Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
June 25, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL30588
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Summary
Following two high-level policy reviews on Afghanistan in 2009, the Obama Administration
asserts that it is pursuing a fully resourced and integrated military-civilian strategy that will pave
the way for a gradual transition to Afghan security leadership beginning in July 2011. The policy
is intended to address deteriorating security in large parts of Afghanistan since 2006. Each of the
two reviews resulted in a decision to add combat troops, with the intent of creating the conditions
to expand Afghan governance and economic development, rather than on hunting and defeating
insurgents. A total of 51,000 additional U.S. forces were authorized by the two reviews, which
will bring U.S. troop levels to approximately 104,000 by September 2010. Currently, U.S. troops
in Afghanistan total about 94,000 and foreign partners are about 40,000.
U.S. strategy has not shown clear success, to date, although senior U.S. officials say that only
now is the effect of the U.S. and partner “surge” being achieved. These comments have been
intended to address a growing sense that the conflict may not produce clear or permanent stability
in Afghanistan. That perception has been fed by the failure to fully stabilize Marjah; Afghan
reluctance to allow combat to better secure Qandahar Province; President Hamid Karzai’s
dismissal on June 5 of two top security-related officials on whom the international alliance has
placed extensive confidence; and the imminent or near-term departure of several major partner
contingents, and growing reluctance of others to continue the effort. Although U.S. strategy is not
expected to change, the overall mission was further disrupted by the sudden ousting on June 23 of
the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, for disparaging public
comments by him and his staff about U.S. civilian leaders of Afghanistan policy. He has been
replaced by CENTCOM Commander David Petraeus, whose leading reputation will likely calm
Afghan and partner country fears of turmoil surrounding the McChrystal dismissal.
The credibility of the Afghan government is considered crucial to U.S. strategy. To improve
Afghan performance, U.S. diplomats are adjusting their approach to President Karzai, who
recoiled in early 2010 from U.S. criticism of his failure to curb corruption and of the extensive
fraud in the August 20, 2009, presidential elections. U.S.-Karzai strains on these issues—and over
Karzai’s criticism of what he asserted was U.S. disrespect for Afghan sovereignty—nearly led to
a revocation of President Obama’s invitation for Karzai to visit the United States May 10-14,
2010. The visit was assessed as highly fruitful and resulted in a decision to renew a 2005 U.S.-
Afghan long-term partnership accord, although that positive assessment subsequently soured
following U.S. press articles in June that said Karzai doubts that the United States can prevail in
Afghanistan.
A major issue—and the focus of the Karzai visit to Washington, DC, and an international meeting
on Afghanistan held in London on January 28, 2010—has been the effort to persuade insurgent
fighters and leaders to end their fight and join the political process. There is broad international
support for Karzai’s plan to reintegrate insurgent foot soldiers but not for his vision of reconciling
with high-level insurgent figures, potentially including Taliban leader Mullah Umar. Karzai
received general backing for these initiatives at a “consultative peace jirga” that convened in
Kabul during June 2-4, 2010.
Through the end of FY2009, the United States has provided over $40 billion in assistance to
Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $21 billion has been to equip and train
Afghan forces. (See CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government
Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman.)

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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Contents
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
From Early History to the 19th Century.................................................................................. 1
Early 20th Century and Cold War Era..................................................................................... 1
Geneva Accords (1988) and Soviet Withdrawal ..................................................................... 2
The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban ............................................................. 5
Taliban Rule (September 1996-November 2001) ................................................................... 5
The “Northern Alliance” Congeals .................................................................................. 6
Policy Pre-September 11, 2001.............................................................................................. 7
September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom ................................................. 8
Post-Taliban Nation-Building Efforts .......................................................................................... 9
Post-Taliban Political Transition............................................................................................ 9
Bonn Agreement ........................................................................................................... 10
Permanent Constitution ................................................................................................. 10
First Post-Taliban Elections in 2004 .............................................................................. 12
Formation of an Elected National Assembly (Parliament) .............................................. 13
2009 Presidential and Provincial Elections .................................................................... 13
September 18, 2010, Parliamentary Elections ................................................................ 14
Other Major Governance Issues .......................................................................................... 14
“Unity of Effort”: U.S. and International Policy Management and U.S. Embassy
Kabul......................................................................................................................... 15
U.S. Efforts to Expand and Reform Central Government/Corruption ............................. 17
Enhancing Local Governance........................................................................................ 19
Human Rights and Democracy ...................................................................................... 20
Narcotics Trafficking/Insurgent Financing/Agricultural Development............................ 21
Security Policy and Force Capacity Building............................................................................. 23
Taliban, Al Qaeda, and Related Insurgents and Their Strength ............................................. 24
Groups: The Taliban (“Quetta Shura Taliban”)............................................................... 24
Al Qaeda/Bin Laden Whereabouts ................................................................................ 25
Hikmatyar Faction ........................................................................................................ 26
Haqqani Faction............................................................................................................ 27
Pakistani Groups ........................................................................................................... 27
The U.S. Military Effort ...................................................................................................... 27
U.S. Efforts in the First Five Post-Taliban Years ............................................................ 28
Perception of Deterioration and Growing Force Levels in 2007 and 2008 ...................... 29
Obama Administration Strategy Reviews and Further Buildup............................................. 30
March 27, 2009, Policy Announcement and Command Change ..................................... 30
McChrystal Initial Assessment and Strategy Concept .................................................... 31
Second High Level Strategy Review and Debate Over Further Force Increases.............. 31
Second Command Change/McChrystal Ousted.............................................................. 32
Summary of Policy Decisions and U.S. Strategy............................................................ 32
Implementation, Early Results, and Doubts ................................................................... 34
Alternative “Counter-Terrorism” Strategy Not Adopted................................................. 37
Local and Other Security Experiments Under Way .............................................................. 38
“Reintegration” and “Reconciliation” With Insurgents................................................... 38
Local Security Experiments: Afghan Provincial Protection Program (APPP) and
Local Defense Initiative ............................................................................................. 41
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Reversal of Previous Efforts: DDR and DIAG programs ............................................... 42
Possible Further Limits on U.S. Operations/Status of Forces Agreement.............................. 43
Long-Term Security Commitment ................................................................................. 44
Alliance Issues: The NATO-Led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and
Operation Enduring Freedom ........................................................................................... 44
Recent Major Force Pledges.......................................................................................... 45
Provincial Reconstruction Teams......................................................................................... 48
Evolving Civil-Military Concepts at the PRTs ............................................................... 49
Afghan National Security Forces......................................................................................... 49
Afghan National Army.................................................................................................. 50
Afghan Air Force .......................................................................................................... 51
Afghan National Police (ANP) ...................................................................................... 51
Rule of Law/Criminal Justice Sector ............................................................................. 53
U.S. Security Forces Funding/”CERP”.......................................................................... 53
International Trust Fund for the ANSF .......................................................................... 54
Regional Context ...................................................................................................................... 56
Pakistan/Pakistan-Afghanistan Border................................................................................. 58
Cooperation Against Al Qaeda ...................................................................................... 59
Increased Direct U.S. Action ......................................................................................... 59
Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations ..................................................................................... 59
Iran..................................................................................................................................... 60
India ................................................................................................................................... 62
Russia, Central Asian States, and China............................................................................... 63
Russia ........................................................................................................................... 63
Central Asian States ...................................................................................................... 63
China ............................................................................................................................ 64
Persian Gulf States: Saudi Arabia and UAE......................................................................... 65
U.S. and International Aid to Afghanistan and Development Issues ........................................... 66
U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan............................................................................................ 66
Aid Oversight ............................................................................................................... 67
Aid Authorization: Afghanistan Freedom Support Act ................................................... 68
International Reconstruction Pledges/National Development Strategy ........................... 70
Key Sectors......................................................................................................................... 70
Private Sector Initiatives ............................................................................................... 72
National Solidarity Program.......................................................................................... 74
Trade Initiatives/Reconstruction Opportunity Zones ...................................................... 74
Residual Issues from Past Conflicts........................................................................................... 91
Stinger Retrieval ........................................................................................................... 91
Mine Eradication........................................................................................................... 91

Figures
Figure A-1. Map of Afghanistan ................................................................................................ 95
Figure A-2. Map of Afghan Ethnicities ...................................................................................... 96

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Tables
Table 1. Afghanistan Social and Economic Statistics ................................................................... 4
Table 2. U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) ..................................................... 17
Table 3. The Dutch Experience in Uruzgan................................................................................ 43
Table 4. Background on NATO/ISAF Formation and U.N. Mandate .......................................... 45
Table 5. Operation Enduring Freedom Partner Forces................................................................ 48
Table 6. Major Security-Related Indicators................................................................................ 55
Table 7. Afghan and Regional Facilities Used for
Operations in and Supply Lines to Afghanistan ...................................................................... 57
Table 8. Major Reporting Requirements .................................................................................... 68
Table 9. Major International (Non-U.S.) Pledges to Afghanistan Since January 2002................. 75
Table 10. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998....................................................... 76
Table 11. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002....................................................... 77
Table 12. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2003 .................................................................... 78
Table 13. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004 .................................................................... 79
Table 14. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2005 .................................................................... 80
Table 15. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2006 .................................................................... 81
Table 16. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2007 .................................................................... 82
Table 17. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2008 .................................................................... 83
Table 18. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2009 .................................................................... 84
Table 19. FY2010 Assistance (Includes Supplemental Request)................................................. 85
Table 20. FY2011 Regular Request ........................................................................................... 86
Table 21. Total Obligations for Major Programs: FY2001-FY2009 ............................................ 87
Table 22. NATO/ISAF Contributing Nations ............................................................................. 88
Table 23. Provincial Reconstruction Teams ............................................................................... 89
Table 24. Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan ...................................................................... 90

Appendixes
Appendix. U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted .................................................................... 93

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 96

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Background
From Early History to the 19th Century
Alexander the Great conquered what is now Afghanistan in three years (330 B.C.E. to 327
B.C.E), although at significant cost and with significant difficulty, and requiring marriage to a
resident of the conquered territory. From the third to the eighth century, A.D., Buddhism was the
dominant religion in Afghanistan. At the end of the seventh century, Islam spread in Afghanistan
when Arab invaders from the Umayyad Dynasty defeated the Persian empire of the Sassanians. In
the 10th century, Muslim rulers called Samanids, from Bukhara (in what is now Uzbekistan),
extended their influence into Afghanistan, and the complete conversion of Afghanistan to Islam
occurred during the rule of the Gaznavids in the 11th century. They ruled over the first vast
Islamic empire based in what is now Ghazni province of Afghanistan.
In 1504, Babur, a descendent of the conquerors Tamarlane and Genghis Khan, took control of
Kabul and then moved onto India, establishing the Mughal Empire. (Babur is buried in the Babur
Gardens complex in Kabul, which has been refurbished with the help of the Agha Khan
Foundation.) Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, Afghanistan was fought over by the Mughal
Empire and the Safavid Dynasty of Persia (now Iran), with the Safavids mostly controlling Herat
and western Afghanistan, and the Mughals controlling Kabul and the east. A monarchy ruled by
ethnic Pashtuns was founded in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, who was a senior officer in the
army of Nadir Shah, ruler of Persia, when Nadir Shah was assassinated and Persian control over
Afghanistan weakened.
A strong ruler, Dost Muhammad Khan, emerged in Kabul in 1826 and created concerns among
Britain that the Afghans were threatening Britain’s control of India; that fear led to a British
decision in 1838 to intervene in Afghanistan, setting off the first Anglo-Afghan War (1838-1842).
Nearly all of the 4,500-person British force was killed in that war, which ended with a final
British stand at Gandamack. The second Anglo-Afghan War took place during 1878-1880.
Early 20th Century and Cold War Era
King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) launched attacks on British forces in Afghanistan (Third
Anglo-Afghan War) shortly after taking power and won complete independence from Britain as
recognized in the Treaty of Rawalpindi (August 8, 1919). He was considered a secular
modernizer presiding over a government in which all ethnic minorities participated. He was
succeeded by King Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-1933), and then by King Mohammad Zahir
Shah. Zahir Shah’s reign (1933-1973) is remembered fondly by many older Afghans for
promulgating a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature and promoting
freedoms for women, including dropping a requirement that they cover their face and hair.
However, possibly believing that he could limit Soviet support for Communist factions in
Afghanistan, Zahir Shah also entered into a significant political and arms purchase relationship
with the Soviet Union. The Soviets also began to build large infrastructure projects in
Afghanistan.
Afghanistan’s slide into instability began in the 1970s when the diametrically opposed
Communist Party and Islamic movements grew in strength. While receiving medical treatment in
Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad Daoud, a military leader who
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established a dictatorship with strong state involvement in the economy. Daoud was overthrown
and killed1 in April 1978 by People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA, Communist party)
military officers under the direction of two PDPA (Khalq faction) leaders, Hafizullah Amin and
Nur Mohammad Taraki, in what is called the Saur (April) Revolution. Taraki became president,
but he was displaced in September 1979 by Amin. Both leaders drew their strength from rural
ethnic Pashtuns and tried to impose radical socialist change on a traditional society, in part by
redistributing land and bringing more women into government. The attempt at rapid
modernization sparked rebellion by Islamic parties opposed to such moves. The Soviet Union
sent troops into Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, to prevent a seizure of power by the Islamic
militias, known as the mujahedin (Islamic fighters). Upon their invasion, the Soviets replaced
Amin with another PDPA leader perceived as pliable, Babrak Karmal (Parcham faction of the
PDPA), who was part of the 1978 PDPA takeover but was exiled by Taraki and Amin.
Soviet occupation forces, which numbered about 120,000, were never able to pacify the outlying
areas of the country. The mujahedin benefited from U.S. weapons and assistance, provided
through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in cooperation with Pakistan’s Inter-Service
Intelligence directorate (ISI). The mujahedin were also relatively well organized and coordinated
by seven major parties that in early 1989 formed a Peshawar-based “Afghan Interim
Government” (AIG). The seven party leaders were Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi; Sibghatullah
Mojaddedi; Gulbuddin Hikmatyar; Burhanuddin Rabbani; Yunus Khalis; Abd-i-Rab Rasul
Sayyaf; and Pir Gaylani. Mohammadi and Khalis have died in recent years of natural causes, but
the others are still active. Most of those mujahedin leaders still active are part of the current
government; others, such as Hikmatyar, fight it.
The mujahedin weaponry included U.S.-supplied portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft systems
called “Stingers,” which proved highly effective against Soviet aircraft. The United States
decided in 1985 to provide these weapons to the mujahedin after substantial debate within the
Reagan Administration and some in Congress over whether they could be used effectively and
whether doing so would harm broader U.S.-Soviet relations. The mujahedin also hid and stored
weaponry in a large network of natural and manmade tunnels and caves throughout Afghanistan.
Partly because of the effectiveness of the Stinger in shooting down Soviet helicopters and fixed
wing aircraft, the Soviet Union’s losses mounted—about 13,400 Soviet soldiers were killed in the
war, according to Soviet figures—turning Soviet domestic opinion against the war. In 1986, after
the reformist Mikhail Gorbachev became leader, the Soviets replaced Karmal with the director of
Afghan intelligence, Najibullah Ahmedzai (known by his first name). Najibullah was a Ghilzai
Pashtun, and was from the Parcham faction of the PDPA. Some Afghans say that some aspects of
his governing style were admirable, particularly his appointment of a prime minister (Sultan Ali
Keshtmand and others) to handle administrative duties and distribute power.
Geneva Accords (1988) and Soviet Withdrawal
On April 14, 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the Geneva Accords) requiring
it to withdraw. The withdrawal was completed by February 15, 1989, leaving in place the weak
Najibullah government. A warming of relations moved the United States and Soviet Union to try
for a political settlement to the Afghan conflict, a trend accelerated by the 1991 collapse of the
Soviet Union, which reduced Moscow’s capacity for supporting communist regimes in the Third

1 Daoud’s grave was discovered outside Kabul in early 2008. He was reburied in an official ceremony in Kabul in
March 2009.
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World. On September 13, 1991, Moscow and Washington agreed to a joint cutoff of military aid
to the Afghan combatants.
The State Department has said that a total of about $3 billion in economic and covert military
assistance was provided by the U.S. to the Afghan mujahedin from 1980 until the end of the
Soviet occupation in 1989. Press reports say the covert aid program grew from about $20 million
per year in FY1980 to about $300 million per year during FY1986-FY1990.2 The Soviet pullout
decreased the perceived strategic value of Afghanistan, causing a reduction in subsequent covert
funding. As indicated below in Table 10, U.S. assistance to Afghanistan remained at relatively
low levels from the time of the Soviet withdrawal, validating the views of many that the United
States largely considered its role in Afghanistan “completed” when Soviets troops left, and there
was little support for a major U.S. effort to rebuild the country. The United States closed its
embassy in Kabul in January 1989, as the Soviet Union was completing its pullout, and it
remained so until the fall of the Taliban in 2001.
With Soviet backing withdrawn, Najibullah rallied the PDPA Army and the party-dominated
paramilitary organization called the Sarandoy, and successfully beat back the post-Soviet
withdrawal mujahedin offensives. Although Najibullah defied expectations that his government
would immediately collapse after a Soviet withdrawal, military defections continued and his
position weakened in subsequent years. On March 18, 1992, Najibullah publicly agreed to step
down once an interim government was formed. That announcement set off a wave of rebellions
primarily by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders in northern Afghanistan—particularly Abdul
Rashid Dostam, who joined prominent mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud of the Islamic
Society, a largely Tajik party headed by Burhannudin Rabbani. Masud had earned a reputation as
a brilliant strategist by preventing the Soviets from occupying his power base in the Panjshir
Valley of northeastern Afghanistan. Najibullah fell, and the mujahedin regime began April 18,
1992.3 Each year, a public parade is held to mark that day. (Some major mujahedin figures did not
attend the 2010 celebration because of a perception that they are under Afghan public and
international criticism of their immunity from alleged human rights abuses during the anti-Soviet
war.)

2 For FY1991, Congress reportedly cut covert aid appropriations to the mujahedin from $300 million the previous year
to $250 million, with half the aid withheld until the second half of the fiscal year. See “Country Fact Sheet:
Afghanistan,” in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 5, no. 23 (June 6, 1994), p. 377.
3 After failing to flee, Najibullah, his brother, and aides remained at a U.N. facility in Kabul until the Taliban
movement seized control in 1996 and hanged them.
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Table 1. Afghanistan Social and Economic Statistics
Population
28
million +. Kabul population is 3 million, up from 500,000 in Taliban era.
Ethnicities/Religions
Pashtun 42%; Tajik 27%; Uzbek 9%; Hazara 9%; Aimak 4%; Turkmen 3%; Baluch 2%.
Size of Religious
Religions: Sunni (Hanafi school) 80%; Shiite (Hazaras, Qizilbash, and Isma’ilis) 19%; other
Minorities
1%Christians-estimated 500-8,000 persons; Sikh and Hindu-3,000 persons; Bahai’s-400
(declared blasphemous in May 2007); Jews-1 person; Buddhist- smal numbers, mostly
foreigners. No Christian or Jewish schools. One church.
Literacy Rate
28% of population over 15 years of age. 43% of males; 12.6% of females.
Total and Per Capita
$23.3 billion purchasing power parity. 114th in the world. Per capita: $800 purchasing
GDP/Growth Rates
power parity. 219th in the world. Growth: 3.5%, down from 12% in 2007.
Unemployment Rate
40%
Children in
5.7 million, of which 35% are girls. Up from 900,000 in school during Taliban era. 8,000
School/Schools Built
schools built; 140,000 teachers hired since Taliban era. 17 universities, up from 2 in
2002. 75,000 Afghans in universities in Afghanistan; 5,000 when Taliban was in power.
35% of university students in Afghanistan are female.
Afghans With Access to 65% with basic health services access-compared to 8% during Taliban era. Infant
Health Coverage
mortality down 18% since Taliban to 135 per 1,000 live births. 680 clinics built .
Roads Built
About 2,500 miles paved post-Taliban, including repaving of “Ring Road” (78%
complete) that circles the country. Kabul-Qandahar drive reduced to 6 hours.
Judges/Courts
900 sitting judges trained since fal of Taliban
Banks Operating
14, including branches in some rural areas. Da Afghanistan Bank is the best known.
Zero during Taliban era. Some limited credit card acceptance. Some Afghan police now
paid by cel phone (E-Paisa).
Access to Electricity
15%-20% of the population.
Revenues
About $1.3 billion in 2009; $900 million in 2008; $720 million 2007
Financial Reserves
About $4.4 billion, up from $180 million in 2002.
Expenditures
About $3 billion in 2009; $2.7 billion in 2008; $1.2 billion in 2007; 900 million in 2006.
Budgetary shortfall filled by international donors, including through World Bank-run
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund.
External Debt
$8 billion bilateral, plus $500 million multilateral. U.S. forgave $108 million in debt in
2004, and $1.6 billion forgiven by other creditors in March 2010.
Foreign/Private
About $500 million to $1 billion per year. Four Afghan airlines: Ariana (national) plus
Investment
three privately owned: Safi, Kam, and Pamir.
Agriculture/Major Legal 80% of the population is involved in agriculture. Self-sufficiency in wheat production as
Exports
of May 2009 (first time in 30 years). Products for export include fruits, raisins, melons,
pomegranate juice (Anar), nuts, carpets, lapis lazuli gems, marble tile, timber products
(Kunar, Nuristan provinces). In 2009, large exports of pomegranates and apples to India
and Dubai began. Vast untapped minerals affirmed by U.S. experts (June 2010).
Oil Proven Reserves
3.6 billion barrels of oil, 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas. Current oil production negligible.
USAID funding project to revive oil and gas facilities in the north.
Import
Pakistan 38.6%; U.S. 9.5%; Germany 5.5%; India 5.2%./ main imports are food,
Partners/Imports
petroleum, capital goods, textiles, autos
Cellphones/Tourism
About 12 million cellphones, up from several hundred used by Taliban government
officials. Tourism: National park opened June 2009. Increasing tourist visits.
Sources: CIA, The World Factbook; International Religious Freedom Report, October 26, 2009; Afghan National
Development Strategy; DOD “Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan” report, June 2009.
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The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban
The fall of Najibullah exposed the differences among the mujahedin parties. The leader of one of
the smaller parties (Afghan National Liberation Front), Islamic scholar Sibghatullah Mojadeddi,
was president during April-May 1992. Under an agreement among the major parties, Rabbani
became President in June 1992 with agreement that he would serve until December 1994. He
refused to step down at that time, saying that political authority would disintegrate without a clear
successor. Kabul was subsequently shelled by other mujahedin factions, particularly that of
nominal “Prime Minister” Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a Pashtun, who accused Rabbani of
monopolizing power. Hikmatyar, who never formally assumed a working prime ministerial role
in Kabul because of suspicions of Rabbani, was purportedly backed by Pakistan. Hikmatyar’s
radical faction of the Islamist Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) had received a large proportion of the
U.S. aid during the anti-Soviet war. (Yunus Khalis led a more moderate faction of Hizb-e-Islami
during that war.)
In 1993-1994, Afghan Islamic clerics and students, mostly of rural, Pashtun origin, formed the
Taliban movement. Many were former mujahedin who had become disillusioned with conflict
among mujahedin parties and had moved into Pakistan to study in Islamic seminaries
(“madrassas”) mainly of the “Deobandi” school of Islam.4 Some say this Islam is similar to the
“Wahhabism” that is practiced in Saudi Arabia. Taliban practices were also consonant with
conservative Pashtun tribal traditions.
The Taliban viewed the Rabbani government as corrupt and anti-Pashtun, and the four years of
civil war (1992-1996) created popular support for the Taliban as able to deliver stability. With the
help of defections, the Taliban peacefully took control of the southern city of Qandahar in
November 1994. By February 1995, it was approaching Kabul, after which an 18-month
stalemate ensued. In September 1995, the Taliban captured Herat province, bordering Iran, and
imprisoned its governor, Ismail Khan, ally of Rabbani and Masud, who later escaped and took
refuge in Iran. In September 1996, new Taliban victories near Kabul led to the withdrawal of
Rabbani and Masud to the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul with most of their heavy weapons; the
Taliban took control of Kabul on September 27, 1996. Taliban gunmen subsequently entered a
U.N. facility in Kabul to seize Najibullah, his brother, and aides, and then hanged them.
Taliban Rule (September 1996-November 2001)
The Taliban regime was led by Mullah Muhammad Umar, who lost an eye in the anti-Soviet war
while fighting as part of the Hizb-e-Islami mujahedin party of Yunis Khalis. Umar held the title of
Head of State and “Commander of the Faithful,” remaining in the Taliban power base in
Qandahar and almost never appearing in public, although he did occasionally receive high level
foreign officials. Umar forged a political and personal bond with bin Laden and refused U.S.
demands to extradite him. Like Umar, most of the Taliban were Ghilzai Pashtuns, which
predominate in eastern Afghanistan. They are rivals of the Durrani Pashtuns, who are
predominant in the south.

4 The Deobandi school began in 1867 in a seminary in Uttar Pradesh, in British-controlled India, that was set up to train
Islamic clerics and to counter the British educational model.
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The Taliban progressively lost international and domestic support as it imposed strict adherence
to Islamic customs in areas it controlled and employed harsh punishments, including executions.
The Taliban authorized its “Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice” to
use physical punishments to enforce strict Islamic practices, including bans on television, Western
music, and dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or working outside the home,
except in health care, and it publicly executed some women for adultery. In what many consider
its most extreme action, and which some say was urged by bin Laden, in March 2001 the Taliban
blew up two large Buddha statues carved into hills above Bamiyan city, considering them idols.
The Clinton Administration held talks with the Taliban before and after it took power, but was
unable to moderate its policies. The United States withheld recognition of Taliban as the
legitimate government of Afghanistan, formally recognizing no faction as the government. The
United Nations continued to seat representatives of the Rabbani government, not the Taliban. The
State Department ordered the Afghan embassy in Washington, DC, closed in August 1997. U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1193 (August 28, 1998) and 1214 (December 8, 1998) urged the
Taliban to end discrimination against women. Women’s rights groups urged the Clinton
Administration not to recognize the Taliban government. In May 1999, the Senate-passed S.Res.
68 called on the President not to recognize an Afghan government that oppresses women.
The Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda’s leadership gradually became the Clinton Administration’s
overriding agenda item with Afghanistan. In April 1998, then U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations Bill Richardson (along with Assistant Secretary of State Karl Indurfurth and NSC senior
official Bruce Riedel) visited Afghanistan, but the Taliban refused to hand over bin Laden. They
did not meet Mullah Umar. After the August 7, 1998, Al Qaeda bombings of U.S. embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton Administration progressively pressured the Taliban, imposing
U.S. sanctions and achieving adoption of some U.N. sanctions as well. On August 20, 1998, the
United States fired cruise missiles at alleged Al Qaeda training camps in eastern Afghanistan, but
bin Laden was not hit.5 Some observers assert that the Administration missed several clearer
opportunities to strike him, including a purported sighting of him by an unarmed Predator drone
at the Tarnak Farm camp in Afghanistan in the fall of 2000.6 Clinton Administration officials say
they did not try to oust the Taliban militarily because domestic and international support for doing
so was lacking.
The “Northern Alliance” Congeals
The Taliban’s policies caused different Afghan factions to ally with the ousted President Rabbani
and Masud and their ally in the Herat area, Ismail Khan—the Tajik core of the anti-Taliban
opposition—into a broader “Northern Alliance.” In the Alliance were Uzbek, Hazara Shiite, and
even some Pashtun Islamist factions discussed in Table 24.
Uzbeks/General Dostam. One major faction was the Uzbek militia (the
Junbush-Melli, or National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) of General Abdul
Rashid Dostam. Frequently referred to by some Afghans as one of the “warlords”
who gained power during the anti-Soviet war, Dostam first joined those seeking
to oust Rabbani during his 1992-96 presidency, but later joined Rabbani’s

5 A pharmaceutical plant in Sudan (Al Shifa) believe to be producing chemical weapons for Al Qaeda also was struck
that day, although U.S. reviews later corroborated Sudan’s assertions that the plant was strictly civilian in nature.
6 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4540958.
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Northern Alliance against the Taliban. (For more information on Dostam, see
CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government
Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman.)
Hazara Shiites. Members of Hazara tribes, mostly Shiite Muslims, are
prominent in Bamiyan, Dai Kundi, and Ghazni provinces (central Afghanistan)
and are always wary of repression by Pashtuns and other larger ethnic factions.
The Hazaras have tended to serve in working class and domestic household jobs,
although more recently they have been prominent in technology jobs in Kabul,
raising their economic status. During the various Afghan wars, the main Hazara
Shiite militia was Hizb-e-Wahdat (Unity Party, composed of eight different
groups). Hizb-e-Wahdat suffered a major setback in 1995 when the Taliban
captured and killed its leader Abdul Ali Mazari.
Pashtun Islamists/Sayyaf. Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, later a post-Taliban
parliamentary committee chairman, headed a Pashtun-dominated hardline
Islamist mujahedin faction called the Islamic Union for the Liberation of
Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet war. Even though he is an Islamic
conservative, Sayyaf viewed the Taliban as selling out Afghanistan to Al Qaeda
and he joined the Northern Alliance to try to oust the Taliban.
Policy Pre-September 11, 2001
Throughout 2001, but prior to the September 11 attacks, Bush Administration policy differed little
from Clinton Administration policy—applying economic and political pressure while retaining
dialogue with the Taliban, and refraining from militarily assisting the Northern Alliance. The
September 11 Commission report said that, in the months prior to the September 11 attacks,
Administration officials leaned toward such a step and that some officials wanted to assist anti-
Taliban Pashtun forces. Other covert options were reportedly under consideration as well.7 In a
departure from Clinton Administration policy, the Bush Administration stepped up engagement
with Pakistan to try to reduce its support for the Taliban. At that time, there were allegations that
Pakistani advisers were helping the Taliban in their fight against the Northern Alliance. In
accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, in February 2001 the State Department
ordered the Taliban representative office in New York closed, although the Taliban representative
(Abdul Hakim Mujahid) continued to operate informally. In March 2001, Administration officials
received a Taliban envoy to discuss bilateral issues.
Fighting with some Iranian, Russian, and Indian financial and military support, the Northern
Alliance nonetheless continued to lose ground to the Taliban after it lost Kabul in 1996. By the
time of the September 11 attacks, the Taliban controlled at least 75% of the country, including
almost all provincial capitals. The Alliance suffered a major setback on September 9, 2001, two
days before the September 11 attacks, when Ahmad Shah Masud was assassinated by Arab
journalists who allegedly were Al Qaeda operatives. He was succeeded by his intelligence chief,
Muhammad Fahim,8 a veteran figure but one who lacked Masud’s undisputed authority.

7 Drogin, Bob. “U.S. Had Plan for Covert Afghan Options Before 9/11.” Los Angeles Times, May 18, 2002.
8 Some Afghan sources refer to him by the name “Fahim Khan,” or “Marshal Fahim.”
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September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom
After the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration decided to militarily overthrow the
Taliban when it refused to extradite bin Laden, judging that a friendly regime in Kabul was
needed to enable U.S forces to search for Al Qaeda activists there. United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1368 of September 12, 2001, said that the Security Council
expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond (implying force) to the
September 11 attacks.
This is widely interpreted as a U.N. authorization for military action in response to the attacks,
but it did not explicitly authorize Operation Enduring Freedom to oust the Taliban. Nor did the
Resolution specifically reference Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which allows for responses to
threats to international peace and security.
In Congress, S.J.Res. 23 (passed 98-0 in the Senate and with no objections in the House, P.L.
107-40), was somewhat more explicit than the U.N. Resolution, authorizing9
all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or persons.
Major combat in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) began on October 7, 2001. It
consisted primarily of U.S. air-strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, facilitated by the
cooperation between small numbers (about 1,000) of U.S. special operations forces and CIA
operatives. The purpose of these operations was to help the Northern Alliance and Pashtun anti-
Taliban forces by providing information to direct U.S. air strikes against Taliban positions. In
part, the U.S. forces and operatives worked with such Northern Alliance contacts as Fahim and
Amrollah Saleh, who now serves as Afghanistan’s intelligence director, to weaken Taliban
defenses on the Shomali plain north of Kabul (and just south of Bagram Airfield, which marked
the forward position of the Northern Alliance during Taliban rule). Some U.S. combat units
(about 1,300 Marines) moved into Afghanistan to pressure the Taliban around Qandahar at the
height of the fighting (October-December 2001), but there were few pitched battles between U.S.
and Taliban soldiers. Some critics believe that U.S. dependence on local Afghan militia forces in
the war subsequently set back post-war democracy building efforts.
The Taliban regime unraveled rapidly after it lost Mazar-e-Sharif on November 9, 2001, to forces
led by Dostam.10 Other, mainly Tajik, Northern Alliance forces—the commanders of which had
initially promised U.S. officials they would not enter Kabul—entered the capital on November
12, 2001, to popular jubilation. The Taliban subsequently lost the south and east to U.S.-
supported Pashtun leaders, including Hamid Karzai. The end of the Taliban regime is generally
dated as December 9, 2001, when the Taliban surrendered Qandahar and Mullah Umar fled the
city, leaving it under tribal law administered by Pashtun leaders such as the Noorzai clan.

9 Another law (P.L. 107-148) established a “Radio Free Afghanistan” under RFE/RL, providing $17 million in funding
for it for FY2002.
10 In the process, Dostam captured Taliban fighters and imprisoned them in freight containers, causing many to
suffocate. They were buried in a mass grave at Dasht-e-Laili. This issue is covered in CRS Report RS21922,
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by Kenneth Katzman.
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Subsequently, U.S. and Afghan forces conducted “Operation Anaconda” in the Shah-i-Kot Valley
south of Gardez (Paktia Province) during March 2-19, 2002, against 800 Al Qaeda and Taliban
fighters. In March 2003, about 1,000 U.S. troops raided suspected Taliban or Al Qaeda fighters in
villages around Qandahar (Operation Valiant Strike). On May 1, 2003, Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld announced an end to “major combat.”
Post-Taliban Nation-Building Efforts11
With Afghanistan devastated after more than 20 years of warfare, the 2001 fall of the Taliban
regime raised questions about the extent of a U.S. and international commitment to Afghanistan.
Taking the view that leaving the Afghanistan-Pakistan theater after the 1989 Soviet pullout had
led Afghanistan degenerate into chaos, the decision was made by the Bush Administration to try
to rebuild try to build a relatively strong central government and to assist Afghanistan’s economy,
in order to prevent a return of the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and other militants to Afghanistan.
The “nation-building” task—which was supported by major international institutions and U.S.
partners in several post-Taliban international meetings—has proved more difficult than
anticipated. In part this is because of the devastation that years of war wrought on Afghan tribal
structures and related local governing institutions, on the education, and on the already limited
infrastructure. Some observers believe the international community had unrealistic expectations
of what could be achieved in a relatively short time frame—particularly in establishing
competent, non-corrupt governance.
The Obama Administration’s two “Afghanistan strategy reviews,” the results of which were
announced on March 27, 2009, and on December 1, 2009, narrowed official U.S. goals to
preventing terrorism safe haven in Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, the elements of Obama
Administration strategy in many ways enhance the nation-building strategy put in place by the
Bush Administration. The policy articulated on December 1, 2009 introduced the concept of
transition to Afghan security leadership, and specifically stated that better performance is
expected of the Afghan government. To this extent, some Afghan, neighboring, and partner
country leaders question whether the December 1, 2009, policy statement foreshadows an
eventual Obama Administration effort to wind down the U.S. mission there. (H.Con.Res. 248, a
resolution introduced by Representative Kucinich to require removal of U.S. forces from
Afghanistan not later than December 31, 2010, was defeated in the House by a vote of 65 to 356.)
Post-Taliban Political Transition
The 2001 ouster of the Taliban government paved the way for the success of a long-stalled U.N.
effort to form a broad-based Afghan government and for the international community to help
Afghanistan build legitimate governing institutions. In the formation of the first post-Taliban
transition government, the United Nations was viewed as a credible mediator by all sides largely
because of its role in ending the Soviet occupation. During the 1990s, a succession of U.N.
mediators adopted many of former King Zahir Shah’s proposals for a government to be selected
by a traditional assembly, or loya jirga. However, U.N.-mediated cease-fires between warring

11 See also: CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by Kenneth
Katzman.
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factions did not hold. Non-U.N. initiatives made little progress, particularly the “Six Plus Two”
multilateral contact group, which began meeting in 1997 (the United States, Russia, and the six
states bordering Afghanistan: Iran, China, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan).
Other failed efforts included a “Geneva group” (Italy, Germany, Iran, and the United States)
formed in 2000; an Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) contact group; and prominent
Afghan exile efforts, including discussion groups launched by Hamid Karzai and his clan, former
mujahedin commander Abd al-Haq, and Zahir Shah (“Rome process”).
Bonn Agreement
Immediately after the September 11 attacks, former U.N. mediator Lakhdar Brahimi was brought
back (he had resigned in frustration in October 1999). U.N. Security Council Resolution 1378
(November 14, 2001) called for a “central” role for the United Nations in establishing a
transitional administration and inviting member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote
stability and aid delivery. After the fall of Kabul in November 2001, the United Nations invited
major Afghan factions, most prominently the Northern Alliance and that of the former King—but
not the Taliban—to an international conference in Bonn, Germany.
On December 5, 2001, the factions signed the “Bonn Agreement.”12 It was endorsed by U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1385 (December 6, 2001). The agreement was reportedly forged
with substantial Iranian diplomatic help because Iran had supported the military efforts of the
Northern Alliance faction and had leverage to persuade temporary caretaker Rabbani and the
Northern Alliance to cede the top leadership to Hamid Karzai as leader of an interim
administration. Other provisions of the agreement:
• authorized an international peace keeping force to maintain security in Kabul,
and Northern Alliance forces were directed to withdraw from the capital. Security
Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001) gave formal Security Council
authorization for the international peacekeeping force (International Security
Assistance Force, ISAF);
• referred to the need to cooperate with the international community on counter
narcotics, crime, and terrorism; and
• applied the constitution of 1964 until a permanent constitution could be drafted.13
Permanent Constitution
A June 2002 “emergency” loya jirga put a representative imprimatur on the transition; it was
attended by 1,550 delegates (including about 200 women) from Afghanistan’s 364 districts.
Subsequently, a 35-member constitutional commission drafted the permanent constitution, and
unveiled in November 2003. It was debated by 502 delegates, selected in U.N-run caucuses, at a
constitutional loya jirga (CLJ)” during December 13, 2003-January 4, 2004.

12 Text of Bonn agreement at http://www.ag-afghanistan.de/files/petersberg.htm.
13 The last pre-Karzai loya jirga that was widely recognized as legitimate was held in 1964 to ratify a constitution.
Najibullah convened a loya jirga in 1987 to approve pro-Moscow policies, but that gathering was widely viewed by
Afghans as illegitimate.
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The CLJ, chaired by Sibghatullah Mojadeddi (mentioned above, now chairman of the upper
house of the National Assembly), ended with approval of the constitution with only minor
changes. It set up a presidential system, with an elected president and a separately elected
National Assembly (parliament). The Northern Alliance failed in its effort to set up a prime
ministership (in which the elected parliament would select a prime minister and a cabinet) , but
the faction did achieve a limitation on presidential powers by assigning major authorities to the
parliament, such as the power to veto senior official nominees and to impeach a president. The
constitution made former King Zahir Shah honorary “Father of the Nation,” a title that is not
heritable. Zahir Shah died on July 23, 2007.14 The constitution also set out timetables for
presidential, provincial, and district elections (by June 2004) and stipulated that, if possible, they
should be held simultaneously.


14 Text of constitution: http://arabic.cnn.com/afghanistan/ConstitutionAfghanistan.pdf.
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Hamid Karzai, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Hamid Karzai, born December 24, 1957, was selected to lead Afghanistan at the Bonn Conference because he was a
prominent Pashtun leader who had been involved in Taliban-era political talks among exiled Afghans and was viewed
as a compromiser rather than a “strongman.” However, some observers consider his compromises as Afghanistan’s
leader a sign of weakness, and criticize him for indulging members of his clan and other allies with appointments and
contracts. Others view him as overly suspicious of the intentions of the United States and other outside powers,
believing they are intent on replacing him or favoring certain groups of Afghans over others. These concerns, coupled
with U.S. press and official criticism of his tolerance of corruption, prompted Karzai to include in several early April
2010 speeches to accuse the international community of attempting to pressure the Afghan government and to
undermine its sovereignty. At the same time, U.S. officials reportedly seek, with only mixed success, to draw him
directly into planning and approving operations against insurgents and trying to rally the Afghan public against the
insurgency.
From Karz village in Qandahar Province, Hamid Karzai has led the powerful Popolzai tribe of Durrani Pashtuns since
1999, when his father was assassinated, al egedly by Taliban agents, in Quetta, Pakistan. Karzai attended university in
India. He was deputy foreign minister in Rabbani’s government during 1992-1995, but he left the government and
supported the Taliban as a Pashtun alternative to Rabbani. He broke with the Taliban as its excesses unfolded and
forged alliances with other anti-Taliban factions, including the Northern Alliance. Karzai entered Afghanistan after the
September 11 attacks to organize Pashtun resistance to the Taliban, supported by U.S. Special Forces. He became
central to U.S. efforts after Pashtun commander Abdul Haq entered Afghanistan in October 2001 without U.S.
support and was captured and hung by the Taliban. Karzai was slightly injured by an errant U.S. bomb during major
combat of Operation Enduring Freedom (late 2001).
His half brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, is chair of the provincial council of Qandahar and the most powerful political
figure in that province, He is key to Karzai’s maintenance of support and the cornerstone of his information network
in Qandahar but Ahmad Wali has been widely accused of involvement in or tolerating narcotics trafficking. A New
York Times article on October 28, 2009, said Ahmad Wali is also a paid informant for the CIA and some of his
property has been used by U.S. Special Forces. Ahmad Wali was the apparent target of at least two bombings in
Qandahar in 2009. Others of Karzai’s several brothers have lived in the United States, including Qayyum Karzai.
Qayyum Karzai won a parliament seat in the September 2005 election but resigned his seat in October 2008 due to
health reasons. Qayyum subsequently represented the government in inconclusive talks, held in several Persian Gulf
states, to reconcile with Taliban figures close to Mullah Umar. Another brother, Mahmoud Karzai, is a businessman,
reportedly has extensive business interests in Qandahar and Kabul, including auto dealerships and apartment houses.
Other Karzai relatives and allies have formed security companies and other contracting firms that have profited
extensively from international reconstruction, transportation, and protection funds, including a $2.2 billion U.S. “Host
Nation Trucking” contract.
Karzai also relies heavily for advice from tribal and faction leaders from southern Afghanistan, including Sher
Mohammad Akhunzadeh, the former governor of Helmand (until 2005), as wel as from wel educated professionals
such as his current Foreign Minister Zalmay Rasool, and the former foreign minister, now National Security Adviser,
Rangeen Spanta.
With heavy protection, Karzai has survived several assassination attempts since taking office, including rocket fire or
gunfire at or near his appearances. His wife, Dr. Zenat Karzai, is a gynecologist by profession. They have several
children, including one born in 2008. In December 2009, he spoke publicly about personal turmoil among relatives in
Karz village that resulted in the death of an 18-year-old relative in October 2009.

First Post-Taliban Elections in 2004
Security conditions precluded the holding of the first post-Taliban elections simultaneously. The
first election, for president, was held on October 9, 2004, missing a June constitutional deadline.
Turnout was about 80%. On November 3, 2004, Karzai was declared winner (55.4% of the vote)
over his 17 challengers on the first round, avoiding a runoff. Parliamentary and provincial council
elections were intended for April-May 2005 but were delayed until September 18, 2005. Because
of the difficulty in confirming voter registration rolls and determining district boundaries,
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elections for the 364 district councils, each of which will likely have contentious boundaries
because they will inevitably separate tribes and clans, have not been held to date.
Formation of an Elected National Assembly (Parliament)
The National Assembly (parliament) is emerging as a relatively vibrant body that creates
accountability and has often asserted itself politically. The most notable example has been the
2009-2010 confirmation process for Karzai’s cabinet and the lower house’s subsequent vote
against a Karzai election decree to govern the September 18, 2010, National Assembly election
(see “September 18, 2010, Parliamentary Elections”). The Assembly’s assertiveness shows that
the better educated “independents” are emerging as pivotal members of parliament.
For the 2005 first election to the Assembly, voting was conducted for individuals running in each
province, not as party slates. When parliament first convened on December 18, 2005, the
Northern Alliance bloc achieved selection of one of its own, Yunus Qanooni—who was Karzai’s
main competitor in the presidential election—for speaker of the all-elected 249 seat lower house
(Wolesi Jirga, House of the People). In April 2007, Qanooni and Northern Alliance political
leader Rabbani organized this opposition bloc, along with ex-Communists and some royal family
members, into a party called the “United Front” (UF), that wants increased parliamentary powers
and directly elected provincial governors.
The 102-seat upper house (Meshrano Jirga, House of Elders) is selected by the elected provincial
councils (which choose two thirds of the seats)15 and Karzai. Because of its selection structure,
the body consists mainly of older, well-known figures, and is more pro-Karzai than is the lower
house. It has 23 females (half of Karzai’s 34 appointments, as provided for in the constitution,
plus six others). The leader of the body is Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, who is pro-Karzai as
discussed above, and whose son, a health care professional, is rumored to be in line to be the next
Ambassador to the United States. With his bloc of 17 non-female slots, Karzai appointed several
other allies.
2009 Presidential and Provincial Elections
The 2009 presidential and provincial elections were expected to further Afghanistan’s democratic
development. However, because of the widespread fraud identified by Afghanistan’s U.N.-
appointed “Elections Complaints Commission” (ECC) in the August 20, 2009, first round of the
elections, the process did not produce that result, and continues to cloud U.S.-Afghan relations.
The official U.S. position is that, because Karzai ultimately acquiesced to an ECC ruling that he
did not win a first round victory over his major opponent, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, the process was
resolved in accordance with the Afghan constitution. Still, the marred elections process was a
factor in the late 2009 high-level U.S. strategy reevaluation because of the centrality of a credible,
legitimate partner Afghan government to U.S. strategy.16 Dr. Abdullah has gone on to become
Afghanistan’s “opposition leader,” and he visited one week after the May 2010 Karzai visit to
Washington, DC. Abdullah spent most of his visit speaking at think tanks and explaining his
criticism of the Karzai government’s corruption and alleged electoral fraud. Afghan politics are

15 When district elections are held, the elected district councils will then assume their constitutional function of
choosing one third of the Meshrano Jirga seats, lessening those chosen by the provincial councils.
16 Fidler, Stephen and John W. Miller. “U.S. Allies Await Afghan Review.” Wall Street Journal, September 25, 2009.
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discussed further in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government
Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman.
The election fraud difficulty may have contributed to the substantial parliamentary opposition to
many of Karzai’s nominees for his post-2010 cabinet. In each of two rounds of cabinet
nominations in December 2009 and January 2010, more than half of Karzai’s nominees were
voted down by the National Assembly. He therefore has 11 ministries lacking a permanent
minister. That number became 12 on June 6, 2010, when Karzai forced Interior Minister
Mohammad Hanif Atmar to resign, ostensibly for failing to prevent insurgent attacks in Kabul
itself. Atmar was close to and well respected by U.S. officials, but they also work well with the
Karzai economic team that featured prominently during Karzai’s May 10-14, 2010, visit to
Washington, DC. Also resigning on June 6 was National Directorate of Security (NDS, Afghan
intelligence) chief Amrollah Saleh, a Tajik and an ally of the United Front leaders.
September 18, 2010, Parliamentary Elections
A key test of Karzai’s repeated commitment to reforms will be the September 18, 2010, National
Assembly elections. In February 2010, Karzai opponents and some international officials strongly
criticized Karzai for issuing an election decree that would eliminate the three international slots
on the five-person ECC and “Afghanize” the election oversight process. Some believe the decree
is not consistent with constitutional provisions that election laws not be changed within one year
of the applicable election. In a compromise announced March 23, 2010, Karzai said that there
would be two international officials on the ECC—down from the three previously but not the all-
Afghan body envisioned in the February 2010 election decree. The lower house of the National
Assembly voted on March 31 to reject the decree, but the upper house upheld it by refusing to
schedule a vote to reject it. Nonetheless, Karzai has implemented the ECC compromise. On April
17, 2010, he also appointed a new IEC head, Fazel Ahmed Manawi, who drew praise from many
factions (including “opposition leader” Dr. Abdullah) for impartiality. Registration of candidates
has been completed (2,577 candidates, of which 405 are women, for the 249 seats up for election)
and registration of voters has begun as of mid-June 2010. In a June 16, 2010, report (S/2010/318),
the U.N. Secretary General said he is “encouraged by the state of preparedness of the Afghan
electoral institutions” for the upcoming election.
Other Major Governance Issues
Obama Administration policy, as articulated on March 27, 2009, and December 1, 2009,
emphasizes expanding and improving Afghan governance as a long-term means of stabilizing
Afghanistan and preventing its reversion to a base for terrorist groups. The latter Obama
statement specified that there would be “no blank check” for the Afghan government if it does not
reduce corruption and deliver services. This emphasis is expressed extensively in the State
Department January 2010 document outlining its policy priorities, entitled Afghanistan and
Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy.
17 The corruption issue was emphasized by international
participants at the January 28, 2010, London conference and was a focus—although not publicly
so—of the May 10-14, 2010, Karzai visit to Washington, DC. Several press reports prior to the
Karzai visit indicated that the Obama Administration has decided to mute its public criticism of

17 Released by the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, January 2010.
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135728.pdf
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Karzai on the grounds that public criticism causes Karzai to become suspicious of U.S. intent and
to ally with undemocratic elements in Afghanistan. Corruption in the Afghan government is
expected to be a major issue at a Kabul-based follow-up to the London conference, to be held
on/about July 20, 2010.
“Unity of Effort”: U.S. and International Policy Management and U.S.
Embassy Kabul

In line with the prioritization of Afghanistan policy, in February 2009, the Administration
appointed Ambassador Richard Holbrooke as “Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan,” reporting to Secretary of State Clinton. His team at the State Department consists
mainly of members detailed from several different agencies. Karl Eikenberry, who served as
commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan during 2004-2005, is U.S. Ambassador. Eikenberry and
the rest of the U.S. works closely with Holbrooke, as well as with the U.S. and NATO military
structure, and a civilian-military “joint campaign plan” was developed and released in mid-
August 2009.18
However, it has been widely that there are differences and divisions among senior policymakers,
some of them personal, others about policy preeminence. It was noted in April 2010, during an
exchange of recriminations between Karzai and the United States and international community,
that both Holbrooke and Eikenberry have been critics of Karzai and have inconsistent relations
with him. These criticisms are said to have caused Karzai to question his alliance with the United
States, and to favor his relationship with the now dismissed top U.S. commander in Afghanistan,
Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who expressed praise for Karzai’s facilitation of U.S. strategy.
McChrystal was dismissed by President Obama on June 23, 2010, for impolitic comments by him
and his staff about U.S. civilian policymakers on Afghanistan in an article in Rolling Stone
magazine.19 He was replaced by CENTCOM Commander Gen. David Petraeus, whose
established reputation calmed Afghan fears of disruption among the U.S. policy team. Still, some
believe that more changes to the senior level policy team might be needed, in light of the strained
relationship that Karzai has with Ambassador Holbrooke and Ambassador Eikenberry.
On February 7, 2010, in an effort to improve civilian coordination between the United States, its
foreign partners, and the Afghan government, a NATO “Senior Civilian Representative” in
Afghanistan, UK Ambassador Mark Sedwill, took office. These officials work with
representatives of the embassies of partner countries and with a special U.N. Assistance Mission–
Afghanistan (UNAMA, see Table 2).
At U.S. Embassy Kabul, there is a “deputy Ambassador,” senior official Francis Ricciardone, and
Ambassador Anthony Wayne managing U.S. assistance issues. Another Ambassador-rank official,
Joseph Mussomeli, handles Embassy management issues. Ambassador Timothy Carney oversaw
U.S. policy for the 2009 elections. Observers say another U.S. Ambassador, Hans Klemm, will be
appointed to coordinate U.S. Embassy efforts to promote rule of law. Zalmay Khalilzad, an
American of Afghan origin discussed above, was Ambassador during December 2003-August
2005; he reportedly had significant influence on Afghan decisions.20

18 For a copy of the joint campaign plan, see: http://info.publicintelligence.net/0908eikenberryandmcchrystal.pdf.
19 Hastings, Michael. “The Runaway General.” Rolling Stone, July 6-22, 2010.
20 Waldman, Amy. “In Afghanistan, U.S. Envoy Sits in Seat of Power.” New York Times, April 17, 2004. Afghanistan’s
(continued...)
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The U.S. Embassy, now in newly constructed buildings, has progressively expanded its personnel
and facilities and will expand its facilities further to accommodate some of the additional civilian
hires and Foreign Service officers who will be posted to Afghanistan as mentors and advisers to
the Afghan government. The tables at the end of this report include U.S. funding for State
Department and USAID operations, including Embassy construction and running the “Embassy
air wing,” a fleet of twin-engine turboprops that ferry U.S. officials and contractors around
Afghanistan. In a significant development attempting to signal normalization of certain areas of
Afghanistan, in early 2010 the United States formally inaugurated U.S. consulates in Herat and
Mazar-e-Sharif.
Although the Afghan government has been increasing its revenue (about $1.3 billion for 2009)
and is covering about one quarter of its overall budget, USAID provides funding to help the
Afghan government meet gaps in its budget—both directly and through a U.N.-run multi-donor
Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) account, run by the World Bank. The Obama
Administration has requested about $200 million in FY2011 funds to provide direct budget
support to Afghan ministries that meet reform benchmarks. Those figures are provided in the U.S.
aid tables at the end.

(...continued)
ambassador in Washington is Seyed Jalal Tawwab, formerly a Karzai aide.
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Table 2. U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)
The international community is extensively involved in Afghan governance and national building, primarily in factional
conflict resolution and coordination of development assistance. The coordinator of U.N. efforts is the U.N.
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), headed as of March 22, 2010, by Swedish diplomat Staffan de-Mistura,
replacing Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide. Mistura formerly played a similar role in Iraq. U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1806 of March 20, 2008, expanded UNAMA’s authority to coordinating the work of international donors
and strengthening cooperation between the international peacekeeping force (ISAF, see below) and the Afghan
government. In concert with the Obama Administration’s emphasis on Afghan policy, UNAMA is to open offices in as
many of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces as financial y and logistical y permissible. (The mandate of UNAMA, reviewed at
one year intervals, ran until March 23, 2010, as provided for by Resolution 1869 of March 23, 2009, and was renewed
for another year on March 22, 2010 (Resolution 1917). Resolution 1917 largely restated UNAMA’s expanded
mandate and coordinating role with other high level representatives in Afghanistan, and election support role.
In keeping with its expanding role, in 2008 U.S. Ambassador Peter Galbraith was appointed as Eide’s deputy, although
he left Afghanistan in early September 2009 in a reported dispute with Eide over how vigorously to insist on
investigating fraud in the August 20 Afghan election. Galbraith reportedly pressed Afghan and independent election
bodies to be as vigorous as possible in the interests of rule of law and election legitimacy; Eide purportedly was willing
to encourage an Afghan compromise to avoid a second round run-off. The split led U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki
Moon to remove Galbraith from his post at UNAMA in late September 2009 on the grounds that the disharmony was
compromising the UNAMA mission. Several Galbraith supporters subsequently resigned from UNAMA and Galbraith
has appealed his firing amid reports he was proposing a plan to replace Karzai had an election runoff been postponed
until 2010. Perhaps as a result of the turmoil, Eide said in December 2009 he would leave his post when his contract
with the U.N. expires in March 2010. Mistura’s appointment as his replacement was announced in conjunction with
the January 28, 2010, international conference in London.
UNAMA is co-chair of the joint Afghan-international community coordination body cal ed the Joint Coordination and
Monitoring Board (JCMB), and is helping implement the five-year development strategy outlined in a “London
Compact,” (now cal ed the Afghanistan Compact) adopted at the January 31-February 1, 2006, London conference on
Afghanistan. The priorities developed in that document comport with Afghanistan’s own “National Strategy for
Development,” presented on June 12, 2008, in Paris. Many of the same issues were discussed at the London
conference. During his term, Eide urged the furnishing of additional capacity-building resources, and he complained
that some efforts by international donors are redundant or tied to purchases by Western countries. In statements
and press conferences, Eide continued to note security deterioration but also progress in governance and in
reduction of drug cultivation, and he publicly supported negotiations with Taliban figures to end the war. His final
speech before leaving criticized the U.S.-led coalition for focusing too much on military success and not enough on
governance. UNAMA also often has been involved in local dispute resolution among factions, and it helps organize
elections. Under a March 2010 compromise with Karzai, it nominates two international members of the five person
Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), one fewer than the three it selected under the prior election law.
The difficulties in coordinating U.N. with U.S. and NATO efforts were belied in a 2007 proposal to create a new
position of “super envoy” that would represent the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO in Afghanistan.
The concept advanced and in January 2008, with U.S. support, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon tentatively
appointed British diplomat Paddy Ashdown as the “super envoy.” However, Karzai rejected the appointment
reportedly over concerns about the scope of authority of such an envoy. Karzai might have also sought to show
independence from the international community. Ashdown withdrew his name on January 28, 2008. However, the
concept reportedly was floated again in late 2009, but was again suppressed by Karzai and others who say it
contradicts U.S. and other efforts to promote Afghan leadership. The NATO senior civilian representative post, held
by Amb. Mark Sedwill (UK), appears to represent a step in the direction of improved donor coordination in
Afghanistan and streamlining of the foreign representative structure there.
For more information on UNAMA, see CRS Report R40747, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan:
Background and Policy Issues, by Rhoda Margesson.

U.S. Efforts to Expand and Reform Central Government/Corruption
U.S. policy has been to expand governance throughout the country, a policy that is receiving
increased U.S. financial and advisory resources under the Obama Administration. However, in
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part because building the central government has gone slowly and because official corruption is
widespread, there has been a U.S. shift, predating the Obama Administration, away from reliance
only on strengthening central government toward promoting local governance. Some argue that,
in addition to offering the advantage of bypassing an often corrupt central government, doing so
is more compatible with Afghan traditions of local autonomy. These issues are discussed in
greater detail in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government
Performance
.
Since its formation in late 2001, Karzai’s government has grown in capabilities and size, although
more slowly than expected, particularly outside Kabul. At the same time, the key security
ministries have come to be progressively dominated by ethnic Pashtuns, who have traditionally
governed Afghanistan. However, most of the Pashtuns in top positions are Ghilzai Pashtuns,
fueling suspicions are resentment among the Durrani Pashtuns (Karzai is one of them) who
believe it is the right of the Durranis to rule Afghanistan.
U.S. Embassy officers in Kabul told CRS in October 2009 that, at least among the economic
ministries, Karzai has “the best cabinet he has had in eight years.” Most of these ministers were
retained in the December 19 cabinet presentation, and, of those, almost all were confirmed in the
January 2, 2010, National Assembly vote, even as almost all of the other ministers were vetoed.
Others note progress on little known initiatives, such as civil service reform and the Sivil Service
Commission, which has developed clear government position descriptions, performance criteria,
pay and bonus criteria, and other formal procedures. The U.S. efforts to help the Commission,
particularly its goal of training about 13,000 additional bureaucrats, are discussed in the State
Department civilian strategy document issued in January 2010, and in CRS Report RS21922,
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by Kenneth Katzman.
Marginalization of Regional Strongmen
A key to U.S. strategy, particularly during 2002-2006, was to strengthen the central government
by helping Karzai curb key regional strongmen and local militias—whom some refer to as
“warlords.” These actors controlled much of Afghanistan after the Taliban regime disintegrated in
late 2001, but there was a decision by the international community to build an accountable
government rather than leave Afghanistan in the hands of local militias. These forces often
arbitrarily administer justice and use their positions to enrich themselves and their supporters.
Karzai has marginalized some of the largest regional leaders, but he is criticized by some human
rights groups and international donors for continuing to tolerate or rely on others to keep order in
some areas, particularly in non-Pashtun inhabited parts of Afghanistan (the north and west).
Karzai’s view is that maintaining ties to ethnic and regional faction leaders has prevented the
emergence of ethnic conflict that would detract from the overall effort against the Taliban.
CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance discusses
Karzai’s efforts to engage and simultaneously weaken such figures as Abd al-Rashid Dostam, the
Uzbek leader from northern Afghanistan; Ismail Khan, a Tajik leader of western Afghanistan; UF
military strongman Muhammad Fahim; Balkh Province Governor Atta Mohammad Noor, and
various Pashtun leaders, such as Nangarhar Governor Ghul Agha Shirzai.
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Anti-Corruption Efforts
An accelerating trend in U.S. policy—and emphasized in both major Obama Administration
strategy reviews—is to press Karzai to weed out official corruption. U.S. officials believe that rife
corruption in the Afghan government is undermining U.S. domestic support for the U.S. mission
in Afghanistan, and causing the Afghan population to sour on the Karzai government. In reported
conversations with President Karzai during his visit to Afghanistan on March 28, 2010, President
Obama told Karzai that he must move decisively against official corruption. Observers close to
Karzai say that the public U.S. upbraiding may have contributed to Karzai’s subsequent
comments in late March and early April accusing the international community of undermining the
sovereignty of the Afghan government. U.S. anti-corruption and rule of law efforts are discussed
extensively in the “Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy” issued by
Ambassador Holbrooke’s office in January 2010, referenced above. These issues are also
discussed in far greater detail in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and
Government Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman.
Enhancing Local Governance
As emphasized in the January 2010 Holbrooke strategy document, there has been a major U.S.
and Afghan push to build up local governance, reflecting a shift in emphasis from the 2001-2007
approach of focusing on building up central authority. The approach represents an attempt to
rebuild some of the tribal and other local structures, such as “jirgas” and “shuras”—traditional
local councils—that were destroyed in the course of constant warfare over several decades, as
well as to reduce reliance on the central government. However, the difficulties in making local
governance effective are evident, and there is a clear deficit of trained and respected local
government administrators ready or willing to serve, particularly where hostilities are ongoing.
This deficiency has hindered U.S. counter-insurgency efforts in southern Afghanistan, as
discussed further below. There is also a paucity of equipment and facilities available. According
to a September 22, 2009, quarterly U.N. report on Afghanistan, about 180 district governors
(there are 364 districts) have no offices, and 288 district governors have no official vehicle.
The Afghan leader in the effort to expand local governance has been the “Independent Directorate
of Local Governance” (IDLG), formed in August 2007 and headed by Jelani Popal (a member of
Karzai’s Popolzai clan). The IDLG reports to Karzai’s office, and its establishment was intended
to institute a systematic process for selecting capable provincial and district governors by taking
the screening function away from the Interior Ministry. The IDLG is also selecting police chiefs
and other local office holders, and in many cases has already begun removing allegedly corrupt
local officials. It has, to date, helped replace more than half of Afghanistan’s 34 governors and
aspires to replace at least 30% of the 364 district governors, either for alleged corruption or for
ineffectiveness. Major municipalities have appointed mayors (there are at least 42 mayors in
Afghanistan) and there are plans to hold municipal elections for these offices at some point. A
draft “subnational governance policy” was approved by the Afghan cabinet on March 22, 2010.
The IDLG runs the government’s “Social Outreach Program,” intended to draw closer
connections between tribes and localities to the central government by offering small payments
(about $200 per month) to tribal leaders and other participants to persuade them to inform on
Taliban insurgent movements.
According to the Holbrooke document referenced above, the U.S. effort to empower the district
leaderships is coordinated by inter-agency, civilian-military “District Development Working
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Groups.” Some U.S. civilians are working with forward deployed U.S. units as “District Support
Teams.” These teams are working with the IDLG to implement the “District Delivery Program”
intended to improve delivery of government services at the district level in the 80 districts, mostly
in the south, that are the focus of U.S./ISAF counter-insurgency operations in 2010, as discussed
below. Authority for the District Delivery Program was given to the IDLG under a March 18,
2010, Karzai decree. Another U.S. initiative to promote local governance is the “Performance-
Based Governor’s Fund.” This provides a budget to provincial governors who prove responsive to
the needs of their constituents, including reduction of narcotics cultivation.
Several districts receiving special attention to become “models” of district security and
governance are Nawa, in Helmand Province, and Baraki-Barak, in Lowgar Province, both cleared
of Taliban militants in 2009. With substantial infusions of U.S. development funds that put
sometime insurgents to work on projects (offering $5 per day to perform such tasks as cleaning
irrigation canals), these districts are, by several accounts, far more stable and secure than they
were in 2009. As part of “Operation Moshtarek” (Operation Together), launched February 13,
2010, to clear the city of Marjah of militants, a district governor (Hajji Zahir) and district
administration were selected in advance. Zahir is building up his administration now that the city
has been wrested from Taliban control, although governance there has still not expanded to the
level that was hoped. (Marjah is currently part of Nad Ali district, and is eventually to become its
own district, according to Afghan observers.)
Part of the Afghan government and international mission is to empower localities to decide on
development projects by forming local “Community Development Councils” (CDCs) that decide
on local development projects and are key to the perceived success of the “National Solidarity
Program” development program discussed later. There are about 30,000 CDCs formed. Elections
to these councils have been held in several provinces, and almost 40% of those elected have been
women.21
Human Rights and Democracy
The Administration and Afghan government claim progress in building a democratic Afghanistan
that adheres to international standards of human rights practices and deserves the support of the
Afghan people. The process of confirming Karzai’s cabinet selections in January 2010 caused
some experts to assess Afghan democracy as perhaps more vibrant than previously believed.
However, the State Department report on human rights practices for 2009 (released March 11,
2010)22 said that Afghanistan’s human rights record remained “poor,” noting in particular that the
government or its agents commit arbitrary or unlawful killings. Still, virtually all observers agree
that Afghans are freer than they were under the Taliban.
Afghan political groupings and parties are able to meet and organize freely, but there are also
abuses based on ethnicity or political factionalism and arbitrary implementation of justice by
local leaders. Since the Taliban era, numerous privately owned media outlets have opened but the
State Department say that there are growing numbers of arrests or intimidation of journalists who
criticize the central government or local leaders. Some press and other restrictions appear to

21 Khalilzad, Zalmay (then-U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan). “Democracy Bubbles Up.” Wall Street Journal, March
25, 2004.
22 For text, see http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/sca/136084.htm.
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reflect the government’s sensitivity to Afghanistan’s conservative society rather than politically
motivated action.
According to a wide variety of reports, including from the State Department, the Afghan
government is promoting the advancement of women. However, numerous abuses, such as denial
of educational and employment opportunities, continue primarily because of Afghanistan’s
conservative traditions. Overall, the security situation has caused increasing difficulties for
women and setbacks for the expansion of their rights.
The tables at the end of this report contain information on U.S. funding for democracy,
governance, rule of law and human rights, and elections support since the fall of the Taliban. Of
these, by far the largest category was “good governance,” discussed above. FY2009 and FY2010
levels, and funding earmarks for programs benefitting women and girls, are also in the tables. For
more depth on Afghanistan human rights issues, see CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics,
Elections, and Government Performance
, cited above.
Narcotics Trafficking/Insurgent Financing/Agricultural Development23
Narcotics trafficking is regarded by some as a core impediment to the U.S. mission in
Afghanistan by undermining rule of law and providing funds to the insurgency. However, it is
also an area on which there has been progress in recent years. The trafficking generates an
estimated $70 million - $100 million per year for the Taliban.
U.S. officials hope that recent progress will be sustained. A UNODC report of February 10, 2010,
continued a positive trend in reporting on this issue, noting that almost all of the 20 provinces (out
of 34 provinces in Afghanistan) in the “poppy free” category will remain that way in 2010,
although there has been backsliding in several provinces (Baghlan, Faryab and Sar-i-Pul). The
report said that further reductions in overall cultivation (such as the 22% decrease in 2009) will
probably not continue in 2010. The report adds that as many as 25 provinces may be in the
“poppy free” category by the end of 2010 if timely elimination, public awareness, and
development programs are implemented. On the other hand, some poppy growers are turning to
marijuana cultivation and trafficking, perhaps sensing less pressure on that activity, and a
September 2009 UNODC report contained ominous warnings that “narco-cartels” may be starting
to form in Afghanistan. An April 2010 UNODC expresses concern over cannabis cultivation and
trafficking—which is present in at least 17 Afghan provinces - but which receives substantially
less international attention than does the poppy cultivation and opium trafficking.24
Obama Administration policy is focusing on promoting legitimate agricultural alternatives to
poppy growing and, in conjunction, Ambassador Holbrooke announced in July 2009 that the
United States would end its prior focus on eradication of poppy fields. In this view, eradication
was driving Afghans into the arms of the Taliban as protectors of their ability to earn a living,
even if doing so is from narcotics cultivation. Encouraging alternative livelihoods has always
been the preferred emphasis of the Afghan government.

23 For a detailed discussion and U.S. funding on the issue, see CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S.
Policy
, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
24 UNPDC. Afghanistan Cannabis Survey: 2009. http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/
Afghanistan_Cannabis_Survey_2009.pdf.
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Ambassador Holbrooke has also placed additional focus on the other sources of Taliban funding,
including continued donations from wealthy residents of the Persian Gulf. He has established a
multinational task force to combat Taliban financing generally, not limited to narcotics, and U.S.
officials are emphasizing with Persian Gulf counterparts the need for cooperation.
Agricultural Development and Alternative Livelihoods
Ambassador Holbrooke, including in his January 2010 strategy document, has outlined U.S.
policy to boost Afghanistan’s agriculture sector not only to reduce drug production but also as an
engine of economic growth. Prior to the turmoil that engulfed Afghanistan in the late 1970s,
Afghanistan was a major exporter of agricultural products. According to the document, 89 U.S.
agricultural experts (64 from U.S. Department of Agriculture and 25 from USAID) are in
Afghanistan. Their efforts include providing new funds to buy seeds and agricultural equipment,
and to encourage agri-business. Some countries are promoting alternative crops and are reporting
good results from the growing of pomegranates and of saffron rice as crops that draw buyers
outside Afghanistan. Wheat production was robust in 2009 because of healthy prices for that crop,
and Afghanistan is again self-sufficient in wheat production. However, U.S. strategy has
addressed not only crop choice but also trying to construct the entirety of the infrastructure
needed for a healthy legitimate agriculture sector, including road building, security of the routes
to agriculture markets, refrigeration, storage, transit through Pakistan and other transportation of
produce, building legitimate sources of financing, and other aspects of the industry. Other policies
promote incentives; Helmand, for example, received about $10 million in good performance
funding in 2009 for a 33% cut in poppy cultivation that year. According to Afghan cabinet
members, the government also is spending funds on a “social safety net” to help wean landless
farmers away from poppy cultivation work.
The de-emphasis on eradication also put aside the long standing differences over whether to
conduct spraying of fields, particularly by air. President Karzai strongly and successfully opposed
aerial spraying when it was proposed by then Ambassador to Afghanistan William Wood in early
2007, arguing that doing so would cause a backlash among Afghan farmers. Congress sided with
Karzai’s view; the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 110-161) prohibited U.S. counter-
narcotics funding from being used for aerial spraying on Afghanistan poppy fields without
Afghan concurrence. That provision is reiterated in the FY2010 consolidated appropriation (P.L.
111-117).
Military Aspects of Counter-Narcotics
How consistently to use U.S. and NATO forces to combat narcotics is another facet under debate.
Some NATO contributors, such as Britain, have focused on interdicting traffickers and raiding
drug labs, and a Senate Foreign Relations Committee report issued in August 2009 said that U.S.
and partner military forces have put 50 major traffickers on a target list to be killed or captured.
This listing appears to be an implementation of a February 2009 modification of NATO’s posture
to one of viewing some drug traffickers as participants in the insurgency, and therefore subject to
military operations.
The U.S. military, in support of the effort after initial reluctance, is flying Afghan and U.S.
counter-narcotics agents (Drug Enforcement Agency, DEA) on missions and identifying targets; it
also evacuates casualties from counter-drug operations. The Department of Defense is also
playing the major role in training and equipping specialized Afghan counter-narcotics police, in
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developing an Afghan intelligence fusion cell, and training Afghan border police, as well as
assisting an Afghan helicopter squadron to move Afghan counter-narcotics forces around the
country. To help break up narcotics trafficking networks, the DEA presence in Afghanistan is
expected to expand from 13 agents now to 68 in September 2009, and then to 81 in 2010, with
additional agents in Pakistan.
Aid Conditionality
The Bush Administration repeatedly named Afghanistan as a major illicit drug producer and drug
transit country, but did not include Afghanistan on a smaller list of countries that have “failed
demonstrably to make substantial efforts” to adhere to international counter-narcotics agreements
and take certain counter-narcotics measures set forth in U.S. law.25 The Bush Administration
exercised waiver provisions to a required certification of full Afghan cooperation that was needed
to provide more than congressionally stipulated amounts of U.S. economic assistance to
Afghanistan. A similar certification requirement (to provide amounts over $300 million) was
contained in the FY2008 appropriation (P.L. 110-161); in the FY2009 regular appropriation, P.L.
111-8 ($200 million ceiling); and the FY2010 appropriation, P.L. 111-117, ($200 million ceiling).
The FY2009 supplemental (P.L. 111-32) withholds 10% of State Department narcotics funding
(International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, INCLE) pending a report that
Afghanistan is removing officials involved in narcotics trafficking or gross human rights
violations. No funds for Afghanistan have been held up, and the required certifications have been
issued by the Administration or apparently are pending. Narcotics trafficking control was perhaps
the one issue on which the Taliban regime satisfied much of the international community; the
Taliban enforced a July 2000 ban on poppy cultivation.26
Security Policy and Force Capacity Building27
The U.S. definition of “success” in Afghanistan, articulated since the ouster of the Taliban in late
2001, is to help build up an Afghan government and security force that can defend itself, expand
governance, and develop economically. The Obama Administration’s policy reviews in 2009
formally narrowed U.S. goals to preventing Al Qaeda from reestablishing a base in Afghanistan.
However, the policy and military tools employed by the Obama Administration in most ways
continue and even expand the nation-building goal. The December 1, 2009, speech by President
Obama stated U.S. goals as (1) to deny Al Qaeda a safe haven [in Afghanistan]; and (2) to reverse
the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. The statement
appeared to back the August 30, 2009, recommendations of now dismissed Gen. Stanley
McChrystal’s (who was the top overall commander in Afghanistan) to undertake a fully resourced
counter-insurgency mission. The focus of the mission is to be on 121 districts (out of 364 total
districts in Afghanistan) deemed restive and in which support for the Afghan government is
lowest. Of those, 80 districts are of the most intense focus.

25 Afghanistan had been so designated every year during 1987-2002.
26 Crossette, Barbara. “Taliban Seem to Be Making Good on Opium Ban, U.N. Says.” New York Times, February 7,
2001.
27 Some of the information in this section is taken from: Department of Defense. “Report on Progress Toward Security
and Stability in Afghanistan.” April 2010. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_26_10.pdf.
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The two major U.S. policy reviews did not significantly change most of the basic pillars of U.S.
and NATO security strategy that have been in place since 2001, although the emphasis of some of
these components might have shifted. The main elements include (1) combat operations and
patrols by U.S. forces and a NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to protect
the population and allow for development by international and then Afghan government forces
and civilian officials; (2) U.S. and NATO operation of “provincial reconstruction teams” (PRTs)
to serve as enclaves to facilitate the strategy; and (3) the equipping, training, and expansion of
Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). Some strategy elements that have emerged since
2008 include establishing local protection forces, and backing efforts to reintegrate Taliban
fighters and leaders who might want to end armed struggle.
Taliban, Al Qaeda, and Related Insurgents and Their Strength
As noted in General McChrystal’s August 2009 initial assessment and the Defense Department
April 2010 report cited below, security is being challenged by a confluence of related armed
groups who are increasingly well equipped and sophisticated in their tactics and operations,
particularly by using roadside bombs. (In January 2010, President Karzai issued a decree banning
importation of fertilizer chemicals commonly used for the roadside bombs. This move came one
month after international forces uncovered an extremely large cache of the chemicals.)
According to the April 2010 Defense Department report, “the insurgents perceive 2009 as their
most successful year.” However, there is not agreement about the relative strength of insurgents in
all of the areas where they operate, or their degree of cooperation with each other. Afghan and
U.S. assessments are that there are more than 20,000 total insurgents operating in Afghanistan, up
from perhaps a few thousand in 2003. Prior to U.S.-led offensives launched in July 2009, the
Karzai government was estimated by U.S. officials to control about 30% of the country, while
insurgents controlled 4% (13 out of 364 districts). Insurgents “influenced” or “operated in”
another 30% (Afghan Interior Ministry estimates in August 2009). Tribes and local groups with
varying degrees of loyalty to the central government control the remainder. Outside groups
sometimes report higher percentages of insurgent control or influence. U.S. military officers in
Kabul told CRS in October 2009 that the Taliban has named “shadow governors” in 33 out of 34
of Afghanistan’s provinces, although many provinces, such as Bamiyan, Faryab, Panjshir,
Badakshan, Takhar, and Balkh, appear to have a minimal Taliban presence.
In terms of violence, NATO officials reported in December 2009 that there were over 7,000
attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in 2009, up from 4,170 in 2008, 2,700 in 2007,
and 1,920 in 2006. IED attacks nearly doubled again in frequency in the first four months of
2010, according to the U.N. Secretary General’s report of June 16, 2010, possibly an insurgent
response to the various U.S.-led offensives during the year. There were about 310 U.S. soldiers
killed in 2009, nearly double the previous year, although U.S. offensives in Helmand in 2009
might explain that trend. Including the U.S. losses, there were about 506 total coalition deaths in
Afghanistan in 2009.
Groups: The Taliban (“Quetta Shura Taliban”)
The core of the insurgency remains the Taliban movement centered around Mullah Umar, who led
the Taliban regime during 1996-2001. Mullah Umar and many of his top advisers from their time
in power remain at large and are reportedly running their insurgency from their safe haven in
Pakistan. They are believed to be in and around the city of Quetta, according to Afghan officials,
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thus accounting for the term usually applied to Umar and his aides: “Quetta Shura Taliban”
(QST). The prime near term target of their operations is believed to be to capture Qandahar city,
the former Taliban stronghold of Qandahar.
Some believe that Umar and his inner circle blame their past association with Al Qaeda for their
loss of power and want to distance themselves from Al Qaeda. Other experts see continuing close
association that is likely to continue were the Taliban movement to return to power in
Afghanistan. On September 19, 2009, Umar issued an audiotape criticizing the Afghan elections
as fraudulent. The Taliban also threatened Afghans who voted in the August 20, 2009, elections.
However, the Taliban is suffering significant setbacks at the hands of Pakistan and the United
States. Some believe the setbacks could be turning Umar toward accepting Karzai’s public offers
to negotiate a political settlement to the conflict. Umar’s top deputy, Mullah Bradar, was arrested
in a reported joint U.S.-Pakistani operation near the city of Karachi in February 2010. Bradar’s
arrest had the potential to cause a surrender or reconciliation of several subordinate commanders,
although there is a possibility that his capture set back Afghan government-Taliban reconciliation
talks, which are discussed further below. That same month, two Taliban “shadow governors,”
including the one for Konduz, were arrested by Pakistan. It was also reported in March 2010 that
Pakistan had briefly detained another member of the Quetta Shura, Mullah Kabir, and arrested
Agha Jhan Motasim, a son-in-law of Umar.28 In recent years, other top Taliban figures, including
Mullah Dadullah, his son Mansoor, and Mullah Usmani have been killed or captured. (There were
some unconfirmed reports circulating on May 11, 2010, that Umar had been captured in
Pakistan.)
To address the losses, Umar reportedly has replaced Bradar with a young leader, Mullah Abdul
Qayyum Zakir, a U.S. detainee in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, until 2007.29 However, some reports
say other aides (most notably Mullah Ghul Agha Akhund) may not recognize Zakir and might
themselves be seeking the number two spot in the organization. The Taliban has several official
spokespersons still at large, including Qari Yusuf Ahmadi and Zabiullah Mujahid, and it operates
a clandestine radio station, “Voice of Shariat” and publishes videos. Two members of the Quetta
Shura, Mullah Hassan Rahmani, former Taliban governor of Qandahar, and Mullah Afghan Tayib,
another spokesman, are said to be the focus of increased Pakistani pressure.
The Taliban of Afghanistan are increasingly linked politically and operationally to Pakistani
Taliban militants. The Pakistani Taliban are primarily seeking to challenge the government of
Pakistan, but they facilitate the transiting into Afghanistan of Afghan Taliban and support the
Afghan Taliban goals of recapturing Afghanistan. The Pakistani Taliban may also be seeking to
target the United States, based on a failed bombing in New York in May 2010.
Al Qaeda/Bin Laden Whereabouts
U.S. commanders say that Al Qaeda militants are facilitators of militant incursions into
Afghanistan rather than active participants in the Afghan insurgency. U.S. National Security
Adviser James Jones said on CNN on October 4, 2009, that the “maximum estimate” of Al Qaeda
fighters in Afghanistan itself is less than 100, with no bases there.30 Small numbers of Al Qaeda

28 Filkins, Dexter and Pir Zubair Shah. “After Arrests, Taliban Promote a Fighter.” New York Times, March 25, 2010.
29 Ibid.
30 CNN “State of the Union” program. October 4, 2009.
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members—including Arabs, Uzbeks, and Chechens—have been captured or killed in battles in
Afghanistan itself, according to U.S. commanders.
Al Qaeda’s top leadership has eluded U.S. forces in Afghanistan and other efforts in Pakistan. In
December 2001, in the course of the post-September 11 major combat effort, U.S. Special
Operations Forces and CIA operatives reportedly narrowed Osama bin Laden’s location to the
Tora Bora mountains in Nangarhar Province (30 miles west of the Khyber Pass), but the Afghan
militia fighters who were the bulk of the fighting force did not prevent his escape. Some U.S.
military and intelligence officers (such as Gary Berntsen and Dalton Fury, who have written
books on the battle) have questioned the U.S. decision to rely mainly on Afghan forces in this
engagement.
Bin Laden and his close ally Ayman al-Zawahiri are presumed to be on the Pakistani side of the
border. From this redoubt, these leaders are widely believed to continue to be looking for ways to
attack the U.S. homeland or U.S. allies and continuing to issue audio statements threatening such
attacks. While there have been no recent public indications that U.S. or allied forces have learned
or are close to learning bin Laden’s location, a U.S. strike reportedly missed Zawahiri by a few
hours in the village of Damadola, Pakistan, in January 2006, suggesting that there was
intelligence on his movements.31
Among other efforts, a strike in late January 2008, in an area near Damadola, killed Abu Laith al-
Libi, a reported senior Al Qaeda figure who purportedly masterminded, among other operations,
the bombing at Bagram Air Base in February 2007 when Vice President Cheney was visiting. In
August 2008, an airstrike was confirmed to have killed Al Qaeda chemical weapons expert Abu
Khabab al-Masri, and two senior operatives allegedly involved in the 1998 embassy bombings in
Africa reportedly were killed by a Predator strike in January 2009.
These strikes have become more frequent under President Obama, indicating that the
Administration sees the tactic as effective in preventing attacks. Unmanned vehicle strikes are
also increasingly used on the Afghanistan battlefield itself and against Al Qaeda affiliated
militants in such countries as Yemen.
Hikmatyar Faction
Another “high value target” identified by U.S. commanders is the faction of former mujahedin
party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, HIG) allied with Al Qaeda and
Taliban insurgents. As noted above, Hikmatyar was one of the main U.S.-backed mujahedin
leaders during the Soviet occupation era. Hikmatyar’s fighters—once instrumental in the U.S.-
supported war against the Soviet Union, are most active in Kunar, Nuristan, Kapisa, and
Nangarhar provinces, north and east of Kabul. On February 19, 2003, the U.S. government
formally designated Hikmatyar as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist,” under the authority
of Executive Order 13224, subjecting it to financial and other U.S. sanctions. (It is not designated
as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization.”) Table 6 contains estimated numbers of HIG.
While U.S. commanders continue to battle Hikmatyar’s militia, on March 22, 2010, both the
Afghan government and Hikmatyar representatives confirmed they were in talks in Kabul,

31 Gall, Carlotta and Ismail Khan. “U.S. Drone Attack Missed Zawahiri by Hours.” New York Times, November 10,
2006.
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including meetings with Karzai. Hikmatyar has expressed a willingness to discuss a cease-fire
with the Karzai government since 2007, and some of Karzai’s key allies in the National Assembly
are former members of Hikmatyar’s mujahedin party. In January 2010, he outlined specific
conditions for a possible reconciliation with Karzai, including elections under a neutral caretaker
government following a U.S. withdrawal. These conditions are unlikely to be acceptable to
Karzai or the international community, although many of them might be modified or dropped.
Some close to Hikmatyar apparently attended the consultative peace loya jirga on June 2-4, 2010,
which discussed the reconciliation issue, as analyzed further below.
Haqqani Faction
Another militant faction, cited in McChrystal’s assessment, is the “Haqqani Network” led by
Jalaludin Haqqani and his eldest son, Siraj (or Sirajjudin). Jalaludin Haqqani, who served as
Minister of Tribal Affairs in the Taliban regime of 1996-2001, is believed closer to Al Qaeda than
to the ousted Taliban leadership in part because one of his wives is purportedly Arab. The group
is active around its key objective, Khost city, capital of Khost Province. The Haqqani network
may have been responsible for the January 18, 2010, attacks in Kabul that prompted four hours of
gun battles with Afghan police in locations near the presidential palace.
U.S. officials say they are continuing to pressure the Haqqani network. Haqqani property inside
Pakistan has been repeatedly targeted since September 2008 by U.S. aerial drone strikes. Siraj’s
brother, Mohammad, was reportedly killed by a U.S. unmanned vehicle strike in late February
2010, although Mohammad was not thought to be a key militant commander. There is a
substantial body of opinion that Pakistan sees the Haqqani network as part of a reconciled
political structure in Afghanistan that would protect Pakistan’s interests and work to limit the
influence of India. This view was emphasized in a New York Times story of June 25, 2010.32
Table 6 contains estimated numbers of Haqqani fighters.
Pakistani Groups
There are growing observations that some Pakistani groups are increasingly involved in the
Afghanistan conflict. These include the Pakistani Taliban, which purportedly made an incursion
into Afghanistan’s Kunar Province itself in early June 2010. Another group said to be increasingly
active inside Afghanistan is Laskhar-e-Tayyiba (LET, or Army of the Righteous), an Islamist
militant group that has previously been focused on operations against Indian control of Kashmir.
These groups might see a Taliban recapture of Afghanistan’s government as helpful to the
prospects for these groups inside Pakistan or in their Kashmir struggle.
The U.S. Military Effort
The large majority of U.S. troops in Afghanistan are under NATO/ISAF command. The remainder
are part of the post-September 11 anti-terrorism mission Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
There are also Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan under a separate command. Gen. Stanley
McChrystal was commander of NATO/ISAF (COMISAF) and U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-
A) until June 23, 2010. His deputy is Maj. Gen. David Rodriguez, who heads a NATO-approved

32 Jane Perlez, Eric Schmitt, and Carlotta Gall, "Pakistan Is Said to Pursue Foothold in Afghanistan," The New York
Times
, June 24, 2010.
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“Intermediate Joint Command” focused primarily on day-to-day operations and located at Kabul
International Airport.
The ISAF/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan commander reports not only to NATO but, through U.S.
channels, to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM, headed as of October 31, 2008, by General
David Petraeus, who has been named to replace McChrystal). As noted above, in line with efforts
to boost the civilian side of the joint counter-insurgency strategy, NATO has appointed a Senior
Civilian Representative (UK Ambassador Mark Sedwill) to serve alongside Gen. McChrystal.
Some May 2010 press reports indicate that U.S. Ambassador Eikenberry sought that role
concurrently, but that McChrystal and the Obama Administration broadly did not support him.
Whether under NATO or OEF, many U.S. forces in Afghanistan are in eastern Afghanistan and
lead Regional Command East of the NATO/ISAF operation. These U.S. forces belong to
Combined Joint Task Force 101 (as of June 2010), which is commanded by Maj. Gen. John
Campbell. He replaced Maj. Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, who commanded the 82nd Airborne Division.
The key restive provinces in the RC-E are Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Kunar, Kapisa, Wardak,
Lowgar, Nangarhar, and Nuristan.
Helmand, Qandahar, Uruzgan, Zabol, Nimruz, and Dai Kundi provinces constitute “Regional
Command South (RC-S),” a command formally transferred to NATO/ISAF responsibility on July
31, 2006. U.S. forces have not led RC-S; the command is rotated among Britain, the Netherlands,
and Canada. However, the growing U.S. troop strength in RC-S prompted a May 23, 2010, NATO
decision to bifurcate RC-S, with the United States to lead a “southwest” subdivision focused on
Helmand and Nimruz. This is an evolution of the growing U.S. involvement in RC-S since 2008.
U.S. Efforts in the First Five Post-Taliban Years
During 2001-mid-2006, U.S. forces and Afghan troops fought relatively low levels of insurgent
violence. The United States and Afghanistan conducted “Operation Mountain Viper” (August
2003); “Operation Avalanche” (December 2003); “Operation Mountain Storm” (March-July
2004) against Taliban remnants in and around Uruzgan province, home province of Mullah Umar;
“Operation Lightning Freedom” (December 2004-February 2005); and “Operation Pil”
(Elephant)in Kunar Province in the east (October 2005). By late 2005, U.S. and partner
commanders appeared to believe that the combat, coupled with overall political and economic
reconstruction, had virtually ended any insurgency. As a result, NATO/ISAF assumed lead
responsibility for security in all of Afghanistan during 2005-2006.
Violence increased significantly in mid-2006, particularly in the east and the south, where ethnic
Pashtuns predominate. The increase in violence surprised some U.S. commanders and officials.
Reasons for the deterioration include some of those discussed above in the sections on
governance: Afghan government corruption; the absence of governance or security forces in
many rural areas; the safe haven enjoyed by militants in Pakistan; the reticence of some NATO
contributors to actively combat insurgents; civilian casualties caused by NATO and U.S. military
operations; and the slow pace of economic development. Many Afghans are said to have turned to
the Taliban as a source of impartial and rapid justice, in contrast to the slow and corrupt processes
instituted by the central government.
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Perception of Deterioration and Growing Force Levels in 2007 and 2008
The key theater of intensified combat—where many of the factors sustaining insurgency
converge, such as proximity to Pakistan, widespread drug trafficking, limited and poor Afghan
governance—has been eastern and southern Afghanistan. The provinces that are particularly
restive include Helmand and Qandahar provinces. NATO counter-offensives in 2006 were only
temporary successes, including such operations as Operation Mountain Lion, Operation Mountain
Thrust, and Operation Medusa (August-September 2006, in Panjwai district of Qandahar
Province). Later, British forces—who believe in negotiated local solutions—entered into an
agreement with tribal elders in the Musa Qala district of Helmand Province, under which they
would secure the main town of the district themselves. That strategy failed when the Taliban took
over Musa Qala town in February 2007. A NATO offensive in December 2007 retook it, although
there continue to be recriminations between the Britain, on the one side, and the United States and
Karzai, on the other, over the wisdom of the British deal.
As a further response, NATO and OEF forces tried to apply a more integrated strategy involving
preemptive combat, increased development work, and a more streamlined command structure.
Major combat operations in 2007 included U.S. and NATO attempted preemption of an
anticipated Taliban “spring offensive” (“Operation Achilles,” March 2007) in the Sangin district
of Helmand Province, around the Kajaki dam, and Operation Silicon (May 2007), also in
Helmand.
In addition, the United States and its partners decided to increase force levels. U.S. troop levels
started 2006 at about 30,000, and climbed slightly to about 32,000 by December 2008, and about
39,000 by April 2009. Partner forces were increased significantly as well, by about 6,000 during
this time, to a total of about 39,000 at the end of 2009 (rough parity between U.S. and no-U.S.
forces). Many of the U.S. forces deployed in 2008 and 2009 were Marines that deployed to
Helmand, which had fallen almost totally out of coalition control since 2006.
Despite the additional resources put into Afghanistan, throughout 2008, growing concern took
hold within and outside the Bush Administration. Within the Administration, the pessimism was
reflected in such statements as one in September 2008 by Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Admiral
Mike Mullen that “I’m not sure we’re winning” in Afghanistan. These assessments comport with
a reported U.S. intelligence estimate on Afghanistan, according to the New York Times (October 9,
2008), that described Afghanistan as in a “downward spiral”—language used also by Gen.
Petraeus.
Several other major incidents that shook U.S. and partner confidence in 2008 included (1)
expanding Taliban operations in provinces where it had not previously been active, particularly
Lowgar, Wardak, and Kapisa, close to Kabul; (2) high-profile attacks in Kabul against well-
defended targets, such as the January 14, 2008, attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul and the July
7, 2008, suicide bombing at the gates of the Indian Embassy in Kabul, killing more than 50; (3)
the April 27, 2008, assassination attempt on Karzai during a military parade celebrating the ouster
of the Soviet Union; (4) a June 12, 2008, Sarposa prison break in Qandahar (several hundred
Taliban captives were freed, as part of an emptying of the 1,200 inmates there); (5) a July 13,
2008, attack on a U.S. outpost in Nuristan Province that killed nine U.S. soldiers; and (6) an
August 18, 2008, attack that killed 10 French soldiers near Sarobi, 30 miles northeast of Kabul.
Contradicting the highly negative assessments, NATO/ISAF commander U.S. Gen. David
McKiernan, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan during June 2008-May 2009, asserted that
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70% of the violence in Afghanistan was occurring in only 10% of Afghanistan’s 364 districts, an
area including about 6% of the Afghan population.
In mid-late 2008, Gen. McKiernan submitted a request for about 30,000 additional U.S. troops
(beyond the approximately 35,000 there at the time of the request). The figure included about
4,000 trainers to expand Afghan forces. In fulfilling some of that request, an additional 5,000 U.S.
forces deployed to Lowgar and Wardak provinces in January 2009, sites of deterioration. U.S.
force levels in Afghanistan reached about 39,000 by April 2009. However, as the U.S. presidential
election approached, a decision on whether to fulfill the entire request was deferred to the next
Administration.
Obama Administration Strategy Reviews and Further Buildup
In September 2008, it was reported that both the U.S. military and NATO were conducting a
number of different strategy reviews. One review was headed by Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute, the Bush
Administration’s senior adviser on Iraq and Afghanistan (who was kept on under the Obama
Administration); others were conducted by the Department of Defense, by CENTCOM, by
NATO, and by the State Department. These reviews were completed and briefed to the incoming
Obama Administration.
The Obama Administration, which stated that Afghanistan needed to be given a higher priority
than it was during the Bush Administration, integrated the reviews into an overarching 60-day
inter-agency “strategy review.” It was chaired by South Asia expert Bruce Riedel and co-chaired
by Ambassador Holbrooke and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy.
Ministers from Afghanistan and Pakistan visited Washington, DC, during February 23-27, 2009,
as part of the review, and reached agreement to hold regular trilateral meetings (U.S.,
Afghanistan, Pakistan). The latest, which included the presidents of both Afghanistan and
Pakistan, took place during May 4-7, 2009.
March 27, 2009, Policy Announcement and Command Change
President Obama announced a “comprehensive” strategy on March 27, 2009.33 In conjunction, he
announced the deployment of an additional 21,000 U.S. forces, of which about 4,000 would be
trainers. Shortly after the announcement, the Administration decided that U.S. military leadership
in Afghanistan was insufficiently innovative. On May 11, 2009, Secretary of Defense Gates and
Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Michael Mullen announced that Gen. McKiernan had been asked
to resign and Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, considered an innovative commander as head of U.S.
special operations from 2003 to 2008, was named his successor. He assumed command on June
15, 2009.

33 “White Paper”: http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf.
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McChrystal Initial Assessment and Strategy Concept
Gen. McChrystal, after assuming command, began and completed an assessment of the security
situation and laid out his vision of a new strategy. His initial assessment was submitted on August
30, 2009, and presented to NATO on August 31, 2009.34 The main elements are as follows:
• That the goal of the U.S. military should be to protect the population—and to
help the Afghan government take steps to earn it the trust of the population—
rather than to search and combat Taliban concentrations. Indicators such as ease
of road travel and normal life for families are more important indicators of
success than are counts of numbers of enemy fighters killed.
• That there is potential for “mission failure” unless a fully resourced,
comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy is pursued and reverses Taliban
momentum within 12-18 months.
• Related to the assessment, McChrystal reportedly requested about 44,000
additional U.S. combat troops—which he reportedly believed was needed to have
the greatest chance for his strategy’s success—beyond those approved by the
Obama Administration strategy review in March 2009. His request for more
resources apparently included additional trainers for the Afghan forces.
Some of the data supporting McChrystal’s negative assessment of the security situation—and his
recommendations—included Taliban gains in Konduz, Farah, and other areas that previously
were relatively peaceful, as well as high U.S. casualties (about 45-55 per month in mid-late
2009). McChrystal’s report took particular note of Taliban gains in and around Qandahar. A high-
profile attack there on August 25, 2009, killing about 40 persons, shook confidence substantially,
and there have been several high profile assassinations, attacks, and incidents of intimidation of
the population since then.
Second High Level Strategy Review and Debate Over Further Force Increases
The McChrystal assessment set off another debate within the Administration and Congress. In
September 2009, the Administration began a second high-level review of U.S. strategy, taking
into account the McChrystal report, the marred August 20, 2009, presidential election, and other
developments. During the review, President Obama met briefly with Gen. McChrystal on October
2, 2009, following a speech in London (to the International Institute for Strategic Studies) in
which McChrystal advocated adoption of the recommendations in his August 30 report.
In the debate on strategy, some senior U.S. officials, such as National Security Adviser Jones,
asserted that the situation in Afghanistan might not be as urgent as McChrystal suggested. Others,
such as Secretary of Defense Gates, were concerned that adding many more U.S. forces could
create among the Afghan people a sense of “occupation” that could prove counter-productive.
Some Members of Congress, including Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin,
said that the U.S. focus should be on expanding Afghan security forces capabilities before
sending additional U.S. forces.

34 Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan.
“Commander’s Initial Assessment.” August 30, 2009, available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?
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The high-level review included at least nine high-level meetings, chaired by President Obama,
and reportedly concluded on/about November 19, 2009. The President announced his decisions in
a speech at West Point military academy on December 1, 2009, and further elaborations were
made by Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, and Joint Chiefs Chairman Mullen during December
2-11, 2009.35 The major features of the December 1 statement included the following:
• That 30,000 additional U.S. forces (plus an unspecified number of additional
“enablers”) would be sent to “reverse the Taliban’s momentum” and strengthen
the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government so that they can
take the lead. U.S. military officials, including Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman
Mullen (February 2, 2010), have since indicated the 30,000, of whom about
almost 25,000 have arrived, would all be in place by late summer-early fall of
2010. U.S. force levels will reach about 104,000 when all forces have arrived.
• That there would be a transition, beginning in July 2011, to Afghan leadership of
the stabilization effort. This is the policy element that has caused significant
controversy, as discussed further below. The pace and scope of the transition is to
be determined as a consequence of another review of the battlefield situation to
be completed by December 2010.
Second Command Change/McChrystal Ousted
On June 23, 2010, President Obama accepted the resignation of Gen. McChrystal after
summoning him to Washington, DC, to discuss the comments by him and his staff to a reporter
for Rolling Stone (article cited earlier) that disparaged virtually all the civilian figures involved in
Afghanistan policy. He named Gen. Petraeus as Gen. McChrystal’s successor, a move that
appeared to reassure President Karzai and that some believe might foreshadow changes on the
civilian side of policy. In a June 23, 2010, statement in the Rose Garden, President Obama
attributed the change purely to the disrespect of civilian authority contained in the Rolling Stone
comments, and stated that Afghanistan policy was not at issue and would not change.
Summary of Policy Decisions and U.S. Strategy
The major outlines of Obama Administration strategy have taken shape as follows.
Key Goals: (1) disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan to degrade
their ability to launch international terrorist attacks; (2) promote a more capable,
accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan; (3) develop self-reliant
Afghan security forces; and (4) involve the international community to actively
assist in addressing these objectives. These relatively targeted goals are in line
with comments by President Obama that he wants to “finish the job” in
Afghanistan during his presidency.
Strategy Definition: The overall strategy is intended to “clear, hold, build, and
transition”—to protect the population and allow time for governance and
economic development to take root.

35 President Obama speech, op. cit. Testimony of Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, and Admiral Mullen before the
Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. December 2, 2009.
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Transition/July 2011 Date: The Obama Administration emphasis on transition to
Afghan security leadership beginning in July 2011 has been interpreted by some
Administration officials—and by some Afghan and regional leaders—as laying
the groundwork for winding down U.S. involvement in coming years.36 However,
Defense Department officials, including in testimony before the Senate and
House Armed Services Committees during June 15-16, 2010, have asserted any
withdrawal would be subject to conditions on the ground, as assessed by DOD in
ongoing reviews and a more extensive assessment to be completed by December
2010. In a press conference on June 24, 2010, President Obama said “we didn’t
say we’d be switching off the lights and closing the door behind us [in July
2011]. What we said is we’d begin a transition phase in which the Afghan
government is taking on more and more responsibility.” The Administration
asserts that the July 2011 date was stipulated in order to “focus” the Afghans to
take ownership of the effort more quickly. As a step in this direction, on April 23,
2010, NATO adopted a plan to put Afghan forces in the lead role in some of the
less restive German-led northern sector (provinces such as Badakshan, Takhar,
Balkh, and Faryab) some time in 2010, and fully transition them in 2011. Some
provinces in the U.S.-led eastern sector, such as Panjshir or Bamiyan, could be
turned over in 2011, with Nangarhar considered a candidate for turnover
thereafter.
Resources and Troops: Sufficient resources are being provided to the Afghanistan
effort, which U.S. officials say were lacking during the Bush Administration.
Pressing the Afghan Government: The Karzai government is to be held to
account for its performance, although, as noted, no specific penalties or
alterations have been specified for government shortcomings. Criticism of his
government was highly muted during the May 10-14, 2010, Karzai visit to
Washington, DC.
Civilian “Uplift”: A key part of the effort is to develop Afghan institutions not
only in the central government but particularly at the provincial and local levels.
To be effective, the number of U.S. civilian advisors in Afghanistan reached
about 1,000 in early 2010 and is to rise another 300 in 2010. Of these about 350
are serving outside Kabul to build local governance and development in various
initiatives such as 32 District Support Teams and other District Working Groups.
That is up from 67 outside Kabul in early 2009.
Civilian-Military Integration: There is a commitment to civilian-military
integration, as outlined in a DOD-State Department joint campaign plan and
Ambassador Holbrooke’s January 2010 strategy document, referenced earlier.
High level “Senior Civilian Representatives” have been appointed to help the
military formulate strategy for the regional commands where they serve. This is
part of a new “Interagency Provincial Affairs” initiative that is less military-

36 Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan.
“Commander’s Initial Assessment.” August 30, 2009, available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf. White House. Remarks by the President In Address to the Nation on the
Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. December 1, 2009; Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “Differing Views of New
Afghanistan Strategy.” Washington Post, December 26, 2009.
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focused. (For more information, see CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics,
Elections, and Government Performance
.)
Reintegration: As discussed later, the Administration supports Afghan efforts to
provide financial and social incentives to persuade insurgents to lay down their
arms and accept the Afghan constitution.
Pakistan: Engagement with Pakistan and enlisting its increased cooperation is
pivotal to U.S. policy. More information is in the section on Pakistan, below, and
in CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
International Dimension: New international diplomatic mechanisms were formed
to better coordinate all “stakeholders” in the Afghanistan issue (NATO,
Afghanistan’s neighbors, other countries in Afghanistan’s region, the United
Nations, and other donors). Meetings such as the January 28, 2010, meeting in
London on Afghanistan are one part of that effort. To date, at least 25 nations
have appointed direct counterparts to Holbrooke, including the UAE, Saudi
Arabia, and Turkey.
Partner Contributions: Increased partner contributions of funding and troops are
sought, and efforts—unsuccessful to date—are being made to try to persuade
those partners who have announced future withdrawals (Canada, the
Netherlands) to overturn those decisions.
Metrics: The Administration will continue to measure progress along clear
metrics. Many in Congress, pressing for clear metrics to assess progress, inserted
into P.L. 111-32 (FY2009 supplemental appropriation) a requirement that the
President submit to Congress, 90 days after enactment (by September 23, 2009),
metrics by which to assess progress, and a report on that progress every 180 days
thereafter. The Administration’s approximately 50 metrics were reported at the
website of Foreign Policy37 and were submitted. However, the difficulty in
formulating useful and clear metrics that would enable Members and officials to
assess progress in the war effort was demonstrated by comments by Ambassador
Holbrooke on August 12, 2009, saying that on defining success in Afghanistan
and Pakistan: “We will know it when we see it.”38 In its September 22, 2009,
report on the situation in Afghanistan (A/64/364-S/2009/475), the United Nations
developed its own “benchmarks” for progress in Afghan governance and security.
Implementation, Early Results, and Doubts
In early 2010, the United States and its partners began to implement the McChrystal strategy,
which purportedly will be continued as is by Gen. Petraeus, although there may be the potential
for modification when Petraeus arrives in Afghanistan. The April 2010 Defense Department
report, referenced earlier, states that “The continuing decline in stability in Afghanistan, described
in the last report, has leveled off in many areas.” However, the report added that support for the
Afghan government in the 121 districts identified as the most restive remains very low, although
many residents are “on the fence” awaiting signs that the coalition and Afghan government will

37 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/16/evaluating_progress_in_afghanistan_pakistan.
38 Schmitt, Eric. “White House Is Struggling to Measure Success in Afghanistan”. New York Times, August 7, 2009.
Comments by Ambassador Holbrooke at seminar hosted by the Center for American Progress. August 12, 2009.
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produce security and other signs of progress. That the strategy has not, to date, produced
unambiguous positive results has caused concern among some Members of Congress, partner
countries, opinion leaders, and others. These doubts were reinforced by comments by ousted
Afghan Intelligence Director Amrollah Saleh on June 11, 2010, that Karzai has begun to doubt
U.S. resolve and might be looking to settle the conflict through a “deal” with Pakistan and its
Afghan proxies39. Defense Secretary Gates said in testimony during June 15-16, 2010, that the
full “surge” forces are not yet in place and it is too early to assess the strategy, although there is
an expectation that the strategy should show clear progress by late 2010.
On the other hand, senior U.S. military leaders say that operations in 2010 have ended Taliban
control in large parts of Helmand and are creating a contiguous secure corridor for commerce
between Helmand and Qandahar. Others argue that there has been substantial progress in other
provinces and that too much attention is focused only on Helmand and Qandahar.
Even before directing his first offensives in Afghanistan, Gen. McChrystal sought to set
conditions for success by sharply limiting air strikes and some types of raids and combat that
cause Afghan civilian casualties.40 Some refer to the rules as the “Karzai 12,” referring to the
number of points of these rules of engagement. Both the Karzai government and the international
community want to prevent any recurrence of incident such as the one that occurred near Herat on
August 22, 2008, in which a NATO bomb killed up to 90 civilians. Another incident occurred in
November 2008 when an alleged 37 Afghan civilians at a wedding party were killed. A highly
significant incident occurred in early September 2009 in Konduz in which Germany’s contingent
called in an airstrike on Taliban fighters who captured two fuel trucks; several civilians were
killed in the strike as well as Taliban fighters. Such casualties had been identified by U.S. and
Afghan officials as cause for Afghan anger at the U.S.-led coalition and the Afghan government.
Some raids angered Afghans who were embarrassed because women and family members are
startled by the raids. Still, ISAF-caused civilian casualties continue, mainly due to
misunderstandings at ISAF checkpoints. One such incident, in April 2010, resulted in the
mistaken ISAF firing on a civilian bus near Qandahar, killing five Afghans.
In operations that have produced the more positive assessments of the April 2010 DOD report,
Gen. McChrystal sent the additional U.S. Marines that arrived in Helmand in June 2009 into a
major offensive on July 2, 2009—Operation Khanjar—intended to expel the Taliban and
reestablish Afghan governance in parts of the province. The offensive reportedly ended Taliban
control of several districts in Helmand, including Nawa, Now Zad, and Musa Qala. On the other
hand, in May 2010, insurgents briefly seized the remote district of Barg-i-Mital in Nuristan
province. They fled when a NATO-Afghan force moved to recapture it.
Operation Moshtarek in Marjah/Nad Ali
A more substantial operation, “Operation Moshtarek” (Operation Together), consisting of about
15,000 U.S., foreign partner, and Afghan forces (about 5,000 of the total), began on February 13,
2010, to clear Taliban militants from Marjah city (85,000 population) in Helmand. An Afghan
governing structure was identified in advance, the population had substantial warning, and there
were meetings with regional elders just before the offensive began—all of which were an

39 Dexter Filkins, "Karzai Is Said to Doubt West Can Defeat Taliban," The New York Times, June 11, 2010.
40 See CRS Report R41084, Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians, by Susan G. Chesser
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apparent effort to cause militants to flee and to limit civilian losses.41 Civilian losses occurred but
reportedly were relatively light. The city, for the most part, was declared cleared of militants as of
February 26, 2010. On March 8, 2010, Afghan President Hamid Karzai visited Marjah—the first
Afghan head of state ever to do so, according to Ambassador Holbrooke—and spoke about
government plans to address the needs of the local population, while at the same time receiving
numerous audience complaints about official corruption and other failings of the Afghan
government. However, militants continue to fight in and on the outskirts of Marjah and to
assassinate and intimidate Afghans cooperating with U.S. and Afghan forces. Some Afghan
officials, such as ministry representatives, have refused to serve inside the city itself. The
difficulties led Gen. McChrystal to call the city a “bleeding ulcer” in June 2010 and have caused
doubt about the success of the operation.
U.S. officials stress that the joint military-civilian partnership in Operation Moshtarek will
eventually bring more calm. Ambassador Holbrooke, in the CNN interview cited above, said that
a “small but high quality team” of U.S. civilians and Afghan officials have moved into Marjah to
help establish governance and economic development. In concert with their ongoing combat
operations, U.S. forces, primarily Marines, have reportedly been disbursing Commanders
Emergency Response Program (CERP-funds controlled by U.S. officers) funds to clear rubble
from schools, clean canals, repair markets, rebuild bridges, and compensate families who lost
members due to the combat. Afghans who work on these projects in Marjah and in the previously
cleared Nawa district are reportedly being paid about $5 per day as part of an effort to provide
livelihoods to Afghans who might previously have supported the Taliban for purely financial
reasons.42 Some fear that many of these workers might rejoin insurgent activities when U.S.
funding for these “cash for work” programs decline.
The Afghan governor of Marjah is Hajji Abdul Zahir, who was in exile in Germany during
Taliban rule and returned to Afghanistan after the movement’s 2001 fall from power. U.S.
officials have said that he is remaining in position because he enjoys the support of his immediate
boss, Helmand governor Ghulab Mangal, despite allegations that he was jailed while in Germany
for domestic violence. Zahir denies that he was jailed.43 However, the allegations reinforce for
some observers the difficulty the Afghan government might have in gaining the trust of the
Afghan population and the international community.
Planned Qandahar Effort
Further doubts about the U.S. mission in Afghanistan have been raised by delays and downscaling
of a planned U.S.-led operation to stabilize the key province of Qandahar. In late February 2010,
U.S. commanders and senior Obama Administration officials told journalists that initial planning
had begun for a complex offensive in the province in June 2010.44 During Defense Secretary
Gates’s visit to Afghanistan in March 2010, he reportedly reviewed planning for the Qandahar
effort with President Karzai and Gen. McChrystal. On April 3, 2010, Karzai and McChrystal
jointly visited Qandahar city to address tribal and other leaders there on the upcoming operations.

41 Holbrooke interview on CNN, March 14, 2010, op. cit.
42 Nissenbaum, Dion. “Marine Forward Operating Base Marjah Takes Root.” McClatchy Newspapers, March 16, 2010.
43 Graff, Peter. “NATO Backs Afghan Official Despite Accusation.” Reuters, March 6, 2010.
44 Kornblut, Anne and Greg Jaffe. “U.S. Begins to Lay Groundwork for Kandahar Drive.” Washington Post, February
27, 2010.
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Gen. McChrystal had emphasized that any Qandahar effort was likely to differ substantially from
Operation Moshtarek by focusing less on combat and more on conducting consultations and
shuras with tribal leaders and other notables to enlist their cooperation against Taliban infiltrators.
U.S. commanders have described the operation as more of a “process,” or a slow push into restive
districts (by setting up Afghan checkpoints to secure the city, for example) around Qandahar city
(such as Arghandab) than a more classic military offensive. Qandahar’s population is far larger
(about 1 to 2 million in the province), and Qandahar province and city have functioning
governments, which Marjah did not. The city hosts numerous businesses and is relatively vibrant,
despite some Taliban infiltration and clandestine activity. During the Gates visit in March 2010,
Gen. McChrystal told journalists that, unlike Marjah, Qandahar is not under Taliban control, but it
has been under a “menacing Taliban presence, particularly in the districts around it.”45 As part of
the effort to stabilize Qandahar U.S. officials are also reportedly trying to strengthen Governor
Tooryalai Wesa and balance the flow of U.S. and international funds to the various tribes and
clans in the province. An unstated objective is also to weaken the influence of Karzai’s brother,
Ahmad Wali Karzai, chair of the provincial council, who is discussed above.46
A sense of doubt has come from apparent resistance to any combat to secure Qandahar. To date,
the planned shuras have begun, as have reported operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces
against key militants near the city,47 and the setting up of some Afghan checkpoints. However,
some local leaders at the shuras have voiced opposition to any planned U.S.-led combat
operations so as to avoid civilian casualties and violence. As a consequence, Gen. McChrystal
said on June 10 that the operation would unfold more slowly and gradually than had been
communicated.
In addition, the Taliban has sought to disrupt the upcoming operations. On March 13, 2010, the
Taliban again demonstrated its ability to hit the city by detonating a series of bombs, including in
and around its main prison. It has assassinated the deputy governor of Qandahar city. Other
accounts say that the Taliban has begun to focus attacks on civilian contractors working for
USAID or Afghan government projects in Qandahar so as to derail governance expansion and
economic development. The attacks prompted USAID’s top official in Kabul to visit Qandahar on
April 18, 2010, to reassure Qandahar officials that USAID projects would not be abandoned.
Alternative “Counter-Terrorism” Strategy Not Adopted
During the late 2009 strategy review, some, purportedly including Vice President Joseph Biden,
favored a more limited mission for Afghanistan designed solely to disrupt Al Qaeda in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. This approach envisioned only a small increase in U.S. or other
international forces present in Afghanistan. Advocates of this approach asserted that the
government of Afghanistan is not a fully legitimate partner. Such doubts flowed from the flawed
August 20, 2009, presidential election, and purported cables from U.S. Ambassador Eikenberry
asserting that the corruption of the Karzai government necessitated conditioning more U.S. forces
on Afghan performance.

45 Bumiller, Elisabeth. Gates and Afghan Leader Review Plan for a Kandahar Offensive” New York Times, March 9,
2010.
46 Partlow, Joshua. “U.S. Seeks to Bolster Kandahar Governor, Upend Power Balance.” Washington Post, April 29,
2010.
47 “U.S. Elite Units Step Up Effort in Afghan City.” New York Times, April 26, 2010.
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However, critics of this strategy expressed the view that the Afghan government might collapse
and Al Qaeda would have safe haven again in Afghanistan if there are insufficient numbers of
U.S. forces there to protect the government.48 Others believed it would be difficult for President
Obama to choose a strategy that could jeopardize the stability of the Afghan government, after
having defined Afghan security and stability as a key national interest in his March 2009 strategy
announcement. Still others say that it would be difficult to identify targets to strike with
unmanned or manned aircraft unless there were sufficient forces on the ground to identify targets.
Local and Other Security Experiments Under Way
Discussed below are some additional or alternative approaches that have been in various stages of
implementation since 2008, and which enjoy general support among U.S. partners in Afghanistan.
“Reintegration” and “Reconciliation” With Insurgents
The issue of reintegration fighters and reconciling with insurgent leaders is an Afghan-led process
that was discussed extensively during the January 28, 2010, London conference and by about
1,600 delegates (about 350 were women) to a “consultative peace loya jirga held in Kabul during
June 2-4, 2010. The issue has made some in the international community concerned for the
potential to involve compromises with insurgents and perhaps some backsliding on human rights.
Most insurgents are highly conservative Islamists who agreed with the limitations in women’s
rights that characterized Taliban rule. Many leaders of ethnic minorities are also skeptical of the
effort because they fear that it might further Pashtun solidarity and political strength within
Afghanistan.
Others see these processes as the only way to end the conflict in Afghanistan. Secretary Gates, in
a January 2010 trip to the region, said the Taliban is “part of the political fabric of Afghanistan”—
an indication that the United States has shifted toward accepting at least some of these approaches
as part of overall strategy. The United States and the Karzai government appear to agree that
fighters and insurgent commanders could only be reintegrated if they: surrender their arms;
accept the Afghan constitution; and sever any ties to Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
Reintegration/”Peace Jirga”
The January 28, 2010, London conference, in general, backed devoting more emphasis to
reintegration of fighters amenable to surrendering. Britain, Japan, and several other countries
announced a total of about $160 million in donations to a new fund to support the reintegration
process.49 Some of the incentives to surrendering insurgents that the international community
deemed likely to fund are jobs, amnesty, and protection, and possibly making them part of the
security architecture for their communities. These are elements included in a reintegration plan
drafted by the Afghan government and presented to the peace loya jirga during June 2-4, 2010.50

48 Ibid.
49 See: http://afghanistan.hmg.gov.uk/en/conference/contributions/.
50 Afghanistan National Security Council. “Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program.” April 2010.
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In its final declaration, the jirga backed the plan, but also called for limits in NATO-led raids and
further efforts to limit civilian casualties. It also called for the release of some detained insurgents
where allegations against them are weak. The day after the jirga concluded, Karzai sought to
implement that recommendation by calling for a review of the cases of all insurgent detentions.
After the jirga, according to testimony by Defense Under Secretary Michele Flournoy on June
15-16, 2010, some success were in evidence, including the “surrender” by 80-90 insurgents in the
Shindand area of Herat Province.
Although it reached some substantive conclusions, the jirga itself received mixed reviews for its
inclusiveness or lack thereof. Karzai tried to bring other minority communities along in backing
the peace jirga and the reintegration process, and to do so he appointed former leader Rabbani to
chair the jirga. However, “opposition leader” Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, Karzai’s rival in the 2009
presidential election, boycotted the jirga. Taliban attacks on the first day of the jirga served as the
public justification for the subsequent resignation of intelligence director Saleh and Interior
Minister Atmar, discussed above.
To implement these efforts from the international perspective, in November 2009, ISAF set up a
“force reintegration cell,” headed by Britain’s Maj. Gen. Richard Barrons, to develop additional
programs and policies to accelerate the effort to cause insurgents to change sides. These strategies
are similar to what was employed in Anbar Province in Iraq in 2006 and 2007.
The Obama Administration has been expanding U.S. efforts to lure lower level insurgents off the
battlefield with job opportunities and infrastructure construction incentives. Another component
of the program has been meetings with tribal elders to persuade Taliban and other insurgents in
their areas to give up their fight. Some U.S. commanders are reporting some successes with this
effort, using Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds. The National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2010 (P.L. 111-84) authorizes the use of CERP funds to win local
support, to “reintegrate” Taliban fighters who renounce violence. FY2011 budget language
requested by the Administration would authorize U.S. funds to be contributed to the reintegration
fund mentioned above.
Karzai has consistently advocated talks with Taliban militants who want to consider ending their
fight. Noted above is the “Program for Strengthening Peace and Reconciliation” (referred to in
Afghanistan by its Pashto acronym “PTS”) headed by Meshrano Jirga speaker Sibghatullah
Mojadeddi and former Vice President Karim Khalili, and overseen by Karzai’s National Security
Council. The program is credited with persuading 9,000 Taliban figures and commanders to
renounce violence and join the political process.
Reconciliation With Taliban/Insurgent Leaders
A separate Karzai initiative discussed at the consultative peace jirga was negotiations with senior
insurgent leaders. This aspect of Afghan strategy is even more controversial within international
circles than reintegration because of the potential to welcome major insurgent figures, some of
whom have been allied with Al Qaeda, back into the fold. In March 2009, President Obama
publicly ruled out negotiations with Mullah Umar and his aides because of their alignment with
Al Qaeda. Secretary of Defense Gates said on March 24, 2010, that “the shift in momentum
[toward the United States] is not yet strong enough to convince the Taliban leaders that they are in
fact going to lose.” However, then British Foreign Secretary David Miliband came out in full
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support of the concept of a negotiated settlement of the conflict in a high-profile speech at M.I.T.
on March 10, 2010.51 The subsequent British government of David Cameron is believed to take a
similar position. This issue was a focus of the May 10-14, 2010, Karzai visit to the United States,
which included a meeting with President Obama on May 12.
Although the Taliban as a movement was not invited to the June 2-4, 2010, consultative peace
jirga, some Taliban sympathizers reportedly were there, and Karzai has said he is open to
potential talks to reconcile even high-level leaders such as Mullah Umar. One press report,
quoting figures around Umar, says Umar might be willing to enter into direct talks with the
Afghan government—this is the first indication, if accurate, that Umar might be willing to
reconcile.52 In advance of the peace jirga, the Karzai government and representatives of
Hikmatyar confirmed peace talks on March 21, 2010, in which Karzai, his brother, Ahmad Wali,
and several Northern Alliance figures met with the Hikmatyar representatives. The
representatives reportedly presented a 15-point peace plan to Karzai that does not necessarily
demand his government step down immediately, and would demand a July 2010 deadline for all
foreign forces to leave Afghanistan. Karzai was reportedly angered by the Pakistani capture of
Mullah Bradar in February 2010, believing it disrupted Karzai’s efforts to reach out to the Taliban
inner circle. Although the circumstances of the arrest remain unclear, Karzai reportedly believes
that Pakistan arrested Bradar in order to be able to influence the course of any Afghan
government-Taliban settlement.
Sets of high-level talks have been taking place over the past few years, although with less
apparent momentum than is the case in 2010. Press reports said that Afghan officials (led by
Karzai’s brother Qayyum) and Taliban members had met each other in Ramadan-related
gatherings in Saudi Arabia in September 2008. Another round of talks was held in January 2009
in Saudi Arabia, and there are reports of ongoing contacts in Dubai, UAE. Some of these talks
apparently involved Arsala Rahmani, a former Taliban official now in parliament, and the former
Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan, Abdul Salam Zaeef, who purportedly is in touch with Umar’s
inner circle. The core Taliban leaders continue to demand that (1) all foreign troops leave
Afghanistan; (2) a new “Islamic” constitution be adopted; and (3) Islamic law is imposed.
Hikmatyar’s demands are somewhat less extreme, as discussed above.
The consultative peace jirga, in its final declaration, supported Karzai and his allies by calling for
the removal of the names of some Taliban figures from U.N. lists of terrorists, lists established
pursuant to Resolution 1267 and Resolution 1333 (October 15, 1999, and December 19, 2000,
both pre-September 11 sanctions against the Taliban and Al Qaeda) and Resolution 1390 (January
16, 2002). Ambassador Holbrooke, in January 2010, expressed support for removing from the
lists those Taliban figures who have since deceased or others not believed to be key Taliban-era
figures. On January 26, 2010, Russia, previously a hold-out against such a process, dropped
opposition to removing five Taliban-era figures from these sanctions lists, including Taliban-era
foreign minister Wakil Mutawwakil, who ran in 2005 parliamentary elections. Also removed was
Abdul Hakim Monib, who has served Karzai as governor of Uruzgan, and three others. “Mullah
Rocketi,” not on the sanctions list, is a former Taliban commander who ran for president in the
August 2009 elections.

51 M.I.T. Compton Lecture by U.K. Foreign Secretary David Miliband. Text at: http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-
news/?view=Speech&id=21865587.
52 Grey, Stephen. “Taliban’s Supreme Leader Signals Willingness to Talk Peace.” London Sunday Times, April 18,
2010.
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Local Security Experiments: Afghan Provincial Protection Program (APPP) and
Local Defense Initiative

Until mid-2008, U.S. military commanders opposed assisting local militias anywhere in
Afghanistan for fear of creating new rivals to the central government who would arbitrarily
administer justice. The urgent security needs in Afghanistan caused reconsideration and some
relaxation of that stance, but the same conceptual concerns about local security institutions have
held back expansion of the practice. Gen Petraeus, who is slated to take over command in
Afghanistan, is perceived as favorable toward these type of local security experiments, based on
his similar and successful experiences in Iraq.
In late 2008, the Bush Administration and Karzai government reached tentative agreement to
attempt the concept. The militia formation is intended to strengthen the ability of local
communities to keep Taliban infiltrators out. It is termed the “Afghan Provincial Protection
Program” (APPP, commonly called “AP3”) and is funded with DOD (CERP) funds. U.S.
commanders say that no U.S. weapons are supplied to the militias, but this is an Afghan-led
program and the Afghan government is providing weapons (Kalashnikov rifles) to the local
groups, possibly using U.S. funds. Participants in the program are given $200 per month.
The program got under way in Wardak Province (Jalrez district) in early 2009 and 100 local
security personnel “graduated” in May 2009. It has been expanded to 1,200 personnel, in a
province with a population of about 500,000. The program was to be expanded to Ghazni,
Lowgar, and Kapisa provinces and eventually include as many as 8,000 Afghans. However, Gen.
McChrystal put any further expansion of the program “on hold,” pending further study,53 despite
press stories since August 2009 indicate that the program might be helping quiet Wardak. That
deferral may reflect reported concerns on the part of Ambassador Eikenberry and the Afghan
government that these militias will become uncontrollable and undermine rule of law. U.S.
military commanders believe they can keep the APPP militias “under control,” because the
militias are to be integrated into the structure of the Interior Ministry, which runs the Afghan
National Police. As an indication of divisions among Afghan leaders about the concept, the upper
house of the Afghan parliament (Meshrano Jirga) passed a resolution in November 2008
opposing the concept. The National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84) calls for a report
within 120 days of enactment (October 28, 2009) on the results of the program.
Another program, the Local Defense Initiative, began in February 2010 in Arghandab district of
Qandahar Province. U.S. Special Forces organized about 25 villagers into a neighborhood watch
group, which is armed. The program was credited with bringing normal life back to the district.
Karzai has opposed plans to expand the program, on the same grounds as noted above. Other
local defense initiatives have emerged, raising similar concerns. Some problems in arbitrary
administration of justice was noted with an Afghan-supported militia that sprang up in Konduz to
help secure the northern approaches to that city (not part of the APPP).
The local security experiments to date, because they are to be under some type of national
command, are not arbokai, which are private tribal militias. Still, some believe that the arbokai
concept should be revived as a means of securing Afghanistan, as the arbokai did during the reign
of Zahir Shah and in prior pre-Communist eras.

53 Druzin, Heath. “Future Unclear For Widely Praised Afghan Militias.” Mideast Stars and Stripes, March 13, 2010.
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Reversal of Previous Efforts: DDR and DIAG programs
As noted, the local security programs appear to reverse the 2002-2007 efforts to disarm local
sources of armed force. The main program, run by UNAMA, was called the “DDR” program:
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, and it formally concluded on June 30, 2006.
The program got off to a slow start because the Afghan Defense Ministry did not reduce the
percentage of Tajiks in senior positions by a July 1, 2003, target date, dampening Pashtun
recruitment. In September 2003, Karzai replaced 22 senior Tajiks in the Defense Ministry
officials with Pashtuns, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, enabling DDR to proceed.
The DDR program was initially been expected to demobilize 100,000 fighters, although that
figure was later reduced. (Figures for accomplishment of the DDR and DIAG programs are
contained in Table 6 below.) Of those demobilized, 55,800 former fighters have exercised
reintegration options provided by the program: starting small businesses, farming, and other
options. U.N. officials say at least 25% of these found long-term, sustainable jobs. Some studies
criticized the DDR program for failing to prevent a certain amount of rearmament of militiamen
or stockpiling of weapons and for the rehiring of some militiamen.54 Part of the DDR program
was the collection and cantonment of militia weapons, but generally only poor quality weapons
were collected. As one example, Fahim, still the main military leader of the Northern Alliance
faction, continues to turn heavy weapons over to U.N. and Afghan forces (including four Scud
missiles), although the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) says that large
quantities of weapons remain in the Panjshir Valley.
The major donor for the program was Japan, which contributed about $140 million. Figures for
collected weapons are contained in Table 6 and U.S. spending on the program are in the U.S. aid
tables at the end of this report.
DIAG
Since June 11, 2005, the disarmament effort has emphasized another program called “DIAG”—
Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups. It is run by the Afghan Disarmament and Reintegration
Commission, headed by Vice President Khalili. Under the DIAG, no payments are available to
fighters, and the program depends on persuasion rather than use of force against the illegal
groups. DIAG has not been as well funded as was DDR: it has received $11 million in operating
funds. As an incentive for compliance, Japan and other donors have made available $35 million
for development projects where illegal groups have disbanded. These incentives were intended to
accomplish the disarmament of a pool of as many as 150,000 members of 1,800 different “illegal
armed groups”: militiamen that were not part of recognized local forces (Afghan Military Forces,
AMF) and were never on the rolls of the Defense Ministry. These goals were not met by the
December 2007 target date in part because armed groups in the south say they need to remain
armed against the Taliban, but UNAMA reports that some progress continues to be achieved.
Several U.S.-backed local security programs implemented since 2008, discussed below, appear to
reverse the intent and implementation of the DIAG process.


54 For an analysis of the DDR program, see Christian Dennys. Disarmament, Demobilization and Rearmament?, June
6, 2005, http://www.jca.apc.org/~jann/Documents/Disarmament%20demobilization%20rearmament.pdf.
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Table 3. The Dutch Experience in Uruzgan
The counterinsurgency strategy being pursued by Gen. McChrystal, and the policy adopted by the Obama
Administration, appears to adopt many of the techniques and policies used in Uruzgan Province by the Netherlands.
The Dutch have been the lead force there since 2006. A January 2009 DOD report on Afghanistan stability
(mandated by P.L. 110-181) noted the substantial success of the Dutch approach in Uruzgan. The Dutch approach
focuses on development work and engagement with local leaders to understand their development needs.55 In this
strategy, decisions are made jointly—or at least with extensive consultations—by the commander of the military
contingent and the Dutch civilian leader for the province, usually a relatively senior Foreign Ministry diplomat.
On March 29, 2009, the Netherlands converted its Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT, see below) in Tarin Kowt
to civilian leadership rather military leadership. Dutch officials say their projects in Uruzgan encourage the follow-on
expansion of governance, and clearly place Afghans in the lead in implementing projects, rather than on delivering
projects implemented by foreign donors. As a possible sign of success, the Netherlands has not added substantial
numbers of troops to the 1,700+ contingent that took over the peacekeeping in the province. Others say the
approach is not unique because the Netherlands relies on the Australian contingent to conduct protective combat.
Some say the approach cannot be widely applied because Uruzgan geography is not as hostile as in other provinces,
and because the Taliban insurgency is not as strong there. The province does not border Pakistan, an entry point for
insurgents.
Despite the successes, motions passed in the Dutch parliament require it to pull its military forces out of Afghanistan
by the end of 2010. The prime minister, member of one of three parties in a governing coalition, supports continuing
the mission and has tried to change parliamentary opinion. Prime Minister Balkenende’s position has been supported
by the urging of the Obama Administration that the Netherlands keep its current posture in Afghanistan. However,
his coalition collapsed in February 2010 when one of the coalition partners withdrew from the governing alliance over
its opposition to keeping Dutch troops beyond the 2010 deadline. This means that the Netherland’s decision whether
to go forward with the pullout might be subject to the outcome of elections in June 2010. Australia’s leaders have
said they do not plan to add troops when the Netherlands leaves, an indication that Australia is not willing to replace
the Netherlands as the lead force there. One possible outcome is that the Netherlands might withdraw combat
troops but send forces geared toward development, or it might deploy to areas not as combat prone as Uruzgan.

Possible Further Limits on U.S. Operations/Status of
Forces Agreement

The issue of a larger Afghan government role in approving NATO-led operations surfaced again
at the June 2-4, 2010, peace jirga, whose final declaration called for the Afghan government to
“be able to lead military operations and coordination” among international forces operating in
Afghanistan. Such sentiments arose in 2008, when the Afghan cabinet reacted to some high-
profile instances of accidental civilian deaths by demanding negotiation of a formal “Status of
Forces Agreement” (SOFA). A SOFA could spell out the combat authorities of non-Afghan
forces, and would limit the United States to airstrikes, detentions, and house raids.56
A draft SOFA—or technical agreement clarifying U.S./coalition authorities in Afghanistan—
reportedly has been under discussion between the United States and Afghanistan. U.S. forces
currently operate in Afghanistan under a “diplomatic note” between the United States and the
interim government of Afghanistan in November 2002; the agreement gives the United States
legal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel serving in Afghanistan and states the Afghan government’s
acknowledgment that U.S.-led military operations were “ongoing.”

55 Chivers, C.J. “Dutch Soldiers Stress Restraint in Afghanistan.” New York Times, April 6, 2007.
56 Gall, Carlotta. Two Afghans Lose Posts Over Attack. New York Times, August 25, 2008.
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Long-Term Security Commitment
As noted, some Afghan leaders perceive the Obama Administration’s 2011 deadline to “begin” a
transition to Afghan security leadership as a sign the Administration might want to wind down
U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. In part to reassure the Afghan government, President Obama, at
a May 12, 2010, press conference with visiting President Karzai, stated that the United States and
Afghanistan would renew a five-year-old strategic partnership.
The strategic partnership was first established on May 23, 2005, when Karzai and President Bush
issued a “joint declaration”57 providing for U.S. forces to have access to Afghan military
facilities, in order to prosecute “the war against international terror and the struggle against
violent extremism.” The joint statement did not give Karzai enhanced control over facilities used
by U.S. forces, over U.S. operations, or over prisoners taken during operations. Some of the
bases, both in and near Afghanistan, that support combat in Afghanistan, include those in Table 7.
Karzai’s signing of the partnership had been blessed by Afghan representatives on May 8, 2005,
when he summoned about 1,000 delegates to a consultative jirga in Kabul on whether to host
permanent U.S. bases. That jirga supported an indefinite presence of international forces to
maintain security but urged Karzai to delay a decision. A FY2009 supplemental appropriation
(P.L. 111-32) and the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84) prohibit the U.S.
establishment of permanent bases in Afghanistan.
Alliance Issues: The NATO-Led International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom58

President Obama’s December 1, 2009, policy speech on Afghanistan was explicit in seeking new
partner troop commitments, and pledges met or exceeded what some U.S. officials expected.
These contributions, to some extent, refuted arguments by observers that U.S. partners were
unwilling to contribute more combat troops to the Afghanistan effort, although some key
contingents are planning to end their combat missions, as discussed below.
Even those European governments committed to staying in Afghanistan are under pressure from
their publics and parliaments to end or reduce the military involvement in Afghanistan. This
pressure led Britain, France, and Germany to ask the United Nations to organize the international
conference that took place in London on January 28, 2010. The conference did, as these countries
sought, endorse the concept of transition to Afghan leadership on security and improvement of its
governance. The London conference also encouraged more regional assistance from India, China,
and Russia. The concept will be pursued again at a follow-up conference to be held in Kabul
on/about July 20, 2010, and at the NATO meeting in Lisbon in November 2010. As discussed,
most U.S. troops in Afghanistan remain under the umbrella of the NATO-led “International
Security Assistance Force” (ISAF)—consisting of all 26 NATO members states plus partner
countries.

57 See http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/afghanistan/WH/20050523-2.pdf.
58 Twelve other countries provide forces to both OEF and ISAF.
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Table 4. Background on NATO/ISAF Formation and U.N. Mandate
ISAF was created by the Bonn Agreement and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001, a Chapter
7 resolution),59 initially limited to Kabul. In October 2003, after Germany agreed to contribute 450 military personnel
to expand ISAF into the city of Konduz, ISAF contributors endorsed expanding its presence to several other cities,
contingent on formal U.N. approval—which came on October 14, 2003 in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1510. In
August 2003, NATO took over command of ISAF—previously the ISAF command rotated among donor forces
including Turkey and Britain.
NATO/ISAF’s responsibilities broadened significantly in 2004 with NATO/ISAF’s assumption of security responsibility
for northern and western Afghanistan (Stage 1, Regional Command North, in 2004 and Stage 2, Regional Command
West, in 2005, respectively). The transition process continued on July 31, 2006, with the formal handover of the
security mission in southern Afghanistan to NATO/ISAF control. As part of this “Stage 3,” a British/Canadian/Dutch-
led “Regional Command South” (RC-S) was formed. Britain is the lead force in Helmand; Canada is lead in Qandahar,
and the Netherlands is lead in Uruzgan; the three rotate the command of RC-S. “Stage 4,” the assumption of
NATO/ISAF command of peacekeeping in 14 provinces of eastern Afghanistan (and thus all of Afghanistan), was
completed on October 5, 2006. As part of the completion of the NATO/ISAF takeover, the United States put about
half the U.S. troops then operating in Afghanistan under NATO/ISAF in “Regional Command East” (RC-E).
The ISAF mission was renewed (until October 13, 2010) by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1890 (October 8, 2009
2008), which reiterated previous resolutions’ support for the Operation Enduring Freedom mission. Resolution 1890
also welcomed the new joint initiatives to train the Afghan forces, discussed further below. Tables at the end of this
report list contributing forces, areas of operations, and their Provincial Reconstruction Teams.


Recent Major Force Pledges
Despite waning public support in partner countries, there have been several waves of additional
non-U.S. troop and aid contributions for Afghanistan. NATO and other partner forces that
continue to bear the brunt of combat in Afghanistan include Britain, Canada, Poland, the
Netherlands, France, Denmark, Romania, and Australia. In 2008, France deployed about 1,000
additional forces to Kapisa province to block Taliban movements toward northern Kabul.
President Sarkozy won a parliamentary vote of support for the mission, in late September 2008,
following the killing of 10 French soldiers in August 2008. In an effort to repair divisions within
the Afghanistan coalition over each country’s respective domestic considerations, Secretary Gates
presented, at a NATO meeting in Scotland on December 13, 2007, a “strategic concept paper”
that would help coordinate and guide NATO and other partner contributions and missions over
the coming three to five years. This was an effort to structure each country’s contribution as
appropriate to the politics and resources of that contributor. The concept paper, now titled the
“Strategic Vision,” was endorsed by the NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania in April 2008.
Following the Obama Administration’s March 27, 2009, policy announcement, some additional
pledges came through at the April 3-4, 2009, NATO summit. Major new force pledges were
issued after the December 1 policy statement, and in conjunction with the January 28 conference
in London. However, some of these forces are required to compensate for the intended pullouts
by the Netherlands and Canada 2010 and 2011, respectively. The major pledges since 2009 began
include:

59 Its mandate was extended until October 13, 2006, by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1623 (September 13, 2005);
and until October 13, 2007, by Resolution 1707 (September 12, 2006).
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• April 2009: Deployment of 3,000 non-U.S. troops to secure the Afghan elections
and 2,000 trainers for the Afghan security forces. Contributing forces for the
election period include Spain (400), Germany (600), Poland (600), and Britain
(about 900). Other pledges (from Bulgaria, Estonia, Italy, Greece, Portugal,
Turkey, and Slovakia) were for trainers to fill out 61 existing Operational Mentor
and Liaison Teams (OMLTs), each of which has about 30 trainers.
• April 2009: NATO agreed to new training missions for the ANSF. A NATO
Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A) has been established, and a France-led
300-person European Gendarmerie Force has been established to train Afghan
forces out in the provinces. Italy said it would send 100 paramilitary trainers
(carabineri) for the NTM-A mission, medical helicopters, and transport planes.
• April 2009: $500 million in additional civilian assistance to Afghanistan was
pledged by several donors.
• November 10, 2009: Ahead of President Obama’s visit to Asia, Japan announced
a pledge of $5 billion over the next five years for Afghanistan civilian
development, although it suspended its naval refueling mission (discussed
below).
• July 2009: South Korea announced it would increase its aid contribution to
Afghanistan by about $20 million, in part to expand the hospital capabilities at
Bagram Air Base. In November 2009, it announced a return of about 150
engineers to Afghanistan for development missions, protected by 300 South
Korean forces. The forces will deploy to Parwan Province, probably by June or
July 2010. (Until December 2007, 200 South Korean forces at Bagram Air Base,
mainly combat engineers, were part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF); they
left in December 2007 in fulfillment of a decision by the South Korean
government the previous year. However, many observers believe South Korea
did not further extend its mission beyond that, possibly as part of an agreement in
August 2007 under which Taliban militants released 21 kidnapped South Korean
church group visitors.60)
• December 2009-January 2010 (London conference): A total of about 9,000 forces
were pledged (including retaining 2,000 sent for the August 2009 election who
were due to rotate out). The pledges included: Britain (500); Poland (600);
Romania (600, plus about 30 trainers); Italy (1,000); Georgia (900+); Spain
(500); Colombia (240, first time contributor of forces); Slovakia (60); Sweden
(125); Portugal (120); and Germany (500 plus 350 on reserve, but still only in the
north, not heavy combat zones). France pledged 80 trainers but no new combat
forces. Several countries pledged police trainers.
• Other Major Civilian Aid Pledges in Context of London Conference:61 France
($45 million); Saudi Arabia ($150 million over three years); Australia ($40
million); China ($75 million). Japan agreed to pay ANP salaries for another six
months (until the end of 2010), a cost of about $125 million in a six month
period, to come out of its $5 billion contribution mentioned above. Japan

60 Two were killed during their captivity. The Taliban kidnappers did not get the demanded release of 23 Taliban
prisoners held by the Afghan government.
61 For more information, see http://afghanistan.hmg.gov.uk/en/conference/contributions/.
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reiterated that commitment during Karzai’s June 17, 2010, visit to Tokyo. Other
pledges were made for Taliban reintegration, as noted above.
Upcoming Contingent Withdrawals
As noted, the Netherland is due to complete its combat mission by the end of 2010, and is
expected to begin that withdrawal this summer. Canada is following suit by the end of 2011.
Britain has steadily increased its troop commitment in Afghanistan—mainly in high combat
Helmand Province—to about 9,500 (plus 500 Special Forces). The British government formed in
May 2010 has not altered its Afghanistan policy, but U.S. officials said on June 7, 2010, that no
additional British troops will be sought henceforth. Britain has lost over 300 soldiers in
Afghanistan.
The ceiling for German force levels in Afghanistan, authorized by the German parliament, is now
about 5,300, a steady increase over the past several years. German officials have said they are
looking to “transition” some provinces in the northern sector to Afghan lead, as discussed above,
by some time in 2011. German officials have indicated they want to wind down troop
involvement in 2013 or 2014.
Poland’s prime minister said on June 13, 2010, after Poland lost its 17th soldier since deploying in
2006, that it would press at the NATO meeting in Lisbon in November 2010 for a “relatively
quick and precise plan for ending this intervention.”
Equipment Issues
Some of the pledges address NATO’s chronic equipment shortages—particularly helicopters, both
for transport and attack—for the Afghanistan mission. In 2007, to try to compensate for the
shortage, NATO chartered about 20 commercial helicopters for extra routine supply flights to the
south, freeing up Chinooks and Black Hawks for other missions. Some of the Polish troops
deployed in 2008 operate and maintain eight helicopters. Germany provides six Tornado combat
aircraft to assist with strikes in combat situations in the south. NATO/ISAF also assists the
Afghan Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism in the operation of Kabul International Airport
(where Dutch combat aircraft also are located). In 2009, Belgium sent two more F-16 fighters.
National “Caveats” on Combat Operations
As noted in McChrystal’s assessment, one of the most thorny issues has been the U.S. effort to
persuade other NATO countries to adopt flexible rules of engagement that allow all contributing
forces to perform combat missions. NATO and other partner forces have not, as they pledged at
the NATO summit in April 2008, removed the so-called “national caveats” on their troops’
operations that Lt. Gen. McChrystal says limits operational flexibility. For example, some nations
refuse to conduct night-time combat. Others have refused to carry Afghan personnel on their
helicopters. Others do not fight after snowfall. These caveats were troubling to those NATO
countries with forces in heavy combat zones, such as Canada, which feel they are bearing the
brunt of the fighting. (See CRS Report RL33627, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the
Transatlantic Alliance
, by Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin.)
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Table 5. Operation Enduring Freedom Partner Forces
Operation Enduring Freedom continues as a separate combat track, led by the United States but joined by a few
partners. The caveat issue is less of a factor with OEF, since OEF is known as a combat-intensive mission conducted
in large part by Special Forces contingents of contributing nations. The overwhelming majority of non-U.S. forces are
under the NATO/ISAF mission. Prior to NATO assumption of command in October 2006, 19 coalition countries—
primarily Britain, France, Canada, and Italy contributing approximately 4,000 combat troops to OEF-Afghanistan.
Now, that figure is lower as most have been re-badged to ISAF. However, several foreign contingents, composed
mainly of special operations forces, including a 200 person unit from the UAE, are still part of OEF-Afghanistan. This
includes about 500 British special forces, some German special forces, and other special forces units. In early 2010,
Gen. McChrystal brought U.S. Special Forces operating in Afghanistan under his direct command.
Under OEF, Japan provided naval refueling capabilities in the Arabian sea, but the mission was suspended in October
2007 fol owing a parliamentary change of majority there in July 2007. The mission was revived in January 2008 when
the new government forced through parliament a bill to allow the mission to resume. It was renewed again, over
substantial parliamentary opposition, in December 2008, but the opposition party won September 2009 elections in
Japan and reportedly has decided on an alternative to continuing the refueling mission—by increasing its financial
contributions to economic development in Afghanistan. That led to an October 2009 pledge by Japan—already the
third largest individual country donor to Afghanistan, providing about $1.9 billion in civilian reconstruction aid since
the fall of the Taliban—to provide another $5 billion over five years. It has been requested to be a major financial
donor of an Afghan army expansion, and, in March 2009, it pledged to pay the costs of the Afghan National Police for
six months.
As part of OEF outside Afghanistan, the United States leads a multi-national naval anti-terrorist, anti-smuggling, anti-
proliferation interdiction mission in the Persian Gulf/Arabian Sea, headquartered in Bahrain. That mission was
expanded after the fall of Saddam Hussein to include protecting Iraqi oil platforms in the Gulf.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams
U.S. and partner officials have generally praised the effectiveness of “Provincial Reconstruction
Teams” (PRTs)—enclaves of U.S. or partner forces and civilian officials that provide safe havens
for international aid workers to help with reconstruction and to extend the writ of the Kabul
government—in accelerating reconstruction and assisting stabilization efforts. The PRTs,
announced in December 2002, perform activities ranging from resolving local disputes to
coordinating local reconstruction projects, although most U.S.-run PRTs and most PRTs in
combat-heavy areas focus mostly on counter-insurgency. (U.S. PRTs in restive regions are “co-
located” with “forward operating bases” of 300-400 U.S. combat troops.) The PRTs are key to
implementing U.S. and international policy to build governance in Afghanistan. Many of the U.S.
civilian officials being deployed to Afghanistan will work out of the PRTs, which have facilities,
vehicles, and security. There are 27 PRTs in operation; the list of PRTs, including lead country, is
shown in Table 23. Virtually all the PRTs are now under the ISAF mission. Each PRT operated by
the United States has U.S. forces (50-100 U.S. military personnel); Defense Department civil
affairs officers; representatives of USAID, State Department, and other agencies; and Afghan
government (Interior Ministry) personnel. Most PRTs, including those run by partner forces, have
personnel to train Afghan security forces. USAID officers assigned to the PRTs administer PRT
reconstruction projects. USAID spending on PRT projects is in the table on USAID spending in
Afghanistan at the end of this report, and there is a database on development projects sponsored
by each PRT available to CRS, information from which can be provided on request.
In the south, most PRTs are heavily focused on security and are co-located with U.S. military
bases or outposts. In August 2005, in preparation for the establishment of Regional Command
South (RC-S), Canada took over the key U.S.-led PRT in Qandahar. In May 2006, Britain took
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over the PRT at Lashkar Gah, capital of Helmand Province. The Netherlands took over the PRT at
Tarin Kowt, capital of Uruzgan Province. Poland reportedly is considering taking over the U.S.
PRT in Ghazni, where its combat troops operate alongside U.S. forces.
Some aid agencies say they have felt more secure since the PRT program began, fostering
reconstruction,62 and many of the new civilian advisers arriving in Afghanistan under the new
Obama Administration strategy work out of the PRTs. On the other hand, some relief groups do
not want to associate with military forces because doing so might taint their perceived neutrality.
Others, such as Oxfam International, argue that the PRTs are delaying the time when the Afghan
government has the skills and resources to secure and develop Afghanistan on its own.
Evolving Civil-Military Concepts at the PRTs
Representing evolution of the PRT concept, some donor countries—as well as the United
States—are trying to enhance the civilian component of the PRTs and change their image from
mainly military institutions. There has been long been consideration to turn over the lead in the
U.S.-run PRTs to civilians rather than military personnel, presumably State Department or
USAID officials. That was first attempted in 2006 with the establishment of a civilian-led U.S.-
run PRT in the Panjshir Valley. As noted, in March 2009, the Netherlands converted its PRT to
civilian lead. Turkey opened a PRT, in Wardak Province, on November 25, 2006, to focus on
providing health care, education, police training, and agricultural alternatives in that region.
As of November 2009, the “civilianization” of the PRT concept has evolved further with the
decision to refer to PRTs as Interagency Provincial Affairs (IPA) offices or branches. In this new
concept—a local paralled to the Senior Civilian Representatives now assigned to each regional
command—State Department officers enjoy enhanced decision-making status at each PRT.
Afghan National Security Forces
As noted, President Obama’s December 1, 2009, policy speech sees capable Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF)—the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Policy
(ANP)—as the means by which the United States and NATO could begin to draw down forces in
July 2011. Obama Administration strategy emphasizes expanding the ANSF and improving it
through partnering and more intense mentoring and training. On January 21, 2010, the joint U.N.-
Afghan “Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board” (JCMB) agreed that, by the end of 2011, the
ANA would expand to 171,600 (from its current level of about 113,000) and the ANP to about
134,000 (from its current level of about 102,000). That is fewer than the level recommended by
Gen. McChrystal—a total end strength of 400,000 (240,000 ANA and 160,000 ANP). However,
Joint Chiefs Chairman Mullen has said this remains an “aspirational goal.”
U.S. forces along with partner countries and contractors, train the ANSF. As of early 2010, the
U.S.-run “Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan” (CSTC-A) that ran the training
has been subordinated to a broader NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A). NTM-A is
commanded by U.S. Maj. Gen. William Caldwell. According to Gen. McChrystal’s August 2009
report, CSTC-A’s mission is being reoriented to building the capacity of the Afghan Defense and

62 Kraul, Chris. “U.S. Aid Effort Wins Over Skeptics in Afghanistan.” Los Angeles Times, April 11, 2003.
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Interior Ministries, and to provide resources to the ANSF. The total number of required trainers
for these institutions is 4,800. There is still an unfilled gap of trainers totaling about 450.
Afghan National Army
The Afghan National Army has been built “from scratch” since 2002—it is not a direct
continuation of the national army that existed from the 1880s until the Taliban era. That national
army all but disintegrated during the 1992-1996 mujahedin civil war and the 1996-2001 Taliban
period. However, some Afghan military officers who served prior to the Taliban have joined the
new military.
U.S. and allied officers say that the ANA is becoming a major force in stabilizing the country and
a national symbol. It now has at least some presence in most of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces,
working with the PRTs, and it deployed outside Afghanistan to assist relief efforts for victims of
the October 2005 Pakistan earthquake. According to the Department of Defense, the ANA is now
able to lead 75% of the combat operations in the eastern sector, and over 45% of operations
overall, and it participates in about 90% of all combat operations. It has demonstrated “increasing
competence, effectiveness, and professionalism,” and some U.S. officials have praised its bravery
and competence in the course of Operation Moshtarek. Among other examples of the ANA taking
overall responsibility, in August 2008, the ANA took over security of Kabul city from Italy, and it
took formal control of Kabul Province in early 2009. The commando forces of the ANA, trained
by U.S. Special Operations Forces, are considered well-trained and are taking the lead in some
operations against high value targets, particularly against HIG elements in Nuristan province.
However, some U.S. military assessments say the force remains poorly led. It still suffers from at
least a 20% desertion rate. Many officers are illiterate or poorly motivated.63 Some accounts say
that a typical ANA unit is only at about 50% of its authorized strength at any given time, and
there are significant shortages in about 40% of equipment items. Some recruits take long trips to
their home towns to remit funds to their families, and often then return to the ANA after a long
absence. Others, according to U.S. observers, often refuse to serve far from their home towns.
The FY2005 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) required that ANA recruits be vetted for
terrorism, human rights violations, and drug trafficking.
ANA battalions, or “Kandaks,” are the main unit of the Afghan force. There are over about 100
Kandaks. The Kandaks are stiffened by the presence of U.S. and partner embeds, called
“Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams” (OMLTs). Each OMLT—of which there are about 61—
has about 12-19 personnel, and U.S. commanders say that the ANA will continue to need embeds
for the short term, because embeds give the units confidence they will be resupplied, reinforced,
and evacuated in the event of wounding.
The Obama Administration strategy is to also partner the ANA with U.S. and other foreign units
to enhance effectiveness. Among the partner countries contributing OMLTs (all or in part) are
Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Britain, and the United States, and additional OMLT contributions and
other training initiatives, such as NTM-A and the European Gendarmerie, were discussed above
in the section on the new U.S. strategy.

63 Report by Richard Engel. NBC Nightly News. December 29, 2009.
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The United States has built five ANA bases: Herat (Corps 207); Gardez (Corps 203); Qandahar
(Corps 205); Mazar-e-Sharif (Corps 209); and Kabul (Division HQ, Corps 201, Air Corps).
Coalition officers conduct heavy weapons training for a heavy brigade as part of the “Kabul
Corps,” based in Pol-e-Charki, east of Kabul.
Ethnic and Factional Considerations
At the time the United States first began establishing the ANA, Northern Alliance figures who
were then in key security positions weighted recruitment for the national army toward its Tajik
ethnic base. Many Pashtuns, in reaction, refused recruitment or left the ANA program. The
naming of a Pashtun, Abdul Rahim Wardak, as Defense Minister in December 2004 reduced
desertions among Pashtuns (he remains in that position). U.S. officials in Afghanistan say this
problem was further alleviated with better pay and more close involvement by U.S. forces, and
that the force is ethnically integrated in each unit and representative. With about 41% Pashtuns,
34% Tajiks, 12% Hazaras, and 8% Uzbeks, the force is roughly in line with the broad
demographics of the country, according to the April 2010 DOD report. However, U.S.
commanders say that those Pashtuns who are in the force are disproportionately eastern Pashtuns
(from the Ghilzai tribal confederations) rather than southern Pashtuns (mostly Durrani tribal
confederations). The chief of staff is Gen. Bismillah Khan, a Tajik who was a Northern Alliance
commander.
Afghan Air Force
Equipment, maintenance, and logistical difficulties continue to plague the Afghan National Army
Air Corps (Afghan Air Force). The force is a carryover from the Afghan Air Force that existed
prior to the Soviet invasion, and is expanding gradually after its equipment was virtually
eliminated in the 2001-2002 U.S. combat against the Taliban regime. It now has about over 3,000
personnel, including 400 pilots, as well as a total of about 46 aircraft. Afghan pilots are based at
Bagram air base.
The Afghan goal is to have 61 aircraft by 2011, but Defense Minister Wardak said in September
2008 that it will remain mostly a support force for ground operations rather than a combat-
oriented Air Force. Gen. McKiernan, in statements in November 2008, credited the Afghan Air
Force with an ability to make ANA units nearly self-sufficient in airlift. In May 2008, the Afghan
Air Force received an additional 25 surplus helicopters from the Czech Republic and the UAE,
refurbished with the help of U.S. funds. Afghanistan is seeking the return of 26 aircraft, including
some MiG-2s that were flown to safety in Pakistan and Uzbekistan during the past conflicts in
Afghanistan. U.S. plans do not include supply of fixed-wing combat aircraft such as F-16s, which
Afghanistan wants, according to U.S. military officials. In 2010, Russia and Germany supplied
MI-8 helicopters to the Afghan Air Force.
Afghan National Police (ANP)
U.S. and Afghan officials believe that building up a credible and capable national police force is
at least as important to combating the Taliban insurgency as building the ANA. The April 2010
DOD report reinforces a widespread consensus that the ANP substantially lags the ANA in its
development. Outside assessments are widely disparaging, particularly in asserting that there is
rampant corruption to the point where citizens are openly mistrustful of the ANP. Among other
criticisms are a desertion rate far higher than that of the ANA; substantial illiteracy; involvement
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in local factional or ethnic disputes because the ANP works in the communities its personnel
come from; and widespread use of drugs.
Some U.S. commanders are more positive, saying that it is increasingly successful in repelling
Taliban assaults on villages and that is experiencing fewer casualties from attacks. Afghan police
in Kabul won praise from the U.S. commanders for putting down, largely on their own and
without major civilian casualties, the insurgent attack on Kabul locations near the presidential
palace on January 18, 2010, and a similar attack on February 26, 2010. However, the failings of
the ANP, and their failure to prevent an insurgent attack on the peace jirga on June 2, could have
contributed to the firing of Interior Minister Atmar on June 6. He was highly regarded by U.S.
officials and his dismissal might cause some disruption in intensified efforts to train the ANP. He
was replaced by Gen. Munir Mangal, a Pashtun (Ghilzai confederation, and relative of Helmand
governor Gulab Mangal).
Other U.S. commanders credit a November 2009 raise in police salaries (nearly doubled to about
$240 per month for service in high combat areas)—and the streamlining and improvement of the
payments system for the ANP—with reducing the solicitation of bribes by the ANP. The raise also
stimulated an eightfold increase in the number of Afghans seeking to be recruited.
Retraining and Other Initiatives
Some U.S. officials believe the ANP needs to be retrained wholesale, and training programs
revamped. This potential conclusion would represent a setback for the latest training
reorganization implemented since 2007. It is called “focused district development,” which
attempts to retrain individual police forces in districts, which is the basic geographic area of ANP
activity. (There are about 10 “districts” in each of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.) In this program, a
district force is taken out and retrained, its duties temporarily performed by more highly trained
police (Afghan National Civil Order Police, or ANCOP, which number about 5,800 nationwide) ,
and then reinserted after the training is complete. As of April 2010, about police in 83 districts
have undergone this process, although the program has had “limited success,” according to the
DOD April 2010 report, because of continuing governance and other problems in those districts.
There has also been some criticism of the ANCOP performance in Marjah, even though the unit is
supposed to be elite and well trained.
Police training now includes instruction in human rights principles and democratic policing
concepts, and the State Department human rights report on Afghanistan, referenced above, says
the government and outside observers are increasingly monitoring the police force to prevent
abuses. In March 2010, then-Interior Minister Atmar signed a “strategic guidance” document for
the ANP, which prioritizes eliminating corruption within the ANP and winning public confidence.
About 1,000 ANP are women, demonstrating some commitment to gender integration of the
force.
There have been few quick fixes for the chronic shortage of equipment in the ANP. Most police
are under-equipped, lacking ammunition and vehicles. In some cases, equipment requisitioned by
their commanders is being sold and the funds pocketed by the police officers. These activities
contributed to the failure of a 2006 “auxiliary police” effort that attempted to rapidly field large
numbers of new ANP officers.
The U.S. police training effort was first led by State Department/INL, but the Defense
Department took over the lead in police training in April 2005. Much of the training is still
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conducted through contracts with DynCorp. In addition to the U.S. effort, which includes 600
civilian U.S. police trainers (mostly still Dyncorp contractors) in addition to the U.S. military
personnel (see Table 6), Germany (originally the lead government in Afghan police training) is
providing 41 trainers. The European Union has taken over from Germany as lead and is providing
a 190-member “EUPOL” training effort, and 60 other experts to help train the ANP. These efforts
are being subsumed under NTM-A.
Rule of Law/Criminal Justice Sector
Many experts believe that an effective justice sector is vital to Afghan governance. Some of the
criticisms and allegations of corruption at all levels of the Afghan bureaucracy have been
discussed throughout this report. U.S. justice sector programs generally focus on promoting rule
of law and building capacity of the judicial system, including police training and court
construction. Some of these programs are conducted in partnership with Italy, which was
technically the “lead” coalition country on judicial reform until 2005. The United States has
trained over 900 judges, lawyers, and prosecutors and built at least 40 judicial facilities. USAID
also trains court administrators for the Ministry of Justice, the office of the Attorney General, and
the Supreme Court. A focus has been on helping the Afghan justice sector systematize and
automate its case tracking system. There reportedly is consideration of appointing, at the U.S.
Embassy in Kabul, an Ambassador-rank “rule of law coordinator” (Hans Klemm) who would
focus on this issue.
The State Department (INL) has placed at least 30 U.S. advisors in the Interior Ministry to help it
develop the national police force and counter-narcotics capabilities. U.S. trainers are also building
Border Police and Highway Patrol forces.
Informal Justice
The United States and its partners have, to date, generally refrained from interfering in traditional
mechanisms such as village jirgas or shuras convened to dispense justice. Doing so would likely
raise questions among Afghans that the United States is trying to influence traditional Afghan
culture and impose Western values on Afghanistan. Ambassador Holbrooke’s January 2010 says
that this will continue to be the case, and that a USAID pilot project will try to re-establish
traditional dispute resolution mechanisms in areas cleared of insurgents. The Holbrooke plan says
that over time, traditional justice mechanisms will increasingly be linked to the formal justice
sectors. Even now, serious criminal cases will be handled through the formal justice system,
which the April 2010 DOD reports says most Afghans are amenable to using for many of their
legal problems. Traditional justice mechanisms are widely used in Afghan villages, particularly in
Pashtun areas, in part because of the ease of access of these mechanisms.
U.S. Security Forces Funding/”CERP”
In December 2009, Karzai asserted that the Afghan government could not likely fund its own
security forces until 2024. More than half of all U.S. assistance to Afghanistan since 2002 has
gone toward building the ANSF. U.S. funds are used to cover ANA salaries as well as to equip
and train them. Recent appropriations for the ANA and ANP are contained in the tables at the end
of this report, which also contain breakdowns for Commanders Emergency Response Program
funds, or CERP. CERP is used for projects that build goodwill and presumably reduce the threat
to use forces. The tables at the end also list breakdowns for requested ANSF funding for FY2011
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and supplemental FY2010 funding. As noted in the table, as of FY2005, the security forces
funding has been DOD funds, not State Department funds.
International Trust Fund for the ANSF
In 2007, ISAF set up a trust fund for donor contributions to fund the transportation of equipment
donated to and the training of the ANSF. U.S. funding for the ANSF is provided separately, not
through this fund. The fund is estimated to require $2 billion per year. In April 2009, $100 million
in contributions were pledged. Of this, $57 million was pledged by Germany. Japan, as noted,
separately pledged to pay the expenses of the Afghan police for six months (about $125 million).
As noted above, some additional funds for the fund were pledged at the London conference,
including by Greece ($4 million); and Japan ($11 million out of the $5 billion mentioned above).
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Table 6. Major Security-Related Indicators
Force Current
Level
Total Foreign Forces in
About 135,000: About 94,000 U.S. and 41,000 non-U.S. partner forces. (U.S. total was:
Afghanistan
25,000 in 2005; 16,000 in 2003; 5,000 in 2002. ISAF totals were: 12,000 in 2005; and
6,000 in 2003.) US. forces deployed at 88 bases in Afghanistan, and include 1 air wing
(40 aircraft) and 1 combat aviation brigade (100 aircraft). U.S. number includes only
about 2,000 of the new U.S. troop commitments announced December 1.
U.S. Casualties in
1,044 killed, of which 823 by hostile action. Additional 78 U.S. deaths in other OEF
Afghanistan
theaters, including the Philippines and parts of Africa. Over 315 U.S. killed in 2009-
highest yet. 150 U.S. killed from October 2001-January 2003. 45 killed in each of July
and August 2009,and 50-55 in each of September and October 2009. About 25 U.S.
killed per month in 2010. 285 UK forces killed in Afghanistan to date.
NATO Sectors (Regional
Commands-South, east,
RC-S- 45,000. Canada, UK, Netherlands rotate lead); RC-E- 25,000 (U.S. lead); RC-N-
north, west, and
5,895; RC-W- 4,600 (Italy lead) RC-Kabul-6,300 ( France, Afghan lead).
central/Kabul)
Afghan National Army
113,000t. There are 110+ battalions. Goal is 171,600 by late 2011, with interim goal of
(ANA)
134,000 by October 2010. About 2,000 trained per month. 4,000 are commando forces,
trained by U.S. Special Forces. ANA private paid about $200 per month; generals
receive about $750 per month. ANA being outfitted with U.S. M16 rifles and 4,000 up-
armored Humvees.
Afghan National Police
102,000. Goal is 134,000 by late 2011, with interim goal of 109,000 by October 2010.
(ANP)
14,000 are border police; 3,800+ counter-narcotics police; 5,300 civil order police.
1,000 are female, some serving in very conservative south. Most ANP salaries raised to
$240 per month in November 2009, from $120, to counter corruption. Some police
paid by E-Paisa system of Roshan cel phone network.
U.S. and Partner Trainers
About 4,800 required, with 1,800 now in place.
Legally Armed Fighters
disarmed by DDR
63,380; al of the pool identified for the program
Number of Taliban
Over 20,000 (U.S. military and Afghan estimates). Some estimates higher. Plus about
fighters
1,000 Haqqani faction and 1,000 HIG. Smal numbers of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, other.
Armed groups disbanded
161 illegal groups (five or more fighters) disbanded. Goal is to disband 1,800 groups, of
by DIAG
which several hundred groups are “significant.” 5,700 weapons confiscated, 1.050
arrested. About 5,000 Taliban reconciled since May 2005.
Weapons collected by
DDR
57,630 medium and light; 12,250 heavy.
Attacks per day (average)
1,100 per month in 2009; 1,000 per month in 2008; 800 per month in 2007 and 2006;
400 in 2005. 7,000 IEDs in 2009, almost double the 2008 level.
Afghan casualties
For extended discussion, see CRS Report R41084, Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces
and Civilians, by Susan G. Chesser.
Sources: CRS; testimony and public statements by DOD officials.
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Regional Context
Most of Afghanistan’s neighbors believed that the fall of the Taliban would stabilize the region,
but like-minded militants have been battling the government of Pakistan, dashing hopes for long-
term stability. Six of Afghanistan’s neighbors signed a non-interference pledge (Kabul
Declaration) on December 23, 2002. In November 2005, Afghanistan joined the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and Afghanistan has observer status in the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is discussed below. (Karzai attended the SCO summit
in Tajikistan on August 30, 2008.) Several regional summit meeting series have been established
involving Afghanistan, including summit meetings between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkey;
and between Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. As shown in the table below, cooperation from
several of the regional countries are crucial to U.S. and ISAF operations and resupply in
Afghanistan.
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Table 7. Afghan and Regional Facilities Used for
Operations in and Supply Lines to Afghanistan
Facility
Use
Bagram Air
50 miles north of Kabul, the operational hub of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and base for CJTF-
Base
101 and Gen. Scaparotti. At least 2000 U.S. military personnel are based there. Handles many
of the 150+ U.S. aircraft (including helicopters) in country. Hospital constructed, one of the
first permanent structures there. FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) provided about $52
million for various projects to upgrade facilities at Bagram, including a control tower and an
operations center, and the FY2006 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provided $20
million for military construction there. NATO also using the base and sharing operational costs.
Bagram can be accessed directly by U.S. military flights following April 2010 agreement by
Kazakhstan to allow overflights of U.S. lethal equipment.
Qandahar Air
Just outside Qandahar, the hub of military operations in the south. Turned over from U.S. to
Field
NATO/ISAF control in late 2006 in conjunction with NATO assumption of peacekeeping
responsibilities. Enhanced (along with other facilities in the south) at cost of $1.3 billion to
accommodate influx of U.S combat forces in the south.
Shindand Air
In Farah province, about 20 miles from Iran border. Used by U.S. forces and combat aircraft
Base
since October 2004, after the dismissal of Herat governor Ismail Khan, who controlled it.
Peter Ganci
Used by 1,200 U.S. military personnel as well as refueling and cargo aircraft for shipments into
Base: Manas,
Afghanistan. Leadership of Kyrgyzstan changed in April 2005 in an uprising against President
Kyrgyzstan
Askar Akayev and again in April 2010 against Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Previous Kyrgyz governments
demanded the U.S. vacate the base but in both cases, (July 2006 and July 2009) agreement to
use the base was extended in exchange for large increase in U.S. payments for its use (to $60
million per year in the latter case). Interim government formed in April 2010 first threatened
then retracted eviction of U.S. from the base, but the issue remains open.
Incirlik Air
About 2,100 U.S. military personnel there; U.S. aircraft supply U.S. forces in Iraq and
Base, Turkey
Afghanistan. U.S. use repeatedly extended for one year intervals by Turkey.
Al Dhafra, UAE Air base used by about 1,800 U.S. military personnel, to supply U.S. forces and related
transport into Iraq and Afghanistan. Could see increasing use if Manas closes.
Al Udeid Air
Largest air facility used by U.S. in region. About 5,000 U.S. personnel in Qatar. Houses central
Base, Qatar
air operations coordination center for U.S. missions in Iraq and Afghanistan; also houses
CENTCOM forward headquarters. Could see increased use if Manas closes.
Naval Support
U.S. naval command headquarters for OEF anti-smuggling, anti-terrorism, and anti-proliferation
Facility, Bahrain
naval search missions, and Iraq-related naval operations (oil platform protection) in the Persian
Gulf and Arabian Sea. About 5,100 U.S. military personnel there.
Karsi-Khanabad Not used by U.S. since September 2005 fol owing U.S.-Uzbek dispute over May 2005 Uzbek
Air Base,
crackdown on unrest in Andijon. Once housed about 1,750 U.S. military personnel (900 Air
Uzbekistan
Force, 400 Army, and 450 civilian) supplying Afghanistan. Uzbekistan allowed German use of
the base temporarily in March 2008, indicating possible healing of the rift. Could also represent
Uzbek counter to Russian offer to U.S. coalition to al ow use of its territory to transport
equipment into Afghanistan. U.S. relations with Uzbekistan improved in 2009, but U.S. officials
said in 2010 that the use of the air base is still not under active discussion. Some shipments
beginning in February 2009 through Navoi airfield in central Uzbekistan, and U.S. signed
agreement with Uzbekistan on April 4, 2009, al owing nonlethal supplies for the Afghanistan
war. Goods are shipped to Latvia and Georgia, some transits Russia by rail, then to Uzbekistan.
Tajikistan
Some use of air bases and other facilities by coalition partners, including France, and emergency
use by U.S. India also uses bases under separate agreement. New supply lines to Afghanistan
established in February 2009 (“northern route”) make some use of Tajikistan.
Pakistan
Discussed further in sections below, most U.S. supplies flow through Pakistan. Heavy
equipment docks in Karachi and is escorted by security contractors to the Khyber Pass
crossing.
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Pakistan/Pakistan-Afghanistan Border64
The Obama Administration strategy reviews in 2009 both emphasized the linkage between
militants present in Pakistan and the difficulty stabilizing Afghanistan. Since the late 2009 review,
Pakistan appears to have shifted to try to position Pakistan for any war-ending settlement between
the Afghan government and the insurgency. The United States had previously criticized Pakistan
for refusing or failing to do more to assist the U.S. effort in Afghanistan, but continued to assist
and engage extensively with Pakistan as a necessary ally in this effort.
During 2009, the Obama Administration pressed Pakistan for more cooperation against Afghan
militants including the Taliban leaders believed in or around Quetta, and against the Haqqani
network believe in the north Waziristan area. Pakistan had resisted on the grounds that these
militants are not a direct threat to Pakistan,65 but the arrest of Mullah Bradar in February 2010,
and of other Afghan Taliban figures discussed above appeared to signal a shift by Pakistan to one
of trying to carve out a role for itself in any conflict settlement negotiations. This possible effort
to influence any peace settlement apparently contributed to Karzai’s reported anger at the arrest of
Bradar, who was said to be in talks with Karzai representatives when he was seized.
Pakistan’s stance on Afghanistan is heavily colored by fears of historic rival India. Pakistan
viewed the Taliban regime as providing Pakistan strategic depth against rival India, and Pakistan
apparently remains wary that the current Afghan government may come under the sway of India.
Numerous militant groups, such as LET (Laskhar-e-Tayyiba, or Army of the Righteous) were
formed in Pakistan to challenge India’s control of part of the disputed territories of Jammu and
Kashmir. Some observers believe Pakistan wants to retain the ability to stoke these militants
against India, even though these militants may be aiding Islamist groups challenging Pakistan’s
stability.
Pakistan says India is using its Embassy and four consulates in Afghanistan (Pakistan says India
has nine such consulates) to train and recruit anti-Pakistan insurgents, and is using its
reconstruction funds to build influence there. Afghan officials have said they have evidence that,
to counter that influence, ISI agents were involved in the July 7, 2008, suicide bombing of India’s
embassy in Kabul. In connection with that act, U.S. officials, in July 2008, confronted Pakistani
officials with evidence that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) is actively helping
Afghanistan militants, particularly the Haqqani faction.66
Pakistan has also sought to control Afghanistan’s trade, particularly with India, leading to U.S.
efforts to persuade Pakistan to forge a “transit trade” agreement with Afghanistan. Such an
agreement would permit easy flow of Afghan products, which are mostly agricultural products
that depend on rapid transit. To try to address some of these concerns and to institute more cross
border controls, Canada has sponsored the “Dubai Process” of talks between Afghanistan and
Pakistan on modernizing border crossings, new roads, and a comprehensive border management
strategy to meet IMF benchmarks.

64 For extensive analysis of U.S. policy toward Pakistan, and U.S. assistance to Pakistan in conjunction with its
activities against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
65 Sanger, David and Eric Schmitt. “U.S. Weighs Taliban Strike into Pakistan.” New York Times, March 18, 2009.
66 Mazzetti, Mark and Eric Schmitt. “CIA Outlines Pakistan Links With Militants.” New York Times, July 30, 2008.
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Cooperation Against Al Qaeda
During 2001-2006, the Bush Administration praised then President Pervez Musharraf for
Pakistani accomplishments against Al Qaeda, including the arrest of over 700 Al Qaeda figures
since the September 11 attacks.67 After the attacks, Pakistan provided the United States with
access to Pakistani airspace, some ports, and some airfields for OEF. Others say Musharraf acted
against Al Qaeda only when it threatened him directly; for example, after the December 2003
assassination attempts against him. Musharraf resigned in August 2008, and the civilian
government is led by the party of the late Pakistani secular leader Benazir Bhutto. Her widower,
Asif Ali Zardari, is President.
U.S. criticism of Pakistan’s approach increased following a New York Times report (February 19,
2007) that Al Qaeda had reestablished some small terrorist training camps in Pakistan, near the
Afghan border. This possibly was an outgrowth of a September 5, 2006, compromise between
Pakistan and tribal elders in this region. That, and subsequent compromises were criticized,
including a 2008 “understanding” with members of the Mehsud tribe, among which is Tehrik-e-
Taliban (Pakistan Taliban) leader Baitullah Mehsud (killed in a U.S. strike in August 2009).
Increased Direct U.S. Action68
The Obama Administration has tried to combat militants in Pakistan without directly violating
Pakistan’s restrictions on the U.S. ability to operate “on the ground” in Pakistan. The Obama
Administration has continued to use Predator and Reaper unmanned aircraft to strike militant
targets in Pakistan, often incurring Pakistani official protestations. Such a strike reportedly was
responsible for the death of Beitullah Mehsud, and some militant websites say the strikes are
taking a major toll on their operations and networks. The New York Times reported on February
23, 2009, that there are about 70 U.S. military advisers on the ground in Pakistan but they are
there to help train Pakistani forces to battle Al Qaeda and Taliban militants.
Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations
The relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan could determine how Pakistan positions itself
for any turns in the international war effort. Some Afghan leaders still resent Pakistan as the most
public defender of the Taliban movement when it was in power (Pakistan was one of only three
countries to formally recognize it as the legitimate government; Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates are the others) and many suspect Pakistan wants to have the option to restore a Taliban-
like regime, or at least a pro-Pakistan regime, if the international community abandons
Afghanistan.
However, there has been a dramatic improvement in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations since the
Musharraf era. Karzai attended the September 9, 2008, inauguration of Zardari. A “peace jirga
process—a series of meetings of notables on each side of the border—was launched at a
September 28, 2006, dinner hosted by President Bush for Karzai and Musharraf, and meetings of

67 Among those captured by Pakistan are top bin Laden aide Abu Zubaydah (captured April 2002); alleged September
11 plotter Ramzi bin Al Shibh (September 11, 2002); top Al Qaeda planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (March 2003);
and a top planner, Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005).
68 CRS Report RL34763, Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and U.S. Policy, by K. Alan
Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzman.
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700 Pakistani and Afghan tribal elders were held in August 2007 and again during October 27-28,
2008. The latter was led on the Afghan side was headed by former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah
and resulted in a declaration to endorse efforts to try to engage militants in both Afghanistan and
Pakistan to bring them into the political process. In the clearest sign of closer ties, Zardari visited
Kabul and met with Karzai on January 9, 2009, where the two signed a joint declaration against
terrorism that affects both countries. Additional progress was made during the visit of Afghan and
Pakistani ministers to Washington, DC, during February 23-27, 2009, to participate in the Obama
Administration strategic review. As noted above, Karzai and Zardari visit Washington, DC, in
May 2009 to continue the strategic dialogue. Further warming of ties could color Karzai’s view of
any terms he might seek in dealing with Taliban and other militants to settle the conflict.
In April 2008, in an extension of the Tripartite Commission’s work, the three countries agreed to
set up five “border coordination centers”—which will include networks of radar nodes to give
liaison officers a common view of the border area. These centers build on an agreement in May
2007 to share intelligence on extremists’ movements. Only one has been established to date—
near the Torkham Gate at the Khyber Pass. In June 2008, Pakistan ended a six month suspension
in attendance at meetings of the Tripartite Commission under which NATO, Afghan, and
Pakistani military leaders meet regularly on both sides of the border.
Regarding the long-term relationship, Pakistan wants the government of Afghanistan to pledge to
abide by the “Durand Line,” a border agreement reached between Britain (signed by Sir Henry
Mortimer Durand) and then Afghan leader Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893, separating
Afghanistan from what was then British-controlled India (later Pakistan after the 1947 partition).
The border is recognized by the United Nations, but Afghanistan continues to indicate that the
border was drawn unfairly to separate Pashtun tribes and should be renegotiated. As of October
2002, about 1.75 million Afghan refugees have returned from Pakistan since the Taliban fell, but
as many as 3 million might still remain in Pakistan, and Pakistan says it plans to expel them back
into Afghanistan in the near future.
Iran
The Obama Administration initially saw Iran as potentially helpful to its strategy for Afghanistan.
Ambassador Holbrooke had advocated a “regional” component of the strategy, which focuses
primarily on Pakistan but also envisioned cooperation with Iran on Afghanistan issues. As Iran-
U.S. relations have worsened since late 2009 over Iran’s refusal to accept an international
settlement to its nuclear program, the Obama Administration has become more critical of Iran’s
activities in Afghanistan.
The State Department report on international terrorism for 2008, released April 30, 2009, said
Iran continues to provide some training to and ships arms to “selected Taliban members” in
Afghanistan. Weapons provided, according to the State Department report, as well as an April
2010 Defense Department report on Iran’s military capabilities, include mortars, 107mm rockets,
rocket-propelled grenades, and plastic explosives. Ambassador to Afghanistan Eikenberry said in
March 2010 that “Iran or elements within Iran have provided training assistance and some
weapons to the Taliban.” On May 30, 2010, Gen. McChrystal said that Iran is providing
weaponry and training in Iran for Afghan militants that is “inappropriate.”
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Iran may be trying to pressure U.S. forces that use Afghanistan’s Shindand air base,69 which Iran
fears the United States might use to attack or conduct surveillance against Iran. Or, Iran’s policy
might be to gain broader leverage against the United States by demonstrating that Iran is in
position to cause U.S. combat deaths in Afghanistan. Yet, the Iranian aid is not at a level that
would make Iran a major player in the insurgency in Afghanistan. Others are puzzled by Iran’s
support of Taliban fighters who are Pashtun, because Iran has traditionally supported Persian-
speaking non-Pashtun factions in Afghanistan.
U.S. views on Iran’s influence in Afghanistan differ from those held at the beginning of the
Obama Administration. Secretary of State Clinton made a point of announcing that Iran would be
invited to the U.N.-led meeting on Afghanistan at the Hague on March 31, 2009. At the meeting,
Special Representative Holbrooke briefly met the Iranian leader of his delegation to the meeting,
and handed him a letter on several outstanding human rights cases involving Iranian-Americans.
At the meeting, Iran pledged cooperation on combating Afghan narcotics and in helping
economic development in Afghanistan—both policies Iran is already pursuing to a large degree.
However, suggesting continued low-level cooperation, the United States and Iran took similar
positions at a U.N. meeting in Geneva in February 2010 that discussed drug trafficking across the
Afghan border.
Bilateral Afghan-Iranian Relations
Iran’s interest in a broad relationship with Karzai has not, to date, been affected by Iran’s
continued support for Taliban and other militants in Afghanistan. Aside from its always tense
relations with the United States, Iran perceives its key national interests in Afghanistan as
exerting its traditional influence over western Afghanistan, which Iran borders and was once part
of the Persian empire, and to protect Afghanistan’s Shiite and other Persian-speaking minorities.
Karzai has, at times, called Iran a “friend” of Afghanistan, and in March 2010 he met with
Ahmadinejad on two occasions, possibly to signal to the United States that he might realign with
regional actors if the United States continues to criticize his leadership. One of the meetings was
just after the departure of visiting Defense Secretary Gates. Previously, Karzai received Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Kabul in August 2007, and he visited Tehran at the end of
May 2009 as part of the tripartite diplomatic process between Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.
During his visit to the United States in May 2009, Karzai said he had told both the United States
and Iran that Afghanistan must not become an arena for the broader competition and disputes
between the United States and Iran.70
Iran’s pledged assistance to Afghanistan has totaled about $1.164 billion since the fall of the
Taliban, mainly to build roads and schools and provide electricity and shops to Afghan cities and
villages near the Iranian border.71 However, the Defense Department report cited above suggest
that much of the pledge has not been implemented.
Many Afghans look fondly on Iran for helping them try to oust the Taliban regime when it was in
power. Iran saw the Taliban regime, which ruled during 1996-2001, as a threat to its interests in
Afghanistan, especially after Taliban forces captured Herat (the western province that borders

69 Rashid, Ahmed. “Afghan Neighbors Show Signs of Aiding in Nation’s Stability.” Wall Street Journal, October 18,
2004.
70 Comments by President Karzai at the Brookings Institution. May 5, 2009.
71 Iranian economic and political influence efforts in Herat were discussed in a CRS visit to Herat in October 2009.
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Iran) in September 1995. Iran subsequently drew even closer to the ethnic minority-dominated
Northern Alliance than previously, providing its groups with fuel, funds, and ammunition.72 In
September 1998, Iranian and Taliban forces nearly came into direct conflict when Iran discovered
that nine of its diplomats were killed in the course of the Taliban’s offensive in northern
Afghanistan. Iran massed forces at the border and threatened military action, but the crisis cooled
without a major clash, possibly out of fear that Pakistan would intervene on behalf of the Taliban.
Iran offered search and rescue assistance in Afghanistan during the U.S.-led war to topple the
Taliban, and it also allowed U.S. humanitarian aid to the Afghan people to transit Iran. Iran
helped construct Afghanistan’s first post-Taliban government, in cooperation with the United
States—at the December 2001 “Bonn Conference.” In February 2002, Iran expelled Karzai-
opponent Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, but it did not arrest him. At other times, Afghanistan and Iran
have had disputes over Iran’s efforts to expel Afghan refugees. About 1.2 million remain, mostly
integrated into Iranian society, and a crisis erupted in May 2007 when Iran expelled about 50,000
into Afghanistan. About 300,000 Afghan refugees have returned from Iran since the Taliban fell.
India
The interests and activities of India in Afghanistan are almost the exact reverse of those of
Pakistan. India’s goal is to deny Pakistan “strategic depth” in Afghanistan, and India supported
the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in the mid-1990s. Tajikistan allows India to use one of
its air bases; both countries supported the mostly Tajik Northern Alliance against the Taliban
when it was in power. Many of the families of Afghan leaders have lived in India at one time or
another and, as noted above, Karzai studied there. India saw the Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda as
a major threat to India itself because of Al Qaeda’s association with radical Islamic organizations
in Pakistan dedicated to ending Indian control of parts of Jammu and Kashmir. Some of these
groups have committed major acts of terrorism in India, and there might be connections to the
militants who carried out the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008.
Pakistan accuses India of using its four consulates in Afghanistan (Pakistan says there are nine
such consulates) to spread Indian influence in Afghanistan. However, many U.S. observers
believe India’s role in Afghanistan is constructive, and some would support an Indian decision to
deploy more security forces in Afghanistan to protect its construction workers, diplomats, and
installations. India reportedly decided in August 2008 to improve security for its officials and
workers in Afghanistan, but not to send actual troops there.
India is the fifth-largest single country donor to Afghan reconstruction, funding projects worth
about $1.2 billion. Indian officials assert that all their projects are focused on civilian, not
military, development and are in line with the development priorities set by the Afghan
government. India, along with the Asian Development Bank, financed a $300 million project,
mentioned above, to bring electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan. It has also renovated the
well-known Habibia High School in Kabul and committed to a $25 million renovation of
Darulaman Palace as the permanent house for Afghanistan’s parliament. India financed the
construction of a road to the Iranian border in remote Nimruz province. India is also helping the
IDLG with its efforts to build local governance organizations, and it provides 1,000 scholarships
per year for Afghans to undergo higher education in India.

72 Steele, Jonathon, “America Includes Iran in Talks on Ending War in Afghanistan.” Washington Times, December 15,
1997.
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Russia, Central Asian States, and China
Some neighboring and nearby states take an active interest not only in Afghan stability, but in the
U.S. military posture that supports U.S. operations in Afghanistan. The region to the north of
Afghanistan is a growing factor in U.S. efforts to secure new supply lines to Afghanistan. Some
of these alternative lines have begun to open, at least to non-lethal supplies.
Russia
Russia wants to reemerge as a great power and to contain U.S. power in Central Asia, including
Afghanistan. But, it supports U.S. efforts to combat militants in the region who have sometimes
posed a threat to Russia itself. In February 2009, Russia resumed allowing the United States to
ship non-lethal equipment into Afghanistan through Russia (following a suspension in 2008
caused by differences over the Russia-Georgia conflict). In July 2009, following President
Obama’s visit to Russia, it announced it would allow the transit to Afghanistan of lethal supplies
as well. Russia reportedly is being urged by NATO (as evidenced in a visit by NATO Secretary
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen to Russia in December 2009) to provide helicopters and spare
parts to the Afghan forces (which still make heavy use of Russian-made Hind helicopters) as well
as fuel.
In June 2010, Russia said more economic and social assistance is needed for Afghanistan. Russia
provides some humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, although it keeps a low profile in the country
because it still feels humiliated by its withdrawal in 1989 and senses some Afghan resentment of
the Soviet occupation. Dr. Abdullah told CRS in October 2009, however, that Afghan resentment
of Russia because of that occupation has eased in recent years. During the 1990s, Russia
supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban with some military equipment and technical
assistance in order to blunt Islamic militancy emanating from Afghanistan.73 Although Russia
supported the U.S. effort against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan out of fear of Islamic
(mainly Chechen) radicals, Russia continues to seek to reduce the U.S. military presence in
Central Asia. Russian fears of Islamic activism emanating from Afghanistan may have ebbed
since 2002 when Russia killed a Chechen of Arab origin known as “Hattab” (full name is Ibn al-
Khattab), who led a militant pro-Al Qaeda Chechen faction. The Taliban government was the
only one in the world to recognize Chechnya’s independence, and some Chechen fighters fighting
alongside Taliban/Al Qaeda forces have been captured or killed.
Central Asian States
These states are becoming increasingly crucial to U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. As discussed in
the chart, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan are pivotal actors in U.S. efforts
to secure supply routes into Afghanistan that avoid Pakistan.
During Taliban rule, Russian and Central Asian leaders grew increasingly alarmed that radical
Islamic movements were receiving safe haven in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan, in particular, has long
asserted that the group Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), allegedly responsible for four
simultaneous February 1999 bombings in Tashkent that nearly killed President Islam Karimov, is

73 Risen, James. “Russians Are Back in Afghanistan, Aiding Rebels.” New York Times, July 27, 1998.
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linked to Al Qaeda.74 One of its leaders, Juma Namangani, reportedly was killed while
commanding Taliban/Al Qaeda forces in Konduz in November 2001. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
do not directly border Afghanistan, but IMU guerrillas transited Kyrgyzstan during incursions
into Uzbekistan in the late 1990s.
During Taliban rule, Uzbekistan supported Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostam, who was part of
that Alliance. It allowed use of Karshi-Khanabad air base by OEF forces from October 2001 until
a rift emerged in May 2005 over Uzbekistan’s crackdown against riots in Andijon, and U.S.-
Uzbek relations remained largely frozen. Uzbekistan’s March 2008 agreement with Germany for
it to use Karshi-Khanabad air base temporarily, for the first time since the rift in U.S.-Uzbek
relations developed in 2005, suggests that U.S.-Uzbek cooperation on Afghanistan and other
issues might be rebuilt. Ambassador Holbrooke visited in February 2010, indicating further
warming. Renewed U.S. discussions with Uzbekistan apparently bore some fruit with the Uzbek
decision in February 2009 to allow the use of Navoi airfield for shipment of U.S./NATO goods
into Afghanistan.
Central Asian Views During Taliban Rule
In 1996, several of the Central Asian states banded together with Russia and China into a regional
grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to discuss the Taliban threat. It includes
China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Reflecting Russian and
Chinese efforts to limit U.S. influence in the region, the group has issued statements, most
recently in August 2007, that security should be handled by the countries in the Central Asia
region. Despite the Shanghai Cooperation Organization statements, Tajikistan allows access
primarily to French combat aircraft, and Kazakhstan allows use of facilities in case of emergency.
In April 2010, it also agreed to allow U.S. overflights of lethal military equipment to Afghanistan,
allowing the United States to use polar routes to fly materiel directly from the United States to
Bagram Airfield. A meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to discuss Afghanistan
was held in Moscow on March 25, 2009, and was observed by a U.S. official, as well as by Iran.
Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, only Turkmenistan chose to seek close
relations with the Taliban leadership when it was in power, possibly viewing engagement as a
more effective means of preventing spillover of radical Islamic activity from Afghanistan. It saw
Taliban control as facilitating construction of a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through
Afghanistan (see above). The September 11 events stoked Turkmenistan’s fears of the Taliban and
its Al Qaeda guests and the country publicly supported the U.S.-led war. No U.S. forces have
been based in Turkmenistan.
China75
China’s involvement in Afghanistan policy appears to be growing. Some diplomats in
Washington, DC, indicated to CRS in November 2009 that, should President Obama ask for
China to contribute People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces, even in a non-combat role, to
Afghanistan, China might agree to that request. No such commitment resulted from the Obama

74 The IMU was named a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department in September 2000.
75 For more information, see CRS Report RL33001, U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy,
by Shirley A. Kan.
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visit to China in November 2009, but the communiqué of the visit implied a possible larger role
for China to help stabilize Afghanistan. In late 2009, China allocated an additional $75 billion in
economic aid to Afghanistan, bringing its total to close to $1 billion since 2002. On March 20,
2010, ahead of a visit to China by Karzai, China called for more international support for
Afghanistan. During the visit, China stressed that its investments in Afghanistan would continue.
Chinese delegations continue to assess the potential for new investments in such sectors as
mining and energy,76 and a $3.4 billion deal was signed in November 2007 for China
Metallurgical Group to develop the Aynak copper mine south of Kabul, and build related
infrastructure. The deal represents the largest investment in Afghanistan in history. However, U.S.
Embassy officials told CRS in October 2009 that actual work at the mine has been stalled for
some time. U.S. forces do not directly protect the project, but U.S. forces are operating in Lowgar
province, where the project is located, and provide general stability there. China is also a major
contender to develop the Hajji Gak iron ore mine near Kabul.
A major organizer of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China has a small border with a
sliver of Afghanistan known as the “Wakhan corridor.” China had become increasingly concerned
about the potential for Al Qaeda to promote Islamic fundamentalism among Muslims in China. In
December 2000, sensing China’s increasing concern about Taliban policies, a Chinese official
delegation met with Mullah Umar. China did not enthusiastically support U.S. military action
against the Taliban, possibly because China was wary of a U.S. military buildup nearby. In
addition, China has been allied to Pakistan in part to pressure India, a rival of China.
Persian Gulf States: Saudi Arabia and UAE
The Gulf states are, according to Ambassador Holbrooke, a key part of the effort to stabilize
Afghanistan. As noted, Ambassador Holbrooke has focused increasing U.S. attention—and has
formed a multilateral task force—to try to curb continuing Gulf resident donations to the Taliban
in Afghanistan. Holbrooke has said these donations might be a larger source of Taliban funding
than is the narcotics trade.
Saudi Arabia has a role to play in Afghanistan in part because, during the Soviet occupation,
Saudi Arabia channeled hundreds of millions of dollars to the Afghan resistance, primarily
Hikmatyar and Sayyaf. Drawing on its reputed intelligence ties to Afghanistan during that era,
Saudi Arabia worked with Taliban leaders to persuade them to suppress anti-Saudi activities by Al
Qaeda. Some press reports indicate that, in late 1998, Saudi and Taliban leaders discussed, but did
not agree on, a plan for a panel of Saudi and Afghan Islamic scholars to decide bin Laden’s fate.
A majority of Saudi citizens practice the strict Wahhabi brand of Islam similar to that of the
Taliban, and Saudi Arabia was one of three countries to formally recognize the Taliban
government. The Taliban initially served Saudi Arabia as a potential counter to Iran, but Iranian-
Saudi relations improved after 1997 and balancing Iranian power ebbed as a factor in Saudi
policy toward Afghanistan.
Saudi Arabia has played a role as a go-between for negotiations between the Karzai government
and “moderate” Taliban figures. This role was recognized at the London conference on January

76 CRS conversations with Chinese officials in Beijing. August 2007.
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28, 2010, in which President Karzai stated in his opening speech that he sees a role for Saudi
Arabia in helping stabilize Afghanistan.
According to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia cooperated extensively, if not publicly, with OEF. It
broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban in late September 2001 and quietly permitted the
United States to use a Saudi base for command of U.S. air operations over Afghanistan, but it did
not permit U.S. airstrikes from it.
The United Arab Emirates, the third country that recognized the Taliban regime, is emerging as
another major donor to Afghanistan. Its troop contribution was discussed under OEF, above. At a
donors conference for Afghanistan in June 2008, UAE pledged an additional $250 million for
Afghan development, double the $118 million pledged by Saudi Arabia. That brought the UAE
contribution to Afghanistan to over $400 million since the fall of the Taliban. Projects funded
include housing in Qandahar, roads in Kabul, a hospital in Zabol province, and a university in
Khost. There are several daily flights between Kabul and Dubai emirate.
U.S. and International Aid to Afghanistan and
Development Issues

Many experts have long believed that accelerating economic development would do more to
improve the security situation—and to eliminate narcotics trafficking—than intensified anti-
Taliban combat. This belief appears to constitute a major element of Obama Administration
strategy. Afghanistan’s economy and society are still fragile after decades of warfare that left
about 2 million dead, 700,000 widows and orphans, and about 1 million Afghan children who
were born and raised in refugee camps outside Afghanistan. More than 3.5 million Afghan
refugees have since returned, although a comparable number remain outside Afghanistan. The
U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) supervises Afghan repatriation and Afghan
refugee camps in Pakistan. The literacy rate is very low and Afghanistan lacks a large pool of
skilled labor.
U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan
During the 1990s, the United States became the largest single provider of assistance to the Afghan
people. During Taliban rule, no U.S. aid went directly to that government; monies were provided
through relief organizations. Between 1985 and 1994, the United States had a cross-border aid
program for Afghanistan, implemented by USAID personnel based in Pakistan. Citing the
difficulty of administering this program, there was no USAID mission for Afghanistan from the
end of FY1994 until the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan in late 2001.
For all of FY2002-FY2009, the United States has provided about $40 billion in assistance,
including military “train and equip” for the ANA and ANP (which is about $21 billion of these
funds). The Obama Administration request for FY2010 (regular and supplemental) and for
FY2011 are in separate tables below. The figures in the tables do not include costs for U.S.
combat operations. For that information, see CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
, by Amy Belasco.
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Currently, only about 10% to 20% of all donated funds disbursed are channeled through the
Afghan government. The United States views only a few ministries, such as the Ministry of
Public Health, as sufficiently transparent to handle donor funds. However, Ambassador
Holbrooke’s January 2010 strategy document says that the U.S. intent is to increase to about 40%
the percentage of U.S. aid that is channeled through the Afghan government. In the Afghanistan
Compact, the Afghan government promised greater financial transparency and international
(United Nations) oversight to ensure that international contributions are used wisely.
There is also a debate over how aid is distributed. Some of the more stable provinces, such as
Bamiyan and Balkh, are complaining that U.S. and international aid is flowing mostly to the
restive provinces in an effort to quiet them, and ignoring the needs of poor Afghans in peaceful
areas. Later in this report are tables showing U.S. appropriations of assistance to Afghanistan, and
Table 21 lists U.S. spending on all sectors for FY2002-FY2009.
Aid Oversight
Still heavily dependent on donors, Karzai has sought to reassure the international donor
community by establishing a transparent budget and planning process. Some in Congress want to
increase independent oversight of U.S. aid to Afghanistan; the conference report on the FY2008
defense authorization bill (P.L. 110-181) established a “special inspector general” for Afghanistan
reconstruction, (SIGAR) modeled on a similar outside auditor for Iraq (“Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction,” SIGIR). Funds provided for the SIGAR are in the tables below.
On May 30, 2008, Maj. Gen. Arnold Fields (Marine, ret.) was named to the position. He has filed
several reports on Afghan reconstruction, which include discussions of SIGAR staffing levels and
activities, as well as several specific project audits. One recent SIGAR report noted deficiencies
in the ability of the Afghan government’s Central Audits Office to monitor how funds are used.











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Table 8. Major Reporting Requirements
Several provisions require Administration reports on numerous aspects of U.S. strategy, assistance, and related issues:
• P.L. 108-458, The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments require, through the end of FY2010, an
overarching annual report on U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Other reporting requirements expired, including
required reports: (1) on long-term U.S. strategy and progress of reconstruction; (2) on how U.S. assistance is
being used; (3) on U.S. efforts to persuade other countries to participate in Afghan peacekeeping; and (4) a joint
State and Defense Department report on U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan.
• P.L. 110-181 (Section 1230), FY2008 Defense Authorization Act requires a quarterly DOD report on the
security situation in Afghanistan; the first was submitted in June 2008. It is required through FY2011.
• Section 1229 of the same law requires the quarterly report of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR).
• P.L. 111-8 (Omnibus Appropriation, explanatory statement) requires a State Department report on the use of
funds to address the needs of Afghan women and girls (submitted by September 30, 2009).
• P.L. 111-32, FY2009 Supplemental Appropriation (Section 1116), required a report, by the time of the FY2011
budget submission, on whether Afghanistan and Pakistan are cooperating with U.S. policy sufficiently to warrant a
continuation of Administration policy toward both countries, as wel as efforts by these governments to curb
corruption, their efforts to develop a counter-insurgency strategy, the level of political consensus in the two
countries to confront security chal enges, and U.S. government efforts to achieve these objectives.
• The same law (Section 1117) required a report, by September 23, 2009, on metrics to be used to assess
progress on Afghanistan and Pakistan strategy. A progress report measured against those metrics is to be
submitted by March 30, 2010, and every six months thereafter, until the end of FY2011.
• Section 1228 of the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84) requires a report, within 120 days,
on the Afghan Provincial Protection Program and other local security initiatives. Section 1235 authorizes a DOD-
funded study of U.S. force levels needed for eastern and southern Afghanistan, and Section 1226 requires a
Comptroller General report on the U.S. “campaign plan” for the Afghanistan (and Iraq) effort.

Aid Authorization: Afghanistan Freedom Support Act
A key post-Taliban aid authorization bill, S. 2712, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (AFSA)
of 2002 (P.L. 107-327, December 4, 2002), as amended, authorized about $3.7 billion in U.S.
civilian aid for FY2003-FY2006. The law, whose authority has now expired, was intended to
create a central source for allocating funds; that aid strategy was not implemented. However,
some of the humanitarian, counter-narcotics, and governance assistance targets authorized by the
act were met or exceeded by appropriations. No Enterprise Funds authorized by the act have been
appropriated. The act authorized the following:
• $60 million in total counter-narcotics assistance ($15 million per year for
FY2003-FY2006);
• $30 million in assistance for political development, including national, regional,
and local elections ($10 million per year for FY2003-FY2005);
• $80 million total to benefit women and for Afghan human rights oversight ($15
million per year for FY2003-FY2006 for the Afghan Ministry of Women’s
Affairs, and $5 million per year for FY2003-FY2006 to the Human Rights
Commission of Afghanistan);
• $1.7 billion in humanitarian and development aid ($425 million per year for
FY2003-FY2006);
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• $300 million for an Enterprise Fund;
• $550 million in drawdowns of defense articles and services for Afghanistan and
regional militaries. (The original law provided for $300 million in drawdowns.
That was increased by subsequent appropriations laws.)
A subsequent law (P.L. 108-458, December 17, 2004), implementing the recommendations of the
9/11 Commission, contained “The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004.” The
subtitle mandated the appointment of a U.S. coordinator of policy on Afghanistan and requires
additional Administration reports to Congress.
Afghan Freedom Support Act Reauthorization
In the 110th Congress, H.R. 2446, passed by the House on June 6, 2007 (406-10), would have
reauthorized AFSA through FY2010. A version (S. 3531), with fewer provisions than the House
bill, was not taken up by the full Senate. Some observers say that versions of AFSA
reauthorization are expected to be reintroduced in the 111th Congress. The following are the major
provisions of H.R. 2446:
• A total of about $1.7 billion in U.S. economic aid and $320 in military aid
(including drawdowns of equipment) per fiscal year would be authorized.
• A pilot program of crop substitution to encourage legitimate alternatives to poppy
cultivation is authorized. Afghan officials support this provision as furthering
their goal of combating narcotics by promoting alternative livelihoods.
• Enhanced anti-corruption and legal reform programs.
• A cut off of U.S. aid to any Afghan province in which the Administration reports
that the leadership of the province is complicit in narcotics trafficking. This
provision drew criticism from observers who say that the most needy in
Afghanistan might be deprived of aid based on allegations.
• $45 million per year for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, the Afghan
Independent Human Rights Commission, and programs for women and girls.
• $75 million per year for enhanced power generation, a key need in Afghanistan.
• A coordinator for U.S. assistance to Afghanistan.
• Military drawdowns for the ANA and ANP valued at $300 million per year (un-
reimbursed) are authorized (versus the aggregate $550 million allowed
currently).
• Appointment of a special envoy to promote greater Afghanistan-Pakistan
cooperation.
• Reauthorization of “Radio Free Afghanistan.”
• Establishment of a U.S. policy to encourage Pakistan to permit shipments by
India of equipment and material to Afghanistan.
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International Reconstruction Pledges/National Development Strategy
International (non-U.S.) donors have pledged over $30 billion since the fall of the Taliban, as of
late 2009. When combined with U.S. aid, this by far exceeds the $27.5 billion for reconstruction
identified as required for 2002-2010. The major donors, and their aggregate pledges to date, are
listed below. These amounts were pledged, in part, at the following donor conferences: (Tokyo),
Berlin (April 2004), Kabul (April 2005), the London conference (February 2006), and the June
12, 2008, conference in Paris, discussed below. The January 28, 2010, London conference
resulted in further pledges, as noted above. The Afghanistan Compact leaned toward the view of
Afghan leaders that a higher proportion of the aid be channeled through the Afghan government,
a policy adopted by the United States.
At the June 12, 2008, conference in Paris, Afghanistan formally presented its Afghan National
Development Strategy, asking for $50.1 billion during 2009-2014 from international donors. Of
that, $14 billion was requested to improve infrastructure, including airports, and to construct a
railway. Another $14 billion would be to build the ANSF, and about $4.5 billion would be for
agriculture and rural development. However, citing in part a relative lack of transparency in
Afghan governance, donors pledged about $21 billion, but that included $10.2 billion already
committed by the United States.
Among multilateral lending institutions, in May 2002, the World Bank reopened its office in
Afghanistan after 20 years. Its projects have been concentrated in the telecommunications and
road and sewage sectors. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has also been playing a major role
in Afghanistan. One of its projects in Afghanistan was funding the paving of a road from
Qandahar to the border with Pakistan, and as noted above, it is contributing to a project to bring
electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan. On the eve of the London conference on January 28,
2010, the IMF and World Bank announced $1.6 billion in Afghanistan debt relief.
Efforts to build the legitimate economy are showing some results, by accounts of senior U.S.
officials, including expansion of roads and education and health facilities constructed. USAID
spending to promote economic growth is shown in Table 21.
Key Sectors
The following are some key sectors and what has been accomplished with U.S. and international
donor funds:
Roads. Road building is considered a U.S. priority and has been USAID’s largest
project category there, taking up about 25% of USAID spending since the fall of
the Taliban. Roads are considered key to enabling Afghan farmers to bring
legitimate produce to market in a timely fashion, and former commander of U.S.
forces in Afghanistan Gen. Eikenberry (now Ambassador) said “where the roads
end, the Taliban begin.” The major road, the Ring Road, is 78% repaved,
according to the Defense Department June 2009 report on Afghan stability.
Among other major projects completed are a road from Qandahar to Tarin Kowt,
built by U.S. military personnel, inaugurated in 2005; and a road linking the
Panjshir Valley to Kabul. In several provinces, U.S. funds (sometimes CERP
funds) are being used to build roads connecting remote areas to regional district
centers in several provinces in the eastern sector. This is a part of a U.S. effort to
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link up farming communities to the market for their products. Another key
priority is building a Khost-Gardez road, under way currently.
Bridges. Afghan officials are said to be optimistic about increased trade with
Central Asia now that a new bridge has opened (October 2007) over the Panj
River, connecting Afghanistan and Tajikistan. The bridge was built with $33
million in (FY2005) U.S. assistance. The bridge will further assist what press
reports say is robust reconstruction and economic development in the relatively
peaceful and ethnically homogenous province of Panjshir, the political base of
the Northern Alliance.
Education. Despite the success in enrolling Afghan children in school since the
Taliban era (see statistics above), setbacks have occurred because of Taliban
attacks on schools, causing some to close.
Health. The health care sector, as noted by Afghan observers, has made
considerable gains in reducing infant mortality and improving Afghans’ access to
health professionals. In addition to U.S. assistance to develop the health sector’s
capacity, Egypt operates a 65-person field hospital at Bagram Air Base that
instructs Afghan physicians. Jordan operates a similar facility in Mazar-e-Sharif.
Agriculture. USAID has spent about 15% of its Afghanistan funds on agriculture
and “alternative livelihoods” to poppy cultivation, and this has helped
Afghanistan double its legitimate agricultural output over the past five years.
Afghan and U.S. officials say agricultural assistance and development is a top
U.S. priority as part of a strategy of encouraging legitimate alternatives to poppy
cultivation and for export-led growth. One emerging “success story” is growing
Afghan exports of high-quality pomegranate juice called Anar. On the other
hand, U.S. officials in Kabul say that Pakistan’s restrictions on trade between
Afghanistan and India has prevented a rapid expansion of Afghan pomegranate
exports to that market. Dubai is another customer for Afghan pomegranate
exports. Other crops now substituting for poppy include wheat and saffron. To
help Afghanistan develop this sector, the National Guard from several states
(Texas, for example) is deploying “Agribusiness Development Teams” in several
provinces to help Afghan farmers with water management, soil enhancement,
crop cultivation, and improving the development and marketing of their goods.
The timber industry in the northwest is said to be vibrant as well.
Electricity/Energy/Hydrocarbons. About 10% of USAID spending in
Afghanistan is on power projects. The Afghanistan Compact states that the goal
is for electricity to reach 65% of households in urban areas and 25% in rural
areas by 2010. Severe power shortages in Kabul are fewer now than they were
two years ago. The power shortages were caused in part by the swelling of
Kabul’s population to about 3 million, up from half a million when the Taliban
was in power. Power to the capital has grown due to the Afghan government’s
agreements with several Central Asian neighbors to import electricity, although
other electricity projects have suffered from a lack of fuel to run them. Many
shops in Kabul are now lit up at night, as observed by CRS in October 2009.
Afghanistan has no hydrocarbons energy export industry and a small refining
sector that provides some of Afghanistan’s needs for gasoline or other fuels.
Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan are its main fuel suppliers.
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A major power project is the Kajaki Dam, located in unstable Helmand Province.
USAID has allocated about $500 million to restore the three electricity-
generating turbines (two are operating) of the dam which, when functional, will
provide electricity for 1.7 million Afghans and about 4,000 jobs in the
reconstruction. In an operation involving 4,000 NATO troops (Operation Ogap
Tsuka), components of the third and final turbine was successfully delivered to
the dam in September 2008. It was expected to be operational in mid-late 2009
but technical and security problems have delayed the project. The U.S. military
reportedly wants to focus instead on small projects that can bring more electricity
to Qandahar and other places in the south quickly, while State Dept. and USAID
reportedly want to focus resources on a longer term but more enduring projects
such as the dam.
Railways. Afghanistan does not currently have any functioning railway.
However, a railway from Mazar-i-Sharif to the border with Uzbekistan, is now
under construction with $165 million from the Asian Development Bank. The rail
will eventually link up with Herat and will integrate Afghanistan to the former
Soviet railway system in Central Asia, increasing Afghanistan’s economic
integration in the region.
Private Sector Initiatives
Some sectors are being developed primarily with private investment funding. There is substantial
new construction, particularly in Kabul, such as the Serena luxury hotel (opened in November
2005) and a $25 million Coca Cola bottling factory (opened in September 2006). The bottling
factory is located near the Bagrami office park (another private initiative) which includes several
other factories. The Serena was built by the Agha Khan foundation, a major investor in
Afghanistan; the Agha Khan is a leader of the Isma’ili community which is prevalent in northern
Afghanistan. The foundation has also funded the successful Roshan cellphone company. Some
say that private investment could be healthier if not for the influence exercised over it by various
faction leaders and Karzai relatives.
Telecommunications and Transportation. Several Afghan telecommunications
firms have been formed, including Afghan Wireless (another cell phone service,
which competes with Roshan) and Tolo Television. A Gold’s Gym has opened in
Kabul as well. The 52-year-old national airline, Ariana, is said to be in significant
financial trouble due to corruption that has affected its safety ratings and left it
unable to service a heavy debt load, but there are new privately run airlines, such
as Pamir Air, Safi Air (run by the Safi Group, which has built a modern mall in
Kabul), and Kam Air. Major new buildings include several marriage halls in
Kabul city, as observed by CRS in October 2009.
Mining and Gems. Afghanistan’s mining sector has been largely dormant since
the Soviet invasion. Some Afghan leaders complain that not enough has been
done to revive such potentially lucrative industries as minerals mining, such as of
copper and lapis lazuli (a stone used in jewelry). The issue became more urgent
in June 2010 when a Defense Department development team announced, based
on surveys, that Afghanistan may have untapped minerals worth over $1
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trillion.77 Among the most valuable are significant reserves of such minerals as
lithium in western Afghanistan; lithium is crucial to the new batteries being used
to power electric automobiles.
Still, in November 2007, the Afghan government signed a deal with China
Metallurgical Group for the company to invest $3.4 billion to develop
Afghanistan’s Aynak copper field in Lowgar Province. The agreement, viewed as
generous to the point where it might not be commercially profitable for China
Metallurgical Group, includes construction of two coal-fired electric power plant
(one of which will supply more electricity to Kabul city); a freight railway (in
conjunction with the Asian Development Bank project above); and a road from
the project to Kabul. However, work on the mine reportedly has been slowed by
the need to clear mines in the area. Bids are being accepted for another large
mining project, the Haji Gak iron ore mine (which may contain 60 billion tons of
iron ore) near Kabul. China Metallurgy, as well as companies from India, are said
to be finalists for the project.
Hydrocarbons and Pipelines. As noted, Afghanistan has virtually no operational
hydrocarbon energy sector. Afghanistan’s prospects in this sector appeared to
brighten by the announcement in March 2006 of an estimated 3.6 billion barrels
of oil and 36.5 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves. Experts believe these amounts,
if proved, could make Afghanistan relatively self-sufficient in energy and able to
export energy to its neighbors. USAID is funding a test project to develop gas
resources in northern Afghanistan.
Another major energy project remains under consideration. During 1996-1998,
the Clinton Administration supported proposed natural gas and oil pipelines
through western Afghanistan as an incentive for the warring factions to
cooperate. A consortium led by Los Angeles-based Unocal Corporation proposed
a $2.5 billion Central Asia Gas Pipeline, estimated to cost $3.7 billion to
construct, that would originate in southern Turkmenistan and pass through
Afghanistan to Pakistan, with possible extensions into India.78 The deterioration
in U.S.-Taliban relations after 1998 largely ended hopes for the pipeline projects.
Prospects for the project have improved in the post-Taliban period. In a summit
meeting in late May 2002 between the leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan, the three countries agreed to revive the project. Sponsors held an
inaugural meeting on July 9, 2002, in Turkmenistan, signing a series of
preliminary agreements. Turkmenistan’s leadership (President Gurbanguly
Berdimukhamedov, succeeding the late Saparmurad Niyazov) favors the project
as well. Some U.S. officials view this project as a superior alternative to a
proposed gas pipeline from Iran to India, transiting Pakistan.


77 Risen, James. “U.S. Identifies Mineral Riches in Afghanistan.” New York Times, June 14, 2010.
78 Other participants in the Unocal consortium include Delta of Saudi Arabia, Hyundai of South Korea, Crescent Steel
of Pakistan, Itochu Corporation and INPEX of Japan, and the government of Turkmenistan. Some accounts say
Russia’s Gazprom would probably receive a stake in the project. Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), October 30, 1997,
p. 3.
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National Solidarity Program
The United States and the Afghan government are also trying to promote local decision making
on development. The “National Solidarity Program” (NSD) largely funded by U.S. and other
international donors—but implemented by Afghanistan’s Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and
Development—seeks to create and empower local governing councils to prioritize local
reconstruction projects. It is widely hailed as a highly successful, Afghan-run program. The
assistance, channeled through donors, provides block grants of about $60,000 per project to the
councils to implement agreed projects, most of which are water projects. The U.S. aid to the
program is part of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) account.
The FY2009 supplemental request asked about $85 million for the ARTF account, of which much
of those funds would be used to fill a $140 million shortfall in the NSP program. P.L. 111-32, the
FY2009 supplemental discussed above, earmarks $70 million to defray the shortfall. The FY2010
consolidated appropriation (P.L. 111-117) earmarked another $175 million in ESF for the
program.
The FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84) authorizes the use of some CERP
funds, controlled by the U.S. military, to supplement the funding for the NSP. However, this
authorization, if implemented, is likely to incur opposition from some international NGOs who
are opposed to combining military action with development work.
Trade Initiatives/Reconstruction Opportunity Zones
The United States is trying to build on Afghanistan’s post-war economic rebound with trade
initiatives. In September 2004, the United States and Afghanistan signed a bilateral trade and
investment framework agreement (TIFA). These agreements are generally seen as a prelude to a
broader and more complex bilateral free trade agreement, but negotiations on an FTA have not yet
begun. On December 13, 2004, the 148 countries of the World Trade Organization voted to start
membership talks with Afghanistan. Another initiative supported by the United States is the
establishment of joint Afghan-Pakistani “Reconstruction Opportunity Zones” (ROZ’s) which
would be modeled after “Qualified Industrial Zones” run by Israel and Jordan in which goods
produced in the zones receive duty free treatment for import into the United States. For FY2008,
$5 million in supplemental funding was requested to support the zones, but P.L. 110-252 did not
specifically mention the zones.
Bills in the 110th Congress, S. 2776 and H.R. 6387, would authorize the President to proclaim
duty-free treatment for imports from ROZ’s to be designated by the President. In the 111th
Congress, a version of these bills was introduced (S. 496 and H.R. 1318). President Obama
specifically endorsed passage of these bills in his March 2009 strategy announcement. H.R. 1318
was incorporated into H.R. 1886, a Pakistan aid appropriation that is a component of the new
U.S. strategy for the region, and the bill was passed by the House on June 11, 2009, and then
appended to H.R. 2410. Another version of the Pakistan aid bill, S. 1707, did not authorize
ROZ’s; it was passed and became law (P.L. 111-73).

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Table 9. Major International (Non-U.S.) Pledges to Afghanistan Since January 2002
(as of March 2010; $ in millions)
Japan 6,900
Britain 2,897
World Bank
2,803
Asia Development Bank
2,200
European Commission (EC)
1,768
Netherlands
1,697
Canada 1,479
India 1,200
Iran 1,164
Germany 1,108
Norway 977
Denmark 683
Italy 637
Saudi Arabia
533
Spain 486
Australia 440
Total Non-U.S. Pledges
30,800
(including donors not listed)
Sources: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. October 2008 report, p. 140; various press
announcements. Figures include funds pledged at April 2009 NATO summit and Japan’s October 2009 pledge of
$5 billion over the next five years.
Note: This table lists donors pledging over $400 million total.
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Table 10. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998
($ in millions)
Fiscal
Devel.
Econ. Supp.
P.L. 480 (Title I
Other (Incl. Regional
Year
Assist.
(ESF)
and II)
Military
Refugee Aid)
Total
1978 4.989 —
5.742 0.269
0.789 11.789
1979 3.074 —
7.195 —
0.347 10.616
1980

(Soviet invasion-December 1979)


1981 — —
— —


1982 — —
— —


1983 — —
— —


1984 — —
— —


1985 3.369 —



3.369
1986 — —
8.9 —

8.9
1987
17.8
12.1 2.6 — — 32.5
1988 22.5 22.5 29.9 —

74.9
1989 22.5 22.5 32.6 —

77.6
1990 35.0 35.0 18.1 —

88.1
1991 30.0 30.0 20.1 —

80.1
1992 25.0 25.0 31.4 —

81.4
1993 10.0 10.0 18.0 —
30.2 68.2
1994 3.4 2.0
9.0 —
27.9 42.3
1995 1.8 —
12.4 —
31.6 45.8
1996 — — 16.1 —
26.4 42.5
1997 — — 18.0 —
31.9a 49.9
1998

— 3.6
— 49.14b 52.74
Source: Department of State.
a. Includes $3 million for demining and $1.2 million for counternarcotics.
b. Includes $3.3 million in projects targeted for Afghan women and girls, $7 million in earthquake relief aid,
100,000 tons of 416B wheat worth about $15 million, $2 million for demining, and $1.54 for
counternarcotics.
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Table 11. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002
($ in millions)

FY1999 FY2000 FY2001
FY2002
(Final)
U.S. Department of
42.0 worth of
68.875 for 165,000
131.1 (300,000
198.12 (for food
Agriculture (DOA) and
wheat (100,000 metric tons. (60,000 metric tons under
commodities)
USAID Food For Peace
metric tons under
tons for May 2000
P.L. 480, Title II,
(FFP), via World Food
“416(b)” program.)
drought relief)
and 416(b))
Program(WFP)
State/Bureau of
16.95 for Afghan
14.03 for the same
22.03 for similar
136.54 (to U.N.
Population, Refugees and
refugees in Pakistan
purposes
purposes
agencies)
Migration (PRM) via
and Iran, and to
UNHCR and ICRC
assist their
repatriation
State Department/
7.0 to various
6.68 for drought
18.934 for similar
113.36 (to various
Office of Foreign
NGOs to aid
relief and health,
programs
U.N. agencies and
Disaster Assistance
Afghans inside
water, and
NGOs)
(OFDA)
Afghanistan sanitation programs
State Department/HDP
2.615 3.0 2.8
7.0
to
Halo
(Humanitarian Demining
Trust/other demining
Program)
Aid to Afghan Refugees
5.44 (2.789 for
6.169, of which
5.31 for similar

in Pakistan (through
health, training—
$3.82 went to
purposes
various NGOs)
Afghan females in
similar purposes
Pakistan)
Counter-Narcotics

1.50
63.0
USAID/Office of

0.45
(Afghan
24.35 for
Transition Initiatives
women in
broadcasting/media
Pakistan)
Dept. of Defense



50.9 ( 2.4 million
rations)
Foreign Military



57.0 (for Afghan
Financing
national army)
Anti-Terrorism



36.4
Economic Support Funds

105.2
(E.S.F)
Peacekeeping


24.0
Totals
76.6
113.2
182.6
815.9
Source: CRS.
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Table 12. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2003
($ in millions, same acronyms as Table 11)
FY2003 Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 108-7)
Development/Health 90
P.L. 480 Title II (Food Aid)
47
Peacekeeping 10
Disaster Relief
94
ESF
50
Non-Proliferation, De-mining, Anti-Terrorism (NADR)
5
Refugee Relief
55
Afghan National Army (ANA) train and equip (FMF)
21
Total from this law:
372
FY2003 Supplemental (P.L. 108-11)
Road Construction (ESF, Kabul-Qandahar road)
100
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ESF)
10
Afghan government support (ESF)
57
ANA train and equip (FMF)
170
Anti-terrorism/de-mining
28
(NADR, some for Karzai protection)
Total from this law:
365
Total for FY2003
737
Source: CRS.
Note: Earmarks for programs benefitting women and girls totaled: $65 million. Of that amount, $60 million was
earmarked in the supplemental and $5 million in the regular appropriation.
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Table 13. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004
($ in millions, same acronyms as previous tables)
Afghan National Police (FMF)
160
Counter-Narcotics
125.52
Afghan National Army (FMF)
719.38
Presidential Protection (NADR)
52.14
DDR Program (disarming militias)
15.42
MANPAD destruction
1.5
Terrorist Interdiction Program
0.41
Border Control (WMD)
0.23
Good Governance Program
113.57
Political Competition, Consensus Building
24.41
(Elections)
Rule of Law and Human Rights
29.4
Roads
348.68
Education/Schools 104.11
Health/Clinics 76.85
Power
85.13
PRTs
57.4
CERP (DOD funds to build good will)
39.71
Private Sector Development/Economic Growth
63.46
Water Projects
28.9
Agriculture 50.5
Refugee/IDPs 82.6
Food Assistance
88.25
De-Mining 12.61
State/USAID Program Support
203.02
Total Aid for FY2004
2,483.2
Laws Derived: FY2004 supplemental (P.L. 108-106); FY2004 regular appropriation (P.L. 108-
199). Regular appropriation earmarked $5 million for programs benefitting women and girls.
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Table 14. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2005
($ in millions)
Afghan National Police (State Dept. funds, FMF, and DOD funds,
624.46
transition to DOD funds to Afghan security forces
Counter-Narcotics 775.31
Afghan National Army (State Dept. funds, FMF, and DOD funds)
1,633.24
Presidential (Karzai) Protection (NADR funds)
23.10
DDR
5.0
Detainee Operations
16.9
MANPAD Destruction
0.75
Small Arms Control
3.0
Terrorist Interdiction Program
0.1
Border Control (WMD)
0.85
Good Governance
137.49
Political Competition/Consensus-Building/Election Support
15.75
Rule of Law and Human Rights
20.98
Roads
334.1
Afghan-Tajik (Nizhny Panj) Bridge
33.1
Education/Schools 89.63
Health/Clinics 107.4
Power
222.5
PRTs
97.0
CERP
136.0
Civil Aviation (Kabul International Airport)
25.0
Private Sector Development/Economic Growth
77.43
Water Projects
43.2
Agriculture 74.49
Refugee/IDP Assistance
54.6
Food Assistance (P.L. 480, Title II)
108.6
Demining 23.7
State/USAID Program Support
142.84
Total Aid for FY2005
4,826.52
Laws Derived: FY2005 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-447); Second FY2005 Supplemental
(P.L. 109-13). The regular appropriation earmarked $50 million to be used for programs to
benefit women and girls.
Source: CRS.
Note: In FY2005, funds to equip and train the Afghan national security forces was altered from State
Department funds (Foreign Military Financing, FMF) to DOD funds.
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Table 15. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2006
($ in millions)
Afghan National Police (DOD funds)
1,217.5
Counter-narcotics
419.26
Afghan National Army (DOD funds)
735.98
Presidential (Karzai) protection (NADR funds)
18.17
Detainee Operations
14.13
Small Arms Control
2.84
Terrorist Interdiction
.10
Counter-terrorism Finance
.28
Border Control (WMD)
.40
Bilateral Debt Relief
11.0
Budgetary Support to the Government of Afghanistan
1.69
Good Governance
10.55
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
47.5
Political Competition/Consensus Building/Elections
1.35
Civil Society
7.77
Rule of Law and Human Rights
29.95
Roads
235.95
Education/Schools 49.48
Health/Clinics 51.46
Power
61.14
PRTs
20.0
CERP Funds (DOD)
215.0
Private Sector Development/Economic Growth
45.51
Water Projects
.89
Agriculture 26.92
Food Assistance
109.6
De-mining 14.32
Refugee/IDP aid
36.0
State/USAID program support
142.42
Total 3,527.16
Laws Derived: FY2006 Regular Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 109-102); FY06
supplemental (P.L. 109-234). The regular appropriation earmarked $50 million for programs
to benefit women and girls.
Source: CRS.
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Table 16. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2007
($ in millions)
Afghan National Police (DOD funds)
2,523.30
Afghan National Army (DOD funds)
4,871.59
Counter-Narcotics
737.15
Presidential (Karzai) Protection (NADR)
19.9
Detainee Operations
12.7
Small Arms Control
1.75
Terrorist Interdiction Program
0.5
Counter-Terrorism Finance
0.4
Border Control (WMD)
0.5
Budget Support to Afghan Government
31.24
Good Governance
107.25
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (incl. National
Solidarity Program)
63
Political Competition/Election support (ESF)
29.9
Civil Society (ESF)
8.1
Rule of Law/Human Rights (ESF)
65.05
Roads (ESF)
303.1
Education/Schools (ESF)
62.75
Health/Clinics 112.77
Power (ESF)
194.8
PRTs (ESF)
126.1
CERP (DOD funds)
206
Private Sector Development/Economic Growth
70.56
Water Projects (ESF)
2.3
Agriculture (ESF)
67.03
Refugee/IDP Assistance
72.61
Food Assistance
150.9
Demining 27.82
State/USAID Program Support
88.7
Total 9,984.98
Laws Derived: Regular Appropriation P.L. 110-5; DOD Appropriation P.L. 109-289; and
FY2007 Supplemental Appropriation P.L. 110-28. The regular appropriation earmarked $50
million for programs to benefit women/ girls. Providing ESF in excess of $300 million subject
to certification of Afghan cooperation on counter-narcotics.
Sources: CRS; Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, October 2008 report.
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Table 17. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2008
(appropriated, $ in millions)
Afghan National Army (DOD funds)
1,724.68
Afghan National Police (DOD funds)
1,017.38
Counter-Narcotics (INCLE and DOD funds)
619.47
NADR (Karzai protection)
6.29
Radio Free Afghanistan
3.98
Detainee operations
9.6
Small Arms Control
3.0
Terrorist Interdiction Program
.99
Counter-Terrorism Finance
.60
Border Control (WMD)
.75
Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP, DOD
269.4
funds)
Direct Support to Afghan Government
49.61
Good Governance
245.08
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (incl. National
45.0
Solidarity program)
Election Support
90.0
Civil Society Building
4.01
Rule of Law and Human Rights
125.28
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
2.0
(SIGAR)
Roads
324.18
Education/Schools 99.09
Health/Clinics 114.04
Power (incl. Kajaki Dam rehabilitation work)
236.81
PRT programs
75.06
Economic Growth/Private Sector Development
63.06
Water Projects
16.4q
Agriculture 34.44
Refugee/IDP Assistance
42.1
Food Aid
101.83
De-Mining 15.0
State/USAID Program Support
317.4
Total 5,656.53
Appropriations Laws Derived: Regular FY2008 (P.L. 110-161); FY2008 Supplemental (P.L.
110-252). The regular appropriation earmarked $75 million for programs to benefit woman
and girls. ESF over $300 million subject to narcotics cooperation certification.
Sources: Special Inspector General Afghanistan Reconstruction, October 2008 report; CRS.
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Table 18. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2009
($ in millions)
Regular
Bridge
FY2009
Appropriation
Supplemental
Supplemental

(P.L. 111-8)
(P.L. 110-252)
(P.L. 111-32)
Total
ANSF Funding

2,000
3,607
5,607
CERP (DOD funds)

683

683
Detainee ops (DOD)

4

4
Counternarcotics (C-N) (DOD)
24
150
57
232
C-N (DEA)
19


19
C-N—Alternative. Livelihoods (INCLE)
100
70
87
257
C-N—Eradication, Interdiction (INCLE)
178
14
17
209
IMET 1.4


1.4
ARTF (Incl. National Solidarity Program)
45
20
85
150
Governance building
100
68
115
283
Civil Society promotion
8
4

12
Election Support
93
56
25
174
Strategic Program Development


50
50
Rule of Law Programs (USAID)
8
15
20
43
Rule of Law (INCLE)
34
55
80
169
Roads (ESF)
74
65

139
Power (ESF)
73
61

134
Agriculture (ESF and DA)
25

85
110
PRTs/Local Governance (ESF)
74
55
159
288
Education 88
6

94
Health 61
27

88
Econ Growth/”Cash for Work”
49
37
220
306
Water, Environment, Victims Comp.
31
3

34
Karzai Protection (NADR)
32

12
44
Food Aid (P.L. 480, Food for Peace)
14
44

58
Migration, Refugee Aid

50
7
57
State Ops/Embassy Construction
308
131
450
889
USAID Programs and Ops
18
2
165
185
State/USAID IG/SIGAR
3
11
7
20
Cultural Exchanges, International Orgs
6
10

16
Totals 1,463
3,640
5,248
10,352
Notes: P.L. 111-32 (FY2009 supplemental): provides requested funds, earmarks $70 million for National
Solidarity Program; $150 million for women and girls (all of FY2009); ESF over $200 million subject to narcotics
certification; 10% of supplemental INCLE subject to certification of Afghan government moves to curb human
rights abuses, drug involvement.
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Table 19. FY2010 Assistance (Includes Supplemental Request)
($ in millions)
Afghan Security Forces Funding (DOD funds)
9,162 (6,563 appropriated plus 2,600
supplemental request)
CERP (DOD funds)
1,000
Counternarcotics (DOD)
361
INCLE: all functions: interdiction, rule of law,
620 (420 regular approp. plus 200
alternative livelihoods
supplemental request)
IMET
1.5
Global Health/Child Survival
92.3
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (Incl.
200
National Solidarity Program) (ESF)
Governance building (ESF)
191
Civil Society promotion (ESF)
10
Election Support (ESF)
90
Strategic Program Development (ESF)
100
USAID Rule of Law Programs (ESF)
50
Roads (ESF)
230
Power (ESF)
230
Agriculture (ESF)
230
PRT programs/Local governance (ESF)
251
Education (ESF)
95
Health (ESF)
102
Econ Growth/”Cash for Work” (ESF)
274
Water, Environment, Victim Comp. (ESF)
15
Karzai Protection (NADR)
58
Food Aid (P.L. 480, Food for Peace)
16
Refugees and Migration
11
State Ops/Embassy Construction
697 (486 regular plus 211 supplemental)
Cultural Exchanges
6
SIGAR
37 (23 regular plus 14 supp request)
FY2010 supplemental ESF request (for ESF
1,576
programs above)
Total Appropriated and Supp Requested
15,700
Laws derived: FY2010 foreign aid appropriation in Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 111-117),
which earmarks: $175 million (ESF and INCLE) for programs for women and girls, and $175
million (ESF) for the National Solidarity Program. The FY2010 Defense Appropriation (P.L.
111-118), which cut $900 million from the requested amount for the ANSF (regular defense
appropriation).
Source: CRS.
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Table 20. FY2011 Regular Request
($ in millions)
Program/Area Request
Afghan National Security Forces (DOD funds)
11,600
CERP
1,100
Economic Support Funds (ESF)
3,316.3
Global Health/ Child Survival
71.1
INCLE
450
Karzai Protection (NADR funds)
69.3
IMET
1.5
State Dept. Operations (not incl. security)
754
SIGAR
35.3
Total
17,398
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Table 21. Total Obligations for Major Programs: FY2001-FY2009
($ millions)
Security Related Programs (mostly DOD funds)
Afghan National Security Forces
21,297
Counter-Narcotics
3,436
Karzai Protection (NADR funds)
226
DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration of militias)
20.42
Detainee Operations
57.33
MANPAD Destruction (Stingers left over from anti-Soviet war)
2.25
Small Arms Control
10.59
Commander Emergency Response Program (CERP)
1,976
De-Mining Operations (Halo Trust, other contractors)
98.53
International Military Education and Training Funds (IMET)
3
Humanitarian-Related Programs
Food Aid (P.L. 480, other aid)
958
Refugee/IDP aid
743
Debt Relief for Afghan government
11
Democracy and Governance Programs (mostly ESF)
Support for Operations of Afghan Government
80.86
Good Governance (incentives for anti-corruption, anti-narcotics)
1,044
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (funds National Solidarity Program)
305.5
Civil Society (programs to improve political awareness and activity)
31.88
Elections Support
600
Rule of Law and Human Rights (USAID and INCLE funds)
552.66
Economic Sector-Related Programs (mostly ESF)
Roads
1,908
PRT-funded projects (includes local governance as wel as economic programs)
698.11
Education (building schools, teacher training)
535.93
Health (clinic-building, medicines)
620.59
Power
934.38
Water (category also includes some funds to compensate Afghan victims/Leahy)
128.02
Agriculture (focused on sustainable crops, not temporary alternatives to poppy)
441
Private Sector Development/Economic Growth (communications, IT, but
includes some cash-for-work anti-narcotics programs)
627.52
State Dept. operations/Embassy construction/USAID operations/educational and
cultural exchanges/SIGAR operations
2,445
Total (including minor amounts not included in table)
39,730
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Table 22. NATO/ISAF Contributing Nations
(As of June 21, 2010; http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf)
NATO Countries
Non-NATO Partners
Belgium 590
Albania 250
Bulgaria 525
Armenia 75
Canada 2,830
Austria
3
Czech Republic
525
Australia
1,550
Denmark 750
Azerbaijan 90
Estonia 160
Bosnia-Herzegovina
10
France 3,750
Croatia 280
Germany 4,350
Finland
115
Greece 75
Georgia
925
Hungary 340
Ireland
7
Iceland 3
Jordan 6
Italy 3,300
Macedonia
210
Latvia 170
Mongolia
40
Lithuania 245
Montenegro
30
Luxemburg 9
New
Zealand
155
Netherlands 1,705
Singapore
40
Norway 500
Slovenia 75
Poland 2500
Sweden 500
Portugal 265
Ukraine 15
Romania 1,140
United
Arab
Emirates
25
Slovakia
290
South Korea
0
Slovenia 70

Spain 1,415

Turkey 1,710

United Kingdom
9,500


United States
78,430


Total Listed ISAF: 119,500
Note: This ISAF table likely does not include the ful extent of U.S. buildup that is under way, and may also
reflect differences in counting U.S. forces as part of ISAF or as part of the separate OEF mission. As noted
elsewhere in this report, U.S. force totals in Afghanistan are approximately 94,000. Non-U.S. forces in the table
total 41,000. In addition, the NATO/ISAF site states that troop numbers in this table are based on broad
contribution and do not necessarily reflect the exact numbers on the ground at any one time.
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Table 23. Provincial Reconstruction Teams
Location (City)
Province/Command
U.S.-Lead (all under ISAF banner)
1. Gardez
Paktia Province (RC-East, E)
2. Ghazni
Ghazni (RC-E). with Poland.
3. Bagram
Parwan (RC-C, Central)
A.B./Charikar
4. Jalalabad
Nangarhar (RC-E)
5. Khost
Khost (RC-E)
6. Qalat
Zabol (RC-South, S). with Romania.
7. Asadabad
Kunar (RC-E)
8. Sharana
Paktika (RC-E). with Poland.
9. Mehtarlam
Laghman (RC-E)
10. Jabal o-Saraj
Panjshir Province (RC-E), State Department lead
11. Qala Gush
Nuristan (RC-E)
12. Farah
Farah (RC-W)
Partner Lead (all under ISAF banner)
PRT Location
Province
Lead Force/Other forces
13. Qandahar
Qandahar (RC-S)
Canada
14. Lashkar Gah
Helmand (RC-S)
Britain. with Denmark and Estonia
15. Tarin Kowt
Uruzgan (RC-S)
Netherlands. With Australia and 40 Singaporean military medics and
others
16. Herat
Herat (RC-W)
Italy
17. Qalah-ye Now
Badghis (RC-W)
Spain
18. Mazar-e-Sharif
Balkh (RC-N)
Sweden
19. Konduz
Konduz (RC-N)
Germany
20. Faizabad
Badakhshan (RC-
Germany. with Denmark, Czech Rep.
N)
21. Meymaneh
Faryab (RC-N)
Norway. with Sweden.
22. Chaghcharan
Ghowr (RC-W)
Lithuania. with Denmark, U.S., Iceland
23. Pol-e-Khomri
Baghlan (RC-N)
Hungary
24. Bamiyan
Bamiyan (RC-E)
New Zealand (not NATO/ISAF). 10 Singaporean engineers
25. Maidan Shahr
Wardak (RC-C)
Turkey
26. Pul-i-Alam
Lowgar (RC-E)
Czech Republic
27. Shebergan
Jowzjan (RC-N)
Turkey
Note: RC = Regional Command.
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Table 24. Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan
Party/
Ideology/

Leader
Leader
Ethnicity
Regional Base
Taliban
Mullah (Islamic cleric) Muhammad Umar (still at large
Ultra-
Insurgent
possibly in Afghanistan). Jalaludin and Siraj Haqqani allied with
orthodox
groups, mostly
Taliban and Al Qaeda. Umar, born in Tarin Kowt, Uruzgan
Islamic,
in the south and
province, is about 65 years old.
Pashtun
east, and in
Pakistan
Islamic Society Burhannudin Rabbani/ Yunus Qanooni (speaker of lower
Moderate Much of
(leader of
house)/Muhammad Fahim/Dr. Abdul ah Abdul ah (Foreign
Islamic,
northern and
“Northern
Minister 2001-2006). Ismail Khan, a so-cal ed “warlord,”
mostly Tajik western
Alliance”)
heads faction of the grouping in Herat area. Khan, now
Afghanistan,
Minister of Energy and Water, visited United States in March
including Kabul
2008 to sign USAID grant for energy projects.
National
Abdul Rashid Dostam. During OEF, impressed U.S.
Secular,
Mazar-e-Sharif,
Islamic
commanders with horse-mounted assaults on Taliban
Uzbek
Shebergan, and
Movement of
positions at Shulgara Dam, south of Mazar-e-Sharif, leading
environs
Afghanistan
to the fal of that city and the Taliban’s subsequent col apse.
About 2,000 Taliban prisoners taken by his forces were held
in shipping containers, died of suffocation, and were buried
in mass grave. Grave excavated in mid-2008, possibly an
effort by Dostam to destroy evidence of the incident. Was
Karzai rival in October 2004 presidential election, then his
top “security adviser” but now in exile in Turkey.
Hizb-e-
Composed of Shiite Hazara tribes from central Afghanistan.
Shiite,
Bamiyan
Wahdat
Karim Khalili is Vice President, but Mohammad Mohaqiq is
Hazara
province
Karzai rival in 2004 presidential election and parliament.
tribes
General y pro-Iranian. Was part of Rabbani 1992-1996
government, and fought unsuccessful y with Taliban over
Bamiyan city. Still revered by Hazara Shiites is the former
leader of the group, Abdul Ali Mazari, who was captured and
killed by the Taliban in March 1995.
Pashtun
Various regional governors and local leaders in the east and
Moderate Dominant in the
Leaders
south; central government led by Hamid Karzai.
Islamic,
south and east
Pashtun
Hizb-e-Islam
Mujahedin party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. Was part of
Orthodox Small groups
Gulbuddin
Soviet-era U.S.-backed “Afghan Interim Government” based
Islamic,
around Jalalabad,
(HIG)
in Peshawar, Pakistan. Was nominal “prime minister” in
Pashtun
Nuristan, and
1992-1996 mujahedin government but never actual y took
Kunar provinces
office. Lost power base around Jalalabad to the Taliban in
1994, and fled to Iran before being expelled in 2002. Still
allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda in operations east of Kabul,
but open to ending militant activity. Leader of a rival Hizb-e-
Islam faction, Yunus Khalis, the mentor of Mullah Umar, died
July 2006.
Islamic Union
Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf. Islamic conservative, leads a pro-
orthodox Paghman
Karzai faction in parliament. Lived many years in and
Islamic,
(west of Kabul)
politically close to Saudi Arabia, which shares his “Wahhabi”
Pashtun
ideology. During anti-Soviet war, Sayyaf’s faction, with
Hikmatyar, was a principal recipient of U.S. weaponry.
Criticized the U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein after
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
Source: CRS.
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Residual Issues from Past Conflicts
A few issues remain unresolved from Afghanistan’s many years of conflict, such as Stinger
retrieval and mine eradication.
Stinger Retrieval
Beginning in late 1985 following internal debate, the Reagan Administration provided about
2,000 man-portable “Stinger” anti-aircraft missiles to the mujahedin for use against Soviet
aircraft. Prior to the U.S.-led ouster of the Taliban, common estimates suggested that 200-300
Stingers remained at large, although more recent estimates put the number below 100.79 The
Stinger issue resurfaced in conjunction with 2001 U.S. war effort, when U.S. pilots reported that
the Taliban fired some Stingers at U.S. aircraft during the war. No hits were reported. Any
Stingers that survived the anti-Taliban war are likely controlled by Afghans now allied to the
United States and presumably pose less of a threat, in part because of the deterioration of the
weapons’ batteries and other internal components.
In 1992, after the fall of the Russian-backed government of Najibullah, the United States
reportedly spent about $10 million to buy the Stingers back, at a premium, from individual
mujahedin commanders. The New York Times reported on July 24, 1993, that the buy back effort
failed because the United States was competing with other buyers, including Iran and North
Korea, and that the CIA would spend about $55 million in FY1994 in a renewed buy-back effort.
On March 7, 1994, the Washington Post reported that the CIA had recovered only a fraction
(maybe 50 or 100) of the at-large Stingers. In February 2002, the Afghan government found and
returned to the United States “dozens” of Stingers.80 In late January 2005, Afghan intelligence
began a push to buy remaining Stingers back, at a reported cost of $150,000 each.81
The danger of these weapons has become apparent on several occasions, although U.S.
commanders have not reported any recent active firings of these devices. Iran bought 16 of the
missiles in 1987 and fired one against U.S. helicopters; some reportedly were transferred to
Lebanese Hizballah. India claimed that it was a Stinger, supplied to Islamic rebels in Kashmir
probably by sympathizers in Afghanistan, that shot down an Indian helicopter over Kashmir in
May 1999.82 It was a Soviet-made SA-7 “Strella” man-portable launchers that were fired,
allegedly by Al Qaeda, against a U.S. military aircraft in Saudi Arabia in June 2002 and against
an Israeli passenger aircraft in Kenya on November 30, 2002. Both missed their targets. SA-7s
were discovered in Afghanistan by U.S. forces in December 2002.
Mine Eradication
Land mines laid during the Soviet occupation constitute one of the principal dangers to the
Afghan people. The United Nations estimates that 5 million to 7 million mines remain scattered
throughout the country, although some estimates are lower. U.N. teams have destroyed one

79 Saleem, Farrukh. “Where Are the Missing Stinger Missiles? Pakistan,” Friday Times. August 17-23, 2001.
80 Fullerton, John. “Afghan Authorities Hand in Stinger Missiles to U.S.” Reuters, February 4, 2002.
81 “Afghanistan Report,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. February 4, 2005.
82 “U.S.-Made Stinger Missiles—Mobile and Lethal.” Reuters, May 28, 1999.
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million mines and are now focusing on de-mining priority-use, residential and commercial
property, including lands around Kabul. As shown in the U.S. aid table for FY1999-FY2002
(Table 11), the U.S. de-mining program was providing about $3 million per year for Afghanistan,
and the amount increased to about $7 million in the post-Taliban period. Most of the funds have
gone to HALO Trust, a British organization, and the U.N. Mine Action Program for Afghanistan.
The Afghanistan Compact adopted in London in February 2006 states that by 2010, the goal
should be to reduce the land area of Afghanistan contaminated by mines by 70%.

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Appendix. U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted
Virtually all U.S. and international sanctions on Afghanistan, some imposed during the Soviet
occupation era and others on the Taliban regime, have now been lifted.
• P.L. 108-458 (December 17, 2004, referencing the 9/11 Commission
recommendations) repealed bans on aid to Afghanistan outright. On October 7,
1992, President George H.W. Bush had issued Presidential Determination 93-3
that Afghanistan is no longer a Marxist-Leninist country, but the determination
was not implemented before he left office. Had it been implemented, the
prohibition on Afghanistan’s receiving Export-Import Bank guarantees,
insurance, or credits for purchases under Section 8 of the 1986 Export-Import
Bank Act, would have been lifted. In addition, Afghanistan would have been able
to receive U.S. assistance because the requirement would have been waived that
Afghanistan apologize for the 1979 killing in Kabul of U.S. Ambassador to
Afghanistan Adolph “Spike” Dubs. (Dubs was kidnapped in Kabul in 1979 and
killed when Afghan police stormed the hideout where he was held.)
• U.N. sanctions on the Taliban imposed by Resolution 1267 (October 15, 1999),
Resolution 1333 (December 19, 2000), and Resolution 1363 (July 30, 2001) have
now been narrowed to penalize only Al Qaeda (by Resolution 1390, January 17,
2002). Resolution 1267 banned flights outside Afghanistan by Ariana, and
directed U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets. Resolution 1333 prohibited
the provision of arms or military advice to the Taliban (directed against
Pakistan); ordered a reduction of Taliban diplomatic representation abroad; and
banned foreign travel by senior Taliban officials. Resolution 1363 provided for
monitors in Pakistan to ensure that no weapons or military advice was provided
to the Taliban.
• On January 10, 2003, President Bush signed a proclamation making Afghanistan
a beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), eliminating U.S.
tariffs on 5,700 Afghan products. Afghanistan had been denied GSP on May 2,
1980, under Executive Order 12204 (45 F.R. 20740).
• On April 24, 1981, controls on U.S. exports to Afghanistan of agricultural
products and phosphates were terminated. Such controls were imposed on June 3,
1980, as part of the sanctions against the Soviet Union for the invasion of
Afghanistan, under the authority of Sections 5 and 6 of the Export Administration
Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404, app. 2405].
• In mid-1992, the George H.W. Bush Administration determined that Afghanistan
no longer had a “Soviet-controlled government.” This opened Afghanistan to the
use of U.S. funds made available for the U.S. share of U.N. organizations that
provide assistance to Afghanistan.
• On March 31, 1993, after the fall of Najibullah in 1992, President Clinton, on
national interest grounds, waived restrictions provided for in Section 481 (h) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 mandating sanctions on Afghanistan,
including bilateral aid cuts and suspensions, including denial of Ex-Im Bank
credits; the casting of negative U.S. votes for multilateral development bank
loans; and a non-allocation of a U.S. sugar quota. Discretionary sanctions
included denial of GSP; additional duties on exports to the United States; and
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curtailment of air transportation with the United States. Waivers were also
granted in 1994 and, after the fall of the Taliban, by President Bush.
• On May 3, 2002, President Bush restored normal trade treatment to the products
of Afghanistan, reversing the February 18, 1986, proclamation by President
Reagan (Presidential Proclamation 5437) that suspended most-favored nation
(MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan (51 F.R. 4287). The Foreign Assistance
Appropriations for FY1986 [Section 552, P.L. 99-190] had authorized the denial
of U.S. credits or most-favored-nation (MFN) status for Afghanistan.
• On July 2, 2002, the State Department amended U.S. regulations (22 C.F.R. Part
126) to allow arms sales to the new Afghan government, reversing the June 14,
1996, addition of Afghanistan to the list of countries prohibited from importing
U.S. defense articles and services. Arms sales to Afghanistan had also been
prohibited during 1997-2002 because Afghanistan had been designated under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132) as a state
that is not cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts.
• On July 2, 2002, President Bush formally revoked the July 4, 1999, declaration
by President Clinton of a national emergency with respect to Taliban because of
its hosting of bin Laden. The Clinton determination and related Executive Order
13129 had blocked Taliban assets and property in the United States, banned U.S.
trade with Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan, and applied these sanctions to
Ariana Afghan Airlines, triggering a blocking of Ariana assets (about $500,000)
in the United States and a ban on U.S. citizens’ flying on the airline. (The ban on
trade with Taliban-controlled territory had essentially ended on January 29, 2002,
when the State Department determination that the Taliban controls no territory
within Afghanistan.).
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Figure A-1. Map of Afghanistan

Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.
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Figure A-2. Map of Afghan Ethnicities

Source: 2003 National Geographic Society. http://www.afghan-network.net/maps/Afghanistan-Map.pdf. Adapted
by Amber Wilhelm, CRS Graphics.
Notes: This map is intended to be illustrative of the approximate demographic distribution by region of
Afghanistan. CRS has no way to confirm exact population distributions.

Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612


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