Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations
Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
June 14, 2010
Congressional Research Service
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Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations
Summary
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ruled by the Al Saud family since its founding in 1932, wields
significant political and economic influence as the birthplace of the Islamic faith and by virtue of
its large energy reserves. Since 2005, King Abdullah bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud has sought to
strengthen Saudi relations with European and Asian counterparts and has worked to build and
lead an Arab consensus on regional security issues such as Lebanon and the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. Domestic reforms under King Abdullah have codified royal succession rules, begun
restructuring the justice system, and updated some educational curricula and practices. An Al
Qaeda-inspired terrorist campaign inside the kingdom appears to have ebbed as security
improvements and anti-extremism campaigns have been implemented. However, Saudi
authorities remain focused on the threat of a resurgence in domestic terrorism. In March 2010,
officials announced the arrest of over 110 individuals suspected of continuing involvement in Al
Qaeda activities. Robust energy export revenues in recent years strengthened the kingdom’s
regional and global economic position and are now providing Saudi leaders with resources to
meet investment needs and fiscal challenges posed by the global economic downturn.
A close Cold War-era relationship between the United States government and the ruling Al Saud
family was built on shared interests in securing Saudi oil production and in combating global
Communism. Since the end of the Cold War, the emergence of the Al Qaeda terrorist threat and
volatile regional security conditions in the Middle East have tested U.S.-Saudi relations. The
direct participation of 15 Saudi nationals in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the
identification of several Saudi nationals and entities as alleged supporters of terrorism have called
into question Saudi Arabia’s reliability as an ally for some U.S. observers. Increased official
counterterrorism cooperation and shared concerns about Iranian foreign policy have provided a
new strategic logic for U.S.-Saudi security relations since 2003. Long-standing defense ties
remain intact, and U.S. arms sales have continued, with over $18.7 billion in potential Foreign
Military Sales to Saudi Arabia approved by the executive branch and Congress since 2005.
While security cooperation has improved since 2003, the United States and Saudi Arabia continue
to face a core challenge identified by the 9/11 Commission in its final report: defining a broader
bilateral relationship that “leaders on both sides are prepared to publicly defend.” The Obama
Administration has continued to hold high-level consultations with key decision makers in the
Saudi royal family on issues of mutual concern, including energy policy, finance, Israeli-Arab
peace, Iran, trade, and counterterrorism. In conjunction with a May 2008 visit by President Bush
to Saudi Arabia, the previous Administration announced new agreements relating to nuclear
cooperation, infrastructure security training, and visas.
The Obama Administration has signaled its intention to engage the Saudi government as a
strategic partner in efforts to promote regional stability and to defeat Al Qaeda. The 111th
Congress has considered foreign assistance requests for Saudi Arabia and prohibited the use of
FY2010 funds for assistance to Saudi Arabia, subject to a national interest waiver authority
granted to the Secretary of State. The Obama Administration is requesting $360,000 in border
security assistance and $10,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding
for Saudi Arabia in FY2011. This report provides background information about Saudi Arabia and
analyzes current issues in U.S.-Saudi relations.
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Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations
Contents
Recent Developments.................................................................................................................. 1
Background ................................................................................................................................ 4
Saudi Arabia’s Political Development.................................................................................... 4
Saudi-U.S. Relations, 1931-1991........................................................................................... 5
Saudi-U.S. Relations, 1991-2001........................................................................................... 7
September 11, 2001, and its Aftermath .................................................................................. 8
The 9/11 Commission Report .......................................................................................... 9
Saudi Responses ............................................................................................................. 9
Recent Assessments ............................................................................................................ 10
Terrorist Financing Concerns ........................................................................................ 10
Toward a New Relationship?............................................................................................... 11
Recent Bilateral Agreements ......................................................................................... 13
Recent Congressional Interest in Saudi Arabia........................................................................... 14
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Saudi Arabia and Congressional Prohibitions............................. 15
International Military Education and Training (IMET)................................................... 15
Counterterrorism Assistance.......................................................................................... 16
Prohibitions on Foreign Assistance................................................................................ 17
FY2010 Appropriations Debate ..................................................................................... 18
U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia ......................................................................................... 19
Background .................................................................................................................. 19
Criticism and Action in the 110th Congress .................................................................... 20
BAE Corruption Inquiry................................................................................................ 22
Current Issues in U.S.-Saudi Relations ...................................................................................... 23
U.S.-Saudi Military Cooperation ......................................................................................... 24
U.S. Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia (USMTM) ........................................... 25
Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization Program (PM-SANG)............................. 25
Office of Program Management Ministry of Interior – Facilities Security Forces
(OPM MOI-FSF) ....................................................................................................... 26
Counterterrorism................................................................................................................. 26
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula ................................................................................ 27
Combating Extremism .................................................................................................. 28
The Arab-Israeli Conflict..................................................................................................... 30
Saudi-Palestinian Relations ........................................................................................... 31
Saudi Peace Proposals................................................................................................... 31
Iraq..................................................................................................................................... 33
Saudi Policy Priorities in Iraq........................................................................................ 34
Saudi-Iraqi Diplomatic and Economic Relations............................................................ 34
Economic Relations and Trade ............................................................................................ 36
U.S.-Saudi Trade........................................................................................................... 36
U.S. Oil Imports and Saudi Policy................................................................................. 36
U.S.-Saudi Foreign Direct Investment ........................................................................... 37
Saudi Boycott of Israel and WTO Membership ............................................................. 38
Human Rights, Religious Freedom, and Political Reform .................................................... 39
Political Reform Debates and Elections ......................................................................... 40
Leadership and Succession............................................................................................ 41
Social Reform Debates and Recent Leadership Changes................................................ 42
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Human Rights ............................................................................................................... 43
Religious Freedom ........................................................................................................ 44
Consular Issues ................................................................................................................... 45
Further Reading and Historical Resources ................................................................................. 48
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Saudi Arabia .................................................................................................... 5
Figure 2. Non-Immigrant U.S. Visas Issued to Saudi Nationals, 1996-2009 ............................... 46
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Military Training Provided to Saudi Personnel ..................................................... 16
Table 2. U.S. Assistance to Saudi Arabia, FY2004-FY2011 ....................................................... 17
Table 3. U.S. Oil Consumption and Imports .............................................................................. 37
Appendixes
Appendix A. Recent Proposed Arms Sales................................................................................. 49
Appendix B. Text of Saudi Peace Initiatives .............................................................................. 52
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 54
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Recent Developments
In December 2009, the House and Senate approved the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act
(H.R. 3288, P.L. 111-117). Section 7041 of the act prohibits the obligation or expenditure of funds
appropriated by the act for Saudi Arabia, subject to a national interest waiver authority granted to
the Secretary of State. The Obama Administration estimates that it will obligate $8,000 for
International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds and $200,000 in border security
assistance (Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs - NADR) funding
for Saudi Arabia in FY2010. As of May 25, 2010, the Secretary of State had not issued a waiver
for FY2010 funds. The Administration is requesting $10,000 in IMET funds and $360,000 in
NADR funds to continue current programs in FY2011. IMET assistance makes Saudi Arabia
eligible to purchase other U.S. military training at reduced rates using its own funds. The
conference report for H.R. 3288 (H.Rept. 111-366) requires the Administration to report to
Congress within 180 days (by June 14, 2010) on the net savings this eligibility provides to Saudi
Arabia and other IMET recipients.
Saudi Arabia has hosted a number of Iraqi political leaders in the wake of Iraq’s March 2010
national elections. President Jalal Talibani, Vice President Tariq al Hashimi, Kurdistan Regional
Government President Massoud Barzani, Iraqiya list leader Iyad Allawi, Iraq Supreme Islamic
Council leader Ammar al Hakim, and Al Sadr trend political council chairman Karrar al Khafaji
all have visited Riyadh for consultations with Saudi officials. Saudi Arabia has yet to name an
ambassador to Baghdad, and debt relief discussions remain unresolved. In light of longstanding
Saudi concerns about instability and Iranian influence in Iraq, most observers expect that the
outcome of coalition and cabinet formation negotiations in Baghdad will shape directly Saudi
decisions about the future of the bilateral relationship. In response to accusations of Saudi
financial and political support for the Iraqiya list in the recent election, Foreign Minister Prince
Saud al Faisal bin Abdelaziz Al Saud said, “We support all Iraqis, and Iraq’s unity, independence
and sovereignty over its territory, and we maintain the same distance from all politicians.” Most
observers believe that Saudi Arabia would prefer to see a non-sectarian government emerge in
Iraq that would help to balance Iran’s influence in the region and that would not threaten its Arab
neighbors.
Saudi Arabia’s brief war with Yemen’s Al Houthi rebel movement drew to a close in February
2010, ending months of air strikes and ground combat operations on the border between the
southern Saudi province of Jizan and the northern Yemeni province of Sa’da. The Yemeni
military had been battling the rebels for months in the latest and most intense round of fighting in
a civil war that has resurfaced over years in spite of periodic cease-fire agreements. Over 130
Saudi military personnel were killed and hundreds more were injured in the fighting, which began
in November 2009. The conflict was a major test of Saudi air and ground combat capabilities,
which have been developed in recent years with the support of U.S. training and equipment
purchased by the Saudi government through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program. Saudi
forces reportedly captured hundreds of alleged Al Houthi fighters during operations to prevent
infiltration attacks and enforce a security zone along the border.
The fighting was the latest example of a trend that has seen Saudi Arabia drawn more closely into
the affairs of its problematic southern neighbor, as Yemen’s government upholds an uncertain
ceasefire with the rebels amid continuing attacks from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and
ongoing demonstrations by separatists in southern Yemen. The threat that Al Qaeda in Yemen
poses to Saudi Arabia was vividly illustrated by a failed assassination attempt in August 2009
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against Assistant Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdelaziz Al Saud, the
director of the kingdom’s counterterrorism campaign. The March 2010 arrest of over 110 alleged
Al Qaeda operatives in the kingdom, including twelve individuals described as squads of suicide
bombers, reportedly prevented attacks on energy infrastructure in the kingdom. The death of
young Saudi AQAP leader Nayef al Qahtani was announced in Yemen in mid-May 2010; Saudi
authorities welcomed the announcement and noted that Al Qahtani had served as an important
link between AQAP operatives in Yemen and the group’s supporters in the kingdom.
The attempted Christmas Day 2009 airliner bombing in the United States created new urgency for
U.S. plans to provide increased security assistance to the Yemeni government. The kingdom
hosted a donors conference for Yemen in February 2010 and announced $115 million in new
loans for Yemen to support education, infrastructure and health care projects. In 2006, Saudi
Arabia pledged $1 billion in loans and grants for Yemen; officials continue to negotiate
agreements to disburse those funds.
Saudi Crown Prince and Minister of Defense and Aviation Sultan bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud
returned to the kingdom on December 9, 2009, after a yearlong absence during which he was
treated for an undisclosed chronic illness—widely believed to be cancer—and spent most of the
year recuperating in Morocco. During the Crown Prince’s absence, King Abdullah bin Abd al
Aziz named long-serving Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abd al Aziz to serve as Second
Deputy Prime Minister, a position seen as a potential stepping stone to the position of Crown
Prince and heir to the Saudi throne. Some observers express concern about the potential policy
implications of Prince Nayef’s conservative political and religious views, while others emphasize
the constraints imposed on Saudi leaders by the kingdom’s consensus-driven leadership system
and by global and domestic economic conditions.
In February 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Saudi Arabia for consultations with
Saudi leaders. In remarks with the Secretary, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal bin Abd al
Aziz Al Saud noted that Saudi leaders “appreciate the prompt movement of the U.S.
Administration to resuscitate the [Israeli-Palestinian] peace process and to treat the major issue of
conflict within the framework of the two-state solution which aims at an autonomous and viable
Palestinian state.” He added that “The kingdom believes in the importance of launching the peace
process comprehensively to treat all the main issues of the conflict simultaneously, according to
specific terms of reference and a clear-cut time schedule taking into account that the step-by-step
policy and the confidence-building strategy have failed to accomplish their objectives.” Saudi
officials continue to vocally and vehemently criticize Israeli settlement activity, particularly in the
environs of Jerusalem. At the March 2010 Arab League in Sirte, Libya, the foreign minister called
for a “clear Arab movement… to address the campaign of Judaization and desecration of the Arab
and Islamic heritage in the city of Al Quds {Jerusalem).”
The kingdom launched the King Abdullah City for Nuclear and Renewable Energy in April 2010,
to oversee the country’s planned development of nuclear energy production and meet rising
domestic consumption needs. Like other oil exporting states in the region, Saudi Arabia has
signaled its intention to develop alternative energy generation methods to preserve its oil
resources as an export revenue source. Saudi Arabia signed a Memorandum of Understanding on
Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation with the United States in 2008 in which it signaled its intent to
forego domestic uranium enrichment or fuel reprocessing in favor of procuring nuclear fuel from
market sources.
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Also in April, Saudi Intelligence Director Prince Muqrin bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud attended the
Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, and pledged the kingdom’s support for a zone free
of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. In his remarks, Prince Muqrin argued that
“Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons constitutes a fundamental obstacle to the achievement of
security and stability in the Middle Eastern region.” With regard to Iran, he stated that Saudi
Arabia “welcomes the international endeavors to find a peaceful solution to this crisis through
dialogue in such a way as to guarantee the right of Iran and other states in the region to the
peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the procedural safeguards, and under the
supervision, of the International Atomic Energy Agency.” He warned of the dangers and ultimate
futility of a nuclear arms race in the region and signaled support for recent changes in U.S.
nuclear policy.
Massive flooding in the western city of Jeddah killed over 120 Saudis in November 2009 and
damaged thousands of homes and vehicles. The government’s response in recent months has
raised some Saudi’s hopes for increased government responsiveness and support for official
accountability. Over 50 officials were detained in the wake of the flooding and investigations into
alleged administrative corruption and its role in the disaster are ongoing. Prince Khaled al Faisal
bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud, the governor of Mecca, has overseen the special investigative committee
looking into the matter. In May 2010, King Abdullah issued a royal decree calling for the referral
of suspects for prosecution and issuing orders to a number of ministries and regional bodies to
address factors that led to the floods and to make infrastructure improvements to curb future
flooding threats. The decree was welcomed and praised by many Saudi observers.
Saudi Shiites in the Eastern Province have protested the arrest of a number of activists and the
closure of a number of mosques in recent months. Sectarian tensions have risen in the kingdom in
the wake of clashes between Shiite worshipers and religious police and security forces in the city
of Medina in February 2009. Both King Abdullah and Shiite leaders such as Shaykh Hassan al
Saffar appear to remain committed to the dialogue process dialogue that has prevailed in recent
years. However, there appears to be potential for further confrontation between activist elements
of the Shiite community and conservative members of the Sunni security and religious
establishment in the Eastern Province, particularly with regard to Shiite demands for permits for
new mosques and attempts at more public expressions of their faith.
Saudi public debate has focused intensely on issues of women’s rights, education, and religious
extremism in recent months, fueled by events and statements by clerics, journalists, and activists.
Outspoken criticism of the alleged extremism of some religious clerics, clerical condemnations of
gender mixing and certain media practices, and debate among women about their role and rights
in society appear frequently, if not daily, in Saudi media. Many outside observers have noted
marked differences in the intensity and frequency of public debate on these issues and argue that
the government no longer has the ability it once held to effectively stifle public discourse on
sensitive social matters, even as its control over security and political activity has tightened in
recent years. By all accounts, certain so-called “red lines” still exist, most notably with regard to
the ruling family and calls for fundamental political change. The boundaries of debate on
religious and social issues now appear more fluid, though government officials, including the
king, have called for moderation in the tone of public remarks and writing by citizens.
The 2009 State Department report on human rights in Saudi Arabia (released March 2010) notes
both severe problems and improvements in human rights conditions. Restrictions on civil liberties
and religious freedom, allegations of torture, and political detention were reported along with the
implementation of judicial reforms and improvements in women’s education.
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Background
Saudi Arabia’s Political Development
As the birthplace of the Islamic religion in 622 A.D. and as the home of Islam’s two holiest sites
(the cities of Mecca and Medina), the Arabian Peninsula has long occupied a position of
importance within the broader Middle East. However, with the establishment of Arab empires
based in Damascus and Baghdad in the centuries
following the Prophet Mohammed’s death, the
Saudi Arabia in Brief
peninsula sank into disunity and its relative
Population (2009): 28,686,633 (includes 5,576,076
political influence gradually declined. In the 16th
non-nationals) Growth rate: 1.85%
century, much of the Arabian Peninsula came
Area: 1,960,582 sq.km. (756,985 sq.mi.); just over
under the nominal rule of the Ottoman Empire,
one fifth the size of the United States
although tribal leaders effectively controlled most
of the region. In the mid-eighteenth century, an
Ethnic Groups: (native Saudis only) Arab 90%; Afro-
Asian 10%
alliance developed between an influential eastern
family, the Al Saud, and the leaders of a
Religion: (native Saudis only) Sunni 85-95%, Shiite 5-
15%
puritanical religious movement known by
outsiders as Wahhabism, after its founder,
Literacy (2003): 78.8% (male 84.7%, female 70.8%)
Mohammed ibn Abd Al Wahhab. The Al Saud-
GDP (purchasing power parity, 2009): $585.8
Wahhabi alliance built two states in the Arabian
billion; growth rate: 0.2%
peninsula during the next century that eventually
External Public Debt (2009 est.): $72.4 billion
collapsed under pressure from outside powers and
inter- and intra-family rivalries.1
Inflation (2009 est.): 5.0%
Unemployment (2009): 11.6% (Saudi males); some
During the first quarter of the 20th century, a
estimates range up to 25%
chieftain of the Al Saud family, Abd al Aziz ibn
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF); U.S.
Abd al Rahman Al Saud (commonly referred to as
Department of Commerce; U.S. Central Intelligence
Ibn Saud) overcame numerous tribal rivals with
Agency (CIA) World Factbook; Economist
Intelligence Unit; and Saudi Arabian Monetary
the support of his Wahhabi allies and, at times, the
Agency (SAMA).
British government. By 1932, King Abd al Aziz
had unified most of the Arabian Peninsula by
force under his rule, and declared the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Five of his
sons—Kings Saud, Faisal, Khaled, Fahd, and Abdullah—have succeeded him as rulers of the
third Saudi state during seven decades characterized by a rapid socioeconomic transformation of
the country. A series of agreements, statements by successive U.S. administrations, arms sales,
training arrangements, and military deployments have demonstrated a strong U.S. security
commitment to the Saudi monarchy since the 1940s.
1 For more information about Mohammed ibn Abd al Wahhab, see CRS Report RS21695, The Islamic Traditions of
Wahhabism and Salafiyya, by Christopher M. Blanchard. For an account of the earlier Al Saud states see Alexei
Vassiliev, History of Saudi Arabia, New York University Press, 2000.
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Figure 1. Map of Saudi Arabia
Source: Map Resources Adapted by CRS. (March 2008)
Saudi-U.S. Relations, 1931-1991
Saudi-U.S. diplomatic relations were established on the foundation of military, political, and
commercial understandings developed during and immediately following the Second World War.
The United States recognized King Abd Al Aziz as the ruler of Hejaz and Nejd (the western and
central regions of the peninsula) in 1931. However, prior to 1942, the United States did not have
resident diplomatic representatives in the kingdom. From the early 1930s through 1945, U.S.-
Saudi relations were shaped significantly by the awarding in 1933 of an oil exploration
concession to the California Arabian Standard Oil Company [CASOC, the forerunner of the
Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), itself the forerunner of today’s Saudi Aramco)].
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CASOC’s discovery in 1938 of substantial oil reserves in eastern Saudi Arabia and subsequent
private and public U.S. efforts to manage and defend oil production operations during the war
years led to a deepening of bilateral relations. The United States gradually replaced the United
Kingdom as the chief external political and economic supporter of the Saudi government during
this period.2
Many observers of U.S.-Saudi relations identify a February 14, 1945, meeting between President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt and King Abd al Aziz aboard the U.S.S. Quincy as the starting point
for the more robust U.S.-Saudi political relationship that developed thereafter.3 The construction
of a U.S. military airfield at Dhahran and the provision of U.S. military planning and training
assistance from the mid-1940s onward formed the basis for bilateral military cooperation during
the early postwar era. Aramco operations and oil exports, U.S. contributions to the establishment
of the Saudi financial system,4 and the involvement of U.S. contractors in the development of the
kingdom’s infrastructure were the key pillars of bilateral economic and commercial relations
during this period.
Saudi Arabia and the United States pursued some common national security objectives from the
1950s onward, in spite of recurring differences of opinion over regional issues, the most
significant of which was the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Saudi and U.S. governments’ divergent
responses to Arab-Israeli conflicts in 1948, 1967, and 1973 created conditions that severely tested
bilateral relations. Nevertheless, the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon
Administrations each viewed the Saudi monarchy as an ally in relation to other nationalist and
socialist governments in the region and as a bulwark against the spread of Communism in the
Gulf region and beyond.
The October 1973 Arab-Israeli war brought latent tensions in U.S.-Saudi relations to the surface
and altered the prevailing political and economic dynamics of the relationship. Saudi leaders
responded to U.S. support for Israel during the war by instituting an oil embargo and oil
production cuts. In the United States, the oil shocks produced inflation, new concern about
foreign investment from oil producing countries, and open speculation about the advisability and
feasibility of militarily seizing oil fields in Saudi Arabia or other countries.5 In the wake of the
embargo, both Saudi and U.S. officials worked to re-anchor the bilateral relationship on the basis
of shared opposition to Communism, renewed military cooperation, and through economic
2 See Aaron David Miller, Search for Security: Saudi Arabian oil and American foreign policy, 1939-1949, University
of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1980; and, Simon Davis, “Keeping the Americans in line? Britain, the United
States and Saudi Arabia, 1939-45: Inter-Allied Rivalry in the Middle East Revisited,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, Volume
8:Number 1, 1997, pp. 96 -136.
3 See Memorandum of Conversation Between King of Saudi Arabia (Abdul Aziz Al Saud) and President Roosevelt,
February 14, 1945, Aboard the U.S.S. “Quincy”. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1945, Volume VIII,
pp. 2-3, 7-9. See also, “Texts of Letters Exchanged by Ibn Saud and Roosevelt,” New York Times, October 19, 1945,
pg. 4.
4 Arthur N. Young, Saudi Arabia: The Making of a Financial Giant. New York University Press, 1983; and, Oral
History Interview with Arthur N. Young, Pasadena, California February 21, 1974 by James R. Fuchs, Harry S. Truman
Library, available at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/young.htm.
5 See, for example, Miles Ignotus, “Seizing Arab Oil,” Harper’s Magazine, March 1975; and, Congressional Research
Service, “Oil Fields as Military Objectives: A Feasibility Study,” Committee Print Prepared for the House Committee
on International Relations Special Subcommittee on Investigations, August 21, 1975.
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initiatives that promoted the recycling of Saudi petrodollars to the United States via Saudi
investment in infrastructure, industrial expansion, and U.S. securities.6
During the Carter and Reagan Administrations, the Saudi Arabian government supported anti-
Communist causes around the world in efforts that often ran parallel to or that were coordinated
with U.S. policy.7 The 1979 Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan helped fuel
a decade of collaborative U.S.-Saudi foreign policy efforts, including shared support for anti-
Soviet mujahidin fighters in Afghanistan and for Saddam Hussein’s war against Iran. The 1991
Persian Gulf War placed Saudi Arabia in the role of host for U.S. combat troops and military
equipment involved in operations to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The continued presence of
U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia during the 1990s was cited as a serious provocation by some Saudi
opposition figures and extremists, including Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden, whose
supporters, allies, and affiliates have since attacked the United States, Saudi Arabia, and others
around the world.
Saudi-U.S. Relations, 1991-2001
The end of the Cold War eliminated the shared anti-Communist interests that had helped define
U.S.-Saudi security relations since the late 1940s. Continuing interests in preventing conflict from
threatening the political status quo in the Persian Gulf region and from interrupting the continued
flow of Saudi oil to international markets remained strong. U.S.-Saudi differences over the Arab-
Israeli conflict and other regional issues also persisted. The Clinton Administration’s policy of
“dual containment” of both Iraq and Iran was supported in part by U.S. military personnel based
in Saudi Arabia, 24 of whom were killed and hundreds of whom were injured in two terrorist
bombings in Riyadh in 1995 and Dhahran in 1996.8
Inside the kingdom, Saudi political activists sought to reopen domestic debates over fiscal policy,
constitutional government, and foreign policy that had been largely proscribed by the government
since the 1950s and 1960s. Following the 1991 Gulf War, citizens submitted several petitions to
King Fahd calling for reform, and several Islamist opposition figures who were critical of the
Saudi government were imprisoned. The pan-Islamic solidarity movement that drove Saudi
involvement in Afghanistan during the 1980s continued to inspire international activism among
Saudis, as private Saudi citizens, Saudi government charitable committees, and international
Islamic charity organizations based in the kingdom funneled financial and material support to a
range of Muslim groups around the world. This included support for entities and individuals
engaged in or victimized by nationalist conflicts in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kashmir,
Kosovo, and the West Bank and Gaza. At times, this support complicated U.S. policy and
peacemaking efforts in those regions and, whether directly or indirectly, contributed to the
6 These economic initiatives were coordinated in part through the U.S.-Saudi Arabian Joint Commission on Economic
Cooperation, which was established in 1974. See Joint Statement on Saudi Arabian-United States Cooperation, June 8,
1974, 26 UST 1689.
7 This included Saudi funding of anti-Communist groups that were prohibited from receiving U.S. foreign assistance by
Congress, such as the Nicaraguan Contras. See Independent Counsel, Court Record, “U.S. Government Stipulation on
Quid Pro Quos with Other Governments as Part of Contra Operation,” April 6, 1989, available at http://www.gwu.edu/
~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB210/index.htm; and Rachel Bronson, Thicker than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership
with Saudi Arabia, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp.168-190.
8 See The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 60, and House National Security Committee Staff Report, “The Khobar Towers
Bombing Incident,” August 14, 1996.
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development and sustainment of a transnational network of violent activists, some of whom were
affiliated with Al Qaeda. U.S. policy makers’ concern about these trends predated the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks, as evidenced by Clinton Administration’s efforts to secure Saudi
cooperation with regard to Saudi detainees and citizens suspected of supporting international
terrorism.9
As the first post-Cold War decade of U.S.-Saudi relations came to a close, the bilateral
relationship remained strong in traditional areas such as defense cooperation, but showed signs of
weakness in other areas. Political ties were challenged by the lingering effects of anti-U.S.
terrorist attacks, disagreements over the resurgence of Israeli-Palestinian fighting from late-2000
onward, and basic incompatibilities in some U.S. and Saudi figures’ expectations concerning
political reform and human rights in the kingdom.
September 11, 2001, and its Aftermath
The direct participation of 15 Saudi nationals in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks kindled
strong criticism in the United States of Saudi involvement in terrorism or of Saudi laxity in acting
against terrorist groups. The attacks constituted the most serious challenge to U.S.-Saudi relations
since the 1973-1974 oil embargo, and some analysts have since contended that Al Qaeda planners
may have chosen a large number of Saudi participants for the attacks in an attempt to damage
U.S.-Saudi relations. Saudi officials have acknowledged the deeply negative effect the attacks had
on Saudi Arabia’s relations with the United States.10 Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden is a Saudi
national, although Saudi authorities revoked his citizenship in 1994.
Some critical commentators have gone as far as to accuse Saudi government officials of
responsibility for the September 11 attacks through design or negligence. Others have taken a
longer-term view and argued that Saudi policy decisions over several decades directly or
indirectly supported the development of certain types of religious extremism and international
terrorism, which now threaten citizens of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other countries. In
particular, many critics of Saudi policies have cited reports that the Saudi government permitted
or encouraged fund raising in Saudi Arabia by some charitable religious groups and foundations
that espoused extremist ideologies or were linked to or exploited by Al Qaeda and other terrorist
groups. As noted above, this trend emerged as an outgrowth of a pan-Islamic solidarity movement
in Saudi Arabia that began under King Faisal in the 1960s and 1970s and was embraced by the
United States in the 1980s as an asset during the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan.11
9 For example, the final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11
Commission) highlights a series of unsuccessful U.S. government efforts to gain access to a senior Al Qaeda financial
operative who had been detained by Saudi Arabia in 1997. The report credits the Saudi government with assisting U.S.
officials in interviewing members of the bin Laden family in 1999 and 2000.
10 Current Saudi Ambassador to the United States Adel Al Jubeir famously characterized the revelation that 15 Saudi
nationals had participated in the attacks as “a disaster” and argued that “Bin Laden, at that moment, had made in the
minds of Americans Saudi Arabia into an enemy.” See PBS Frontline, “House of Saud,” February 8, 2005. Available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saud/.
11 Saudi antipathy to Communism was based largely on the view that the Soviet Union’s atheistic official ideology
posed a direct threat to Saudi Arabia and Muslims globally. See Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA,
Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, Penguin Press: New York, 2004. See
also footnote 70 below.
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Nevertheless, by the 1990s, Osama bin Laden and other Saudi dissidents had increased their
criticism of the Saudi government’s domestic and foreign policies and its close relationship with
the United States. Bin Laden and his followers declared war on the United States in 1996,
ostensibly to secure the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Arabian Peninsula and the broader
Middle East.12 Following September 11, 2001, Bin Laden sought to justify the attacks as a
response to what he and his supporters perceived to be anti-Islamic U.S. policies in the Middle
East and other regions. However, Al Qaeda rhetoric condemning secular democracy, U.S. society,
and aspects of Western culture leads many observers to question the notion that Bin Laden and
other Al Qaeda figures were then or are now motivated by political concerns that can be
distinguished from a broader religious or cultural agenda. Al Qaeda attacks in the kingdom
following the withdrawal of thousands of U.S. troops in 2003 created further doubts about Al
Qaeda’s stated motives.
The 9/11 Commission Report
In its final report, released on July 23, 2004, the U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) described Saudi Arabia as having been “a
problematic ally in combating Islamic extremism.” However, the Commission found “no
evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually
funded” Al Qaeda. According to the report, Saudi Arabia “was a place where Al Qaeda raised
money directly from individuals and through charities,” and indicates that “charities with
significant Saudi government sponsorship,” may have diverted funding to Al Qaeda. The report
takes note of long-standing cooperative relations between the U.S. and Saudi governments,
growing misunderstandings at the popular level, and the U.S. government’s desire for Saudi
officials to do more to fight terrorism. The report acknowledged increased Saudi efforts in that
regard after mid-2003, when terrorists began attacking targets in Saudi Arabia with more
frequency.13
Saudi Responses
The Saudi government has denied any knowledge of or involvement with the September 11,
2001, attacks and has focused intensely since 2003 on combating the domestic terrorist threat
from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Members of this group and others inspired by
its activities have carried out a number of attacks on civilians, government officials, foreigners,
and oil facilities in the kingdom. Saudi officials maintain that they are working closely with the
United States against Al Qaeda and its supporters, whom officials on both sides say are targeting
both the Saudi regime and the United States. Saudi efforts to confront and control extremist
religious beliefs and practices continue, but remain complicated by the ruling regime’s
historically close relationship with Saudi Arabia’s conservative clerical community and by the
beliefs and activism of some Saudi citizens (see “Combating Extremism” below).
12 See CRS Report RL32759, Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
13 The Commission concluded that the Saudi government had become “locked in mortal combat with Al Qaeda.”
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Recent Assessments
U.S. government statements have generally complimented Saudi cooperation with U.S.
counterterrorism initiatives since 2003, while sometimes suggesting that the Saudi government
can and should do more, particularly with regard to terrorist threats beyond Saudi borders. In its
most recent Country Reports on Terrorism, 2008 (published April 30, 2009), the U.S. Department
of State praised improvements in Saudi counterterrorism practices, credited Saudi cooperation
with U.S. counterterrorism efforts as “significant,” and characterized Saudi anti-extremism
initiatives as “aggressive.” The report also stated that “Saudi Arabia needs to continue to take
steps to exercise oversight of fundraising activities in the Kingdom and Saudi charitable activities
abroad.”
Bush Administration officials routinely praised Saudi domestic counterterrorism efforts, led by
Assistant Interior Minister for Security Affairs Prince Mohammed Bin Nayef (see
“Counterterrorism” below). Saudi Arabia established a terrorist suspect rehabilitation program
and sought to promote it as a model for regional governments. However, questions about the
utility of the program in dealing with hardened terrorists have arisen after several participants
have rejoined Al Qaeda outside of the kingdom.
Terrorist Financing Concerns
Terrorist financing concerns have proven to be a persistent point of contention.14 From 2003
onward, Saudi Arabia has established new entities and laws designed specifically to combat
terrorist financing in accordance with U.S. and international standards. The 2007 Country Report
on Terrorism in Saudi Arabia praised Saudi authorities for arresting dozens of terrorist financing
suspects and for enacting new declaration requirements for the cross-border transfer of cash and
other high value items. Nevertheless, U.S. counterterrorism officials have continued to express
alarm about alleged terrorist financing activities involving Saudi nationals. For example, in April
2008, Undersecretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey stated
before the Senate Finance Committee, stating that, Saudi Arabia is “serious about fighting Al
Qaeda in the kingdom, and they do,” but that “the seriousness of purpose with respect to the
money going out of the kingdom is not as high.” Undersecretary Levey further stated that, at the
time, “Saudi Arabia today remains the location from which more money is going to terror groups
and the Taliban—Sunni terror groups and the Taliban—than from any other place in the world.”15
On February 2, 2009, the Obama Administration announced that Undersecretary Levey would
continue to serve in his position.
Other U.S. government entities have offered general praise for Saudi efforts, while
acknowledging there remains work to be done. In response to questions for the record submitted
by Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in February 2009, Director of National Intelligence
Admiral Dennis Blair stated:
Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations continue to seek and obtain funding from private
Saudi donors, but Riyadh’s aggressive efforts to identify and disrupt financial facilitators---
particularly those associated with Al Qaeda---probably have impeded these efforts… Saudi
14 See CRS Report RL32499, Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
15 Testimony of U.S. Department of the Treasury Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart A.
Levey before the Senate Finance Committee, April 1, 2008.
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Arabia aggressively targets Al Qaeda-associated financial facilitators, but has historically
taken little action against the supporters of other groups that play into Riyadh’s domestic and
foreign policy calculations, and do not pose a direct threat to the kingdom.16
The 2009 U.S. State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy Report on money
laundering concludes that Saudi Arabia “continues to be a significant jurisdictional source for
terrorist financing worldwide” and notes that the Saudi government “continues to take aggressive
action to target direct threats to the Kingdom, but could do more to target Saudi-based support for
extremism outside of Saudi’s borders.” Specifically the report calls on Saudi authorities to “hold
terrorist financiers publicly accountable through prosecutions and full implementation of United
Nations Security Council obligations” and “to establish a charities oversight mechanism that also
oversees ‘multilateral organizations’ and enhances its oversight and control of Saudi entities with
overseas operations.” The 2010 report did not include an entry for Saudi Arabia.
Saudi officials insist that their efforts to combat terrorist financing are intensive and robust and
are not limited to actions taken against entities or individuals that pose internal threats to the
kingdom. In December 2008, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) issued new bank
account regulations that appear to significantly strengthen the rules regarding charitable
organizations, including so-called ‘multilateral organizations’ that have been of concern to U.S.
terrorist financing officials.17
A September 2009 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that:
U.S. and Saudi officials also report progress on efforts to prevent financial support to
extremists, citing, for example, the Saudi government’s regulations on sending charitable
contributions overseas, and the arrest and prosecution of individuals providing support for
terrorism. However, U.S. officials remain concerned about the ability of Saudi individuals
and charitable organizations to support terrorism outside of Saudi Arabia, and noted limited
Saudi enforcement capacity and terrorists’ use of cash couriers as challenges.18
Toward a New Relationship?
Following the last severe test of U.S.-Saudi relations in the early 1970s, Saudi and U.S. officials
engaged in a multi-track effort to re-anchor the bilateral relationship on a range of joint military
and economic commitments. Official political relations recovered and remained close, but a
degree of public mistrust persisted on both sides. Several contentious debates regarding proposed
U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia in the 1980s and 1990s demonstrated this mistrust; some
Members of Congress and others made evident their doubts about Saudi Arabia’s reliability as an
ally, and some Saudi officials questioned the reliability of U.S. commitments to Saudi Arabia.
Saudi support for the coalition response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 helped mitigate
some of those mutual doubts, but created conditions that ultimately made it more challenging for
officials on both sides to publicly defend the bilateral relationship. Saudi officials faced withering
16 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Questions for the Record submitted to the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, February 12, 2009.
17 Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, Rules Governing the Opening of Bank Accounts and General Operational
Guidelines in Saudi Arabia, Third Update, December 2008.
18 GAO-09-883, U.S. Agencies Report Progress Countering Terrorism and Its Financing in Saudi Arabia, but
Continued Focus on Counter Terrorism Financing Efforts Needed, September 2009.
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criticism from some quarters for inviting foreign military forces into the kingdom, for hosting
U.S. troops after the end of major combat operations against Iraq, and for continuing to cooperate
with the United States diplomatically, in spite of U.S. airstrikes on Iraq and ongoing U.S. support
for Israel. The Bush and Clinton Administrations sought to justify continuing military cooperation
and arms sales initiatives with Saudi Arabia for strategic reasons amid growing U.S. concern
about human rights and political reform in the kingdom, terrorist attacks on U.S. forces stationed
there, and increasing U.S. awareness that some Saudi citizens were espousing religious
extremism and supporting international terrorism.
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks compounded the effects of these negative factors in
both the official and broader public spheres. The 9/11 Commission Report recommendations
directly addressed the resulting challenges which continue to complicate the U.S.-Saudi official
relationship:
The problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship must be confronted, openly. The United States
and Saudi Arabia must determine if they can build a relationship that political leaders on
both sides are prepared to publicly defend—a relationship about more than oil. It should
include a shared commitment to political and economic reform, as Saudis make common
cause with the outside world. It should include a shared interest in greater tolerance and
cultural respect, translating into a commitment to fight the violent extremists who foment
hatred.19
Under the Bush Administration, the Saudi and U.S. governments sought to maintain the mutual
strategic benefits of existing cooperative arrangements while managing the potential negative side
effects of policy differences and working level disagreements. In 2005, the United States and
Saudi Arabia established a cabinet-level strategic dialogue to address issues of mutual
importance. Six associated working groups met “as needed” to discuss (1) counterterrorism; (2)
military affairs; (3) energy; (4) economic and financial affairs; (5) partnership, education,
exchange, and human development; and (6) consular affairs.20
The relative strengthening of Iran as a regional power since 2001 has helped provide a new
strategic logic for official U.S.-Saudi cooperation. However, U.S. military engagement in Iraq and
Afghanistan, fluctuating oil prices, and dilatory Saudi action on some reform and
counterterrorism issues continued to complicate public relations. In May 2008, one former U.S.
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia characterized the state of U.S.-Saudi relations as reflecting “an odd
disconnect,” in which, in his view, there has been
“recognition on the part of the governments in both countries that this is a very important
relationship. But in both cases, the public is extremely negative. Saudi Arabia has been
successfully vilified in American politics, and the United States is now extraordinarily
unpopular in Saudi Arabia.”21
Efforts to restore and redefine U.S.-Saudi partnership continued during the term of the 110th
Congress. Section 2043 of P.L. 110-53 (the Implementing the 9/11 Commission
19 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Final Report, p. 374.
20 H.Con.Res. 202 (referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on August 3, 2007) called on the
Administration to create an additional working group to address human rights.
21 Ambassador Chas Freeman, President of the Middle East Policy Council, served as U.S. Ambassador to Saudi
Arabia from 1989 to 1992. Tabassum Zakaria, “Analysis—Saudi smile likely for Bush on oil plea, not more,” Reuters,
May 12, 2008.
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Recommendations Act of 2007) required the Bush Administration to report on the long-term
strategy of the United States to work with the Saudi government to facilitate political, economic,
and social reforms, including greater religious freedom, and to combat terrorism, including efforts
to prevent and prohibit terrorist financing by Saudi institutions and citizens. The report was
transmitted to the Congress on January 30, 2008, and described a “multi-dimensional” U.S.
approach to achieving goals for relations with Saudi Arabia.22
The extent to which the Obama Administration and the 111th Congress will seek to reinforce that
strategy or chart a new course for U.S.-Saudi relations remains to be seen. In October 2009, U.S.
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia James Smith emphasized his views on the importance of “taking
down walls” in the bilateral relationship and expanding U.S.-Saudi partnerships in education,
trade, and investment. Addressing the 2009 National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations
Policymakers Conference in Washington, DC, Ambassador Smith argued:
…it is not 2001. It is not 2003. And it is not 2004. So if you are an American and you formed
an opinion about Saudi Arabia or Saudis in the aftermath of 9/11, it is time to rethink your
position. If you are a Saudi and you formed an opinion about the United States and
Americans in the aftermath of 9/11 it is time to rethink your opinion. That was eight years
ago.23
Recent Bilateral Agreements
On the eve of President Bush’s May 2008 visit to Riyadh to commemorate the 75th anniversary of
the establishment of U.S.-Saudi relations, then-U.S. National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley
argued that the U.S.-Saudi relationship was in “pretty good shape.”24 In conjunction with
President Bush’s visit, his Administration announced a series of agreements designed to
strengthen bilateral relations in key areas:
• Civil Nuclear Cooperation—Both governments signed a Memorandum of
Understanding on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation under which the United
States agreed to “assist the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to develop civilian nuclear
energy for use in medicine, industry, and power generation and will help in
development of both the human and infrastructure resources in accordance with
evolving International Atomic Energy Agency guidance and standards.”25
• Enhanced Security Arrangements—Saudi Arabia agreed to join the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative,
both of which are multilateral initiatives aimed at reducing the threats posed by
weapons of mass destruction proliferation, terrorism, and related activities. A
White House statement released prior to President Bush’s visit indicated that “the
United States and Saudi Arabia have agreed to cooperate in safeguarding the
kingdom’s energy resources by protecting key infrastructure, enhancing Saudi
border security, and meeting Saudi Arabia’s expanding energy needs in an
22 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Strategy Toward Saudi Arabia, Report Pursuant to Section 2043c of the
Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, P.L. 110-53, January 30, 2008.
23 Ambassador James Smith, Remarks to Arab-U.S. Policymakers Conference, Washington, DC, October 15, 2009.
24 Tabassum Zakaria, “Analysis—Saudi smile likely for Bush on oil plea, not more,” Reuters, May 12, 2008.
25 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Media Note: U.S.-Saudi Arabia Memorandum of
Understanding on Nuclear Energy Cooperation,” May 16, 2008.
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environmentally responsible manner.”26 Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs William Burns said in April 2009 that the United States and Saudi Arabia
are working to launch a training program that will provide Saudi security forces
with expertise to protect critical energy infrastructure.27 See “Office of Program
Management Ministry of Interior – Facilities Security Forces (OPM MOI-FSF)”
below.
• Reciprocal Visa Policies—Both governments agreed to issue business and
tourist visas to each others’ citizens on reciprocal terms: valid for five years, with
multiple entries. Both governments also agreed to issue student visas valid for the
duration of the student’s study program, up to a maximum of five years, without
two-year renewal requirements. The number of non-immigrant visas issued to
Saudi nationals has returned to its pre-9/11 level, with over 50,000 issued in
2009. See “Consular Issues” below for more information.
Recent Congressional Interest in Saudi Arabia
The September 11 terrorist attacks created an atmosphere of skepticism about U.S.-Saudi
relations that has characterized much of the discourse in Congress on Saudi Arabia since late
2001. During the 107th and 108th Congresses, some Members of Congress frequently criticized
what they perceived to be Saudi policies that may have contributed to the development of terrorist
threats to the United States and other countries. In the 109th Congress, some Members’
perspectives evolved to reflect a degree of solidarity with Saudi citizens in the face of Al Qaeda
terrorist attacks inside Saudi Arabia, amid persistent concerns about the Saudi government’s
counterterrorism policies, reform efforts, and positions toward Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. Many Members of Congress have acknowledged Saudi domestic counterterrorism
efforts as significant, while continuing to raise questions about Saudi efforts to combat religious
extremism and to support U.S. counterterrorism and regional policies.
During the 110th Congress, issues of mutual interest to Members of Congress and Saudi Arabian
officials included the conflict in Iraq, Iran’s nuclear technology development efforts, Saudi
political and economic reform efforts, Saudi oil policies, counterterrorism cooperation, and new
initiatives to revive dormant Israeli-Arab peace negotiations. These issues, along with
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and security cooperation have remained at the top of the agenda for U.S.
and Saudi leaders during the term of the 111th Congress. Since January 2009, the Obama
Administration and the 111th Congress have continued the established patterns of foreign
assistance, security cooperation, and arms sales described below, and Members of Congress have
continued to express varied views on the future of U.S.-Saudi relations.
26 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: Strengthening Diplomatic Ties with Saudi Arabia,”
May 16, 2008.
27 Remarks of Under Secretary of State William Burns, New America Foundation Conference – “U.S.-Saudi Relations
in a World Without Equilibrium,” Washington, D.C., April 27, 2009.
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Saudi Arabia and Congressional
Prohibitions
U.S. foreign assistance programs for Saudi Arabia have been a consistent point of contention
between some Members of Congress and the Bush and Obama Administrations since 2001. Some
Members of Congress have criticized the provision of U.S. foreign assistance to Saudi Arabia by
arguing that robust Saudi oil revenues make U.S. assistance unnecessary or by citing security and
terrorism concerns about Saudi government policies. Others have argued that security-related
support for the Saudi Arabian government is necessary and important in order to help Saudis
confront the threat of Al Qaeda terrorism in their country, to protect Saudi infrastructure critical to
ensuring global oil supplies, to secure Saudi support for U.S. counterterrorism priorities overseas,
to bolster Saudi Arabia against a potential threat from Iran, and to ensure continuing U.S. access
to and cooperation with the Saudi armed forces.
From 1946 through 2007, the United States provided Saudi Arabia with $333.1 million (current
dollars) in foreign assistance funding, of which $294.8 million was military assistance and $38.3
million was economic assistance.28 Significant U.S. military training and advisory programs in
Saudi Arabia have continued in various forms since the mid-1940s. Currently, these programs
include the United States Training Mission to Saudi Arabia (USMTM, established 1953) and the
Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization Program (PM-SANG, established 1973). The costs
of these training programs are paid by the Saudi government through Foreign Military Sales
purchases (see “U.S.-Saudi Military Cooperation” below).
International Military Education and Training (IMET)
The Bush Administration and Obama Administration annually have requested limited funding for
a small International Military Education and Training (IMET) program for Saudi Arabia since
FY2003. Like its predecessor, the Obama Administration supports Saudi IMET participation
because it reduces the cost to the Saudi government of other training purchases29 and provides a
range of benefits for U.S.-Saudi military to military relations. According to the U.S. Department
of Defense and U.S. Department of State:
Providing minimal IMET to Saudi Arabia permits them to purchase military training at the
significantly reduced Foreign Military Sale (FMS) incremental rate ensuring a continued
high level of Saudi attendance at U.S. military institutions; enhances technical capabilities;
exposes all levels of Saudi military personnel and their families to U.S. values, ideas, and
policies; and increases awareness of international norms of human rights, the principle of
civilian control of the military, and the rule of law.30
28 U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID], U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan
Authorizations. Available at http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/.
29 Section 21(c) of P.L.90-629, the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), states that IMET recipient countries are eligible
to purchase non-IMET training at reduced cost. Section 108(a) of P.L. 99-83 amended the AECA to provide this
reduced cost benefit to IMET recipients. The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) implements the
authority provided in P.L. 99-83 to apply a lower cost to U.S. military training purchased by Saudi Arabia and other
IMET recipient countries through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. At present, the “incremental rates”
applied to the FMS training purchases of IMET recipient countries are calculated according to the terms outlined in
Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation (FMR), Volume 15, Chapter 7 (Sections 0711 and 0712).
30 U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State Joint Report to Congress on Foreign Military Training In
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The Obama Administration requested $65,000 in IMET funds for Saudi Arabia in FY2010, but
estimates that it will provide only $8,000.31 For FY2011, the Administration is requesting $10,000
in IMET for the kingdom.
Table 1 displays the number of Saudi students receiving U.S. military training from FY2002
through FY2007, with the total dollar value of the training purchased by the Saudi government
(see below). For FY2003 through FY2007, this total value includes courses purchased using
nominal amounts of IMET assistance. The value of IMET-funded training is provided in Table 2
below. The net value of the reduction in cost for other non-IMET training purchased by Saudi
Arabia and other IMET recipient countries through the Foreign Military Sale (FMS) program is
not regularly reported by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). However, the
conference report on the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 3288, H.Rept. 111-366)
requires the Administration to report on these net savings within 180 days (by June 14, 2010).
Table 1. U.S. Military Training Provided to Saudi Personnel
FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007
Students Trained
1,110
1,664 596 416 524 849a
Value
$57.4 $20.2 $21.1 $11.2 $8.9 $39.2
($ million)
Source: U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State Joint Reports to Congress on Foreign
Military Training, FY2002-FY2008. Available at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/.
a. Of these students, one was trained via the IMET program, and over 700 were trained via Foreign Military
Sales training purchased by Saudi Arabia.
Counterterrorism Assistance
The Obama Administration has requested $400,000 in export control and related border security
funds (Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related programs account, NADR-
EXBS) for Saudi Arabia in FY2010 (see Table 2 below). The Administration now estimates it
will reduce its obligation to $200,000 in NADR to continue U.S. programs to improve Saudi
border enforcement capabilities, specifically as a means of combating weapons of mass
destruction and small arms trafficking. The Bush Administration requested and Congress
appropriated similar funds for Saudi Arabia from FY2001 through FY2003. The assistance
supported a program to improve Saudi export laws and enforcement procedures. Anti-terrorism
assistance (NADR-ATA) was provided in FY2005 in the form of VIP protection courses for Saudi
security officers along with counterterrorism financing assistance (NADR-CTF). Assistance in
FY2006 funded crisis management training and counterterrorism financing courses related to
bulk cash smuggling. The Bush Administration obligated $300,000 in NADR-ATA funding for
(...continued)
Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007, Volume I, August 2007. Available at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2007/.
31 According to the State Department Congressional Budget Justification for FY2010, “U.S. assistance will encourage
Saudi Arabia’s continued participation in U.S. military, education and training programs. This level of funding permits
the Saudi government to purchase military training in the United States at considerably lower cost than is charged
countries that are not eligible for military, education and training funds. Military training enhances interoperability with
U.S. forces, promotes military professionalism and respect for human rights. It also builds Saudi defensive capacities,
and reinforces the importance of a strong, cooperative political and military relationship between American and Saudi
military officers.”
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Saudi Arabia for FY2007 and requested $100,000 for FY2008, which was planned, in part, to
support Saudi efforts to establish a national counterterrorism center. For FY2009, the Bush
Administration requested $350,000 in NADR-EXBS.
Table 2. U.S. Assistance to Saudi Arabia, FY2004-FY2011
($ thousand)
FY2004
FY2005a FY2006a FY2007c
IMETb $23.5
$6.9
$20.3
$19.0
NADR-EXBS -
-
-
-
NADR-ATA -
760c $1,387.0 $300.0
NADR-CTF -
$200.0
$189.0
-
Annual Total
$23.5
$966.9
$1,576.0
$319.0
FY2008 FY2009
FY2010
Estimate
FY2011
Request
IMETb
-d $11.0 $8.0
$10.0
NADR-EXBS -
$350.0
$200.0
$360.0
NADR-ATA $99.0
- -
-
NADR-CTF -
-
-
-
Annual Total
$113.0
$361.0 $208.0
$370.0
Sources: U.S. Department of State - Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations FY2004-
FY2010; and, U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State Joint Report to Congress on Foreign
Military Training, Fiscal Years 2002-2007.
a. The Administration requested $24,000 in IMET and $100,000 in NADR-CTF funds for FY2006. In late 2005,
$25,000 in no-year funds were obligated for IMET programming for Saudi Arabia.
b. FY2003-FY2006 IMET figures contained in the Joint Reports to Congress on Foreign Military Training, Fiscal
Years 2002-2006. FY2007 IMET figure based on FY2007 Country Aid Al ocation Report by Account (653a
Report), June 2007.
c. FY2007 Country Aid Al ocation Report by Account (653a Report), June 2007.
d. On September 20, 2007, the Bush Administration notified the Congress of its intention to use $15,800 in
unobligated no-year IMET funds appropriated in 2002 to support the IMET program with Saudi Arabia. See
Executive Communication 3416. A letter from the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency,
transmitting notification of the intention to use unobligated X-year IMET funds appropriated in fiscal year
2002 for Saudi Arabia, pursuant to the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2002, P.L. 107-115; jointly to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Appropriations.
Prohibitions on Foreign Assistance
During congressional consideration of appropriations for FY2004 through FY2008, several
proposals to prohibit the extension of U.S. foreign assistance to Saudi Arabia were considered and
adopted by Congress.32 As the total amount of U.S. assistance to Saudi Arabia has been relatively
32 The prohibition on FY2006 foreign assistance to Saudi Arabia contained in Section 582 of P.L. 109-102 was carried
forward in subsequent continuing appropriations resolutions for FY2007 (P.L. 110-5) and FY2008 (P.L. 110-92). On
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minuscule in recent years, the practical effect of the prohibitions was to rescind Saudi Arabia’s
eligibility for certain counterterrorism and border security assistance as well as its ability to
purchase U.S. military training at a reduced cost, absent the issuance of presidential waivers or
the assertion of existing executive authority. As noted above, some supporters of the prohibitions
raised questions regarding Saudi Arabia’s reliability as a counterterrorism partner, while
opponents of the assistance bans argued that the provisions would unnecessarily jeopardize
continuance of cooperative diplomatic and security efforts with a long-standing regional ally.
Each legislative proposal has differed in its cited reasons for prohibiting aid as well as whether or
not it provided national security waiver authority for the President. 33
Section 697 of Division J of P.L. 110-161, the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act,
prohibited the use of funds appropriated by the act for assistance to Saudi Arabia, but provides
waiver authority for the President. President Bush did not issue a waiver applicable to the
FY2008 funds appropriated by P.L. 110-161. The FY2008 prohibition was originally carried
forward under the terms of the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2009, P.L. 110-329.
However, the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8) did not contain such a prohibition
for FY2009 funds.
FY2010 Appropriations Debate
The assistance prohibition debate resurfaced during consideration of FY2010 appropriations
legislation. When reported from committee, Section 7041 of the House version of the FY2010
Foreign Operations Appropriations bill (H.R. 3081) would have prohibited the obligation or
expenditure of funds appropriated by the act for Saudi Arabia unless the Obama Administration
certified Saudi counterterrorism cooperation. On July 9, 2009, the House adopted an amendment
(H.Amdt. 309) by a vote of 297 to 135 (Roll no. 519) that withdrew the certification exception.
During floor debate on July 9, 2009, Representative Anthony Weiner, the sponsor of the
amendment and several amendments adopted in previous years seeking to prohibit assistance to
Saudi Arabia, argued that the inclusion of the waiver provision undermined the expressed will of
Congress regarding funds appropriated to the president.34 Opponents of the amendment argued
that a complete prohibition on assistance could undermine U.S.-Saudi security relations and
would unduly tie the hands of the Obama Administration.
(...continued)
June 9, 2006, the House adopted H.Amdt. 997 to H.R. 5522 (Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, FY2007) by a
vote of 312-97 (Roll no. 244); this amendment would have prohibited U.S. assistance to Saudi Arabia during FY2007
and contained no presidential waiver. On October 19, 2007, President Bush certified that Saudi Arabia was
“cooperating with efforts to combat international terrorism” and waived the prohibition on the use of funds
appropriated in P.L. 109-102 and in the continuing appropriations resolutions for FY2007 (P.L. 110-5) and FY2008
(P.L. 110-92) for foreign assistance to Saudi Arabia. (See Presidential Determination Relating to Assistance for Saudi
Arabia (No. 2008-5), October 19, 2007.)
33 For example, the House version of the FY2008 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill (Section 699N of H.R. 2764
EH) would have prohibited the use of appropriated FY2008 funds for assistance to Saudi Arabia, including under
authority granted to the President by Section 571 or 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. It did not provide
waiver authority for the President. The Senate version of the bill did not include a similar provision. See H.Amdt. 389,
adopted by voice vote on June 21, 2007. For consideration see Congressional Record (CR), June 22, 2007 (H6941-
H6942); for text, (H6941-H6942).
34 Congressional Record, House of Representatives, July 09, 2009, pp. H7895-H7897.
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The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported a version of the FY2010 Foreign Operations
Appropriations bill (S. 1434) that did not prohibit assistance to Saudi Arabia. The conference
agreement on the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act included the assistance prohibition
language from the House bill, but reinstated a national interest waiver authority for the Secretary
of State (Section 7041 of P.L. 111-117).
Other related legislation in the 111th Congress includes the Prohibit Aid to Saudi Arabia Act of
2009 (H.R. 792, introduced February 2, 2009), which would prohibit any and all “funds
appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to an Act making appropriations for the
Department of State, foreign operations, and related programs” from being “obligated or
expended to finance directly any assistance or reparations to Saudi Arabia.”
U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia
Background
The United States has long been Saudi Arabia’s leading arms supplier. From 1950 through 2006,
Saudi Arabia purchased and received from the United States weapons, military equipment, and
related services through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) worth over $62.7 billion and foreign
military construction services (FMCS) worth over $17.1 billion (figures in historical dollars).
These figures represent approximately 19% of all FMS deliveries and 85% of all FMCS
deliveries made worldwide during this period. The largest single recent U.S. foreign military sale
to Saudi Arabia was a $9 billion contract for 72 F-15S fighter aircraft. The contract was signed in
May 1993, and delivery of the F-15S aircraft was completed in 1999.
The overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq removed the primary conventional military
threat to Saudi Arabia’s security. According to many military experts, Saudi Arabia enjoys some
qualitative conventional military advantages over Iran, its larger, more populous neighbor and
primary peer competitor in the Gulf region. These advantages are expected to grow, and key
Saudi deficiencies in areas such as naval technology are expected to diminish as a multi-year
Saudi defense investment initiative continues. Saudi officials have announced their intention to
devote $50-60 billion to upgrading existing weapons systems, improving command and control,
and expanding the size, training, and capabilities of the Saudi armed forces.35
From January 2005 through January 2009, the Bush Administration and Congress approved a
number of potential36 U.S. military sales to Saudi Arabia with a possible combined value of over
35 A downward trend in Saudi arms procurement prevailed from the mid-1990s through 2003 as Saudi Arabia
completed payments for many of its post-Gulf War purchases and the country faced strained finances. Higher oil
prices, perceived regional threats, and counterterrorism requirements led Saudi officials to reassess their defense and
security needs and procurement plans in light of recent developments. Purchases from the United States and other
suppliers have increased accordingly. From 2004 through 2007, Saudi Arabia made arms agreements worth $23.2
billion (in current dollars), including deals signed with four major European suppliers ($16.9 billion) and the United
States ($5.2 billion). For more information, see CRS Report RL34723, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing
Nations, 2000-2007, by Richard F. Grimmett.
36 The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notifies Congress of the potential value of sales, because the
final value of actual sales may change once congressional approval is granted and contracts are signed. DSCA officials
report that the notified totals reflect an approximate upper limit of the potential value of a given sale. Author interview
with DSCA officials, Arlington, Virginia, December 12, 2007.
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$16.7 billion.37 For the period 2005 through 2008, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
reports that the United States and Saudi Arabia concluded FMS agreements worth $11.2 billion,
and the United States delivered $4.4 billion in FMS purchased defense goods and services to
Saudi Arabia.38 Since January 2009, the Obama Administration has notified Congress of potential
sales with a possible combined value of an additional $2.2 billion. In spite of ongoing equipment
and training improvements, some security analysts believe that Saudi Arabia will remain
dependent on the United States to serve as the ultimate guarantor of its security from
conventional external threats. Saudi armed forces successfully compelled Yemeni rebels to
withdraw from Saudi territory in late 2009 and early 2010. Saudi Arabia has not indicated that it
relied on any extraordinary U.S. material support or advisory assistance for the operation,
although public accounts suggest that U.S. origin weaponry was used extensively during the
campaign.
Unconventional threats from Iran, the threat of domestic terrorism, and the residual effects of
continuing instability in Iraq, Yemen, and Pakistan now constitute the primary threats to Saudi
national security. Counterterrorism, intelligence, and border security improvements are ongoing
to respond to these threats, and the United States is seeking to improve the deterrent and
defensive capabilities of Saudi and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) militaries vis-à-vis
Iran. The Bush Administration sought to coordinate these efforts with other GCC countries via a
U.S. initiative known as the Gulf Security Dialogue.39 However, the Obama Administration has
continued to engage with Saudi Arabia on these security issues using established bilateral
mechanisms (see below). U.S. and Saudi officials report that future arms sale requests and
proposals will be determined by joint assessments of Saudi defense needs and regional security
conditions. Recent arms sale proposals are detailed in the Appendix A.
Criticism and Action in the 110th Congress
Members of Congress have not initiated a coordinated bicameral legislative effort to block or
significantly modify any U.S. arms sales to any of the GCC states since the early 1990s.
However, some in Congress have expressed reservations about sale of sophisticated weaponry
and armament packages to the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, in recent years. Debate in the
110th Congress over weapons sales to the GCC states in general, and to Saudi Arabia in particular,
largely mirrored past congressional debate over the sale of major weapons systems to these
countries. As of May 2010, the 111th Congress had not engaged in significant public debate over
proposed arms sales to Saudi Arabia.
Nevertheless, some Members of Congress continue to express concern that sales of sophisticated
weaponry to the GCC states have the potential to erode Israel’s “qualitative military edge” (often
referred to as QME) over its Arab neighbors if those states choose to join in any potential joint
Arab military action against Israel. Section 201 of the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2008 (P.L.
110-429) requires the President to conduct “an empirical and qualitative assessment of the extent
to which Israel possesses a qualitative military edge over military threats to Israel” by June 30,
2009, and every four years thereafter. The Act further amends Section 36 of the Arms Export
37 DSCA notification press releases are available at http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/36b_index.htm.
38 For more information, see CRS Report R40959, U.S. Arms Sales: Agreements with and Deliveries to Major Clients,
2001-2008, by Richard F. Grimmett.
39 For more information see CRS Report RL34322, The Gulf Security Dialogue and Related Arms Sale Proposals, by
Christopher M. Blanchard and Richard F. Grimmett.
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Control Act to require certifications for proposed arms sales “to any country in the Middle East
other than Israel” to include “a determination that the sale or export of the defense articles or
defense services will not adversely affect Israel’s qualitative military edge over military threats to
Israel.” The Act defines QME as follows:
the ability to counter and defeat any credible conventional military threat from any individual
state or possible coalition of states or from non-state actors, while sustaining minimal
damages and casualties, through the use of superior military means, possessed in sufficient
quantity, including weapons, command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance capabilities that in their technical characteristics are superior in
capability to those of such other individual or possible coalition of states or non-state actors.
Others have expressed concerns about the fate of U.S. weaponry exports should currently allied
Gulf governments suffer abrupt regime changes. Successive U.S. Administrations have
maintained that Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states are too dependent on U.S. training, spare
parts, and technology to be in a position to use sophisticated U.S.-made arms against Israel or any
other U.S. ally under current conditions or in the event of significant regime changes.40 By all
accounts, Saudi officials continue to view U.S. willingness to sell sophisticated military
technology to Saudi Arabia as an indicator of the strength of U.S. commitments to Saudi security
and the health of the broader bilateral relationship.
Proposed Sale of Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs)
On January 14, 2008, the Bush Administration formally notified Congress of a proposal to sell
900 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) bomb guidance kits to Saudi Arabia (Defense Security
Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Transmittal No. 08-18). During the 110th Congress, a joint
resolution of disapproval (H.J.Res. 76) was introduced in the House to prohibit the proposed sale,
but the resolution was not considered within the 30-day period specified by the Arms Export
Control Act. In May 2008, a bill (S.J.Res. 32) disapproving of the proposed JDAM sale and three
other proposed sales was introduced in the Senate. S.J.Res. 32 sought to link approval of four
proposed arms sales to Saudi willingness to increase oil production.
As of September 2009, DSCA reported that Letters of Offer and Acceptance for the sale of JDAM
warheads and bomb bodies to Saudi Arabia had been signed, along with a contract for 900
warheads scheduled for delivery in 2011.41 Congress may take legislative action to modify or
prevent the sale at any point up to the physical transfer of Foreign Military Sale items. In the
Middle East region, to date, the United States has sold JDAM kits to Israel, the United Arab
Emirates, and Oman. From August 2007 through January 2009, the Bush Administration notified
Congress of proposals to sell 10,000 JDAM kits to Israel and 200 JDAM kits to the United Arab
Emirates.
40 Gopal Ratnam and Amy Svitak, “U.S. Would Keep Tight Rein on Missile Sold to Bahrain,” Defense News,
September 11, 2000. The U.S. Department of State and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency routinely offer
briefings to Members of Congress and congressional and committee staff regarding proposed Foreign Military Sales to
Saudi Arabia and other countries.
41 CRS analyst correspondence with DSCA officials, September 15, 2009.
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BAE Corruption Inquiry
In February 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice announced a $400 million settlement in its
long-running investigation of British defense contractor BAE Systems plc and its U.S. subsidiary
BAE Systems Incorporated for “suspicious payments… in numerous jurisdictions around the
world, including in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”42 In accordance with the settlement, BAE pled
guilty to violations of the Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations
that stemmed from its failure to report to the U.S. State Department commission payments used
to secure sales of items subject to U.S. export licenses.43 The court filings note BAE’s
commitment as of the year 2000 for both it’s U.S. and non-U.S. divisions to abide by the
requirements of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), but do not charge BAE with a
violation of the FCPA in connection with past arms sales and commission payments to Saudi
Arabia and other countries.44
BAE has agreed to a number of reform requirements as a condition of the settlement including a
restatement of its commitment for all of its entities to abide by the terms of the FCPA. Some legal
observers have characterized the Department’s decision not to charge BAE with a violation of the
FCPA as a “creative” solution to policy challenges that could have resulted if BAE were found
guilty of violating the FCPA and subsequently prohibited from contracting with the United States
government and military.45 The Department of Justice noted in its sentencing memorandum that
BAE Systems plc “is the world's second largest defense contractor and the fifth largest provider
of defense materials to the United States government.”
Courts in the United Kingdom are reviewing a parallel plea bargain and £30 million fine
agreement struck between BAE and Britain’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) in February 2010.
British press reports have long alleged that BAE executives made illegal payments to Saudi
officials in support of a multi-billion dollar, decade-long arms-for-oil barter treaty known as Al
Yamamah.46 BAE officials and Saudi authorities have denied any wrongdoing and claim that any
and all payments associated with the deal were legal and reflected commonly understood terms of
government-to-government sale agreements between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia.
BAE sales to other countries also were subject to SFO scrutiny.
42 United States of America V. BAE Systems plc, United States' Sentencing Memorandum, Criminal No.: 1:10-Cr-035
(Jdb), February 22, 2010.
43 According to the Department of Justice, BAE “consistently failed to identify commissions paid to third parties to
assist in securing the sales of defense articles that were the subject of export licenses… The undisclosed payments were
tolerated or condoned up to the highest corporate levels.” Ibid.
44 The Department of Justice sentencing memorandum states: “BAES made some third-party payments while aware
that there was a high probability that par of the funds would be passed on to a foreign government official to influence
a decision in favor of BAES. BAES made other payments aware that there was a high probability that the payments
would be used to influence government decision makers in the purchase of defense materials. Regardless of the true
identities of the ultimate recipients of the funds, BAES intentionally failed to create mechanisms to ensure its
compliance with the FCPA and failed properly to identify and disclose to the State Department commission payments
as required by the AECA and ITAR in connection with the sales and exports of defense articles and services.” Ibid.
45 Sue Reisinger, “Don't Call It Bribery; A creative criminal plea means that BAE can still do business with the
government,” Corporate Counsel, Volume 12; Issue 5, May 1, 2010.
46 Detailed press coverage of the allegations is available from the British newspaper The Guardian at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/bae.
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The SFO dropped its original investigation into BAE-Saudi dealings in 2006 when ordered to do
so by the government of then-Prime Minister Tony Blair.47 The Blair government determined that
the continuation of the SFO investigation, which was seeking access to Swiss bank records
involving Saudi royal family members, constituted a threat to U.K. national security. This
determination was based on alleged Saudi threats to withdraw terrorism-related intelligence
cooperation or to cancel a then-pending arms sale agreement for U.K.-produced Typhoon aircraft
if the SFO investigation did not cease.48 Britain’s High Court overturned the SFO decision to drop
the case in April 2008 and criticized what it deemed the Blair government’s willingness to
“surrender” to alleged Saudi threats, which, in the court’s view jeopardized “the integrity of the
criminal justice system.”49 The British government won its subsequent appeal of the High Court
ruling, with the House of Lords finding that the SFO Director acted lawfully in suspending the
investigation in light of an “ugly and obviously unwelcome threat.”50
Former U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Louis Freeh, who serves as legal counsel
for Prince Bandar bin Sultan, said in an April 2009 interview that his client did not receive or
accept bribes related to the BAE transactions and argued that while the transactions under
investigation may appear inconsistent with U.S. standards, each was audited and approved by
relevant authorities in the Saudi government.51
Current Issues in U.S.-Saudi Relations
Saudi-U.S. relations have grown increasingly complex as the number of policy challenges facing
both countries has multiplied and as both countries’ security and economic interests have become
more intertwined. The United States remains the principal external actor in the Middle East
region, but by most accounts, many regional policy makers, including those in Saudi Arabia,
perceive potential U.S. influence to be limited by current U.S. military commitments in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Saudi confidence in U.S. influence and guarantees reportedly has diminished, and
the ability of the United States to simultaneously pursue a political and social reform agenda and
a close strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia remains in question. Saudi Arabia has weathered
economic strains and a dangerous domestic terrorism campaign and arguably has emerged as the
most economically and politically powerful Arab state.52 Over the long term, growing demand for
47 In a personal minute to Attorney General in December 2006, Prime Minister Blair wrote “it is in my judgment very
clear that the continuation of the SFO investigation into Al Yamamah risks seriously damaging Saudi confidence in the
UK as a partner. It is also my judgment that such damage risks endangering UK national security, both directly in
protecting citizens and service people, and indirectly through impeding our search for peace and stability in this critical
part of the world.”
48 SFO Director Robert Wardle has testified that in response to his inquiries about the alleged threats, he was told by
the Saudi Ambassador to the United Kingdom that “British lives on British streets were at risk” if the investigation
continued.
49 High Court of Justice (UK), Approved Judgment, Case No: CO/1567/2007, Neutral Citation Number: [2008] EWHC
714 (Admin), April 10, 2008. Available at http://media.ft.com/cms/7397bb16-06e8-11dd-b41e-0000779fd2ac.pdf.
50 David Leigh, “Law lords: fraud office right to end bribery investigation: in BAE case,” The Guardian, July 31, 2008;
and, Lord Bingham, “Extracts: He was confronted by an ugly and unwelcome threat,” The Guardian, July 31, 2008.
51 Extended Interview With Louis Freeh, PBS Frontline, April 7, 2009, available at:
[http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/bribe/2009/04/louis-freeh-interview.html]; and, Tom Hamburger and Josh
Meyer, “Freeh defends Saudi payments,” Los Angeles Times, April 07, 2009.
52 “Saudi Arabia is arguably the most powerful and influential country in the Arab world today.” U.S. Department of
State, U.S. Strategy Toward Saudi Arabia, Report Pursuant to Section 2043c of the Implementing the
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, P.L. 110-53, January 30, 2008, p. 1.
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oil in developing countries, declining oil reserves outside of the Persian Gulf region, and
expanding Saudi oil revenues are likely to further raise Saudi Arabia’s international profile and
influence. U.S. national security interests with regard to Saudi Arabia are likely to persist, while
U.S. efforts to achieve policy goals may be complicated by these trends. At present, formal U.S.-
Saudi security and political relationships appear strong, in spite of differences in some areas. As
noted above, the Obama Administration appears poised to promote U.S.-Saudi cooperation in
education, trade, and investment while continuing to seek Saudi cooperation on global
counterterrorism and regional security issues.
U.S.-Saudi Military Cooperation53
Long-standing military training programs remain an important pillar of U.S.-Saudi relations. The
United States has played an integral role in the development, training, and arming of the Saudi
Arabian military since the 1940s, when U.S. military advisors first carried out a comprehensive
assessment of the kingdom’s defense requirements.54 Since the 1940s, a number of subsequent
U.S. defense assessments, joint planning activities, and training programs have established close
and cooperative relationships between the U.S. military services and their Saudi counterparts. The
Saudi Arabian government has continually sought U.S. military technology and training as a
guarantee of its national security, and Saudi authorities have pursued military procurement and
modernization initiatives based on the recommendations of U.S. defense surveys.55 In the late
1970s and early 1980s, the United States Army Corps of Engineers completed a series of massive
military infrastructure construction projects across the kingdom; many U.S.-built facilities remain
critical to the operations of Saudi security forces.
As noted above, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and subsequent coalition efforts to evict
Iraqi forces and enforce United Nations Security Council Resolutions provided the basis for the
expanded U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia that lasted from 1990 until 2003. Following the
overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, the U.S. military withdrew almost all of the
5,000 troops that had been stationed in Saudi Arabia and moved its Combat Air Operations Center
from Saudi Arabia to neighboring Qatar. Now, as before, between 200 and 300 U.S. military
personnel remain in Saudi Arabia at any given time to administer long-standing U.S. training
programs in conjunction with U.S. civilians and local hires. Almost all U.S. training for the Saudi
armed forces is funded via Saudi government purchases through the Foreign Military Sales
program. The existence of parallel U.S. training programs for different Saudi security forces
reflects the relatively stove-piped nature of Saudi Arabia’s security and defense establishment;
anecdotal evidence suggests that different Saudi ministries and security forces do not operate
jointly and may serve as sources of influence and patronage for members of the royal family.56
53 A detailed account of the history of U.S.-Saudi military cooperation is contained in David E. Long, The United States
and Saudi Arabia: Ambivalent Allies, Westview Press, Boulder and London, 1985, pp.33-72.
54 The survey was undertaken by Air Force Major General Richard O’Keefe. See Memorandum of Conversation,
890F.00/12-849, December 8, 1949, Washington, DC, FRUS, 1949, Volume VI, pp. 1625-7.
55 Prominent examples include the U.S. air defense survey of the country, which was completed in 1963, and the U.S.
naval defense survey associated with the Saudi Naval Expansion Program (SNEP), which was completed in 1969.
56 See Joshua Teitelbaum, “A Family Affair: Civil-Military Relations in Saudi Arabia,” Draft Paper Presented to the
Fourth Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Florence,
March 2003.
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U.S. Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia (USMTM)
The U.S. Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia (USMTM) has served as the focal point for
U.S.-Saudi military-to-military relations since its establishment in 1953. Through USMTM, the
U.S. Department of Defense and the joint military services work with counterparts from the Saudi
Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA) and Saudi armed forces, which are led by Crown
Prince Sultan bin Abd al Aziz and his son Prince Khaled bin Sultan. The USMTM is a joint
services training mission under the command of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and works
with the Saudi MODA “to assist and advise the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces with respect to the
building of military equipment, plans, organization, administrative procedures, training methods,
and the conduct of such training.”57 Organized in 1953 under the auspices of the U.S.-Saudi
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement,58 the program is now administered according to the terms
of a 1977 memorandum of understanding.59
Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization Program (PM-SANG)
The Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), which operates separately from MODA forces, is led
by King Abdullah bin Abd Al Aziz and his son, Prince Miteb bin Abdullah. The United States
Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) administers PM-SANG, which seeks to
“develop, within the Saudi Arabian National Guard, the capability to unilaterally initiate, sustain,
and operate modern military organizations and systems.” According to USASAC, modernization
support under the PM-SANG mission is “open-ended and includes training, supply, maintenance,
operations, medical, construction, equipment fielding, equipment post fielding support, and a host
of other related activities.”60 The program was chartered by and operates according to the terms of
a 1973 memorandum of understanding.61 The Vinnell Corporation, a subsidiary of the Northrop
Grumman Corporation, is the primary U.S. contractor charged with training SANG units.62 In
2004, terrorists shot and killed an American Vinnell employee based in Riyadh. In July 2008, the
Bush Administration notified Congress of a potential sale to Saudi Arabia of “continued
assistance in the modernization of the Saudi Arabian National Guard as well as associated
equipment and services … for the period 1 January 2009 through 31 December 2013.” The
estimated potential cost is $1.8 billion. The Obama Administration notified Congress in
December 2009 of a potential sale of 2,700 TOW-2A anti-tank missiles to the SANG. The
potential value of the sale is estimated at $177 million. As of July 2008, there were 215 U.S.
military personnel and 500 contractors in Saudi Arabia supporting PM-SANG.
57 USMTM Mission Statement, available at http://www.usmtm.sppn.af.mil/.
58 Agreement Providing for a Military Assistance Advisory Group, June 27, 1953 (4 UST 1482; TIAS 2812; 212 UNTS
335). Terminated February 27, 1977, except that the provisions of paragraph 7 remain in force in respect to activities
under the agreement of February 8 and 27, 1977 (28 UST 2409; TIAS 8558).
59 Agreement Relating to a United States Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia, February 27, 1977 (28 UST 2409;
TIAS 8558).
60 OPM-SANG, “Historical Perspective,” available at https://www.opmsang.sppn.af.mil/.
61 Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization Program, March 19,
1973 (24 UST 1106; TIAS 7634).
62 Information on VinnellArabia operations with the SANG is available at http://www.vinnell.com/ArabiaRecruiting/
recruiting.htm.
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Office of Program Management Ministry of Interior – Facilities Security Forces
(OPM MOI-FSF)
The newest U.S.-Saudi security cooperation program is administered by the U.S. Department of
State and the U.S. military and seeks to improve the state of critical infrastructure (including
energy infrastructure) protection in the kingdom. The MOI-FSF program implements the
Technical Cooperation Agreement signed by the Bush Administration and the Saudi government
in May 2008 to govern U.S. assistance “in the areas of critical infrastructure protection and public
security, including border protection, civil defense capabilities, and coast guard and maritime
capabilities.”63 A small team of military advisers associated with the MOI-FSF program deployed
in early 2009 to begin an assessment mission that will make recommendations to the Ministry of
Interior and U.S. Central Command (U.S. CENTCOM) for the development of Saudi Arabia’s
planned 35,000-person Facility Security Force. In the future, the OPM MOI-FSF will oversee
U.S. contributions to the training and equipping of the FSF, which will be financed on a contract
basis. The current commanding officer of U.S. forces engaged with the OPM MOI-FSF program
is Brig. Gen. Robert G. Catalanotti. Retired Maj. Gen. Kenneth Bowra is the senior State
Department officer for the program. In October 2008, then-U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
Ford Fraker referred to the program as “probably the single biggest initiative for the U.S.-Saudi
relationship,” and predicted the value of contracts associated with the program could reach “tens
of billions of dollars.”64
Counterterrorism
The Bush Administration’s January 2008 Strategy Toward Saudi Arabia asserted that, “Victory for
the United States in the global war on terrorism will be impossible without a partnership to dry up
funds for terrorists and to combat Islamic extremism in the kingdom.”65 Terrorism has long been
an issue in U.S.-Saudi relations, and the strategy document constitutes the latest acknowledgment
by U.S. officials of the roles that Saudi nationals play in both supporting and combating
terrorism. U.S. policy makers sought the support of Saudi authorities throughout the 1970s and
1980s in combating various terrorist groups. However, after terrorist attacks on U.S. military
facilities in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996, the need for additional U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism
cooperation grew more urgent.
Current counterterrorism issues include joint U.S.-Saudi efforts to eliminate threats posed by
violent extremists in the kingdom as well as internationally. U.S. officials acknowledge
significant Saudi domestic counterterrorism efforts and encourage the Saudi government to build
upon the positive steps it has already taken to combat international terrorism. Both U.S. and Saudi
officials have said the impetus for closer counterterrorism cooperation in recent years came from
a series of terrorist attacks against Saudi, U.S., and other facilities in Saudi Arabia beginning in
May 2003. One knowledgeable observer described the May 2003 attacks as “the inevitable wake
up call” for Saudi leaders increasingly concerned over attempts by terrorists to target the Saudi
63 Available at: [http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/109344.pdf].
64 Saudi-US Relations Information Service, “Managing the Marriage: A Conversation with Ambassador Ford Fraker –
Part 3,” December 1, 2008.
65 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Strategy Toward Saudi Arabia, Report Pursuant to Section 2043c of the
Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, P.L. 110-53, January 30, 2008, p. 1.
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regime.66 According to the 9/11 Commission’s final report, “[a]s in Pakistan, Yemen, and other
countries, [Saudi] attitudes changed when the terrorism came home.”
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
Terrorism “came home” to Saudi Arabia gradually during the 1990s, although attacks against
non-U.S. targets did not begin until May 2003. Saudi veterans of anti-Soviet fighting in
Afghanistan (the “Afghan Arabs”), Saudi combatants from subsequent conflicts involving
Muslims in other regions, and Saudi graduates of terrorist training camps based in Afghanistan
returned to the kingdom during this period. Some eventually formed the core of an organization
calling itself Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which launched a deadly campaign of
terrorist attacks in cooperation with local allies in May 2003.67 Saudi counterterrorism officials
describe the AQAP terrorism campaign and the government’s counterterrorism response as
having three stages:68
• The “Momentum” Phase—From May 2003 through June 2004, Saudi
counterterrorism officials faced an organized campaign of terrorist attacks
planned and executed by a trained network of AQAP operatives. Saudi officials
describe AQAP as having created a network of storage caches and safe houses
based on the work of local and foreign operatives trained in document forgery,
fund-raising, publishing, weapons and explosives use, and personal security
techniques. Major attacks during this period included the May 2003 bombing of
residential compounds in Riyadh and the May 2004 attack on a residential
facility in Al Khobar. In June 2004, Saudi officials announced they had shot and
killed Abd al Aziz al Muqrin, the then-leader of AQAP.
• The “Regrouping” Phase—From June 2004 through April 2005, Saudi officials
report that AQAP operatives began working in smaller cells with new leaders in
an attempt to reestablish themselves after the government’s initial
counterterrorism response. Incidents during this period included a number of
attacks on Saudi security facilities and forces, many of which ended in the death
or arrest of AQAP fighters. Major attacks during this period included December
2004 attacks on the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah and the Ministry of Interior
headquarters in Riyadh. In April 2005, Saudi officials announced the death of
AQAP leader Saud al Otaibi following a three-day gun battle in Al Qassim
province.
• The “Fragmentation” Phase—From April 2005 to the present, Saudi officials
report that the AQAP organization in the kingdom has become increasingly
fragmented. According to Saudi counterterrorism officials, current terrorist
threats in the kingdom are associated with less organized cells that lack central
leadership and that do not exhibit the skills or training evident among AQAP
operatives previously detained or killed. Nevertheless, this period has been
characterized by high-profile attempted attacks, including an abortive attack in
66 Judith Kipper quoted in Patrick E. Tyler, “Stability Itself Is the Enemy,” New York Times, November 10, 2003.
67 A detailed account of the development and leadership of AQAP is available in Thomas Hegghammer, “Terrorist
Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia,” Middle East Policy, Vol. XIII, No. 4, Winter 2006, pp. 39-60.
68 Briefings from Saudi Ministry of Interior counterterrorism advisors, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, February 2008 and
Washington, D.C., April 2008.
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February 2006 on the world’s largest oil processing facility at Abqaiq in eastern
Saudi Arabia. Shootouts and large scale arrests continued through late 2007.
Saudi counterterrorism officials appear confident that they have killed or captured most of the
leaders and operatives that made up the original AQAP organization. King Abdullah echoed this
sentiment in June 2006, when he stated that AQAP had been “defeated.”69 Nevertheless,
continuing terrorist incidents and arrests have sustained concerns about the threat that Al Qaeda
and its sympathizers pose in Saudi Arabia. Of particular concern is an apparent shift in attackers’
objectives toward targeting critical energy infrastructure and Saudi government officials.70 The
arrest of over 110 terrorist suspects in March 2010, along with reports that some of the suspects
planned to target energy installations, highlighted these concerns.
In response, Saudi authorities are establishing a 35,000-man oil facilities protection service, with
U.S. support. Longer-term challenges include the prospect of better-trained Saudi operatives
returning from Iraq (see below) and the prospect of new weapons and operatives entering the
kingdom from Yemen, where some terrorist operatives have reestablished AQAP. Saudi
authorities also are working to improve border security controls to prevent infiltration of weapons
and trained individuals from these areas. According to the U.S. Department of State, “there is an
ongoing security threat” in Saudi Arabia, and a travel warning remains in effect.71
While some analysts have argued that the AQAP campaign threatened the viability of the Al Saud
family’s control over the country, developments since 2004 have shown that relatively basic
improvements in Saudi counterterrorism techniques and investigative procedures enabled the
government to weather a sustained assault from trained, experienced Al Qaeda operatives. Others
have suggested that if AQAP members had completed preparations for a national campaign the
outcome of their sustained confrontation with Saudi authorities may have been more in doubt.
Saudi counterterrorism officials, like security officials in other Arab states, report that they do not
intend to allow combatants from Iraq and Afghanistan to return and that they plan to maintain a
state of vigilance and preparedness based on the expectation of enduring terrorist threats,
particularly from Al Qaeda affiliates in Yemen.
Yemen’s importance as a hub for Al Qaeda activity appears to have grown during 2009, as
indicated by the reorganization of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula there and the flight of
several suspected Saudi Al Qaeda operatives to Yemen. The attempted assassination of Assistant
Interior Minister for Security Affairs Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdelaziz Al Saud in
August 2009 highlighted this threat and raised questions about the tactics employed in the
kingdom’s terrorist rehabilitation program (see below).
Combating Extremism
Saudi officials now consider efforts to combat violent extremist ideology to be a central
component in their domestic counterterrorism campaign. Saudi leaders and official religious
figures have launched multifaceted public outreach and detainee rehabilitation campaigns that
69 “Saudi King Says Al Qaeda Militants Defeated,” Reuters, June 7, 2006.
70 In late April 2007, Saudi authorities arrested 170 terrorism suspects on charges of planning to target critical oil
facilities in the Eastern Province. Dan Murphy, “New Saudi Tack on Al Qaeda,” Christian Science Monitor, April 30,
2007.
71 U.S. Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs, Travel Warning - Saudi Arabia, February 18, 2010.
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seek to portray Al Qaeda supporters and other violent activists as “misguided” followers of a
“deviant ideology.” These characterizations have powerful negative connotations in Saudi society,
and are closely associated with long-standing government efforts to promote social consensus and
deference to the official views of religious and political authorities. Newspapers and television
channels regularly feature articles and programs condemning “deviant ideology” and promoting
Saudi government programs designed to root out violent extremism.
The Saudi Ministries of Islamic Affairs, Education, and Interior have launched various programs
associated with the campaigns, as have religious bodies such as the Commission for the
Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice.72 The detainee rehabilitation program is based on
the engagement of Saudi counterterrorism officials, psychologists, and religious clerics with
terrorism detainees in an effort to dissuade detainees from supporting extremism and violence in
the future.73 Successfully rehabilitated detainees are provided various types of social and financial
support designed to prevent recidivism.74 Saudi authorities report that recidivism rate estimates
range from 10%-20%.75
Some outside observers have hailed the Saudi programs as innovative and effective, while others
have questioned the wisdom of releasing and supporting former detainees because of the tangible
threats that potential recidivism could pose. Saudi authorities state that they carefully monitor
participants during and after rehabilitation, and trials and continued detention await unresponsive
detainees. The extent and success of the program and Saudi Arabia’s post-rehabilitation
monitoring drew new skepticism in early 2009 when two individuals who had passed through the
program and had disappeared resurfaced in Yemen and announced themselves to be the leaders of
Al Qaeda operations in that country and in the broader Arabian Peninsula. Subsequent reporting
revealed that other program participants could not be located and are believed to have resumed
activities in support of Al Qaeda. The attempted assassination of the program’s primary patron
and sponsor, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, by a Saudi national posing as a repentant terrorist
raised further doubts about the program’s success in dealing with hardened militants. Reporting in
the aftermath of the attack also revealed a high degree of personal involvement on the part of the
prince in negotiation with the would-be assassin for his surrender, undermining some
international media accounts of the program that suggested the program was managed by
counterterrorism officers with a strictly clinical approach.76
The ideological content of reeducation programs and Saudi anti-terrorism outreach statements
also may be problematic to the extent that it portrays religiously motivated violence as
illegitimate when it is expressly prohibited by religious and political leaders, rather than as being
illegitimate in and of itself. Similar questions could be raised regarding the Saudi anti-extremism
campaign’s approach to so-called takfiri ideology; this term refers to a practice known as takfir in
which an individual is ruled insufficiently pious and therefore subject to religious disavowal and
72 OSC Document FEA20070717232153, “Saudi Arabia: Riyadh Announces New Campaigns To Confront Extremist
Ideology,” July 17, 2007; and, OSC Document GMP20080429614004, “Saudi Vice, Virtue Chief on Study
Documenting Counter-Terrorism Efforts,” Ukaz (Jeddah), April 24, 2008.
73 See Terrence Henry, “Get out of Jihad Free,” The Atlantic, June 2007, pp 39-40.
74 See for example, OSC Document GMP20071008836001, “Saudi Minister Orders Funds, Temporary Release For
Returnees From Guantanamo,” Ukaz (Jeddah), October 6, 2007.
75 Briefings from Saudi Ministry of Interior counterterrorism advisors, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, February 2008.
76 See for example, a partial transcript of call between the attacker and Prince Mohammed bin Nayef reprinted by the
Saudi Press Agency on September 2, 2009, available at:
http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentID=2009090248580.
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potential violence. Some official clerics continue to argue that determinations of religious fidelity
and infidelity are not divisive or illegitimate in and of themselves, but rather that judgments
regarding individuals’ piety should be made by qualified religious scholars.77
Some opposition figures have questioned the legitimacy of Saudi officials who call on Saudi
citizens to avoid supporting combatants in Iraq or other conflicts involving Muslims. Some critics
allege that Saudi officials and clerics are being hypocritical in light of their past encouragement
of similar activism among Saudis in other cases.78 At issue is the government’s assertion that
activism or violence are illegitimate unless endorsed by the country’s leaders. Some critics’
counter-arguments contend that the government’s endorsements appear to have become arbitrary
or based on secular foreign policy priorities rather than on religious principles or solidarity.
The Arab-Israeli Conflict
Many Saudi citizens and officials hold and express the view that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is
the central policy problem in the Middle East region. Many Saudis argue that the United States
should support a solution to the conflict that adequately addresses various Palestinian and Arab
concerns. The government of Saudi Arabia supports Palestinian national aspirations, strongly
endorses Muslim claims in the Old City of Jerusalem, and has frequently criticized Israeli
settlement building in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Since the 1940s, Saudi-U.S. relations have
been challenged repeatedly by stark differences of opinion over the Israeli-Palestinian question,
with leaders on both sides questioning the other’s devotion to achieving a just peace and
willingness to abide by stated policy commitments.
Unlike several other Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia has not established open trade or liaison
channels for communication with Israel. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia generally has supported U.S.
policy since the early 1990s by endorsing Israeli-Palestinian peace agreements; by joining with
neighboring Gulf states in 1994 in terminating enforcement of the so-called secondary and
tertiary (indirect) boycotts of Israel;79 and by adopting a more proactive approach to Arab-Israeli
peacemaking and diplomacy. The outbreak of the second Palestinian intifadah, or uprising, in late
2000 and the collapse of the Oslo peace process in early 2001 ushered in a period of renewed
tension in Saudi-Israeli relations. Saudi leaders were sharply critical of Israeli military and
security responses to Palestinian terrorist attacks and launched massive relief campaigns for the
Palestinians, some of which are alleged to have supported the families of Palestinians who died in
attacks on Israelis or in engagements with Israeli security forces.
In response to Israel’s 2009 military campaign against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Saudi leaders
sought to balance their commitment to conditional offers of peace and recognition to Israel with
77 For example, Saudi Grand Mufti Shaykh Abd al Aziz bin Abdullah Al Al Shaykh has argued that, “The issues of
holding others as infidels or debauchers or apostates are sharia [Islamic law] issues that should be built on the
scholarship of sharia and by qualified religious scholars.” OSC Document GMP20080318913003, “Saudi Grand Mufti
Lashes Out at Terrorists, Deviants in Lecture at Islamic University,” Al Madinah (Jeddah), March 18, 2008.
78 A prominent early example of this type of encouragement was King Khalid’s decision in 1980 to create a Committee
to Aid the Afghani Mujahidin, which followed an earlier announcement by then-Grand Mufti Shaykh Abd al Aziz Bin
Baz that authorized the payment of zakat, a 2.5% alms wealth tax required of Muslims as one of the five pillars of faith,
to anti-Soviet fighters in Afghanistan. See Saudi Committee to Collect Funds for Afghan Muslims, U.S. Department of
State, Cable Jidda 00530, January 1980. Similar committees were subsequently established over the next twenty years
to provide “support” or “relief” to Bosnians, Palestinians, Chechens, Kashmiris, Kosovars, and Iraqis.
79 Saudi Arabia maintains the primary (direct) boycott. See below.
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the demands of regional rivals and some Saudi citizens, clerics, and officials for a more
confrontational approach to Israel. Uneven progress in U.S.-sponsored peace efforts and Israeli
settlement construction appear to be testing Saudi leaders patience. Statements from Saudi
officials in 2010 indicate the kingdom’s continuing support for U.S. involvement in the peace
process; for comprehensive, direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians on all aspects
of the conflict, and for an area free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, in
the Middle East.
Saudi-Palestinian Relations
Saudi Arabia maintains contact with the two main Palestinian political entities—the secular
nationalist Fatah movement and the Islamic Resistance Movement, more commonly known as
Hamas, which remains a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization. Political rivalry and
violence between Hamas and Fatah since 2006 has complicated Saudi policy toward the
Palestinians. As a result, the Saudi government at times has pursued policies divergent from the
expressed preferences of the United States and other members of the Quartet.80 However, more
recent Saudi policy initiatives have sought to promote reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah
and foster inter-Arab unity, in light of internecine fighting and a political stalemate that has
blocked further progress in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process.
Saudi authorities and citizens have long endorsed public and private efforts to channel financial
and material support to Palestinian organizations and causes. These efforts continued during the
period in which Hamas controlled the Palestinian Authority.81 In December 2007, Saudi Arabia
pledged between $500 and $750 million to the Palestinian Authority over three years, and
unofficial estimates suggest that Saudi pledges scheduled for delivery in 2008 have been met.82 In
January 2009, the Saudi Arabian government launched a nationwide fundraising campaign under
the auspices of the Saudi Committee to Support the Palestinian People in response to Israel’s
military operations in the Gaza Strip. In August 2009, Saudi Arabia transferred $200 million to
the Palestinian Authority in line with its pledges of assistance.
Saudi Peace Proposals
In March 2002, then-Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abd al Aziz proposed a peace initiative calling
for full Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories in return for full normalization of relations
between Arab states and Israel. The 2002 initiative paralleled and built upon the August 1981
80 The Quartet includes the United States, the United Nations, Russia, and the European Union. For example, in 2006,
Saudi Arabia continued to deliver assistance to the Palestinian territories, in spite of U.S. efforts to convince the
international community to halt support for the Palestinian Authority following Hamas’ victory in parliamentary
elections. Similarly, in February 2007, King Abdullah invited representatives of Fatah and Hamas to meet in Mecca,
where they negotiated an agreement on a national unity government. Although the agreement represented an
achievement for Saudi diplomacy, the national unity government did not explicitly meet preconditions set by the
United States and its Quartet partners for recognition of the then-Hamas-led government (i.e., disavowal of violence,
recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous Israeli-Palestinian accords). Helene Cooper, “After the Mecca Accord,
Clouded Horizons,” New York Times, February 21, 2007.
81 In late July 2006, the Saudi Arabian government announced plans to transfer $250 million in reconstruction
assistance “to the Palestinian people” and confirmed the transfer of half of a $92 million budgetary support pledge for
the Palestinian Authority.
82 Howard LaFranchi, “Global donors exceed Palestinian expectations at Paris conference,” Christian Science Monitor,
December 19, 2007.
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eight point plan proposed by then-Crown Prince Fahd bin Abd al Aziz and subsequently endorsed
by the Arab League. The text of both proposals can be found in Appendix B. Continuing violence
and political developments precluded further consideration of the 2002 Saudi proposal for several
years. The overall direction of Saudi policy has remained committed to engagement in support of
an eventual negotiated settlement. On March 28-29, 2007, the heads of state of most of the Arab
League countries met in Riyadh and reconfirmed their support for King Abdullah’s peace
proposal, as adopted by the Arab League in 2002. At the time, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince
Saud al Faisal warned that if Israel rejects the proposal, “they will be putting their future not in
the hands of the peacemakers but in the hands of the lords of war.”83
In November 2007, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal attended the U.S.-sponsored
peace meeting in Annapolis, MD, lending the kingdom’s support to renewed U.S. efforts to
broker a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The foreign minister reiterated Saudi
Arabia’s willingness to normalize relations with Israel subject to conditions, including the
establishment of a Palestinian state on territory occupied by Israel in 1967, a negotiated solution
for the return of Palestinian refugees, and some degree of Palestinian sovereignty over East
Jerusalem.
During the last year of the Bush Administration, Saudi officials expressed increasing frustration
with U.S. policy and Israeli efforts to restrict the flow of material into the Hamas-controlled Gaza
Strip. In February 2008, Prince Saud al Faisal stated that, “We hope that Israel responds
positively to our quest and efforts, to avoid desperation that would force us to review our
options.”84 In May 2008, he expressed the Saudi government’s “dissatisfaction with and strong
condemnation of Israel’s continuation of its collective punishment policy against the Palestinian
people, and its continuing blockade of the Gaza Strip.”85
Israel’s strikes on Hamas in January 2009 drew widespread condemnation in Saudi Arabia,
although the government took a position that linked the outbreak of hostilities to intransigence
and attacks by Hamas. At a January summit in Kuwait, King Abdullah characterized the Gaza
conflict as “bloody, painful and brutal scenes and genocide being carried out by a criminal,
inhuman, and merciless gang as the world listened and watched,” and warned Israel that “the
Arab Initiative on the table today will not be on the table for ever.”86
U.S. Special Envoy for Middle East Peace Senator George Mitchell has visited Saudi Arabia
repeatedly along with other high ranking U.S. officials. Saudi officials continue to call for
Palestinian unity and forceful engagement by the United States in supporting a balanced approach
to the conflict and in restraining potential Israeli military operations against Hamas and other
regional threats.
Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal Al Saud visited the United States in September 2009 to
represent the kingdom at the opening of the United Nations General Assembly and the G-20
meeting in Pittsburgh, PA. In his remarks at the General Assembly, he reiterated the kingdom’s
83 David Blair, “Accept Peace Plan or Face War, Israel Told,” Daily Telegraph (UK), March 28, 2007.
84 Damian Wroclavsky and Fiona Ortiz, “Saudi minister calls for Israeli response on talks,” Reuters, February 20, 2008.
85 OSC Document GMP20080514831001, “Re-filed Version of SPA Report on Saudi ForMin Al Faysal’s News
Conference,” Saudi Press Agency, May 13, 2008.
86 OSC Document GMP20090119869001, “Saudi King: Israel ‘Must Realize’ Arab Peace Offer ‘Will Not Be on Table
Forever’,” January 19, 2009.
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position with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, emphasizing that the kingdom would not
adopt any so-called “confidence building measures” toward Israel beyond the standing Saudi
peace proposal that has been endorsed by the Arab League. The Foreign Minister said, “the
desired peace will never be achieved by attempting to impose normalization of relations on the
Arabs before the completion of withdrawal and the establishment of peace, as though we are
expected to reward the aggressor for his aggression in a reverse logic that totally lacks any form
of serious credibility.”87
Prince Saud Al Faisal’s remarks echoed the positions taken by Saudi Ambassador to the United
States Adel Al Jubeir in a September 8, 2009, letter to Members of Congress, in which he stated
the kingdom’s “firm view that resolution of this conflict does require outlining the final
settlement at the outset, followed by prompt resumption of negotiations on all final status
issues—borders, Jerusalem, water, security and refugees—with a deadline set for their early
conclusion. The focus must be on the final settlement and on the final peace, not on an
incremental process.”88
Iraq
Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Iraq has been tense historically, although periods of Saudi-Iraqi
cooperation have occurred when supported by convergent interests, most notably during the Iran-
Iraq war of the 1980s. Saudi Arabia publicly opposed the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, but
provided logistical support to U.S. forces,89 and Saudi officials have called on U.S. forces not to
leave Iraq on an “uninvited” basis.90 Saudi Arabia’s principal interests with regard to Iraq are—
first, to prevent instability and conflict in Iraq from threatening Saudi Arabia’s internal security
and stability; second, to prevent the repression of Iraq’s Sunnis by newly dominant Shiites; and,
third, to limit the regional influence of a potentially hostile Iran.91
Saudi Arabia’s longer term interests include ensuring that the revival of Iraq’s oil industry does
not threaten Saudi preeminence and preferences in global energy markets and that Iraq does not
87 United Nations General Assembly, Debate of the 64th Session (2009), Saudi Arabia – Statement of His Royal
Highness Prince Saud Al-Faisal, Minister for Foreign Affairs, September 26, 2009. Available at:
http://www.un.org/ga/64/generaldebate/SA.shtml.
88 Letter available from the Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington, DC, at:
http://www.saudiembassy.net/announcement/announcement09130901.aspx.
89 On March 19, 2003, a communiqué from then-King Fahd stated that Saudi Arabia “will not participate in any way”
in the coalition attack on Iraq. A number of news reports, however, indicated that Saudi Arabia informally agreed to
provide logistical support to U.S.-led forces, including permission to conduct refueling, reconnaissance, surveillance,
and transport missions from bases in Saudi Arabia; landing and overflight clearances; and use of a U.S.-built facility in
Saudi Arabia known as the Combat Air Operations Center (CAOC) to coordinate military operations in the region.
Unnamed Saudi and U.S. officials later told the press that the Saudi royal family permitted the staging of U.S. special
forces operations from inside Saudi Arabia, allowed some 250-300 mainly transport and surveillance planes to fly
missions from Saudi Arabia, and provided tens of millions of dollars in discounted oil, gas, and fuel for U.S. forces.
See also “U.S. And Saudis Agree On Cooperation,” Washington Post, February 26, 2003; and John Solomon, “Saudis
had wider role in war,” Associated Press, April 26, 2004.
90 In October 2006, and repeatedly thereafter, then-Saudi Ambassador to the United States Prince Turki al Faisal argued
that, “The kingdom’s position has always been that since the United States came into Iraq uninvited, they shouldn’t
leave uninvited.” Arshad Mohammed, “Saudi envoy warns US against abrupt Iraq withdrawal,” Reuters, October 30,
2006.
91 For the Saudi cabinet’s statement of its key principles for Iraq, see Saudi Press Agency (Riyadh), “King Abdullah
Chairs Cabinet’s Session,” November 20, 2006.
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re-emerge as a strategic military threat to the Arab Gulf states. Reconciliation and long-term
stability in Iraq could ease Saudi fears of creeping insecurity, but could also create new
challenges. Saudi Arabia’s immediate concern is the reintegration or elimination of Saudi
militants who may be seeking to return from Iraq. The success of Iraqi reconciliation efforts and
the choices made by Iraq’s government will determine whether Saudi fears about the
empowerment of Shiite Arabs and the growth of Iranian influence persist or diminish. Future
Iraqi choices in key areas such as energy and military policy will have important implications for
Iraqi-Saudi relations.92
Saudi Policy Priorities in Iraq
The Saudi Arabian government has refrained from overt political-military intervention in Iraq
since 2003, in spite of the threat that instability in Iraq has posed to Saudi Arabia’s national
security. To date, Saudi policy initiatives have sought to meet the humanitarian needs of Iraqis
displaced by violence; to promote political and religious reconciliation among Iraqis by hosting
and participating in various regional conferences; and, to take preventive security measures to
limit the spread of violence into Saudi Arabia. Some analysts believe that Saudi Arabia has not
fulfilled pledges of aid to Iraq because it has not wanted to support an Iraqi government that
many Saudis believed had a Shiite sectarian agenda. Other observers also speculate that the Saudi
government may be offering financial support to Sunni Arab individuals and groups in Iraq,
including tribal leaders and others associated with the so called “awakening” movement and the
Iraqiya coalition led by former Prime Miniser Iyad Allawi. However, Prince Saud al Faisal
publicly has dismissed calls for direct Saudi involvement in supporting Iraqi Sunnis and has
stated, that “since the start of the crisis in Iraq ... the Kingdom has said it will stand at an equal
distance from all Iraqi groups and does not describe itself as the guardian of any group or sect.”93
Saudi-Iraqi Diplomatic and Economic Relations
Sectarian and strategic anxieties complicate Saudi efforts to engage the Shiite-led Iraqi
government, to establish strong trade links, and to discourage and prevent Saudi clerics and
individuals from supporting Sunni Arab combatants in Iraq. Saudi leaders maintain regular
contact with prominent Iraqi government officials, clerics, and political figures. A Saudi Foreign
Ministry delegation visited Iraq in August 2007 to explore the possibility of reopening an
embassy in Baghdad, and in January 2008, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal
announced that an ambassador had been chosen and that Saudi Arabia hoped to open an embassy
in Baghdad “in the next few months.”94 However, in October 2008 he appeared to place an
indefinite delay on plans to send an ambassador to Baghdad because, in the Saudi government’s
view, security concerns would limit the ability of any Saudi representative to operate effectively.95
92 With regard to oil policy, there is a possibility, in the words of one analyst, that, over the long term, “the Saudi
interest in moderate prices and preserving market share will run afoul of the Iraqi need for maximum production at high
prices to fund national reconstruction.” See Joseph McMillan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq: Oil, Religion, and an Enduring
Rivalry, USIP, Special Report No. 157, January 2006, p. 14.
93 Arab News (Jeddah), “Kingdom Won’t Take Sides in Iraq, Says Saud,” December 20, 2006; and Robin Wright,
“Royal Intrigue, Unpaid Bills Preceded Saudi Ambassador’s Exit,” Washington Post, December 23, 2006.
94 Prince Saud al Faisal quoted in “U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice Remarks With Saudi Arabia Minister of
Foreign Affairs, His Royal Highness Prince Saud Al-Faisal,” State Department Press Releases and Documents, January
15, 2008.
95 Donna Abu-Nasr, “Saudi Arabia, citing security, delays opening embassy in Baghdad,” Associated Press, October
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A regional press report in April 2009 appeared to confirm that advanced preparations for an
eventual Saudi diplomatic presence in Baghdad have been made, but quoted Saudi officials as
indicating that security concerns continue to limit their willingness to send high level diplomatic
personnel to Iraq on a permanent basis. The bombings of Iraqi government ministries in August
and October 2009 likely confirmed Saudi views of insecurity in Baghdad following the
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq’s cities. As of May 2010, a Saudi Embassy had not been
opened in Baghdad and no ambassador had been publicly identified.
As of January 2004, Iraq reportedly owed the Saudi government $9 billion in debts incurred
during the Saddam Hussein regime (mostly during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s), while private
Saudi firms and banks hold about $19 billion in Iraqi debt.96 Questions have been raised about
whether Iraq’s debt to Saudi Arabia is subject to interest, and both parties have agreed to discuss
the matter. U.S. officials have encouraged Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to forgive Iraq’s outstanding
debt to support reconstruction and economic recovery efforts. The Iraq Study Group report
speculated that Saudi Arabia could agree to cancel the outstanding debt as part of regional efforts
to support and stabilize Iraq.97 In May 2007, Prince Saud al Faisal stated that the Saudi
government will continue its negotiations with Iraq “to have an appropriate solution to debts in
line with rules of the Paris Club.”
In December 2008, Paris Club members completed their debt forgiveness schedule with Iraq,
which eliminated 80% of Iraq’s Paris Club-held debt in line with Iraq’s participation in an IMF
economic reform program. In April 2009, press reports indicated that Saudi Arabia may be
reconsidering the terms of publicly held Iraqi debt from the Iran-Iraq war period while continuing
to consider privately held debt as unalterable. Past media reports have suggested that Saudi
officials are reluctant to offer substantial economic concessions, such as debt relief, until they are
confident that Iraq’s elected government is committed to establishing an equitable balance of
power among Iraq’s sectarian groups and to resisting Iranian influence.
The Saudi government has pledged $500 million from the Saudi Development Fund to sponsor
Iraqi government-requested development projects, along with $500 million to finance potential
bilateral trade and close to $90 million in humanitarian relief assistance.98 However, since 2003,
trade between Iraq and Saudi Arabia has remained very limited. Saudi and Iraqi security services
also reportedly have increased their cooperation. Nevertheless, some accounts suggest that Iraqis
are frustrated by the slow pace of official Saudi-Iraqi rapprochement and the Saudi government's
unwillingness or inability to prevent individuals in Saudi Arabia from engaging in sectarian
incitement. In September 2009, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said in a media interview
that, “To be frank and clear, I will say there is really a problem in Iraqi-Saudi relations. We are
doing the impossible to correct these relations and place them on the right track.”99
(...continued)
21, 2008.
96 For more information, see CRS Report RL33376, Iraq’s Debt Relief: Procedure and Potential Implications for
International Debt Relief, by Martin A. Weiss; and, Tom Everett-Heath, “Opposing Views of the Kingdom to Come,”
Middle East Economic Digest, January 23-29, 2004, p. 1.
97 Mariam Karouny and Alister Bull, “Iraq Finance Minister Says Still No Deal on Gulf Debt, Reuters, August 1, 2006;
and, ISG Report, p. 35.
98 Statement of Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal to United Nations meeting on Iraq, September 18, 2006.
Available at http://www.mofa.gov.sa/Detail.asp?InNewsItemID=55259.
99 OSC Report GMP20090918643001, "Al-Jazirah Interviews Iraq's Zebari on Syrian-Iraqi Crisis, Ties With
(continued...)
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Economic Relations and Trade
U.S.-Saudi Trade
Saudi Arabia remained the largest U.S. trading partner in the Middle East in 2009. According to
the U.S. International Trade Administration, Saudi exports to the United States were $22.0 billion
(down from $54.8 billion in 2008 and $35.6 billion in 2007) and imports from the United States
are estimated at $10.8 billion (down from $12.5 billion in 2008 and $10.4 billion in 2007).100
Comparable 2009 figures for Israel, the second-largest U.S. trading partner in the Middle East
that year, were $18.7 billion in exports to the United States and $9.6 billion in imports from the
United States. To a considerable extent, the high value of U.S.-Saudi trade is dictated by U.S.
imports of hydrocarbons from Saudi Arabia (see Table 3 below) and U.S. exports of weapons,
machinery, and vehicles to Saudi Arabia. Fluctuations in the volume and value of U.S.-Saudi oil
trade account for declines in the value of Saudi exports to the U.S. in recent years.
U.S. Oil Imports and Saudi Policy
With the world’s largest proven oil reserves (estimated at 262.3 billion barrels), Saudi Arabia
produced approximately 8 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil in mid-January 2009, a
significant drop from record high production of 9.7 million bpd in mid-2008.101 Recent estimates
suggest production remains at or near these levels. Saudi oil reserves, oil exports, and excess oil
production capacity make the kingdom the focal point for the global oil market. SaudiAramco is
in the process of completing a multi-year, multi-billion dollar production capacity expansion
project that will raise its daily production capacity to 12.5 million bpd. According to the U.S.
Energy Information Administration, in 2009, Saudi Arabia was the fourth-largest supplier to the
United States, based on average monthly supply. (See Table 3 below.)
U.S. calls for Saudi Arabia to increase its daily oil production in order to bring down climbing
global oil prices in early 2008 were met with resistance from Saudi oil officials. Saudi officials
argued that global consumption data and oil market conditions suggested that high oil prices were
not the result of a lack of supply or excess demand, but rather a function of refining capacity
restrictions, declines in the value of the U.S. dollar relative to other currencies, commodity
market speculation, and insecurity in key oil producing regions. Significant declines in global
demand and market prices for crude oil since mid-2008 have largely reversed a trend that
delivered record oil export revenues and budget surpluses to Saudi Arabia over the last five years.
Most estimates suggest that oil export revenue provides 90% of the Saudi government’s budget.
In response Saudi Arabia led OPEC production cuts in an attempt to stabilize oil prices. Saudi
authorities estimated a 2009 budget deficit of $17 billion after a record surplus of $157 billion in
2008. In September 2009, Saudi Oil Minister Ali al Naimi said in an interview that, “We believe
that around $75 [per barrel] is a fair price for the oil producer, the consumer.”102
(...continued)
Neighbors," September 18, 2009.
100 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration Office of Trade and Industry Information
(OTII), National Trade Data, Custom Report - Saudi Arabia, May 2010. Available at http://tse.export.gov/.
101 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Saudi Arabia: Energy Profile, April 21, 2008; and, Economist Intelligence
Unit, Country Report: Saudi Arabia, January 19, 2009.
102 Kate Dourian, “Saudi minister Naimi sees no need for OPEC production change at December meeting,” Platts
(continued...)
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Table 3. U.S. Oil Consumption and Imports
(in millions of barrels per day)
Category
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Average
Total U.S.
20.034 20.731 20.802 20.687 20.698 19.419 18.879
Consumption
Total U.S.
12.264 13.145 13.714 13.612 13.439 12.872 11.891
Imports
Imports from
1.774 1.558 1.537 1.463 1.489 1.532 1.012
Saudi Arabia
Imports from
2.072 2.138 2.181 2.353 2.426 2.459 2.464
Canada
Imports from
1.623 1.665 1.662 1.705 1.533 1.299 1.235
Mexico
Imports from
1.376 1.554 1.529 1.419 1.362 1.191 1.078
Venezuela
Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Annual Energy Review (AER) 2008, Report No. DOE/EIA-0384(2008), June
26, 2009; Weekly U.S. Petroleum Products Product Supplied; Weekly Imports and Exports, and, AER Table 5.4 -
Petroleum Imports by Country of Origin, 1960-2008, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/aer/.
Saudi officials have committed to completing planned oil production capacity expansion to the
level of 12.5 million barrels per day, while arguing that U.S. policy makers and elected officials
are sending conflicting signals about the future of U.S. energy policy. Specifically, Saudi officials
appear concerned that U.S. efforts to reduce petroleum consumption in the United States will
undermine demand for Saudi and other petroleum producers’ exports, which in turn could limit
the profitability of planned investments in production capacity and threaten the fiscal positions of
oil revenue dependent governments. Saudi officials also are warning that increased domestic
energy consumption could significantly reduce the amount of oil available for export if changes
to pricing and consumption patterns are not made. An Aramco official reportedly said in April
2010 that domestic oil consumption could grow from the equivalent of 3.4 mbd in 2009 to the
equivalent of 8.3 mbd by 2028 if changes are not made.103
U.S.-Saudi Foreign Direct Investment
Saudi leaders, notably King Abdullah, have shown increasing interest in attracting foreign
investment to the kingdom. Major Saudi economic initiatives, such as plans to construct several
massive economic cities104 and to lift Saudi Arabia’s global competitiveness ranking into the top
10 by 2010 (the “10x10” initiative),105 involve efforts to secure foreign investment and economic
(...continued)
Oilgram News, September 29, 2009.
103 SaudiAramco CEO Chief Executive Khaled al Falih as cited in Alex Schindelar, “Aramco: Rising Consumption at
Home Could Cut into Saudi Exports,” Oil Daily, April 27, 2010.
104 For more information see the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) overview, available at
http://www.sagia.gov.sa/english/index.php?page=ecs-overview.
105 For more information, see the SAGIA overview, available at http://www.sagia.gov.sa/english/
index.php?page=overview-of-10x10-program.
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development partnerships. Economists expect that tighter credit conditions and reduced global
economic activity may hinder Saudi efforts to attract outside investors, although Saudi officials
appear to be prepared to continue with several ambitious economic reform and infrastructure
expansion initiatives.
Several U.S. companies are involved in existing or planned projects in Saudi Arabia, many of
which leverage Saudi energy resources. On May 12, 2007, SaudiAramco and the U.S. Dow
Chemical Company announced the signing of a memorandum of understanding related to the
development of a large scale, jointly operated petrochemical and plastic production facility in
Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. The potential value of the deal has been estimated at over $20
billion, although bidding for engineering and construction contracts has been delayed until
2010.106 On May 21, 2008, General Electric announced the sale of its GE Plastics division to the
Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) for $11.6 billion. The Saudi Arabian government
owns 70% of SABIC.
Saudi officials and business leaders have at times expressed concern that U.S. companies are
failing to adequately pursue non-energy resource linked investment opportunities in the kingdom.
Saudi Arabia established a sovereign wealth fund in May 2008 with limited resources (~$5
billion) for overseas investments. Other sovereign wealth funds have attracted interest in the
United States, where some observers and policy makers have been advocating for increased
transparency of and rules for sovereign wealth fund investments.107
Saudi Boycott of Israel and WTO Membership 108
Some Members of Congress have raised questions regarding Saudi Arabia’s participation in the
primary Arab League boycott of Israel in light of the conclusion of a bilateral agreement with the
United States on Saudi Arabia’s WTO accession.109 On April 5, 2006, the House passed
H.Con.Res. 370, which expresses the sense of Congress that Saudi Arabia should fully live up to
its WTO commitments and end all aspects of any boycott on Israel. Under the terms of an
agreement with the United States, Saudi negotiators confirmed that Saudi Arabia would not
invoke the non-application provision of the WTO Agreement toward any fellow WTO member
(which would prohibit enforcement of the boycott) and confirmed the kingdom would not enforce
the secondary and tertiary Arab League boycotts.
However, in June 2006, then-Saudi Ambassador to the United States Prince Turki al Faisal
reportedly stated that the Government of Saudi Arabia plans to continue to enforce the Arab
106 Sharad Mirji, “Dow/Saudi Aramco delay bids for $25 bil Ras Tanura plant: sources,” Platts Commodity News,
February 5, 2009.
107 See Economist Intelligence Unit, “Join the club: Saudi Arabia launches a formal sovereign-wealth fund,” May 1,
2008. For background information on sovereign wealth funds and related U.S. policy debates, see CRS Report
RL34336, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by Martin A. Weiss.
108 See CRS Report RL33961, Arab League Boycott of Israel, by Martin A. Weiss.
109 For more background, see American Association of Exporters and Importers, “Saudi Arabia’s WTO Accession,”
Vol. 105, No. 46, November 22, 2005. On September 9, 2005, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announced that
the United States and Saudi Arabia had completed bilateral negotiations on terms of Saudi accession to the World
Trade Organization (WTO). On November 10, President Bush signed a memorandum to the USTR noting that Saudi
Arabia had concluded a bilateral agreement with the United States related to Saudi accession to the WTO. In the
meantime, the press noted that Saudi Arabia had concluded bilateral negotiations with all other interested WTO
members, and on December 11, 2005, Saudi Arabia became the 149th member of the WTO.
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League’s primary boycott of Israel, drawing criticism and inquiries from some Members of
Congress. Prince Turki reportedly commented that “the primary boycott is an issue of national
sovereignty guaranteed within the makeup of the WTO and its rules,” and indicated that the Saudi
government had already made its decision clear to the United States Trade Representative’s office
(USTR). A USTR spokesman was quoted as saying that “in [USTR’s] view, maintaining the
primary boycott of Israel is not consistent with Saudi Arabia’s obligation to extend full WTO
treatment to all WTO Members.”110 January 2007 press reports quoted the Director General of the
Saudi Customs Service, Saleh Al Barak, as saying that goods manufactured in Israel could not be
legally imported into Saudi Arabia.111 However, Dan Catarivas, director of foreign trade and
international relations at the Manufacturers Association of Israel, stated his opinion in a March
2008 interview that “the Arab boycott exists much more on paper than in practicality,” and media
reporting suggests that low levels of Saudi-Israeli trade do exist and may grow if political
conditions permit.112 As of April 2010, the U.S. Department of the Treasury included Saudi
Arabia on the list of countries that require or may require participation in or cooperation with an
international boycott as define in Section 999(b)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.113
Human Rights, Religious Freedom, and Political Reform
U.S. efforts to encourage the protection of human rights, the establishment of religious freedom,
and the liberalization of political life in Saudi Arabia continue, but face some significant
obstacles. To outsiders, Saudi decision-making processes remain opaque. Many experts agree that
the leaders of the Saudi monarchy seek to preserve their ultimate authority over political decision
making in the kingdom. Saudi leaders maintain their legitimacy among conservative constituent
groups by carefully managing changes that could affect established religious and cultural
practices. Recent experience suggests that U.S. reliance on Saudi government cooperation for
counterterrorism, regional security, and global energy supply purposes may limit the U.S.
government’s ability to press for more rapid or wide-ranging changes in Saudi domestic and
social policies.
As it has elsewhere across the Arab world, advocacy by the U.S. government and other
international parties in support of social and political reform in the kingdom has been met with
skepticism and allegations of outside interference. At the same time, some reform activists
question the commitment of the United States to promote political and social liberalization,
because, in their view, renewed U.S.-Saudi security and counterterrorism cooperation strengthens
the ability of the Saudi government and the royal family to control the Saudi population and
perceived political rivals. Some observers also believe that apparent Saudi reluctance to adopt
broader social reforms is a product of the rapid transformation that the country has undergone
since its establishment, some of which has been met with violent opposition.
By all accounts, the Al Saud family and its close allies dominate political and economic decision
making in the kingdom, although Saudi leaders have taken some nominal steps since the early
110 Michael Freund, “Saudi Ambassador to U.S. Admits Boycott of Israel Still in Force,” Jerusalem Post, June 22,
2006; and, Freund “U.S. Official Under Fire Over Saudi Flap,” Jerusalem Post, June 25, 2006.
111 “Ban on Israeli Goods in Place: Customs Chief,” Arab News (Jeddah), January 4, 2007.
112 Rachelle Kliger, “Made in Israel, sold in Saudi Arabia,” Jerusalem Post, March 21, 2008.
113 Department of the Treasury, Office of the Secretary, List of Countries Requiring Cooperation With an International
Boycott, April 23, 2010, reprinted in the Federal Register, April 29, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 82), p. 22679.
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1990s to respond to calls for the protection of individual liberties and for more participatory,
accountable government. Within the ruling family, political differences and intra-clan and inter-
generational rivalries appear to influence the distribution of government posts and the policy
positions of leading actors on key issues. King Abdullah bin Abd al Aziz is widely considered to
be supportive of some social and economic reforms, but appears to share the strong commitment
of other leading royal figures to preserving the Al Saud family’s national authority and the
country’s international influence. Although decision-making authority remains concentrated,
policy decisions on controversial issues appear to reflect Saudi leaders’ efforts to manage and
address the demands of various interest groups. Outside observers and Saudi officials describe the
policy-making process in the kingdom as being based on the pursuit and maintenance of
consensus among key groups rather than being exclusively driven by the immediate needs of the
royal family and its allies.
Saudi Arabia’s conservative religious establishment and other non-government affiliated clerics
remain socially and culturally influential. Members of the official clerical community continue to
provide a degree of religious legitimacy to the rule of the royal family, but they have no formal
political authority, outside of the judicial system. Important families, tribal groups, and business
leaders also influence Saudi policy decisions on some issues. Political and religious advisory
bodies, such as the 150-member, appointed Shura Council and the appointed Senior Ulema
Council (made up of leading religious scholars), reflect the views of these influential groups but
have only cursory powers.
Political Reform Debates and Elections
Saudis have debated questions of political legitimacy and authority in the kingdom throughout its
history. Continuing petitions from reform activists since the 1990s have called on the royal family
to make decision-making and governance structures more participatory, accountable, and
responsive to citizens’ needs. To date, these calls have been met with a mixture of embrace and
resistance by the government. Since 2003, activists have submitted petitions calling for specific
political reforms, including the introduction of a constitutional monarchy.114 Then-crown prince
and now King Abdullah responded to initial calls for reform by instituting a “National Dialogue”
process, which some observers have described as an unprecedented opportunity for Saudi citizens
to publicly debate political and social issues and to offer criticism of government policies.115
However, the subsequent arrest and detention of signatories of various reform petitions has
angered reform supporters and creates doubt among some Saudis and outside observers about the
royal family’s willingness to compromise on certain core principles, particularly on issues
relating to the overarching authority of the royal family.
As such, tangible changes to the structure of the Saudi political system since 2003 have been
extremely limited. In 2005, elections were held for half of the seats on 178 newly created
municipal councils, which have been granted nominal powers to oversee local government and
make recommendations to regional and national level authorities. In practice, some Saudis have
114 See, International Crisis Group, “Can Saudi Arabia Reform Itself?” Middle East Report N̊28, July 14, 2004; and,
Reuters, “Saudi Arabia Frees 3 Islamist Reformists,” July 10, 2007.
115 Six sessions have been held under the auspices of the King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue, with
corresponding regional preparation meetings. The subjects included national unity, combating extremism, women,
youth, “dialogue with world cultures,” and education policy. For more information, see http://www.kacnd.org/eng/
default.asp.
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criticized the government for failing, in their views, to implement recommendations made
through the National Dialogue process or to adequately empower the municipal councils vis-à-vis
municipal and regional authorities. Several municipal council members have resigned, and
support for structural changes appears to remain strong among some Saudis. In September 2007,
Prince Talal bin Abd al Aziz, half-brother of King Abdallah and a long-term reform advocate,
called for the creation of a reform-oriented political party in the kingdom and criticized the
detention of reform activists.116
Municipal council elections were scheduled to be held in 2009, but the election has been
postponed. However, in April 2009, Prince Mansour bin Miteb bin Abd al Aziz, then-deputy
minister for municipal and rural affairs, indicated that recommendations for improving the
municipal council system were the subject of a recent conference held in Ras Tanura. Press
reports suggest that proposals to allow women to vote in municipal council elections would be
considered, along with recommendations intended to shape a forthcoming bylaw for the
municipal council system. Prince Mansour was promoted to minister for municipal and rural
affairs in November 2009 in the wake of his father’s resignation.
Leadership and Succession
In the aftermath of King Fahd’s death in 2005, media reports initially speculated that King
Abdullah planned to name a second deputy prime minister (a de facto deputy crown prince) as his
recent predecessors had done, but the king did not do so. Some commentators believed the king
declined to take this step to avoid possible rivalries over future succession within the large Al
Saud family, which numbers more than 5,000 princes, according to some estimates. On October
18, 2007, the royal court released royal decree A/135 to amend the Basic Law and create a Bayah
[Arabic for “Allegiance”] Council to fill the positions of king and crown prince using defined
procedures and criteria. Under the Bayah system, the 39 Allegiance Council members [members
of the families of the 37 sons of the founder of the modern Saudi state, Abd al Aziz ibn Saud, plus
two family members appointed by the king] will select the new crown prince in consultation with
the king.
The new procedures, the members of the Council, and potential candidates have received
increased attention since late 2008, when reports surfaced that current Crown Prince Sultan bin
Abd al Aziz had received additional medical treatment for chronic illness in the United States and
spent most of 2009 convalescing in Morocco. The advanced age of many of the leading members
of the Al Saud (the sons of Abd al Aziz) suggests that there is the potential for a series of
leadership changes in the kingdom over the coming decade. Possible future candidates for
succession include the 21 remaining brothers and half-brothers of the king and a number of their
sons and nephews. For example, many experts consider Prince Salman, Governor of Riyadh, and
Prince Nayef, Minister of the Interior, as possible candidates for the position of crown prince
when the position becomes vacant.117
116 Associated Press (AP), “Key Saudi Prince Says Plans To Form Political Party,” September 4, 2007.
117 Like Crown Prince Sultan, both Prince Nayef and Prince Salman are full brothers of the late King Fahd, and belong
to an influential group within the royal family whose mother was a member of the Sudayri tribe. Some commentators
note that the conservative Prince Nayef is thought to have resisted reforms supported by Abdullah, while Prince Salman
has a lower international profile than Crown Prince Sultan or Prince Nayef.
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Some observers contend that the likelihood that Prince Nayef will serve as the next crown prince
has increased following his promotion to the position of second deputy prime minister in March
2009. Intelligence director Prince Muqrin bin Abd al Aziz also has been mentioned as a potential
candidate.118 Other members of the next generation of Saudi leaders also have distinguished
themselves and accumulated important responsibilities, including Prince Mohammed bin Nayef,
Prince Khaled bin Sultan, Prince Khaled al Faisal, and Prince Miteb bin Abdullah.
Some observers have speculated that the appointment of King Abdullah’s private secretary,
Khaled al Tuwayjeri, as secretary general of the Allegiance Council may indicate the king’s desire
to influence the Council’s operation in the event of his death or incapacitation. The lack of
reference in the decree to Saudi Arabia’s clerical establishment also has drawn comments from
some academics who have speculated that the omission may have been an intentional step to
sideline the religious authorities. Others contend that Saudi clerics have not had a direct role in
the royal family’s critical decision-making processes for decades but rather have served in
advisory and legitimating roles before and after key decisions are taken—roles that are likely to
continue.
Social Reform Debates and Recent Leadership Changes
Since 2006, significant public debates have occurred on social issues such as the powers of
religious police, education reform proposals, the roles and rights of women, and the integration of
Shiites into Saudi Arabia’s predominantly Sunni society. Each has illustrated the challenges Saudi
leaders face in responding to some groups’ calls for change while preserving national traditions
and pursuing their own political goals.
• Numerous allegations of abuse leveled against members of the Commission for
the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (Saudi Arabia’s religious
police) have fueled a public debate among Saudis, many of whom appear not to
question the underlying legitimacy of the Commission as an institution, but may
have serious concerns about the Commission’s statutory powers, the
professionalism of its employees, and the protection of due process for detained
individuals.
• Similarly, many Saudis have expressed support for education reform proposals as
a means of improving the economic opportunities available to the kingdom’s
young population. However, others have spoken out against curricular reforms
they perceive to be either contrary to Saudi religious and cultural traditions or
taken in response to the wishes of outsiders, including the United States.
• The roles and rights of women remain subjects of interest in the United States
and subjects of intense debate in Saudi Arabia. Some Saudi activists advocate for
greater employment, marital, and political rights for Saudi women, while others
seek to maintain status quo arrangements based on their religious and cultural
preferences. The issue of restrictions on female driving, often discussed as an
example of gender bias by outside observers, is debated among many Saudis as
both a cultural and economic issue; the views of some Saudi families appear to
be changing as they begin to face limits in their ability to meet the costs of hiring
118 For one analyst’s views, see Simon Henderson, “Saudi Leadership Crisis Looms: Health of Crown Prince Falters,”
Washington Institute for Near East Policy - PolicyWatch #1459, January 21, 2009.
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drivers so that mothers and daughters can pursue economic and educational goals
outside the home.
• King Abdullah has made some high-level public attempts to improve sectarian
relations between Sunni and Shiite leaders, but these efforts have been
undermined amid ongoing claims of abuses against Shiites and the issuance of a
series of statements from clerics who regard Shiite minority groups as religiously
aberrant and potentially politically disloyal. Since early 2007, Shiite groups in
the Eastern Province and the southern region of Najran have reported a number
of human rights violations and restrictions on their political and religious rights,
in spite of some government attempts to create a more tolerant atmosphere.119
Leadership changes announced by King Abdullah in February 2009 appear designed in part to
address several of the concerns at the heart of the social reform debates described above. The
director of the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice was replaced,
and its new director has pledged to continue to improve the professionalism of Commission
personnel. Sheikh Saleh bin Abdullah bin Humaid, the former chairman of the Shura Council, has
been named as the chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council and will work with new Minister of
Justice Mohammad Al Eissa to implement judicial reform. The former judicial council head,
Sheikh Saleh bin Mohammed Al Luhaydan was perceived to have resisted some reform efforts
and caused controversy in 2008 by making statements regarding the potential execution of
prominent media industry figures on religious grounds.
King Abdallah also named a former intelligence official Prince Faisal bin Mohammed bin Abd al
Aziz Al Saud as education minister in a shift that may indicate the king’s intention to strengthen
efforts to root out extremism in the education sector. Norah Al Fayez will serve as Prince Faisal
bin Mohammed’s deputy, making her the first female deputy minister in the kingdom’s history;
her appointment has been met with opposition from conservatives.120 Finally, in March 2009 King
Abdullah named his son Prince Meshaal bin Abdullah as the replacement for the former governor
of Najran province, who was removed in December 2008 in a move widely interpreted as a
positive gesture toward local Shiite residents. However, as noted above, clashes between Sunni
and Shiite citizens and Shiites and security forces in Medina and the Eastern Province since
February 2009 have placed further stress on sectarian relations in the kingdom.
Human Rights
According to the Department of State, several categories of human rights violations occurred in
Saudi Arabia during 2009, along with some improvements in government efforts to implement
judicial reform and to improve educational opportunities for women.121 The Saudi National
119 OSC Document FEA20070501128188, “Report On Situation Of Saudi Shiites 1 Jan 06-30 Apr 07” Al Rasid
Newspaper (Saudi Arabia) April 24, 2007; and, OSC Document GMP20080514866001, “Saudi Authorities Arrest
Fatimid Leader,” Al Rasid Newspaper May 14, 2008.
120 Jumana Al Tamimi, “High-ranking female official settles in job,” Washington Times, April 1, 2009; and Gulf News,
“Hardliners want Saudi woman minister sacked,” April 10, 2009.
121 Reported violations included “no right to change the government peacefully; disappearances; torture and physical
abuse; poor prison and detention center conditions; arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention; denial of public
trials and lack of due process in the judicial system; political prisoners; restrictions on civil liberties such as freedoms
of speech (including the Internet), assembly, association, movement, and severe restrictions on religious freedom; and
corruption and lack of government transparency. Violence against women, violations of the rights of children, and
discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, sect, and ethnicity were common. The employment sponsorship system
(continued...)
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Society for Human Rights, an independent organization approved by the Saudi government in
2004, also reported and investigated alleged human rights abuses during the year, including
violations reported by Saudi citizens.122 In 2008, Human Rights Watch argued that “violations of
defendants’ fundamental rights in Saudi Arabia are so systemic that it is hard to reconcile the
existing criminal justice system with basic principles of fairness, the rule of law and international
human rights standards.”123 Saudi authorities have launched a comprehensive judicial
restructuring process aimed at improving some identified deficiencies and many observers expect
that leadership changes announced by King Abdullah in February 2009 will improve the
likelihood that several influential judicial bodies will implement planned reforms. Notable recent
cases involving human rights activists or alleged abuses include the arrest and detention of Saudi
blogger Fouad Al Farhan (released April 2008) and human rights advocate and university
professor Dr. Matrook Al Faleh (released January 2009).124 Saudi Arabia served as a member of
the United Nations Human Rights Council through June 2009.
Religious Freedom
The State Department has designated Saudi Arabia as a “country of particular concern” since
2004 with regard to restrictions on religious freedom. According to the most recent International
Religious Freedom Report (released October 26, 2009) religious freedom remains “severely
restricted” in Saudi Arabia.125 Non-Muslims continue to be prohibited from worshiping publicly.
However, the report noted for the third year in a row that U.S. officials observed some positive
developments that “would continue progress” and noted the king’s personal calls for interfaith
dialogue and religious tolerance among Muslims. According to the report:
Improvements included limited education reform, better protection of the right to possess
and use personal religious materials, augmented efforts to curb and investigate harassment
by the CPVPV, increased media coverage and criticism of the CPVPV, somewhat greater
authority and capacity for official human rights entities to operate, and measures to combat
extremist ideology.
The Obama Administration waived the imposition of sanctions on Saudi Arabia in May 2009 as a
result of these observed steps.126 U.S. organizations such as Freedom House have criticized
(...continued)
limited the rights of foreign workers and remained a severe problem.” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Human
Rights, Democracy, and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2009 - Saudi Arabia, March 11, 2010.
Available at: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136079.htm.
122 OSC Report GMP20100316869002, “Saudi Human Rights Commission Publishes Annual Report,” Al-Sharq al-
Awsat (London) March 16, 2010.
123 Christoph Wilcke, “Re-education, Saudi style,” Guardian Unlimited (UK), April 25, 2008. Wilcke is the primary
author of “Precarious Justice: Arbitrary Detention and Unfair Trials in the Deficient Criminal Justice System of Saudi
Arabia,” Human Rights Watch, Volume 20, No. 3(E), March 2008. Available at http://hrw.org/reports/2008/
saudijustice0308/.
124 See Faiza Saleh Ambah, “Saudi Activist Blogger Freed After 4 Months in Jail Without Charge,” Washington Post,
April 27, 2008; and, Faiza Saleh Ambah, “Saudi Critic Jailed After Decrying Justice System,” Washington Post, May
21, 2008.
125 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, International Religious Freedom Report
2009, October 26, 2009. Saudi Arabia entry available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127357.htm.
126 State Department Public Notice 6608, Secretary of State's Determination Under the International Religious Freedom
Act of 1998, Federal Register: May 11, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 89), p. 21843.
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restrictions on religious freedom in Saudi Arabia and questioned the Saudi government’s
commitment to stated reform initiatives, including education reform.
Consular Issues
Prior to 2001, Saudi nationals received the highest number of U.S. non-immigrant entry visas
issued to nationals of any Arab country, and were second only to Israel and Turkey in the Middle
East. Saudis in Saudi Arabia were able to utilize so-called ‘third party’ expedited visa services
whereby travel agencies were permitted to forward visa materials to consular officials at the U.S.
Embassy for processing and the applicants would later receive their entry visas by mail. The
revelations that 15 of the September 11 hijackers were Saudi nationals who had legally obtained
U.S. visas and that three of the hijackers reportedly had obtained their U.S. visas using the
expedited “visa express” arrangements led to significant changes in U.S. visa policy in Saudi
Arabia and around the world.127 Following the 2001 attacks, third party visa issuance in Saudi
Arabia was specifically prohibited under Section 428(i) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(P.L. 107-296).128 The Department of State terminated the expedited visa system in Saudi Arabia
in 2002 and significantly increased the visa interview rates for Saudi nationals.129
As in other countries, new administrative arrangements were made at U.S. consular facilities in
Saudi Arabia to accommodate new security requirements. As a result, visa issuances to Saudi
nationals slowed along with Saudi application rates. Global non-immigrant visa issuance rates
declined after 2001, and issuance rates dropped steeply for Saudi Arabian nationals, but have now
returned to their previous level. (See Figure 2 below.) In addition to complaints about backlogs
and perceived discrimination, Saudi officials and nationals voiced strong concerns about declines
in the number of Saudis visiting the United States for travel, work, and study. People-to-people
linkages have supported U.S.-Saudi relations over time, particularly to the extent that many
leading Saudis have pursued their higher education in the United States since the 1960s. U.S.
officials, who had long sought visa reciprocity for U.S. citizens with regard to multiple entry and
long-term visas for Saudi Arabia, reportedly met resistance from Saudi authorities in light of the
post-9/11 U.S. policy changes.
New U.S. consular administrative practices130 and broader Saudi awareness of new U.S. visa
requirements reportedly have contributed to an ease in visa backlogs and delays in recent
months.131 Overall, visa issuance rates for Saudi nationals have increased annually since 2003.
(See Figure 2 below.) The Department of State has opened a permanent visa issuance facility at
the U.S. consulate in Dhahran, and in April 2008, then-U.S. Ambassador Ford Fraker announced
that the U.S. government aimed to double the number of student visas issued to Saudi students
within five years.
127 Jonathan Peterson, “Express Visa Program May Have Benefitted 3 Hijackers,” Los Angeles Times, December 17,
2001.
128 Section 428(i) reads as follows: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, after the date of the enactment of this
Act all third party screening programs in Saudi Arabia shall be terminated. On-site personnel of the Department of
Homeland Security shall review all visa applications prior to adjudication.”
129 William C. Mann, “Feds End Visa Shortcut for Saudis,” Associated Press, July 20, 2002.
130 Saudis nationals have the option of scheduling visa interview appointments at the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh using an
online reservation system, and the Embassy has frequently advised Saudi students on how best to avoid having their
studies in the United States interrupted by visa renewal requirements.
131 Briefings from U.S. Department of State personnel, Washington, D.C. and Riyadh Saudi Arabia, February 2008.
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Under the terms of a consular agreement announced in May 2008, Saudi students are allowed to
travel to and from the United States for up to five years without having to reapply for a visa after
two years, as previously required.132 The Department of Homeland Security Student and
Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) provides status and identification information for
U.S. government verification throughout foreign students’ stays in the United States. In the 111th
Congress, S. 2944 and S. 3077 would empower the Department of Homeland Security to conduct
on-site reviews of visa applications in Saudi Arabia and other countries and, if necessary, to
revoke visas held by nationals of Saudi Arabia and the nationals of a number of other specific
countries.
Figure 2. Non-Immigrant U.S. Visas Issued to Saudi Nationals, 1996-2009
Non-Immigrant U.S. Visas Issued to Saudi Nationals
1996-2009
70,000
ed
60,000
su
s
50,000
isas I 40,000
t V
n 30,000
ra
ig 20,000
m
-Im 10,000
n
o
N
0
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Year
Sources: CRS graphic derived from data in U.S. Department of State, Visa Office Report, 2005, Table XVIII
(Part I) “Nonimmigrant Visas Issued by Nationality (Including Border Crossing Cards), Fiscal Year 1996-2005”;
and, Department of State, Visa Office Report, 2009, Table XVII “Nonimmigrant Visas Issued by Nationality
(Including Border Crossing Cards), Fiscal Year 2000-2009.” Available at
http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/FY09AnnualReport_TableXIX.pdf.
Some Members of Congress have expressed concern about U.S. visa issuance to Saudi nationals,
and legislation has been introduced in the 111th Congress seeking to influence U.S. visa policy
toward Saudi Arabia. Some Members of Congress have expressed concern about restrictions on
the importation of non-Islamic religious materials and symbols into Saudi Arabia and about
reported visa restrictions for Jewish visitors to the kingdom or Israeli passport stamp holders.
132 Saudi student visa holders, like student visa holders from other countries, are be required to remain “in status” and
be enrolled in a full course of study. According to the Department of State, “This decision to expand visa reciprocity
was taken in light of the economic benefits associated with more business, tourist, and student travelers and heightened
cooperation on security and counterterrorism between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. This decision also reflects recent
measures taken by the U.S. to enhance visa processing and security, such as online visa applications and enhanced
biometrics.” U.S. Department of State response to CRS inquiry, May 20, 2008.
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In the 110th Congress, H.R. 2981 specifically sought to ban the issuance of visas to Saudi
nationals until these concerns are addressed. H.R. 3217 sought to prohibit the issuance of student
and diversity immigrant visas to Saudi Arabian nationals on security grounds absent Presidential
review.
In the 111th Congress, H.R. 1288, the Saudi Arabia Accountability Act of 2009, would prohibit the
issuance of any visa to any Saudi citizen “until the President certifies that the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia does not discriminate in the issuance of visas on the basis of religious affiliation or
heritage.”
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Further Reading and Historical Resources
Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman (eds.), Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society,
Foreign Affairs, New York University Press, 2006.
Rachel Bronson, Thicker than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia, Oxford
University Press, 2006.
Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the
Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, Penguin Press, 2004.
Steve Coll, The Bin Ladens: An Arabian Family in the American Century, Penguin Press, 2008.
John S. Habib, Ibn Saud’s Warriors of Islam: The Ikhwan of Najd and their Role in the Creation
of the Saudi Kingdom, 1910-1930, E.J. Brill, 1978.
Thomas Hegghammer, “Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalisation in Saudi Arabia,” Middle East
Policy, Volume 13, Number 4, 2006.
Joseph Kostiner, The Making of Saudi Arabia, 1916-1936, From Chieftaincy to Monarchical
State, Oxford University Press, 1993.
Robert Lacey, The Kingdom: Arabia & The House of Sa’ud, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982.
Thomas W. Lippman, Inside the Mirage: America’s Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia,
Westview Press, 2004.
David E. Long, Culture and Customs of Saudi Arabia, Greenwood Press, 2005.
David E. Long, The United States and Saudi Arabia: Ambivalent Allies, Westview Press, 1985.
Madawi Al Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Madawi Al Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Yaroslav Trofimov, The Siege of Mecca: The Forgotten Uprising in Islam’s Holiest Shrine and the
Birth of Al Qaeda, Doubleday, 2007.
Alexei Vassiliev, History of Saudi Arabia, New York University Press, 2000.
Robert Vitalis, America’s Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier, Stanford University
Press, 2006.
Mai Yamani, Cradle of Islam: The Hijaz and the Quest for an Arabian Identity, I.B. Tauris, 2004.
Mai Yamani, Changed Identities: The Challenge of the New Generation in Saudi Arabia,
University of British Columbia Press, 2005.
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Appendix A. Recent Proposed Arms Sales
On October 4, 2007, Congress was notified of a possible sale of Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
and High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) and associated equipment.
Specifically, 37 Light Armored Vehicles-Assault Gun (LAV-AG); 26 LAV-25mm; 48 LAV
Personnel Carriers; 5 Reconnaissance LAVs; 5 LAV Ambulances; 3 LAV Recovery Vehicles; 25
M1165A1 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV); 25 M1165A1 HMMWV
with winch; 124 M240 7.62mm Machine Guns; 525 AN/PVS-7D Night Vision Goggles (NVGs);
various M978A2 and M984A2 Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks, family of Medium
Tactical Vehicles, 120mm Mortar Towed, M242 25mm guns, spare and repair parts; sets, kits, and
outfits; and support services and equipment. The estimated value of the sale, if all options are
exercised, could be as high as $631 million. Transmittal No. 08-03.133
On December 7, 2007, Congress was notified of a possible sale of five sets of Airborne Early
Warning (AEW) and Command, Control and Communications (C3) mission
equipment/Radar System Improvement Program (RSIP) Group B kits for subsequent
installation and checkout in five E-3 Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS).
This proposed sale will also include spare and repair parts, support equipment, documentation,
contractor engineering and technical support, and other program support. The estimated value of
the sale, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $400 million. Transmittal No. 08-28.134
On December 7, 2007, Congress was notified of a possible sale of 40 AN/AAQ-33 SNIPER
Advanced Targeting Pods, aircraft installation and checkout, digital data recorders/cartridges,
pylons, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical documentation,
contractor engineering and technical support, and other program support. The estimated value of
the sale, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $220 million. Transmittal No. 08-29.135
On January 14, 2008, Congress was notified of a possible sale of 900 Joint Direct Attack
Munition (JDAM) tail kits (which include 550 Guided Bomb Unit (GBU)-38 kits for MK-82
bombs, 250 GBU-31 kits for MK-84 bombs, and 100 GBU-31 kits for BLU-109 bombs). Also
included are bomb components, mission planning, aircraft integration, publications and technical
manuals, spare and repair parts, support equipment, contractor engineering and technical support,
and other related support elements. The estimated value of the sale, if all options are exercised,
could be as high as $123 million. Transmittal No. 08-18.136
On July 18, 2008, Congress was notified of a possible sale of continued assistance in the
modernization of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) as well as associated
equipment and services. The estimated value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as
$1.8 billion. The sale would support the continuation of the PM-SANG program (see “Saudi
Arabian National Guard Modernization Program (PM-SANG)”) through December 2013.
Transmittal No. 08-67.137
133 Details available at http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2007/Saudi_08-03.pdf.
134 Details available at http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2007/Saudi_08-28.pdf.
135 Details available at http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2007/Saudi_08-29.pdf.
136 Details available at http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2008/Saudi_Arabia_08-18.pdf.
137 Details available at http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2008/Saudi_Arabia_08-67.pdf
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On September 9, 2008, Congress was notified of a possible sale of 12 AH-64D APACHE
Longbow Helicopters, along with 30 T700-GE-701D Engines, 12 Modernized Targeting
Acquisition and Designation Systems/Pilot Night Vision Sensors, 4 each AN/APG-78 Fire
Control Radars and AN/APR-48 Radar Frequency Interferometers, 28 M299 HELLFIRE
Longbow Missile Launchers, 12 AN/ALQ-144C(V)3 Infrared Jammers, 12 AN/APR-39A(V)4
Radar Signal Detecting Sets, 12 AN/ALQ-136(V)5 Radar Jammers, 12 AAR-57(V)3/5 Common
Missile Warning Systems, 36 Improved Countermeasures Dispensers, and 12 AN/AVR-2B Laser
Warning Sets. The sale would also include U.S. Government and contractor technical support and
other related elements of program support. The estimated value of the sale, if all options are
exercised, could be as high as $598 million. Transmittal No. 08-75.138
On September 26, 2008, Congress was notified of a possible sale of 80 Link 16 Multifunctional
Information Distribution System/Low Volume Terminals (MIDS/LVT-1) to be installed on
United Kingdom Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft, as well as associated equipment and services.
The estimated value of the sale, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $31 million.
Transmittal No. 08-101.139
On September 26, 2008, Congress was notified of a possible sale of 250 All-Up-Round AIM-9X
SIDEWINDER Missiles, 84 AIM-9X SIDEWINDER Captive Air Training Missiles
(CATMs), 12 AIM-9X SIDEWINDER Dummy Air Training Missiles (DATMs), as well as
associated equipment and services, personnel training and training equipment, contractor
engineering and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The
estimated value of the sale, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $164 million.
Transmittal No. 08-88.140
On September 26, 2008, Congress was notified of a possible sale of 17 AN/FPS-117 radars,
including installation and checkout, engineering, calibration, reintegration, testing, support
equipment, spare and repair parts, personnel training, publications and technical data, U.S.
Government and contractor technical assistance and other related elements of logistics support.
The estimated value of the sale, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $145 million.
Transmittal No. 08-88.141
On August 5, 2009, Congress was notified of a possible sale of Tactical Airborne Surveillance
System (TASS) aircraft upgrades, including spare and repair parts, support and test equipment,
personnel training and training equipment, modification/construction of facilities, U.S.
Government and contractor engineering and support services and other related elements of
logistics support. The estimated value of the sale, if all options are exercised, could be as high as
$530 million. Transmittal No. 09-20.142
On August 6, 2009, Congress was notified of a possible sale of Communication Navigation and
Surveillance/Air Traffic Management upgrades for Saudi Arabia’s E-3 Airborne Warning and
138 Details available at http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2008/Saudi_Arabia_08-75.pdf
139 Details available at http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2008/Saudi_Arabia_08-101.pdf
140 Details available at http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2008/Saudi_Arabia_08-88.pdf
141 Details available at http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2008/Saudi_Arabia_08-90.pdf
142 Details available at http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2009/Saudia_Arabia_09-20.pdf
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Control System (AWACS) airplane fleet. The estimated value of the sale, if all options are
exercised, could be as high as $1.5 billion. Transmittal No. 09-40.143
On December 17, 2009, Congress was notified of a possible sale of 2,742 BGM-71E-4B-RF
Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW-2A) Radio Frequency missiles and
associated parts, equipment, training and logistical support for the Saudi Arabian National
Guard (SANG). The estimated value of the sale, if all options are exercised, could be as high as
$177 million billion. Transmittal No. 09-63.144
143 Details available at http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2009/Saudia_Arabia_09-40.pdf
144 Details available at http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2009/Saudia_Arabia_09-63.pdf
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Appendix B. Text of Saudi Peace Initiatives
Final Declaration of the Twelfth Arab Summit Conference, adopted
at Fez on 9 September 1982
The following text reflects principles proposed by then-Crown Prince and now late King Fahd bin
Abd al Aziz Al Saud in August 1981 and later adopted by the Arab League in September 1982.145
It is commonly referred to as “the Fahd eight point plan,” “the Fahd principles,” and “the Fez
declaration,” among other terms.
Convinced of the ability of the Arab nation to achieve its legitimate objectives and to put an
end to the aggression, on the basis of the fundamental principles laid down by the Arab
Summit Conferences, in view of the desire of the Arab States to continue to strive by every
means for the achievement of peace based on justice in the Middle East region, taking
account of the plan of His Excellency President Habib Bourguiba, which holds international
legality to be the basis for the solution of the Palestinian question, and of the plan of His
Majesty King Fahd Ibn Abdul Aziz for peace in the Middle East and in the light of the
discussions and observations of Their Majesties, Their Excellencies and Their Highnesses,
the Kings, Presidents and Amirs, the Conference adopted the following principles:
1. Israel to withdraw from all Arab territory occupied in 1967, including Arab Jerusalem.
2. Israeli settlements built on Arab land after 1967 to be dismantled, including those in Arab
Jerusalem.
3. A guarantee of freedom of worship for all religions in the Holy Places.
4. An affirmation of the right of the Palestinian Arab people to return to their homes and
compensation for those who do not wish to return.
5. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip to have a transitional period under the auspices of the
United Nations for a period not exceeding several months.
6. An independent Palestinian State should be set up with Jerusalem as its capital.
7. All States in the region should be able to live in peace in the region.
8. The United Nations or Member States of the United Nations to guarantee the carrying out
of these provisions.
Beirut Declaration on Saudi Peace Initiative
The following is the text of the peace initiative proposed by then-Crown Prince and current King
Abdullah bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud and adopted by the Arab League in March 2002. It is
commonly referred to as “the Beirut declaration,” “the Saudi peace initiative,” and “the Arab
145 Letter dated December 3, 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations addressed to
the Secretary-General, United Nations General Assembly Security Council Document A/37/696, S/15510, December
15, 1982.
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League peace proposal,” among other terms. The following translation is available in the United
States Institute of Peace - Peace Agreements Digital Collection.
March 28, 2002
The Council of Arab States at the Summit Level at its 14th Ordinary Session, reaffirming the
resolution taken in June 1996 at the Cairo Extra-Ordinary Arab Summit that a just and
comprehensive peace in the Middle East is the strategic option of the Arab countries, to be
achieved in accordance with international legality, and which would require a comparable
commitment on the part of the Israeli government.
Having listened to the statement made by his royal highness Prince Abdullah bin Abdul
Aziz, crown prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in which his highness presented his
initiative calling for full Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since June
1967, in implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, reaffirmed by the
Madrid Conference of 1991 and the land-for-peace principle, and Israel's acceptance of an
independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, in return for the
establishment of normal relations in the context of a comprehensive peace with Israel.
Emanating from the conviction of the Arab countries that a military solution to the conflict
will not achieve peace or provide security for the parties, the council:
1. Requests Israel to reconsider its policies and declare that a just peace is its strategic option
as well.
2. Further calls upon Israel to affirm:
I- Full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967, including the Syrian
Golan Heights, to the June 4, 1967 lines as well as the remaining occupied Lebanese
territories in the south of Lebanon.
II- Achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in
accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194.
III- The acceptance of the establishment of a sovereign independent Palestinian state on the
Palestinian territories occupied since June 4, 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with
East Jerusalem as its capital.
3. Consequently, the Arab countries affirm the following:
I- Consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, and enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and
provide security for all the states of the region.
II- Establish normal relations with Israel in the context of this comprehensive peace.
4. Assures the rejection of all forms of Palestinian patriation which conflict with the special
circumstances of the Arab host countries.
5. Calls upon the government of Israel and all Israelis to accept this initiative in order to
safeguard the prospects for peace and stop the further shedding of blood, enabling the Arab
countries and Israel to live in peace and good neighbourliness and provide future generations
with security, stability and prosperity .
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6. Invites the international community and all countries and organisations to support this
initiative.
7. Requests the chairman of the summit to form a special committee composed of some of its
concerned member states and the secretary general of the League of Arab States to pursue
the necessary contacts to gain support for this initiative at all levels, particularly from the
United Nations, the Security Council, the United States of America, the Russian Federation,
the Muslim states and the European Union.
Author Contact Information
Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428
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