Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and
Government Performance

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
June 29, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21922
CRS Report for Congress
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repared for Members and Committees of Congress

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Summary
The performance and legitimacy of the Afghan government figured prominently in two reviews
of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan during 2009 and continues to color U.S. relations with Afghan
President Hamid Karzai. In his December 1, 2009, speech on Afghanistan, which followed the
second review, President Obama stated that the Afghan government would be judged on
performance, and “The days of providing a blank check are over.” President Obama reportedly
pressed Karzai to move more decisively to address his government’s deficiencies, particularly
corruption, during a March 28, 2010, visit to Afghanistan. The emphasis on that issue may have
contributed to two subsequent statements by Karzai accusing the international community of
exercising undue pressure on him and on Afghanistan. These issues were muted during Karzai’s
May 10-14, 2010, visit to Washington, DC, which was described by officials on both sides as
highly productive. It produced a commitment to renew and expand a U.S.-Afghanistan “strategic
partnership” by the end of 2010. However, the benefits of the visit quickly dissipated when
Karzai fired two of the most pro-U.S. top security officials on June 5, 2010, with one of them
alleging that Karzai has concluded he must negotiate with Pakistan on a settlement of the Afghan
conflict because the U.S.-led coalition will not succeed in pacifying Afghanistan.
The Afghan government’s widespread official corruption, as well as its ineffectiveness, is
identified by U.S. officials as feeding the insurgency. Karzai’s alliances with key ethnic and
political faction leaders have reduced his ability to fill the government with politically neutral and
technically competent officers. In the August 20, 2009, presidential election, there were
widespread charges of fraud, many substantiated by an Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC).
Nearly one-third of President Karzai’s votes were invalidated, leaving him just short of the 50%+
total needed to avoid a second-round runoff. Asserting that more fraud was likely, Karzai’s main
challenger dropped out of the race on November 1, 2009, and Karzai was declared the winner. He
has since had difficulty obtaining parliamentary confirmation of a full cabinet, and seven
ministerial posts remain unfilled. Most of the well-regarded economic ministers have been
retained. Lacking confidence in the central government, the United States is now focused on
strengthening local governing bodies, in part by expanding the presence of U.S. government
civilians as advisors outside Kabul. The Administration also has appointed senior civilian officials
to work jointly with their military counterparts in the five regional commands.
Karzai has tried to rebuild international support by announcing new anti-corruption steps as well
as by formulating proposals to try to persuade insurgent fighters to give up their fight. Several
donors at a major international conference on Afghanistan in Britain on January 28, 2010,
endorsed—and agreed to begin to fund—Karzai’s proposals, which were mostly endorsed at an
Afghan consultative “peace jirga” during June 2-4, 2010. However, concerns remain about
whether Karzai is committed to ensuring that the upcoming parliamentary elections, to be held
September 18, 2010, will correct previous flaws and prove free and fair. Confidence was
undermined, to an extent, in February 2010 when Karzai issued an election decree to govern the
National Assembly elections on September 18, 2010. The decree eliminated the three U.N.-
appointed positions for international officials on the ECC, although a subsequent compromise
restored two non-Afghan ECC seats. For more information, see CRS Report RL30588,
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman, and CRS
Report R40747, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Background and Policy
Issues
, by Rhoda Margesson.
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Contents
Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape .......................................................................... 1
Overview of Afghan Politics and Governance ....................................................................... 1
Ethnic Affiliations and Relations ..................................................................................... 2
Politics: Karzai and His Opponents ....................................................................................... 3
The Opposition and Its Strength: Dr. Abdullah and Others............................................... 4
The Upper House of the National Assembly .................................................................... 5
Enhancing Government Capacity and Performance ..................................................................... 5
U.S.-Karzai Relations............................................................................................................ 6
Differences Among U.S. Officials Over the Approach Toward Karzai.............................. 7
The Influences of Regional Faction Leaders/“Warlords”........................................................ 7
Vice President Muhammad Fahim................................................................................... 8
Northern Afghanistan: Abdurrashid Dostam .................................................................... 8
Herat: Isma’il Khan......................................................................................................... 9
Helmand Province: Sher Mohammad Akhundzadeh and “Koka” ..................................... 9
Balkh: Atta Mohammad Noor ....................................................................................... 10
Nangarhar: Ghul Agha Shirzai....................................................................................... 10
Qandahar: Ahmad Wali Karzai ...................................................................................... 10
Building Central Government Capacity ............................................................................... 11
The Afghan Civil Service .............................................................................................. 12
Government Corruption/Rule of Law .................................................................................. 12
Scope of the Problem .................................................................................................... 13
Other Karzai Responses ................................................................................................ 14
Rule of Law .................................................................................................................. 15
Expanding Local Governance/U.S. Civilian “Uplift” ........................................................... 16
Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils............................................................... 16
District-Level Governance ............................................................................................ 17
U.S. Local Governance Advisory Capacity.................................................................... 18
Human Rights Issues........................................................................................................... 18
Religious Freedom ........................................................................................................ 19
Human Trafficking........................................................................................................ 20
Advancement of Women ............................................................................................... 20
Democracy, Governance, and Elections Funding Issues ................................................. 23
Elections in 2009 and 2010 ....................................................................................................... 24
2009 Presidential Election................................................................................................... 24
Election Modalities and Processes................................................................................. 25
The Political Contest and Campaign.............................................................................. 26
The Campaign............................................................................................................... 27
The Election Results ..................................................................................................... 28
Post-Election Cabinet.................................................................................................... 31
2010 Parliamentary Elections and Election Law Dispute ..................................................... 33
Election Decree............................................................................................................. 34
Preparations Proceed..................................................................................................... 34
Implications for the United States of the Afghan Elections................................................... 35

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Figures
Figure 1. Map of Afghan Ethnicities.......................................................................................... 39

Tables
Table 1. Afghanistan Political Transition Process....................................................................... 36
Table 2. Major Pashtun Tribal Confederations ........................................................................... 37

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 40
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 40

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Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape
In implementing policy to stabilize Afghanistan, a U.S. policy priority, particularly during the
period from 2002 to 2007, has been to increase the capabilities of and extend the authority of
Afghanistan’s central government. The policy was predicated on the observation that weak
governance was causing some Afghans to acquiesce to, or even support, Taliban insurgents as
providers of security and impartial justice. Since 2007, in line with the perception that weak and
corrupt governance was contributing to a deterioration of the security situation, the U.S. and
Afghan focus has been on reforming and reducing corruption within the central government, and
on expanding local governance. Then-head of the U.N. Assistance Mission Afghanistan
(UNAMA), Kai Eide, said in a departing news conference on March 4, 2010, that improving
governance and political processes are “indispensable” for resolving the conflict in Afghanistan,
and that U.S. and partner efforts have focused too much on military approaches. Eide has since
been succeeded by Staffan de Mistura, whose substantive position on the issue is similar.
Overview of Afghan Politics and Governance
Through differing regimes of widely varying ideologies, Afghanistan’s governing structure has
historically been characterized by a weak central government unwilling or unable to enforce
significant financial or administrative mandates on Afghanistan’s localities. About 80% of
Afghans live in rural areas; there are about 25,000 villages in Afghanistan. The tribal, clan,
village, and district political structures that provided governance and security until the late 1970s
were severely weakened by over 20 years of subsequent war. Many traditional local authority
figures fled or were killed, and were displaced by mujahedin commanders, militia leaders, and
others. These local power brokers, many of whom still wield authority, are widely accused of
selectively applying Afghan law and have resisted ceding their influence back to traditional
leaders or to new central or local governing structures.
At the national level, Afghanistan had few, if any, Western-style democratic institutions prior to
the international intervention that took place after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United
States. Karzai is the first directly elected president in Afghan history. There were parliamentary
elections during the reign of King Zahir Shah (the last were in 1969, before his reign was ended
in a 1973 military coup), but the parliament during that era did not have the political authority or
role as a check on presidential power that the post-Taliban National Assembly has. The elected
institutions and the 2004 adoption of a constitution were part of a post-Taliban transition roadmap
established by a United Nations-sponsored agreement of major Afghan factions signed in Bonn,
Germany, on December 5, 2001, (“Bonn Agreement”),1 after the Taliban had fallen. The political
transition process is depicted in Table 1.
Some believe that the elements of Western style democracy introduced since 2001 are supported
by traditional Afghan patterns of decision making that have some democratic and representative
elements. On the other hand, some see the traditional patterns as competing mechanisms that
resist change and modernization, and generally minimize the role of women, and do not meet
international standards of democratic governance. At the national level, the loya jirga, or
traditional Afghan assembly consisting of about 1,500 delegates from all over Afghanistan, has

1 For text, see http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm.
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been used to ratify some major decisions in the post-Taliban period (Karzai’s leadership, the post-
Taliban constitution, and long-term defense relations with the United States). Another national
jirga was held on June 2-4, 2010, to review government plans to offer incentives for insurgent
fighters to end their armed struggle and rejoin society. At the local level, shuras, or jirgas
(consultative councils)2 composed of local notables, are key mechanisms for making authoritative
local decisions or dispensing justice.
Ethnic Affiliations and Relations
Traditional patterns of political affiliation by family, clan, tribe, village, ethnicity, region, and
other relationships remain. These patterns were evident in the August 20, 2009, presidential
campaign in Afghanistan. Many presidential candidates, Karzai included, pursued campaign
strategies designed primarily to assemble blocs of ethnic and geographic votes, rather than
advance specific new ideas. These patterns were even more pronounced in campaigns for the
provincial councils, which were elected concurrently. In the provincial elections, electorates were
smaller and candidates could easily appeal to clan and familial relationships at local levels.
While Afghans continue to follow traditional patterns of affiliation, there has been a sense among
Afghans that their country now welcomes members of all political and ethnic groups and factions.
There have been very few incidents of ethnically based violence since the fall of the Taliban,
jealousies over relative economic and political positions of the different ethnic communities have
sporadically manifested as clashes or political disputes.
Ethnic Pashtuns (sometimes referred to as Pathans—pronounced pah-TAHNS), as the largest
single ethnicity, believe they have the right to rule. Pashtuns are about 42% of the population and,
with few exceptions, have governed Afghanistan. The sentiment of the “right to lead” is
particularly strong among Pashtuns of the Durrani tribal confederation, which predominates in the
south and is a rival to the Ghilzai confederation, which predominates in the east. One recent
exception was the 1992-1996 presidency of the mujahedin government of Burhanuddin Rabbani,
a Tajik. Karzai is a Pashtun and his cabinet, although not necessarily the security forces, has come
to be progressively dominated by Pashtuns. The Taliban government was and its insurgency is
composed almost completely of Pashtuns. A table on major Pashtun clans is provided below (see
Table 2), as is a map showing the distribution of Afghanistan’s various ethnicities (see Figure 1).
Although they largely concede Pashtun rule, non-Pashtuns want to be and have been represented
at high levels of the central government. Non-Pashtuns also have achieved a large measure of
control over how government programs are implemented in their geographic regions. The
security organs are considered an arena where Pashtuns and Tajiks have worked together
relatively well. Of the major security ministries and organizations, only the National Directorate
for Security (NDS, the intelligence directorate) had been headed by a non-Pashtun (Amrollah
Saleh, a Tajik), although he was dismissed on June 6, 2010, by Karzai for disagreements over
whether and how to engage insurgents in a political process. He was temporarily replaced by a
Pashtun, Ibrahim Spinzadeh. However, perhaps to restore ethnic balance, the chief of staff of the
Afghan National Army, Bismillah Khan (a Tajik), was named interior minister on June 26, 2010,
to replace a Pashtun, Mohammad Hanif Atmar, who was fired the same day and on roughly the
same grounds as Saleh. The security ministries tend to have key deputies who are of a different
ethnicity than the minister or top official. Some observers take a different view, asserting that

2 Shura is the term used by non-Pashtuns to characterize the traditional assembly concept. Jirga is the Pashtun term.
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Tajiks continue to control many of the command ranks of the Afghan security institutions, giving
Pashtuns only a veneer of control of these organizations. U.S. commanders in Afghanistan say the
composition of the security forces has recently been brought more into line with the population,
although Pashtuns from the south (Durranis) remain underrepresented.
Others believe that ethnic differences may be on the verge of erupting over Karzai’s plan to try to
induce both low-level and leading insurgent figures to end their fight and rejoin society, perhaps
even in prominent posts. Tajik leaders, in particular, as the most prominent group after the
Pashtuns, fear that Karzai’s plans will increase the Pashtun predominance in government and lead
to marginalization of the Tajiks and other non-Pashtun minorities.
Politics: Karzai and His Opponents
In post-Taliban Afghanistan, the National Assembly (parliament)—particularly the 249-seat
elected lower house (Wolesi Jirga, House of the People)—has become the key institution for the
non-Pashtuns and political independents to exert influence on Karzai. The December 2009-
January 2010 process of confirming Karzai’s second-term cabinet—in which about two-thirds of
Karzai’s nominees were voted down on two occasions—demonstrates that the Assembly is an
increasingly strong institution that is pressing for honest, competent governance. These principles
are advocated most stridently by the younger, more technocratic independent bloc in the lower
house. These independents were key to the lower house vote on March 31, 2010, to reject an
election decree that would structure the holding of September 18, 2010, National Assembly
elections.
This institutional growth has come despite the fact that about one-third of the seats in the lower
house are held by personalities and factions prominent in Afghanistan’s recent wars, many of
whom are non-Pashtuns from the north and the west. Both houses of parliament, whose budgets
are controlled by the Ministry of Finance, are staffed by about 275 Afghans, reporting to a
“secretariat.” There are 18 oversight committees, a research unit, and a library.
The other factions in the lower house are not strictly organized according to Afghanistan’s 108
registered political parties. Because of the popular aversion to formal “parties” as tools of
neighboring powers, Karzai has not formed his own party. However, his core supporters in the
Wolesi Jirga are about 50 former members of the conservative Pashtun-based Hizb-e-Islam party
(the same party as that headed by insurgent leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar); and supporters of Abd-
i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf—a prominent Islamic conservative mujahedin era party leader.3 Another base
of Karzai’s support are figures from Qandahar (Karzai’s home province) and Helmand provinces,
including several Karzai clan members. One clan member in the parliament is his cousin Jamil
Karzai, and another is relative by marriage Aref Nurzai, who was prominent in Karzai’s 2009
election campaign. Karzai’s elder brother, Qayyum, was in the lower house representing
Qandahar until his October 2008 resignation, although Qayyum continues to represent his brother
informally domestically and abroad, including at 2008 and 2009 meetings to explore negotiated
settlements with Taliban figures. Other pro-Karzai Pashtuns in the parliament are former militia
and Taliban leaders, including Hazrat Ali (Nangarhar Province), who led the Afghan component
of the failed assault on Osama bin Laden’s purported redoubt at Tora Bora in December 2001;
Pacha Khan Zadran (Paktia) who, by some accounts, helped Osama bin Laden escape Tora Bora;

3 Sayyaf led the Ittihad Islami (Islamic Union) mujahedin party during the war against the Soviet occupation.
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and Mullah Abdul Salam (“Mullah Rocketi”), from Zabol. (Salam ran for President in 2009 but
garnered only about 0.5%.)
The Opposition and Its Strength: Dr. Abdullah and Others
Although the political “opposition” to Karzai is fluid and often joins him on some issues, those
who can be considered opposition (putting aside Taliban and other insurgents) are mainly ethnic
minorities (Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara) who were in an alliance against Taliban rule that was called
the “Northern Alliance.” Leaders of these groups, and particularly Tajiks, view as a betrayal
Karzai’s firing of many of the non-Pashtuns from the cabinet. One of those is former Foreign
Minister Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, who is about 48 years old and whose mother is Tajik, and who
was dismissed from that post by Karzai in 2006. He has emerged as Afghanistan’s “opposition
leader” after his unsuccessful challenge against Karzai for president in the August 2009 election.
He visited Washington, DC, one week after Karzai’s May 10-14, 2010, visit, criticizing Karzai’s
governance strategy and implementation at various think tanks and in at least one meeting with
the State Department. Dr. Abdullah subsequently turned down an invitation to the June 2-4, 2010,
peace jirga in Kabul on the grounds that the 1,600 delegates are not representative of all Afghans,
implying that it would be overwhelmingly run and dominated by Pashtuns and exclude the views
of the other communities. Abdullah announced in late May 2010 that he has begun laying
groundwork to create a formal, national democratic opposition organization.
Currently, the main ethnic opposition grouping in the National Assembly, which supports Dr.
Abdullah, is called the United Front (UF), although some accounts refer to it as the “National
Front” or “United National Front.” It was formed in April 2007 by Wolesi Jirga Speaker Yunus
Qanooni (Karzai’s main challenger in the 2004 presidential election) and former Afghan President
Burhanuddin Rabbani (both, like Abdullah, are prominent ethnic Tajik Northern Alliance figures
and former associates of the legendary mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masood). The United
Front is broader than the Tajik-dominated “Northern Alliance” in that the Front includes some
Pashtuns, such as prominent Soviet-occupation era security figures Sayed Muhammad Gulabzoi
and Nur ul-Haq Ulumi, who has chaired the defense committee. Both of Karzai’s then-vice
presidents joined the UF when it was formed, although they subsequently continued to serve as
vice presidents (one, Ahmad Zia Masoud, is no longer vice president following the 2009
presidential election). The UF advocates amending the constitution to give more power to
parliament and to empower the elected provincial councils (instead of the president) to select
governors and mayors. Fearing Pashtun consolidation, the UF has been generally opposed to
Karzai’s overtures to Taliban leaders.
Even before the formation of the UF, the opposition bloc in the Wolesi Jirga first showed its
strength in March 2006, following the December 19, 2005, inauguration of parliament, by
requiring Karzai’s cabinet to be approved individually, rather than en bloc, increasing opposition
leverage. However, Karzai rallied his support and all but 5 of the 25 nominees were confirmed. In
May 2006, the opposition compelled Karzai to change the nine-member Supreme Court, the
highest judicial body, including ousting 74-year-old Islamic conservative Fazl Hadi Shinwari as
chief justice. The proximate justification for the ouster was Shinwari’s age, which was beyond the
official retirement age of 65. Parliament approved Karzai’s new court choices in July 2006, all of
whom are trained in modern jurisprudence.
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Parliamentary Independents
Karzai and the UF have often competed for the support of the “independents” in the lower house.
Among them are several outspoken women, intellectuals, and business leaders, such as the 43-
year-old Malalai Joya (Farah Province), a leading critic of war-era faction leaders. In May 2007
the lower house voted to suspend her for this criticism for the duration of her term. Others in this
camp include Ms. Fauzia Gailani (Herat Province); Ms. Shukria Barekzai, editor of Woman
Mirror
magazine; and Mr. Ramazan Bashardost, a former Karzai minister who champions
parliamentary powers and has established a “complaints tent” near the parliament building to
highlight and combat official corruption. (He ran for president in the 2009 elections on an anti-
corruption platform and drew an unexpectedly large amount of votes.) U.S.-based International
Republican Institute (IRI) has helped train the independents; the National Democratic Institute
(NDI) has assisted the more established factions.
The Upper House of the National Assembly
Karzai has relatively fewer critics in the 102-seat Meshrano Jirga (House of Elder, upper house),
partly because of his bloc of 34 appointments (one-third of that body). He engineered the
appointment of an ally as speaker: Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, a noted Islamic scholar and former
mujahedin party leader who headed the post-Communist mujahedin government for one month
(May 1992).4 However, because it is composed of more elderly, established, notable Afghans who
are traditionalist in their political outlook, the upper house has tended to be more Islamist
conservative than the lower house, advocating a legal system that accords with Islamic law, and
restrictions on press and Westernized media broadcasts. As an example of the upper house’s
greater support for Karzai, it voted on April 3, 2010, not to act on the election decree that the
lower house had rejected on March 31, 2010, meaning that the decree will apply to the
parliamentary election in September 2010.
Karzai also has used his bloc of appointments to the upper house to co-opt potential antagonists
or reward his friends. He appointed Northern Alliance military leader Muhammad Fahim to the
upper body, perhaps to compensate for his removal as defense minister, although he resigned after
a few months and later joined the UF. (He was Karzai’s primary running mate in the 2009
elections and is now a vice president.) Karzai named a key ally, former Helmand governor Sher
Mohammad Akhunzadeh, to the body. There is one Hindu, and 23 women; 17 are Karzai
appointees and six were selected in their own right.
Enhancing Government Capacity and Performance5
Since 2001, U.S. policy has been to help expand the capacity of Afghan institutions, which were
nearly non-existent during Taliban rule. Since 2007, but with a particular focus of the Obama
Administration, U.S. policy has been to promote Afghan central government reform and to build
or rebuild local governing institutions. The anti-corruption and governmental performance aspect
of U.S. policy was emphasized in two major Afghanistan policy statements by President

4 The mujahedin party he headed during the anti-Soviet war was the Afghan National Liberation Front.
5 Some information in this section is from the State Department reports on human rights in Afghanistan for 2009,
March 11, 2010; for text, see http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/sca/136084.htm and the International Religious
Freedom Report, released October 26, 2009, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127362.htm
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Obama—March 27, 2009, and December 1, 2009. Both statements stressed that more needed to
be done to promote the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan government at both the Kabul
and local levels. The latter statement indicated that “The days of providing a blank check [to the
Afghan government] are over.”
U.S.-Karzai Relations
U.S. relations with President Hamid Karzai, and U.S. assessments of his performance, are a key
part of the international effort to build governance in Afghanistan. Obama Administration
assessments of the failings of the Karzai government have caused substantial frictions in U.S.-
Karzai relations. Administration testimony before Congress following President Obama’s
December 1, 2009, policy statement, reiterated Administration concerns about the Karzai
shortcomings but also noted his late 2009 anti-corruption pledges and some positive
accomplishments of his government. U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry, who in
reported cables to Washington, DC, in September 2009 expressed numerous concerns about
Karzai’s leadership, testified in December 2009 that Karzai should receive credit for some of the
well-regarded economic sector ministerial appointments he made in 2008 and 2009.
Continuing U.S. concerns prompted President Obama to make anti-corruption efforts a particular
focus of his talks with President Karzai in Kabul on March 28, 2010. The meeting in Kabul was
said to be productive, if somewhat tense, but Karzai’s frustrations at what he sees as U.S. and
international pressure on him to reform emerged in his comments on April 1, 2010, and April 4,
2010, both to groups of Afghans. On both occasions, and the latter of which was to National
Assembly members, Karzai expressed frustration with what he claims was international meddling
in the August 20, 2009, presidential election and, more generally, what he sees as his
subordination to the decisions of Afghanistan’s international partners. The April 4, 2010,
comments were more specifically critical of the United States and suggested that Western
meddling in Afghanistan was fueling support for the Taliban as a legitimate resistance to foreign
occupation. An exact English translation of his April 4 comments, in which he purportedly said
that even he might consider joining the Taliban if U.S. pressure on him continues, is not available.
Karzai called Secretary of State Clinton following his April 1, 2010, comments, seeking to
“clarify” his comments, but the reportedly productive discussion did not prevent the additional
sharp comments by Karzai on April 4. White House spokesperson Robert Gibbs said on April 6,
2010, that the May 2010, Karzai visit to Washington, DC, might be called off if Karzai continued
to make similar remarks.
Subsequently, top Obama Administration officials, including Secretary of Defense Gates,
Secretary of State Clinton, and CENTCOM commander Gen. David Petraeus, issued comments
apparently designed to put the relationship back on an even footing.6 This reflected an apparent
decision that public criticism of Karzai was counterproductive and that the May 10-14, 2010, visit
should proceed, and with public criticism of his performance muted. The visit took place, and
included several working group meetings between several Karzai ministers and their U.S.
counterparts, and meetings and a joint press conference between Karzai and President Obama.
President Karzai, other Afghan officials, and U.S. officials all called the visit highly productive,

6 Dreazen, Yochi, and Sarah Lynch. “U.S. Seeks to Repair Karzai Tie.” Wall Street Journal, April 12, 2010.
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resulting in a decision to review, renew, and expand a 2005 “strategic partnership” that would
reflect a long-term U.S. commitment to Afghanistan.7
Differences Among U.S. Officials Over the Approach Toward Karzai
Still, a perception had taken hold that Karzai’s closest U.S. interlocutor was the top commander in
Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, and that Karzai’s relations with the Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, and with Ambassador
Eikenberry, are severely strained. This perception was fed by numerous reports and comments by
observers that said that Holbrooke and Eikenberry, reportedly backed by Vice President Biden
and, to a certain extent, President Obama, believed in the efficacy of public U.S. pressure on
Karzai. McChrystal viewed public upbraiding of him as counterproductive. Differences among
the U.S. team on this and other issues were exposed in the Rolling Stone article “The Runaway
General” (July 6-22, 2010, issue), which included impolitic comments by McChrystal and his
staff. Karzai publicly expressed support for McChrystal—a demonstration of their trust—but
President Obama nonetheless removed McChrystal on June 24, 2010. The appointment of Gen.
David Petraeus (CENTCOM Commander) to replace McChrystal partly calmed Karzai’s fears of
a further downturn in his relations with the U.S. policy team. However, some believe that there
may need to be further changes on the U.S. side in order to achieve better unity of effort.
The Influences of Regional Faction Leaders/“Warlords”
A major international concern about Karzai’s governing style is his consistent reluctance to
confront—and his willingness to sometimes ally himself with—unelected or well-armed faction
leaders. The Obama Administration’s March 27, 2009, and December 1, 2009, strategy statements
did not outline new measures to sideline these strongmen, who are sometimes referred to by
experts and others as “warlords.” General McChrystal, in his August 2009, “initial assessment,”
cited below, indicated that some of these faction leaders—most of whom the United States and its
partners regularly deal with and have good working relations with—cause resentment among
some sectors of the population and complicate U.S. stabilization strategy. On the other hand,
some Afghans and outside experts believe that the international community’s strategy of
dismantling local power structures and empowering the central government has caused the
security deterioration noted since 2006.
Some assert that the Obama Administration’s criticism of Karzai has caused him to become more
reliant on factional power brokers than he was previously. Karzai’s position is that confronting
faction leaders outright would likely cause their followers—who usually belong to ethnic or
regional minorities—to go into armed rebellion. Even before the Obama Administration came
into office, Karzai argued that keeping the faction leaders on the government side is needed in
order to keep the focus on fighting “unrepentant” Taliban insurgents (who are almost all ethnic
Pashtuns). Perhaps taking umbrage to international criticism, some Soviet-era faction leaders did
not attend the April 28, 2010, celebration in Kabul of the anniversary of the mujahedin victory
over the pro-Soviet Communist government (1992).
In February 2007, both houses passed a law giving amnesty to faction leaders and others who
committed abuses during Afghanistan’s past wars. Karzai altered the draft to give victims the

7 Interview with Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CNN, May 30 2010.
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right to seek justice for any abuses; Karzai did not sign a modified version in May 2007, leaving
the status unclear. However, in November 2009, the Afghan government published the law in the
official gazette (a process known as “gazetting”), giving it the force of law.
The following sections analyze some of the main faction leaders who often attract criticism and
commentary from U.S. and international partners in Afghanistan.
Vice President Muhammad Fahim
Karzai’s choice of Muhammad Fahim, a Tajik from the Panjshir Valley region who is military
chief of the Northern Alliance/UF faction, as his first vice presidential running mate in the August
2009 elections might have been one manifestation of Karzai’s growing reliance on faction
leaders. The Fahim choice was criticized by human rights and other groups because of Fahim’s
long identity as a mujahedin commander/militia faction leader. However, the alliance was viewed
as a major political coup for Karzai by splitting off a major figure from the UF bloc. A New York
Times
story of August 27, 2009, said that the Bush Administration continued to deal with Fahim
when he was Defense Minister (2001-2004) despite reports that he was involved in facilitating
narcotics trafficking in northern Afghanistan. Other allegations suggest he has engineered
property confiscations and other benefits to feed his and his faction’s business interests. He also
has reportedly withheld turning over some heavy weapons to U.N. disarmament officials who
have been trying to reduce the influence of local strongmen such as Fahim. U.S. officials have not
announced any limitations on dealings with Fahim now that he is vice president.
Northern Afghanistan: Abdurrashid Dostam
Some observers cite Karzai’s handling of prominent Uzbek leader Abdurrashid Dostam as
evidence of political weakness. Dostam commands numerous partisans in his redoubt in northern
Afghanistan (Jowzjan and Balkh provinces), where he was widely accused of human rights
abuses of political opponents. To try to separate him from his armed followers, in 2005 Karzai
appointed him to the post of chief of staff of the armed forces. On February 4, 2008, Afghan
police surrounded Dostam’s villa in Kabul in response to reports that he attacked an ethnic
Turkmen rival, but Karzai did not order his arrest for fear of stirring unrest among Dostam’s
followers. To try to resolve the issue without stirring unrest, in December 2008 Karzai
purportedly reached an agreement with Dostam under which he resigned as chief of staff and
went into exile in Turkey in exchange for the dropping of any case against him.8
Dostam returned to Afghanistan on August 16, 2009, and subsequently held a large pro-Karzai
election rally in his home city of Shebergan. Part of his intent has been to weaken and oust
another strong figure in the north, Balkh Province governor Atta Mohammad, who views himself
as relatively independent of Kabul’s writ. Mohammad is a Tajik but, under a 2005 compromise
with Karzai, is in control of a province that is inhabited mostly by Uzbeks—a source of irritation
for Dostam and other Uzbek leaders. Mohammad supported Dr. Abdullah in the 2009 presidential
race. Dostam’s support apparently helped Karzai carry several provinces in the north, including
Jowzjan, Sar-i-Pol, and Faryab, although Dr. Abdullah won Balkh and Samangan, according to
certified results (see “The Election Results ” below). Dostam reportedly went back into exile as of
October 2009 and was not himself nominated for any cabinet or other major post in the post-

8 CRS e-mail conversation with National Security aide to President Karzai, December 2008.
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election cabinet presentations. At least two members of his “Jombush Melli” organization were
nominated for cabinet seats, although they were voted down by the National Assembly because
the Assembly insisted on competent officials rather than party loyalists in the new cabinet.
Dostam returned to Afghanistan in January 2010 and was restored to his previous, primarily
honorary, position of chief of staff of the armed forces.
Dostam’s reputation is further clouded by his actions during the U.S.-backed war against the
Taliban. On July 11, 2009, the New York Times reported that allegations that Dostam had caused
the death of several hundred Taliban prisoners during the major combat phase of OEF (late 2001)
were not investigated by the Bush Administration. In responding to assertions that there was no
investigation of the “Dasht-e-Laili” massacre because Dostam was a U.S. ally,9 President Obama
said any allegations of violations of laws of war need to be investigated. Dostam responded to
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (which carried the story) that only 200 Taliban prisoners died
and this was due to combat and disease, and not due to intentional actions of forces under his
command.
Herat: Isma’il Khan
Another strongman that Karzai has sought to simultaneously engage and weaken is prominent
Tajik political leader and former Herat governor Ismail Khan. In 2006, Karzai appointed him
minister of energy and water, taking him away from his political base in the west. However, Khan
remains influential there, and maintaining ties to Khan has won Karzai Khan’s election support.
Khan apparently was able to deliver potentially decisive Tajik votes in Herat Province that might
otherwise have gone to Dr. Abdullah. Afghan certified results showed Karzai winning that
province, indicating that the deal with Khan was helpful to Karzai.
Still, Khan is said to have several opponents in Herat, and a bombing there on September 26,
2009, narrowly missed his car, causing Khan to threaten to resign his ministry post. U.S. officials
purportedly would prefer that Khan not be in the new cabinet because of his checkered record,
even though some U.S. officials credit him with cooperating with the privatization of the power
sector of Afghanistan. Karzai renominated Khan in his ministry post on December 19, 2009,
causing purported disappointment by parliamentarians and western donor countries who want
Khan and other faction leaders weakened. His renomination was voted down by the National
Assembly and no new nominee for that post was presented on January 9, 2010. Khan remains as
head of the ministry but in an acting capacity.
Helmand Province: Sher Mohammad Akhundzadeh and “Koka”
Karzai’s relationship with another Pashtun strongman, Sher Mohammad Akhundzadeh,
demonstrates the dilemmas facing Karzai in governing Afghanistan. Akhunzadeh was a close
associate of Karzai when they were in exile in Quetta, Pakistan, during Taliban rule. Karzai
appointed him governor of Helmand after the fall of the Taliban, but in 2005, Britain demanded
he be removed for his abuses and reputed involvement in drug trafficking, as a condition of
Britain taking security control of Helmand. Karzai reportedly wants to reappoint Akhundzadeh,
who Karzai believes was more successful against militants in Helmand using his local militiamen
than Britain has been with its more than 9,000 troops there. Akhunzadeh said in a November 2009

9 This is the name of the area where the Taliban prisoners purportedly died and were buried in a mass grave.
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interview that many of his followers joined the Taliban insurgency after Britain insisted on his
ouster. However, Britain and the United States have strongly urged Karzai to keep the existing
governor, Ghulab Mangal, who is winning wide praise for his successes establishing effective
governance in Helmand (discussed further under “Expanding Local Governance,” below) and for
reducing poppy cultivation there. Akhunzadeh attempted to deliver large numbers of votes for
Karzai in Helmand, although turnout in that province was very light partly due to Taliban
intimidation of voters.
An Akhunzadeh ally, Abdul Wali Khan (nicknamed “Koka”), was similarly removed by British
pressure in 2006 as police chief of Musa Qala district of Helmand. However, Koka was reinstated
in 2008 when that district was retaken from Taliban control. The Afghan government insisted on
his reinstatement and his militia followers subsequently became the core of the 220-person police
force in the district.
Balkh: Atta Mohammad Noor
Atta Mohammad Noor, who is about 46 years old, has been the governor of Balkh Province,
whose capital is the vibrant city of Mazar-e-Sharif, since 2005. He is an ethnic Tajik, former
mujahedin commander, who openly endorsed Dr. Abdullah in the 2009 presidential election.
However, Karzai has kept Noor in place because he has kept the province secure, allowing
Mazar-e-Sharif to become a major trading hub, and because displacing him could cause ethnic
unrest. Observers say that Noor exemplifies the local potentate, brokering local security and
business arrangements that enrich Noor and his allies while ensuring stability and prosperity.10
Nangarhar: Ghul Agha Shirzai
A key gubernatorial appointment has been Ghul Agha Shirzai as governor of Nangarhar. He is a
Pashtun from Qandahar, and is generally viewed in Nangarhar as an implant from the south.
However, much as has Noor in Balkh, Shirzai has exercised effective leadership, particularly in
curbing poppy cultivation there. However, Shirzai is also widely accused of arbitrary action
against political or other opponents, and he reportedly has also not remitted all the customs duties
collected at the Khyber Pass/Torkham crossing to the central government.
Qandahar: Ahmad Wali Karzai
Governing Qandahar, a province of about 2 million, of whom about half live in Qandahar city, is
a sensitive issue in Kabul because of President Karzai’s active interest in his home province.
Qandahar governance is particularly crucial to an anticipated U.S.-led offensive to increase
security in surrounding districts. In Qandahar, Ahmad Wali Karzai, Karzai’s elder brother, is chair
of the provincial council. He has always been more powerful than any appointed governor of
Qandahar. Perceiving him as the key power broker in the province, many constituents and interest
groups meet him each day in his home requesting his interventions on their behalf.
In May 2010, Ahmad Wali publicly admitted to unspecified “mistakes,” and backed the
forthcoming U.S.-led stabilization effort for the province. That backing came amid reports that
the United States is trying to bolster the clout in Qandahar of the appointed governor, Tooryalai

10 Gall, Carlotta. “In Afghanistan’s North, Ex-Warlord Offers Security.” New York Times, May 17, 2010.
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Wesa. Karzai appointed Wesa—a Canadian-Afghan academic—in December 2008, perhaps
hoping that his ties to Canada would assuage Canadian reticence to continuing its mission in
Qandahar beyond 2011. That effort has not succeeded. The United States and its partners are
trying to assist Wesa with his efforts to equitably distribute development funds and build local
governing structures out of the tribal councils he has been holding. U.S. officials reportedly have
sought to keep Ahmad Wali from interfering in Wesa’s efforts.11 Observers report that President
Karzai has repeatedly rebuffed U.S. and other suggestions to try to remove his brother from
Qandahar.
The Wesa appointment was the latest of a series of appointments to that post. Because of his close
interest in the province, President Karzai has frequently rotated the governors of Qandahar,
putting in place relatively weak officials who will not impinge on Ahmad Wali’s authority.
President Karzai appointed General Rahmatullah Raufi to replace Asadullah Khalid after an
August 7, 2008, Taliban assault on the Qandahar prison that led to the freeing of several hundred
Taliban fighters incarcerated there.
Building Central Government Capacity
Governmental reforms, some of which President Karzai says are being implemented or planned,
include instituting merit-based performance criteria, ending the practice of hiring based on
kinship and ethnicity rather than qualifications, and weeding out rampant official corruption.
Afghan ministries based in Kabul are increasing their staffs and technological capabilities (many
ministry offices now have modern computers, for example) although they still suffer from a low
resource and skill base. Corruption is fed, in part, by the fact that government workers receive
very low salaries.
Some observers assert that the Afghan government is ineffective because it lacks focus and
organization, most notably in the presidential office. One idea that surfaced in 2009, but has since
receded, was to prod Karzai to create a new position to help the Karzai government’s
administrative abilities. Several potential officials reportedly negotiated with Karzai about
playing that role, including one of Karzai’s 2009 election challengers, Ashaf Ghani. Karzai did
not mention this issue in his second-term inaugural speech on November 19, 2009.12 Ghani has
been advising Karzai on government reform and institution building after reconciling with him in
November 2009 (after the election was settled), and was part of Karzai’s advisory team during the
January 28, 2010, London conference.
The Administration has developed about 45 different metrics to assess progress in building
Afghan governance and security, as it was required to do so (by September 23, 2009) under P.L.
111-32, an FY2009 supplemental appropriation.13 To date, and under separate authorities such as
provisions of supplemental appropriations and foreign aid appropriations, only small amounts of
U.S. aid have been made conditional on Afghanistan’s performance on such metrics, and no U.S.
aid has been permanently withheld.

11 Partlow, Joshua, “U.S. Seeks to Bolster Kandahar Governor, Upend Power Balance,” Washington Post, April 29,
2010.
12 Text of unofficial translation of Karzai speech provided by the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in
Washington, DC.
13 “Evaluating Progress in Afghanistan-Pakistan” Foreign Policy website, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/
09/16/evaluating_progress_in_afghanistan_pakistan.
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The Afghan Civil Service
The low level of Afghan bureaucratic capacity is being addressed in a number of ways, although
slowly. The United States and its partners do not have in place a broad program to themselves
train Afghan government officials, but instead fund Afghan institutions to conduct such training.
Issues of standardizing job descriptions, salaries, bonuses, benefits and the like are being
addressed by Afghanistan’s Civil Service Commission. According to the April 2010 version of a
mandated Defense Department report on Afghanistan,14 the Commission has thus far redefined
more than 80,000 civil servant job descriptions.
Under a program called the Civilian Technical Assistance Plan, the United States is providing
technical assistance to Afghan ministries and to the Commission. From January 2010 until early
2011, the United States is giving $85 million to programs run by the Commission to support the
training and development of Afghan civil servants. One of the Commission’s subordinate
organizations is the Afghan Civil Service Institute, that has thus far graduated 1,300 government
employees. Many Afghan civil service personnel have undergone training in India, building on
growing relations between Afghanistan and India.
Government Corruption/Rule of Law
President Obama and his senior aides, including Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and Ambassador
to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry, have been publicly critical of Karzai’s shortcomings on the
corruption issue. U.S. officials apparently believe that the corruption within the Afghan
government is contributing to a souring of Western publics on the mission as well as causing
some Afghans to embrace Taliban insurgents. Official corruption was identified as a key problem
in the August 30, 2009, assessment of the Afghanistan situation by General Stanley McChrystal,
then overall commander of U.S. and international forces there.
The Obama Administration’s March 2009 and December 2009 strategy announcements
highlighted the need to reduce official corruption. The December 1, 2009, strategy announcement
did not specifically make U.S. forces or assistance contingent on progress on this issue. However,
the statement’s stipulation of July 2011 as the beginning of a “transition” process to Afghan
leadership implied that U.S. support is not open-ended or unconditional. In the December 1,
2009, statement, the President said “We expect those [Afghan officials] who are ineffective or
corrupt to be held accountable.” As noted, pressing Karzai on corruption reportedly was a key
component of President Obama’s brief visit to Afghanistan on March 28, 2010.
Several of the required U.S. “metrics” of progress, cited above, involve Afghan progress against
corruption. A FY2009 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 111-32) mandated the withholding of
10% of about $90 million in State Department counter-narcotics funding subject to a certification
that the Afghan government is acting against officials who are corrupt or committing gross human
rights violations. No U.S. funding for Afghanistan has been withheld because of this or any other
legislative certification requirement. On the other hand, a Members of Congress threatened to
withhold nearly $4 billion in requested FY2001 reconstruction aid to Afghanistan subject to
progress on the issue. The assertion came amid reports that Afghan leaders are impeding
investigations by the Afghan justice system of some politically well-connected Afghans, and

14 Department of Defense. “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan.” April 2010.
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/report_final_secdef_04_26_10.pdf.
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following reports that as much as $3 billion in funds have been allegedly embezzled by Afghan
officials over the past several years.15
Scope of the Problem
Partly because many Afghans view the central government as “predatory,” many Afghans and
international donors have lost faith in Karzai’s leadership. A U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime
report released in January 2010 said 59% of Afghans consider corruption as a bigger concern than
the security situation and unemployment. Transparency International, a German organization that
assesses governmental corruption worldwide, ranked Afghanistan in 2008 as 176th out of 180
countries ranked in terms of government corruption.
At the upper levels of government, some observers have asserted that Karzai deliberately tolerates
officials who are allegedly involved in the narcotics trade, in exchange for their support. The
Afghan figure exemplifying that allegation has been Karzai’s brother, Qandahar provincial
council chief Ahmad Wali Karzai. Numerous press stories have asserted that he has protected
narcotics trafficking in the province, although some pieces say he is also a paid informant and
helper for CIA and Special Forces operations in the province.16 Some Afghans explain Ahmad
Wali Karzai’s activities as an effort to ensure that his constituents in Qandahar have financial
means to sustain themselves, even if through narcotics trade, before there are viable alternative
sources of livelihood. He is discussed further below, under “Qandahar governance.”
Another brother, Mahmoud Karzai, has apparently grown wealthy through real estate and auto
sales ventures in Qandahar and Kabul, purportedly by fostering the impression he can influence
his brother, President Karzai. Mahmoud Karzai held a press conference in Washington, DC, on
April 16, 2009, denying allegations of corruption.
Aside from the issue of high level nepotism and corruption, observers who follow the issue say
that most of the governmental corruption takes place in the course of performing mundane
governmental functions, such as government processing of official documents, in which
processing services routinely require bribes in exchange for action.17 In other cases, Afghan
security officials are said to sell U.S./internationally provided vehicles, fuel, and equipment to
supplement their salaries. In other cases, local police or border officials may siphon off customs
revenues or demand extra payments to help guard the U.S. or other militaries’ equipment
shipments.
Other observers who have served in Afghanistan say that Karzai has appointed some provincial
governors to “reward them” and that these appointments have gone on to “prey” economically on
the populations of that province. Several high officials, despite very low official government
salaries, have acquired ornate properties in west Kabul since 2002, according to Afghan
observers. The U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has

15 Rosenberg, Matthew. “Corruption Suspected in Airlift of Billions in Cash From Kabul.” Wall Street Journal, June
28, 2010.
16 Filkins, Dexter, Mark Mazetti and James Risen, “Brother of Afghan Leader Is Said to be on C.I.A. Payroll,” New
York Times
, October 28, 2009.
17 Filkins, Dexter, “Bribes Corrode Afghan’s Trust in Government,” New York Times, January 2, 2009.
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assessed that the mandate of Afghanistan’s Control and Audit Office is too narrow and lacks the
independence needed to serve as an effective watch over the use of Afghan government funds.18
Because of corruption, only about 10% of U.S. aid is channeled through the Afghan government,
although Ambassador Holbrooke said in May 2009 (and in his strategy document of January
2010), that empowering Afghan governance requires raising that to about 40% (direct support to
ministries or Afghan NGOs and firms). Currently, the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry
of Communications qualify to have U.S. funds channeled through them, and the FY2011 Obama
Administration aid request expressed the goal that six ministries would qualify for direct funding
by the end of 2010. Among others, direct aid is expected to be extended to the Ministry of Rural
Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), which runs the widely praised National Solidarity
Program, which awards local development grants for specific projects. The Ministry has
developed a capability, widely praised by Britain and other observers, to account for large
percentages of donated funds to ensure they are not siphoned off by corruption. The Ministry of
Finance and of Agriculture are also considered well run under Omar Zakhiwal and Mohammad
Asef Rahimi, respectively.
Other Karzai Responses
Karzai has taken note of the growing U.S. criticism, and Obama Administration officials have
credited him with taking several steps, tempered by criticism of slow implementation. Karzai
himself declared his assets on March 27, 2009. In his public appearances during his visit to the
United States in May 2009, Karzai repeatedly stressed what he said were efforts by him and his
government to remove corrupt officials and combat official corruption. On June 26, 2010, Karzai
urged anti-corruption officials to monitor the incomes of government officials and their families,
including his, to ensure their monies are earned legally.
In late 2008, he replaced the ministers of Interior, of Education, Agriculture, and Finance with
officials believed to be dedicated to weeding out official corruption. U.S. embassy officials
suggest these cabinet ministers are the best members of what they consider the most effective
cabinet Karzai has had since he became leader in 2001, and were heartened that they were
reappointed to the cabinet in December 2009 and confirmed by the National Assembly. (The
minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Ehsan Zia, was not reappointed.) In addition:
High Office of Oversight. In August 2008 Karzai, with reported Bush
Administration prodding, set up the “High Office of Oversight for the
Implementation of Anti-Corruption Strategy” (commonly referred to as the High
Office of Oversight, HOO) with the power to identify and refer corruption cases
to state prosecutors, and to catalogue the overseas assets of Afghan officials. In
his November 19, 2009, inaugural address, Karzai announced the upgrading of
the High Office of Oversight by increasing its scope of authority and resources,
and by reforming relevant anti-corruption laws. On March 18, 2010, Karzai, as
he promised during the January 28, 2010, international meeting on Afghanistan
in London, issued a decree giving the High Office direct power to investigate
corruption cases rather than just refer them to other offices. The United States
gave the High Office about $1 million in assistance during FY2009 and its
performance was audited by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan

18 Madhani, Aamer. “U.S. Reviews Afghan Watchdog Authority.” USA Today, May 12, 2010.
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Reconstruction (SIGAR), in an audit released in December 2009.19 Aid to the
HOO is expected to be over $30 million in FY2011 to build capacity, according
to USAID officials.
• During December 15-17, 2009, Karzai held a conference in Kabul to combat
corruption. It debated, among other ideas, requiring deputy ministers and others
to declare their assets, not just those at the ministerial level. That requirement has
now been imposed. On the other hand, during the conference Karzai defended
Kabul Mayor Abdul Ahad Sahibi, who was convicted earlier in December of
embezzlement. On December 13, 2009, the deputy Kabul mayor (Wahibuddin
Sadat) was arrested at Kabul airport for alleged misuse of authority. In November
2009, the Afghan government also has announced an increase in police salaries
(from $180 per month to $240 per month), in part to attract recruits and reduce
their inclination to demand bribes.
• A Major Crimes Task Force and Anti-Corruption Tribunal have been established.
Eleven judges have been appointed to the Tribunal. A headquarters for the Major
Crimes Task Force–Afghanistan, at which U.S. and international law
enforcement agencies investigate official links to illicit activities, was
inaugurated on February 25, 2010.
• Some prosecutions have been undertaken. In November 2009, Attorney General
Mohammad Ishaq Aloko announced that two ministers were under investigation
for corruption, including the Minister of Mines Mohammad Ibrahim Adel, who
reportedly accepted a $30 million bribe to award a key mining project in Lowgar
Province (Aynak Copper Mine) to China.20 Neither was reappointed to the
cabinet named December 19. In April 2010, Afghan authorities said that at least
17 other officials of ministerial rank are under investigation for corruption.
However, as noted above, Afghan figures have quietly blocked some of these
investigations, including that of former Minister of the Hajj Mohammad Siddiq
Chakari. He fled Afghanistan and is thought to be in Britain.
• Additional steps pledged at the January 2010 London conference are expected to
be taken prior to an international conference on Afghanistan, to be held in Kabul
on July 2010, with additional measures to be undertaken by the end of 2010.
Some of Karzai’s anti-corruption steps have been recommended in studies within the State
Department, the Afghan government, and the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime, which is
responsible for assisting Afghanistan on counter-narcotics. The Afghan government initially
committed itself to stepped up anti-corruption efforts in the so-called “Afghanistan Compact”
adopted at an international meeting in London on February 1, 2006, and it ratified the U.N.
Convention Against Corruption in August 2008.
Rule of Law
U.S. efforts to curb corruption go hand-in-hand with efforts to promote rule of law. The U.S.
Embassy reportedly will have an Ambassador rank official, Hans Klemm, as a rule of law

19 http://www.sigar.mil/reports/pdf/audits/SIGAR20Audit-10-2.pdf.
20 Partlow, Joshua, “Afghanistan Investigating 5 Current and Former Cabinet Members,” Washington Post, November
24, 2009.
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coordinator. U.S. funding supports training and mentoring for Afghan justice officials, direct
assistance to the Afghan government to expand efforts on judicial security, legal aid and public
defense, gender justice and awareness, and expansion of justice in the provinces.
One concern is how deeply to become involved in the informal justice sector. Afghans turn often
to local, informal mechanisms to adjudicate disputes, particularly those involving local property,
familial or local disputes, or personal status issues, rather than use the national court system.
Some estimates say that 80% of cases are decided in the informal justice system. However, this
informal justice system is dominated almost exclusively by males. The rule of law issue cuts
across many different issues, including policing, security, the justice sector, and other functions,
and some of these issues are covered in greater depth in CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan:
Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
, by Kenneth Katzman.
Expanding Local Governance/U.S. Civilian “Uplift”
U.S. emphasis on local governance since 2007 has sought, in part, to enable U.S. policy to reduce
dependence on the Afghan central government and on Karzai, in part to try to circumvent their
flaws. The U.S. shift in emphasis complements those of the Afghan government, which asserts
that it has itself long sought to promote local governance as the next stage in Afghanistan’s
political and economic development. A key indicator of the Afghan intent came in August 2007
when Karzai placed the selection process for local leaders (provincial governors and down) in a
new Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG)—and out of the Interior Ministry. As
noted above, the IDLG is headed by Jelani Popal, a member of Karzai’s Popolzai tribe and a close
ally. Some international officials say that Popal packed local agencies with Karzai supporters,
where they were able to fraudulently produce votes for Karzai in the August 2009 presidential
elections.
Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils
Many believe that the key to effective local governance is the appointment of competent
governors in all 34 Afghan provinces. U.N., U.S., and other international studies and reports all
point to the beneficial effects (reduction in narcotics trafficking, economic growth, lower
violence) of some of the strong Afghan civilian appointments at the provincial level. However,
many of the governors are considered weak, ineffective, or corrupt. Others, such as Ghul Agha
Shirzai and Atta Mohammad Noor, discussed above in the section on faction leaders, are
considered effective but also relatively independent of central authority.
One of the most widely praised gubernatorial appointments has been the March 2008 replacement
of the weak and ineffective governor of Helmand with Gulab Mangal, who is from Laghman
Province. The U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) praised Mangal in its September 2009
report for taking effective action to convince farmers to grow crops other than poppy. The
UNODC report said his efforts account for the 33% reduction of cultivation in Helmand in 2009,
as compared with 2008. Mangal has played a key role in convening tribal shuras and educating
local leaders on the benefits of the U.S.-led offensive to remove Taliban insurgents from Marjah
town and install new authorities there (“Operation Moshtarek,” which began in February 2010.)
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Provincial Councils
One problem noted by governance experts is that the role of the elected provincial councils is
unclear. The elections for the provincial councils in all 34 provinces were held on August 20,
2009, concurrent with the presidential elections. The previous provincial council elections were
held concurrent with the parliamentary elections in September 2005. The 2009 election results for
the provincial councils were certified on December 29, 2009, although international officials say
that there continues to be unrest over some of the results.21 In most provinces, the provincial
councils do not act as true legislatures, and they are considered weak compared to the power and
influence of the provincial governors.
Still, the provincial councils play a major role in choosing the upper house of the National
Assembly (Meshrano Jirga); in the absence of district councils (no elections held or scheduled),
the provincial councils choose two-thirds of the 102-seat Meshrano Jirga. The councils elected in
2009 will select their portion of new Meshrano Jirga representatives when the upper body is
selected again (after the parliamentary elections planned for September 2010).
District-Level Governance
Central government representation in outlying provinces is expanding very slowly and unevenly.
District governors are appointed by the president, at the recommendation of the IDLG. Only about
half of all district governors (there are 364 districts) have any staff or vehicles. Efforts to expand
village local governance have been hampered by corruption and limited availability of skilled
Afghans. In some districts of Helmand that had fallen under virtual Taliban control until the July
2009 U.S.-led offensives in the province, there were no district governors in place at all. Some of
the district governors, including in Nawa and Now Zad district, have returned in concert with the
U.S. expulsion of Taliban militants.
The ISAF campaign plan to retake the Marjah area of Helmand (Operation Moshtarak), which
began on February 14, 2010, and succeeded in ousting Taliban control of the town by February
25, 2010, included recruiting, in advance, civilian Afghan officials who would govern the district
once military forces had expelled Taliban fighters from it. Haji Zahir, a businessman who was in
exile in Germany during Taliban rule, has taken up his position to become the chief executive in
Marjah (which is to become its own district). He has held meetings with Marjah residents, one of
which included hosting a visit to Marjah by President Karzai (March 7, 2010). Zahir is expected
to remain in his post even though press reports in March 2010 assert he had been convicted of
domestic violence during his exile in Germany. Zahir denies the story. He has told journalists he
is planning to expand his staff to facilitate the “build phase” of the ISAF counter-insurgency plan
for the area. However, thus far the expansion of that staff —and the building of governance in
Marjah more generally—has been slow and some officials assigned to the city refuse to serve in it
for fear of Taliban assassination.

21 Comments by Electoral Complaints Commission Chair Grant Kippen at a meeting with CRS experts, January 7,
2010.
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District Councils and Municipal and Village Level Authority
No elections for district councils have been held due to boundary and logistical difficulties.
However, in his November 19, 2009, inaugural speech, Karzai said the goal of the government is
to hold these elections along with the 2010 parliamentary elections. However, subsequently,
Afghan officials have said that there will not be district elections in May 2010 when the
parliamentary elections are to be held.
As are district governors, mayors of large municipalities are appointed. Karzai also pledged in his
November 2009 inaugural that “mayoral” elections would be held “for the purpose of better city
management.” However, no municipal elections have been held and none is scheduled.
The IDLG, with advice from India and other donors, is also in the process of empowering
localities to decide on development priorities by forming Community Development Councils
(CDC’s). Thus far, there are about 30,000 CDC’s established, and they are eventually to all be
elected.
U.S. Local Governance Advisory Capacity
As a consequence of the March 2009 Obama Administration review, to help build local governing
capacity, the Administration recruited about 500 U.S. civilian personnel from the State
Department, USAID, the Department of Agriculture, and several other agencies—and many
additional civilians from partner countries will join them—to advise Afghan ministries, and
provincial and district administrations. That effort raised the number of U.S. civilians in
Afghanistan to about 975 by early 2010. Of these, nearly 350 are serving outside Kabul, up from
67 in early 2009. A strategy document released by the office of Ambassador Holbrook in January
2010 said that the number of U.S. civilians is slated to grow by another 30% in 2010.22
Senior Civilian Representative Program
The Administration also has instituted appointments of “Senior Civilian Representatives”
(SCR),23 who are counterparts to the military commanders of each NATO/ISAF regional
command (there are currently five of them). Each Senior Civilian Representative is to have 10-30
personnel on their team. For example, Ambassador Frank Ruggiero, who is serving in Qandahar
as the SCR for Regional Command South, is based at Qandahar airfield and interacts closely with
the military command of the southern sector. He testified before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on May 6, 2010. USAID official Dawn Liberi is SCR for Regional Command East
(RC-E), which is U.S.-run. She was mentioned specifically by President Obama in his address to
U.S. forces at Bagram Airfield (headquarters of RC-E) on March 28, 2010.
Human Rights Issues
None of the Obama Administration strategy reviews in 2009 specifically changed U.S. policy on
Afghanistan’s human rights practices, although this issue could be deemed addressed implicitly

22 For text, see http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135728.pdf.
23 For more information, see the Defense Department report on Afghanistan stability, April 2010, cited earlier.
pp. 19-20.
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by the Administration’s December 1, 2009, statement that policy is intended to make the Afghan
government more “accountable.” On human rights issues, the overall State Department judgment
is that the country’s human rights record remains poor, according to the Department’s report for
2009 (issued March 11, 2010).24 The latest State Department report was similar in tone and
substance to that of previous years, citing Afghan security forces and local faction leaders for
abuses, including torture and abuse of detainees. In October 2007, Afghanistan resumed enforcing
the death penalty after a four-year moratorium, executing 15 criminals.
Afghanistan’s conservative traditions have caused some backsliding in recent years on media
freedoms, which were hailed during 2002-2008 as a major benefit of the U.S. effort in
Afghanistan. A press law was passed in September 2008 that gives some independence to the
official media outlet, but also contains a number of content restrictions, and requires that new
newspapers and electronic media be licensed by the government. Backed by Islamic
conservatives in parliament, such as Sayyaf (referenced above), and Shiite clerics such as
Ayatollah Asif Mohseni, Afghanistan’s conservative Council of Ulema (Islamic scholars) has
been ascendant. With the Council’s backing, in April 2008 the Ministry of Information and
Culture banned five Indian-produced soap operas on the grounds that they are too risque,
although the programs were restored in August 2008 under a compromise that also brought in
some Islamic-oriented programs from Turkey. At the same time, according to the State
Department there has been a growing number of arrests or intimidation of journalists who
criticize the central government or local leaders. As another example of the growing power of
Islamists, alcohol is increasingly difficult to obtain in restaurants and stores, although it is not
banned for sale to non-Muslims. There were reports in April 2010 that Afghan police had raided
some restaurants and prevented them from selling alcoholic beverages at all.
Religious Freedom
The October 2009 International Religious Freedom report (released October 26, 2009) says the
Afghan government took limited steps during the year to increase religious freedom, but that
“serious problems remain.” Members of minority religions, including Christians, Sikhs, Hindus,
and Baha’i’s, often face discrimination; the Supreme Court declared the Baha’i faith to be a form
of blasphemy in May 2007. Northeastern provinces have a substantial population of Islamailis, a
Shiite Muslim sect often called “Seveners” (believers in the Seventh Imam as the true Imam).
Many Ismailis follow the Agha Khan IV (Prince Qarim al-Husseini), who chairs the large Agha
Khan Foundation that has invested heavily in Afghanistan.
One major case incurring international criticism has been the January 2008 death sentence,
imposed in a quick trial, against 23-year-old journalist Sayed Kambaksh for allegedly distributing
material critical of Islam. On October 21, 2008, a Kabul appeals court changed his sentence to 20
years in prison, a judgment upheld by another court in March 2009. He was pardoned by Karzai
and released on September 7, 2009.
A positive development is that Afghanistan’s Shiite minority, mostly from the Hazara tribes of
central Afghanistan (Bamiyan and Dai Kundi provinces) can celebrate their holidays openly, a
development unknown before the fall of the Taliban. Some Afghan Shiites follow Iran’s clerical
leaders politically, but Afghan Shiites tend to be less religious and more socially open than their
co-religionists in Iran. The Hazaras are also advancing themselves socially and politically through

24 Department of State. 2009 Human Rights Report: Afghanistan, March 11, 2010.
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education in such fields as information technology.25 The former Minister of Justice, Sarwar
Danesh, is a Shiite, the first of that sect to hold that post. He studied in Qom, Iran, a center of
Shiite theology. (Danesh was voted down by the parliament for reappointment on January 2,
2010, and again on June 28 when nominated for Minister of Higher Education.) The minister who
was approved on January 16, 2010, Habibullah Ghalib, is part of Dr. Abdullah’s faction, but not a
Shiite Muslim. Ghaleb previously (2006) was not approved by the Wolesi Jirga for a spot on the
Supreme Court. There was unrest among some Shiite leaders in late May 2009 when they learned
that the Afghan government had dumped 2,000 Iranian-supplied religious texts into a river when
an Afghan official complained that the books insulted the Sunni majority.
A previous religious freedom case earned congressional attention in March 2006. An Afghan
man, Abd al-Rahman, who had converted to Christianity 16 years ago while working for a
Christian aid group in Pakistan, was imprisoned and faced a potential death penalty trial for
apostasy—his refusal to convert back to Islam. Facing international pressure, Karzai prevailed on
Kabul court authorities to release him (March 29, 2006). His release came the same day the
House passed H.Res. 736 calling on protections for Afghan converts. In May 2010, the Afghan
government suspended the operations of two Christian-affiliated international relief groups
claiming the groups were attempting to promote Christianity among Afghans – an assertion
denied by the groups (Church World Service and Norwegian Church Aid).
Human Trafficking
Afghanistan was placed in Tier 2: Watch List in the State Department report on human trafficking
issued on June 14, 2010 (Trafficking in Persons Report for 2010, released June 14, 2010). The
placement was a downgrade from the Tier 2 placement of the 2009 report. The Afghan
government is assessed in the report as not complying with minimum standards for eliminating
trafficking, but making significant efforts to do so. However, the downgrade was attributed to the
fact that the government did not prosecute any human traffickers under a 2008 law. The State
Department report says that women from China, some countries in Africa, Iran, and some
countries in Central Asia are being trafficked into Afghanistan for sexual exploitation. Other
reports say some are brought to work in night clubs purportedly frequented by members of many
international NGOs. In an effort to also increase protections for Afghan women, in August 2008
the Interior Ministry announced a crackdown on sexual assault—an effort to publicly air a taboo
subject. The United States has spent about $500,000 to eliminate human trafficking in
Afghanistan since FY2001.
Advancement of Women
Freedoms for women have greatly expanded since the fall of the Taliban with their elections to
the parliament, their service at many levels of government. According to the State Department
human rights report for 2009, numerous abuses, such as denial of educational and employment
opportunities, continue primarily because of Afghanistan’s conservative traditions. Other
institutions, such as Human Rights Watch, report backsliding due in part to the lack of security.26

25 Oppel, Richard Jr. and Abdul Waheed Wafa, “Hazara Minority Hustles to Head of the Class in Afghanistan,” New
York Times
, January 4, 2010.
26 “We Have the Promises of the World:Women’s Rights in Afghanistan,” Human Rights Watch, December 2009,
http://www.wluml.org/sites/wluml.org/files/hrw_report_2009.pdf.
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Many Afghan women are concerned that the efforts by Karzai and the international community to
persuade insurgents to end their fight and rejoin the political process could result in backsliding
on women’s rights. Most insurgents are highly conservative Islamists who oppose the
advancement of women that has occurred and might try to demand some reversals of that trend.
Women have been a target of attacks by Taliban supporters, including attacks on girls’ schools
and athletic facilities.
A major development in post-Taliban Afghanistan was the formation of a Ministry of Women’s
Affairs dedicated to improving women’s rights, although numerous accounts say the ministry’s
influence is limited. It promotes the involvement of women in business ventures, and it plays a
key role in trying to protect women from domestic abuse by running a growing number of
women’s shelters across Afghanistan. Husn Banu Ghazanfar remains minister in an acting
capacity, having been voted down by the lower house for reappointment.
The Afghan government tried to accommodate Shiite leaders’ demands in 2009 by enacting
(passage by the National Assembly and signature by Karzai in March 2009) a “Shiite Personal
Status Law,” at the request of Shiite leaders. The law was intended to provide a legal framework
for members of the Shiite minority in family law issues. However, the issue turned controversial
when international human rights groups and governments—and Afghan women in a
demonstration in Kabul—complained about provisions that would appear to sanction marital rape
and which would allow males to control the ability of females in their family to go outside the
home. President Obama publicly called these provisions “abhorrent.” In early April 2009, taking
into account the outcry, Karzai sent the law back to the Justice Ministry for review, saying it
would be altered if it were found to conflict with the Afghan constitution. On April 19, 2009,
Karzai said on CNN that his government’s review of specific provisions of the law, which was
long and highly detailed, had been inadequate, and Karzai reiterated during his U.S. visit in May
2009 that the controversial provisions would be removed. The offending clauses were
substantially revised by the Justice Ministry in July 2009, requiring that wives “perform
housework,” but also apparently giving the husband the right to deny a wife food if she refuses
sex. The revised law was passed by the National Assembly in late July 2009, signed by Karzai,
and published in the official gazette on July 27, 2009, although it remains unsatisfactory to many
human rights and women’s rights groups.
On August 6, 2009, perhaps in an effort to address some of the criticisms of the Shiite law, Karzai
issued, as a decree, the “Elimination of Violence Against Women” law. Minister of Women’s
Affairs Ghazanfar told CRS in October 2009 that the bill was long contemplated and not related
to the Shiite status law.27 However, it is subject to review and passage by the National Assembly,
where some Islamic conservatives, such as Sayyaf (cited above) are said to be blocking final
approval. Sayyaf and others reportedly object to the provisions of the law criminalizing child
marriages.
Women in Key Positions
Despite conservative attitudes, women have moved into prominent positions in all areas of
Afghan governance, although with periodic setbacks. Three female ministers were in the 2004-
2006 cabinet: former presidential candidate Masooda Jalal (Ministry of Women’s Affairs), Sediqa
Balkhi (Ministry for Martyrs and the Disabled), and Amina Afzali (Ministry of Youth). Karzai

27 CRS meeting with the Minister of Women’s Affairs, October 13, 2009.
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nominated Soraya Sobhrang as minister of women’s affairs in the 2006 cabinet, but she was voted
down by Islamist conservatives in parliament. He eventually appointed another female, Husn
Banu Ghazanfar, as minister. Ghazanfar, who is a Russian-speaking Uzbek from northern
Afghanistan, has been the only woman in the cabinet for several years. She was renominated on
December 19, 2009, but was voted down on January 2, 2010. Karzai subsequently named three
women in new selections presented on January 9, 2010, including Afzali (to Labor and Social
Affairs). Of the three, however, only Afzali was confirmed on January 16, 2009; the other two
may have been opposed by Islamic conservatives. In March 2005, Karzai appointed a former
minister of women’s affairs, Habiba Sohrabi, as governor of Bamiyan province, inhabited mostly
by Hazaras. (She hosted then First Lady Laura Bush in Bamiyan in June 2008.) A female, Dr.
Sima Samar (Hazara from Ghazni Province), heads the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights
Commission (AIHRC).
The constitution reserves for women at least 17 of the 102 seats in the upper house and 62 of the
249 seats in the lower house of parliament. There are 68 women in the lower house, meaning 6
were elected without the quota. There are 23 serving in the upper house, 6 more than Karzai’s
mandated bloc of 17 female appointees. Two women ran for President for the August 20, 2009,
election, as discussed below, although preliminary results show each receiving less than one-half
of 1%. Some NGOs and other groups believe that the women elected by the quota system are not
viewed as equally legitimate parliamentarians. For the September 18, 2010, parliamentary
elections, 368 women are running out of about 2,450 candidates. About 350 women were
delegates to the 1,600 person “peace jirga” taking place in Kabul during June 2-4, 2010, which
endorsed an Afghan plan to reintegrate insurgents who want to end their fight. Women’s groups
are concerned that the plan will produce compromises that nod toward Taliban ideology to
rollback the gains women have made since the movement lost power in 2001.
More generally, women are performing jobs that were rarely held by women even before the
Taliban came to power in 1996, including in the new police force. There are over 200 female
judges and 447 female journalists working nationwide. The most senior Afghan woman in the
police force was assassinated in Qandahar in September 2008. Press reports say Afghan women
are increasingly learning how to drive. Under the new government, the wearing of the full body
covering called the burqa is no longer obligatory, and fewer women are wearing it than was the
case a few years ago.
U.S. and International Posture on Women’s Rights
U.S. officials have had some influence in persuading the government to codify women’s rights.
After the Karzai government took office, the United States and the new Afghan government set
up a U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council to coordinate the allocation of resources to Afghan women.
Some believe that, in recent years, the U.S. government has dropped women’s issues as a priority
for Afghanistan. Some criticized President Obama’s speech on December 1, 2009, for its absence
of virtually any mention of women’s rights. Promoting women’s rights was discussed at the
January 28, 2010, London conference but primarily in the context of the reintegration issue.
Specific earmarks for use of U.S. funds for women’s and girls’ programs in Afghanistan are
contained in recent annual appropriations, and these earmarks have grown steadily. The United
States provided $153 million to programs for Afghan women in FY2009, and expects to provide
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$175 million for FY2010, in line with these earmarks.28According to State Department reports on
U.S. aid to women and girls, covering FY2001-2008, and then FY2008-9, the United States has
numerous, multi-faceted projects directly in support of Afghan women, including women’s
empowerment, maternal and child health and nutrition, funding the Ministry of Women’s Affairs,
and micro-finance projects. Some programs focus on training female police officers.29 Some
donors, particularly those of Canada, have financed specific projects for Afghan women farmers.
The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (AFSA, P.L. 107-327) authorized $15 million per
year (FY2003-FY2006) for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. Those monies are donated to the
Ministry from Economic Support Funds (ESF) accounts controlled by USAID. S. 229, the
Afghan Women Empowerment Act of 2009, introduced in the 111th Congress, would authorize
$45 million per year in FY2010-FY2012 for grants to Afghan women, for the ministry of
Women’s Affairs ($5 million), and for the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission ($10
million).
Democracy, Governance, and Elections Funding Issues
U.S. funding for democracy, governance, and rule of law programs has grown, in line with the
Obama Administration strategy for Afghanistan. During FY2002-FY2008, a total of $1.8 billion
was spent on democracy, governance, rule of law and human rights, and elections support. Of
these, by far the largest category was “good governance,” which, in large part, are grant awards to
provinces that make progress against narcotics.
The following was spent in FY2009:
• $881 million for all of democracy and governance, including
• $283 million for good governance;
• $150 million for National Solidarity Program and direct budget support to
Afghan government;
• $174 million for election support;
• $50 million for strategic program development; and
• $212 million for rule of law, funded by both USAID and State Department
Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE).
Planned for FY2010 (regular appropriation and FY2010 supplemental request):
• $1.7 billion for all democracy and governance, including
• $1.15 billion for “good governance”;
• $411 million for rule of law and human rights (ESF funds controlled by
USAID and INCLE funds);

28 For prior years, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by
Kenneth Katzman, in the section on aid to Afghanistan, year by year.
29 Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, “Report on U.S. Government Activities 2008-
2009 For Women and Girls in Afghanistan,” October 20, 2009.
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• $113 million for “civil society” building programs; and
• $25 million for political competition and consensus building (elections).
Key Components of FY2011 request:
• $1.388 billion for all democracy and governance funds, including
• $1.01 billion for good governance;
• $248 million for rule of law and human rights;
• $80 million for civil society building; and
• $50 million for political competition and consensus building.
For comprehensive tables on U.S. aid to Afghanistan, by fiscal year and by category and type of
aid, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,
by Kenneth Katzman.
Elections in 2009 and 2010
As noted throughout, the 2009 presidential and provincial elections were anticipated to be a major
step in Afghanistan’s political development. They were the first post-Taliban elections run by the
Afghan government itself in the form of the Afghanistan Independent Electoral Commission.
There were assertions of a lack of credibility of the IEC, because most of its commissioners,
including then-Chairman Azizullah Ludin, were selected by and politically close to Karzai. As a
check and balance to ensure electoral credibility, there was also a U.N.-appointed Elections
Complaints Commission (ECC) that reviews fraud complaints. Under the 2005 election law, there
were three seats for foreign nationals, appointed by the Special Representative of the U.N.
Secretary General/head of U.N. Assistance Mission–Afghanistan, UNAMA. The two Afghans on
the ECC governing council30 were appointed by the Supreme Court and Afghanistan Independent
Human Rights Commission, respectively. Some fear that the difficulties that plagued the 2009
presidential election have not been adequately addressed to ensure that the September 18, 2010,
parliamentary elections are free and fair. A dispute over a new election decree that will govern
that election, and which weakened the international voice on the ECC, is discussed below.
2009 Presidential Election
Special Representative Holbrooke said at a public forum on August 12, 2009, that the August 20,
2009, presidential elections were key to legitimizing the Afghan government, no matter who won.
Yet, because of the widespread fraud identified by Afghanistan’s U.N.-appointed “Elections
Complaints Commission (ECC)” in the first round of the elections, the process did not produce
fully legitimacy. The marred elections process was a major factor in a September-November 2009
high-level U.S. strategy reevaluation because of the centrality of a credible, legitimate partner
Afghan government to U.S. strategy.31

30 ECC website, http://www.ecc.org.af/en/.
31 Fidler, Stephen and John W. Miller, “U.S. Allies Await Afghan Review,” Wall Street Journal, September 25, 2009.
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Problems with the election began in late 2008 with a dispute over the election date. On February
3, 2009, Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission (IEC) set August 20, 2009, as the
election date (a change from a date mandated by Article 61 of the Constitution as April 21, 2009,
in order to allow at least 30 days before Karzai’s term expired on May 22, 2009). The IEC
decision on the latter date cited Article 33 of the Constitution as mandating universal accessibility
to the voting—and saying that the April 21 date was precluded by difficulties in registering
voters, printing ballots, training staff, advertising the elections, and the dependence on
international donor funding, in addition to the security questions.32
In response to UF insistence that Karzai’s presidency ended May 22, and that a caretaker
government should run Afghanistan until elections, Karzai issued a February 28, 2009, decree
directing the IEC to set the elections in accordance with all provisions of the constitution. The
IEC reaffirmed on March 4, 2009, that the election would be held on August 20, 2009. Karzai
argued against his stepping down, saying that the Constitution does not provide for any transfer of
power other than in case of election or death of a President. The Afghan Supreme Court backed
that decision on March 28, 2009, and the Obama Administration publicly backed these rulings.
Election Modalities and Processes
Despite the political dispute between Karzai and his opponents, enthusiasm among the public
appeared high in the run-up to the election. Registration, which updated 2005 voter rolls, began in
October 2008 and was completed as of the beginning of March 2009. About 4.5 million new
voters registered, and about 17 million total Afghans were registered. However, there were
widespread reports of registration fraud (possibly half of all new registrants), with some voters
registering on behalf of women who do not, by custom, show up at registration sites. U.S. and
other election observers found instances of fraudulent registration cards and evidence that cards
had been offered for sale. U.S./NATO military operations in some areas, including in Helmand in
January 2009, were conducted to secure registration centers; however, some election observers
noted that there was insufficient international assistance to the IEC, which ran the election, to
ensure an untainted registration process.
Candidates filed to run during April 24-May 8, 2009. A total of 44 registered to run for president,
of which three were disqualified for various reasons, leaving a field of 41 (later reduced to 32
after several dropped out).
In the provincial elections, 3,200 persons competed for 420 seats nationwide. Those elections
were conducted on a “Single Non-Transferable Vote” (SNTV) system, in which each voter votes
for one candidate in a multi-member constituency. That system encourages many candidacies and
is considered to discourage the participation of political parties. Although about 80% of the
provincial council candidates ran as independents, some of Afghanistan’s parties, including Hezb-
i-Islam, which is a prominent grouping in the National Assembly, fielded multiple candidates in
several different provinces.
The provincial elections component of the election received little attention, in part because the
role of these councils is unclear. Of the seats up for election, about 200 women competed for the
124 seats reserved for women (29%) on the provincial councils, although in two provinces

32 Statement of the Independent Election Commission Secretariat, February 3, 2009, provided to CRS by a Karzai
national security aide.
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(Qandahar and Uruzgan) there were fewer women candidates than reserved seats. In Kabul
Province, 524 candidates competed for the 29 seats of the council.
The European Union, supported by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) sent a few hundred observers, and the International Republican Institute and National
Democratic Institute sent observers as well. About 8,000 Afghans assisted the observation
missions, according to the U.N. Nations Development Program. Because much of Afghanistan is
inaccessible by road, ballots were distributed (and were brought for counting) by animals in
addition to vehicles and fixed and rotary aircraft.
Security was a major issue for all the international actors supporting the Afghan elections process,
amid open Taliban threats against Afghans who vote. In the first round, about 7,000 polling
centers were to be established (with each center having multiple polling places, totaling about
29,000), but, of those, about 800 were deemed too unsafe to open, most of them in restive
Helmand and Qandahar provinces. A total of about 6,200 polling centers opened on election day.
The total cost of the Afghan elections in 2009 were about $300 million. Other international
donors contributing funds to close the gap left by the U.S. contribution of about $175 million.
The Political Contest and Campaign
The presidential competition took shape in May 2009. In the election-related political deal-
making,33 Karzai obtained an agreement from Fahim to run as his first vice presidential running
mate. Karzai, Fahim, and incumbent second Vice President Karim Khalili (a Hazara) registered
their ticket on May 4, 2009, just before Karzai left to visit the United States for the latest round of
three-way strategic talks (U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan).
Karzai convinced several prominent Pashtuns not to run. Ghul Agha Shirzai, a member of the
powerful Barakzai clan, reportedly reached an arrangement with Karzai the week of the
registration period that headed off his candidacy. Anwar al-Haq Ahady, the former finance
minister and Central Bank governor, did not run. (He did receive a cabinet nomination in the
December 19 ministry list but was voted down by the parliament.) Nor did Bush Administration
U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Afghan-born Zalmay Khalilzad, run.
Anti-Karzai Pashtuns did not succeed in coalescing around one challenger. Former Interior
Minister Ali Jalali (who resigned in 2005 over Karzai’s compromises with faction leaders), and
former Finance Minister (2002-2004) and Karzai critic Ashraf Ghani did not reach agreement to
forge a single ticket. In the end, Ghani, the 54-year-old former World Bank official, registered his
candidacy, but without Jalali or prominent representation from other ethnicities in his vice
presidential slots. As noted above, Ghani is now a key Karzai adviser.
The UF also failed to forge a united challenge to Karzai. Burhanuddin Rabbani (Afghanistan
President during 1992-1996), the elder statesman of the UF bloc, reportedly insisted that an ethnic
Tajik (the ethnic core of the UF) head the UF ticket. Former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah
Abdullah, the 50-year-old former ophthalmologist and foreign envoy of the legendary Tajik
mujahedin leader Ahmad Shah Masoud, registered to run with UF backing. His running mates

33 Some of the information in this section obtained in CRS interviews with a Karzai national security aide, December
2008.
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were Dr. Cheragh Ali Cheragh, a Hazara who did poorly in the 2004 election, and a little known
Pashtun, Homayoun Wasefi. Another problem for the UF was that Ahmad Zia Massoud (a Vice
President) did not win support of the bloc to head its ticket. Massoud is the brother of Ahmad
Shah Masoud (see above), who was killed purportedly by Al Qaeda two days before the
September 11 attacks on the United States.
The Campaign
Karzai went into the election as a clear favorite, but the key question was whether he would win
in the first round (more than 50% of the vote). IRI and other pre-election polls showed him with
about 45% support. Dr. Abdullah polled about 25% and emerged as the main challenger. The
conventional wisdom has always been that the two-round format favors a Pashtun candidate.
Although Karzai’s public support was harmed by perceptions of ineffectiveness and corruption,
although many Afghan voters apparently see many of Afghanistan’s problems as beyond Karzai’s
control. He used some U.S. policy setbacks to bolster his electoral prospects, for example by
railing against civilian casualties resulting from U.S./NATO operations, and by proposing new
curbs on international military operations in Afghanistan. During the campaign, Karzai
announced new measures to limit international forces’ operations in civilian areas and said he
would hold a loya jirga, if elected, including Taliban figures, to try to reach a settlement with the
insurgency. He restated that intent in his November 19, 2009, inaugural speech.
Karzai was criticized for a campaign that relied on personal ties to ethnic faction leaders rather
than a retail campaign based on public appearances. Karzai agreed to public debates with rivals,
although he backed out of a scheduled July 23 debate with Abdullah and Ghani (on the private
Tolo Television network) on the grounds that the event was scheduled on short notice and was
limited to only those three. Abdullah and Ghani debated without Karzai, generating additional
criticism of Karzai. Karzai did attend the next debate (on state-run Radio-Television Afghanistan)
on August 16, debating Ghani and Bashardost, but Abdullah did not participate. There was also a
radio forum in which all major candidates participated. Karzai was said to benefit from his ready
access to media attention, which focuses on his daily schedule as president, including meetings
with foreign leaders.
Dr. Abdullah stressed his background of mixed ethnicity (one parent is Pashtun and one is Tajik)
to appeal to Pashtuns, but his experience and background has been with other Tajik leaders and he
campaigned extensively in the north and west, which are populated mainly by Tajiks. However,
he also campaigned in Qandahar, in Pashtun heartland. Both Karzai and Abdullah held large
rallies in Kabul and elsewhere.
Ghani polled at about 6% just before the election, according to surveys. Ghani appeared
frequently in U.S. and Afghan media broadcasts criticizing Karzai for failing to establish
democratic and effective institutions, but he has previously spent much time in the United States
and Europe and many average Afghans view him as a global technocrat who is not necessarily in
touch with day-to-day problems in Afghanistan. Ghani made extensive use of the Internet for
advertising and fundraising, and he hired political consultant James Carville to advise his
campaign.34 He emphasized new programs for women in the August 16 debate.

34 Mulrine, Anna, “Afghan Presidential Candidate Takes a Page From Obama’s Playbook,” U.S. News and World
Report
, June 25, 2009.
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Another candidate who polled unexpectedly well was 54-year-old anti-corruption parliamentarian
Ramazan Bashardost, an ethnic Hazara. He was polling close to 10% just before the election. He
ran a low-budget campaign with low-paid personnel and volunteers, but attracted a lot of media.
This suggests that, despite most Hazara ethnic leaders, such as Mohammad Mohaqiq, endorsing
Karzai, Bashardost would do well among Hazaras, particularly those who are the most educated.
Some believe the Shiite personal status law, discussed above, was an effort by Karzai to win
Hazara Shiite votes. According to the preliminary results, Bashardost carried several Hazara
provinces, including Ghazni and Dai Kondi, but Mohaqiq’s backing apparently helped Karzai
carry the Hazara heartland of Bamiyan province. Other significant candidates are shown below.
Other Candidates
Abd al-Salam Rocketi ("Mullah Rocketi”). A Pashtun, reconciled Taliban figure, member of the lower house of
parliament. Was expected to do well if Taliban sympathizers participated, but received less than 1% (preliminary
totals), putting him in 9th place out of 32.
Hedayat Amin Arsala. A Pashtun, was a vice president during 2001-2004. He was Foreign Minister in the 1992-96
Rabbani-led mujahedin government. He is a prominent economist and perceived as close to the former royal family.
Finished 30th out of 32.
Abd al Jabbar Sabit. A Pashtun, was fired by Karzai in 2007 for considering a run against Karzai in the election.
Finished in 19th place.
Shahnawaz Tanai. A Pashtun. Served as defense minister in the Communist government of Najibullah (which was
left in place after the Soviets withdrew in 1989) but led a failed coup against Najibullah in April 1990. Finished an
unexpectedly strong sixth place and did wel in several Pashtun provinces.
Mirwais Yasini. Another strong Pashtun candidate, was viewed as a dark horse possible winner. 48-year-old deputy
speaker of the lower house of parliament, but also without wel -known non-Pashtun running mates. Finished fifth.
Frozan Fana and Shahla Ata. The two women candidates in the race. Fana is the wife of the first post-Taliban
aviation minister, who was killed during an altercation at Kabul airport in 2002. These two candidates are widely given
almost no chance of winning, but attracted substantial media attention as trail-blazers. Fana finished seventh but Ata
finished in 14th place.

The Election Results
Taliban intimidation and voter apathy appears to have suppressed the total turnout to about 5.8
million votes cast, or about a 35% turnout, far lower than expected. Twenty-seven Afghans,
mostly security forces personnel, were killed in election-day violence. Turnout was said by
observers and U.S. and other military personnel based there to have been very low in Helmand
Province, despite the fact that Helmand was the focus of a U.S. military-led stabilization
offensive that began July 2, 2009, with the participation of about 8,000 U.S. Marines.
Some observers said that turnout among women nationwide was primarily because there were not
sufficient numbers of female poll workers recruited by the IEC to make women feel comfortable
enough to vote. In general, however, election observers reported that poll workers were generally
attentive and well trained, and the voting process appeared orderly.
In normally secure Kabul, turnout was said to be far lighter than in the 2004 presidential election.
Turnout might have been dampened by a suicide bombing on August 15, 2009, outside
NATO/ISAF military headquarters and intended to intimidate voters not to participate. In
addition, several dozen provincial council candidates, and some workers on the presidential
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campaigns, were killed in election-related violence. A convoy carrying Fahim (Karzai vice
presidential running mate, see below) was bombed, although Fahim was unharmed.
Clouding the election substantially were the widespread fraud allegations coming from all sides.
Dr. Abdullah held several news conferences after the election, purporting to show evidence of
systematic election fraud by the Karzai camp. Karzai’s camp made similar allegations against
Abdullah as applied to his presumed strongholds in northern Afghanistan. The ECC, in
statements, stated its belief that there was substantial fraud likely committed, and mostly by
Karzai supporters. However, the low turnout in the presumed Karzai strongholds in southern
Afghanistan led Karzai and many Pashtuns to question the election’s fairness as well, on the
grounds that Pashtuns were intimidated from voting in greater proportions than were others.
The IEC released vote results slowly. Preliminary results were to be announced by September 3.
However, the final, uncertified total was released on September 16, 2009. It showed Karzai at
54.6% and Dr. Abdullah at 27.7%. Bashardost and Ghani received single-digit vote counts (9%
and 3% respectively), with trace amounts for the remainder of the field.
Vote Certified/Runoff Mandated
The constitution required that a second-round runoff, if needed, be held two weeks after the
results of the first round are certified. Following the release of the vote count, the complaints
evaluation period began which, upon completed, would yield a “certified” vote result. On
September 8, 2009, the ECC ordered a recount of 10% of polling stations (accounting for as many
as 25% total votes) as part of its investigations of fraud. Polling stations were considered
“suspect” if: the total number of votes exceeded 600, which was the maximum number allotted to
each polling station; or where any candidate received 95% or more of the total valid votes cast at
that station (assuming more than 100 votes were cast there). Perhaps reflecting political
sensitivities, the recount consisted of a sampling of actual votes.35 Throughout the investigation
period (September 16-October 20), the ECC said it was not “in a rush” to finish.
On October 20, 2009, the ECC determined, based on its investigation, that about 1 million Karzai
votes, and about 200,000 Abdullah votes, were considered fraudulent and were deducted from
their totals. The final, certified, results of the first round were as follows: Karzai—49.67%
(according to the IEC; with a slightly lower total of about 48% according to the ECC
determination); Abdullah—30.59%; Bashardost—10.46%; Ghani—2.94%, Yasini—1.03%, and
lower figures for the remaining field.36
During October 16-20, 2009, U.S. and international officials, including visiting Senator John
Kerry, met repeatedly with Karzai to attempt to persuade him to acknowledge that his vote total
did not legitimately exceed the 50%+ threshold to claim a first-round victory. On October 21,
2009, the IEC accepted the ECC findings and Karzai conceded the need for a runoff election. A
date was set as November 7, 2009. Abdullah initially accepted.
In an attempt to produce a fair second round, UNAMA, which provided advice and assistance to
the IEC, requested that about 200 district-level election commissioners be replaced. In addition, it
recommended there be fewer polling stations—about 5,800, compared to 6,200 previously—to

35 “Afghan Panel to Use Sampling in Recount,” USA Today, September 22, 2009.
36 See IEC website for final certified tallies, http://www.iec.org.af/results.
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eliminate polling stations where very few votes are expected to be cast. Still, there were concerns
that some voters may be disenfranchised because snow had set in some locations. Insurgents were
expected to resume their campaign to intimidate voters from casting ballots.
After a runoff was declared, no major faction leader switched support of either candidate, making
it difficult to envision an Abdullah victory. Prior to the ECC vote certification, Dr. Abdullah told
CRS at a meeting in Kabul on October 15, 2009, that he might be willing to negotiate with Karzai
on a “Joint Program” of reforms—such as direct election of governors and reduced presidential
powers—to avoid a runoff. Abdullah told CRS he himself would not be willing to enter the
cabinet, although presumably such a deal would involve his allies doing so. However, some said
the constitution does not provide for a negotiated settlement and that the runoff must proceed.
Others said that a deal between the two, in which Abdullah dropped his candidacy, could have led
the third-place finisher, Ramazan Bashardost, to assert that he must face Karzai in a runoff. Still
others say the issue could be resolved by Afghanistan’s Supreme Court.
If a second round were held and proved equally flawed, it is possible that a loya jirga could have
been called to determine who would lead Afghanistan for the next five years. As the favorite in a
two-man race, Karzai presumably had an interest in avoiding this outcome because a loya jirga
could conceivably select a new figure as Afghanistan’s next president.
Election Conclusion
The various pre-runoff scenarios were mooted on November 1, 2009, when Dr. Abdullah refused
to participate in the runoff on the grounds that the problems that plagued the first round were
likely to recur. He asserted that Karzai, in negotiations during October 2009, was refusing to
replace the IEC head, Azizullah Ludin, to fire several cabinet ministers purportedly campaigning
for Karzai, or to address several other election-related complaints. The IEC refused to follow a
UNAMA recommendation to reduce the number of polling stations. Some believe Abdullah
pulled out because of his belief that he would not prevail in the second round.
On November 2, 2009, the IEC issued a statement saying that, by consensus, the body had
determined that Karzai, being the only candidate remaining in a two-person runoff, should be
declared the winner and the second round not held. The Obama Administration accepted the
outcome as “within Afghanistan’s constitution,” on the grounds that the fraud had been
investigated. On that basis, the United States, as well as U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon
(visiting Kabul), and several governments, congratulated Karzai on the victory. U.S. officials,
including Secretary of State Clinton, praised Dr. Abdullah for his relatively moderate speech
announcing his pullout, in particular his refusal to call for demonstrations or violence by his
supporters, and called on him to remain involved in Afghan politics. Dr. Abdullah denied that his
pullout was part of any “deal” with Karzai for a role for his supporters in the next government.
Amid U.S. and international calls for Karzai to choose his next cabinet based on competence,
merit, and dedication to curbing corruption, Karzai was inaugurated on November 19, 2009, with
Secretary of State Clinton in attendance.
As noted above, the election for the provincial council members were not certified until
December 29, 2009. The council members have taken office.
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Fallout for UNAMA
The political fallout for UNAMA continues. During the complaint period, a dispute between
UNAMA head Kai Eide and the American deputy, Ambassador Peter Galbraith, broke out over
how vigorously to press for investigation of the fraud. This led to the September 29, 2009,
dismissal by Secretary General Ban Ki Moon of Galbraith, who had openly accused UNAMA
head Kai Eide of soft-pedaling on the fraud charges and siding with Karzai. Galbraith has
appealed his dismissal, amid press reports that he had discussed a plan with some U.S. officials to
replace Karzai with an interim government, if the second round could not be held until after the
winter. In December 2009, Eide announced he would not seek to renew his two year agreement to
serve as UNAMA chief. The replacement named at the January 28, 2010, London conference is
Staffan de Mistura, who previously played a similar U.N. role in Iraq. He arrived in Kabul in mid-
March 2010. In his April 1, 2010, allegations of Western interference in the August 2009 election,
Karzai named Galbraith and EU chief election observer Phillipe Morillon, specifically, as
responsible for the interference.
Post-Election Cabinet
U.S. officials stated they would scrutinize the new cabinet for indications that Karzai would
professionalize his government and eliminate corruption. Complicating Karzai’s efforts to obtain
confirmation of a full cabinet was the need to present his choices as technically competent while
also maintaining a customary and expected balance of ethnic and political factions. In the
parliamentary confirmation process that has unfolded, National Assembly members, particularly
the well-educated independents, have objected to many of his nominees as “unknowns,” as
having minimal qualifications, or as loyal to faction leaders who backed Karzai in the 2009
election. Karzai’s original list of 24 ministerial nominees (presented December 19) was generally
praised by the United States for retaining the highly praised economic team (and most of that
team was confirmed). However, overall, only 7 of the first 24 nominees were confirmed (January
2, 2010), and only 7 of the 17 replacement nominees were confirmed (January 16, 2010), after
which the Assembly went into winter recess. This left Karzai with 11 vacant cabinet seats as he
went into the major international meeting on Afghanistan in Britain on January 28, 2010,
although caretakers (many of them the ex-ministers) are in charge in the vacant ministerial posts.
Another five (out of seven nominees) were confirmed on June 28, 2010, although one was a
replacement for the ousted Interior Minister Atmar. The permanent posts remain unfilled.
Although then UNAMA head Kai Eide called the vetoing of many nominees a “setback” to
Afghan governance, Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell said on January 6, 2010, that the
vetoing by parliament reflected a “healthy give and take” among Afghanistan’s branches of
government. Outside experts have said the confirmation process—and the later parliamentary
review of a 2010 election decree, discussed below—reflects the growing institutional strength of
the parliament and the functioning of checks and balances in the Afghan government.
Of the major developments in the cabinet selection process to date:
• The main security ministers—Defense Minister Abdal Rahim Wardak and
Interior Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar—were renominated by Karzai and
confirmed on January 2. They work closely with the U.S. military to expand and
improve the Afghan national security forces.
• Three key economic/civilian sector officials who work very closely with USAID
and U.S. Embassy Kabul—Finance Minister Omar Zakhiwal, Agriculture
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Minister Mohammad Rahimi, and Education Minister Ghulam Faruq Wardak—
were renominated and also were confirmed on January 2. The highly praised
Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (Ehsan Zia), who runs the
widely touted and effective National Solidarity Program, was not renominated, to
the chagrin of U.S. officials. His named replacement (Wais Barmak, a Fahim and
Dr. Abdullah ally) was voted down. The second replacement, Jarullah Mansoori,
was confirmed on January 16.
• The U.S.-praised Commerce Minister Wahidollah Sharani was selected to move
over to take control of the Mines Ministry from the former minister, who is under
investigation for corruption. Sharani was confirmed on January 2. Also
confirmed that day was Minister of Culture Seyyed Makhdum Raheen. He had
been serving as Ambassador to India.
• The clan of former moderate mujahedin party leader Pir Gaylani rose to
prominence in the December 19 list. Gaylani son-in-law Anwar al Haq Al Ahady
(see above) was named as economy minister and Hamid Gaylani (Pir Gaylani’s
son) was named as minister of border and tribal affairs. However, neither was
confirmed and neither was renominated.
• Ismail Khan was renominated as minister of energy and water on December 19,
disappointing U.S. officials and many Afghans who see him as a faction leader
(Tajik leader/mujahedin era commander, Herat Province) with no technical
expertise. He was voted down and no new replacement nominee has been
submitted by Karzai, likely indicating that Khan will ultimately leave the cabinet.
• Karzai initially did not nominate a permanent foreign minister, leaving Spanta in
place as a caretaker. However, in the second nomination round, Karzai selected
his close ally Zalmay Rassoul, who has been national security adviser since 2004,
to the post. Rassoul was confirmed on January 16.
• Minister of Women’s Affairs Ghazanfar was renominated to remain the only
female minister, but was voted down (January 2). In the cabinet renominations,
Karzai named three women—Suraiya Dalil to Public Health, Pelwasha Hassan to
Women’s Affairs, and Amina Afzali (minister of youth in an earlier Karzai
cabinet) to Labor and Social Affairs. Of those, only Afzali was confirmed on
January 16. Ghazanfar and Dalil are heading those ministries in an acting
capacity. In the December 16, 2009, list, Karzai proposed a woman to head a new
Ministry of Literacy, but parliament did not vote on this nomination because it
had not yet acted to approve formation of the ministry
• Of the other nominees confirmed on January 16, at least one has previously
served in high positions. The Assembly confirmed that day: Zarar Moqbel (who
previously was interior minister) as counternarcotics minister; Economy Minister
Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal, who belongs to the party linked with pro-Taliban
insurgent leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (although the faction in the parliament
and the government has broken with Hikmatyar and rejects violence against the
government); Yousaf Niazi, minister of hajj and waqf (religious endowments)
affairs; and Habibullah Ghalib, minister of justice.
• The following 10 were voted down on January 16. (1) Palwasha Hassan,
nominated to head the Ministry of Women’s Affairs; (2) Dalil, Public Health,
now acting minister, mentioned above; (3) Muhammad Zubair Waheed, minister
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of commerce; (4) Muhammad Elahi, minister of higher education; (5)
Muhammad Laali, Public Works; (6) Abdul Rahim, who was telecommunications
minister in the first Karzai cabinet, as minister of refugee affairs (acting); (7)
Arsala Jamal, formerly the governor of Khost Province who was widely praised
in that role by Secretary Gates, as minister of border and tribal affairs (and now is
acting minister); (8) Abdul Qadus Hamidi, minister of communications; (9)
Abdur Rahim Oraz, minister of transport and aviation; and (10) Sultan Hussein
Hesari, minister of urban development (acting).
• On June 28, 2010, Karzai obtained parliamentary approval for five positions out
of seven nominees. Approved were: Bismillah Khan as interior minister
(replacing Atmar, who was fired on June 6); Al Ahady (see above) as commerce
minister; former Qandahar governor Asadullah Khalid as minister of border and
tribal affairs; Hamidi (see above) as minister of public works; and Jamahir
Anwari as minister of refugees and repatriation. Voted down were two Hazara
Shiites: Sarwar Danesh as minister of higher education and ousted IEC chief
Daud Ali Najafi as minister of transportation. Their rejection caused Hazara
members in the Assembly to demonstrate their disapproval of the vote, and
Karzai called for Hazaras to be approved in the future to ensure all-ethnic
participation in government.
2010 Parliamentary Elections and Election Law Dispute
The 2009 presidential election was resolved, but concerns about repetition of the 2009 election’s
problems color the September 18, 2010, parliamentary elections. On January 2, 2010, the IEC had
initially set National Assembly elections for May 22, 2010. The IEC view was that this date was
in line with a constitutional requirement for a new election to be held well prior to the expiry of
the current Assembly’s term. However, U.S., ECC, UNAMA, and officials of donor countries
argued that Afghanistan’s flawed institutions would not be able to hold free and fair elections
under this timetable. Among the difficulties noted were: that the IEC lacks sufficient staff, given
that some were fired after the 2009 election; that the IEC lacks funds to hold the election under
that timetable; that the U.S. military buildup will be consumed with securing still restive areas at
election time; and that the ECC’s term expired at the end of January 2010. A functioning ECC is
needed to evaluate complaints against registered parliamentary candidates because there are
provisions in the election law to invalidate the candidacies of those who have previously violated
Afghan law or committed human rights abuses.
The international community pressed for a delay of all of these elections until August 2010 or,
according to some donors, mid-2011.37 Bowing to funding and the wide range of other
considerations mentioned, on January 24, 2010, the IEC announced that the parliamentary
elections would be postponed until September 18, 2010. Among other steps, the Afghan Interior
Ministry planned to institute a national identity card system to curb voter registration fraud.
About $120 million is budgeted by the IEC for the parliamentary elections, of which at least $50
million is needed from donor countries, giving donors leverage over when the election might take
place. The remaining $70 million are funds left over from the 2009 elections. Donors had held
back the needed funds, possibly in an effort to pressure the IEC to demonstrate that it is

37 Trofimov, Yaroslav, “West Urges Afghanistan to Delay Election,” Wall Street Journal, December 11, 2009.
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correcting the flaws identified in the various “after-action” reports on the 2009 election. With the
compromises and Karzai announcements below, those funds were released as of April 2010.
Election Decree
With the dispute between the Karzai government and international donors continuing over how to
ensure a free and fair election, the Afghan government drafted an election decree that would
supersede the 2005 election law and govern the 2010 parliamentary election.38 Karzai signed the
decree in February 2010. The Afghan government argues that the decree supersedes the
constitutional clause that any new election law not be adopted less than one year prior to the
election to which that law will apply.
Substantively, some of the provisions of the election decree—particularly the proposal to make
the ECC an all-Afghan body—caused alarm in the international community. Another issue of
concern is the reduction in the number of women to the “two per province” target level of the
previous law, therefore not allowing for more women who might be elected beyond the target
quota. Another controversial element was the registration requirements of a financial deposit
(equivalent of about $650), and that candidates obtain signatures of at least 1,000 voters. On
March 14, 2010, after discussions with outgoing UNAMA head Kai Eide, Karzai reportedly
agreed to cede to UNAMA two “international seats” on the ECC, rather than to insist that all five
ECC members be Afghans. Still, the majority of the ECC seats are Afghans.
The election decree became an issue for Karzai opponents and others in the National Assembly
who seek to assert parliamentary authority. On March 31, the Wolesi Jirga voted to reject the
election decree, leaving its status unclear. However, on April 3, 2010, the Meshrano Jirga decided
not to act on the election decree, meaning that it was not rejected by the Assembly as a whole and
will likely stand to govern the September 18, 2010, National Assembly elections. Karzai has
pledged to implement the March 2010 compromise with then UNAMA head Eide by allowing
UNAMA to appoint two ECC members and for decisions to require that at least one non-Afghan
ECC member concur. On April 17, 2010, he also appointed a new IEC head, Fazel Ahmed
Manawi, who drew praise from many factions (including “opposition leader” Dr. Abdullah) for
impartiality.
Preparations Proceed
Preparations for the September 18 election are under way. Candidates registered during April 20-
May 6, 2010. A list of candidates was circulated on May 13, 2010, including 2,477 candidates for
the 249 seats.39 These figures included 226 candidates who registered but whose documentation
was not totally in order; and appeal restored about 180 of them. On May 30, 2010, in a
preliminary ruling, 85 candidates others were disqualified as members of illegal armed groups. A
final list of candidates, after all appeals and decisions on the various disqualifications, was issued
June 22. The final list included 2,577 candidates, including 406 women. Voter registration is
conducted June 12-August 12, and campaigning began June 23.

38 Partlow, Joshua, “Afghanistan’s Government Seeks More Control Over Elections,” Washington Post, February 15,
2010.
39 The seat allocation per province is the same as it was in the 2005 parliamentary election – 33 seats up for election in
Kabul; 17 in Herat province; 14 in Nangarhar, 11 each in Qandahar, Balkh, and Ghazni; 9 in Badakhshan, Konduz, and
Faryab, 8 in Helmand, and 2 to 6 in the remaining provinces. Ten are reserved for Kuchis (nomads).
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Implications for the United States of the Afghan Elections
U.S. officials expressed clear U.S. neutrality vis-à-vis the 2009 presidential election, although
Karzai reportedly believed the United States was hoping strong candidates might emerge to
replace him. This perception was a function of the strained relations between Karzai and some
Obama Administration officials, particularly Ambassadors Holbrooke and Eikenberry.
Ambassador Timothy Carney was appointed to head the U.S. election support effort at U.S.
Embassy Kabul, tasked to ensure that the United States was even-handed.
The legitimacy of the Afghan partner of the United States was a major factor in the
Administration’s consideration of the McChrystal initial assessment of August 2009, 40 which
recommended pursuing a classic counterinsurgency strategy to protect the Afghan population. If
there is no legitimate Afghan partner available, then some might argue that McChrystal’s
recommended strategy might not succeed because U.S. forces are not authorized or able to reform
the Afghan government. According to the DOD report of April 2010, cited earlier, the strategy is
focused on 120 restive districts (of the 364 total Afghan districts). Administration officials
clarified that any July 2011 deadline to begin transitioning to Afghan security leadership would
be subject to evaluation of conditions that would be determined in a December 2010 review. That
review is likely to take into account an assessment of the credibility of the September 18, 2010,
parliamentary elections, particularly the public perception of whether the problems of the 2009
presidential election were corrected.


40 Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan.
“Commander’s Initial Assessment,” August 30, 2009, available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?.
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Table 1. Afghanistan Political Transition Process
Interim Administration
Formed by Bonn Agreement. Headed by Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, but key
security positions dominated by mostly minority “Northern Alliance.” Karzai
reaffirmed as leader by June 2002 “emergency loya jirga.” (A jirga is a traditional
Afghan assembly).
Constitution
Approved by January 2004 “Constitutional Loya Jirga” (CLJ). Set up strong presidency,
a rebuke to Northern Alliance that wanted prime ministership to balance presidential
power, but gave parliament significant powers to compensate. Gives men and women
equal rights under the law, allows for political parties as long as they are not “un-
Islamic”; al ows for court rulings according to Hanafi (Sunni) Islam (Chapter 7, Article
15). Set out electoral roadmap for simultaneous (if possible) presidential, provincial,
and district elections by June 2004. Named ex-King Zahir Shah to non-hereditary
position of “Father of the Nation;” he died July 23, 2007.
Presidential Election
Elections for President and two vice presidents, for 5-year term, held Oct. 9, 2004.
Turnout was 80% of 10.5 million registered. Karzai and running mates (Ahmad Zia
Masud, a Tajik and brother of legendary mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud,
who was assassinated by Al Qaeda two days before the Sept. 11 attacks, and Karim
Khalili, a Hazara) elected with 55% against 16 opponents. Second highest vote getter,
Northern Alliance figure (and Education Minister) Yunus Qanooni (16%). One female
ran, got about 1%. Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqiq got 11.7%; and Dostam won
10%. Funded with $90 million in international aid, including $40 million from U.S.
(FY2004 supplemental, P.L. 108-106).
First Parliamentary Elections
Elections held Sept. 18, 2005, on “Single Non-Transferable Vote” System; candidates
stood as individuals, not part of party list. Parliament consists of a 249 elected lower
house (Wolesi Jirga, House of the People) and a selected 102 seat upper house
(Meshrano Jirga, House of Elders). Voting was for one candidate only, although
number of representatives varied by province, ranging from 2 (Panjshir Province) to
33 (Kabul Province). Herat has 17; Nangahar, 14; Qandahar, Balkh, and Ghazni, 11
seats each. The body is 28% female (68 persons), in line with the legal minimum of 68
women—two per each of the 34 provinces. Upper house appointed by Karzai (34
seats, half of which are to be women), by the provincial councils (34 seats), and
district councils (remaining 34 seats). There are 23 women in it, above the 17
required by the constitution. Because district elections (400 district councils) were
not held, provincial councils selected 68 on interim basis. 2,815 candidates for Wolesi
Jirga, including 347 women. Turnout was 57% (6.8 million voters) of 12.5 million
registered. Funded by $160 million in international aid, including $45 million from
U.S. (FY2005 supplemental appropriation, P.L. 109-13).
First Provincial Elections/
Provincial elections held Sept. 18, 2005, simultaneous with parliamentary elections.
District Elections
Exact powers vague, but now taking lead in deciding local reconstruction Provincial
council sizes range from 9 to the 29 seats on the Kabul provincial council. Total seats
are 420, of which 121 held by women. l3,185 candidates, including 279 women. Some
criticize the provincial election system as disproportionately weighted toward large
districts within each province. District elections not held due to complexity and
potential tensions of drawing district boundaries.
Second Presidential and
Presidential and provincial elections were held Aug. 20, 2009, but required a runoff
Provincial Elections
because no candidate received over 50% in certified results issued October 20.
Second round not held because chal enger, Dr. Abdul ah, pulled out of a second-
round runoff vote. Election costs about $300 million.
Parliamentary Elections
Original y set for May 22, 2010, now set for September 18, 2010.


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Table 2. Major Pashtun Tribal Confederations
Clan/Tribal
Confederations
Location Example
Durrani
Mainly southern Afghanistan:

Qandahar, Helmand, Zabol,
Uruzgan,Nimruz
Popalzai
Qandahar
Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan; Jelani Popal,
head of the Independent Directorate of Local
(Zirak branch
Governance; Mullah Bradar, the top aide to Mullah
of Durrani
Umar, captured in Pakistan in Feb. 2010. Two-
Pashtun)
thirds of Qandahar’s provincial government posts
held by Zirak Durrani Pashtuns
Alikozai Qandahar
N/A
Barakzai
Qandahar, Helmand
Ghul Agha Shirzai (Governor, Nangarhar Province)
Achakzai
Qandahar, Helmand
Abdul Razziq, Chief of Staff, Border Police,
Qandahar Province
Alozai
Helmand (Musa Qala district)
Sher Mohammad Akhunzadeh (former Helmand
governor); Hajji Zahir, governor of Marjah
Noorzai
Qandahar
Noorzai brothers, briefly in charge of Qandahar
after the fal of the Taliban in November 2001
Ghilzai
Eastern Afghanistan: Paktia, Paktika,

Khost, Nangarhar, Kunar
Ahmadzai

Mohammed Najibullah (pres. 1986-1992); Ashraf
Ghani, Karzai adviser, Finance Minister 2002-2004
Hotak

Mullah Umar, but hails from Uruzgan, which is
dominated by Durranis
Taraki

Nur Mohammed Taraki (leader 1978-1979)
Kharoti

Hafizullah Amin (leader September-
December1979); Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, founder of
Hezb-e-Islami (Gulbuddin), former mujahedin party
leader now anti-Karzai insurgent.
Zadran
Paktia, Khost
Pacha Khan Zadran; Insurgent leader Jalaluddin
Haqqani
Kodai


Mangal
Paktia, Khost
Ghulab Mangal (Governor of Helmand Province)
Orkazai

Shinwari
Nangarhar province
Fasl Ahmed Shinwari, former Supreme Court Chief
Justice
Mandezai

Sangu Khel


Sipah

Wardak
Wardak Province
Abdul Rahim Wardak (Defense Minister)
(Pashtu-speaking
non-Pashtun)
Afridis
Tirah, Khyber Pass, Kohat

Zaka khel


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Clan/Tribal
Confederations
Location Example
Jawaki

Adam khel


Malikdin, etc


Yusufzais
Khursan, Swat, Kabul

Akozais

Malizais

Loezais

Khattaks
Kohat, Peshawar, Bangash

Akorai

Terai

Mohmands
Near Khazan, Peshawar

Baizai


Alimzai


Uthmanzais

Khawazais


Wazirs Mainly
in
Waziristan

Darwesh khel


Bannu

Source: This table was prepared by Hussein Hassan, Information Research Specialist, CRS.
Note: N/A indicates no example is available.

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Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Figure 1. Map of Afghan Ethnicities

Source: 2003 National Geographic Society, http://www.afghan-network.net/maps/Afghanistan-Map.pdf. Adapted by Amber Wilhelm, CRS
Notes: This map is intended to be illustrative of the approximate demographic distribution by region of Afghanistan. CRS has no way to confirm exact population
distributions.
CRS-39

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance


Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612

Acknowledgments
The table of major Pashtun tribes was prepared by Hussein Hassan, Information Research Specialist, CRS.

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