Zimbabwe: Background
Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
July 8, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL32723
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Zimbabwe: Background
Summary
Zimbabwe’s prospects appeared promising in 1980, as it gained independence after a long
liberation war. Rising inflation and unemployment bred discontent in the 1990s and led in 1999 to
the formation of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The new party
surprised many with its initial success, campaigning against a 2000 referendum that would have
legalized the president’s continued rule, made government officials immune from prosecution,
and allowed the uncompensated seizure of white-owned land for redistribution to black farmers.
The referendum failed, and the MDC won nearly half the seats in the 2000 parliamentary
election. Members of President Robert Mugabe’s ruling party subsequently took numerous, often
undemocratic actions to bolster their power.
President Mugabe’s government was seen in the past decade as autocratic and repressive by its
critics, and its human rights record has been poor. The government suppressed freedom of speech
and assembly, and many contend that the ruling party restricted access to food, already scarce, in
opposition areas. The MDC, divided over how to respond, split into two factions in 2005,
hampering its ability to challenge the ruling party. Reports of political violence rose sharply after
Zimbabwe’s March 2008 elections, when, for the first time since independence, Mugabe’s party
lost its majority in the National Assembly. Mugabe’s re-election as president in the June runoff
was viewed as illegitimate by the United States and the United Nations Secretary-General, among
others. In September 2008, after several weeks of negotiations, Mugabe and MDC leader Morgan
Tsvangirai signed a power-sharing arrangement aimed at resolving the political standoff. As part
of the deal, Tsvangirai became prime minister of a new coalition government in February 2009,
and cabinet positions have been divided among the parties. Some observers remain skeptical that
the MDC will be able to implement major political reforms through the arrangement, although
there has been some progress, particularly on the economic front, and some donors have begun to
cautiously reengage. The cost of rebuilding the country’s economy may be over $8 billion.
Zimbabwe’s economic output decreased dramatically between 1998 and 2008. Official inflation
rose above 200,000,000% in 2008, and although the economy has since stabilized, unemployment
remains estimated at more than 90%. An adult HIV prevalence rate of over 14% has contributed
to a sharp drop in life expectancy, and a nationwide cholera outbreak from late 2008 through
early 2009 resulted in almost 100,000 infections and over 4,300 deaths. The number of
Zimbabweans requiring food aid has declined, from an estimated 5 million in 2008 to 2 million in
2010, but chronic malnutrition rates remain high. Deteriorating economic and humanitarian
conditions in recent years have led many to emigrate to neighboring countries, creating a
substantial burden on the region. The country appears to be making a gradual shift from
humanitarian crisis toward recovery, but much of the population remains highly vulnerable.
Robert Mugabe has historically enjoyed considerable popularity in Africa as a former liberation
leader, but some African leaders have viewed his policies as increasingly damaging to the
continent and have urged democratic reforms in recent years. Following controversial elections in
2000 and citing abuses of human rights and the rule of law, the United States and some other
former allies of the government became vocal critics. The United States has enforced targeted
sanctions against top Zimbabwe officials and associates since 2002. This report provides
background on events leading up to and surrounding the country’s most recent elections, in
March and June 2008. For further discussion of Zimbabwe’s power sharing agreement, its
transitional government, and other more recent developments, please see CRS Report RL34509,
Zimbabwe: The Transitional Government and Implications for U.S. Policy, by Lauren Ploch.
Congressional Research Service
Zimbabwe: Background
Contents
Overview .................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
Political Situation........................................................................................................................ 2
Restrictions on Political Freedoms ........................................................................................ 3
Parliamentary Elections 2005 ................................................................................................ 4
Election-Related Violence ............................................................................................... 5
Charges of Election Rigging............................................................................................ 5
Election Observers .......................................................................................................... 6
2005 Senate Elections ........................................................................................................... 7
Internal ZANU-PF Struggles ................................................................................................. 7
The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)..................................................................... 8
Origins of the MDC ........................................................................................................ 8
Treason Charges.............................................................................................................. 9
Division in the Opposition .............................................................................................. 9
Opposition Defiance Against a Ban on Protests and Rallies ........................................... 10
Political Violence ................................................................................................................ 11
Developments Surrounding the 2008 Elections.......................................................................... 12
South African Mediation ............................................................................................... 12
March 2008 Elections ......................................................................................................... 14
Election Preparations .................................................................................................... 14
Alleged Vote Buying ..................................................................................................... 14
Pre-Election Violence.................................................................................................... 15
Election Monitoring ...................................................................................................... 16
Press Restrictions .......................................................................................................... 16
March 2008 Election Results......................................................................................... 16
June 2008 Runoff Election ............................................................................................ 19
Post-Election Violence .................................................................................................. 20
The Power Sharing Agreement and the New Coalition Government .............................. 22
Humanitarian Situation ............................................................................................................. 22
Operation Murambatsvina................................................................................................... 22
Political Motivations? ................................................................................................... 23
The International Response ........................................................................................... 23
Continued Evictions and Operation Garikai .................................................................. 24
Violations of Domestic and International Law ............................................................... 25
Zimbabwe’s Food Crisis...................................................................................................... 26
Operation Taguta .......................................................................................................... 27
Food as a Political Weapon?.......................................................................................... 28
HIV/AIDS .......................................................................................................................... 28
Cholera and the Healthcare System Collapse ....................................................................... 29
The Economy............................................................................................................................ 30
The IMF and the World Bank .............................................................................................. 30
Attempts to Revive Agriculture Industry ............................................................................. 31
The Mining Industry ........................................................................................................... 32
Illegal Mining ............................................................................................................... 33
“Blood Diamonds”? ...................................................................................................... 33
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Zimbabwe: Background
“Look East” Policy ............................................................................................................. 34
The Military and the Economy ............................................................................................ 34
International Perspectives.......................................................................................................... 35
U.S. Policy.......................................................................................................................... 35
Sanctions ...................................................................................................................... 36
Congressional Response................................................................................................ 37
U.S. Support for African Diplomacy.............................................................................. 38
U.S. Assistance ............................................................................................................. 38
Other International Perspectives .......................................................................................... 39
United Kingdom ........................................................................................................... 39
European Union ............................................................................................................ 40
Commonwealth............................................................................................................. 40
China and Iran .............................................................................................................. 40
Nigeria.......................................................................................................................... 42
South Africa.................................................................................................................. 42
The African Union ........................................................................................................ 44
SADC ........................................................................................................................... 45
Prospects for the Future............................................................................................................. 46
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Zimbabwe ...................................................................................................... 48
Tables
Table 1. Regional Efforts to Block Arms Transfer to Zimbabwe................................................. 46
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 48
Congressional Research Service
Zimbabwe: Background
Overview
On September 15, 2008, Robert Mugabe, president of Zimbabwe for more than two decades, and
opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai signed a power-sharing arrangement to resolve a political
standoff stemming from flawed elections earlier in the year. The agreement, known as the Global
Political Agreement (GPA), laid the foundations for a transitional government and outlined a time
frame for the drafting and adoption of a new constitution. As part of the deal, which was not
implemented until February 2009 under pressure from regional powers and the international
community, Tsvangirai became prime minister of a new coalition government. Cabinet positions
have been divided among the parties. Many observers remain skeptical that the parties can work
together effectively to implement political reforms deemed necessary by international donors.
The coalition government faces considerable challenges in prioritizing humanitarian needs and
making the reforms necessary for the country’s economic recovery. For further discussion of the
coalition government and other current events, please see CRS Report RL34509, Zimbabwe: The
Transitional Government and Implications for U.S. Policy, by Lauren Ploch.
Background
After years of economic sanctions by the international community and a decades-long civil war
that resulted in more than 30,000 dead, the white minority rule government of Southern Rhodesia
concluded a series of agreements with the black majority in 1979 that resulted in the
establishment of the government of the Republic of Zimbabwe. Among the greatest challenges
facing the new government was the demand by the majority for greater equity in land distribution.
At independence, the white minority, who composed less than 5% of the population, owned the
vast majority of arable land. Many observers considered the country’s white-owned commercial
farms crucial to the country’s economy, although there was a general recognition that land reform
was necessary. Britain initially funded a “willing buyer, willing seller” program to redistribute
commercial farmland, offering compensation to white farmers amenable to leaving their lands.
Dissatisfaction with the pace of land reform grew and led in the 1990s to spontaneous and often
violent farm invasions. At the same time, the country’s labor movement and a segment of its
urban middle class were becoming increasingly critical of the government’s economic
performance. Facing rising political and economic challenges, the government of Zimbabwe
began to implement aggressive land expropriation policies, leading Britain and other donors to
begin withdrawing financial support for resettlement.
In 2000, the government held a referendum to approve changes to the constitution that would
allow land seizures without compensation, a responsibility that in its view lay with Britain. The
referendum was rejected by 55% of voters and was seen as a victory for a new opposition party,
the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Within days of the vote war veterans and ruling
party supporters moved onto an estimated 1,000 white-owned farms, and, months later, the
president invoked emergency powers to take land without compensation. During this time there
were numerous attacks against white farmers and their employees, as well as against supporters
of the MDC; more than 30 people were killed.
Since then, the country’s problems have deepened. Substantial political violence and human
rights violations have accompanied elections since 2000. The broad scale of such abuses in the
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Zimbabwe: Background
wake of the 2008 elections brought international condemnation, but little consensus on how best
to stop the violence. Reports of government-orchestrated human rights abuses continued for
months afterward. Zimbabwe’s political difficulties have been accompanied by a sharp decline in
living standards, with more than 80% of the population living on less than $1 per day.1 Once
touted as a potential “breadbasket of Africa,” a significant portion of Zimbabwe’s population is
now periodically dependent on food aid. An estimated 14.3% of adults are infected by the
HIV/AIDS virus, and life expectancy fell from an estimated 56 years in 1990 to 44 in 2008.2
Foreign Policy magazine ranked Zimbabwe second in its index of failed states, behind Somalia,
in 2009.3 Its ranking “improved” to that of fourth in the 2010 index, but the classification
suggests considerable room for progress. Observers are concerned that the difficulties confronting
Zimbabwe have affected neighboring countries and deterred investors from the region.
Zimbabwe at a Glance
Political Situation
Population: 11.65 million
Approximate size: Slightly larger than Montana
Zimbabwe has been ruled since independence
Population growth rate: 2.954%
by the Zimbabwe African National Union -
Life expectancy at birth: 47.55 years
Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), which has come
Ethnic groups: African 98% (Shona 82%, Ndebele 14%,
under increasing scrutiny from human rights
other 2%), Mixed and Asian 1%, White less than 1%
activists, both at home and abroad, in the past
Languages: English (official), Shona, Sindebele and a
decade. Although ZANU-PF now shares power
number of tribal dialects.
in the coalition government, the party still
controls the presidency and key security
Literacy: Total Population: 90.7%; Male: 94.2%; Female:
87.2% (2003)
ministries. Critics have cited high levels of
corruption, political violence, and strictly
GDP real growth rate in 2009: 3.7% (CIA) -1.3% (EIU)
enforced laws restricting basic freedoms. The
GDP Per Capita in 2009: less than $100
party contends that its detractors have engaged
HIV Prevalence Rate: 14.3% (adults, aged 15-49)
in a “propaganda war” backed by Britain and
the United States, using democracy and human
Unemployment: 95%
rights as a cover to push for regime change.4
Sources: CIA World Factbook; Economist
Many domestic and international observers
Intelligence Unit; UNAIDS. Figures are for 2009-
have judged elections since 2000 to be “far
2010 unless otherwise indicated.
from free and fair.” The country’s main
opposition party, the MDC, split over tactical issues in 2005; Morgan Tsvangirai’s faction remains
dominant. ZANU-PF has also suffered internal competition, and some observers suggest that
opposition to President Mugabe himself has grown within the party.
1 Oxfam International, “Humanitarian Crisis in Zimbabwe,” January 2009.
2The adult HIV prevalence rate for 2009 was reported by the Zimbabwe Ministry of Health and Child Welfare in its
“Zimbabwe National HIV Estimates 2009” as referenced in Zimbabwe Country Report: January 2008 to December
2009, presented at a U.N. General Assembly Special Session and available at
http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2010/zimbabwe_2010_country_progress_report_en.pdf.
3 The Washington-based Foreign Policy magazine uses 12 economic, social, political, and military indicators to rank
countries in order of their “vulnerability to violent internal conflict and social dysfunction.” Zimbabwe’s ranking on the
index dropped 14 points from 2005 to 2006, and three points since then, suggesting that the country’s situation had
deteriorated. For more information, see “The Failed States Index,” Foreign Policy, 2009 and 2010.
4 “Imperialists Can’t Preach Human Rights,” The Herald, January 19, 2007.
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Zimbabwe: Background
Restrictions on Political Freedoms
Legislative actions by Zimbabwe’s parliament, led by ZANU-PF until the 2008 elections,
increased concerns about human rights in Zimbabwe. Laws that critics contend have been used to
quiet dissent and influence political developments include the following:
• The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA). This 2002
act requires that all media services be licensed, and that all journalists, including
foreign correspondents, be officially accredited. The government, citing AIPPA,
closed The Daily News, the only remaining independent daily, in 2003. In 2005,
three Zimbabwean correspondents for the Associated Press, Bloomberg News,
and the Times of London fled Zimbabwe after police raided their office. The
Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) has stated that AIPPA is “one of the
most effective legal instruments of state control over the media and civil society
communication anywhere in the world.”5 ZANU-PF counters that AIPPA
encourages responsible journalism.
• The Public Order and Security Act (POSA), the Criminal Law (Codification
and Reform) Act (“Criminal Law Code”), and the Miscellaneous Offences
Act (MOA). POSA, also enacted in 2002, prohibits statements deemed to be
“abusive, indecent, obscene, or false” about the president or considered to
“undermin(e) public confidence” in the security forces, and prohibits false
statements prejudicial to the state.6 The measure has been used in the arrest of
thousands of political opponents and in police action to break up public meetings
and demonstrations. Zimbabweans overheard criticizing the president in a public
place have also been jailed. The MOA criminalized “conduct likely to cause a
breach of the peace,” and was often used with POSA against activists. Police and
“persons assisting the police” may use “all necessary force” to stop unlawful
gatherings.7 In 2006 many offences under POSA and MOA were transferred to a
new Criminal Law Code.
• The Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO) Act. Critics suggest that the
government has used the PVO Act, enacted in 2002, to limit the activities of
domestic NGOs. They are required to register with the government, and a “probe
team” of intelligence officers has wide powers to investigate groups and demand
documents related to activities and funding. The African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights has recommended that it be repealed.
Prior to taking the majority, the MDC had limited success in preventing ZANU-PF from passing
other legislation that it contended would restrict freedoms. An Interception of Communications
Bill, which would allow the government to monitor all Internet, email, and telephone
communications for threats to national security, was initially stalled by the Parliamentary Legal
Committee (chaired by an MDC MP), but was later revised and approved in June 2007. Critics
suggest that the revisions were cosmetic.
5 MISA, Annual Report, April 2003-March 2004; “Media Institute Says Press Restrictions in Zimbabwe Rule Out Fair
Elections,” Voice Of America (VOA), April 5, 2004.
6 For the text of the POSA, see http://www.kubatana.net/docs/legisl/posa060203.doc.
7 Solidarity Peace Trust, Policing the State, December 2006.
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Zimbabwe: Background
In the 2005 elections ZANU-PF won over two-thirds of the seats in the House of Assembly,
giving the party the power to amend the constitution. The parliament subsequently passed several
controversial constitutional amendments which some analysts contend breach international
human rights standards. The 2005 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act (No.17) allowed
the government to limit the right to freedom of movement when it is in “the public interest” or in
“the economic interests of the State” and restricts the right to leave Zimbabwe. Journalists, MDC
officials, and union leaders have had their passports revoked under the act, with the government
charging that they planned to lobby abroad for sanctions or military intervention against the
country.8 The act also prevents land owners from challenging the acquisition of agricultural land
by the state. It paved the way for the passage of Gazetted Land (Consequential Provisions) Act in
late 2006, making it illegal for former farm owners to occupy nationalized land and allowing the
government to evict farmers and resettle the land without compensation. The 2005 constitutional
amendment also revived the upper house of the parliament, the Senate.
The negotiations led by South Africa between Zimbabwe’s political parties in January 2008
resulted in amendments to both AIPPA and POSA. Critics suggest the amendments did not
adequately address human rights concerns and have not been adequately implemented.9 The
Media Institute of Southern Africa dismissed the AIPPA amendments as “dwelling … on
inconsequential issues which will not advance basic freedoms.”10 Numerous MDC rallies were
blocked in the period preceding the 2008 runoff, despite court orders allowing the events.
Political space for civil society appears to have widened since the formation of the coalition
government, but police continue to use POSA on occasion to arrest civil society leaders.
Parliamentary Elections 2005
Zimbabwe held legislative elections in 2005. The elections, like those before them in 2000 and
2002, were controversial, with the opposition disputing the results and alleging government
efforts to deny a fair race. ZANU-PF retained control of the 150-member parliament, taking 108
seats (of these, 30 are appointed by the president rather than elected). The MDC won 41 seats,
and one seat went to an independent.11
The MDC’s representation in parliament had declined from its first elections, in 2000, when it
won 57 seats. Some observers argue that the MDC did not do as well in the 2005 election because
it delayed a decision to participate and left little time to campaign. Violence against MDC voters
in past elections, the alleged use of food distributions by the ruling party to secure votes, and a
general climate of intimidation may have also discouraged MDC support. Government supporters
suggested that voters simply lost faith in MDC promises. Opposition access to the state-run media
was severely limited, according to Reporters Without Borders, a Paris-based organization that
8 “Title Deeds to 4,000 Farms Nullified,” The Herald, September 23, 2005.
9 They cite, for example, a January 2008 MDC “freedom march” that was blocked by police despite prior notification
of the event, in accordance with the changes to POSA. Supporters who defied a police ban were reportedly tear-gassed
and beaten with batons. Human Rights Watch, All Over Again: Human Rights Abuses and Flawed Electoral Conditions
in Zimbabwe’s Coming Elections, Vol. 20, No. 2(A), March 2008.
10 Media Institute of Southern Africa, “AIPPA, POSA, BSA Amendments Signed into Law,” Media Alert Update,
January 12, 2008.
11 Jonathan Moyo, former Information Minister, left ZANU-PF and was elected as an independent candidate. He
rejoined the party in 2010.
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Zimbabwe: Background
supports press freedom.12 The MDC was rarely covered on television or in the Herald, the
government newspaper, and the stories that did appear were typically disparaging.
Election-Related Violence
Although most observers agree that the level of political violence surrounding the 2005 elections
was significantly less than that which preceded the 2000 and 2002 elections, many argue the
election was not “free and fair,” and that there were some incidents of violence. Critics suggest
that state harassment of civil society and the political opposition, combined with limitations on
press and other political freedoms, left little need for violent repression. Nevertheless, the
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, a coalition of 17 human rights organizations, reported
more than 300 assaults in the pre-election period.13
Charges of Election Rigging
Many analysts argue that the Zimbabwean political system is undemocratic because elections
have been administered by institutions and under laws that many consider biased in favor of
ZANU-PF. In response to democratic protocols established by the Southern African Development
Community (SADC), the government passed the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) Act
and the Electoral Act prior to the 2005 elections. However, the new “independent” ZEC,
appointed by the president, was only established two months before the election, leaving many of
the preparations to the old Electoral Commission, which many considered discredited by its past
performance. According to the U.S.-based democracy advocacy group Freedom House, “despite
some improvements, the Electoral Act granted the ZEC powers to employ security forces,
retained biased residency requirements for voters, denied most expatriates the right to vote, and
created an Electoral Court staffed by a deeply compromised judiciary.”14
The Mugabe government employed other legal tactics seen by critics as designed to intimidate the
opposition and produce a political landscape favorable to ZANU-PF. The 2004 gerrymandering of
constituencies, which the government attributed to population shifts arising from its land reform
program, resulted in the redistricting of three urban seats held by the MDC into three new rural
constituencies, which ZANU-PF candidates won in 2005. The International Council of Barristers
and Advocates described extensive efforts by ZANU-PF to gain control over the legal system in a
2004 report, suggesting the ruling party had interfered in judicial appointments and forced the
removal of impartial judges “through a combination of psychological and physical intimidation
and threats of violence.”15
12 Reporters Without Borders, “No Letup in Abusive Media Tactics Three Weeks Before Legislative Elections,” March
8, 2005.
13 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Political Violence Report, March 2005. The forum produces monthly reports
on the human rights situation in Zimbabwe and assists victims of violence. See http://www.hrforumzim.com.
14 Freedom House, “Country Report: Zimbabwe,” Freedom in the World 2006.
15 International Council of Barristers and Advocates, The State of Justice in Zimbabwe, December 2004. The Council
sent an investigative team to Zimbabwe which included Chairmen of the Bar of England and Wales and the Irish Bar,
and Vice Chairman of the South African Bar.
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Zimbabwe: Background
The MDC challenged the results of numerous 2005 races in court.16 Their allegations focused on
several largely rural districts in which the ZEC announced voter turnout totals before the vote
results were reported. Once the results came in, the ZANU-PF candidate won in each case, but
the vote for the two candidates added together exceeded the initial ZEC-reported turnout total.
This created a suspicion that additional votes had been given to the ZANU-PF candidates during
the tabulation phase.17 According to the ZEC, they had initially released early totals coming in to
provide an indication of voter turnout, and the discrepancies between those initial figures and the
final tallies were due to poor communications from rural areas. Other allegations focused on large
numbers of voters in contested areas reportedly turned away due to registration problems.
Election Observers
Many domestic election observers, such as the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR)
and the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), were critical of the 2005 elections. During
the pre-election period, they cited a lack of transparency surrounding voter registration as a
“significant and serious threat to the overall credibility of the electoral process.” Their reports
cited no incidents of overt political violence, but noted that the pre-election period was marked by
intimidation, “politicization of food distribution,” and a lack of media access by the opposition.
The observers contended that they were restricted access to the vote counting process at many
polling stations, and that in some cases the total voter tally did not coincide with the total number
of votes cast for the candidates.18 Both groups reported the use of restrictive legislation against
opposition supporters. The ZLHR report concluded, “Zimbabwean authorities have failed, on
most accounts, to ensure a free and fair electoral process.”19
The Mugabe government placed limits on foreign observers for the election. No U.S. observers
were invited, and Russia was the only European country asked to send a team. Leading the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) delegation, then-South African Deputy
President Mlambo-Ngcuka congratulated Zimbabwe on “the holding of a peaceful, credible, well
managed and transparent election. The people of Zimbabwe have expressed their will in an
impressively instructive manner that will go a long way in contributing to the consolidation of
democracy and political stability not only in Zimbabwe, but also in the region as a whole.”20 The
head of South Africa’s parliamentary observer mission was quoted saying that the delegation had
“unanimously agreed that the elections were credible, legitimate, free and fair.”21 Both statements
received substantial criticism in the international press. The SADC Parliamentary Forum, which
consists of legislators from the region and had issued a report critical of the 2002 election, was
not invited to observe the vote.
16 Although none of the 2005 results were overturned, a 2006 Zimbabwean Supreme Court decision gave the opposition
further legal recourse. Against the arguments of the chief justice, the attorney-general, and the justice minister, the
court ruled that the judicial appointment of commissioners to the electoral court was unconstitutional and violated the
principle of separation of powers. “Zimbabwe Court Rules 2005 Electoral Legislation ‘Inconsistent’ with
Constitution,” The Financial Gazette, July 27, 2006.
17 The ZEC eventually halted the release of turnout totals, so it is unknown if there were discrepancies in other districts.
18 ZESN, Report on Zimbabwe’s 2005 General Election, April 2005. The ZESN, a coalition of 35 human rights and
civic groups based in Zimbabwe, deployed 260 long-term observers and 6000 observers for the election itself.
19 The report of the ZLHR,a local human rights organization that deployed 44 observers for the election, is available at
http://www.zlhr.org.zw.
20 “Zimbabwe’s Enabler; South Africa Falls Short as Monitor of Democracy,” Washington Post, April 4, 2005.
21 “The Real Fraud in Zimbabwe,” Washington Times, April 6, 2005.
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Zimbabwe: Background
Western governments condemned the elections. Based on reports from domestic observers and
U.S. Embassy staff who were allowed to observe the election, then-U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice issued the following statement:
Although the campaign and election day itself was generally peaceful, the election process
was not free and fair. The electoral playing field was heavily tilted in the government’s
favor. The independent press was muzzled; freedom of assembly was constrained; food was
used as a weapon to sway hungry voters; and millions of Zimbabweans who have been
forced by the nation’s economic collapse to emigrate were disenfranchised.22
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan commended the election’s lack of violence but noted concern
that “the electoral process has not countered the sense of disadvantage felt by opposition political
parties who consider the conditions were unfair.”23
2005 Senate Elections
Elections to the new 66-seat Senate were held in September 2005, and were marked by record
low voter turnout. Of 26 MDC candidates who ran, seven were elected; ZANU-PF gained the
overwhelming majority of seats. Observers suggest one of the reasons for the low turnout may
have been a lack of solidarity on the part of the opposition, which split prior to the election over
whether to boycott the vote.
Internal ZANU-PF Struggles
In view of President Mugabe’s advanced age, presidential succession has been a matter of intense
interest to observers for several years. Some analysts have expressed concern that Zimbabwe
could experience a violent succession struggle or a possible military coup in the event of his
death. Under the constitution, the president may designate one of the country’s two vice
presidents to serve as acting president until the next election, should he leave office, but Mugabe
has never done so. One of the vice presidential posts was vacant prior to ZANU-PF’s 2004 party
conference, setting off a power struggle that transformed the political scene by revealing internal
party divisions. Despite having turned 86 in 2010, President Mugabe is reportedly in good health
and in no rush to relinquish his post. Many observers suggest that he has used the country’s anti-
corruption authority to check the political ambitions of his party members. Mugabe endorsed a
2007 proposal to extend the next presidential elections to 2010, but it was defeated by his party’s
central committee.
Prior to the December 2004 party conference, Emmerson Mnangagwa, then speaker of the
parliament and a political veteran long touted as Mugabe’s heir, campaigned actively for the
position of ZANU-PF’s second vice president. His selection to that position would likely have
assured his appointment as national vice president, but Mnangagwa was caught off guard when
Mugabe decided that the country should have a woman in the post. Mugabe’s choice for the
position, Joice Mujuru, was inevitably elected to serve as Zimbabwe’s second vice president,
22 The statement of Secretary Rice, made on April 1, 2005, is available online at http://2001-
2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/44141.htm.
23 Secretary-General Annan’s statement is available at http://www.un.org/News/ossg/.
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Zimbabwe: Background
alongside Vice President Joseph Msika. Mujuru, a veteran of the liberation war and a women’s
movement leader, had been serving as Minister of Water Resources and Infrastructure.
According to reports, neither the Mnangagwa nor Mujuru camps initially supported Mugabe’s
proposed term extension. Once a strong Mugabe ally, Retired General Solomon “Rex” Mujuru,
Joice’s husband, was vocal in his disapproval and is rumored to have been pivotal in blocking the
proposal at the party’s national conference. Some have suggested that Mujuru covertly backed
another ZANU-PF official, Simba Makoni, over his wife as a potential successor to Mugabe.
Makoni, a technocrat, was considered by some analysts to be a compromise candidate, untainted
by the corruption scandals that have plagued others. Mugabe’s own choice for his successor is
unknown. Mnangagwa appears to have reconciled with Mugabe, leading the party’s 2008 election
efforts and taking a central role in guiding the country’s security forces. He leads the Ministry of
Defense in the new transitional government.
The outcome of any succession struggle within ZANU-PF may be affected by the country’s
ethnic and clan divisions. Mugabe and many key party officials are from the Zezuru clan of the
Shona people, who are dominant in a wide area encircling the capital, Harare. Solomon Mujuru, a
Zezuru, has been a close advisor to Mugabe and was once regarded as a king-maker. Mnangagwa
is seen as a representative of the large Karanga clan, which has reportedly felt that its turn to
control the reins of power has come. Mnangagwa’s viability as a presidential contender has been
hampered by accusations that he led the purge of alleged regime opponents in provinces of
Matabeleland in the 1980s, which is believed to have resulted in the deaths of 20,000 Ndebele
civilians. The events of the 1980s help to explain why Zimbabwe’s second-largest city,
Bulawayo, has long been regarded as a center of opposition to the government, although Mugabe
has sought to gain support by elevating Ndebele to party and government posts. Mnangagwa’s
power was reduced following the events of 2004, as was that of a number of his backers,
including former minister of information Jonathan Moyo.24
Vice President Joseph Msika died in August 2009 at age 86. According to some reports,
Mnangagwa lobbied, but failed, in the following months to have Joice Mujuru replaced as vice
president with a candidate of his own as the party reconsidered its leadership slate. In December
2009, delegates at ZANU-PF’s party congress re-elected Mujuru as vice president and chose then-
party national chairman John Nkomo to replace Msika. Both Msika and Nkomo are from the
Ndebele minority.
The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)
Origins of the MDC
The MDC party rose from the Zimbabwe labor movement. As poverty deepened in Zimbabwe in
the late 1990s, and allegations of corruption against regime leaders became more frequent, the
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) organized a number of strikes and protests. In
September 1999, the MDC was formed on this trade union base with support from many in
24 Moyo was fired in early 2005 for his sharp-tongued defenses of the regime and for fights with others in leadership.
He is reported to have angered Mugabe by holding an unsanctioned meeting of Mnangagwa supporters before the 2004
party convention, allegedly to strategize ways to derail the Mujuru candidacy. Moyo left the party and ran as an
independent in 2005. He retained his seat in the 2008 elections and has recently moved to rejoin ZANU-PF.
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Zimbabwe: Background
Zimbabwe’s churches and in urban areas. In February 2000, MDC members elected the ZCTU
secretary general, Morgan Tsvangirai, born in 1952, as MDC president, and union president
Gibson Sibanda as MDC vice president.
The MDC proved formidable in the 2000 referendum and in the 2000 parliamentary election;
some contend their success may have prompted a range of repressive actions against the party and
its supporters. Among the retaliatory measures alleged, several leaders of the MDC, including
Tsvangirai himself, were arrested and charged with treason two weeks before the MDC leader ran
against Mugabe in the 2002 presidential elections.
Treason Charges
In October 2004, Tsvangirai was acquitted of a treason charge based on a video recorded in
Canada, which the government claimed showed him calling for the “elimination” of Mugabe. The
verdict surprised many observers in view of the regime’s perceived influence over the courts. The
judge stated that the evidence had been unconvincing, with the witnesses produced by the state
“suspect” and the video unreliable. The government can appeal the verdict, and Tsvangirai may
be tried again because the law does not prohibit double jeopardy. In August 2005, the government
dropped a second treason charge that had been based on claims that he urged violence to bring
down the government in 2004.
Division in the Opposition
In late 2004, the MDC became increasingly divided in its strategy to defeat the ZANU-PF
government. MDC officials initially decided that the party would not participate in the 2005
parliamentary race, unless the government took steps to assure a free and fair election. Several
members questioned this stance on grounds that non-participation would deprive the MDC of any
influence in the next parliament. Some reportedly felt that a refusal to participate would hand
control of parliament to Mugabe on a “silver platter.” Tsvangirai supported a boycott, arguing that
the elections should be postponed until substantial electoral reforms could be implemented. The
party did eventually participate “under protest,” but did not do as well as in previous polls.
In the months prior to the 2005 Senate elections, the MDC was once again divided on whether to
participate. Supported by some civil society groups who suggested the elections were
“meaningless” and “a waste of time and resources,” Tsvangirai argued that participating in the
Senate would legitimize previous “rigged” elections, and vowed instead to lead the opposition
through mass action. He was opposed by a group of MDC politicians led by the party’s secretary-
general, Welshman Ncube, who had also been accused by the government of treason in 2003 (the
charges were subsequently dropped), and Gibson Sibanda. In October, the party’s national council
voted 33-31 to participate in the election, but Tsvangirai overruled the vote and, reportedly in
violation of the party’s constitution, expelled 26 senior officials from the party. He announced the
boycott, touring the country to encourage voters to stay home. The Ncube faction refused to
accept their expulsion and fielded candidates in the Senate race but only gained only seven seats.
Both factions held party conferences in early 2006; Tsvangirai was confirmed as the leader of one
faction, while Ncube ceded control of the “pro-senate” faction to Arthur Mutambara, a noted
student leader in the 1980s. The two factions attacked each other in the press, and there were
allegations that the Tsvangirai faction was behind a violent July 2006 assault on Member of
Parliament (MP) Trudy Stevenson and several other Mutambara supporters. Stevenson identified
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Zimbabwe: Background
the youths who attacked her as known followers of the former labor leader, but Tsvangirai denied
the charges and denounced the beatings. Although his faction was reported to have the larger
support base and the backing of the ZCTU, some observers suggested neither faction would be
effective unless they could resolve their differences and reunite.
Opposition Defiance Against a Ban on Protests and Rallies
In late February 2007, the Zimbabwean government announced a three-month ban on political
rallies and public demonstrations in Harare “due to the volatile situation in the country.”25 The
MDC appealed to the High Court to lift the ban, which coincided with an increase in public
activity by the opposition and civic groups. On February 18, despite a High Court decision
allowing Morgan Tsvangirai to launch his presidential campaign at a rally in Harare, police
reportedly used batons and water cannons to break up the event. A rally planned by the
Mutambara faction in Bulawayo was similarly dispersed, and numerous opposition supporters
were arrested. The ban was announced three days later, and police subsequently arrested several
hundred civic activists, according to press reports.
On March 11, 2007, police broke up a Save Zimbabwe Campaign prayer meeting attended by
both Tsvangirai and Mutambara, arresting an estimated 50 members of the opposition and civil
society, including both MDC leaders. Police shot and killed one opposition supporter after MDC
youth reportedly began throwing stones at police. The following day, police arrested an estimated
240 opposition supporters during a demonstration protesting the March 11 crackdown. Media and
human rights reports suggest that Tsvangirai was severely beaten while in custody, and he
appeared in court days later showing signs of head trauma.26 Other opposition and civic leaders
also reportedly sustained injuries after their arrest. The protestors were released into the custody
of their lawyers on March 14 after prosecutors reportedly failed to appear at their court hearing.
The Zimbabwean government contended that the MDC incited violence and was responsible for
attacks on several civilian targets and a Harare police station.27
The March 11 incident spurred international media attention and drew considerable criticism
from many world leaders. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice issued a strong statement,
saying, “The world community again has been shown that the regime of Robert Mugabe is
ruthless and repressive and creates only suffering for the people of Zimbabwe.”28 U.N. Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon also condemned the “reported beating of those leaders in police custody”
and criticized the ban, noting that “such actions violate the basic democratic right of citizens to
engage in peaceful assembly.”29 Several of Zimbabwe’s neighbors, including South Africa and
Zambia, issued statements of concern regarding the incident, and Ghanaian President John
Kufuor, then chairman of the AU, called the event “very embarrassing.”30
25 “Rally Ban a Fatal Govt Assault on Social Contract,” Zimbabwe Independent, March 2, 2007. The ban was lifted on
June 29, 2007.
26 “Zimbabwe Opposition Leader Taken to Hospital From Court,” CNN, March 13, 2007, and “Mugabe Foes Vow to
Intensify Action,” Washington Post, March 13, 2007.
27 “Zimbabwean Police ‘Fire-Bombed,’” BBC, March 15, 2007.
28 Statement of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “Call for Immediate Release of Zimbabwean Opposition
Leaders,” on March 13, 2007.
29 Statement issued by the Spokesman of the U.N. Secretary General on March 12, 2007.
30 “Zimbabwe Leader Faces Growing Condemnation,” Associated Press, March 15, 2007.
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Zimbabwe: Background
Political Violence
Human rights groups have documented numerous accounts of political violence in Zimbabwe in
the past decade. According to Freedom House, in 2006 “Zimbabwe’s descent into the ranks of the
world’s most repressive states continued unabated.”31 In 2007, the State Department reported that
Zimbabwe’s government has “engaged in the pervasive and systematic abuse of human rights,
which increased significantly during the year” and contended that “state-sanctioned use of
excessive force increased, and security forces tortured members of the opposition, student
leaders, and civil society activists.”32 Amnesty International has been similarly critical.33 The
State Department’s most recent human rights report, issued in March 2010, suggests that abuses
continue, in spite of the transitional government’s formation:
Security forces, the police, and ZANU-PF-dominated elements of the government continued
to engage in the pervasive and systematic abuse of human rights. ZANU-PF's dominant
control and manipulation of the political process through trumped-up charges and arbitrary
arrest, intimidation, and corruption effectively negated the right of citizens to change their
government. Politically motivated, arbitrary, and unlawful killings by government agents
continued. State-sanctioned use of excessive force continued, and security forces tortured
members of the opposition, student leaders, and civil society activists with impunity….
Security forces, who regularly acted with impunity, arbitrarily arrested and detained the
opposition, members of civil society, labor leaders, journalists, demonstrators, and religious
leaders; lengthy pretrial detention was a problem. Executive influence and interference in the
judiciary continued. The government continued to use repressive laws to suppress freedom
of speech, press, assembly, association, and movement.
President Mugabe has, on occasion, publicly condoned police and military brutality against
Zimbabwean citizens. In 2006, during Heroes’ Day, a holiday honoring war veterans, Mugabe
warned that his security forces “will pull the trigger” against protesters.34 A month later, in an
incident caught on video, Zimbabwean police conducted a particularly violent crackdown against
leaders of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), who had planned a civic protest to
highlight the impact of inflation on the country’s citizenry. Mugabe sanctioned the police action,
saying, “Some people are now crying foul that they were assaulted, yes you get a beating …
when the police say move, move, if you don’t move, you invite the police to use force.”35
Subsequent mass ZCTU protests were not held.
Mugabe received international attention for his statement; the U.N. Country Team (UNCT) in
Zimbabwe announced “a profound sense of dismay” over comments that “might be interpreted as
condoning the use of force and torture to deal with peaceful demonstrations by its citizens.”36 The
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture37 repeatedly requested an invitation from Zimbabwe to
31 Freedom House, “Country Report: Zimbabwe,” Freedom in the World 2006: The Annual Survey of Political Rights
and Civil Liberties.
32 DOS, “Zimbabwe,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2007.
33 See, for example, Amnesty International (AI), “Zimbabwe,” Annual Report 2007 and Annual Report 2008.
34 “Threat by Mugabe,” New York Times, August 16, 2006.
35 See Mugabe’s statement in an article from the government-owned newspaper, The Herald at “Zimbabwe Press
Review for 25 Sep 06”, BBC Monitoring Africa, September 25, 2006.
36 “U.N. Slams President Mugabe,” Zimbabwe Independent, September 29, 2006.
37 The post of Rapporteur was created by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in 1985 to investigate questions
relating to torture.
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Zimbabwe: Background
investigate, and the Harare magistrate who heard the case against the ZCTU leaders ordered an
independent investigation into the allegations of police brutality. The Rapporteur reportedly
received an invitation from the new coalition government to visit Zimbabwe, but was blocked
from entering the country when he tried to visit in October 2009.
The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum reported 723 incidents of torture in 2008, 1913
incidents of assault, and 137 incidents of politically motivated abduction/kidnapping. These
figures suggest a marked increase in political violence from 2007, during which there were 586
incidents of torture, 855 incidents of assault, and 19 incidents of abduction.38 The group also
reported 107 politically motivated murders in 2008. Human rights activists suggest that
abductions and beatings of opposition supporters became “more systematic and widespread” after
the events of March 2007.39 Despite provisions in the new Electoral Laws Amendment Act
banning such acts and assurances by security officials that the government would take a “zero
tolerance” approach to violence, reports of attacks on opposition supporters rose dramatically
after the March 2008 elections.40 The State Department’s 2009 human rights report notes that
over 200 were killed during 2008 in political violence targeting the opposition.
Reports suggest that the police have played a significant role in political violence. The Geneva-
based International Commission of Jurists, which investigated the May 2007 detention and
beating of lawyers, expressed shock at the role police played in the attacks and at the “cavalier
response of Zimbabwean authorities.”41
Developments Surrounding the 2008 Elections42
South African Mediation
International criticism of the situation in Zimbabwe grew after the March 2007 opposition arrests,
even among former allies on the continent. In one of the most critical statements from African
leaders, Zambia’s President Levy Mwanawasa compared the country to “a sinking Titanic whose
passengers are jumping out to save their lives.”43 One of South Africa’s Deputy Foreign Ministers
told the South African parliament, “the South African government wishes to express its concern,
disappointment, and disapproval of the measures undertaken by the security forces in dealing
with the political protests,” blaming the current situation on an “absence of open political
dialogue.”44 Southern African Development Community (SADC) leaders convened an emergency
summit on March 28, 2007.
38 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Political Violence Report, December 2008.
39 “Zimbabwe Leaders Accused of Abducting Opponents,” New York Times, March 29, 2007.
40 Human Rights Watch, All Over Again: Human Rights Abuses and Flawed Electoral Conditions in Zimbabwe’s
Coming General Elections, Vol. 20, No. 2(A), March 2008.
41 For more information, see the Mission’s report at http://www.icj.org.
42 For further discussion of the 2008 elections, please see CRS Report RL34509, Zimbabwe: The Transitional
Government and Implications for U.S. Policy, by Lauren Ploch.
43 “Zimbabwe ‘A Sinking Titanic,’” Financial Times, March 22, 2007.
44 “RSA Parliamentarians Urge Stronger Action Against Zimbabwe,” South African Press Association, March 28,
2007.
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Zimbabwe: Background
Given the strong statements made by some southern African leaders, many observers expected the
SADC heads of state to increase pressure on Mugabe to make reforms. Reports suggest that in
private the leaders may have been tough on the Zimbabwean president, who was in attendance,
but their public response was deemed disappointing by human rights activists and critics of the
regime.45 During the summit, the SADC leaders resolved to promote dialogue within the country,
at the same time suggesting that Western countries should drop their sanctions against the
Mugabe government and that Britain should provide funding to assist in land reform efforts.
South African President Thabo Mbeki was appointed to mediate between the Zimbabwean
government and the opposition. Mbeki, who opposed calls for regime change, pushed instead for
democratic elections, saying “you might question whether these elections are genuinely free and
fair ... but we have to get the Zimbabweans talking so we do have elections that are free and
fair.”46 Talks between the Mugabe Administration and the MDC factions began in Pretoria in June
2007.
According to human rights activists and the U.S. Department of State, political violence against
opposition leaders and supporters continued in spite of the negotiations.47 The Mugabe
Administration accused the opposition of being responsible for a series of bombings targeting
shops, trains, and police stations, although some observers suggest the attacks were an attempt to
frame the opposition.48 Harassment of university students by police also reportedly increased. On
November 22, 2007, 22 members of the National Constitutional Assembly, a pro-democracy civil
society organization, reportedly sustained severe beatings during a peaceful protest set to coincide
with a visit by President Mbeki to Harare.49
Although the South Africa negotiations resulted in several agreements between the parties,
leading to the amendment of some laws seen to restrict press freedom and political activity, the
talks were abandoned after Mugabe announced that elections would be held on March 29, 2008.
Despite President Mbeki’s report to SADC leaders that his mediation had achieved
“commendable achievements,” Morgan Tsvangirai announced in February 2008 that “nothing has
changed ... changes in the law, negotiated by President Mbeki, have not changed the behavior of
the dictatorship.”50
45 “Zimbabwe Crisis Deepens,” Voice of America, April 6, 2007.
46 “Mbeki Rejects Regime Change,” Financial Times, April 2, 2007.
47 See, for example, Solidarity Peace Trust, Destructive Engagement: Violence, Mediation, and Politics in Zimbabwe,
Johannesburg, July 10, 2007.
48 The government’s allegations are outlined in reports produced by the Zimbabwe Republic Police, Opposition Forces
in Zimbabwe: A Trail of Violence and Opposition Forces in Zimbabwe: The Naked Truth, Volume 2,available at
http://www.moha.gov.zw/. The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum has refuted the government’s claims in At Best
a Falsehood, At Worst, A Lie, August 2007, available at http://www.hrforumzim.com.
49 Press Statement of U.S. Department of State Spokesman Sean McCormack, “Zimbabwe: Civil Society Organization
Beatings During President Mbeki’s Visit,” November 26, 2007.
50 Barry Bearak, “Zimbabwe Opponent Criticizes Mbeki,” New York Times, February 14, 2008.
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Zimbabwe: Background
March 2008 Elections
Election Preparations
In the period preceding the March 2008 elections, civil society activists reported significant pre-
election irregularities. Critics charged that the Zimbabwe Election Commission (ZEC) lacked
independence, and that it was further crippled by limited administrative capacity and budget
shortages.51 Election reports from domestic groups suggest that the registration process was, at
best, inconsistent, and there is no indication that the ZEC addressed alleged inaccuracies in the
voters’ roll from previous elections.
The March elections were Zimbabwe’s first attempt at holding “harmonized” elections for all
levels of government (local, National Assembly, Senate, and presidential) simultaneously. In
addition to the logistical challenges this posed, civic groups argued that the complexity of a four-
ballot election required a nationwide voter education campaign. They claim that the ZEC’s
education efforts were inadequate and that independent NGOs were barred from engaging in
voter education programs of their own.
The Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), a domestic observer group composed of 38
NGOs, alleges that the ruling party redrew constituencies52 to ensure its continued hold on power.
In its pre-election report, ZESN argued that there were not enough polling stations designated for
urban areas, where the MDC is believed to have its strongest support. ZESN’s report also
suggested that, as in past elections, the ruling party manipulated state resources for campaign
purposes.53 And despite amendments to POSA and AIPPA, which critics suggest restrict freedom
of speech and assembly, advocacy groups argue that the police selectively interpreted the laws
and significantly limited the MDC’s ability to campaign.54 Sections of POSA which prohibit false
statements “prejudicial” to the state and criminalize statements construed as engendering hostility
toward the president remained in effect.
Alleged Vote Buying
In addition to the allegedly partisan administration of the elections, many observers contend that
the government used public resources to buy votes. In the weeks preceding the polls, President
Mugabe announced significant salary increases for the military and civil servants and signed into
51 The ZEC was led by Justice George Chiweshe, a former military officer, until May 2010, when President Mugabe
appointed him to be head of the High Court, sparking protests from civic activists. Reports indicate that the ZEC and its
regional offices have been staffed by numerous former military personnel. For more detail, see Zimbabwe Human
Rights NGO Forum, Can the Elections be Free and Fair in the Current Environment?, March 18, 2008.
52 Parliament passed Constitutional Amendment No. 18 in late 2007, increasing the number of parliamentary seats from
120 to 210. Following a rushed delimitation exercise, the ZEC presented its final report, outlining changes to several
constituency and ward boundaries, with no time for debate before parliament adjourned at the end of January 2008.
53 Lance Guma, “Election Body Calls for More Polling Stations,” SW Radio Africa, March 11, 2008, available at
http://www.allafrica.com.
54 Amendments to POSA allowed groups to present notifications for rallies and demonstrations to the nearest police
station, and if denied approval, provided for appeals to be dealt with in a timely manner by the local magistrates court
rather than the Home Affairs Minister. Amendments to AIPPA abolished the “journalism without accreditation”
offense, although journalists remain prohibited from covering official events, like elections, without accreditation.
HRW, All Over Again: Human Rights Abuses and Flawed Electoral Conditions in Zimbabwe’s Coming General
Elections, Vol. 20, No. 2(A), March 2008.
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Zimbabwe: Background
law the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Bill, requiring foreign-owned firms to
transfer 51% of their shares to domestic investors. His administration also reportedly distributed
vehicles and agricultural equipment worth millions of U.S. dollars to ZANU-PF supporters.55 At
the same time, in a country where almost half the population was considered by the World Food
Program at that time to be malnourished, domestic groups reported numerous incidents of
opposition supporters being denied access to state food supplies.56 NGOs operating in Zimbabwe
reported that the ban on their distribution of food and other humanitarian aid prior to the runoff
continued until August, despite claims by the government that it had been lifted.57
Pre-Election Violence
According to a domestic human rights group, the year prior the 2008 elections was marked by a
significant increase in incidents of politically motivated violence from previous years.58 The
government routinely deployed riot police to break up demonstrations, meetings and rallies,
despite changes to the laws regulating freedom of assembly. In January 2008, police allegedly
tear-gassed and assaulted protestors in Harare after a local magistrate overruled a police order
banning their march.59 In February, members of the Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe
reported being abducted and beaten by ZANU-PF supporters; according to their accounts several
members of the police and intelligence service were present during the attacks.60 According to
reports, the perpetrators were not arrested, but the union leaders were charged with violating a
law that prohibits the distribution of pamphlets in public areas.61
Several of the country’s security service chiefs, including the heads of the army and the police,
publicly announced that they would not recognize an electoral victory by anyone other that
Mugabe.62 In speeches and statements to the press, they and other public officials, including the
president himself, referred to opposition leaders as traitors or puppets of the West. In October
2007, the International Bar Association issued a report accusing Zimbabwe’s police of being
“blatantly partisan” and suggesting that the force’s failure to guarantee equal protection of the law
“is a major obstacle to democracy in Zimbabwe and a considerable impediment to free and fair
elections.”63 As part of the 2008 electoral reforms, police were banned from the polling stations to
allay fears of intimidation. However, just over a week before the elections President Mugabe
issued a decree allowing police into polling stations, allegedly to help disabled voters.
55 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Can the Elections in Zimbabwe be Free and Fair in the Current
Environment? March 18, 2008.
56 “Concern Over Pre-Election Environment, Election Update (1),” ZESN Press Statement, January 25, 2008.
57"Zimbabwe: NGO Ban Starting to Bite," IRIN, July 7, 2008.
58 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Can the Elections in Zimbabwe be Free and Fair in the Current
Environment? March 18, 2008.
59 “Zimbabwe: Opposition Activists Teargassed, Beaten,” IRIN, January 23, 2008.
60HRW, All Over Again: Human Rights Abuses and Flawed Electoral Conditions in Zimbabwe’s Coming General
Elections, Vol. 20, No. 2(A), March 2008.
61ICG, “Zimbabwe: Prospects from a Flawed Election,” March 20, 2008.
62 “Zim Prisons Chief Orders Officers to Vote Mugabe,” Reuters, February 29, 2008.
63International Bar Association, Partisan Policing: An Obstacle to Human Rights and Democracy in Zimbabwe, An
International Bar Association Human Rights Institute Report, October 2007.
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Zimbabwe: Background
Election Monitoring
The government of Zimbabwe reportedly invited election observers from over 40 countries and
regional organizations, including the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the
African Union (AU), but barred observers from countries considered to be critical of its
policies.64 CNN and other Western media organizations and journalists were reportedly denied
permission to cover the elections.65 The AU observer mission, led by former President of Sierra
Leone Tejan Kabbah, issued a preliminary statement after the elections suggesting that the vote
was generally free and fair and expressed the will of the people. He urged all parties to accept the
results. The SADC mission found the elections to be “a credible expression of the will of the
people” but noted concerns regarding opposition access to the media, inflammatory statements by
senior security officials, the presence of police officers at polling stations, and the delay in the
publication of the voters’ roll. Two members of the delegation, both from South Africa’s largest
opposition party, refused to sign the report, calling the elections “chaotic” and “deeply flawed.”66
Other observer groups differed with the SADC findings. The delegations of the World Council of
Churches and the African Council of Churches found the elections to be “skewed in favor of the
incumbent who openly utilized state resources to his advantage” and reported media bias,
“violence, intimidation and outright confrontation,” and the use of food as a “political tool.”67
Press Restrictions
Two international journalists, one a Pulitzer Prize-winning American correspondent for the New
York Times, were arrested in April 2008. After several days in jail, they were released on bail but
were blocked from leaving the country. They were later acquitted. Several other journalists, both
domestic and foreign, were arrested after the elections. The director of the ZESN was briefly
detained by police in April and questioned about possible ties to the Washington-based National
Democratic Institute, which monitors elections worldwide. The editor of The Standard, the
country’s only remaining independent newspaper, was arrested for printing an editorial by
opposition leader Arthur Mutambara entitled, “A Shameful Betrayal of National Independence.”
He was later released, but charged with publishing statements prejudicial to the state. Mutambara
was arrested weeks later.
March 2008 Election Results
Parliament
The MDC, which split into two factions in 2005 (known as MDC-T and MDC-M for their
respective leaders, Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara), remained divided for the March
elections, and this division likely cost the party several parliamentary seats.68 The ZEC, widely
64 “First Poll Observers in Zimbabwe,” BBC, March 11, 2008.
65 “CNN Denied Permission to Cover Elections in Zimbabwe,” CNN, March 25, 2008.
66Statement issued by South African Member of Parliament Diane Kohler Barnard, “DA Rejects SADC Assessment of
Zimbabwe Election as ‘Peaceful and Credible,’” available at http://www.da.org.za.
67 “Ecumenical Observers Challenge Zimbabwe Election Process and Demand Respect for the Will of the People,”
World Council of Churches Press Release, April 29, 2008.
68 A Financial Times report suggests that ZANU-PF won ten parliamentary seats that would have been claimed by the
MDC had its votes not been split between the two factions. “Acrimonious Division Cost MDC Success,” Financial
(continued...)
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Zimbabwe: Background
criticized for its delayed release of the electoral results, announced the National Assembly results
four days after the election. The MDC factions, which reunited on April 28, won a majority in the
220-seat National Assembly with 109 seats, over ZANU-PF’s 97.69 Three weeks after the
election, the electoral commission conducted a recount of 23 of these races, an overwhelming
majority of which were won by the opposition.70 The original results were upheld. On April 6, the
ZEC announced that the ruling party had retained its majority in the Senate, where over one-third
of its 93 members are appointed by the president. Of the 60 seats directly elected, ZANU-PF won
30, MDC-Tsvangirai 24, and MDC-Mutambara 6. Several senior ruling party members lost their
parliamentary seats, including the Ministers of Justice, Agriculture, Mines, Energy, and Transport,
and several senior MDC-M parliamentarians, including Mutambara, lost to MDC-T candidates.
The Presidency
The MDC’s decision to contest the election while still divided may also have cost the party a
clear victory in the initial presidential race. In February 2008, then-ZANU-PF senior member
Simba Makoni announced his intention to run against President Mugabe in the upcoming
elections.71 He was subsequently expelled from the party and ran as an independent, although he
was rumored to have been supported by several senior ruling party officials. MDC faction leader
Arthur Mutambara, who had planned to run against Mugabe and Tsvangirai, withdrew as a
presidential candidate and expressed his support for Makoni. It is unclear how many supporters of
his faction voted for Makoni instead of Tsvangirai.
The main MDC faction claimed victory for Tsvangirai days after the election with over 50% of
the votes cast, basing its claim on tallies of poll results posted outside the polling stations and
constituency centers immediately following the elections. Some have differed with the MDC
count, suggesting that while Tsvangirai almost certainly received more votes than Mugabe, he
may not have achieved the necessary 50% to avoid a runoff.72 ZESN noted that results were not
posted in three constituency tabulation centers despite a legal requirement to do so.
The results of the presidential race were not officially announced until five weeks after the
elections. The opposition called for a nationwide strike on April 14 to protest the delayed release
of results, asking supporters to stay home rather than to demonstrate publicly. Dozens of
opposition supporters, including a newly elected member of parliament, were reportedly arrested
that day for allegedly trying to incite violence or for obstructing the freedom of movement.
According to reports, the strike was unsuccessful. With over 80% unemployment, some analysts
suggest many Zimbabweans could not afford to miss a day’s wages; other Zimbabweans said they
(...continued)
Times, April 4, 2008.
69The Tsvangirai faction won 99 seats and MDC-Mutambara won 10. One seat was won by an independent, and three
seats were subject to by-elections in June 2008 due to candidates’ deaths. In those by-elections, MDC-T won one seat
and ZANU-PF won two.
70 According to press reports, the ZEC conducted the recount in violation of a court order to stop recounts for 23
parliamentary constituencies. The MDC had petitioned the court on the basis that ZANU-PF’s requests for recounts
were not valid because they were not filed within 48 hours of the election in accordance with ZEC rules. The court
allegedly ruled that a recount could not be ordered until after the original results were released.
71Makoni served as Finance Minister from 2000 to 2002 and was reportedly dismissed after criticizing the
administration’s economic policies.
72According to ZESN, Tsvangirai received 49.4% of the vote and Mugabe 41.8%.”ZESN poll projections on March 29
presidential elections,” ZESN press release, March 31, 2008.
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Zimbabwe: Background
had not heard of the strike.73 On the evening of May 2, the ZEC declared that Tsvangirai had
received 47.9% of the votes, while Mugabe received 43.2% and Makoni 8.3%. Some in the
international community questioned whether the government’s delay in releasing the presidential
results should be considered a political coup. The MDC appealed unsuccessfully to the courts to
have the results released, but the electoral commission claimed that it could not do so until a
“process of verification of the presidential ballots” was complete.74
Runoff Elections Called
Although the opposition accused the government of manipulating the presidential results and
initially objected to participating in a runoff, Morgan Tsvangirai agreed to stand against President
Mugabe in a second round of voting.75 ZESN also questioned the validity of the presidential
results, saying, “ZESN cannot substantiate ZEC figures as the network is not aware of the chain
of custody of the ballot materials during the aforementioned period” and claiming that the
delayed announcement of the presidential results undermined the impartiality of the ZEC. These
concerns were echoed by the United States and others.
Having waited for over a month to hear the final results from the first round of elections,
Zimbabweans faced another significant delay before the second round. While the electoral law
requires the government to hold a runoff within 21 days of announcing the initial results, the ZEC
declared that the runoff would not be held until June 27, three months after the first round. Some
analysts questioned whether the government could afford another election, estimated to cost up to
$60 million. According to official Reserve Bank figures, government borrowing in the first three
months of 2008 was 43% above the projected budget deficit for the year.76
The MDC initially called for the immediate deployment of election observers from outside Africa
(in addition to the SADC and AU observers) as well as the deployment of regional peacekeepers
during the runoff. The party later modified its demands, saying that an increased SADC and AU
observer presence would be sufficient, if combined with an immediate repeal of restrictions on
the MDC’s ability to campaign and an end to political violence. The opposition nevertheless
remained largely unable to hold public rallies, which were banned by police in the capital in mid-
April. Tsvangirai, who left the country a week after the elections amidst MDC concerns about his
safety, returned on May 25. Given post-election statements by government officials accusing him
of treason, many believed he would not be allowed to campaign freely inside the country.77 The
MDC leader had been tried, and acquitted, for treason in 2004. Based on interviews with high-
ranking Zimbabwean officials, the International Crisis Group (ICG) issued a report suggesting a
Tsvangirai victory in the runoff could trigger a military coup.78
73 “Zimbabwe Opposition Strike Fails,” BBC, April 16, 2008.
74 “Opposition Unites Against Mugabe,” Al Jazeera, April 28, 2008.
75The MDC suggested that the government had access to the ballot boxes for over two weeks in April without
opposition or observer supervision, and thus they could not be sure the ballots had not been manipulated.
76 “Crisis Looms After Harare Vote-Buying,” Financial Times, April 11, 2008.
77Referring to an alleged letter between Tsvangirai and then-Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Zimbabwe’s Herald
accused the MDC leader of plotting “illegal regime change” and quoted outgoing Justice Minister Chinamasa , “It is
clear... that Tsvangirai along with Brown are seeking regime change in Zimbabwe,and on the part of Tsvangirai, this is
treasonous...There is no doubting the consequences for acting in a treasonous manner.” The MDC says the letter is a
forgery. See “Zimbabwe Opposition Accused of Treason,” CNN, April 17, 2008.
78ICG, “Negotiating Zimbabwe’s Transition,” Africa Briefing No. 51, May 21, 2008.
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June 2008 Runoff Election
During the weeks following the announcement of the presidential results, reports of political
violence increased dramatically. Critics contend that the violence was a government-orchestrated
attempt to punish opposition supporters and ensure a Mugabe victory in the runoff.79 According to
media reports, security forces and militias manned roadblocks and detention centers throughout
the country, despite the increased presence of over 500 international monitors from SADC and
the AU. In July, the Washington Post reported on the government's alleged campaign of violence
against the opposition, referred to as "Coercion. Intimidation. Beating. Displacement.," or CIBD,
and alleged that the ruling party's inner circle was divided on the effort, which reportedly targeted
mid-level MDC organizers, and ordinary citizens, for severe beatings or death. President Mugabe
was quoted in the press saying, "We shed a lot of blood for this country. We are not going to give
up our country for a mere X on a ballot. How can a ballpoint pen fight with a gun?"80
Tsvangirai was detained by police several times during the runoff campaign, and on two
occasions sought refuge in the Dutch Embassy. The MDC's Secretary General, Tendai Biti, was
arrested in June 2008 upon return from South Africa and was charged with treason. After two
weeks in jail, he was released on bail. On June 13, former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan
joined over 40 African leaders and former heads of state, including the group known as the
Elders, in a letter calling on the government to stop the violence, postpone the runoff, and ensure
conditions for free and fair elections.
On June 22, less than a week before the runoff, ZANU-PF supporters, armed with sticks, iron
bars, and rocks, blocked an MDC rally in Harare. Citing the high number of attacks against MDC
supporters and the lack of a level playing field, Tsvangirai withdrew from the race the following
day. By MDC accounts, over 100 of its supporters have been killed since the March elections, and
tens of thousands displaced. Despite public comments from African observer missions and a
presidential statement from the U.N. Security Council arguing that conditions for a free and fair
election did not exist due the high level of violence, the government held the runoff as scheduled.
Mugabe was declared the winner with over 85% of the vote and inaugurated on June 29, 2008.
SADC fielded over 400 observers for the second round. In their preliminary report, the observers
found the pre-election environment marred by "politically motivated violence resulting in loss of
life, damage to property, and serious injuries sustained and hindering political activities." They
also noted the "disruption of campaigning of the opposition party and the regrettable inaction of
the law enforcement agencies," and cited harassment of their own observers. The SADC mission
found that the pre-election period did not conform to SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing
Democratic Elections, which impinged on the credibility of the electoral process. Ultimately, the
delegation reported that runoff "did not represent the will of the people of Zimbabwe."81
The observer delegation from the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) was similarly critical of the
runoff, saying, "political tolerance in Zimbabwe has deteriorated to the lowest ebb in recent
history." The delegation reported witnessing roadblocks and "male-dominated groups [that]
79Human Rights Watch called the violence "a brutal campaign of torture and intimidation" and documented direct
involvement by the security forces. "Zimbabwe: Army Behind New Wave of Human Rights Abuses," HRW Press
Release, April 30, 2008.
80"Zimbabwe Election: Mugabe Threatens to Arrest Opposition Leaders" The Guardian, June 17, 2008.
81Preliminary Statement Presented by the Hon. Jose Marcos Barrica of the SADC Observer Mission, issued on June 30,
2008.
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Zimbabwe: Background
intercepted voters and gave them pieces of paper on which they were required to write the serial
number of their ballots" at many polling stations. The PAP's report questioned the impartiality of
the ZEC, and found that "the current atmosphere prevailing in the country did not give rise to the
conduct of free, fair and credible elections."82 The African Union team echoed the SADC and
PAP findings, declaring that process fell short of accepted AU standards.83
Post-Election Violence
As noted above, although observers suggest that the March 29 election day was largely peaceful,
reports of politically motivated violence subsequently increased to a level not seen in two
decades, according to advocacy groups. In May, the Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human
Rights reported that its doctors had treated hundreds of victims with injuries consistent with
assault and torture since the election date, and that “the violence is now on such a scale that it is
impossible to properly document all cases.”84 The MDC has alleged that over 100 of its
supporters were killed. U.S. Ambassador James McGee implicated the ruling party in
orchestrating the attacks.85
ZANU-PF and the Zimbabwean army have denied involvement with the violence, although the
army; police; intelligence service; “war veterans;”86 and Zimbabwe’s National Youth Service, also
known as the “Green Bombers,” have all been implicated. One week after the elections, self-
styled war veteran leader Jabuli Sibanda warned, “It has come to our realization that the elections
were used as another war front to prepare for the re-invasion of our country.... As freedom
fighters, we feel compelled to repel the invasion,” echoing a frequent Mugabe refrain that an
opposition victory would be tantamount to the British reinstating colonial rule. The state-owned
Herald newspaper, contributed to fears of a white takeover in the wake of the election, reporting,
“an increasing number of white former commercial farmers are reportedly threatening resettled
black farmers throughout the country with eviction from their farms or face the wrath of an
anticipated ‘incoming MDC government.’”87 These pronouncements coincided with farm
invasions throughout the country, and by April 16 the Commercial Farmers Union reported that
over 100 of the estimated remaining 400 white farmers had been forced off their lands.
Since independence, Mugabe’s regime has employed terminology associated with military-style
campaigns for government programs ranging from the implementation of price controls, known
as Operation Reduce Prices, to the demolition of informal urban settlements, or Operation
Murambatsvina (translated as “Clean Out the Filth”). Reports suggest that the post-election round
of violence had its own campaign name, Operation Mavhoterapapi (“Who did you vote for?”).88
Critics note the government’s historic use of violent tactics against political opponents, pointing
82Interim Statement Presented by the Hon. Marwick Khumalo of the Pan-African Parliament Observer Mission, issued
on June 30, 2008.
83Preliminary Statement of the African Union Observer Mission, issued on June 29, 2008.
84As of May 9, 2008 the group reported treating 900 people. See “Mbeki Meets Mugabe for Talks,” Al Jazeera, May 9,
2008.
85Statement by Ambassador James McGee, “Breaking the Silence on Political Violence in Zimbabwe,” issued on May
8, 2008.
86Some “war veterans” have questionable credentials and some were too young to have participated in the liberation
struggle. Other veterans disagree with ZANU-PF’s policies.
87 “White Former Farmers Threaten Blacks with Eviction,” The Herald, May 7, 2008.
88 “Zimbabwe: Operation Glossary - A Guide to Zimbabwe’s Internal Campaigns,” IRIN, May 1, 2008.
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Zimbabwe: Background
to the infamous Operation Gukurahundi (“The rain that washes away the chaff before the rain”),
the violent “pacification” campaign by a North Korean-trained military unit, the 5th Brigade, in
the 1980s against alleged dissidents and supporters of ZANU-PF’s political rival, the Zimbabwe
African People’s Union (ZAPU). Gukurahundi is now better known as the Matabeleland
Massacres, which resulted in the deaths of as many as 20,000 civilians, mostly from the Ndebele
ethnic group in the southwest.89 That 5th Brigade was led by then-Lt. Col. Perence Shire, now
commander of Zimbabwe’s Air Force. Other security officials involved in the campaign were
elevated to senior government posts, including former Defense Minister Sydney Sekeremayi and
Emerson Mnangagwa. Mnangagwa, then Minister of State Security in charge of intelligence, once
reportedly warned that the government would burn down “all the villages infested with
dissidents.” He has been rumored to be in charge of Joint Operations Command (JOC), a
secretive group of the country’s security chiefs and top commanders that some allege control the
government.90
Zimbabwe’s rural areas appear to have been the hardest hit by the post-election violence; the U.S.
Embassy in Harare documented thousands who fled the countryside for urban areas in the months
after the March elections. Most Harare medical clinics were at full capacity during the height of
the violence, according to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).91
Zimbabwe’s largest farmers’ union reported that militias displaced over 40,000 farm workers, and
there were widespread reports of burned homes, granaries, and livestock.92 Human Rights Watch
detailed the “re-education” and torture of more than 70 MDC supporters, seven of whom
reportedly died from their injuries, in Mashonaland province on May 5.93 Amnesty International
reported that victims were often denied medical access and that humanitarian organizations have
been targeted by militias for providing assistance.94 The United Nations’ resident representative in
Zimbabwe declared, “there is an emerging pattern of political violence inflicted mainly, but not
exclusively, on suspected followers of the MDC.” The level of violence was confirmed by an 8-
person SADC mission, “we have seen it, there are people in hospital who said they have been
tortured, you have seen pictures, you have seen pictures of houses that have been destroyed.”95
Some who fled to the cities faced further intimidation. Police repeatedly raided the offices of both
the MDC and ZESN. Hundreds were arrested in the MDC raids, many of whom had reportedly
already suffered attacks in their rural homes and fled to the MDC offices for refuge. In these
raids, the police, allegedly looking for subversive documents, took computers and documents. On
May 9, police arrested the leaders of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) based on
speeches made at a worker’s day rally. The head of the Progressive Teacher’s Union was also
arrested. On May 5, more than 50 people were reportedly beaten by riot police during a public
protest against the ongoing violence in the city of Bulawayo; 11 members of a women’s advocacy
group were arrested.
89For further information on Operation Gukurahundi, see the report by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace
and the Legal Resources Foundation, Breaking the Silence - Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in
Matabeleland and the Midlands 1980-1988, April 1999, available at http://www.sokwanele.com/pdfs/BTS.pdf.
90See, for example, “The Opposition Goes for Broke,” The Economist, May 17, 2008, and “Zimbabwe Under Military
Rule, Former Minister Claims,” Pretoria News, May 12, 2008.
91USAID, Zimbabwe: Complex Emergency and Drought, Situation Report 1, May 16, 2008.
92 “Hunger Drives Post-Election Violence, Deepens Poverty,” IRIN, May 9, 2008.
93 “Zimbabwe: End Violence Before June Runoff,” HRW Press Release, May 16, 2008.
94 Amnesty International, “Zimbabwe Violence Reaches Crisis Levels,” May 16, 2008.
95 “Call for State of Emergency Over Zim Violence,” Mail & Guardian, May 14, 2008.
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Some Zimbabwean officials, including the police chief, have accused the MDC of rigging and
inciting violence. More than ten newly elected MDC legislators were arrested in the wake of the
March elections. Over 100 election officers were arrested on charges of committing fraud and
abusing public office in favor of the MDC. Independent reports suggest that teachers, who held
many of the election officer positions, were specifically targeted by government supporters.
The Power Sharing Agreement and the New Coalition Government
On September 15, after several weeks of negotiations overseen by Thabo Mbeki, Mugabe and
Tsvangirai signed the Global Political Agreement (GPA). The text of the agreement left oversight
of the police undetermined, and debate over which party would control the force delayed the
agreement’s implementation for over four months. Amid concern that the parties would abandon
compromises made in the GPA, SADC renewed pressure for the agreement to be implemented in
January 2009. Tsvangirai agreed to join a coalition government on January 31, and, after
Zimbabwe’s parliament amended the constitution to allow its creation, Tsvangirai and new MDC
ministers were sworn in as members of the new government in early February.
Humanitarian Situation
Operation Murambatsvina
In May 2005, the government of Zimbabwe initiated Operation Murambatsvina (variously
translated as “Restore Order” or “Clean Out the Filth”), a massive demolition program aimed at
destroying allegedly illegal urban structures, such as informal housing and markets. By early July
2005, an estimated 700,000 urban Zimbabweans had been rendered homeless or unemployed by
the operation, and an estimated 2.1 million (in total, almost 20% of the population) were
indirectly affected by the demolitions.96 These are considered “low-end estimates,” and some
reports suggest the numbers of those affected was much higher.97 According to some sources,
70% of the country’s urban population may have lost shelter, while approximately 76% lost their
source of income.98 Police and military who carried out the event reportedly arrested forty
thousand for allegedly illegal activities and told those whose homes were destroyed to “return to
their rural origins,” although many had no rural home to which they could return.99
Operation Murambatsvina had a severe impact on the nation’s economy and on the livelihood of
its citizens. For many, this was not the first time they had been forcibly removed from their
homes. As a result of the 2000 land reform program, an estimated 400,000 black laborers on
commercial farms lost their livelihoods and/or homes, and many fled to urban areas to find work.
Political violence surrounding the 2002 elections also forced many from their homes, reportedly
96 The U.N. Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, Report of the Fact-
Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to Assess The Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina, July 2005.
97 A survey by ActionAid International, a Netherlands-based international development agency, found that 840,000
were directly affected and 1.2 million indirectly affected, while a survey by the independent research firm
Afrobarometer reported that an estimated 2.7 million were directly affected.
98 ActionAid International, The Impact of Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order in Zimbabwe, August 2005.
99 Tibaijuka, 13.
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Zimbabwe: Background
displacing more than 100,000.100 In 2004, under a new phase of land resettlement, an estimated
500,000 who settled on farms during the 2000 invasions were evicted.101 Many of these displaced
inhabited the urban “slums” prior to the demolitions, making their living from trading on the
black market. Given the collapse of the formal economy, 40% of the labor force was estimated to
be informally employed prior to Murambatsvina, while 44% worked in the communal sector
(including the agriculture industry), and 16% worked in the formal sector.102 Of those living in
towns and cities, an estimated 70% were involved in informal trading prior to the demolitions.
Political Motivations?
The government described Murambatsvina as a program designed to restore the capital city to its
former image as “the Sunshine City,” ridding the country’s urban areas of illegal structures that
foster criminal activity and stemming the black market trade in foreign currency.103 Launched
shortly after the disputed 2005 parliamentary elections, many contend the demolitions were a
political move aimed either at preventing mass protests over the growing economic crisis or at
punishing the reputed urban support base of the MDC. The Harare Commission that initiated the
campaign was established in order to contravene the authority of the elected city council, of
which the MDC held the majority. The mayor of Harare, an MDC politician who was elected by
80% of the vote, was fired in April 2004, along with 19 MDC-allied city councillors, after having
been arrested in 2003 under POSA for holding a public meeting without prior state approval.
The legality of the Harare Commission, which was appointed by the Minister of Local
Government, was challenged in a high court ruling that found the commission did not have the
authority to fire the mayor. A new election was supposed to be held within 90 days, according to
law, but when no election occurred, the commission was reappointed. The remaining MDC
councillors resigned in protest. With the exception of Harare, the local authorities of the other
areas (many of which were MDC-controlled) affected by Murambatsvina reported that they were
not informed of the demolitions prior to the event. The implications of this breakdown in
governance are reflected in findings of the United Nations, which noted that Murambatsvina “was
implemented in a highly polarized political climate characterized by mistrust, fear and a lack of
dialogue between Government and local authorities, and between the former and civil society.”104
The International Response
International reaction to Murambatsvina was highly critical. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan
named Tanzanian-born Anna Tibaijuka, Executive Director of UN-HABITAT, as the U.N. Special
Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe to investigate the humanitarian impact of the
demolitions. Following a fact-finding mission to the country, she issued a comprehensive report,
which concluded:
Operation Restore Order, while purporting to target illegal dwellings and structures and to
clamp down on alleged illicit activities, was carried out in an indiscriminate and unjustified
100 U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, “World Refugee Survey, Zimbabwe Country Report,” 2003.
101 DOS, “Zimbabwe,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005.
102 Tibaijuka, 34.
103 “Clean Up Commendable,” The Herald, May 23, 2005.
104 Ibid., 7.
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Zimbabwe: Background
manner, with indifference to human suffering and, in repeated cases, with disregard to
several provisions of national and international legal frameworks.105
The report also described police preventing civil society and humanitarian organizations from
assisting those affected by the demolitions, and suggested that the groups were operating in a
“climate of fear” and practicing “‘self-censorship’ to avoid being closed down or evicted.”106 The
Chairman of the African Union sent his own envoy, but he was prevented from conducting an
assessment (see “International Perspectives,” below). The presentation of the U.N. envoy’s report
to the U.N. Security Council stirred controversy as China, Algeria, Benin, and Russia objected to
debate on the report. The majority of Security Council members voted to allow its discussion,
albeit in a closed session. Secretary-General Annan also issued a strong statement condemning
Murambatsvina, calling on the government of Zimbabwe to stop the evictions and allow
unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance:
“Operation Murambatsvina” has done a catastrophic injustice to as many as 700,000 of
Zimbabwe’s poorest citizens, through indiscriminate actions, carried out with disquieting
indifference to human suffering. I call on the Government to stop these forced evictions and
demolitions immediately, and to ensure that those who orchestrated this ill-advised policy
are held fully accountable for their actions ... the Government must recognize the virtual state
of emergency that now exists, allow unhindered access for humanitarian operations, and
create conditions for sustainable relief and reconstruction.107
Continued Evictions and Operation Garikai
Many observers suggest the Zimbabwean government did little to respond to the U.N. envoy’s
recommendations.108 Reports indicate that forced evictions continued, despite government
declarations to the contrary.109 As was the case during the initial evictions, several thousand of
those made homeless were taken, in some cases reportedly against their will, to police-run “transit
camps” in late 2006. Conditions in these camps were described as dire, often lacking shelter,
water, or basic latrine facilities.110 In keeping with the findings of the U.N. report, Amnesty
International alleged that the government repeatedly prohibited aid organizations, including the
United Nations, from providing the displaced with temporary shelters, such as tents. Secretary-
General Annan expressed his concern in October 2005 over the government’s rejection of U.N.
assistance to “tens of thousands,” noting “there is no clear evidence that subsequent Government
efforts have significantly benefitted these groups.”111 The United Nations was subsequently
permitted to erect approximately 2,300 shelters, a fraction of their target of 40,000.112
105 Ibid., 7.
106 Ibid., 54.
107 The Secretary-General’s statement, made on July 22, 2005, is available online at http://www.un.org/apps/sg/
sgstats.asp?nid=1589.
108 See, for example, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum , “Political Repression Disguised as Civic Mindedness:
Operation Murambatsvina One Year Later,” November 2006 and Political Violence Report, October 2007.
109 U.N., United Nations Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) 2007, July 2007.
110 AI, “Zimbabwe: No Justice for the Victims of Forced Evictions,” September 2006.
111 The October 31, 2005 statement is available at http://www.un.org/News/ossg/.
112 AI, “Zimbabwe,” Annual Report 2007.
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In response to international criticism of Murambatsvina, the government announced a new
housing scheme, Operation Garikai, in June 2005. Under Garakai, also known as “Hlalani
Kuhle” (Live Well), new housing for those rendered homeless was to be built with public funds.
The ambitious reconstruction program would allegedly create tens of thousands of new homes,
but given the shortage of building materials and the government’s budgetary problems, it is
highly unlikely the original target of 5,275 homes has been met. Reports suggest that few houses
were actually completed, and, instead of going to victims of Murambatsvina, the newly built
houses were more likely to be occupied by soldiers, police, and members of the ruling party.113
The government denied these allegations.
Amnesty International and the Coalition Against Forced Evictions, a domestic rights group,
issued a new report in May 2010 on the progress of the government’s re-housing scheme,
Garakai. The report argues that, five years after Murambatsvina, many victims continue to live in
plastic shacks without basic essential services. The groups have been critical of the transitional
government’s response.114 According to Housing Ministry estimates, as many as 500,000 may
currently be on the waiting list for housing in Harare alone; the backlog nationally in urban areas
may be over 1 million.115
Violations of Domestic and International Law
Human rights organizations have raised questions about how Zimbabwe and the international
community should respond to what some have termed “crimes against humanity,”116 as defined by
Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),117 and whether there is a
“responsibility to protect”118 those affected by Murambatsvina or subsequent government actions.
Among the Murambatsvina report recommendations, the U.N. envoy suggested:
Although a case for crime against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute might be
difficult to sustain, the Government of Zimbabwe clearly caused large sections of its
population serious suffering that must now be redressed with the assistance of the United
Nations and the international community. The international community should encourage the
Government to prosecute all those who orchestrated this catastrophe and those who may
have caused criminal negligence leading to alleged deaths, if so confirmed by an independent
internal inquiry/inquest. The international community should then continue to be engaged
with human rights concerns in Zimbabwe in consensus building political forums such as the
UN Commission on Human Rights, or its successor, the African Union Peer Review
Mechanism, and in the Southern African Development Community.
The report included a legal analysis of Murambatsvina through international and regional, and
national legal frameworks. Several domestic and international organizations, including the
113 See the AI report; Solidarity Peace Trust, Meltdown: Murambatsvina One Year On, August 30, 2006.
114 AI, “Zimbabwe: 700,000 Forcibly Evicted Still Ignored Five Years On,” May 18, 2010.
115 “Zimbabwe: Murambatsvina Victims Still Homeless,” UN IRIN, May 21, 2010.
116 Institute of War and Peace Reporting, “Prosecution of Mugabe Urged,” January 20, 2006.
117 The United States is not party to the Rome Statute. For more information, see CRS Report RL31495, U.S. Policy
Regarding the International Criminal Court (ICC), by Jennifer K. Elsea.
118 For more information on the “Responsibility to Protect,” see the Report on the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty, which aims to “reconcil[e] the international community’s responsibility to act in the
face of massive violations of humanitarian norms while respecting the sovereign rights of states.” The report is
available at http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp.
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International Bar Association (IBA), have called for the Zimbabwean government to be brought
before the ICC, not only for violations related to the demolitions, but also for the government’s
alleged support of political violence against its critics. Responding to President Mugabe’s
comments supporting the beating of trade union leaders in 2006, the Executive Director of the
IBA made the following statement:
Mugabe’s statements add to the weight of evidence that torture and other serious violations
of international law are sanctioned at the highest level in Zimbabwe. This underscores the
urgent need for international and regional action to hold the Zimbabwean Government to
account ... the torture of the trade union activists is not an isolated incident, but part of a
dangerous and illegal system of repression which constitutes crimes against humanity in
international law. Decisive action is required by both the United Nations and the African
Union to end impunity and violence in Zimbabwe.119
Because Zimbabwe is not a signatory of the Rome Statute, a U.N. Security Council resolution
would be needed for any referral to the ICC. Given the objections of some Security Council
members to the envoy’s report itself, which as stated above suggested an ICC case would be
“difficult to sustain,” it is unlikely such a referral would be made. The U.N. Envoy found that
“The Government of Zimbabwe is collectively responsible for what has happened,” but cautioned
that “it appears there was no collective decision-making with respect to both the conception and
implementation. Evidence suggests it was based on improper advice by a few architects of the
operation.”120 According to one media source, though, Zimbabwe’s State Security Minister has
claimed, “All the decisions to do with the operation emanated from the politburo [ZANU-PF’s
inner cabinet] and were sent through me to the government.”121
The government of Zimbabwe has yet to prosecute those who might be responsible for crimes
related to Operation Murambatsvina or the subsequent evictions. The victims, in most cases, lack
the financial resources to seek redress in the courts, although Zimbabwean human rights lawyers
have represented groups of victims on several occasions. In one such case, in November 2005,
residents of a Harare suburb were given a temporary stay of eviction by the High Court, but
police ignored the court order and forcibly moved the group to a transit camp. Many argue that
the inability of the country’s judicial system to protect its citizens or their property, or to provide
due process to those seeking remedy or compensation, suggests a fundamental breakdown in
Zimbabwe’s rule of law.
Zimbabwe’s Food Crisis
Several Southern African countries have suffered from chronic food insecurity in recent years,
stemming from a combination of weather-related and man-made factors, including prolonged
drought, floods, poor economic performance, and the impact of HIV/AIDS.122 Zimbabwe has
been particularly hard hit. Grain silos across the country that once held strategic grain reserves
119 The IBA is comprised of Bar Associations and Law Societies around the world. The comments of its Executive
Director can be found at http://www.ibanet.org/iba/article.cfm?article=95.
120 Tibaijuka, 76.
121 See an excerpt from South-Africa based website ZimOnline in “Ex-Ethiopian Leader Said Behind Zimbabwe’s
Cleanup Operation,” BBC Monitoring Africa, February 20, 2006.
122 For more information on food insecurity, see CRS Report R40127, The Impact of Food Insecurity and Hunger on
Global Health: Issues for Congress, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther and Charles E. Hanrahan.
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Zimbabwe: Background
three times the population’s annual food needs have been emptied. Experts attribute this food
insecurity to unexpectedly severe crop failure,123 but some suggest Murambatsvina and other
government policies significantly limited the population’s ability to feed itself, particularly in
urban areas.124 Aid organizations estimated that some 7 million Zimbabweans, almost three-
quarters of the country’s population, required food assistance in early 2009. That figure has
declined significantly in the last year, but the country still faces a cereal shortfall, and an
estimated 2 million required food aid in early 2010.
Although drought is partly to blame for the country’s food shortages, analysts believe that
disruptions to the farming sector resulting from Mugabe’s land seizure program are the main
reason for reduced food production.125 Nearly all of the country’s 4,500 commercial farms have
now been taken over; the government’s land redistribution program is reportedly plagued by
inefficiencies, with large portions of redistributed land not being actively farmed. Tractors and
other inputs to production are reportedly in short supply. Thousands of experienced farm workers
were reportedly forced to flee seized commercial farms, and many of those who now hold
farmland have no agricultural expertise. The government’s introduction of price controls in 2007
may have further restricted production—the country’s seed and fertilizer producers reported that
the controls created “unrealistic prices,” which in turn caused supply shortages.126
Operation Taguta
In late 2005, the Zimbabwean government established Operation Taguta (or “Eat Well”), a move
seen by many as an acknowledgment that the government’s farm resettlement policies had failed
to meet the country’s agricultural production needs. With food distribution already under the
control of the Grain Marketing Board, reportedly led by military officers, the government
established a command agriculture system, in which the military would be responsible for not
only the distribution, but also the production of food. Under Taguta, there were numerous reports
of the illegal seizure of farm equipment, the destruction of the fruit, vegetable, and other cash
crops small-scale farmers grow to sell at market to support their families, and even army brutality
against farmers. Some critics of the government suggest Operation Taguta was used by the
government as an excuse to deploy military forces throughout the country to control the
population.127 A Zimbabwe journalist was jailed in March 2009 for reporting on allegations of
corruption within the Grain Marketing Board, whose power has been significantly reduced under
the new transitional government.
123 United Nations, 2006 CAP Mid-Year Review, June 2006.
124 ActionAid International, The Impact of Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order in Zimbabwe, August 2005. This
study suggests up to 54% of the country may have become food insecure as a result of Murambatsvina. A more recent
USAID study also concluded that Murambatsvina and “more recent evictions “ increased vulnerability, according to its
“Zimbabwe—Drought and Complex Emergency Situation Report #2,” Fiscal Year 2007.
125 On the land takeovers in Zimbabwe, see AI, Zimbabwe: Power and Hunger—Violations of the Right to Food,
October 15, 2004.
126 “Zimbabwe: The Mother of All Farming Seasons,” IRIN, October 25, 2007.
127 Solidarity Peace Trust, Operation Taguta/Sisuthi, April 2006.
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Food as a Political Weapon?
The ZANU-PF government’s stance on food aid led many observers to suspect that food has been
used as a political weapon, a charge the government denied.128 Despite assessments by multiple
international donor agencies suggesting the need for food assistance, President Mugabe
confounded observers in recent years by repeatedly declaring the country was running a maize
surplus and would not need food aid.129 In 2004, the government stopped a U.N. food needs
assessment and later halted general food aid distribution by donors (targeted food aid to
vulnerable groups continued), despite independent estimates that suggested 4.8 million would
require assistance.130 In March 2005, the government finally acknowledged serious food
shortages, but delayed in signing agreement to allow the World Food Program (WFP) and its
implementing partners to provide assistance until December of that year.131 Reports suggested
that the government maintained tight control of food distributions, until its ban on the distribution
of aid by NGOs prior to the 2008 runoff.132 The government accused aid agencies of using food to
turn Zimbabweans away from ZANU-PF.
Critics like Pius Ncube, former Catholic Archbishop of Bulawayo, accused the government of
distributing food only in areas where people would agree to vote for ZANU-PF. During past
elections, civil rights groups and the opposition have reported instances of ZANU-PF holding
campaign rallies in conjunction with government food distributions. In some areas, government
officials distributing food required those in line to show a party card—and MDC supporters were
reportedly turned away. Two 2005 court rulings supported these claims, finding that ZANU-PF
candidates politicized food distribution and used violence against the opposition.133
HIV/AIDS
In the midst of its political and economic crisis, Zimbabwe has been ravaged by HIV/AIDS. The
country’s HIV prevalence rate is among the world’s highest. The United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF) estimates that almost one-quarter of Zimbabwe’s children are orphans (primarily
attributable to AIDS), the highest percentage globally.134 The epidemic is also causing a severe
strain on the country’s healthcare system; reports suggest that 75% of hospital admissions in
recent years have been AIDS-related, leaving few beds or resources for other patients. To
compound this problem, the economic crisis has resulted in the exodus of many of the country’s
medical professionals. Of those who remain, many are infected with HIV themselves, leaving
Zimbabwe to rely upon assistance from others. The AIDS epidemic is having a crippling effect on
the economy—the inability of infected agricultural workers to adequately contribute to food
production further hamstrings the struggling industry.
128 AI, Zimbabwe: Power and Hunger.
129 “Mugabe Word for Word,” Sky News, May 24, 2004.
130 AI, Zimbabwe: Power and Hunger, and USAID, 2004 Annual Report for the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
(OFDA).
131 “ZANU-PF Admits Food Crisis,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting (London), March 7, 2005; “10 More Die of
Hunger in Bulawayo,” Zimbabwe Standard, March 7, 2005; “14 More Die of Hunger in Bulawayo,” Zimbabwe
Standard, February 15, 2005.
132 “Govt Delays Stall WFP Food Distribution,” Financial Gazette, December 13, 2006.
133 Reference to the rulings, made by Judges Nicholas Ndou and Rita Makarau, can be found in DOS, “Zimbabwe,”
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005.
134 “Zimbabwe Has Highest Percentage of Orphans in the World,” Associated Press, December 6, 2006.
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Although its infection rate remains high, Zimbabwe is one of the few countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa in which HIV prevalence rates have declined. While reports suggest evidence of changes
in sexual behavior,135 the country’s high mortality rates also play a role in the decreased
prevalence rate.136 Zimbabwe’s government has claimed significant resolve to fight the disease.
The country was the first to introduce a tax to finance HIV/AIDS programs (3% on taxable
income). President Mugabe has committed Zimbabwe to universal access to antiretroviral therapy
(ART) by 2010. Despite this commitment, access to ART is relatively low, with only 40,000 of
1.3 million HIV positive Zimbabweans on ART in 2008.137
For those who are able to access treatment, the country’s economic crisis has limited its impact.
Patients taking ART must maintain healthy diets for the treatment to be effective, but with
malnutrition rates high, many have been unable to benefit. Murambatsvina reportedly displaced
an estimated 80,000 infected with HIV/AIDS, leaving many not only food insecure but also
without access to ART. Reports suggest that recent farm invasions may have left workers
similarly unable to access ART. Experts suggest disruptions in ART may lead to increased
resistance in HIV-positive patients to the most common medication, Nevirapine.138 The
displacement and separation of families may also lead to an increase in unsafe sexual behavior.
Cholera and the Healthcare System Collapse
From August 2008 to June 2009, over 98,500 suspected cases of cholera, including almost 4,300
deaths, were reported, according to the U.N. World Health Organization (WHO). Neighboring
countries reported confirmed cases in border areas. Cholera, an acute diarrheal infection, is spread
by contaminated food and water. In Zimbabwe, the reported case fatality rate (CFR) reached
almost 6% at its peak in January 2009, much higher than the normal 1% CFR rate for cholera
cases globally. Following significant international intervention, the country’s CFR has since
decreased, and from September 2009 through January 2010 there were less than 150 cases
reported and five deaths.139
Many health experts attribute the severity of Zimbabwe’s 2008/2009 cholera outbreak to the
collapse of the country’s healthcare, water, and sanitation systems.140 According to reports, water
treatment and delivery have dramatically declined in recent years, and the decline of many other
basic social services, such as trash collection, pose significant health risks. Public healthcare
providers often lack basic medications, supplies and functioning medical equipment. Many health
workers have migrated to neighboring countries in search of work, and the cost of transport to
and from work for those who remain reportedly outweighs the salary they might receive. Many
public hospitals and clinics have closed due to understaffing.
135 UNAIDS, AIDS Epidemic Update, December 2007.
136 Dr. Peter Piot, “Launch of the 2005 AIDS Epidemic Update,” UNAIDS, November 21, 2005.
137 ART figures are available at the website of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR),
http://www.pepfar.gov.
138 Tibaijuka, 40.
139 World Health Organization, “Cholera in Zimbabwe- Update 3,” March 23, 2009.
140 Physicians for Human Rights, Health in Ruins: A Man-Made Disaster in Zimbabwe, January 2009.
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The Economy
The turmoil in Zimbabwe led to a severe economic contraction, a sharp drop in living standards
for the rural and urban poor, and a massive exodus of Zimbabweans in search of work. According
to the Solidarity Peace Trust, founded by clergy from Zimbabwe and South Africa, well over 3
million Zimbabweans were living outside the country by 2004. The Trust calculated that this
amounted to 25%-30% of the total population, or 60%-70% of productive adults.141 Given the
continued economic decline in recent years, many more are believed to have fled Zimbabwe since
then. Those who leave the country because of economic hardship often face difficult conditions in
their host country. Many of those who remain behind now reportedly rely on remittances from
family abroad.
The IMF and the World Bank
Dubbed “the world’s fastest shrinking economy” prior to 2009, Zimbabwe’s Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) has declined over 50% since 1998.142 World Bank and International Monetary
Fund (IMF) lending has been suspended since 2000 due to nonpayment of arrears, and foreign
currency for essential imports, particularly fuel, was in short supply. Zimbabweans have faced
steep rises in the prices of food and non-food items in recent years. The coalition government’s
adoption in 2009 of multiple currencies, including the U.S. dollar, stabilized prices, but the cost
of living remains high.
In December 2003, Mugabe selected Gideon Gono, credited with turning around a troubled
commercial bank, as governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ). The move was
welcomed by some, since Gono was regarded as a successful technocrat. However, critics
maintain that his measures to fight corruption and discover illegally held foreign exchange have
been used to damage government opponents and further the interests of ZANU-PF.143 Regardless
of Gono’s efforts, international assessments of Zimbabwe’s economic prospects remained bleak.
Ignoring the advice of the IMF, the government refused to devalue the official exchange rate.
Instead, in June 2006, Gono devalued the country’s currency, the Zimbabwe dollar, removing
three zeros in an effort to mitigate inflation.
Under “Operation Sunrise,” the government printed new “rebased” currency, known as “little
heroes,” in an effort to combat corruption and money laundering, according to the government.144
Zimbabweans were given only 21 days to exchange their old currency. Individuals were restricted
from exchanging more than Z$100 million (USD$1000) of the old notes without clearance from
tax authorities (companies were allowed to exchange Z$5 billion). Police arrested more than
3,000 at roadblocks for holding currency over the individual limit and seized a reported $40
million.145 Analysts suggest the devaluation did little to reverse the foreign exchange rate
141 Solidarity Peace Trust, An Account of the Exodus of a Nation’s People, November 2004.
142 See, for example, Simon Robinson, “Great Leap Backwards,” Time, May 29, 2005, and the World Bank’s “Country
Brief” on Zimbabwe, available at http://www.worldbank.org.
143 “Gono’s Mission Is to Save ZANU-PF, Not the Economy,” LiquidAfrica, December 3, 2004.
144 “Country is Committed to Uprooting All Forms of Corruption,” The Herald, August 24, 2006.
145 “Much Ado About Money,” IRIN, August 18, 2006.
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shortages.146 More recently, in February 2009, Gono devalued the currency again, removing 12
zeros from the Zimbabwe dollar.
In late September 2008, Zimbabwe began officially trading in foreign currency in an attempt to
lower prices, and in February 2009, under the direction of new Finance Minister Tendai Biti of
the MDC, the government began issuing government salaries in vouchers good for $100 U.S.
dollars. Biti and Prime Minister Tsvangirai pledged to pay salaries in foreign currency in an effort
to get Zimbabweans to return to work. Zimbabwe government officials warn that without a
significant influx of foreign currency, they may be unable to maintain these salaries. Salaries have
increased slightly in the past year, but remain extremely low by regional standards.
Zimbabwe is currently restricted from borrowing from the IMF, to which the country still owes
over $100 million. The government paid $120 million in 2005 and $9 million in 2006 to settle
other outstanding arrears with the Fund and to avoid compulsory withdrawal from the IMF. The
source of the funds used to pay the IMF debt has been a source of considerable speculation in the
media.147 Mugabe has dubbed the IMF a “political instrument” and “monster” for regime
change.148 Zimbabwe also owes an estimated $600 million to the World Bank and $460 million to
the African Development Bank; in total the country’s debt is estimated at $6 billion, including
payment arrears of $3.8 billion. In response to the September 2008 power sharing agreement, the
IMF’s Managing Director encouraged the Zimbabwe government discuss policy reforms with the
Fund and to “take steps to show clear commitment to a new policy direction.”149 Following a
consultation visit to the country in March 2009, the IMF noted positive steps toward fiscal
discipline and offered to provide further policy advice, but warned that IMF funding would not be
renewed until Zimbabwe begins to repay its debts and establishes “a track record of sound policy
implementation [and] donor support.”150 The IMF again noted progress after a March 2010 visit,
but has suggested that the country’s economy will not recover without debt relief. The World
Bank has pledged technical assistance to the new coalition government, but like the IMF has
predicated major support on Zimbabwe’s payment of its arrears.
Attempts to Revive Agriculture Industry
In addition to the ZANU-PF government’s attempts to revive its flagging agriculture industry
through the introduction of a command agriculture system (see “Zimbabwe’s Food Crisis”
section, above), the Mugabe administration introduced long-term leases to provide security of
tenure for farmers willing to cultivate land nationalized in the 2005 constitutional amendment.
One of the unintended side effects of Mugabe’s 2000 land reform strategy, which resulted in the
abolition of land tenure, was that farmers were unable to use their land as collateral to obtain bank
loans to invest in their farms. As a result, few commercial farmers were able to find the capital to
maintain productivity. The government began to distribute 99-year leases in November 2006, and
among the initial recipients were 19 white farmers, which came as a shock to many after Mugabe
146 “Bag of Bricks: Hyperinflation in Zimbabwe,” The Economist, August 26, 2006, and “Zimbabwe: Millions no
Longer Millionaires,” African Business, October 2006.
147 See, for example, “A Zimbabwean Businessman, His Farms Seized, Takes on Mugabe,” Washington Post, February
24, 2006.
148 “Mugabe’s 82nd Birthday Blast at Zimbabwe,” Business Day, February 21, 2006.
149 IMF, Statement by IMF Managing Director Strauss-Kahn on Zimbabwe, Press Release No. 08/207, September 15,
2008.
150 Tony Hawkins, “IMF Dampens Hopes of Aid to Zimbabwe,” Financial Times, March 25, 2009.
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declared in July 2005 that his land reform program would be complete only when there was “not
a single white on the farms.”151 Some suggest financial institutions have been reluctant to accept
the new leases as collateral, given that the government reserves the right to cancel the lease if it
deems the farm unproductive. There are reportedly less than 400 white farmers left in Zimbabwe
in 2008, and evictions in 2009 further reduced their number to an estimated 250.
Zimbabwe continues to suffer from electricity shortages, and its internal power generation
capacity is reportedly capable of meeting only half of the country’s demand. The government
announced in 2007 its intention to ration electricity to households across the country in order to
divert its dwindling supplies for irrigation of Zimbabwe’s winter wheat crop.152 Periodic
electricity shortages, caused by supply cuts from Mozambique, South Africa, and Zambia,
compounded Zimbabwe’s economic woes, cutting the production capacity of the manufacturing
and mining sectors by as much 50%, according to some reports.153 The MDC Minister for Energy
and Power Development has asserted that country’s power infrastructure is in disrepair and up to
$1 billion will be needed to fix the crumbling energy sector.154
The Mining Industry
While the country’s agriculture industry founders, its mining industry has continued to bring
much-needed income into Zimbabwe. Mining has accounted for almost half of Zimbabwe’s total
foreign currency revenues in recent years. Zimbabwe has the world’s second-largest reserves of
platinum, behind South Africa.155 In early 2006, the government announced plans to take a 51%
share of all foreign-owned mines for local black investors; 25% of that share would be acquired at
no cost to the government, and mines that refused to part with their shares would be expropriated.
After industry officials cautioned that the plan would deter foreign investment, the proposal was
modified, allowing firms that invested in community projects to keep their majority share. They
voted to approve similar plans to take a majority share in all foreign-owned businesses in
September 2007; the legislation became law in March 2008. The government has insisted that it
will not expropriate foreign-owned companies and that the law will not be applied to every
company, but rather “on the basis of capital (investment) and employment levels.”156 Regulations
related to the law have been subject to considerable debate within the transitional government,
and critics argue the law further deters much-needed foreign investment.
The coalition government has begun to take measures to encourage investment in the mining
sector. Under the previous administration, gold miners were required to sell their product to the
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. As the bank’s foreign currency reserves dwindled, it reportedly
ceased to pay miners for the gold, and many of the country’s gold mines closed. With current gold
prices strong, the new government is now allowing the mines to market their own gold and accept
payment in foreign currency. It has also cut the tax on gold export revenues. Zimbabwe’s gold
151 “In Reversal, Mugabe Seeks White Farmers,” UPI, December 17, 2006.
152 “Zimbabwe to Ration Electricity for Homes to Four Hours a Day,” Reuters, May 10, 2007.
153 “Power Cuts Halt Harare Factories,” Business Day, October 29, 2007.
154 “Mudzuri Says $1 Billion Needed to Revamp Energy Sector,” SW Radio Africa, February 25, 2009.
155 The largest mining operations in the country are controlled by Impala Platinum and Anglo Platinum, respectively.
These South African-owned companies are the world’s largest platinum producers.
156 “Zimbabwe Clarifies Nationalization Legislation,” Financial Times, March 11, 2008.
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sector grew by 14.6 % in 2009 and is forecast by the government to grow 24.6 % in 2010. Growth
in other sectors of the mining industry is expected to be more moderate.
Illegal Mining
The Zimbabwe government has taken steps to crackdown on illegal mining, although some
suggest that members of ZANU-PF may be complicit. Police arrested an estimated 20,000 illegal
miners in late 2006, including several hundred reportedly legal small-scale miners, confiscating
gold, diamonds, emeralds, and gold ore. Security forces have been accused of serious human
rights abuses As a result of the collapse of the formal economy, many of the country’s
unemployed have resorted to illegal mining, selling their goods on the black market. According to
reports, most of the miners were released after paying fines.
“Blood Diamonds”?
The World Diamond Council (WDC), a diamond industry organization that aims to prevent the
trade of conflict diamonds, raised concerns in December 2008 that rough diamonds from
Zimbabwe were being exported illegally, rather than through the Kimberly Process (KP), an
international government certification scheme designed to prevent the “blood diamond” trade.
According to civil society reports, Zimbabwean soldiers in the Marange diamond fields have
forced villagers to labor in the mines and then smuggled the stones from the country.157 Rough
stones from Zimbabwe have reportedly been confiscated in India and Dubai. The European Union
pressed for an investigation into Zimbabwe’s compliance with its Kimberly obligations in early
2009, and a high level KP delegation visited Zimbabwe in March to express the group’s concern
with reports of violence and smuggling from the Marange area. The KP Secretariat refrained from
suspending Zimbabwe from the certification scheme, however.158 During a KP Plenary meeting in
November 2009, the body called for stringent export controls on diamonds from Marange. The
Zimbabwe government reported later that month that security forces had begun withdrawing from
the area, and a judge ordered that the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe hold all diamonds from the area
until legal claims regarding the Marange mines are resolved. The U.S. government and others
have called for Zimbabwe to be suspended from the Process if the controls recommended at the
KP Plenary are not implemented. In the meantime, international diamond dealers in Antwerp
announced that they would not deal in Marange diamonds until the controls are fully in place.
The Kimberly Process had previously investigated allegations that “blood diamonds” from the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) were being smuggled along with rough stones from
Zimbabwe into South Africa for export. The Mugabe government dismissed those claims as a
Western attempt to promote regime change. Zimbabwe has been previously linked to conflict
diamonds; senior officials were named in a 2003 U.N. report for profiting from illicit trade during
Zimbabwe’s military operations in the DRC.159
157 World Diamond Council Press Release, “WDC Calls for Concerted International Action to Halt Theft of Natural
Resources in Zimbabwe,” December 10, 2008; “Soldiers are the New Illegal Diamond Miners,” IRIN, January 20,
2009.
158 Kimberly Process Certification Scheme Secretariat, “Public Statement on the Situation in the Marange Diamond
Fields, Zimbabwe,” March 2009.
159 Zimbabwe is a signatory of the Kimberly Process. For more information, see CRS Report RL30751, Diamonds and
Conflict: Background, Policy, and Legislation, by Nicolas Cook.
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“Look East” Policy
Blaming the United States, the United Kingdom, and other Western governments for the country’s
economic crisis, President Mugabe sought to engender investment and trade opportunities with
Asia, particularly China. Dubbed the “Look East” policy, Mugabe’s efforts were criticized by his
own party as insufficient to address the economy’s slide. In December 2006, the Parliamentary
Portfolio Committee on Budget, Finance, and Economic Development, chaired by a ZANU-PF
MP, accused the central bank governor of exacerbating inflation with “quasi-fiscal activities” and
warned the administration that “the Far East destinations be viewed as a market in its infancy and
that the traditional market of the West should not be neglected as the nation moves toward
regularizing relations with the international community.”160
The Military and the Economy
Critics contend that President Mugabe has bought the continued loyalty of the country’s security
forces through patronage and bribery.161 Some observers suggest that loyalty of the security forces
may have come at a heavy cost to the economy. In 2006, the government reportedly spent more
than $20 million to purchase new cars for police, military and intelligence officers. The security
forces and civil service also reportedly received an almost 300% pay raise to counter record
desertion rates. Observers continue to speculate on how the government has paid for its military
purchases from China, including a reported $240 million in fighter jets.
In addition to allegations of land and housing handouts to security personnel, critics of the
government highlight a significant number of current and former military officers who have been
appointed to civilian government positions. Mugabe previously placed current or former military
officers in control of the Ministries of Energy and Industry, the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (in
charge of tax collection), the electoral commission, the state railway, the Grain Marketing Board,
and the parks authority, and several have served in the Senate and ambassadorial posts abroad.
Several of these individuals still hold these offices.
As the economy continued to collapse in recent years, there were signs that the government might
be running out of funds to maintain its security forces. During a parliamentary hearing in mid-
2007, the Defense Minister reportedly suggested that soldiers were dissatisfied with their low
salaries and that the forces were running out of food and might have to suspend training if new
funds were not released.162 Later that month, Zimbabwean intelligence officials reportedly
uncovered a coup plot led by several senior military officials. Unconfirmed reports suggest that as
many as 400 members of the army, air force, and police may have been involved in the plan,
which allegedly aimed to remove Mugabe and to install Emmerson Mnangagwa as president.
Mnangagwa, who has reportedly long sought to succeed Mugabe, denied any knowledge of the
plot. Other sources suggest Vice President Joice Mujuru and her husband were behind the coup
attempt and used Mnangagwa’s name to discredit him. Neither Mnangagwa nor the Mujurus were
officially accused of involvement, although some reports suggest Solomon Mujuru may have
160 “Zimbabwe: Parliamentary Body Urges State to ‘Normalize’ Trade Ties with West,” BBC Monitoring Africa,
December 8, 2006.
161 “Militarization of State Firms Cause for Worry,” Zimbabwe Independent, May 26, 2006.
162 “Soldiers Go Hungry,” Financial Gazette, May 23, 2007.
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been placed under house arrest for a limited time.163 More recently, in November 2008, soldiers
looted Harare stores after they were unable to access their paychecks. Like other civil servants,
the military and police now receive regular salary payments under the coalition government.
International Perspectives
The international community has been divided on how to respond to Zimbabwe’s economic and
political crises. In general, Western nations and institutions have expressed opposition to Robert
Mugabe’s methods of rule, and have pursued policies intended to pressure the Zimbabwe
government for reforms. Mugabe has enjoyed some sympathy in Africa, where he has been
viewed as an elder statesman and a leader of the anti-colonial struggle, and among the Non-
Aligned nations generally. This has changed to an extent in recent years, however, with some
African leaders concluding that the Zimbabwe situation has been damaging to Africa’s interests
and that political and economic reforms are needed. Nevertheless, African countries supported
Zimbabwe in its successful bid to chair the United Nations Commission on Sustainable
Development in 2007, allegedly to show African solidarity against Western opposition. AU
member states were unable to come to a conclusion on how to address Zimbabwe’s political
situation at the 2008 AU Summit in Egypt, despite election observer reports from the AU, SADC,
and the Pan-African Parliament finding that the June runoff was not free or fair.
The international donor community has generally expressed support for the new coalition
government, but has predicated significant assistance on improvement in the following areas:
the immediate release of all political prisoners;
the end of farm disruptions;
the cessation of politically motivated violence;
the establishment of a credible and transparent Reserve Bank team;
an end to harassment and intimidation of the media;
and a commitment of all stakeholders to holding credible elections in a timely manner.164
U.S. Policy
The United States was critical of the ZANU-PF government for its poor human rights record and
lack of respect for the rule of law, but has expressed cautious support for the coalition
government. Key elements of U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe have included targeted sanctions
against high-ranking ZANU-PF members and their affiliates, support for South Africa to
spearhead an African effort to restore democracy, and assistance intended to help the country’s
poor and strengthen civil society. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told Congress
during her 2005 confirmation hearing that Zimbabwe was one of six “outposts of tyranny”
163 “Army Investigates Reports of Coup Plot,” SW Radio Africa, June 14, 2007.
164 Remarks by the German Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Dr. Albrecht Conze, as referenced in “Getting Zimbabwe to
Work Again,” The Zimbabwe Times, March 29, 2009.
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worldwide and that the United States stood with the oppressed people there.165 These remarks
provoked an angry personal response from Mugabe.166 Prior to the formation of the unity
government, current Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton told the Senate in January 2009
that “the suffering inflicted on the Zimbabwean people by the illegitimate government of Robert
Mugabe is appalling.” Under her leadership, the State Department has welcomed the new
government but warned, “we will not consider providing additional development assistance or
even easing sanctions until we see effective governance.”167
Sanctions
The Mugabe administration has routinely blamed its economic crisis on sanctions from the west.
The United States does not currently have trade sanctions against Zimbabwe, with the exception
of a ban on transfers of defense items and services to the country. The U.S. government has,
however, frozen all non-humanitarian government-to-government aid.168 Zimbabwe is not eligible
for trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) because of its poor
record of economic management and human rights abuses.
The White House has annually renewed U.S. sanctions against ZANU-PF leaders. The sanctions
are intended to punish those responsible for Zimbabwe’s difficulties without harming the
Zimbabwe population at large. The initial sanctions, imposed in 2003, ban travel to the United
States by “senior members of the government of Robert Mugabe and others ... who formulate,
implement, or benefit from policies that undermine or injure Zimbabwe’s democratic institutions
or impede the transition to a multi-party democracy.” Persons who benefit financially from
business dealings with such individuals are also banned, as are the spouses of people in either
group. In 2003, President Bush issued an executive order freezing assets held in the United States
by 75 high-ranking Zimbabwe officials and Mugabe’s wife, Grace.169 Nine companies and
commercial farms were added in 2004, and the list has been further expanded since then. The
executive order also allows the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, to go beyond previous authority and block the property of additional persons who “have
engaged in actions or policies to undermine Zimbabwe’s democratic processes or institutions,”
their immediate family members, and any persons assisting them.170 President Bush added
additional names to the list in December 2007 and November 2008. President Obama most
recently renewed the sanctions in March 2010. In January 2010 coalition government officials,
including Prime Minister Tsvangirai, requested that sanctions against certain banks and
parastatals on the list be reviewed and possibly removed.
165 “Rice Targets 6 ‘Outposts of Tyranny,’” Washington Times, January 19, 2005. The others were Cuba, Burma, North
Korea, Iran, and Belarus.
166 “Zimbabwe’s Mugabe Lashes Out at Rice, Blair at Campaign Launch,” AFP, February 11, 2005.
167 Daily Press Briefing by State Department Spokesman Robert Wood, February 11, 2009.
168 In 2006, Zimbabwe was found to be in violation of crimes related to human trafficking and was subject to sanction
under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-386) for FY2007. In 2007, the State Department moved
Zimbabwe from a “Tier 3” to a “Tier 2” designation, meaning that the government did not meet the minimum standards
for the elimination of trafficking, but was making significant efforts to do so. In 2009, Zimbabwe was redesignated as a
“Tier 3” country, suggesting that the government’s efforts to combat trafficking were insufficient. Zimbabwe retained
its Tier 3 ranking in the 2010 report. For more information, see U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons
Report, available at http://www.state.gov/g/tip.
169 Seventy-seven individuals were named in the executive order (EO 13288), but one of these had died.
170 The text of this annex to EO 13288 can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov.
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Congressional Response
Congress made clear its opposition to Robert Mugabe’s policies in the Zimbabwe Democracy and
Economic Recovery Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-99), which criticized “economic mismanagement” and
“undemocratic practices” in Zimbabwe. This legislation called for consultations with allies on
economic sanctions and a travel ban. In the 109th Congress, the U.S. House of Representatives
passed H.Res. 409 in December 2005, condemning Operation Murambatsvina, which the
resolution termed a “humanitarian disaster that has compounded the country’s humanitarian food
and economic crises.” The resolution also called on the U.N. and African regional bodies to
investigate the impact of the demolitions and requested that the Administration use its influence
to advocate further action by the IMF against the Zimbabwean government. Senator Russ
Feingold (D-WI) introduced S.Amdt. 1254, which was included in the final version of the
FY2006 foreign operations appropriations bill (P.L. 109-102). This amendment provided $4
million for democracy and governance activities in Zimbabwe.
The 110th Congress was active on Zimbabwe. On April 17, 2007, the House of Representatives
passed H.Con.Res. 100, sponsored by Representative Tom Lantos, condemning the Zimbabwean
government’s recent actions against opposition and civil society activists. In June 2007, the
Senate passed parallel legislation, S.Con.Res. 25, introduced by then-Senator Barack Obama.
Former Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton introduced S. 1500, the Support for Democracy and
Human Rights in Zimbabwe Act of 2007, which would have authorized up to $10 million to
support democracy and human rights programs in the country.
Several Members of Congress issued statements highly critical of the Mugabe Administration
surrounding the 2008 elections and the ongoing political violence. Some wrote letters to Bush
Administration officials or African leaders. On April 25, the Senate passed S.Res. 533, introduced
by Senator John Kerry, calling for the immediate release of the presidential results, an end to the
political violence and intimidation, and a peaceful transition to democratic rule. The resolution
also supported calls for an international arms embargo and other targeted sanctions against the
Mugabe regime, and encouraged the creation of a comprehensive political and economic recovery
package in the event a democratic government is installed. The House passed H.Res. 1230,
sponsored by Representative Donald Payne and all the House Members of the Congressional
Black Caucus, among others, condemning the violence and calling for a peaceful resolution to the
political crisis. H.Res. 1270, sponsored by Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, was also passed,
calling for an international arms embargo, urging the United Nations to deploy a special envoy to
Zimbabwe and encouraging the parties to discuss the creation of a government of national unity.
Prior to the June runoff, Representative Adam Schiff introduced legislation calling on the
Zimbabwe government to postpone the election. Representative Tom Tancredo also introduced
legislation, H.Con.Res. 387, calling for the United States to sever diplomatic ties with Zimbabwe.
The 111th Congress continues to monitor the progress of the transitional government, and has
begun to review existing U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe. In March 2009, Representative Ros-
Lehtinen introduced H.Res. 238, declaring the economic and humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe to
be a threat to international security. Seven months after the new government’s formation, the
Senate Foreign Relations Africa Subcommittee held a hearing, Exploring U.S. Policy Options
Toward Zimbabwe’s Transition. Following that hearing, Subcommittee Chairman Russ Feingold
called the transition a “great opportunity ... to help advance real reform and recovery,” noting that
while the transition remains incomplete and abuses in Zimbabwe continue, “we need to seize this
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opportunity and look for ways that we can proactively engage and help strengthen the hands of
reformers in Zimbabwe’s transitional government.”171 On May 4, 2010, Senator Feingold, Senator
Johnny Isakson, and Senator John Kerry introduced S. 3297, the Zimbabwe Transition to
Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2010. According to Senator Feingold, S. 3297 “aims
to update U.S. policy and to provide the necessary direction and flexibility for the United States
to proactively push for democracy and economic recovery in Zimbabwe.”172
U.S. Support for African Diplomacy
During President Bush’s visit to South Africa in 2003, he praised the work of Thabo Mbeki as the
“point man” in seeking a Zimbabwe solution. The statement suggested to some that the United
States was stepping back from a lead role on the Zimbabwe issue and would accede to Mbeki’s
“quiet diplomacy” (see “South Africa” section, below) as the best means of achieving reform in
Zimbabwe.173 Mbeki reportedly assured President Bush at that time that he would be able to bring
about talks between ZANU-PF and the MDC, which did not occur until 2007. In 2004, former
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Jendayi Frazer, who was Ambassador to South Africa
at the time, called for the formation of a “coalition of the willing” to deal with Zimbabwe. Frazer
reiterated South Africa’s position of leverage, and insisted more needed to be done by African
states to return Zimbabwe to democracy.174 The Obama Administration has expressed support for
South Africa’s role as the SADC facilitator on Zimbabwe issues.
U.S. Assistance
The United States remains the leader in humanitarian relief aid to the Zimbabwean people,
supplying an estimated $1 billion in assistance since 2002. In FY2008, U.S. assistance included
$271 million in food aid and $22 million in other humanitarian assistance, as well as over $22
million in health programs and over $10 million for democracy and governance support. During
President Obama’s June 2009 meeting with Tsvangirai, President Obama pledged $73 million in
new governance, education, and health assistance to Zimbabwe; in total, the U.S. government
obligated over $292 million in foreign aid in FY2009. The U.S. government provided over $7.3
million in FY2009 specifically to address the cholera outbreak, in addition to $8.6 million for
other water and sanitation programs. The State Department estimates that $89 million will be
spent on Zimbabwe in FY2010, not including food aid, and has requested $99 million for
FY2011.175 The Administration has indicated that the provision of non-humanitarian assistance
directly to the government remains predicated on progress toward political reforms. Key elements
of current U.S. policy continue to include targeted sanctions against high-ranking members of
ZANU-PF and their affiliates, support for economic and democratic reforms, and the provision of
assistance intended to help the country’s poor and strengthen civil society. Zimbabwe is not
among the countries eligible to participate in the Millennium Challenge Account program, nor is
it a focus country for the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief.
171 Statement of Senator Feingold on Zimbabwe’s Transition for the Congressional Record, October 5, 2009.
172 Statement of Senator Feingold Upon Introducing New Legislation on Zimbabwe for the Congressional Record, May
4, 2010.
173 “Bush Backs Mbeki on Zimbabwe,” The Guardian (London) July 10, 2003.
174 “US Seeks ‘Coalition’ to Force Zimbabwe Regime Change,” The Independent (UK), August 25, 2004.
175 The FY2009 figure includes food aid. Congress approved $40 million in supplemental appropriations for Zimbabwe
in FY2009, and $15 million in FY2008.
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USAID has supported local democracy advocates in Zimbabwe through a variety of programs
aimed at ensuring media freedom and strengthening civil society and the legislative process.
USAID partners were reportedly instrumental in documenting the demolitions and human rights
violations during Operation Murambatsvina and assisting in relief efforts. Legal restrictions have
limited the ability of journalists and independent newspapers to provide alternative source for
news, and the Zimbabwean government has controlled all domestic radio and television
broadcasting stations until recently. Reforms made under the coalition government have laid the
foundation for independent media to operate, but concerns remain that security forces may restrict
free speech. USAID has provided funding for Voice of America to broadcast Studio 7, a daily
program on shortwave and AM radio that USAID describes as “the principal source of
independent electronic media in the country.” Studio 7, along with UK-based Shortwave (SW)
Radio Africa and the Dutch-funded Voice of the People (VOP) had their broadcasts periodically
interrupted by the ZANU-PF government using Chinese jamming equipment.
The U.S. State Department lifted its warning for Americans traveling to Zimbabwe in 2009,
although it suggests that the situation in the country is “unpredictable and could deteriorate
quickly without warning” and has warned that, although there have been no recent events,
Americans have in the past been detained for expressing their views about the political regime
there.176 In 2006, a delegation of the U.S. Coalition of Black Trade Unionists (CBTU), led by
AFL-CIO Vice President William Lucy, was expelled from the country. Then-U.S. Ambassador
Christopher Dell said,
Clearly, the Zimbabwe government’s decision not to honor the delegation’s visas is the result
of the events of 13 September, when security forces brutally suppressed planned peaceful
demonstrations by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions.... This transparent attempt to
deflect international attention from the vicious beatings is itself an example of the
Zimbabwean government’s repression and of its fear of the truth.... There is increasing
acknowledgment that a man who was regarded as a liberator of his people is an oppressor.177
Other International Perspectives
United Kingdom
In 2002, in conjunction with the United States and the European Union, the British Parliament
imposed targeted sanctions on leading members and affiliates of the ZANU-PF regime, as well an
arms embargo and an asset freeze. The UK has imposed travel bans on over 100 members of the
ZANU-PF and close affiliates of the party. Britain continues to provide humanitarian aid in
Zimbabwe. Concurrently, the UK has maintained its willingness to release funds to Zimbabwe to
pay for parts of an orderly land redistribution program if Mugabe retires and the rule of law is
returned. With Mugabe remaining in office under the September 2008 power sharing agreement,
it is unclear whether Britain will concede to release such funds. Mugabe was extremely hostile
toward former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, a persistent critic. Speaking at his 81st birthday
celebration, Mugabe said the upcoming election would “kill once and for all the machinations of
that man in Number 10 Downing Street, who for some reason thinks he has the divine power to
rule Zimbabwe and Britain.... On March 31, we must dig a grave not just six feet but 12 feet and
176 DOS’s Consular Information Sheet for Zimbabwe is available at http://travel.state.gov/.
177 “EU Demands Probe into Congress of Trade Union Attacks,” Zimbabwe Standard, September 24, 2006.
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bury Mr. Blair and the Union Jack.”178 Current Prime Minister Gordon Brown has maintained his
predecessor’s position, boycotting the December 2007 EU-Africa Summit to protest Mugabe’s
attendance. In an April 2008 speech to the House of Commons, British Prime Minister Gordon
Brown called for an international arms embargo against Zimbabwe, accusing the government of
rigging the March elections and calling the political situation “completely unacceptable.”
Britain’s Queen Elizabeth stripped Mugabe of an honorable Knighthood he received in 1994.
European Union
The European Union was among the first to take action against Mugabe’s government. The EU
imposed targeted sanctions on 19 members of Zimbabwe’s elite and their spouses after pulling the
EU election observer team out of Zimbabwe in February 2002. These “light” sanctions were
upgraded by the EU to target 35 Zimbabwean leaders, and have been renewed yearly, with new
names added in January 2009. Current EU sanctions include a travel ban on over 160 members
and beneficiaries of the ZANU-PF, an arms embargo, and an asset freeze. Mugabe defied the
travel ban in 2005 to attend the funeral of Pope John Paul II. The EU continues to provide
humanitarian and limited development assistance.
Commonwealth
The Commonwealth of Nations sent a team of observers to the March 2002 presidential election
in Zimbabwe, and the group found “that the conditions in Zimbabwe did not adequately allow for
the free expression of the will of the electors.”179 Consequently, a special committee appointed to
monitor and respond to the vote, consisting of Australia, South Africa and Nigeria, determined
that Zimbabwe would be suspended from the Commonwealth for one year. The suspension was
the first public action against Mugabe by a body that included influential African countries. In
December 2003, the Commonwealth, including 19 other African members, voted to suspend
Zimbabwe indefinitely. On this occasion, the decision was strongly criticized by South Africa’s
President Mbeki, who had by then committed to his policy of quiet diplomacy, and by other
governments in southern Africa. Mugabe responded by withdrawing Zimbabwe from the
Commonwealth and ruling out any further discussions or a possible return.180 Some speculated, as
a result, that the Commonwealth’s action had backfired by placing Zimbabwe fully outside the
bounds of its influence. Others argued that indefinite suspension by a body including many
African members had important symbolic value in Africa and worldwide.
China and Iran
While many Western governments moved to isolate the ZANU-PF government in the last decade,
China and Iran strengthened ties and deepened their involvement in Zimbabwe’s economy. China,
which became active on the continent in the 1950s and 1960s to gain global influence, now looks
to Africa for natural resources to meet the needs of its growing population. A longtime ally of
ZANU-PF, which it backed during the liberation struggle, China is reported to be Zimbabwe’s
178 “Zimbabwe’s Mugabe Marks 81st Birthday With Attack on Opposition, Blair,” AFP, February 26, 2005.
179 “Commonwealth Observer Group’s Preliminary Report on Zimbabwean Presidential Elections,” March 14, 2002.
Available at http://www.afrol.com.
180 “Mugabe Rules Out Zimbabwe’s Return to the Commonwealth,” AFP, December 16, 2003.
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second-largest trading partner and its largest investor.181 Many observers see Zimbabwe’s
platinum concessions as a major draw for Beijing, and Chinese firms are playing roles in the cell
phone industry, as well as in television, radio, and power generation. China holds controlling
interest in the country’s only electricity generator.
Some critics worry China’s investment in Zimbabwe has come without the “strings attached” that
Western governments might require, such as commitments to human rights, accountability, and
anti-corruption. Arms agreements between China and Zimbabwe have attracted considerable
attention in recent years, as most Western governments continue to enforce an arms embargo
against the country. Zimbabwe’s reported $240 million purchase of 12 Chinese fighter jets drew
questions from analysts as to why a country that faces no immediate external threat from its
neighbors would need such an air force.182 Reports indicate that Zimbabwe also ordered riot gear,
water cannons, armored vehicles, and AK-47 rifles from China. How impoverished Zimbabwe
could pay for arms from China is a subject of much speculation; Defense Ministry officials have
admitted to being in arrears for the 2005 arms purchases. Some observers suspect that the
acquisitions are covered in some way by China’s growing economic role in Zimbabwe.183
In the face of Western condemnation and isolation, Zimbabwe also found an ally in Iran. During a
2006 visit to Tehran, President Mugabe reportedly secured commitments from Iran for direct aid
and Iranian assistance to its energy, agriculture, and mining industries. Reports indicate that Iran
or one of the Gulf countries may also be provide technical assistance to Zimbabwe to revive the
country’s only oil refinery, built 40 years ago to process Iranian crude. Most of Zimbabwe’s fuel
comes by road from South Africa; the country has insufficient foreign currency to import fuel in
bulk through a pipeline from the nearest port, Beira, Mozambique, to Zimbabwe.
In spite of Mugabe’s assurances of Iranian assistance, some observers suggest Iran may not have
met his expectations. Despite an agreement signed by the two countries in 2005, little financial
assistance appears to have been provided. As one economic advisor points out, “At the end of the
day, whether its China or Iran, investors want one thing: a return on their investment and they do
not seem to believe they can get that return (from Zimbabwe).”184 Likewise, Mugabe, traveling to
Beijing in 2005 to request assistance to deal with the country’s foreign exchange shortfall and
fuel shortage, received only $6 million for grain imports reportedly because Zimbabwe was
deemed unworthy of significant investment.185 Although Mugabe did secure a $200 million buyer
credit loan from China to promote agricultural production (reportedly the largest loan to
Zimbabwe since Western donors ceased lending), China dismissed reports that the countries were
negotiating a much larger $2 billion loan to revive the country’s flagging economy.186
In addition to investment and economic assistance, Zimbabwe’s Asian partners have occasionally
offered diplomatic support. A Chinese official visiting in 2004 said that his government
181 “Beijing Quietly Cools Relations With Mugabe,” Financial Times, June 5, 2007.
182 Defense analysts describe the K-8 as a trainer jet with light ground attack capabilities. Zambia and Namibia have
likewise purchased K-8s from China.
183 EIU, “The Government is to Buy More Jets from China,” September 15, 2006.
184 Excerpt from South Africa-based website ZimOnline in “Zimbabwe Leader ‘Frantically’ Seeking Allies,” BBC
Monitoring Africa, November 23, 2006.
185 “China Aid ‘Snub’ to Enable South Africa to Extract Concessions from Zimbabwe,” BBC Monitoring Africa,
August 1, 2005.
186 “Zimbabwe, China to Negotiate $2 Billion Dollar Loan Deal,” AFP, December 22, 2006 and China and “Beijing
Cools on Mugabe China in Africa,” International Herald Tribune, May 4, 2007.
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“appreciates the reasons for the land issue” and was opposed to any interference by foreign
governments.187 China played a lead role in trying to quiet U.N. efforts to condemn Zimbabwe for
Murambatsvina, and has vetoed proposed sanctions against the Mugabe Administration by the
Security Council. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad expressed support during Mugabe’s
visit, saying “We believe Zimbabweans have every right to defend their sovereignty and land. We
are happy that Zimbabwe has once again taken control over its resources and we support the land
redistribution programme.... We strongly condemn the bullying tactics of a number of (Western)
governments against Zimbabwe.”188
Nigeria
Although an observer team from Nigeria endorsed the 2002 presidential election in Zimbabwe,
Nigeria’s former president, Olusegun Obasanjo, attempted to mediate the country’s crisis. He was
reportedly concerned about the consequences of the Zimbabwe situation for the credibility of the
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). NEPAD was an AU initiative aimed at
demonstrating Africa’s capabilities for resolving its own problems in exchange for increased aid,
trade, and investment.189 Obasanjo supported Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Commonwealth,
and in 2004, he held a long discussion with Tsvangirai and an MDC delegation in the Nigerian
capital. The Nigerian leader then took the Zimbabwe visitors on a personal tour of his farm—an
unusual privilege.190 After the 2005 elections, Obasanjo met again with Tsvangirai, and the
government-owned Herald newspaper accused the Nigerian president of funding the MDC.191
Obasanjo’s successor, Umaru Yar’Adua, expressed his own concern with the situation in
Zimbabwe, telling journalists at a German-African summit in October 2007 that developments in
the country were “not in conformity with the rule of law.”192
South Africa
Former President Thabo Mbeki’s “quiet diplomacy” toward Zimbabwe drew criticism from some
for its slow pace, although both sides credit Mbeki with playing a critical role in the September
2008 power sharing agreement. Some analysts point out that his reluctance to openly confront or
condemn President Mugabe is understandable on a number of grounds. Mugabe lent aid and
shelter to the African National Congress (ANC), now the ruling party in South Africa, during its
long struggle against white minority rule, creating a bond of gratitude. Mugabe has enjoyed
considerable popularity around Africa and in South Africa itself, not least because of his moves to
seize lands owned by comparatively wealthy white farmers.
Nonetheless, many have been dissatisfied that South Africa, which is immensely more powerful
than neighboring Zimbabwe, and which has extensive control over Zimbabwe’s transport links to
the outside world, as well as over its electricity supplies, has not been able to improve the
Zimbabwe situation more quickly. As Zimbabwe’s largest trading partner, many consider South
Africa in a position to exert substantial leverage. At the same time, South Africa must weigh the
187 “Chinese Envoy Supports Zimbabwe’s Land Reforms,” AFP, November 2, 2004.
188 “Iran Slams Sactions Against Zim,” AllAfrica, November 22, 2006.
189 See CRS Report RS21353, New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), by Nicolas Cook.
190 September “Nigeria Rolls Out Red Carpet for Tsvangirai,” Zimbabwe Standard, November 15, 2004.
191 “The SA, Nigeria, and MDC Connection,” The Herald, November 6, 2005.
192 “Hotfoot from Harare,” Africa Confidential, Vol. 48, No. 24, November 30, 2007.
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Zimbabwe: Background
unintended effects of such leverage—state collapse across its northern border could produce a
sharp increase in illegal migration and have a substantial impact on South Africa. Some estimate
that over 3 million Zimbabweans have fled into the country.193 In May 2008, Zimbabwean and
other African immigrants became targets of xenophobic violence throughout South Africa. At
least 60 were killed.
Through his policy of engagement, former President Mbeki repeatedly brought the Zimbabwean
government and the MDC together to discuss Zimbabwe’s future. Mbeki’s offer of economic
incentives and an exit strategy for Mugabe in exchange for negotiations with the opposition and a
commitment to free and fair elections were unsuccessful. In 2005, as the IMF threatened to expel
Zimbabwe from the Fund for debt payment arrears, the country requested a loan from South
Africa for fuel, food, and electricity, as well as to address the IMF payments. Amid rumors that
the South African government would make any loan conditional on economic and political
reforms, the negotiations stalled and Mugabe found another source from which to repay the IMF
dues.194 In early 2006 speech, Mugabe warned Mbeki that he should “keep away” from
interference in Zimbabwe’s affairs.
Mbeki’s Zimbabwe policies drew criticism from within his country; former President Nelson
Mandela, Nobel laureate Archbishop Desmond Tutu, former opposition leader Tony Leon, and
even the ANC’s ally, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), were vocal
detractors. COSATU, South Africa’s powerful labor confederation, strongly opposed the quiet
diplomacy policy. A certain sympathy on the part of COSATU toward the MDC may be
inevitable, since the MDC has its roots in the union movement. COSATU delegations have been
forcibly expelled from Zimbabwe twice, first in 2004 and more recently in late 2006, when
COSATU members traveled to Harare to express their support for the ZCTU after the incidents of
police violence. One COSATU leader remarked, “we are not quiet diplomats,” and “we will not
keep mum when freedom does not lead to respect for workers and human rights.”195 When the
Mbeki government issued a terse initial statement following the March 2007 arrest of MDC and
civil society activists, COSATU criticized the government for a “disgraceful” response, “in the
face of such massive attacks on democracy and human rights, especially coming from those who
owed so much to international solidarity when South Africans were fighting for democracy and
human rights against the apartheid regime.”196
Defenders of Mbeki’s approach argued that he was the only leader with the influence and prestige
needed to sway Mugabe.197 Some observers expressed hope for Mbeki’s mediation role when the
president and Morgan Tsvangirai met in October 2004, after Tsvangirai’s acquittal. Tsvangirai,
who had been critical of quiet diplomacy in the past, said after the meeting that he welcomed
President Mbeki’s efforts to mediate.198 But Mbeki stunned the MDC and many supporters of
democracy in Zimbabwe in March 2005, when he told a press conference that he had “no reason
to think that anyone in Zimbabwe will militate in a way so that the elections will not be free and
fair.” He insisted that “there will be a free and fair election in Zimbabwe” and that “things like
193 Michael Wines, “Influx from Zimbabwe to South Africa Tests Both,” New York Times, June 22, 2007.
194 “Zimbabwe Pays Part of IMF Debt,” Washington Post, September 2, 2005.
195 “We Are Not Quiet Diplomats,” Daily Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), November 5, 2004.
196 “South Africa Ends ‘s ‘Silence’ on Zimbabwe, Urges Harare ‘to Respect Rule of Law,’” BBC Monitoring Africa,
March 14, 2007.
197 ICG, Zimbabwe: Another Election Chance, 14.
198 “Tsvangirai Changes Tune on Mbeki’s Quiet Diplomacy,” Business Day, October 29, 2004.
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access to the public media, things like violence-free election have been addressed.”199 Earlier, he
had termed Secretary Rice’s description of Zimbabwe as an outpost of tyranny as “an
exaggeration.”200 These remarks left critics questioning the substance behind Mbeki’s diplomacy.
The future of South Africa’s policy toward Zimbabwe is now in the hands of Mbeki’s successor.
Mbeki, who resigned in late September 2008, was temporarily succeeded by ANC Deputy
President Kgalema Motlanthe. Former Deputy President Jacob Zuma, who was elected as
president of the ANC in December 2007, became South Africa’s fourth post-apartheid president
in early May 2009.201 Zuma has previously referred to the Zimbabwean president as “a monster,”
and although he did not immediately call for Mbeki to step down as mediator after the 2008
elections, he did encourage African leaders to “assist” Mbeki, “given the gravity of the
situation.”202 President Zuma himself assumed the role of SADC facilitator on the Zimbabwe
situation in December 2009; he has appointed a three-person team led by one of his top political
advisors, Charles Nquakula, to manage the mediation. The country’s opposition parties, including
the Democratic Alliance and the Congress of the People (COPE) party, which emerged in late
2008, have encouraged strong action on Zimbabwe. Prior to the coalition government’s
formation, COPE’s leadership took the position that Zimbabwe’s neighbors should withhold
commodities to encourage reforms in the country.203
The African Union
The African Union (AU) and its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), have
been supportive of Mugabe in the past. In 2002, an OAU observer team labeled Mugabe’s
election victory legitimate, free, and fair. In 2004, when the AU allowed a report critical of the
Mugabe government to be circulated at its annual summit, some believed the regional body might
be indicating a change in its approach. The 114-page report, prepared by a delegation from the
African Commission for Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) that visited Zimbabwe in 2002,
reportedly criticized the Zimbabwe government for police abuses, press censorship, and
compromising the judiciary.204 The AU tabled the report at the summit, however, and declared it
would keep its contents secret until Zimbabwe has had a chance to respond in detail. According to
some media reports, the Zimbabwean government used procedural regulations and technicalities
to prevent its release.205 The ACHPR passed a resolution in 2005 calling on the “government of
Zimbabwe to respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of expression” and to allow a second
fact-finding mission to enter the country. The ACHPR resolution was hailed by human rights
advocates, who suggested, “This will exert a lot of pressure on Zimbabwe - this is the first time
such a significant body, so close to African heads of state, observes and condemns such defiance
199 “Mbeki Pays Tribute to Zimbabwe, Says Polls Will Be Free and Fair,” AFP, March 2, 2005.
200 “Mbeki Criticizes U.S Over Zimbabwe,” BBC, February 22, 2005.
201 For more information on challenges to a possible Zuma presidency, see CRS Report RL31697, South Africa:
Current Issues and U.S. Relations, by Lauren Ploch.
202 “I’m No Mugabe, but I Have Sympathy for What He Has Done,” The Sunday Telegraph (London), November 26,
2006; “Africa Shows Impatience on Zimbabwe Crisis,” Reuters, April 22, 2008. “Zuma Ratchets Up Rhetoric Over
Zimbabwe,” Financial Times, April 22, 2008.
203 “More Pressure Builds on Mugabe to Step Down,” SW Radio Africa, December 23, 2008.
204 “AU Report Slams Erosion of Rule of Law,” Zimbabwe Independent, July 16, 2004.
205 “It’s the Very Leaders Who Are Denying the People Their Justice,” Financial Gazette, July 20, 2006.
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of human rights compliance.”206 But like the previous report, the second mission’s findings were
rejected by the AU’s Council of Ministers because of “irregularities and procedural flaws.”207
Some observers and international human rights organizations such as the International Press
Institute (IPI), suggest that the AU’s repeated rejection of ACHPR resolutions on Zimbabwe
tarnished the integrity of the body. As one AU official warned, “If we continue to throw out every
human rights report that comes before us, people out there will stop taking us seriously.”208 IPI
also suggests that refusal of the AU to act on the ACHPR resolutions or to condemn human rights
abuses in Zimbabwe damages the credibility of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)
initiative, a vital part of NEPAD.209
Should ZANU-PF fail to abide by the terms of the power sharing agreement, criticism from the
AU may have little effect, unless it is accompanied by more substantial policy changes toward
Mugabe’s administration. The government has routinely ignored its detractors and has frequently
denied those who might be critical of the regime access to the country. In 2005, AU Commission
Chairman Alpha Konare sent Tom Nyanduga, Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Internally
Displaced Persons, and Asylum Seekers in Africa, as his envoy to investigate Operation
Murambatsvina. The Zimbabwean government prevented Nyanduga from conducting his
assessment and deported him, accusing the envoy of “western collusion and agenda adoption.”210
In November 2008, the government reportedly rejected the visa applications of several members
of the Elders, a group of senior world leaders, including Kofi Annan and former U.S. President
Jimmy Carter.
SADC
Many of the 14 members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are linked to
Zimbabwe by a common historical experience, as well as cultural and economic ties, and the
organization has been seen as disinclined to condemn the actions of President Mugabe’s
government. At its August 2004 summit in Mauritius, SADC approved new electoral principles
and guidelines for all its member nations.211 Analysts were hopeful that these rules might
motivate meaningful democratic reforms in Zimbabwe, particularly since they laid out detailed
guidelines for SADC observer missions.212 The signatory countries, including Zimbabwe, are
pledged to allow SADC observers freedom of movement and access. As noted above, the SADC
observer delegation’s favorable report for Zimbabwe’s 2005 elections was considered by critics of
the Mugabe administration to be disappointing.
206 “African Union Slams Human Rights Record,” IRIN, January 3, 2006.
207 International Press Institute, “IPI Disappointed By African Union’s Slow Progress in Criticizing Zimbabwe’s
Record on Human Rights, Press Freedom,” April 4, 2006. IPI is a global network of editors, media executives and
leading journalists in over 110 countries that promotes press freedoms and journalistic standards.
208 “Mkapa Has a Long Shot at Moving ‘Bad Boy’ Mugabe,” AllAfrica, August 25, 2006.
209 For further information on the APRM and NEPAD, see CRS Report RS21353, New Partnership for Africa's
Development (NEPAD), by Nicolas Cook.
210 “Harare Raps African Union Human Rights Body,” U.S. Fed News, July 6, 2005.
211 SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (Adopted by the SADC Summit, Mauritius,
August 2004). Available at http://www.iss.co.za.
212 ICG, Zimbabwe: Another Election Chance, 13.
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Although Mugabe’s neighboring leaders have not singled him out for criticism, with the
exception of Botswana, they have been increasingly concerned with the impact of Zimbabwe’s
crisis on their own countries. Southern African leaders blamed Zimbabwe and Swaziland for
undermining economic growth in the region at a SADC Summit in Lesotho in 2006. Botswana
has spoken out in the past on regional problems attributed to Mugabe’s policies, including the
burden placed on the country by Zimbabwe’s refugees. In March 2007, following the arrest of
Tsvangirai and other opposition members, Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete traveled to Harare
to discuss the incident, and after the SADC summit, President Mbeki was nominated as mediator.
SADC’s election observer mission to the June 2008 runoff found that the election “did not
represent the will of the people of Zimbabwe,” and called for dialogue among all political
stakeholders toward a negotiated solution.213 Botswana refused to recognize Mugabe as president
after the June 2008 runoff.
Pressure from SADC does appear to have brought the Zimbabwe parties to join together in the
new coalition government, but it remains unclear to what extent they might be willing to enforce
the deal if the parties cannot work together. At a regional summit in late March 2009, SADC
approved an $8 billion plan for Zimbabwe’s economic recovery, including $2 billion for short-
term recovery projects. Member states are still determining what portion of that assistance they
might provide, but many expect the regional body to appeal to foreign donors for much of it.
Table 1. Regional Efforts to Block Arms Transfer to Zimbabwe
On April 18, 2008, as the Chinese freighter An Yue Jiang sat in the waters off South Africa’s port city of Durban
waiting to unload its cargo, the High Court of South Africa issued a court order blocking the cargo’s transfer through
South African territory.214 According to court documents, the ship carried 77 tons of bullets, rocket-propelled
grenades, and mortars bound for Zimbabwe. Freight and dock workers of the South African Transport and Allied
Workers Union (SATAWU) had already refused to unload or transport the shipment. Their protest was backed by
the powerful Congress of Southern African Trade Unions (COSATU) and International Transport Workers’
Federation (ITF), which cal ed for an international boycott of the vessel, dubbed by some as the “Ship of Shame.” The
unions based their protest on concerns that the weapons could fuel violence in the aftermath of Zimbabwe’s
elections.
The international media closely tracked the freighter’s location as it searched for another African port in which to
unload the cargo. Zambia’s President publicly urged regional governments to bar the An Yue Jiang from entering their
waters. He welcomed Mozambique’s decision not to allow the ship access, “because we don’t want a situation which
will escalate the (tension) in Zimbabwe more than what it is.” U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer called
upon both the regional governments and China to prevent the weapons transfer. On April 22, a Chinese Foreign
Ministry spokesperson announced that the ship would return to China. The An Yue Jiang later docked in Angola to
refuel and unload construction supplies bound for the Angolan market, but was denied permission to unload its
Zimbabwe cargo.
Prospects for the Future
Despite hopes that the transitional government may bring change to Zimbabwe, life for many of
the country’s people remains a daily struggle. The rate of unemployment and the cost of living
remain high, and salaries for those with jobs are far below regional standards. In the near term,
the country’s agriculture industry shows little sign of recovery. The issues of property rights and
213 Preliminary Statement Presented by the Hon. Jose Marcos Barrica of the SADC Observer Mission, issued on June
30, 2008.
214High Court of South Africa Durban & Coast Local Division Case No. 4975/08
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Zimbabwe: Background
land reform will be among the most difficult for the government to address. Prospects for
Zimbabwe’s youngest generation remain poor. Primary school attendance dropped dramatically
after 2000. The provision of salary vouchers has brought many teachers back to work, but
enticing the thousands who have left the country to return will be a major challenge. Many
families are unable to afford basic food items, not to mention medicines or doctors. Analysts have
cited a number of reasons for Zimbabwe’s economic problems, including recurrent drought,
difficulties encountered in implementing economic reforms, and industrial competition from
comparatively cheap South African imports.215 At the same time, analysts place considerable
responsibility for Zimbabwe’s problems on the policies adopted and actions taken by the
government since 1997.
Zimbabwe is at a critical juncture. Prior to the power sharing agreement, the government took
some fiscal measures to reverse the economic downturn, but as hyperinflation continued to rise,
they were largely ineffective. Although the MDC has taken control of the Ministry of Finance in
the transitional government, it remains unclear how effective the new Ministry’s economic
policies will be in reversing the downturn if foreign donors continue to withhold assistance for its
recovery plans, estimated to require up to $8 billion. Many donor governments and institutions
are reluctant to release such funds until they can determine whether the coalition government’s
establishment will result in changes to the policies which brought about sanctions in the first
place. The MDC and ZANU-PF, long-standing political foes, must now demonstrate their
willingness to work together to put the country’s economy on the path toward recovery.
215 Teddy Brett and Simon Winter, “Origins of the Zimbabwe Crisis,” Focus (Helen Suzman Foundation), June 2003.
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Zimbabwe: Background
Figure 1. Map of Zimbabwe
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.
Author Contact Information
Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
lploch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7640
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