventing citizens
from bringing diversity cases against states in federal courts, the Supreme Court has expanded the
concept of state sovereign immunity further to prohibit citizens generally from bringing suits
against states under federal law generally. There are exceptions to this limitation, however, and
Congress also has a limited ability to abrogate such state immunity.
Finally, Congress has the power under the Spending Clause to require states to undertake certain
activities as a condition of receiving federal monies. Such conditions, however, must be related to
the underlying grant, and the financial consequences of non-compliance cannot be coercive.

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Contents
Powers of the States .................................................................................................................... 1
Powers of the Federal Government.............................................................................................. 1
The Commerce Clause ................................................................................................................ 3
The Necessary and Proper Clause................................................................................................ 8
The Fourteenth Amendment ...................................................................................................... 10
The Tenth Amendment .............................................................................................................. 16
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity ................................................................ 18
The Spending Clause ................................................................................................................ 21
Conclusion................................................................................................................................ 23

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 24

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he lines of authority between states and the federal government are, to a significant extent,
defined by the United States Constitution and relevant case law. In recent years, however,
T the Supreme Court has decided a number of cases that would seem to be a reevaluation of
this historical relationship. This report discusses state and federal legislative power generally and
focuses on a number of these “federalism” cases. The report discusses state and federal legislative
power generally, and focuses on a number of these “federalism” cases.1 Issues addressed include
congressional power under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment; limits on
congressional powers, such as the Tenth Amendment; and state sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment. The report does not, however, address the much larger federalism issue of
when it is appropriate—as opposed to constitutionally permissible—for federal powers to be
exercised.
Powers of the States
States may generally legislate on all matters within their territorial jurisdiction. This “police
power” does not arise from the Constitution, but is an inherent attribute of the states’ territorial
sovereignty. The Constitution does, however, provide certain specific limitations on that power.
For instance, a state is relatively limited in its authority regarding the regulation of foreign
imports and exports2 or the conduct of foreign affairs.3 Further, states must respect the decisions
of courts of other states,4 and are limited in their ability to vary their territory without
congressional permission.5 In addition, the Supreme Court has found that states are limited in
their ability to burden interstate commerce.6
Powers of the Federal Government
The powers of the federal government, while limited to those enumerated in the Constitution,7
have been interpreted broadly, so as to create a large potential overlap with state authority. For
instance, Article I, § 8, cl. 18 provides that “[t]he Congress shall have power ... To make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any

1 Portions of this report were prepared by Kristin Thornblad, legal intern.
2 See, e.g., U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (“No State shall ... lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports.”)
3 “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of
Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless
actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.” U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
4 “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other
State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings
shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 1. This “Full Faith and Credit Clause” gives Congress
what amounts to enforcement authority over the required recognition by each state of the judgments, records, and
legislation of other states.
5 “... [N]o new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by
the Junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as
well as of the Congress.” U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
6 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
7 Article I, § 1, of the Constitution provides that “All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States.” Unlike a typical grant of power to states Article I, § 1, does not grant to Congress “all legislative
power,” but rather grants to Congress only those specific powers enumerated in § 8 and elsewhere in the Constitution.
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Department or Officer thereof.” Early in the history of the Constitution, the Supreme Court found
that this clause enlarges rather than narrows the powers of Congress.8
Congress has broad financial powers, including the power to tax and spend in order to pay debts
and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States.9 Congress also has
the power to borrow money and to appropriate money from the United States Treasury.10 The
purposes for which Congress may tax and spend are very broad and are not limited by the scope
of other enumerated powers under which Congress may regulate.11 On the other hand, Congress
has no power to regulate “for the general welfare,” but may only tax and spend for that purpose.
Congress also has broad authority over the commercial interests of the nation, including the
power to regulate commerce,12 to establish bankruptcy laws,13 to coin money,14 to punish
counterfeiters,15 to establish post offices and post roads,16 and to grant patents and copyrights.17
The Commerce Clause, discussed in more detail below, is one of the most far-reaching grants of
power to Congress. Regulation of interstate commerce covers all movement of people and things
across state lines, including communication and transportation.
Congress has broad powers over citizenship, including the power to define the circumstances
under which immigrants may become citizens,18 and to protect the rights of those persons who
have citizenship. The Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to enforce the guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment, including the right to due process and equal protection.19 This
power extends specifically to the power of Congress to protect the rights of citizens who are at
least 1820 to vote regardless of race, color, previous condition of servitude,21 or sex.22 Congress

8 As stated by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819): “Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted
to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.”
9 “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States.” U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
10 “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” U.S. Const.,
Art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
11 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
12 “To regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. Const.,
Article I, § 8, cl. 3.
13 U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
14 U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8 cl. 5.
15 U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 6.
16 U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
17 U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
18 “The Congress shall have power ... To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.” U.S. Const., Art I, § 8, cl. 4.
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1.
19 “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1. The Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. Id. at § 5.
20 U.S. Const., Amend. XXVI.
21 U.S. Const., Amend. XV.
22 U.S. Const., Amend. XIX.
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may also regulate the time, place, and manner of federal elections,23 and judge the result of such
elections.24 Congress also has a number of other powers relating to elections and appointments.25
Congress has the power and authority to purchase and administer property, and has power over
those jurisdictions that are not controlled by states, such as the District of Columbia and the
territories.26 Congress is limited by the Fifth Amendment, however, in the taking of private
property without compensation.27 Congress has numerous powers related to war and the
protection of the United States and its sovereign interests.28
The Commerce Clause
As noted above, the U.S. Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the various states.29 This power has been cited as the
constitutional basis for a significant portion of the laws passed by Congress over the last 50 years,
and it currently represents one of the broadest bases for the exercise of congressional powers. In
United States v. Lopez,30 however, the Supreme Court brought into question the extent to which
Congress can rely on the Commerce Clause as a basis for federal jurisdiction.
Under the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Congress made it a federal offense for “any
individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable
cause to believe, is a school zone.”31 In Lopez, the Court held that, because the act neither
regulated a commercial activity nor contained a requirement that the possession was connected to
interstate commerce, the act exceeded the authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause.
Although the Court did not explicitly overrule any previous rulings upholding federal statutes

23 “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each
State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to
the Places of chusing Senators.” U.S. Const., Article I, § 4, cl. 1. While the Fifteenth Amendment and the other voting
rights guarantees noted above protect only against state action, congressional authority under this clause includes
protection of the electoral process against private interference. A variety of enactments can be traced to this authority,
including campaign finance laws and the Hatch Act (insofar as it applies to federal elections).
24 “Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members.” Article I, § 5, cl.
1. The House and the Senate act as judicial tribunals in resolving contested election cases.
25 See, e.g., U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 2 (apportionment).
26 “The Congress shall have power ... To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District ... as
may, by Cession of Particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the
United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in
which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards and other needful Buildings.”
Article I, § 8, cl. 17. “The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States....” Article IV, § 3, cl. 2.
27 “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const., Amend. V. Implicit in
the Fifth Amendment’s requirement that just compensation be paid for private property that is taken for a public use is
the existence of the government’s power to take private property for public use.
28 See, e.g., U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (“The Congress shall have power ... To define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations”); U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (“... To
declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.”); U.S.
Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (“To raise and support Armies....”).
29 U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
30 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
31 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)A).
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passed under the authority of the Commerce Clause, the decision would appear to suggest new
limits to Congress’s legislative authority.
The scope and extent of the Commerce Clause does not appear to have been of particular concern
to the framers of the Constitution.32 There are indications that the founding fathers considered the
federal regulation of commerce to be an important power of the new Constitution primarily as a
means of facilitating trade and of raising revenue.33 While the Anti-Federalists argued that the
new Constitution gave too much power to the federal government, they apparently did not raise
significant objections to the granting of power to regulate interstate commerce.34
The Supreme Court, however, developed an expansive view of the Commerce Clause relatively
early in the history of judicial review. For instance, Chief Justice Marshall wrote in 1824 that “the
power over commerce ... is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single
government ...” and that “the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are ... the
sole restraints” on this power.35 However, the issue in most of the early Supreme Court
Commerce Clause cases dealt not with the limits of congressional authority, but on the implied
limitation of the Commerce Clause on a state’s ability to regulate commerce.36
It has been suggested that the Commerce Clause should be restricted to the regulation of “selling,
buying, bartering and transporting.”37 In fact, much of the federal legislation approved of by the
Supreme Court early in the 20th century did relate to issues such as the regulation of lottery
tickets,38 the transporting of adulterated food,39 and the interstate transportation of prostitutes.40
Moreover, during the early 1900s, the Supreme Court struck down a series of federal statutes that
attempted to extend commerce regulation to activities such as “production,” “manufacturing,”41
and “mining.”42
Starting in 1937, however, with the decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation,43
the Supreme Court held that Congress has the ability to protect interstate commerce from burdens
and obstructions that “affect” commerce transactions. In the NLRB case, the court upheld the
National Labor Relations Act, finding that by controlling industrial labor strife, Congress was

32 Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 Minn. L. Rev.
432, 443-44 (1941); Greenspan, The Constitutional Exercise of the Federal Police Power: A Functional Approach to
Federalism, 41 Vanderbilt Law Review 1019, 1022-24 (1988). Those materials which do address congressional control
over commerce focus on the necessity of uniformity in matters of foreign commerce, although the drafters clearly
intended domestic commerce to be regulated as well. P. Kurland & R. Lerner, THE FOUNDER’S CONSTITUTION 477-528
(1987).
33 Alexander Hamilton, CONTINENTALIST, No. 5, 18 April 1782 (Paper 3:75-82) as reprinted in P. Kurland & R. Lerner,
supra note 32 (“The vesting of the power of regulating trade ought to have been a principal object of the confederation
for a variety of reasons. It is as necessary for the purposes of commerce as of revenue.”)
34 Greenspan, supra note 32 at 1023.
35 Gibbons v. Odgen, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197-98 (1824).
36 See, e.g., Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
37 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 593 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
38 Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
39 Hippolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911).
40 Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
41 United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895).
42 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936).
43 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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preventing burdens from being placed on interstate commerce.44 Thus, the Court rejected previous
distinctions between the economic activities (such as manufacturing) that led up to interstate
economic transactions, and the interstate transactions themselves. By allowing Congress to
regulate activities that were in the “stream” of commerce, the Court also set the stage for the
regulation of a variety of other activities that “affect” commerce.
Subsequent Court decisions found that Congress had considerable discretion in determining
which activities “affect” interstate commerce, as long as the legislation was “reasonably” related
to achieving its goals of regulating interstate commerce.45 Thus the Court found that in some
cases, events of purely local commerce (such as local working conditions) might, because of
market forces, negatively affect the regulation of interstate commerce, and thus would be
susceptible to regulation.46 The Court has also held that an activity which in itself does not affect
interstate commerce could be regulated if all such activities taken in the aggregate did affect
interstate commerce.47 Under the reasoning of these cases, the Court has upheld many diverse
laws, including laws regulating production of wheat on farms,48 racial discrimination by
businesses,49 and loan-sharking.50
The Lopez case was significant in that it is the first time since 1937 that the Supreme Court struck
down a federal statute purely based on a finding that Congress had exceeded its powers under the
Commerce Clause.51 In doing so, the Court revisited its prior cases, sorted the commerce power
into three categories, and asserted that Congress could not go beyond these three categories: (1)
regulation of channels of commerce, (2) regulation of instrumentalities of commerce, and (3)
regulation of economic activities that “affect” commerce.52
Within the third category of activities that “affect commerce,” the Court determined that the
power to regulate commerce applies to intrastate activities only when they “substantially” affect
commerce.53 Still, the Court in Lopez spoke approvingly of earlier cases upholding laws that
regulated intrastate credit transactions, restaurants utilizing interstate supplies, and hotels catering
to interstate guests. The Court also recognized that while some intrastate activities may by
themselves have a trivial effect on commerce, regulation of these activities may be constitutional
if their regulation is an essential part of a larger economic regulatory scheme. Thus, the Court

44 301 U.S. at 41.
45 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)(approving legislation relating to working conditions).
46 312 U.S. at 121.
47 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
48 Id.
49 See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 370 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
50 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
51 Herman Schwartz, Court Tries to Patrol a Political Line, Legal Times 25 (May 8, 1995).
52 The Court failed to note that to some extent, the three categories are intertwined. For instance, the first category, the
regulation of “streams” or “channels” of commerce, allows regulation of the creation, movement, sale and consumption
of merchandise or services. But the initial extension of the “streams” of commerce analysis by the Court to intrastate
trade was justified by the “effect” of these other activities on commerce. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1,
31 (1936). Similarly, the second category, which allows the regulation of such instrumentalities of commerce as planes,
trains or trucks, is also based on the theory that a threat to these instrumentalities “affects” commerce, even if the effect
is local in nature. Southern Railway Company v. United States, 222 U.S. 21, 26-27 (1911)(regulation of intrastate rail
traffic has a substantial effect on interstate rail traffic). Thus, the final category identified by the Court appears to be a
catch-all for all other activities which “substantially affect” commerce.
53 514 U.S. at 559.
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even approved what has been perceived as one of its most expansive rulings, Wickard v. Filburn,
which allowed the regulation of the production and consumption of wheat for home
consumption.54
The Court in Lopez found, however, that the Gun-Free School Zones Act fell into none of the
three categories set out above. It held that it is not a regulation of channels of commerce, nor does
it protect an instrumentality of commerce. Finally, its effect on interstate commerce was found to
be too removed to be “substantial.” The Court noted that the regulated activity, possessing guns in
school, neither by itself nor in the aggregate affected commercial transactions.55 Further, the
statute contained no requirement that interstate commerce be affected, such as that the gun had
been previously transported in interstate commerce.56 Nor was the criminalization of possession
of a gun near a school part of a larger regulatory scheme that did regulate commerce.57 Finally,
the Court indicated that criminal law enforcement is an area of law traditionally reserved to the
states.58 Consequently, the Court found that Congress did not have the authority to pass the Gun-
Free School Zone Act.
It should be noted that the Lopez Court purported to be limiting, but not overruling, prior case law
that had supported an expansive interpretation of the commerce clause. Consequently, most
existing federal laws, which have traditionally been drafted to be consistent with this case law,59
would survive constitutional scrutiny even under Lopez. However, in at least one significant case,
Congress passed a law, the Violence Against Women Act, that seemed to invoke the same
concerns that the Court found in Lopez. Consequently, the relevant portion of that act was struck
down in United States v. Morrison.60
In Morrison, the Court evaluated whether 42 U.S.C. § 13981, which provides a federal private
right of action for victims of gender-motivated violence, was within the power of Congress to
enact under the Commerce Clause. In Morrison, the victim of an alleged rape brought suit against
the alleged rapist, arguing that this portion of the act was sustainable because it addressed
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.61 The Court, however, noted that unlike
traditional statutes based on the commerce clause, the activity in question had nothing to do with
commerce or an economic enterprise. This point had been made previously in Lopez, and here the
Court reaffirmed the holding that in order to fall under the acceptable category of laws that
“substantially affect commerce,” the underlying activity itself must generally be economic or

54 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
55 514 U.S. at 564. The Court rejected arguments that possession of guns in school affected the national economy by its
negative impact on education. Id.
56 514 U.S. at 561.
57 514 U.S. at 560.
58 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Court has reiterated its concern over extending Commerce Clause
powers to Congress in areas of the law traditionally reserved to the states. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (rejecting an interpretation of
the Clean Water Act which allowed regulation of nonnavigable, isolated wetlands as infringing upon the “traditional
and primary state power over land and water use”).
59 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 247 (2000)(forbidding obstruction of persons in the free exercise of religious beliefs where the
offense “is in or affects interstate or foreign commerce.”)
60 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
61 Id. at 609.
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commercial.62 As gender-motivated violence does not inherently relate to an economic activity,
the Court held that it was beyond the authority of Congress to regulate.
In the case of Gonzales v. Raich,63 the Court evaluated an “as applied” challenge to the Controlled
Substances Act as regards obtaining, manufacturing, or possessing marijuana for medical
purposes. The case was brought by two seriously ill residents of California who used marijuana in
compliance with the California Compassionate Use Act of 1996.64 The challenge was based on
the argument that the narrow class of activity being engaged in—the intrastate, noncommercial
cultivation and possession of cannabis for personal medical purposes as recommended by a
patient’s physician pursuant to valid California state law—did not have a substantial impact on
commerce, and thus could not be regulated under the Commerce Clause.65
In upholding the application of the Controlled Substances Act in the Raich case, the Court relied
on its decision in Wickard v. Filburn,66 which held that “even if appellee’s activity be local and
though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.”67 The Wickard case
upheld the application of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938,68 which was designed to
control prices by regulating the volume of wheat moving in interstate commerce. The Court in
Wickard held that Congress could regulate not only the wheat sold into commerce, but also wheat
retained for consumption on a farm.69 The Court did so on the theory that the while the impact of
wheat consumed on the farm on interstate commerce might be trivial, it was significant when
combined with wheat from other farmers similarly situated.70

62 The requirement that a commerce clause regulation be economic or commercial has been influential in a number of
subsequent statutory interpretation cases. In Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000), a criminal defendant
challenged his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), which, in part, makes it a crime to destroy by fire or explosive a
building “used” in interstate commerce. Applying the statutory canon that one should interpret a statute to avoid
constitutional doubt, Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239 (1999), the Court held that the statute did not apply to a
private residence that was “used” as collateral to obtain and secure a loan, “used” to obtain insurance, and “used” to
receive natural gas from other sources. The Court construed the statute to require that a building protected by § 844(i)
be “actively employed” for commercial purposes, id. at 855, arguing that a broader interpretation would extend the
statute to virtually every arson in the country.
A similar result occurred in the case of Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). In SWANCC, the Court considered a challenge to the Migratory Bird Rule, 51 Fed.
Reg. 41217, which extended § 404(a) of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) to nonnavigable, isolated
wetlands. The Court held that this interpretation of the statute would raise serious constitutional questions, requiring,
for instance, a close examination of precisely what activity was being regulated. Absent a clear statement from
Congress that it intended the Clean Water Act to have such a broad reach, the Court found the rule was not supported
by the statute. Id. at 173. See also Rapanos v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 165 L. Ed. 2d 159, 201 (2006).
63 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
64 Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2005) (providing for the legal possession of medical
marijuana by a patient or primary caregiver, upon the written or oral recommendation of a physician).
65 545 U.S. at 28.
66 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
67 Id. at 125.
68 52 Stat. 31.
69 Id. at 128-29.
70 Id. at 127.
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Based on Wickard, the Court in Raich held that Congress could consider the aggregate effect that
allowing the production and consumption of marijuana for medical purposes would have on the
illegal market for marijuana.71 Of even greater concern was that diversion of marijuana grown for
medicinal purposes for other uses would frustrate the federal interest in eliminating commercial
transactions in the interstate market.72 In both cases, the Court found that the regulation was
within Congress’s commerce power because Congress had a rational basis to determine that
production of a commodity meant for home consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, could have a
substantial effect on supply and demand. In addition, because exempting the use of medical
marijuana could undercut enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act, the Court found that the
application in this case was within Congress’s authority to “make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper” to effectuate its powers.
The Necessary and Proper Clause
The Constitution provides Congress not only enumerated powers, but also the ability to pass laws
to make such powers effective. While such a power might have been implied of necessity even
without an explicit textual basis in the Constitution, the Founding Fathers specifically included
congressional authority to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper”73 to effectuate its
powers. Although the extension of congressional power under this clause is not an independent
basis for legislation, the provision has been integral to a broad interpretation of other
congressional powers. For instance, as discussed below, the expansive nature of modern
Commerce Clause doctrine may actually be a reflection of Necessary and Proper Clause
jurisprudence.
Sometimes, the Court’s reliance on the Necessary and Proper Clause in a particular case is only
briefly noted, or may even exist sub silentio. For instance, the majority opinion in the case of
Gonzales v. Raich (discussed above) emphasized that, in evaluating the scope of Congress’s
authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate medicinal marijuana, the Court need only find
that Congress had a “rational basis” to find a link between the legislation and the Commerce
Clause. The Court then went on to note that in such cases “Congress was acting well within its
authority to ‘make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper’ to ‘regulate Commerce ...
among the several States.’”74 This language then served to allow the Court to approve the
restriction of medical marijuana as one component of a larger economic regulatory scheme.
This passing reference to the Necessary and Proper Clause may obscure its historical significance
to Commerce Clause litigation. Writing in concurrence in Raich, Justice Scalia argued that it is
more accurate to characterize the expansive “substantial effects” prong of Commerce Clause
analysis as predominantly based on the Necessary and Proper Clause. He noted that the current
description of the “substantial effects” prong is misleading because, unlike the channels,
instrumentalities, and agents of interstate commerce, activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce are not themselves part of interstate commerce, and thus the power to regulate them
cannot come from the Commerce Clause alone. Rather, “as this Court has acknowledged ...

71 545 U.S. at 19.
72 Id.
73 U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
74 545 U.S. at 22.
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Congress’s regulatory authority over intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate
commerce (including activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce) derives from
the Necessary and Proper Clause.”75 In fact, Justice Scalia argues that, in some cases, the
Necessary and Proper Clause can go beyond existing doctrines of the Commerce Clause, to
regulate even those intrastate activities that do not themselves substantially affect interstate
commerce.
Another area where the Court has provided a similarly broad interpretation of an Article I
congressional power based on the Necessary and Proper Clause is the Spending Clause.76 In Sabri
v. United States,77 the Court considered whether the federal government could punish the bribery
of state, local, and tribal officials if the governmental entities that employed them received at
least $10,000 in federal funds. The defendant, who was convicted of attempting to bribe a city
councilman to facilitate the building of a hotel and retail structure in Minneapolis, argued that the
statute in question had no federal nexus. The Court rejected this argument, holding that
Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause, when supplemented by the Necessary and
Proper Clause, allowed Congress to ensure that federal dollars not be diverted or undermined by
corruption. The Court held that it was not important if the federal funds received by the
governmental entity in question were not directly involved in a particular scheme, because
“money is fungible, bribed officials are untrustworthy stewards of federal funds, and corrupt
contractors do not deliver dollar-for-dollar value.”78
An even more expansive interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in this case as applied
to the entire federal criminal penal system (which derives from a variety of congressional
powers), is found in the Court’s opinion in United States v. Comstock.79 In Comstock, the Court
evaluated a federal statute which allowed for the civil commitment of a federal prisoner past the
term of his or her imprisonment, if that prisoner would have serious difficultly in refraining from
sexually violent conduct or child molestation. The statute contained no requirement that the
threatened future conduct would fall under federal jurisdiction, raising the question of what
constitutional basis could be cited for the enforcement of the statute.
The majority opinion in Comstock upheld the statute after considering five factors: (1) the historic
breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause; (2) the history of federal involvement in this area;
(3) the reason for the statute’s enactment; (4) the statute’s accommodation of state interests; and
(5) whether the scope of the statute was too attenuated from Article I powers.80 The Court noted
that the breadth of the power was established by Justice Marshall in the case of McCulloch v.
Maryland,81 where the Chief Justice wrote:

75 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
76 Art. I, § 8, cl. 1 provides that “The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,
to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”
77 541 U.S. 600 (2004).
78 541 U.S. at 606.
79 No. 08–1224 slip. op. (May 17, 2010).
80 Id. at 22.
81 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819).
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Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are Constitutional.
Previous federal involvement in the area included not only the civil commitment of defendants
who were incompetent to stand trial or who became insane during the course of their
imprisonment, but, starting in 1949, the continued confinement of those adjudged incompetent or
insane past the end of their prison term.
In upholding the sex offender statute, the Court found that protection of the public and the
probability that such prisoners would not be committed by the state represented a rational basis
for the passage of such legislation. The Court further found that the state interests were protected
by the legislation, as the statute provided for transfer of the committed individuals to state
authorities willing to accept them. Finally, the Court found that the statute was not too attenuated
from the Article I powers underlying the criminal laws which had been the basis for incarceration,
as it related to the responsible administration of the United States prison system.
The Fourteenth Amendment
Another significant source of congressional power is § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Fourteenth Amendment provides that states shall not deprive citizens of “life, liberty or property”
without due process of law nor deprive them of equal protection of the laws. Section 5 provides
that Congress has the power to legislate to enforce the amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment represented a significant shift of power in the nation’s federal
system. Until the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Constitution was limited to
establishing the powers and limitations of the federal government. However, the amendments
passed immediately after the Civil War (the Thirteenth,82 Fourteenth, and Fifteenth83
Amendments), dramatically altered this regime. Passage of these amendments subjected a state’s
control over its own citizens to oversight by either the federal judiciary or Congress. The most
significant impact of the Fourteenth Amendment has been its implementation by the federal
courts, as state legislation came under scrutiny for having violated due process or equal
protection. However, Congress has also seen fit to exercise its power under the Fourteenth
Amendment to address issues such as voting rights and police brutality.
The scope of Congress’s power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, has been in
flux over the years. In Katzenbach v. Morgan,84 the Court held that § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment authorized Congress not just to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
as defined by the courts, but to help define its scope. In Katzenbach, the Court upheld a portion of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that barred the application of English literacy requirements to
persons who had reached 6th grade in a Puerto Rican school taught in Spanish. In upholding the
statute, the Court rejected the argument that Congress’s power to legislate under the Fourteenth
Amendment was limited to enforcing that which the Supreme Court found to be a violation of

82 U.S. Const., Amend. XIII (prohibiting slavery).
83 U.S. Const., Amend. XV (voting rights).
84 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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that amendment. Rather, the Court held that Congress could enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
by “appropriate” legislation consistent with the “letter and spirit of the constitution.”
The rationale for this holding appears to be that Congress has the ability to evaluate and address
factual situations that it determines may lead to degradation of rights protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment. This is true even if a court would not find a constitutional violation to
have occurred. In fact, what the Court appeared to have done was to require only that Congress
establish a rational basis for why the legislation was necessary to protect a Fourteenth
Amendment right.
Subsequent Supreme Court cases, however, have limited the reach of Katzenbach. In Oregon v.
Mitchell,85 the Court struck down a requirement that the voting age be lowered to 18 for state
elections. In prohibiting Congress from dictating the voting age for state elections, a splintered
Court appears to have supported Congress’s power to pass laws that protect Fourteenth
Amendment rights against state intrusions, but rejected the ability of Congress to extend the
substantive content of those rights. As 18-year-olds are not a protected class under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court found that Congress was attempting to create, rather than protect,
Fourteenth Amendment rights.
More recently, in the case of Flores v. City of Boerne,86 the Court struck down the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as beyond the authority of Congress under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. For many years prior to the passage of RFRA, a law of general
applicability restricting the free exercise of religion, to be consistent with the Freedom of
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, had to be justified by a compelling governmental
interest. However, in the 1990 case of Oregon v. Smith,87 the Court had lowered this standard. The
Smith case involved members of the Native American Church who were denied unemployment
benefits when they lost their jobs for having used peyote during a religious ceremony. The Smith
case held that neutral generally applicable laws may be applied to religious practices even if the
law is not supported by a compelling governmental interest. RFRA, in response, was an attempt
by Congress to overturn the Smith case, and to require a compelling governmental interest when a
state applied a generally applied law to religion.
The City of Boerne case arose when the City of Boerne denied a church a building permit to
expand, because the church was in a designated historical district. The church challenged the
zoning decision under RFRA. The Supreme Court reiterated that § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment gave Congress the power to enforce existing constitutional protections, but found
that this did not automatically include the power to pass any legislation to protect these rights.
Instead, the Court held that there must be a “congruence and proportionality” between the injury
to be remedied and the law adopted to that end. For instance, the Court’s decision in Katzenbach
v. Morgan of allowing the banning of literacy tests was justified based on an extensive history of
minorities being denied suffrage in this country. In contrast, the Court found no similar pattern of
the use of neutral laws of general applicability disguising religious bigotry and animus against
religion. Rather than an attempt to remedy a problem, RFRA was seen by the Court as an attempt
by Congress to overturn an unpopular Supreme Court decision. The law focused on no one area
of alleged harm to religion, but rather just broadly inhibited state and local regulations of all

85 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
86 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
87 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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types. Consequently, the Court found RFRA to be an overbroad response to a relatively
nonexistent problem.
The scope of the enforcement power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment also has become
important in cases where the Court has found that Congress has overreached its power under
other provision of the Constitution, or is limited by some provision thereof. For instance, as
discussed in detail below, the Supreme Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment and state
sovereign immunity generally prohibit individuals from suing states for damages under federal
law.88 However, the Supreme Court has also held that Congress can abrogate state sovereign
immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment.89 This means that in many cases, litigants suing
states will have to find a Fourteenth Amendment basis for federal legislation in order to defeat an
Eleventh Amendment defense. For instance, a significant amount of federal legislation is clearly
supported by the commerce clause, but it might not be supported under § 5. Recently, the Court
decided two cases that illustrate the difficulties of establishing Fourteenth Amendment authority
for such legislation.
In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board,90 the
Supreme Court considered an unfair competition suit brought by a New Jersey savings bank
against the state of Florida. The New Jersey savings bank had developed a patented program
where individuals could use a certificate of deposit contract to save for college. The state of
Florida set up a similar program, and the College Savings Bank sued Florida for false and
misleading advertising under a provision of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act),91 alleging
that Florida had made misleading representations about its own product.
The Court first noted that under Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, Article I, powers such as
the power to regulate commerce were insufficient to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Thus, the Court next considered whether the Lanham Act could be characterized as an exercise of
Congress’s power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that no state shall “deprive a person of ... property ... without due process of law,” the
Court found that the unfair trade in question, which consisted of allegedly inaccurate statements
made by the state of Florida about its own saving program, did not infringe on any exclusive
property right held by the College Savings Bank. As the Court found that Congress had not
established an authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the state’s immunity, the
College Savings Bank could not proceed against the state of Florida for unfair trade practices.
Even if a property interest is established, it would still need to be determined that Congress had
the authority to protect that property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,92 the Court, in a
decision concerning the same parties as the case discussed above, considered whether the College
Savings Bank could sue the state of Florida for patent infringement. Congress had passed a law
specifically providing that states could be sued for patent violations,93 citing three sources of

88 See notes 90-104 and accompanying text, infra.
89 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65-66 (1996); See discussion infra notes 95-98 and accompanying
text.
90 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
91 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
92 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
93 Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Patent Remedy Act), 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(a).
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constitutional authority: the Article I Patent Clause,94 the Article I Interstate Commerce Clause,95
and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. As the Court had previously precluded abrogation of
sovereign immunity through the exercise of Article I powers, the question became whether
Congress had the authority to pass patent legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Unlike the previous case, the Court found that, under a long line of precedents, patents were
considered property rights. However, the Court had to further consider whether the protection of
such a property right under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was “appropriate” under its ruling
in City of Boerne. Consequently, the Court evaluated whether a federal right to enforce patents
against states was appropriate remedial or preventive legislation aimed at securing the protections
of the Fourteenth Amendment for patent owners. Specifically, the Court sought to evaluate
whether unremedied patent infringement by states rose to the level of a Fourteenth Amendment
violation that Congress could redress.
The Court noted that Congress had failed to identify a pattern of patent infringement by the states,
and that only a handful of patent infringement cases had been brought against states in the last
100 years. The Court also noted that Congress had failed to establish that state remedies for
patent infringement were inadequate for citizens to seek compensation for injury. In fact, the state
of Florida argued that no constitutionally based violation had occurred, as it had procedures in
place that would provide the necessary due process for patent infringement by the state to be
challenged. Consequently, the Court found that the exercise of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
in this context would be out of proportion to the remedial objective.
The Court engaged in a similar analysis, with like results, in evaluating the application of age
discrimination laws to the states. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,96 the Court noted that the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, while a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce
power, could not be applied to the states unless Congress also had the power to enact it under § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Kimel Court held, however, that age is not a suspect class, and
that the provisions of the ADEA far surpassed the kind of protections that would be afforded such
a class under the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, the Court found that an analysis of Congress’s
ability to legislate prophylactically under section § 5 required an examination of the legislative
record to determine whether the remedies provided were proportional and congruent to the
problem. A review by the Court of the ADEA legislative record found no evidence of a pattern of
state governments discriminating against employees on the basis of age. Consequently, the Court
held that a state could not be liable for damages under the ADEA.
Similarly, the application of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to states was
considered in the case of the Board of Trustees v. Garrett,97 again with similar result. In Garrett,
the Court evaluated whether two plaintiffs could bring claims for money damages against a state
university for failing to make reasonable employment accommodations for their disabilities; one
plaintiff was under treatment for cancer, the other for asthma and sleep apnea. Although disability
is not a suspect class and thus discrimination is evaluated under a rational basis test, the Court had
previously shown a heightened sensitivity to arbitrary discrimination against the disabled.98

94 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
95 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
96 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
97 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
98 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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Further, Congress had made substantial findings regarding the pervasiveness of such
discrimination. However, the Supreme Court declined to consider evidence of discrimination by
either the private sector or local government, and dismissed the examples that did relate to the
states as unlikely to rise to the level of constitutionally “irrational” discrimination. Ultimately, the
Court found that no pattern of unconstitutional state discrimination against the disabled had been
established, and that the application of the ADA was not a proportionate response to any pattern
that might exist.
However, the Court reached a different conclusion in the case of Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs.99 In the Hibbs case, an employee of the Nevada Department of Human
Resources had a dispute with the Department regarding how much leave time he had available
under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). The FMLA requires employers to
provide employees up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave to care for a close relative with a “serious
health condition.”100 In Hibbs, the Court held that Congress had the power to abrogate a state’s
Eleventh Amendment immunity under the FMLA, so that a state employee could recover money
damages. The Court found that Congress had established significant evidence of a long and
extensive history of sex discrimination with respect to the administration of leave benefits by the
states, and that history was sufficient to justify the enactment of the legislation under § 5. The
standard for demonstrating the constitutionality of a gender-based classification is more difficult
to meet than the rational-basis test, such was at issue in Kimel and Garrett, so it was easier for
Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations.
Even where the Eleventh Amendment and state sovereign immunity are not at issue, the Court
may be asked to consider whether the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a sufficient basis for a
federal law that does not appear to have a constitutional basis elsewhere in the Constitution. For
instance, in United States v. Morrison,101 discussed previously,102 the Court found that Congress,
in creating a federal private right of action for victims of gender-motivated violence, had
exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause. Consequently, the plaintiff in that case made
the alternate argument that the federal private right of action could be sustained under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
This argument, however, suffered from two major defects. First, the Court has long held that the
Fourteenth Amendment provides Congress with the authority to regulate states but not
individuals.103 In Morrison, however, the civil case had been brought against the individuals
alleged to have engaged in the offense. The plaintiff attempted to avoid this problem by arguing
that there is pervasive bias in various state justice systems against victims of gender-motivated
violence, and that providing a federal private right of action was an appropriate means to remedy
this “state action.”
However, the Court rejected this argument, finding that the remedy did not meet the City of
Boerne test of “congruence and proportionality to the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end.”104 Because the federal private right of action was not aimed at the

99 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
100 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C).
101 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
102 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
103 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
104 521 U.S. at 526.
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allegedly discriminatory actions by state officials, but was instead directed against the individual
engaging in the violence itself, the Court found that the action could not be supported by
reference to the Fourteenth Amendment.105
The Court again considered the issue of Congress’s power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Tennessee v. Lane.106 In the Lane case, two paraplegic plaintiffs alleged that the
state of Tennessee and several of its counties violated Title II of the ADA, which requires that the
disabled be provided access to public services, programs, and activities, by failing to provide
physical access to state courts.107 The Court held that Title II, as applied to this right of access to
the courts, was a proper exercise of Congress’s authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
to abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. Similar to its holdings in the Garrett and
Hibbs cases, the Court found that Congress had established sufficient evidence of the sustained
denial of persons with disabilities of access to the courts.108
In applying the Boerne congruence and proportionality test, the Court in Lane distinguished the
rights Congress intended to protect in Title II (access to public services, programs, and activities)
from the Title I employment rights that had been struck down in Garrett. While both Titles I and
II were intended to address unequal treatment of the disabled (which is only a constitutional
violation when it is irrational), the Court held that Title II was also intended to reach the more
rigorously protected rights of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, such as the
right of access to the courts.109 The Court stated that the due process rights Congress sought to
protect under Title II required a standard of judicial review at least as searching as the sex-based
classifications the Court considered in Hibbs.110 The limited nature of Title II as a remedy for the
denial of the right of access to courts also informed the Court’s holding that the measure is a valid
prophylactic remedy.111

105 529 U.S. at 626.
106 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
107 One plaintiff in Lane claimed he was unable to appear to answer criminal charges on the second floor of a
courthouse that had no elevator. The second plaintiff, a certified court reporter, claimed she was denied the opportunity
both to work and to participate in the judicial process because she was unable to access numerous county courthouses.
108 The Court cited congressional evidence that legislative attempts preceding Title II inadequately addressed the
problem of patterned unconstitutional treatment in access to the courts. 541 U.S. at 526.
109 The Court held that it need not examine Title II as a whole when evaluating the remedy’s congruence and
proportionality to the injury of disability discrimination in access to the courts. The relevant inquiry solely concerned
Title II’s scope as applied to the rights associated with access to judicial services. The Court cited as precedent for this
limited application approach the Garrett case, in which it considered only Title I of the ADA for purposes of
Fourteenth Amendment analysis. Based on this narrow scope of inquiry, the Court determined that both the pattern of
past discrimination in access to the courts and the failure of previous legislative attempts to remedy the injury were
sufficient to hold that Title II is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
110 541 U.S. at 529. As noted by Chief Justice Rehnquist in dissent, 541 U.S. at 541-42 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting),
the congruence and proportionality analysis in the majority opinion in Lane did not limit itself to historical examples of
the disabled being denied due process, but also cited a history of disparate treatment in other less protected areas. See
id. at 524-25.
111 Title II does not require states to compromise the integrity of public programs or make unduly burdensome changes
to public facilities. 541 U.S. at 532. Rather, states need only take reasonable measures to comply with Title II
regulations. Id.
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Congress’s authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity appears strongest when the focus of the prophylactic measure at issue is
conduct that actually violates a constitutional right. In United States v. Georgia,112 a disabled state
prison inmate who used a wheelchair for mobility alleged that the state of Georgia violated Title
II of the ADA in relation to his conditions of confinement. The Court reiterated its holding in
Lane that Title II is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment powers. It
went on to state that Title II was valid as applied to the plaintiff’s cause of action, because he
alleged independent violations under § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment concerning his prison
treatment.113
The Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment provides that “powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.” While this language would appear to represent one of the most clear examples of a
federalist principle in the Constitution, it has not had a significant impact in limiting federal
powers. Initially, the Supreme Court interpreted the Tenth Amendment to have substantive
content, so that certain “core” state functions would be beyond the authority of the federal
government to regulate. Thus, in National League of Cities v. Usery,114 the Court struck down
federal wage and price controls on state employees as involving the regulation of core state
functions.115 The Court, however, overruled National League of Cities in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority.116 In sum, the Court in Garcia seems to have said that most
disputes over the effects on state sovereignty of federal commerce power legislation are to be
considered political questions, and that the states should look for relief from federal regulation
through the political process.117 This appeared to have ended the Court’s attempt to substantively
limit federal government regulation of the states.
The Court soon turned, however, to the question of how the Constitution limits the process by
which the federal government regulates the states. In New York v. United States,118 Congress had
attempted to regulate in the area of low-level radioactive waste. In a 1985 statute, Congress
provided that states must either develop legislation on how to dispose of all low-level radioactive
waste generated within the state, or the state would be forced to take title to such waste, which
would mean that it became the state’s responsibility. The Court found that although Congress had
the authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate low-level radioactive waste, it only had the

112 125 S. Ct. 877 (2006).
113 Id. at 881.
114 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
115 In National League of Cities v. Usery, the Court conceded that the legislation under attack, which regulated the
wages and hours of certain state and local governmental employees, was undoubtedly within the scope of the
Commerce Clause, but it cautioned that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which
may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach
the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that manner.
116 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the Court in Garcia concluded that the National League of
Cities test for “integral operations” in areas of traditional governmental functions had proven impractical, and that the
Court in 1976 had “tried to repair what did not need repair.”
117 See also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
118 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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power to regulate the waste directly. Here, Congress had attempted to require the states to
perform the regulation, and decreed that the failure to do so would require the state to deal with
the financial consequences of owning large quantities of radioactive waste. In effect, Congress
sought to “commandeer” the legislative process of the states. In the New York case, the Court
found that this power was not found in the text or structure of the Constitution, and it was thus a
violation of the Tenth Amendment.
A later case presented the question of the extent to which Congress could regulate through a
state’s executive branch officers. This case, Printz v. United States,119 involved the Brady
Handgun Act. The Brady Handgun Act required state and local law-enforcement officers to
conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers within five business days of an
attempted purchase. This portion of the act was challenged under the Tenth Amendment, under
the theory that Congress was without authority to “commandeer” state executive branch officials.
After a historical study of federal commandeering of state officials, the Court concluded that
commandeering of state executive branch officials was, like commandeering of the legislature,
outside of Congress’s power, and consequently a violation of the Tenth Amendment.
Although the federal government is prohibited from commandeering either the legislature or
executive branch of a state, this does not appear to be the case with state judicial branches. The
federal judicial system and the state judicial system were not intended to be as separate as the
other branches of government, and the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution explicitly provides
that state courts must follow federal law, even if it overrides state laws or constitutions.120 So,
there appears to be less of a concern regarding the “commandeering” of state courts.
A key distinction between constitutional “substantive regulation” and unconstitutional
“commandeering” appears to be whether or not the federal mandate in question is regulating state
activities or whether it is seeking to control the manner in which states regulate private parties.
Thus, for instance, the Court recently held in Reno v. Condon121 that the Driver’s Privacy
Protection Act of 1994, which regulates the sale of personal information gathered from persons
seeking drivers licenses, was substantive regulation, not commandeering. In that case, the Court
found that the state was not being directed on how to regulate its citizens, but rather on how to
treat information that had been elicited from those citizens. However, because the regulation
affected both state governments and private resellers of such information, the Court reserved the
question as to whether a law, which only regulated state activities, would be constitutionally
suspect.

119 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
120 “The Constitution and the Laws of the United States ... shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby....” U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.
121 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
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Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign
Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment and state sovereign immunity provide an example of the complicated
interaction between the powers of the federal government, the state, and the individual. The basic
issue to be addressed here is the extent to which individuals can sue a state under federal law.122
The answer to this question may vary based on a number of factors, including what law the suit is
being brought under, whether the state has taken action to make itself amenable to such law, and
what relief is being sought.
The starting point for such a discussion is usually the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh
Amendment reads, in part, as follows: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State.” The actual text of the Amendment appears to be
limited to preventing U.S. or foreign citizens from bringing diversity cases against states in
federal courts. However, the Supreme Court has expanded the concept of state sovereign
immunity to reach much further than the text of the amendment.
The Eleventh Amendment, the first amendment to the Constitution after the adoption of the Bill
of Rights, was passed as a response to the case of Chisholm v. Georgia.123 Immediately after the
adoption of the Constitution, a number of citizens filed cases in federal court against states. One
of these, Chisholm, was a diversity suit filed by two citizens of South Carolina against the State
of Georgia to recover a Revolutionary War debt. In Chisholm, the Supreme Court noted that
Article III of the Constitution specifically grants the federal courts diversity jurisdiction over suits
“between a State and citizens of another State.”124 Thus, the Court held that this grant of
jurisdiction authorized the private citizen of one state to sue another state in federal court without
that state’s consent.
The states were outraged that such a suit could be brought in federal court, protesting that the
drafters of the Constitution had promised the states they would not be sued by their debtors in
federal courts. Almost immediately after the decision of the Chisholm cases, resolutions were
introduced in Congress to overturn it, the end result being the Eleventh Amendment. The
amendment ensured that a citizen of one state could not sue another state in federal court—in
other words, a citizen could not sue under federal diversity jurisdiction without a state’s
permission.

122 It should be noted that not all suits in which a state is involved is a “suit” against a state. In Tennessee Student
Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004), the Court addressed state sovereign immunity in the context of
bankruptcy proceedings. In that case, the Court addressed whether Eleventh Amendment immunity extended to an
adversary proceeding initiated by a debtor seeking an undue hardship discharge of her state-held student loan debt. The
Court held that the proceeding did not constitute a suit against the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. The
Court noted that the bankruptcy petition in question was an in rem proceeding, so that the court’s jurisdiction was over
the petitioner’s debt, rather than over her person or the state. Id. at 448. Thus, the federal bankruptcy court’s exercise of
jurisdiction over the state-held debt did not infringe upon the state’s sovereignty immunity. Id. at 450.
123 2 U.S. (Dall.) 419 (1793).
124 U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2.
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However, even after the Eleventh Amendment was passed, a number of cases were filed against
states by private citizens, with jurisdiction based on federal question rather than diversity. Under
this reasoning, if a citizen of a state sued his or her own state in federal court, the prohibition of
the Eleventh Amendment would not apply. Consequently, for a number of years after the passage
of the Eleventh Amendment, this type of case was entertained by the federal courts. However, this
line of cases was ended by the case of Hans v. Louisiana.125
In Hans v. Louisiana, the Court provided for an interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment that
allowed the Court to move beyond the literal text of that amendment. Under the reasoning of the
Court, the Eleventh Amendment was not so much an amendment to the original structure of the
Constitution as it was an attempt to overturn a specific court decision that had misinterpreted this
structure. According to this line of reasoning, the Eleventh Amendment was not an amendment,
but a restoration of the original constitutional design.
Ultimately, the issue before the Court in Hans v. Louisiana and in subsequent cases was not the
Eleventh Amendment, but the issue of state sovereign immunity. State sovereign immunity means
that a state must consent to be sued in its own court system. This concept is based on early
English law, which provided that the Crown could not be sued in English courts without its
consent. The doctrine of sovereign immunity was in effect in the states that were in existence at
the time of the drafting of the Constitution. Further, various writings by the founding fathers
seemed to support the concept.126 Thus, the issue before the Court in Hans was whether the grant
of jurisdiction to federal courts under Article III of the Constitution had abrogated state sovereign
immunity. The Hans Court found that Article III did not have this effect.
Although the Hans Court answered the issue of whether adoption of Article III of the Constitution
had waived state sovereign immunity in federal courts, it left a number of questions unanswered.
For instance, the question as to whether there are any instances where Congress could, by statute,
abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity, so that a citizen could sue a state under federal law. In
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,127 the Court seemed to answer that in most cases, such suits
would not be accepted. The Seminole case involved the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988,
which provided Indian tribes with an opportunity to establish gambling operations. However, to
establish such gambling, the Indian tribes had to enter into a compact with the state in which they
were located. The states, in turn, were obligated to negotiate with the Indian tribes in good faith,
and this requirement was made enforceable in federal court. Thus, the question arose as to
whether the tribes could sue the states under the Eleventh Amendment.
The Court in Seminole found it important to establish what constitutional authority was being
exercised by the passage of the Indian Gaming Law. The Court determined that the power being
exercised was the Indian Commerce Clause,128 which is found in Article I. The Court had found
previously in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas,129 that the Commerce Power, as a plenary power, was
so broad that of necessity it required the ability to abrogate state sovereign immunity. In
Seminole, however, the Court overturned Union Gas, holding that as the Eleventh Amendment
was ratified after the passage of the Constitution and Article I, it was a limitation on Congress’s

125 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
126 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 2248 (1999).
127 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
128 U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
129 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
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authority to waive a state’s sovereign immunity under that Article. The Court did indicate,
however, that Congress can abrogate state sovereignty under the Fourteenth Amendment. While
the logic behind this distinction is unclear,130 it means that in many cases, litigants suing states
will try to find a Fourteenth Amendment basis for federal legislation to defeat an Eleventh
Amendment defense.
A question left unanswered by the Hans decision was whether the Eleventh Amendment, which
prohibited Congress from abrogating a state’s sovereign immunity in federal court, extended to a
state’s own courts. In Alden v. Maine,131 the Supreme Court found that the same principles of
sovereign immunity identified in Hans would prevent Congress from authorizing a state to be
sued in its own courts without permission. As in Hans, the Court acknowledged that the literal
text of the Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit such suits, as its language addresses only suits
brought in federal courts. Consequently, the Court relied instead on the proposition that sovereign
immunity is a “fundamental postulate” of the constitutional design, and is not amenable to
congressional abrogation. The same reasoning that prohibited these suits from being brought in
federal court, a deference to the “respect and dignity” of state sovereignty, led the Court to
conclude that it would be anomalous to allow such cases to be brought instead in state court.
In Federal Maritime Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, the Court addressed the
issue of whether state sovereign immunity extended to proceedings before federal agencies.132 In
this case, the South Carolina State Ports Authority denied a cruise ship permission to berth at the
state’s port facilities in Charleston, South Carolina, contending that the primary purpose of the
cruise was for gambling. The cruise ship company, Maritime Services, filed a claim with the
Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) arguing that South Carolina had discriminated against it in
violation of the Shipping Act of 1984 and sought, among other things, damages for loss of
profits.133 The Port Authority, however, successfully moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that
it was inconsistent with the concept of state sovereign immunity.
In reviewing the case, the Court analogized between the FMC’s quasi-judicial proceedings and
traditional judicial proceedings, while noting that “[t]he preeminent purpose of state sovereign
immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign
entities.”134 Consequently, the Court agreed that state sovereign immunity bars the FMC from

130 One apparent argument is that the Fourteenth Amendment was passed after the Eleventh Amendment and thus,
unlike legislative powers found in Article I of the Constitution, it can be seen as an alteration of the restrictions of the
Eleventh Amendment. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65-66 (1996). However, as is discussed in
detail below, the Supreme Court has held that state sovereign immunity preceded and predated the Constitution. Alden
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 2248 (1999). Consequently, all the Articles of the Constitution could arguably be seen as
altering the restrictions of the state sovereign immunity.
Another argument made by the Court in Seminole is that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to alter the pre-
existing balance between state and federal power at the time of its passage. This argument is more plausible, but is still
difficult to differentiate between Congress’s power under the Fourteenth Amendment and Congress’s power under the
Articles of the Constitution. Like the Fourteenth Amendment, the Articles of the Constitution were clearly intended to
alter the balance between state and federal power at the time of the passage of the Constitution, which included state
sovereign immunity. This is exemplified by the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2 which provides that laws
passed under the Articles of the Constitution would be supreme over state law.
131 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
132 122 S. Ct. 186 (2002).
133 46 U.S.C. App. § 1701 (1994 & Supp. V).
134 122 S. Ct. at 1874.
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adjudicating damage claims made by a private party against a nonconsenting State.135 In dissent,
however, Justice Breyer noted that agency administrative proceedings are not judicial
proceedings and that the ultimate enforcement of such proceedings in a court is done by the
federal agency, to which state sovereign immunity does not apply. Thus, while an agency remains
capable of enforcement actions against states in federal court, it cannot use its own adjudicative
process to determine whether to do so, but must rely on its investigatory powers.136 According to
Justice Breyer, “[t]he natural result is less agency flexibility, a larger federal bureaucracy, less fair
procedure, and potentially less effective law enforcement.”137
The Spending Clause
It should be noted that in many instances, the federal government still has the ability to influence
state behavior despite the constitutional limits discussed above.138 One of the more significant
ways that the federal government can encourage state behavior is to impose conditions on the
receipt of federal monies by the states. Considering the large amount of funds provided to states
by the federal government, this represents a significant power for Congress to exercise. Further,
as the concept of grant conditioning can involve waiver by the states of Tenth and Eleventh
Amendment rights, these grant conditions may allow Congress to indirectly achieve compliance
by a state in a way that could not be achieved directly.
The question of whether a state can be required to perform (or refrain from) certain actions was
addressed in the Supreme Court case of South Dakota v. Dole.139 In Dole, Congress enacted the
National Minimum Drinking Age Amendment of 1984,140 which directed the Secretary of
Transportation to withhold a percentage of federal highway funds from states in which the age for
purchase of alcohol was below 21 years. The State of South Dakota, which permitted 19-year-
olds to purchase beer, brought suit arguing that the law was an invalid exercise of Congress’s
power under the Spending Clause to provide for the “general welfare.”141 The Supreme Court
held that, as the indirect imposition of such a standard was directed toward the general welfare of
the country, it was a valid exercise of Congress’s spending power.

135 The Court noted that “[there are] numerous common features shared by administrative adjudications and judicial
proceedings.” 122 S. Ct. at 1872. “[F]ederal administrative law requires that agency adjudication contain many of the
same safeguards as are available in the judicial process. The proceedings are adversary in nature. They are conducted
before a trier of fact insulated from political influence. A party is entitled to present his case by oral or documentary
evidence, and the transcript of testimony and exhibits together with the pleadings constitutes the exclusive record for
decision. The parties are entitled to know the findings and conclusions on all of the issues of fact, law, or discretion
presented on the record.” Id.
136 Justice Breyer noted that after this decision “a private person cannot bring a complaint against a State to a federal
administrative agency where the agency (1) will use an internal adjudication process to decide if the complaint is well
founded, and (2) if so, proceed to court to enforce the law.” Id. at 1881.
137 Id.
138 For instance, the federal government has, in some cases, made the application of federal regulatory authority
contingent, so that if a state chooses to regulate in that field, the federal regulatory role is circumscribed. In many cases,
this will encourage states to regulate, so that the state has closer control of the application of such regulation within the
state. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (national air control standards not applicable upon the adoption by states of adequate
air control standards).
139 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
140 23 U.S.C. § 158.
141 U.S. Const., Art I, 8, cl 1 (Congress has the power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay
the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States”).
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The Court noted that the grant condition did not implicate an independent constitutional bar (i.e.,
the grant condition did not require the state to engage in an unconstitutional activity). Further, the
court noted that the grant condition was not a violation of the Tenth Amendment, which generally
prevents Congress from “commandeering” state legislatures142 and executive branch officials143 to
implement federal programs.144 The Tenth Amendment would not apply here, the Court held,
because the state officials were voluntarily cooperating in order to receive federal grants, and thus
were not being directed to comply with federal mandates.
The Court did suggest, however, that there were limits to Congress’s power under the Spending
Clause to require states to meet certain grant conditions. First, a grant condition must be related to
the particular national projects or programs to which the money was being directed.145 In Dole,
the congressional condition imposing a specific drinking age was found to be related to the
national concern of safe interstate travel, which was one of the main purposes for highway funds
being expended. Second, the Court suggested that, in some circumstances, the financial
inducements offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which “pressure
turns into compulsion.”146 In Dole, however, the percentage of highway funds that were to be
withheld from a state with a drinking age below 21 was relatively small, so that Congress’s
program did not coerce the states to enact higher minimum drinking ages than they would
otherwise choose.
One of the more controversial potential applications of this doctrine arises when the government
requires that, in order to receive a grant, a state waive its sovereign immunity to suits brought by
private citizens. As discussed above, the Supreme Court has imposed significant limits on
Congress’s ability to abrogate state sovereign immunity. However, this does not appear to have
prevented the lower courts from finding that states can be required to waive their sovereign
immunity as a condition of receiving grants.
A state’s sovereign immunity, is “a personal privilege which it may waive at its pleasure.”147
Thus, it is clearly possible for a state, under some circumstances, to waive sovereign immunity as
a condition of receiving federal funds.148 The Supreme Court has held that “mere receipt of
federal funds” is insufficient to constitute a waiver of state sovereign immunity.149 However, the

142 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
143 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
144 It would seem that sovereign immunity is a core state power, and that requiring its waiver would raise Tenth
Amendment concerns. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)(striking down federal wage
and price controls on state employees as involving the regulation of traditional state functions). As discussed
previously, however, the Court has, for the time being, abandoned this line of cases. Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985)(concluding that the test to identify traditional governmental
functions had proven impractical, and that such disputes should be resolved through the political process).
145 483 U.S. at 207.
146 Id. at 211.
147 College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666, 674 (1999) citing
Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883).
148 Since such a waiver must be voluntary, the Court will consider carefully whether a state has actually waived its
immunity. Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985). For instance, a court will generally only
find a waiver to federal suit based on a state statute if a state makes a “clear declaration” that it intends to submit itself
to federal jurisdiction. Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944). See also Pennhurst State School
and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984) (State’s consent to suit must be “unequivocally expressed”).
149 Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985). In Atascadero State Hospital, the Court held that if a
statute “manifests a clear intent to condition participation in the programs funded under the Act on a State’s waiver of
(continued...)
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Court has also held that where a federal statute contains an “unambiguous waiver” of a state’s
Eleventh Amendment immunity, then a state’s acceptance of such funds can be an effective
waiver.150
Thus, it would appear that the waiver of sovereign immunity as a grant condition would pass
constitutional muster under Dole. Just as states may waive their Tenth Amendment rights not to
be commandeered when accepting grant conditions (as noted in Dole), it seems generally
accepted that there is no constitutional bar to a state voluntarily waiving its sovereign immunity
rights.151 As a general matter, conditioning a federal grant on the voluntary waiver of state
sovereign immunity does not seem to be of particular constitutional concern.
Under Dole, however, a court would, on a case-by-case basis, need to examine the level of
financial burden that would be imposed on the state by the withdrawal of a particular federal
grant to ensure that the condition was not coercive. Further, under Dole, a court would need to
examine how related the purpose of the proposed bill was to the waiver of sovereign immunity in
connection with a particular grant program.152 However, the Court in Dole indicated that it would
show significant deference to Congress in determining whether a grant condition relates to an
underlying federal program, and this requirement does not appear to have been of concern to
lower courts considering waiver of sovereign immunity as a grant condition.153
Conclusion
It would appear that the status of the state in the federal system has been strengthened by recent
Supreme Court opinions. Although the Court has not scaled back the federal government’s
substantive jurisdiction significantly, it has to some extent prevented the expansion of Congress’s
power under the Commerce Clause and under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further it has
created a variety of obstacles as to how these powers can be executed, forbidding Congress under

(...continued)
its constitutional immunity,” federal courts would have jurisdiction over claims against states accepting federal funds.
Id. at 247.
150 Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 200 (1996). For instance, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§ 701, et seq. provides that “a state shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973....” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d-7(a)(1). Consequently, a number of United States Courts of Appeals have found that receipt of federal funding
subject to this condition was sufficient to waive a state’s sovereign immunity. Koslow v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; 302 F.3d 161 (3rd Cir. 2002); Nihiser v. Ohio EPA, 269 F.3d 626 (6th Cir.
2001); Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000); Stanley v. Litscher, 213 F.3d 340, 344 (7th Cir. 2000);
Pederson v. La. St. Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 875-76 (5th Cir. 2000); Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 493-94 (11th Cir.
1999), rev’d on other grounds, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 554 (4th Cir. 1999);
Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1997).
151 Susan M. Luken, Irreconcilable Differences: the Spending Clause and the Eleventh Amendment: Limiting
Congress’s Use of Conditional Spending to Circumvent Eleventh Amendment Immunity,70 U. Cin. L. Rev. 693 (2002);
Michael T. Gibson, Congressional Authority to Induce Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity: The Conditional
Spending Power (and Beyond), 29 Hastings Const. L.Q. 439 (2002); Litman v. George Mason University, 186 F.3d 544
(4th Cir. 1999); Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000).
152 See id. at 1084 (Bowman, J., dissenting) (arguing that waiver of sovereign immunity was not related to purpose of
education grants).
153 See generally Litman v. George Mason University, 186 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1999); Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d
1079 (8th Cir. 2000).
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the Tenth Amendment from commandeering the authority of state legislative and executive
branches, and limiting the authority of Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity.
Ultimately, however, Congress retains significant powers to influence state behavior, such as
through the Spending Clause, and, under the Supremacy Clause, Congress may require the
enforcement of its laws in both state and federal court.


Author Contact Information

Kenneth R. Thomas

Legislative Attorney
kthomas@crs.loc.gov, 7-5006


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