Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq
and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
Moshe Schwartz
Specialist in Defense Acquisition
July 2, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40764
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
Summary
The Department of Defense (DOD) increasingly relies upon contractors to support operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan, which has resulted in a DOD workforce that has 19% more contractor
personnel (207,600) than uniformed personnel (175,000). Contractors make up 54% of DOD’s
workforce in Iraq and Afghanistan. The critical role contractors play in supporting such military
operations and the billions of dollars spent by DOD on these services requires operational forces
to effectively manage contractors during contingency operations. Lack of sufficient contract
management can delay or even prevent troops from receiving needed support and can also result
in wasteful spending. Some analysts believe that poor contract management has also played a role
in abuses and crimes committed by certain contractors against local nationals, which may have
undermined U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
DOD officials have stated that the military’s experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with
congressional attention and legislation, has focused DOD’s attention on the importance of
contractors to operational success. DOD has taken steps to improve how it manages and oversees
contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. These steps include tracking contracting data, implementing
contracting training for uniformed personnel, increasing the size of the acquisition workforce in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and updating DOD doctrine to incorporate the role of contractors.
However, these efforts are still in progress and could take three years or more to effectively
implement.
The use of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan has raised a number of issues for Congress,
including (1) what role contractors should play in contingency operations, (2) whether DOD is
gathering and analyzing the right data on the use of contractors, (3) what steps DOD is taking to
improve contract management and oversight, and (4) the extent to which contractors are being
effectively included into military doctrine and strategy. This report examines current contractor
trends in Iraq and Afghanistan, the steps DOD has taken to improve contractor oversight and
management, and the extent to which DOD has incorporated the role of contractors into its
doctrine and strategy. The report also reviews steps Congress has taken to exercise oversight over
DOD contracting, including contracting issues that have been the focus of hearings and
legislation.
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
Contents
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
Managing Contractors during Contingency Contracting .............................................................. 3
Number and Roles of Contractors in the Central Command Region ............................................. 4
Contractors in CENTCOM.................................................................................................... 5
Contractors in Iraq ................................................................................................................ 7
Number of Contractors.................................................................................................... 7
Type of Work Performed by Contractors.......................................................................... 8
Profile of Contractors...................................................................................................... 9
Contractors in Afghanistan .................................................................................................. 10
Number of Contractors.................................................................................................. 10
Type of Work Performed by Contractors........................................................................ 12
Profile of Contractors.................................................................................................... 12
Efforts to Improve Contractor Management and Oversight ........................................................ 13
Contractors in DOD Strategy and Doctrines .............................................................................. 15
Can Contractors Undermine U.S. Efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan? ...................................... 16
DOD Strategy and Doctrine ................................................................................................ 17
The National Defense Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review.................................. 17
Field Manual on Operations .......................................................................................... 18
Field Manual on Counterinsurgency .............................................................................. 19
New Doctrine, DOD Instructions, and Other Efforts...................................................... 19
Selected Congressional Hearings and Legislation ...................................................................... 20
Private Security Contractors and Interrogators..................................................................... 21
Contractors Training Local Security Forces ......................................................................... 22
Contract Management, Oversight, and Coordination............................................................ 22
Training Contractors and the Military in Contingency Contracting ...................................... 23
Figures
Figure 1. Contractor Personnel as Percentage of Workforce in Recent Operations........................ 2
Figure 2. Number of Contractor Personnel in CENTCOM vs. Troop Levels ................................ 6
Figure 3. DOD Contractors in Iraq vs. Troop Levels.................................................................... 7
Figure 4. Iraq DOD Contractor Personnel by Type of Service Provided ....................................... 8
Figure 5. Iraq DOD Percent of Contractors Performing Types of Service..................................... 9
Figure 6. Breakdown of DOD Contractor Workforce in Iraq ...................................................... 10
Figure 7. DOD Contractor Personnel in Afghanistan vs. Troop Levels ....................................... 11
Figure 8. Breakdown of DOD Contractor Workforce in Afghanistan.......................................... 13
Figure A-1. Trend Analysis of Contractor Support by Type of Service Provided in Iraq.............. 24
Figure B-1. Trend Analysis of Contractors in Iraq by Nationality............................................... 25
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
Tables
Table 1. Comparison of Contractor Personnel to Troop Levels..................................................... 5
Table 2. DOD Contractor Personnel in Iraq ................................................................................. 9
Table 3. Number of Contractors Required.................................................................................. 12
Table 4. DOD Contractor Personnel in Afghanistan ................................................................... 12
Appendixes
Appendix A. Trend Analysis of Contractors in Iraq by Type of Service Provided ....................... 24
Appendix B. Percentage Breakdown of Contractors in Iraq by Nationality................................. 25
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 25
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 25
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
Background
The Department of Defense (DOD) has often relied upon contractors to support military
operations. During the Revolutionary War, the Continental Army relied on contractors to provide
such goods and services as transportation and engineering services, clothing, and weapons.1 Since
then, advances in warfare and technology have expanded the functions and responsibilities of
contractors in military operations.2 After the Cold War, reliance on contractors further increased
when DOD cut logistic and support personnel.3 As a result of these cuts, DOD lost in-house
capability and was forced to rely even further on contractor support.4 Many analysts now believe
that DOD is unable to successfully execute large missions without contractor support. These
analysts point to recent contingency operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans—the three
largest operations of the past 15 years—where contractors have comprised approximately 50% of
DOD’s combined contractor and uniformed personnel workforce (see Figure 1).5
1 Deborah C. Kidwell, “Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies,” Global War on
Terrorism Occasional Paper 12, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2005, p. 9. See also James
F. Nagle, History of Government Contracting, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: The George Washington University Law
School, 1999), pp. 16-19.
2 Congressional Budget Office, Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq, August 2008, p. 12.
3 CRS Report R40057, Training the Military to Manage Contractors During Expeditionary Operations: Overview and
Options for Congress, by Moshe Schwartz, p. 1.
4 For example, in 2008 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the Army had a contract for 11,000
linguists because DOD did not have the number of linguists needed. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD
Needs to Address Contract Oversight and Quality Assurance Issues for Contracts Used to Support Contingency
Operations, GAO-08-1087, September 26, 2008, p. 6.
5 For purposes of this report, DOD’s workforce is defined as uniformed personnel and the contractor workforce. DOD
civilian personnel are excluded from this count. According to DOD’s Joint Personnel Status Report, as of September 8,
2009, the DOD civilian workforce in Iraq was 2,033 employees (less than 1.0% of the total force) and the DOD civilian
workforce in Afghanistan was 1,706 employees (1.0% of the total force).
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
Figure 1. Contractor Personnel as Percentage of Workforce in Recent Operations
Source: Balkans: Congressional Budget Office. Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq. August 2008. pg 13;
Afghanistan and Iraq: CRS analysis of DOD data as of March 2010.
Contractors can provide operational benefits to DOD. Using contractors to perform non-combat
activities augments the total force and can also free up uniformed personnel to perform combat
missions. Since contractors can be hired faster than DOD can develop an internal capability,
contractors can be quickly deployed to provide critical support capabilities when necessary.
Contractors also provide expertise in specialized fields that DOD may not possess, such as
linguistics. Using contractors can also save DOD money. Contractors can be hired when a
particular need arises and be let go when their services are no longer needed. Hiring contractors
only as needed can be cheaper in the long run than maintaining a permanent in-house capability.
DOD has spent billions of dollars on contractors supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates, from 2003-2007, DOD obligated
almost $76 billion for contracts in the Iraqi theater.6 For Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 and the first half
of FY2008, DOD obligated approximately $30 billion on contractors for the conflict in Iraq and
Afghanistan (more than $5 billion for Afghanistan and approximately $25 billion for Iraq).7
6 The following countries are considered to be part of the Iraqi theater: Iraq, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. See Congressional Budget Office, Contractors’ Support of U.S.
Operations in Iraq, August 2008, p. 3.
7 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and
Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, GAO-09-19, October 1, 2008, p. 21.
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Managing Contractors during Contingency
Contracting
Lack of sufficient contract management can prevent troops from receiving needed support and
lead to wasteful spending.8 In addition, some analysts believe that lax contractor oversight may
lead to contractor abuses which can undermine U.S. counter-insurgency efforts (see “Can
Contractors Undermine U.S. Efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan?”)
Questions have been raised about DOD’s ability to effectively manage contractors during
contingency operations.9 For example, some analysts assert that DOD has not adequately planned
for the use of contractors, lacks contingency contracting experience, and does not sufficiently
coordinate contracts across military services.10 In 2007, a report by the Commission on Army
Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations (the Gansler Report) found
that contracting officer representatives, who are responsible for managing contracts, usually have
no prior experience with contractors and receive negligible training on how to manage
contractors.11 Some analysts argue that as a result, DOD is not getting the most out of the services
provided by contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Questions have also been raised about DOD spending on contractors. The Commission on
Wartime Contracting highlighted over-spending on contracts as a key concern.12 It reported that
managerial shortages and limited oversight of contractors led to potentially unnecessary
construction, such as a new $30 million dining facility to be completed a year before U.S. troops
were required to leave Iraq, even though a then-recently upgraded dining facility was located
nearby.13
Many analysts argue that only a culture shift in the military will improve contracting outcomes.
The Gansler Report found that despite the importance of acquisitions to military performance,
the Army apparently has not valued the skill and experience required to perform those
processes ... without significant systemic change, the Army acquisition processes
[contracting process] can be expected to inevitably return to below-mediocrity.14
8 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Stabilizing And Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Address Inadequate
Accountability over U.S. Efforts and Investments. GAO-08-568T. March 11, 2008. p. 4,6; See also Urgent Reform
Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, Op. Cit., p. 2.
9 See U.S. Government Accountability Office, High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-standing Problems
with Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces, GAO-07-145, December 18, 2006.
10 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Contract Management: DOD Developed Draft Guidance for Operational
Contract Support but Has Not Met All Legislative Requirements, GAO-09-114R, November 20, 2008, p. 1.
11 Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, Urgent Reform Required:
Army Expeditionary Contracting, October 31, 2007, p. 43.
12 Commission on Wartime Contracting: Interim Findings and Path Forward, 111th Cong., 1st sess., June 10, 2009;
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, At What Cost? Contingency Contracting In Iraq and
Afghanistan, June 2009.
13 Ibid, p. 52-54.
14 Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, p. 9; see also New American Foundation, Changing the
Culture of Pentagon Contracting, November 5, 2008.
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Other analysts have argued that DOD’s current approach to managing service contracts tends to be
reactive and has not fully addressed key factors for success.15 These analysts argue that to improve
contracting outcomes, DOD must (1) understand how and why it uses contractors, including the
number of contractors and types of services provided; (2) develop better management and
contract oversight structures; and (3) establish and commit to a strategic approach that defines
how contractors should be used to achieve operational success.
The use of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan raises a number of issues for Congress, including
(1) what role contractors should play in contingency operations, (2) whether DOD is gathering
and analyzing the right data on the use of contractors, (3) what steps DOD is taking to improve
contract management and oversight, and (4) the extent to which contractors are included in
military doctrine and strategy. This report will discuss current contracting trends in Iraq and
Afghanistan, steps DOD has taken to improve contractor oversight and management, and the
extent to which DOD has incorporated the role of contractors into its strategy and doctrine.
Number and Roles of Contractors in the Central
Command Region
Contractors supply a wide variety of services and products, including base support, construction,
security, training local security forces, and transportation, to assist DOD operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan.16 While many of these contractors work in Iraq and Afghanistan, a number are also
present in surrounding countries within the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (CENTCOM
AOR) and in the United States.17 For example, at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, the Army relies on
contractors to refurbish and repair vehicles used in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as the Bradley
Fighting Vehicle and armored personnel carriers.18
DOD did not begin to gather data on contractors until the second half of 2007. As a result, the
following CRS analysis includes the last ten quarters for Iraq and the last nine quarters for
Afghanistan, for the period ending March 31, 2010. In addition, a number of analysts have raised
questions about the reliability of the data gathered. For example, in October 2008, GAO reported
that DOD’s quarterly contractor reports were not routinely checked for accuracy or
completeness.19 DOD officials have acknowledged these shortcomings; in the second quarter for
FY2009 (Q2 FY2009) census, DOD reported that the data system previously used to count
15 For example, see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions: Tailored Approach Needed to
Improve Service Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-07-20, November 9, 2006, Highlights Page and p. 9.
16 For a discussion on DOD’s use of private security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, see CRS Report R40835, The
Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis, and
Options for Congress, by Moshe Schwartz.
17 USCENTCOM is responsible for operations in 20 countries in and around the Middle East including Afghanistan,
Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, U.A.E., Uzbekistan, and Yemen. The number of contractors based in the U.S. is small;
these contractors are not included in this analysis.
18 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Logistics: The Army Needs to Implement an Effective
Management and Oversight Plan for the Equipment Maintenance Contract in Kuwait, GAO-08-316R, January 22,
2008.
19 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and
Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, GAO-09-19, October 1, 2008, p. 6.
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contractors duplicated reported numbers on task order contracts. DOD stated that they are
working to improve the reliability and the type of data gathered.20 For example, DOD is
implementing the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT), which is
designed to track and monitor contractor personnel within a contingency operation. GAO has
raised questions regarding the implementation of SPOT and identified what it considers
shortcomings in the implementation of SPOT. According to GAO, DOD and the Department of
State disagreed with GAO’s recommendation because of “ongoing coordination efforts and
anticipated upgrades to SPOT.”21
Contractors in CENTCOM
According to DOD, as of March 31, 2010, there were 250,335 DOD contractor personnel in the
CENTCOM AOR compared to approximately 272,000 uniformed personnel in the region who are
supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.22 Contractors made up approximately 48% of
DOD’s combined contractor and uniformed personnel workforce in the CENTCOM AOR,23
representing a .92:1 ratio between contractors and uniformed personnel (see Table 1).
Table 1. Comparison of Contractor Personnel to Troop Levels
(As of March 2010)
Contractors
Troops
Ratio
Iraq
Only
95,461 95,900 1:1
Afghanistan Only
112,092
79,100
1.42:1
CENTCOM
AOR
250,335 272,260 .92:1
Source: CENTCOM 2nd Quarter Contractor Census Report; For Iraq and Afghanistan; Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs
of Staff, “Boots on the Ground” March report to Congress. For CENTCOM, see Defense Manpower Data
Center (DMDC), DRS 21198, “Average Number of Members deployed on any given day by Service Component
and Month/Year,” March 2010.
Notes: CENTCOM AOR includes figures for Iraq and Afghanistan. CENTCOM troop level adjusted by CRS to
deduct troops deployed to non-Central Command locations (e.g., Djibouti, Philippines, Egypt). Troops levels for
non-CENTCOM locations are from DMDC, DRS 11280, “Location Report” for December 2009, which is the
most recent data available.
20 Ibid.
21 See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Contingency Contracting :Further Improvements in Agency Tracking of
Contractor personnel and Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan, GAO-10-187, November 2, 2009.; U.S. Government
Accountability Office, Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Continue to Face Challenges in Tracking
Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan , GAO-10-1, October 1, 2009.
22 According to DOD, there were 274,798 troops dedicated to supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, of which
2,538 were based outside of the CENTCOM region (Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, and the Philippines). We subtracted the
2,538 personnel from the total number of troops to approximate the number of troops based in the CENTCOM region.
This adjustment was made for all prior CENTCOM AOR troop levels. See Defense Manpower Data Center, DRS
21198, “Average Number of Members deployed on any given day by Service Component and Month/Year” and the
“Location Report” for March 2010. Data from Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, and the Philippines is dated December 2009,
which is the most recent data available.
23 For purposes of this report, DOD’s workforce is defined as uniformed personnel and the contractor workforce. DOD
civilian personnel are excluded from this count. According to DOD’s Joint Personnel Status Report, as of September 8,
2009, the DOD civilian workforce in Iraq was 2,033 (less than 1.0% of the total force) and the DOD civilian workforce
in Afghanistan was 1,706 (less than 1.0% of the total force).
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The number of contractor personnel in the CENTCOM AOR roughly tracks to the number of
troops (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. Number of Contractor Personnel in CENTCOM vs. Troop Levels
350,000
300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
0
Mar.
June
Sept.
Dec.
Mar.
June
Sept.
Dec.
Mar.
08
08
08
08
09
09
09
09
10
Troops
Contractors
Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Reports. For troop levels, see Defense Manpower Data
Center (DMDC), DRS 21198, “Average Number of Members deployed on any given day by Service Component
and Month/Year,” March 2010; DMDC, DRS 11280, “Location Report”.
Notes: Troop level data based on data provided by DOD in March 2010. Troop levels for prior months are
adjusted in successive reports and therefore may differ from earlier DOD and CRS reports.
According to GAO, lessons learned and data analysis from past operations must be included in
the development of a strategic plan to define contractor involvement in future operations.24 Many
analysts agree that understanding the role contractors play in various DOD operations—including
the relationship between contractors and troop levels—could help to more effectively determine
contractor support requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as future operations.
An analysis of contractor data appears to indicate differences in how DOD uses contractors in
Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, contractor personnel made up 59% of DOD’s combined
uniformed and contractor personnel workforce in Afghanistan compared to 50% of the workforce
in Iraq. In addition, 70% of contractors in Afghanistan are local nationals compared to only 18%
in Iraq (see Table 2 and Table 4). Some analysts contend that understanding these differences—
and why they occur—could help DOD to strategically plan for the management and use of
contractors in future operations. For example, had DOD understood the extent to which it would
24 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Iraq and Afghanistan: Availability of Forces, Equipment, and Infrastructure
Should Be Considered in Developing U.S. Strategy and Plans, GAO-09-380T, February 12, 2009.
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rely on private security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD might have put in place a more
robust oversight and coordination mechanism earlier. 25
Contractors in Iraq
Number of Contractors
As reflected in Table 1 (above), as of March 2010, there were 95,461 DOD contractor personnel
in Iraq compared to approximately 95,900 uniformed personnel in-country. Despite fluctuations
throughout the last seven quarters, troop and contractor levels have remained relatively equal
(see). Contractors made up approximately 50% of DOD’s workforce in Iraq as of the second
quarter of FY2010. Overall contractor and troop levels have decreased for five consecutive
quarters at similar rates.
Figure 3. DOD Contractors in Iraq vs. Troop Levels
Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Census Reports; CRS Report R40682, Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars,
FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues, by Amy Belasco; Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Boots on the
Ground” monthly reports to Congress. September troop levels based on CRS estimates determined through
media reports and DOD press releases.
Notes: The y-intercept for the level of troops and contractor personnel is similar. The R2 value for the linear
trend line for contractor personnel is 0.84 and for uniformed personnel is .92. R2 is a statistical term used to
describe the goodness of the fit between the trend line and the data points. R2 is a descriptive measure between
0 and 1. The closer the R2 value is to one, the better the fit of the trend line to the data.
25 In addition, a number of military bases in Iraq were not large enough to house contractors because DOD did not
originally know how many contractors would be deployed with the military. As a result, DOD had to quickly find
alternative housing for these contractors, which resulted in increased costs for DOD. Based on discussions with DOD
officials, July 23, 2009.
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Type of Work Performed by Contractors
Contractors perform a wide range of services in Iraq. As of March 2010, 62,295 personnel (65%
of contractors) performed base support functions such as maintaining the grounds, running dining
facilities, and performing laundry services (see Figure 4). Security was the second most common
service provided, with 11,610 personnel (12% of contractors). Combined, these two categories
accounted for almost 80% of DOD contractors in Iraq.
Figure 4. Iraq DOD Contractor Personnel by Type of Service Provided
(as of March 2010)
Source: DOD US CENTCOM 2nd Quarter Contractor Census Report.
Notes: Numbers may vary slightly from data in other sections of the report due to differences in the points in
time when data was gathered. The Department of Defense did not separately track Logistics/Maintenance or
Training until the first quarter of 2010.
As the overall number of troops in Iraq has decreased, so to has the overall number of contractors.
For example, since June 2008, as troop levels dropped by 57,400 (37%), total contractors fell by
approximately 67,000 (41%). However, as reflected in Appendix A, the number of contractors
did not decrease uniformly across the contractor workforce. For example, during the same period,
contractors providing base support and construction declined by approximately 31% (27,400
personnel) and 94% (34,000 personnel) respectively, whereas the number of contractors
providing security actually increased by 26% (2,417 personnel).
These data indicate that as the services required by DOD change during the course of operations,
the percentages of contractors providing different types of services also change. As reflected in
Figure 5, over the past nine fiscal quarters, the percentage of contractors performing base support
has remained relatively constant, the percentage working in construction has decreased, and the
percentage performing security has increased.
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
Figure 5. Iraq DOD Percent of Contractors Performing Types of Service
(as of March 2010)
Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Census Reports.
Profile of Contractors
Of the approximately 95,500 contractors in Iraq as of March 2010, 24,719 were U.S. citizens,
17,193 were local nationals, and 53, 549 were third-country nationals (see Table 2). Third-
country nationals made up more than half of all contractor personnel.
Table 2. DOD Contractor Personnel in Iraq
(as of March 2010)
Total Contractors U.S. Citizens Third-Country Nationals Local Nationals
Number 95,461
24,719 53,549
17,193
Percent of Total 100%
26%
56%
18%
Source: CENTCOM 2nd Quarter Contractor Census Report.
According to a DOD official, contracting local nationals is an important element in counter-
insurgency strategy.26 Employing local nationals injects money into the local economy, provides
job training, and can give the U.S. a more sophisticated understanding of the local landscape.
Nevertheless, as Figure 6 illustrates, from June 2008 to March 2010, the number of Iraqi
contractors has dropped by more than 50,000 (75%) while the number of U.S. contractors has
decreased by nearly 2,000 (7%). This can be only partially explained by the drop in the number of
contractors performing construction (26,000); local nationals generally represent more than 80%
of these workers.
26 Based on discussions with DOD officials, July 23, 2009.
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Figure 6. Breakdown of DOD Contractor Workforce in Iraq
Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Reports.
The percentage of contractors who are local nationals remained steady at 26%-27% during
FY2009 but dropped to 18% in the most recent quarter. This percentage is substantially lower
than the percentage of contractors who were local nationals in Q2 and Q3 of FY2008 (42%-43%.
See Appendix B). By way of comparison, in Afghanistan local nationals have consistently
comprised between 69%-86% of all contractors.
Contractors in Afghanistan
Number of Contractors
As reflected in Table 1, as of March 2010, there were 112,092 DOD contractors in Afghanistan,
compared to approximately 79,100 uniformed personnel. Contractors made up 59% of DOD’s
workforce in Afghanistan (see Figure 7). In December 2008, contractors represented 69% of
DOD’s workforce in Afghanistan, which apparently represented the highest recorded percentage
of contractors used by DOD in any conflict in the history of the United States. 27
27 CRS Report R40057, Training the Military to Manage Contractors During Expeditionary Operations: Overview and
Options for Congress, by Moshe Schwartz.
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Figure 7. DOD Contractor Personnel in Afghanistan vs. Troop Levels
Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Census Reports; Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost
and Other Potential Issues, by Amy Belasco; Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Boots on the Ground” monthly
reports to Congress.
Some analysts and DOD officials believe that the higher percentage of contractors in Afghanistan
is partially a result two factors: contractors providing some services to the more than 30,000
international forces that are part of the International Security Assistance Force and DOD’s
expansion of facilities to support the anticipated military surge in Afghanistan.28
On December 1, 2009, President Obama announced that the United States will be deploying an
additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, bringing the total number of U.S. troops there to
approximately 100,000. This troop increase has already resulted in an increase in the number of
contractor personnel in Afghanistan. According to DOD officials, contractors are expected to
make up approximately 50%-55% of the total workforce in Afghanistan in the future, although
such an estimate could change if conditions in Afghanistan change.29
Over the last nine quarters, contractors have made up between 55% and 69% of DOD’s workforce
in Afghanistan, averaging 61% of the workforce during that period (with a mode of 57%).
Assuming that going forward contractors will continue to make up a similar percentage of DOD’s
workforce, completing the deployment of additional troops to Afghanistan could require an
additional 9,000 to 43,000 contractor personnel, for a total of 120,000 to 155,000 contractors (see
Table 3). However, over the last three quarters the number of contractors has grown at a slower
rate than the number of troops. If this trend continues, the total number of contractor personnel
will tend toward the lower end of the above estimate.
28 See ISAF “Placemat”, http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.html
29 Based on discussions with DOD officials, December 8, and December 11, 2009.
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Table 3. Number of Contractors Required
Contractors as % of
Additional Contractors
Total Number of
Troop Level
Total Workforce
Required
Contractors
100,000 55%
9,000
120,000
100,000 57%
18,000
130,000
100,000 59%
30,000
140,000
100,000 61%
43,000
155,000
Source: CRS analysis of DOD data.
Notes: Numbers rounded to the closest thousand.
Over the last nine quarters (March 2008 to March 2010), contractors have represented 65%, 55%, 67%,
69%, 57%, 57%, 62%, 61% and 59% of the total DOD workforce, respectively. The data points listed in
the table were chosen because they represent the lowest contractor/workforce ratio (55%), the mode
(57%), the most recent quarter (59%), and the mean (average)(61%).
Type of Work Performed by Contractors
DOD does not report the breakdown of services that contractors provide in Afghanistan, with the
exception of data on private security contractors. Nevertheless, the types of services provided by
contractors in Afghanistan are similar to those conducted in Iraq, including logistics, construction,
linguistic services, and transportation; however, the percentage of contractors providing each
service is likely different. DOD officials have stated in the past that they will start providing data
on the breakdown of services in Afghanistan in the next quarterly census. However, to date, they
have not done so.
Profile of Contractors
As of March 2010, of the approximately 112,000 contractors in Afghanistan, 16,000 were U.S.
citizens, 17,500 were third-country nationals, and 78,500 were local nationals (see Table 4).
Local nationals made up 70% of contractor personnel.
Table 4. DOD Contractor Personnel in Afghanistan
(as of March 2010)
Total Contractors U.S. Citizens Third-Country Nationals Local Nationals
Number 112,092
16,081 17,512
78,499
Percent of Total 100%
14%
16%
70%
Source: CENTCOM 2nd Quarter Contractor Census Report.
DOD uses significantly more local nationals in Afghanistan than U.S. citizens and third-country
nationals combined. There also appears to be an inverse relationship between the percentage of
troops and local national contractors in Afghanistan (see Figure 8), although there is not enough
data to draw significant conclusions with statistical reliability. Understanding such data could
help DOD plan more effectively for contractor requirements in future operations.
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
Figure 8. Breakdown of DOD Contractor Workforce in Afghanistan
Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Reports; CRS Report R40682, Troop Levels in the Afghan and
Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues, by Amy Belasco; Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Boots
on the Ground” monthly reports to Congress.
Efforts to Improve Contractor Management and
Oversight
In light of DOD’s experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in response to the findings of
numerous studies (including the Gansler Report and numerous GAO reports), DOD has taken a
number of steps to improve how it manages contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD set up the
Joint Contracting Command (JCC) in both Iraq and Afghanistan to provide a more centralized
management system and to enforce contracting support requirements during ongoing operations.30
DOD has also increased the size of its acquisition workforce in theater. Additional Defense
Contracting Management Agency staff has been sent to administer complex contracts.31
DOD is also working to improve how it will use contractors in future operations. Responding to a
Gansler Report recommendation, in October 2008, the Army Contracting Command (ACC) was
established as a major subordinate command of the U.S. Army Materiel Command. The ACC
performs most of the contracting work for the Army. In addition, the Expeditionary Contracting
30 USCENTCOM, 2nd Quarterly Contractor Census Report, p. 4, May, 2009.
31 Ibid. p. 4-5.
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
Command was established as a subordinate command of the ACC. The Expeditionary
Contracting Command provides contracting support during expeditionary operations. In addition,
the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office was established to assist commanders in
planning, supporting, and overseeing contracting activities during the early stages of contingency
operations.32 DOD developed an Operational Contract Support Concept of Operations
(CONOPS), intended to promote communication and collaboration between contractors and
uniformed personnel in theater.
Uniformed personnel are often responsible for managing contractors during contingency
operations. DOD is developing programs to improve training of uniformed personnel to manage
contractors during contingency operations. DOD intends to introduce courses on contract support
into the curriculum for non-acquisition personnel and is incorporating contract operations into
some mission readiness exercises. DOD is also developing an on-line course that offers pre-
deployment training to personnel about planning for and working with contractors during military
operations.33 Additionally, the Army continues to develop informational handbooks to help guide
military personnel who work with contractors regarding the contracting process and their specific
roles and responsibilities when coordinating with contractors.34
A number of these initiatives have been reflected in recent legislation. For example, the Joint
Contingency Acquisition Support Office was established as a result of section 854 of the FY2007
John Warner National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) requiring DOD to create a team of
contingency contracting experts that can be deployed to support military operations.35 In the
FY2008 NDAA, Congress mandated contingency contracting training for non-acquisition
military personnel who will have relevant contracting responsibilities.36 Furthermore, Congress
required that SPOT contain all contract-related information for Iraq and Afghanistan. Congress
appropriated $8,000,000 for SPOT, $2,500,000 for the Joint Contingency Contract Support
Office, and $2,000,000 for training non-acquisition personnel.37 According to DOD, SPOT is
being used to manage the withdrawal of both contractor and DOD civilian personnel in Iraq, as
well as to authorize contractors to receive government support in CENTCOM’s area of
responsibility. 38 DOD is still transitioning from a manual quarterly census of contractor personnel
to the SPOT database. An updated Memorandum of Understanding between DOD, Department of
State, and USAID on SPOT incorporates legislative requirements from section 854 of the
FY2009 NDAA and section 813 of the FY2010 NDAA.
DOD has shown an ability to improve contractor management and oversight. For example, DOD
has made significant efforts to improve the management, oversight, and coordination of private
32 See CRS Report R40057, Training the Military to Manage Contractors During Expeditionary Operations: Overview
and Options for Congress, by Moshe Schwartz; and U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Logistics Agency, “New
organization to Help Combatant Commanders Manage Acquisition,” Press Release, October 24, 2008.
33 For a more detailed discussion of DOD efforts, see Training the Military to Manage Contractors During
Expeditionary Operations: Overview and Options for Congress.
34 For example, the Army has published Contracting Basics for Leaders and the Deployed COR which is a pocket-sized
pamphlet that explains key contracting concepts, definitions, and processes. The Army has also developed the
Deployed COR: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures handbook, and is drafting a handbook on Armed Private Security
Contracting.
35 P.L. 109-364, Sec. 854.
36 P.L. 110-181 Sec. 849.
37 Congressional Record May 19, 2008, pg. S4325.
38 CENTCOM 2nd Quarter FY2010 Contractor Census Report.
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
security companies (PSC). For instance, DOD established Contractor Operations Cells in Iraq and
in Afghanistan to coordinate the movement of PSCs.39 DOD established the Armed Contractor
Oversight Directorate in Iraq and Afghanistan. This directorate is responsible for developing
policies for and investigating incidents of the use of force by PSCs.40 The improvements in how
DOD manages PSCs have been noted by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction,
the Commission on Wartime Contracting, and the GAO.41
Contractors in DOD Strategy and Doctrines
Regardless of how one analyzes the number of armed contractors working for DOD, PSCs play a
critical role in U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. Yet the extent of DOD’s reliance on PSCs was not
planned and was executed without a clear strategy, exacerbating the risks inherent in using armed
contractors on the battlefield.42 As Secretary of Defense Roberts Gates testified, DOD’s extensive
reliance on contractors occurred
without any supervision or without any coherent strategy on how we were going to do it and
without conscious decisions about what we will allow contractors to do and what we won’t
allow contractors to do... We have not thought holistically or coherently about our use of
contractors, particularly when it comes to combat environments or combat training.43
The unprecedented extent to which DOD relies on contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the
unplanned nature of this reliance, raises some fundamental questions, including what is the
impact of using contractors in military operations and to what extent is DOD incorporating the
use of contractors into strategy and doctrine.
39 The Armed Contractor Oversight Division in Iraq was renamed the Armed Contractor Oversight Bureau. For a
detailed discussion on DOD efforts to improve the coordination of PSC movements throughout Iraq, see Government
Accountability Office, REBUILDING IRAQ: DOD and State Department Have Improved Oversight and Coordination
of Private Security Contractors in Iraq, but Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain Improvements, GAO-08-966, July
31, 2008; Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Field Commanders See Improvements in Controlling and
Coordinating Private Security Contractor Missions in Iraq, SIGIR 09-022, July 28, 2009.
40 Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan, Interim Report, June 2009, p. 73.
41 U.S. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Field Commanders See Improvements in Controlling and
Coordinating Private Security Contractor Missions in Iraq, SIGIR 09-022, July 28, 2009; U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs,
Commission on Wartime Contracting: Interim Findings and Path Forward, 111th Cong., 1st sess., June 10, 2009; U.S.
Government Accountability Office, REBUILDING IRAQ: DOD and State Department Have Improved Oversight and
Coordination of Private Security Contractors in Iraq, but Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain Improvements, GAO-
08-966, July 31, 2008.
42 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Operations: Implementation of Existing Guidance and Other
Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Oversight and Management of Contractors in Future Operations, GAO-08-436T,
January 28, 2008, p. 6. See also U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Management: DOD Needs to
Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance on Contractors and Continue to Improve Management and Oversight, GAO-08-
572T, March 11, 2008, p. 14.
43 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, To Receive Testimony on the Challenges Facing the
Department of Defense, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., January 27, 2009.
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
Can Contractors Undermine U.S. Efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan?
According to the Army Field Manual on counterinsurgency, one of the fundamental strategies in
counterinsurgency operations—such as those undertaken by DOD in Iraq and Afghanistan—is to
retain legitimacy by winning the hearts and minds of the local population.44 Conversely, the field
manual argues that abusing or mistreating the population undermines counterinsurgency efforts,
stating
Though firmness by security forces is often necessary to establish a secure environment, a
government that exceeds accepted local norms and abuses its people ... generates resistance
to its rule. People who have been maltreated or have had close friends or relatives killed ...
may strike back at their attackers. Security force abuses ... can be major escalating factors for
insurgencies.45
In accordance with the manual’s assertion that the local population will ultimately determine the
winner of the conflict, abuses and crimes committed by armed private security contractors and
interrogators against local nationals may have undermined U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.46
There have been published reports of local nationals being abused and mistreated by some DOD
contractors in such incidents as the shooting at Iraqi civilians by private security contractors47 and
the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.48 Local nationals may not draw a distinction
between government contractors and the U.S. military, and the abuses committed by contractors
may strengthen anti-American insurgents, as evidenced by the public outcry following such
incidents.
Poor contract management may also undermine U.S. efforts in the region. GAO stated that poor
contract management can lead to wasteful spending of billions of dollars.49 Wasteful spending can
divert limited resources away from important U.S. efforts as providing security, social services,
and economic development programs. According to the Army, efforts to establish social services
and develop economic programs are critical to a successful counterinsurgency campaign.50
Therefore, wasting resources that could otherwise have been spent on social services and
economic development may limit the effectiveness of U.S. efforts. Poor contract management
may also result in increased fraud, which could similarly undermine the credibility of the U.S. in
the eyes of the local population.
44 Department of Defense, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24, December 2006.
45 Department of Defense, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24, December 2006, p. 1-9.
46 Ibid, p. 1-2, 1-3, 1-22.
47 For a detailed discussion of the use of private security contractors in Iraq, see CRS Report RL32419, Private Security
Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues, by Jennifer K. Elsea, Moshe Schwartz, and Kennon
H. Nakamura.
48 According to an Army investigative report, a lack of good contractor surveillance at Abu Ghraib prison contributed
to fostering a permissive environment in which prisoner abuses took place at the hands of contractors. Department of
Defense, Investigation of Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib, August 23, 2004, p. 52. The report found “Proper
oversight did not occur at Abu Ghraib due to a lack of training and inadequate contract management ... [T]his lack of
monitoring was a contributing factor to the problems that were experienced with the performance of the contractors at
Abu Ghraib.” See http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA429125.
49 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Stabilizing And Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Address Inadequate
Accountability over U.S. Efforts and Investments. GAO-08-568T. March 11, 2008. p. 4,6; See also Urgent Reform
Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, Op. Cit., p. 2.
50 Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24, Washington, DC, December 15, 2006, pp. 1-1.
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
DOD Strategy and Doctrine
Some analysts believe that DOD strategy and doctrine does not sufficiently address the issue of
contractors. These analysts argue that the public backlash following Abu Ghraib and other such
incidents, as well wasteful spending, should compel DOD to reexamine the role contractors play
in contingency operations and the way DOD integrates contractor support into current strategy
and doctrine.51 For example, then Senator Barack Obama stated that “we cannot win a fight for
hearts and minds when we outsource critical missions to unaccountable contractors.”52 The
Gansler Commission echoed a similar sentiment, finding that segments of the Army have not
recognized the important role contractors now have in DOD operations and the ability of
contractors to influence the success of a contingency operation.53 Further integrating contractors
into doctrine and strategy could help DOD better manage contractors, which in turn may mitigate
the negative effects that some contractors have on DOD operations.
Many analysts and DOD officials argue that the military’s experience in Iraq and Afghanistan,
coupled with congressional attention and legislation, has focused DOD’s attention on the
importance of contractors to operational success. According to DOD officials, prior to the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan, contracting was done on an ad-hoc basis and was not adequately
incorporated into the doctrine—or culture—of the military. 54 DOD officials stated that doctrine
and strategy are being updated to incorporate the role of contractors in contingency operations.
DOD strategy can be found in a number of documents, including the National Defense Strategy
and Quadrennial Defense Review. Army doctrine is published in field manuals such as Field
Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, which constitutes the Army’s view on how it conducts operations
and “sets the foundation for developing the other fundamentals and tactics ... detailed in
subordinate field manuals.”55 Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, is a subordinate manual
dedicated to counterinsurgency operations, such as those currently being conducted in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
The National Defense Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review
The National Defense Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) are high-level strategy
documents that support the Administration’s National Security Strategy.56 Some analysts believe
that, given the critical role contractors play in military operations, these documents should
contain a sufficiently meaningful discussion of contractors.
51 Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, Urgent Reform Required:
Army Expeditionary Contracting, October 31, 2007; the Commission on Wartime Contracting and Commission on
Wartime Contracting, At What Cost? Contingency Contracting In Iraq and Afghanistan: Interim Report, June 10, 2009;
and Kidwell, D., Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies, Combat Studies
Institute Press, 2005, p. 48.
52 Hauser, C., New Rules for Contractors are Urged by 2 Democrats, the New York Times, October 4, 2007.
53 Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, p.1.
54 Based on discussions with senior DOD officials on July 23, 2009 and July 27, 2009.
55 Department of Defense, Operations, FM 3-0, February 2008, p. v.
56 For more information, see CRS Report RL34505, National Security Strategy: Legislative Mandates, Execution to
Date, and Considerations for Congress, by Catherine Dale.
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The 2010 QDR, which runs almost 130 pages, contains little discussion on the role contractors
play in military operations. The QDR has a seven page section on counterinsurgency, stability,
and counterterrorism operations, including a list of ten priorities for improvement. However, the
word “contractor” does not appear once in the discussion, despite the fact that contractors make
up more that 50% of DOD’s workforce in Iraq and Afghanistan, including more than 13,000
armed contractors. Some analysts argue that DOD missed an opportunity to address the issue in
the most recent QDR.
The National Defense Strategy runs 23 pages and mentions contractors on two occasions. In the
first instance, it states “The Total Force distributes and balances skills across each of its
constituent elements: the Active Component, the Reserve Component, the civilian workforce, and
the private sector and contractor base.”57 In the second instance, the report states “We also must
continue to improve our acquisition and contracting regulations, procedures, and oversight to
ensure agile and timely procurement of critical equipment and materials for our forces.”58
Some analysts argue that the extent to which contractors are addressed in doctrine that is not
specifically aimed at contracting issues, such as the Quadrennial Defense Review and field
manual on operations, reflects the extent to which DOD incorporates contracting into the overall
culture of the military. Other analysts argue that more appropriate publications to determine the
extent to which contractors are incorporated into doctrine are the operational and tactical level
guidance that related to contracting issues, such as FM 3-100.21, Contractors on the Battlefield,
FM 3-100.21 Contractors on the Battlefield, FM 100-16 Army Operational Support, and FM 100-
10-2 Contracting Support on the Battlefield, and Army Regulation 715-9, Logistics–Contractors
Accompanying the Force.59
Field Manual on Operations
In February 2008, the Army updated Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, the first update since
September 11, 2001.60 In 200 pages, the combined discussion on contractors consists of less than
a page. The most extensive discussion, found in the section on Interagency Coordination and
Cooperation with Other Organizations, states, in toto,
A contractor is a person or business that provides products or services for monetary
compensation. A contractor furnishes supplies and services or performs work at a certain
price or rate based on the terms of a contract (FM 3-100.21). Contracted support often
includes traditional goods and services support but may include interpreter communications,
infrastructure, and other related support. In military operations, contractors may provide life
support, construction and engineering support, weapons system support, security, other
technical services (FM 3-100.21 contains doctrine for contractors accompanying deployed
forces).
57 Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, June 2008, p. 19.
58 Ibid.
59 FM 3-100.21, Contractors on the Battlefield, January 2003, states that it is intended to define the role of contractors
and describe the relationship between contractors and combatant commanders. The field manual is intended for
commanders and their staff. Army Regulation 715-9, Logistics – Contractors Accompanying the Force October 1999,
establishes Army policies for using contractors on the battlefield. The regulation is geared to logistics; the proponent
agency of the regulation is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.
60 Operations, p. Forward.
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There are other isolated references to contractors or contracting, but most analysts consider that
these references provide little actual guidance. For example, one mention of contracting states
“the Army identifies technical matters, such as network operations or contracting, and assigns
responsibilities for them to an appropriate organization.”61
Field Manual on Counterinsurgency
In December 2006, the Army and Marine Corps released Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency,
a field manual devoted exclusively to understanding and conducting counterinsurgency
operations. Prior to publishing 3-24, a manual dedicated to counterinsurgency operations had not
been published for more than 20 years. Counterinsurgency was coauthored by then-Lieutenant
General David Petraeus (Army) and then-Lieutenant General James Amos (Marine Corps). The
manual draws heavily on experiences and lessons from military operations in Iraq.
Counterinsurgency recognizes the role contractors play in counterinsurgency operations and has a
more extensive discussion of contractors than FM 3-0 Operations. The manual lists multinational
corporations and contractors as key counterinsurgency participants and describes the role played
by contractors. The manual goes on to state that “at a minimum, commanders should know which
companies are present in their AO [area of operation] ... commanders should identify contractors
operating in their AO and determine the nature of their contract, existing accountability
mechanisms, and appropriate coordination relationships.”62 And chapter eight of the manual
includes a four page section dedicated exclusively to Contracted Logistics Support. This section
has discussions on theater support contracts, counterinsurgency contracting considerations, and
contingency contracting. Contractor issues are also incorporated into other sections of the manual,
such as the section on enforcing discipline.63
New Doctrine, DOD Instructions, and Other Efforts
Since the release of the Gansler Report, DOD has undertaken a number of initiatives to develop
doctrine and policies for using contractors during contingency operations. For example, in
October 2008, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff published Joint Publication 4-10
Operational Contract Support, which contains doctrine for contract support and contract
management during joint contingency operations. The publication applies to commanders of
combatant commands, joint task forces, the military services, and defense agencies in support of
joint operations.64 In March 2009, Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn issued a directive
detailing who within DOD is responsible for the various aspects of contract management and
oversight, including responsibility for managing contracts, developing policy, issuing guidance,
and integrating contractors into contingency operations.65 In July 2009, DOD issued an
instruction establishing policy and procedures for managing private security contractors during
contingency operations. And in July 2009, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, Under
61 Ibid, p. B-13.
62 Counterinsurgency, pp. 2-4, 2-8.
63 Counterinsurgency, p. d-26.
64 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Operational Contract Support, Joint Publication 4-10 , October 17, 2008, p. i.
65 Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn III, Orchestrating, Synchronizing, and Integrating Program
Management of Contingency Acquisition Planning and Its Operational Execution, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Directive 3020.49, March 24, 2009.
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
Secretary Ashton Carter established a task force on wartime contracting charged with evaluating
the Commission on Wartime Contracting interim report. The task force is to consist of
representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, military services, Joint Staff, and
Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan.66 According to DOD, the task force will examine
the proper role of contractors in contingency operations. The findings of the task force are
expected to influence doctrine and policy, including the size of the contractor workforce in future
operations.
DOD has also issued regulations intended to improve the management of contractors in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Some of these regulations are aimed specifically at improving how DOD manages
PSCs. Other regulations are aimed at improving contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan generally.
In an effort to improve contingency contracting generally, DOD issued the directive
Orchestrating, Synchronizing, and Integrating Program Management of Contingency Acquisition
Planning and its Operational Execution on March 24, 2009.67 This regulation established which
offices within DOD are responsible for various aspects of contract support for contingency
operations. This directive was issued in response to section 854 of the John Warner National
Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2007 (P.L. 109-364) and section 862 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-861).
Officials stated that additional initiatives are still underway and will take time to complete and
implement.68 One official estimated that it could take three years to update policies and
regulations, integrate contractors into operational planning, and implement appropriate training.
Officials also acknowledged that DOD faces a number of challenges in its effort to incorporate
contracting into the culture of the military and into overall DOD planning and doctrine. One
official stated that DOD still needs to examine under what circumstances contractors should—and
should not—be used during contingency operations. For example, there may be circumstances
when activities such as security, contract management, interrogation, and military training should
not be contracted out. DOD has begun to examine this issue. DOD has set up a task force to
examine the extent to which it relies on contactors, and to use the analysis to plan for future
operations and to help plan DOD’s future force structure. The task force has already briefed the
most senior levels of the department. A number of analysts believe that this effort is a step in the
right direction.
Selected Congressional Hearings and Legislation
Congress has held a number of hearings and passed legislation relating to DOD contracting
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Hearings have taken place in a number of different committees
and have covered a wide array of related issues, including private security contractors,
interrogators, logistic support, contract management and oversight, and training requirements.
Congress has also passed legislation annually in a number of these areas. Such legislation
66 Under Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter, Task Force on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Office
of the Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Memorandum, July 26, 2009.
67 William J. Lynn III, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Orchestrating, Synchronizing, and Integrating Program
Management of Contingency Acquisition Planning and Its Operational Execution, Department of Defense, Department
of Defense Directive (DODD) 3020.49, March 24, 2009.
68 Based on discussions with senior DOD officials on July 23, 2009 and July 27, 2009.
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generally occurs in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The following section
provides a highlight of key congressional activity related to contingency contracting.
Private Security Contractors and Interrogators
Congress has focused more on private security contractors than other contracting issues, even
though such contractors comprise roughly 10-15% of DOD contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Interrogators have also been a focus of congressional scrutiny. Hearings have been held in the
Senate Committee on Armed Services,69 the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs,70 the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,71 and the
House Committee on Armed Services.72 This issue was also raised in other hearings, such as the
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform’s hearing on the Commission on
Wartime Contracting: Interim Findings and Path Forward73 and the House Committee on the
Judiciary’ hearing on Enforcement of Federal Criminal Law to Protect Americans Working for
U.S. Contractors in Iraq.74 More recently, the National Security and Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform conducted a
hearing Investigation of Protection Payments for Safe Passage along the Afghan Supply Chain,
which focused on armed private security contractors providing convoy security along the Afghan
supply chain.75
In the FY2008 NDAA, Congress required the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the
Secretary of State, to prescribe regulations and guidance relating to screening, equipping, and
managing private security personnel in areas of combat operations. These regulations were to
include tracking private security personnel (PSC), authorizing and accounting for weapons used
by PSCs, and reporting requirements whenever a security contractor discharges a weapon, kills or
injures another person, or is killed or injured.76 Included in the FY2009 NDAA is a “Sense of
Congress” that private security contractors should not perform inherently governmental functions,
such as security protection of resources, in high-threat operational environments.77 In the same
69 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, 110th
Cong., 1st sess., August 3, 2007.
70 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, An Uneasy Relationship: U.S.
Reliance on Private Security Firms in Overseas Operations, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., February 27, 2008.
71 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Private Security Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan, 110th Cong., 1st sess., October 2, 2007.
72 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Contingency Contracting: Implementing a Call for Urgent
Reform, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., April 9, 2008.
73 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and
Foreign Affairs, Commission on Wartime Contracting: Interim Findings and Path Forward, 111th Cong., 1st sess., June
9, 2009.
74 U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security,
Enforcement of Federal Criminal Law to Protect Americans Working for U.S. Contractors in Iraq, 110th Cong., 1st
sess., December 19, 2007.
75 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and
Foreign Affairs, Investigation of Protection Payments for Safe Passage along the Afghan Supply Chain, 111th Cong.,
2nd sess., June 22, 2010.
76 P.L. 110-181, sec 862.
77 P.L. 110-417, sec 832.
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legislation, Congress mandated that interrogation is an inherently governmental function that
DOD may not outsource to contractors.78
Contractors Training Local Security Forces
Over the last year, Congress has turned its attention to contractors training local security forces in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Such hearings have raised a number of issues, including the behavior of
such contactors, whether there is sufficient contract oversight, and the cost of such contracts. The
Senate Committee on Armed Services held a hearing on Contracting in a Counterinsurgency: An
Examination of the Blackwater-Paravant Contract and the Need for Oversight, which focused on
the shooting of Afghan civilians by two Paravant employees.79 The Ad Hoc Subcommittee on
Contracting Oversight of the Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
held a hearing Afghan Police Force Training, which raised the issue of waste and a lack of
oversight on $6 billion spent on contracts to train the Afghan national police force.80
Contract Management, Oversight, and Coordination
Management and oversight of contracting personnel in contingency operations has been of
significant interest to Congress. Hearings on these issues have been held in the Senate Committee
on Armed Services81 and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs.82 This issue was also raised by the House Committee on Armed Services’ hearing on
Coordinating Contract Support on the Battlefield: Defense, State, and U.S. AID83 and the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform’s hearing on Commission on Wartime
Contracting: Interim Findings and Path Forward.84
In the FY2008 NDAA, Congress mandated the creation of a memorandum of understanding
between the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and Administrator of the United States
Agency for International Development to promote coordinated contingency contracting
practices.85 Congress also established the Commission on Wartime Contracting to study wartime
contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, determine the extent to which the federal government relies
78 P.L. 110-417, sec 1057.
79 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Contracting in a Counterinsurgency: An Examiniation of the
Blackwater-Paravant Contract and the Need for Oversight, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., February 24, 2010.
80 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Ad Hoc Subcommittee on
Contracting Oversight, Contracts for Afghan National Police Training, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., April 15, 2010.
81 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, To
Receive Testimony on Department of Defense Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., April 2,
2008.
82 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal
Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security, Management and
Oversight of Contingency Contracting in Hostile Zones, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., January 24, 2008.
83 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Coordinating
Contract Support on the Battlefield: Defense, State, and U.S. AID, 111th Cong., 1st sess., April 1, 2009.
84 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and
Foreign Affairs, Commission on Wartime Contracting: Interim Findings and Path Forward, 111th Cong., 1st sess., June
9, 2009.
85 P.L. 110-181, sec 861.
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
on contractors, and examine how U.S. objectives are achieved by this reliance on contractors.86 In
the FY2009 NDAA, Congress added additional requirements and reporting mechanisms for
alleged crimes committed by or against contractor personnel in Iraq or Afghanistan.87
Training Contractors and the Military in Contingency Contracting
Some testimony at various hearings emphasized that increased training is necessary for non-
acquisition personnel throughout the military.88 Concerned that DOD contractors and personnel
are not sufficiently trained to execute contingency contracting, Congress passed legislation
requiring DOD to implement training requirements for contingency contracting personnel (in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
Defense Acquisition University), and to provide specific training to contract management
personnel.89 In the FY2008 NDAA, Congress called for contract management training for
personnel outside the acquisition workforce who are responsible for contractor oversight. The
FY2008 NDAA also mandated the incorporation of contractors in mission-readiness exercises
with uniformed personnel.90 In addition, Congress passed legislation establishing of a
government-wide Contingency Contracting Corps that will be available for deployment in
responding to an emergency or major disaster, or a contingency operation.91 Congress authorized
this corps to receive specific training in contingency contracting.
86 P.L. 110-181, sec 841.
87 P.L. 110-417, sec 854.
88 See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Contingency Contracting: Implementing a Call for Urgent
Reform, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., April 10, 2008; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Commission on Wartime Contracting: Interim
Findings and Path Forward, 111th Cong., 1st sess., June 9, 2009; and U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed
Services, Contingency Contracting: Has the Call for Urgent Reform been Answered?, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 25,
2009..
89 P.L. 109-163, sec 817 and P.L. 109-364, sec 854.
90 P.L. 110-181, sec 849
91 P.L. 110-417, sec. 870
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
Appendix A. Trend Analysis of Contractors in Iraq
by Type of Service Provided
Figure A-1. Trend Analysis of Contractor Support by Type of Service Provided in Iraq
Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Census Reports.
Notes: The Department of Defense did not separately track Logistics/Maintenance or Training until the first
quarter of 2010. As a result, CRS did not include these two categories in this graph.
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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis
Appendix B. Percentage Breakdown of Contractors
in Iraq by Nationality
Figure B-1. Trend Analysis of Contractors in Iraq by Nationality
Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Census Reports.
Author Contact Information
Moshe Schwartz
Specialist in Defense Acquisition
mschwartz@crs.loc.gov, 7-1463
Acknowledgments
This report was updated with the assistance of Joyprada Swain, a summer intern with the
Congressional Research Service.
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