Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
June 3, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL32724
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Summary
The United States and Mexico have a close and complex bilateral relationship, with extensive
economic linkages as neighbors and partners under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). U.S.-Mexican relations are characterized by strong commercial and cultural ties and
cooperation on a range of bilateral and international issues. In recent years, security issues have
dominated the bilateral agenda, as the United States has supported Mexican President Felipe
Calderón’s campaign against drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). Immigration and border
security have also returned to the forefront of the bilateral agenda since Arizona enacted a
controversial state law against illegal immigration (SB 1070) on April 23, 2010, a measure
opposed by President Barack Obama. On May 25, 2010, in response to rising state and local
concerns about border security, President Obama authorized sending up to 1,200 National Guard
troops to support law enforcement efforts along the U.S.-Mexico border.
Now in the fourth year of his six-year term, President Calderón of the conservative National
Action Party (PAN) is focused on restarting the Mexican economy, which contracted by 7% in
2009 (largely as a result of the U.S. recession), and combating drug traffickers and organized
criminal groups in Mexico. Although the Calderón Administration has arrested several top drug
kingpins, the persistent and increasingly brazen violence committed by the DTOs has led to
significant criticism of Calderón’s anti-drug strategy. As the 2012 presidential elections approach,
the Mexican Congress, which is now dominated by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI),
could be reluctant to give President Calderón any major legislative victories.
In recent years, U.S.-Mexican relations have grown stronger as the two countries have worked
together to combat drug trafficking and secure their shared border. President Obama met with
President Calderón in Mexico on April 16-17, 2009, to discuss counterdrug cooperation,
immigration reform, and climate change. The leaders met again in August 2009 alongside
Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper at the North American Leaders Summit in Guadalajara,
Mexico to discuss how to coordinate their responses to the global economic crisis, climate
change, and security issues. On May 19, 2010, President Calderón traveled to Washington D.C.
for a state visit with President Obama during which both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to
working together on a wide range of bilateral issues.
The 111th Congress has maintained an active interest in Mexico with counternarcotics, border, and
trade issues dominating the agenda. To date, Congress has appropriated some $1.3 billion in
assistance for Mexico under the Mérida Initiative, an anti-crime and counterdrug package first
funded in FY2008. The Senate-passed version of, H.R. 4899, the FY2010 Supplemental
Appropriations measure, would provide $175 million in additional assistance for Mérida-related
programs in Mexico. The House is reportedly considering inserting additional funds for justice
sectors programs in Mexico and for border security into its version of the supplemental measure.
The Obama Administration asked for $346.6 million in assistance for Mexico in its FY2011
budget request, including $310 million in Mérida-related funding. Congress is likely to maintain a
keen interest in how implementation of the Mérida Initiative and related border security
initiatives are proceeding, particularly now that the President has authorized National Guard
troops to be sent to the Southwest border. Congress may also consider proposals for
comprehensive immigration reform. On the trade front, Congress is likely to maintain interest in
how the Obama Administration moves to resolve the current trucking dispute with Mexico now
that P.L. 111-117 would permit the resumption of a U.S.- funded pilot program for Mexican
trucks.
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Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Contents
Recent Developments.................................................................................................................. 1
Background on Mexico ............................................................................................................... 4
Political Developments ......................................................................................................... 4
Drug Trafficking and Heightened Violence and Crime in Mexico .......................................... 5
Economic Crisis and Nascent Recovery ................................................................................ 7
Foreign Policy Challenges..................................................................................................... 9
Mexican-U.S. Relations ............................................................................................................ 10
Background ........................................................................................................................ 10
Obama Administration ........................................................................................................ 11
U.S. Assistance to Mexico................................................................................................... 12
Bilateral Cooperation on Counternarcotics and Security Efforts........................................... 14
Mérida Initiative ........................................................................................................... 15
Beyond Mérida: the Future of U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation................................ 17
Department of Defense Assistance to Mexico................................................................ 17
Related Security Cooperation with Mexico.................................................................... 18
Human Rights Issues........................................................................................................... 22
Compliance with Human Rights Conditions in the Mérida Initiative.............................. 22
Accountability for Abuses Committed During the “Dirty War” Period ........................... 23
Migration: Trends and Reactions to SB 1070....................................................................... 24
Environmental Cooperation................................................................................................. 27
Trade Issues ........................................................................................................................ 28
Functioning of NAFTA Institutions ............................................................................... 28
Trade Disputes .............................................................................................................. 29
North American Cooperation on Security and Economic Issues ........................................... 30
Legislation in the 111th Congress ............................................................................................... 31
Enacted and Considered Legislation.................................................................................... 31
Additional Legislative Initiatives......................................................................................... 33
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Mexico, Including States and Border Cities ...................................................... 3
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Mexico by Account, FY2007-FY2011 ............................................. 13
Table 2. FY2008 – FY2010 Mérida Funding for Mexico by Aid Account and
Appropriations Measure......................................................................................................... 15
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 35
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 36
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Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Recent Developments
On May 28, 2010, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Roberta
Jacobson, testified before a joint House hearing that more than $420 million in funds appropriated
for the Mérida Initiative are actively supporting programs in Mexico.
On May 27, 2010, the Senate passed its version of H.R. 4899, the FY2010 Supplemental
Appropriations measure, which includes $175 million in assistance for “judicial reform,
institution building, anti-corruption, and rule of law activities” in Mexico and $5 million in funds
for emergency diplomatic security support in Mexico.
On May 25, 2010, the Obama Administration authorized sending up to 1,200 National Guard
troops to help secure the Southwest border and indicated that it would seek $500 million in
additional resources for strengthening border enforcement.
On May 25, 2010, the Mexican Attorney General’s Office arrested Gregorio Sanchez, the
mayor of Cancún and Democratic Revolution Party (PRD) candidate for governor of Quintana
Roo, on charges of colluding with organized crime and money laundering.
On May 20, 2010, President Calderón addressed a joint session of Congress. During his address,
Calderón thanked lawmakers for supporting the Mérida Initiative, but asked for increased U.S.
cooperation in reducing arms trafficking, including suggesting possible reinstatement of the
assault weapons ban that lapsed in 2004. Calderón also voiced support for comprehensive
immigration reform and expressed disapproval of Arizona’s newly enacted immigration law.
On May 19, 2010, President Obama welcomed President Calderón to the White House for a state
visit. President Obama praised Calderón’s “vision and courage,” and said that his visit signaled
“another step forward in a new era of cooperation and partnership between our countries—a
partnership based on mutual interests, mutual respect and mutual responsibility.”
On May 16, 2010, Diego Fernández de Cevallos, a former senator and 1994 presidential
candidate for the PAN, was kidnapped from his ranch in Querétaro, Mexico.
On May 11, 2010, the White House released its 2010 National Drug Control Strategy report,
which includes an increased focus on reducing U.S. drug demand, particularly among youth.
On May 9, 2010, the Mexican government extradited Mario Ernesto Villanueva Madrid, former
governor of Quintana Roo, to the United States to stand trial on allegations of accepting millions
of dollars in bribes from the Juárez DTO.
On April 27, 2010, the Government of Mexico issued a travel warning to Mexicans visiting or
residing in Arizona, which stated that Arizona’s recent immigration changes have resulted in a
“negative political environment for migrant communities and for all Mexican visitors.”
On April 24, 2010, gangsters attempted to assassinate Minerva Bautista, the Minister of Security
for the state of Michoacán. Two of her bodyguards and two civilians were killed in the ambush.
On April 23, 2010, Arizona enacted SB 1070, a measure designed to discourage and deter the
entry to or presence of aliens in Arizona who lack lawful status under federal immigration law.
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Potentially sweeping in effect, the measure requires state and local law enforcement officials to
facilitate the detection of unauthorized aliens in their daily enforcement activities.
On April 8, 2010, Mexican federal police took over primary responsibility for securing Ciudad
Juárez, Chihuahua, from the military forces that had controlled public security efforts in the city
since the spring of 2009.
On March 27, 2010, Robert Krentz, a prominent Arizona rancher, was killed on his ranch along
the Arizona-Mexico border, prompting increased concerns about possible drug trafficking-related
violence in Mexico “spilling over” into the United States.
On March 23, 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton led a cabinet-level delegation to Mexico
for a meeting of the U.S.-Mexico Mérida Initiative High Level Group during which she
announced a new four-pillared strategy for U.S.-Mexican security cooperation (see “Beyond
Mérida: the Future of U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation”).
On March 13, 2010, gunmen killed an American consular officer and her husband who had
recently attended a children’s birthday party in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. In a separate incident,
gunmen killed the husband and wounded the two children of a Mexican employee of the U.S.
Consulate who had attended the same party. On March 29, 2010, Mexican authorities announced
the arrest of a leader of the Barrio Azteca gang suspected of involvement in the murders.
On March 11, 2010, the State Department released its Country Report on Human Rights Practices
covering 2009 (available at: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/wha/136119.htm). The
report asserts that while the Mexican government generally respected human rights, problems
remained, including: unlawful killings by security forces; poor prison conditions; arbitrary arrests
and detention; corruption in the judicial system; and violence and threats against journalists.
On March 1, 2010, the State Department released its 2010 International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report (available at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2010/index.htm). The report
praises the “ambitious pace” of the Mexican government’s efforts to arrest high-level DTO
leaders and root out corruption but finds that, despite government efforts, marijuana and opium
poppy cultivation increased significantly in 2009.
On February 24, 2009, Osiel Cardenas-Guillen, former leader of the Gulf Cartel, was sentenced to
25 years in U.S. federal prison for drug trafficking, money laundering, and other crimes.
On February 1, 2010, the Obama Administration submitted its FY2011 budget request to
Congress. The request includes $346.5 million in assistance to Mexico, including $310 million in
assistance accounts that have funded the Mérida Initiative (see “U.S. Assistance to Mexico”).
On January 31, 2010, gunmen entered a private party at a home in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico and
killed 13 teenagers and two adults with no known ties to DTOs. In response to the massacre,
President Calderón and several of his top advisors have visited Ciudad Juárez on multiple
occasions and worked with municipal and state officials to develop an integrated plan for
improving conditions in the city.
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Figure 1. Map of Mexico, Including States and Border Cities
Source: Map Resources, adapted by CRS.
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Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Background on Mexico
Political Developments
Over the past decade, Mexico has moved from one-party rule by the PRI to multi-party
democracy. Current PAN President Felipe Calderón won the July 2006 presidential election in an
extremely tight race, defeating Andrés López Obrador of the leftist PRD by less than 234,000
votes. The presidential race was so close that final results were not announced until early
September 2006, when the Federal Electoral Tribunal completed adjudication of all the
challenges to those results. Calderón began a six-year term on December 1, 2006.
In the first half of his term, President Calderón, whose PAN party became the largest party in the
Senate and Chamber of Deputies after the 2006 legislative elections, had some success in turning
to the PRI for help in advancing his legislative agenda. In 2007, he secured passage of long-
awaited fiscal and pension reforms that had stalled under the Fox Administration. In June 2008,
President Calderón signed a judicial reform decree after securing the approval of Congress and
Mexico’s states for an amendment to Mexico’s Constitution. Under the judicial reform, Mexico
will have eight years to move from a closed door process based on written arguments to a public
trial system with oral arguments and the presumption of innocence. In October 2008, the
government secured approval of an energy sector reform intended to improve the transparency
and management flexibility of state-oil company, Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX). Critics
maintained that its watered-down provisions, which provide only limited opportunities for private
investment in the company, would not do enough to encourage new oil exploration.1
In the months leading up to the July 5, 2009 midterm elections, most polls indicated that the PRI,
which had fared well in recent state and municipal elections, would fare well as compared to the
PAN and the PRD. The PRI performed even better than those polls had suggested, capturing 237
of 500 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, five of six governorships, and several municipalities.
Analysts have attributed the PRI’s strong performance to growing popular concern about the
country’s economic downturn, as well as the party’s effective use of its still formidable national
machinery. Although President Calderón is still popular, the PAN lost seats in the Chamber (from
206 to 147) and two key governorships, with voters expressing frustration with the party’s failure
to distinguish itself from the PRI. (The PAN still controls the Senate, however.) The PRD fared
even worse than the PAN in the mid-term elections, winning just 72 seats in the Chamber, as
internal divisions within the party led Andrés Lopez Obrador to throw his support behind left-
leaning candidates from smaller parties, many of whom won.2
The composition of the current Congress, which was sworn in on September 1, 2009, has
complicated President Calderón’s agenda for the second half of his term, which had included
enacting a package of comprehensive political reforms. The PRI, which, combined with the
support of the allied Green Ecological Party (PVEM) party, now controls a majority in the
1 Alexandra Olson, “Mexico Approves Oil Reform Bill in General Terms, Experts Call it Disappointment for
Investors,” AP, October 28, 2008.
2 Andrew Selee and Katie Putnam, “Mexico’s 2009 Midterm Elections: Winners and Losers,” Woodrow Wilson
Center, July 2009; George W. Grayson, “The PRI Makes a Comeback in Mexico,” Foreign Policy Research Institute,
July 2009.
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Chamber, appears to be trying to use its position to gear up for the 2010-2011 gubernatorial
elections and the 2012 presidential election. However, many observers maintain that the PRI is
unlikely to block any major security or economic stimulus initiatives, given the severity of the
drug violence and economic challenges that Mexico is facing. Moreover, the PRI is expected to
be more cooperative now than it was after winning a majority in the 2003 elections, for fear of
being dismissed by voters in 2012 as obstructionist.3
This year political attention in Mexico has focused on the state and local elections being held in
15 states as a harbinger of how the major parties are likely to perform in the 2012 presidential
elections. Those elections include races for 12 governorships, ten of which will be held on July 4,
2010. The leading candidates in several of those contests were handpicked by their successors
through a process that some analysts maintain was intended to protect those who are retiring from
future charges of corruption or collusion.4 In an attempt to compete with the now dominant PRI,
the PAN has formed alliances in several states with the PRD and other small parties, many of
which do not share its ideological orientation, a strategy which has received significant criticism.5
There is significant concern about the negative effects that escalating drug trafficking-related
violence in some parts of the country could have on the campaign and upcoming elections,
particularly since gunmen killed a PAN mayoral candidate in Tamaulipas in mid-May 2010.
Drug Trafficking and Heightened Violence and Crime in Mexico6
Mexico is a major producer and supplier to the U.S. market of heroin, methamphetamine, and
marijuana and the major transit country for as much as 90% of the cocaine sold in the United
States. A small number of Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), often erroneously
referred to as “drug cartels,”7 control the most significant drug distribution operations along the
Southwest border. U.S. government reports have characterized Mexican drug trafficking
organizations as representing the “greatest organized crime threat” to the United States today.8
Mexican DTOs have expanded their U.S. presence by increasing their transportation and
distribution networks, as well as displacing other Latin American traffickers, primarily
Colombians.9 In the past few years, the violence and brutality of the Mexican DTOs have
escalated as an increasing number of groups have battled each other for control of lucrative drug
trafficking routes into the United States.
Since taking office in December 2006, President Calderón has made combating drug trafficking
organizations (DTOs) a top priority of his administration. He has called increasing drug
3 “Country Report: Mexico,” Economist Intelligence Unit, February 2010.
4 George W. Grayson, “They’re ‘Off and Running’: The July 4, 2010 Mexican Gubernatorial Elections: A Preliminary
Assessment,” May 20, 2010.
5 “PAN Crisis Over Political Double-Dealing,” Latin American Weekly Report, March 11, 2010.
6 For more on DTOs and drug-related violence in Mexico, see CRS Report R40582, Mexico’s Drug-Related Violence ,
by June S. Beittel. For information on the potential for violence in Mexico spilling over into the United States, see CRS
Report R41075, Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence, coordinated by
Jennifer E. Lake and Kristin M. Finklea.
7 The term drug cartel remains the term used colloquially and in the press, but some experts disagree with this because
“cartel” often refers to price-setting groups and it is not clear that Mexican drug cartels are setting illicit drug prices.
8 U.S. Department of Justice’s National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), 2009 National Drug Threat Assessment,
December 2008.
9 NDIC, 2010 National Drug Threat Assessment, February 2010.
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trafficking-related violence in Mexico a threat to the Mexican state and has sent thousands of
soldiers and police to drug trafficking “hot-spots” in at least 16 states throughout Mexico. Joint
deployments of federal military and police officials are just one part of the Calderón
government’s strategy against the DTOs. That strategy involves (1) deploying the military to
restore law and order, (2) law enforcement operations, (3) institutional reform and anti-corruption
initiatives10, (4) recovering social cohesion and trust, and (5) building up international
partnerships against drugs and crime (like the Mérida Initiative).11 President Calderón has also
used extradition as a major tool to combat drug traffickers, extraditing 95 individuals in 2008 and
a record-breaking 107 individuals in 2009.12 These efforts, combined with increased collaboration
and intelligence-sharing with U.S. law enforcement agencies, have resulted in some significant
government victories against the DTOs—including the December 2009 killing of Arturo Beltrán
Leyva and January 2010 capture of Teodoro Garcia Simental.13
Despite these victories, the persistent and increasingly brazen violence committed by the drug
traffickers, which has occurred partially in response to government pressure, has led to increasing
criticism of Calderón’s aggressive anti-drug strategy. Drug trafficking-related violence resulted in
more than 5,100 lives lost in 2008 and 6,500 deaths in 2009.14 By mid-May 2010, more than
4,185 people had perished in drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico. 15 As in 2009, a large
percentage of the violence has been concentrated in the states of Chihuahua (along the border),
Sinaloa, Guerrero, and Durango. However, a recent split between the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas
has sparked violence in new areas of Tamaulipas and Nuevo León (border states), and feuding for
control over the Beltrán Leyva organization has increased violence in Morelos. Kidnapping for
money, robbery, and extortion have also increased significantly, as some of the DTOs have
evolved into what analysts have termed “full-scale mafias.”16
U.S. concern about the violence in Mexico intensified after March 13, 2010, when gunmen killed
an American consular officer and her husband, an El Paso prison guard, after they had attended a
children’s birthday party in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. In a separate incident the same day, gunmen
killed the husband and wounded the two children of a Mexican employee of the U.S. Consulate
who had attended the same party. The Mexican investigation has significant support from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and other U.S. agencies. They have arrested at least one suspect
who is a member of the Barrio Azteca gang which has ties to the Juárez drug trafficking
10 In August 2009, for example, the Mexican government replaced all of the customs inspectors posted at the country’s
airports and border crossings with 1,454 new, better-trained inspectors.
11 Embassy of Mexico, Washington, DC. “Mexico and the Fight Against Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime:
Setting the Record Straight,” June 2009, p. ii.
12 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) 2010, March 1, 2010.
13 For other recent results, see U.S. Department of State, “United States-Mexico Security Partnership: Progress and
Impact,” May 19, 2010.
14 Trans-Border Institute (TBI), “Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis from 2001-2009,” January 2010, citing
data gathered by Reforma newspaper. On April 13, 2010, press reports said a leaked confidential Mexican government
report intended for the Mexican Senate estimated the total number of drug trafficking-related deaths since December
2006 to be greater than 22,000, a figure that is significantly higher than the totals that have been reported by Reforma
or other open sources. See “Total Gang Killings Under-Reported,” Latin American Weekly Report, April 15, 2010.
Many authorities have started reporting this total, including the U.S. Department of State. See testimony of David T.
Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, before the Senate
Caucus on International Narcotics Control, May 5, 2010.
15 TBI, Justice in Mexico, May 2010 News Report.
16 Mark Stevenson, “Mexican Cartels go From Drugs to Full-Scale Mafias,” AP, August 16, 2009.
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organization. That suspect told Mexican officials that gang leaders had ordered a retaliatory
killing of the prison guard, and that neither of the consular employees had been specifically
targeted. U.S. officials have not confirmed that assertion.17
The persistent and increasingly brazen violence, which has occurred partially in response to
government pressure, has led to increasing criticism of President Calderón’s anti-drug strategy.
Many experts assert that President Calderón needs to reduce drug trafficking-related violence to
regain popular support for his security policies. President Calderón and his top advisers began
consulting with local and state officials to revise the government’s military-led strategy for
Ciudad Juárez after the massacre of 15 civilians, many of them teenagers, at a private home there
in late January 2010. The new strategy that the Calderón government is implementing, “We Are
All Juárez,” includes significant federal government investments in education, job training, and
community development programs to help address some of the underlying factors that have
contributed to the violence.18 U.S. officials have pledged to reprogram FY2009 Mérida funding to
complement Mexican government efforts.19 In early April 2010, Mexican military forces began to
withdraw from Ciudad Juárez, leaving primary security responsibilities to the federal police.
Economic Crisis and Nascent Recovery 20
Mexico’s economy is strongly dependent on economic conditions in the United States because
more than 80% of its exports are destined for the U.S. market and the United States is its primary
source of tourism revenues and foreign investment. The Mexican economy grew 3.3% in 2007,
the first year of the Calderón government. Slower growth was already anticipated for 2008 due in
part to decreasing consumer demand in the United States, declining Mexican oil production, and
slow growth in remittances sent by Mexicans abroad. The global financial crisis, which caused a
run on the Mexican peso, further reduced GDP growth in 2008 to just 1.4%. For 2009, the
Mexican economy contracted by approximately 7%, the worst decline in six decades. Experts do
not expect Mexico’s real GDP to recover 2008 levels until 2011.21
In 2009, the Calderón government struggled to cope with the combined effects of the U.S. and
global recessions, a nationwide outbreak of H1N1 “swine” flu, and declining oil production. The
U.S. recession resulted in steep declines in demand for Mexican exports, particularly in the
manufacturing sector. Mexico’s exports to the United States declined by 18.5% in 2009 as
compared to the previous year.22 The economic decline in the United States also resulted in
declining remittance flows to Mexico. In 2009, remittances to Mexico fell to an estimated $21.2
billion, the lowest level since 2005. These developments were further exacerbated by the
outbreak of pandemic H1N1 “swine flu” in April 2009, which prompted the government to close
restaurants, schools, and retail establishments for nearly two weeks. The tourism industry,
17 “Suspect Says Juárez Killers Had Pursued Jail Guard,” New York Times, April 1, 2010.
18 A progress report on how implementation of the strategy is advancing is available in English at:
http://www.embassyofmexico.org/files/Todos_Somos_english_may10_v1100.pdf.
19 For a description of U.S. programs planned for Ciudad Juárez, see: U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, “Confronting
Border Violence in Ciudad Juárez,” March 2010, available at: http://www.usembassy-
mexico.gov/eng/merida/pdf/emerida_factsheet_ViolenceCJ.pdf.
20 For background on the Mexican economy and U.S.-Mexican economic relations, see CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-
Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
21 “Country Report: Mexico,” EIU, January 2010.
22 Based on data from the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) dataweb.
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Mexico’s third largest foreign exchange earner, was especially hard hit by the outbreak, with a
50% drop in income earned by foreign visitors in May and a 29% drop in June as compared to the
year before.23 Declining oil prices and production have also been major economic setbacks for
Mexico, which depends on oil proceeds for over one-third of government revenue.
The Calderón government took a number of measures to attempt to cushion the Mexican
economy from the fallout of the global economic crisis and the U.S. recession. The government
used billions in its international reserves to shore up the peso, and the Mexican central bank
established a temporary reciprocal currency sway line with the U.S. Federal Reserve for up to $30
billion. The government also hedged its oil exports for 2009 at a price of $70 a barrel in an effort
to protect the economy from the decline in oil prices. The central government increased liquidity
in the banking system, including multiple cuts in the prime policy lending rate. It also increased
its credit lines with the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Inter-American
Development Bank. In 2009, Mexico's fiscal stimulus amounted to 2.5% of GDP and was
targeted on infrastructure spending and subsidies for key goods of household budgets, particularly
those reducing energy costs. Government programs to support small and medium-sized
businesses, worker training, employment generation, and social safety nets were maintained and,
in some cases, expanded.24
There are signs that the Mexican economy has begun to recover from the economic crisis, but the
costs of the government’s policy responses to that crisis have placed significant strain on
Mexico's public finances. Economic growth picked up in the third and fourth quarters of 2009,
and experts are predicting that the Mexican economy may grow by as much as 4.3% in 2010.25
However, Mexico’s overall fiscal deficit is expected to reach 2.8% for 2010, estimated to be near
the maximum that the country can afford. Recent downward revisions of Mexico's credit rating
(still investor grade) reflect growing concern over Mexico's financial position in light of weak
economic fundamentals and Mexico's recovery relying so heavily on a U.S. economic rebound.
As a result, the Calderón government has ended some of the fuel subsidies put into place in
January 2009 and garnered legislative approval for a relatively austere budget for 2010.26
As elsewhere in Latin America, there are concerns that the economic downturn in Mexico has
negatively impacted the country’s recent progress in reducing poverty. Mexico, with a population
of almost 110 million, is classified by the World Bank as an upper middle income developing
country, with a per capita income level of $9,980 (2008). According to officials from the United
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the percentage of
Mexicans living in poverty fell between 2000 and 2006, but rose again between 2006 and 2008 to
23 “Mexico Foreign Tourism Income Sinks 29% in June,” Reuters, August 10, 2009.
24 ECLAC. The Reactions of the Governments of the Americas to the International Crisis: An Overview of Policy
Measures up to 31 March 2009. April 2009.
25 “Country Report: Mexico,” EIU, May 2010.
26 On November 17, 2009, the Mexican Congress gave final approval for the FY2010 budget. While the final bill
included an increase in income taxes for the country’s top income brackets, a slight increase in the value-added tax, and
a tax on beer and cigarettes, it did not include a 2% consumption tax that President Calderón had proposed. On the
expenditure side, the budget requires the Calderón Administration to make cutbacks in its operating and personnel
budgets, while maintaining spending for social programs, infrastructure, and the agriculture sector. The budget
dedicates roughly $6.9 billion for security-related programs. “Mexico Economy: Budget Passed, What Next?” EIU
Viewswire, November 18, 2009; “President Felipe Calderón Eliminates Fuel Subsidies, Contributing to Increase in
Price of Basic Goods,” SourceMex Economic News & Analysis on Mexico, January 13, 2010.
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include roughly 45% of the population. ECLAC has also estimated that the number of individuals
living in extreme poverty in Mexico and Central America increased by 800,000 in 2009.27
Mexico’s main poverty reduction program is Oportunidades (Opportunities). The program,
formerly known as Progresa (Progress), began under President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) and
has since expanded to benefit 5 million Mexican families (25 million individuals). The program
seeks not only to alleviate the immediate effects of poverty through cash and in-kind transfers,
but to break the cycle of poverty by improving nutrition, health standards, and educational
attainment. It provides cash transfers to families in poverty who demonstrate that they regularly
attend medical appointments and can certify that children are attending school. While some have
praised Oportunidades for its positive effects on educational and nutrition outcomes, others have
criticized it for creating dependency on government handouts.28 On April 9, 2009, the World
Bank approved a $1.5 billion loan to Mexico to expand the Oportunidades program in an effort to
relieve the social impact of the economic downturn.
Foreign Policy Challenges
While the bilateral relationship with the United States has continued to dominate Mexican foreign
policy, former President Fox (2000-2006) and current President Calderón have pursued more
diversified foreign policies than their recent predecessors. The Fox Administration pursued other
policy initiatives after the September 2001 terrorist attacks turned U.S. attention away from
Mexico and toward the Middle East. Mexico held a temporary seat on the U.N. Security Council
in 2002 and 2003 and voted against the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which disappointed the Bush
Administration. Fox promoted Plan Puebla-Panama, now called the Mesoamerican Plan, a series
of energy, infrastructure, and regional connectivity initiatives with Central America. He attempted
to revive the G-3 group trade preferences (Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico); however,
Venezuela formally withdrew from the group in November 2006. Fox also sought better ties with
countries in South America. He attempted to expand trade with the European Union under the
EU-Mexico free trade agreement (FTA) that went into effect in July 2000, and with Japan under
the Mexico-Japan FTA that entered into force in April 2005.29
President Calderón has sought to pursue an independent foreign policy with even closer ties to
Latin America. Calderón has regularly met with President Álvaro Uribe of Colombia, with whom
he has formed a partnership, along with the leaders of Guatemala and Panama, to combat drug
trafficking and organized crime. In 2009, the Colombian government sent dozens of police
trainers to teach courses at Mexico’s new federal police training institute. In August 2009,
President Calderón visited Brazil to discuss the possibility of forming a Brazil-Mexico FTA, as
well as developing greater energy cooperation between PEMEX and Petrobras, Brazil’s state-
owned oil company. Security cooperation between Mexico and the Central American Integration
System (SICA) has also expanded under President Calderón. Progress has also continued to
advance, albeit slowly, on the Mesoamerican Project mentioned above. The Calderón government
attempted to help resolve the political crisis in Honduras after the ouster of former president
27 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the
Caribbean 2008; “ECLAC: Extreme Poverty Up in 2009 in Mexico, Central America,” Latin American Herald
Tribune, January 23, 2010.
28 Santiago Levy, Good Intentions, Bad Outcomes – Social Policy, Informality and Economic Growth in Mexico.
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, April 2008.
29 For more information, see CRS Report R40784, Mexico’s Free Trade Agreements, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
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Manuel Zelaya in June 2009, and has recognized the new government of Porfirio Lobo elected in
November 2009. In response to the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, Mexico pledged $8 million
in financial support and sent 10 aircraft, 2 ships (one of which was a hospital ship), 208 experts in
search and rescue, and 1,500 tons of humanitarian supplies.30
President Calderón has also tried to mend relations with Cuba and Venezuela, which had become
tense during the Fox Administration. In September 2007, Mexican and Venezuelan ambassadors
presented credentials to the respective governments, restoring full relations for the first time since
November 2005. In May 2004, President Fox recalled Mexico’s ambassador to Cuba;
ambassadors were later restored, but relations between the two countries remained tense through
the remainder of the Fox administration. A Cuban ambassador to Mexico also presented his
credentials to President Calderón in September 2007. In November 2008, a new Mexico-Cuba
agreement intended to help slow the trafficking of undocumented Cubans passing through
Mexico to the United States took effect.31
Mexican-U.S. Relations
Background
Until the early 1980s, Mexico had a closed and statist economy and its independent foreign policy
was often at odds with the United States. Those policies began to shift, however, under President
Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988), and changed even more dramatically under President Carlos
Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) and President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000). Presidents Salinas
opened Mexico’s economy to trade and investment, while President Zedillo adopted electoral
reforms that leveled the playing field for opposition parties and increased cooperation with the
United States on drug control and border issues.
President Fox (2000-2006) encouraged strong relations with the United States, and called for
greater cooperation under NAFTA and for a bilateral migration agreement that would regularize
the status of undocumented Mexicans in the United States. In the aftermath of the September
2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the focus of relations shifted to border security issues
as the United States became increasingly concerned about homeland security. Relations became
strained during the debate on immigration reform in the United States. After President Bush
approved the Secure Fence Act of 2006, Mexico, with the support of 27 other nations, denounced
the proposed border fence at the Organization of American States.
Under the Calderón government, drug trafficking and violence, border security, and to a lesser
extent, immigration, have continued to define the bilateral relationship. Felipe Calderón made his
first official visit to the United States as President-elect in early November 2006, after first
visiting Canada and several Latin American countries. During his visit, Calderón criticized the
authorization of 700 miles of fencing along the U.S.-Mexico border and noted that it complicated
U.S.-Mexico relations. He asserted that job creation and increased investment in Mexico would
be more effective in reducing illegal migration from Mexico than a border fence. Calderón
30 Organization of American States (OAS), “Update on OAS Efforts in Support of Haiti,” January 21, 2010.
31 “Cuban Envoy to Mexico Says Migration Agreement to Halt People Trafficking,” BBC Monitoring Americas,
November 20, 2008.
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signaled a shift in Mexican foreign policy when he noted that while immigration is an important
issue in the bilateral relationship, it is not the only issue, as trade and economic development are
also important.
President Calderón reiterated these concerns during President Bush’s March 2007 visit to Mexico.
During the visit, President Calderón also called for U.S. assistance in combating drug and
weapons trafficking. Specifically, Calderón promised to continue his efforts to combat drug
trafficking and called for U.S. efforts to reduced the demand for drugs. Calderón’s willingness to
increase narcotics cooperation with the United States led to the development of the Mérida
Initiative, a multi-year U.S. assistance effort announced in October 2007 to help Mexico and
Central America combat drug trafficking and organized crime.
Obama Administration
U.S.-Mexican relations have continued to be close under the Obama Administration, largely
focusing on cooperation in combating organized crime and drug trafficking. In mid-January 2009,
President Calderón visited then President-elect Obama in Washington D.C. That pre-inaugural
meeting, which has become somewhat of a tradition for recent U.S. presidents, demonstrated the
importance of strong relations with Mexico.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton traveled to Mexico City and Monterrey, Mexico, on March 25-
26, 2009 to discuss a broad range of bilateral issues, including cooperation under the Mérida
Initiative. The Secretary asserted that the U.S. relationship with Mexico “is one of the most
important relationships between any two countries in the world” and that both countries “need a
strong and sustained partnership, one based on comprehensive engagement, greater balance,
shared responsibility, and joint efforts to address hemispheric and global issues.”32 During her
visit, Secretary Clinton and Mexican Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa announced the creation
of a new bilateral implementation office in Mexico where Mexican and U.S. officials will work
together on efforts to combat drug traffickers and associated violence. Perhaps most significantly,
Secretary Clinton criticized the failure of U.S. antidrug policy and acknowledged that an
“insatiable demand for illegal drugs” in the United States “fuels the drug trade.”33
Clinton’s visit to Mexico was followed in early April 2009 with trips by Homeland Security
Secretary Napolitano and Attorney General Holder where they met with Mexican officials and
attended an arms trafficking conference. Both officials emphasized new efforts by their agencies
to combat the drug cartels, including the deployment of additional personnel and resources to
support anti-gun trafficking and interdiction efforts, as well as law enforcement cooperation.
On April 16-17, 2009, President Barack Obama traveled to Mexico to meet with President
Calderón. The two presidents discussed cooperation in the fight against drug-related violence,
immigration reform, and a new bilateral framework on clean energy and climate change. During
the visit, President Obama acknowledged the U.S. demand for drugs was helping to keep the
32 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks with Mexican Foreign Secretary
Patricia Espinosa After Their Meeting,” Mexico City, Mexico, March 25, 2009.
33 Mark Lander, “Clinton Says Demand for Illegal Drugs in the U.S. ‘Fuels the Drug Trade’ in Mexico,” New York
Times, March 26, 2009.
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Mexican drugs cartels in business, and that “more than 90% of the guns recovered in Mexico
come from the United States.”34
At the North American Leaders’ Summit in Guadalajara, Mexico in August 2009, President
Obama praised Mexico’s response to the H1N1 swine flu outbreak and gave his full support for
President Calderón’s struggle against the drug cartels. Obama stated that he has “great confidence
in President Calderón’s administration applying the law enforcement techniques that are
necessary to curb the power of the cartels, but doing so in a way that’s consistent with human
rights.”35 During the summit, President Obama, President Calderón, and Canadian Prime Minister
Harper pledged to work together to restore economic growth in North America, combat climate
change, and prepare for the fall flu season.
Thus far in 2010, U.S.-Mexican consultations have continued to occur at the highest levels. On
March 23, 2010, Secretary Clinton chaired a cabinet-level delegation to Mexico that included
Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Michael Mullen,
Homeland Security Secretary Napolitano, and then-Director of National Intelligence Admiral
Dennis Blair. The delegation participated in a Mérida Initiative High-Level Group meeting with
their Mexican counterparts at which they agreed to a new strategy for the Mérida Initiative.
President Obama then welcomed President Calderón to the White House for a two-day state visit
on May 19, 2010 during which the leaders pledged to continue working together to combat the
organized criminal groups that traffic drugs into the United States and illicit weapons and cash
into Mexico. They also reaffirmed their commitment to bilateral efforts to foster economic
competitiveness, produce clean energy, and build a 21st century border
U.S. Assistance to Mexico
Mexico, a middle income country, traditionally has not been a major recipient of U.S. foreign
assistance, but this changed in FY2008 with congressional approval of the Administration’s
request for funding to support the Mérida Initiative (see “Mérida Initiative” section below).
Because of the Mérida Initiative funding, U.S. assistance to Mexico rose from $65 million in
FY2007 to almost $406 million in FY2008. Table 1 provides an overview of recent U.S.
assistance to Mexico funded through State Department aid accounts, while Table 2 provides a
breakdown of Mérida assistance by account. Aside from Mérida-related funding, Mexico receives
development assistance aimed at reducing poverty and inequality and helping the Mexican
economy benefit from the North American Free Trade Agreement. Mexico also benefits from
military training programs funded through the State Department’s International Military
Education and Training Account (IMET), as well as counter-terrorism assistance provided
through the Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism and Related Programs (NADR) account.
34 “President Obama and Mexican President Felipe Calderón Hold News Conference,” CQ Newsmaker Transcripts,
April 16, 2009.
35 U.S. Department of State, “Press Release: North American Leaders Discuss Trade, H1N1 Flu, Climate Change,”
August 10, 2009.
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Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Mexico by Account, FY2007-FY2011
U.S. $ millions
FY2010
FY2011
Account FY2007 FY2008a FY2009ab
(est.)
req.
CSHc
3.7 2.7 2.9
3.5 0.0
DA
12.3 8.2 11.2 10.0 26.3
ESF
11.4 34.7 15.0 15.0 10.0
FMF
0.0 116.5 299.0d 5.3 8.0
IMET
0.1 0.4 0.8
1.1 1.1
INCLE
36.7 242.1 454.0e 190.0 292.0
NADR
1.3 1.4 3.9
5.7 5.7
TOTAL
65.4 405.9 786.8
230.6 346.6
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2008-FY2011,
FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-32).
Notes: CSH= Child Survival and Health; DA=Development Assistance; ESF=Economic Support Fund;
FMF=Foreign Military Financing; IMET=International Military Education and Training; INCLE=International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism and Related Programs.
a. FY2008 assistance includes funding from the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252). FY2009
assistance includes FY2009 bridge funding from the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252).
b. FY2009 assistance includes funding from the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32).
c. Beginning with the FY2010 request, the Child Survival and Health Account became known as Global Health
and Child Survival—USAID.
d. $260 million provided under the FY2009 supplemental (P.L. 111-32) and counted here as FY2009 funding
was considered by appropriators “forward funding” intended to address in advance a portion of the FY2010
request.
e. $94 million provided under P.L. 111-32 and counted here as part of FY2009 funding was considered by
appropriators “forward funding” intended to address in advance a portion of the FY2010 request.
On February 1, 2010, the Obama Administration submitted its FY2011 budget request to
Congress. The request includes $346.6 million in total assistance to Mexico, including $310
million in assistance accounts that have funded the Mérida Initiative: $292 million in INCLE, $8
million in FMF, and $10 million in ESF.
Although Congress has just begun to consider the FY2011 budget request, it may also include
additional funding for Mexico in a FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations measure. On May 27,
2010, the Senate passed its version of H.R. 4899, the FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations
measure, which includes $175 million in assistance for “judicial reform, institution building, anti-
corruption, and rule of law activities” in Mexico (under the State Department's INCLE account)
and $5 million in funds for emergency diplomatic security support in Mexico (under the State
DC&P account). The House Appropriations Committee draft version of the bill reportedly
provides $200 million in INCLE funding and none for diplomatic security. House appropriators
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are also reportedly considering inserting up to $677 million for border security into the House
version of the bill.36
Bilateral Cooperation on Counternarcotics and Security Efforts
In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S.-Mexican counternarcotics efforts were often marked by mistrust.
Beginning in 1986, when the U.S. President was required to certify whether drug-producing
countries and drug-transit countries were cooperating fully with the United States, Mexico often
was criticized for its lack of efforts, which in turn led to Mexican government criticism of the
U.S. assessment. Reforms to the U.S. drug certification process enacted in September 2002 (P.L.
107-228) essentially eliminated the annual drug certification requirement, and instead required
the President to designate and withhold assistance from countries that had “failed demonstrably”
to make substantial counternarcotics efforts.37 In the aftermath of these reforms, U.S. bilateral
cooperation with Mexico on counternarcotics efforts improved considerably during the Fox
administration (2000-2006), and as described above, combating DTOs has become a priority of
the current Calderón administration.
Until 2006, Mexico refused to extradite criminals facing the possibility of life without parole to
the United States. However, two decisions by the Mexican Supreme Court facilitated extraditions
to the United States. In November 2005, in a partial reversal of its October 2001 ruling, the Court
found that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is not cruel and unusual
punishment. Then the Court ruled in January 2006 that U.S. extradition requests only need to
meet the requirements of the 1978 bilateral extradition treaty, not Mexico’s general law on
international extradition that was promulgated in 1975.38 That decision made the extradition
process easier. President Calderón has used extradition as a major tool to combat drug traffickers.
Extraditions from Mexico rose from 41 in 2005 to a record 107 in 2009.
The State Department’s 2010 International Narcotics Control Strategy report maintains that
President Calderón’s efforts against drug traffickers in 2009 continued at an “ambitious pace” in
the face of an increasingly violent backlash from the DTOs. According to the report, those efforts
resulted in the arrests of several significant DTO leaders and record methamphetamine seizures.
In 2009, Mexican law enforcement also seized at least 20 metric tons (mt) of cocaine (up from 19
mt in 2008) and 665 kilograms of opium gum (up from 168 kilograms in 2008), while marijuana
seizures were down. Challenges identified in the report include the continued opacity and
inefficiency of the Mexican judicial system, corruption, and declines in government drug crop
eradication efforts.
36 .(http://appropriations.house.gov/images/Supplemental_Appropriations_Bill_Summary_-
_War_Jobs_and_Other_needs_-_05.26.2010.pdf).
37 See CRS Report 98-174, Mexican Drug Certification Issues: U.S. Congressional Action, 1986-2002, by K. Larry
Storrs.
38 Jesus Aranda, “Allana la Corte el Camino para Extraditar a Connacionales a EU,” La Jornada, February 1, 2006;
“Mexico: Court Clears Way for Faster Extraditions to U.S.,” Latin American Weekly Report, February 7, 2006; and,
U.S. Department of State, INCSR 2006.
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Mérida Initiative39
The United States and Mexico issued a joint statement on October 22, 2007, announcing a multi-
year plan for $1.4 billion in U.S. assistance to Mexico and Central America to combat drug
trafficking and other criminal organizations. The Mérida Initiative, named for the location of a
March 2007 meeting between Presidents Bush and Calderón, expands bilateral and regional
cooperation to combat organized crime, DTOs, and criminal gangs. The stated objective of the
Mérida Initiative, according to the U.S. and Mexican government joint statement, is to maximize
the effectiveness of efforts against drug, human, and weapons trafficking.40 The Bush
Administration first requested funds for Mérida, $500 million for Mexico and $50 million for
Central America, in its FY2008 supplemental appropriations request.
Table 2. FY2008 – FY2010 Mérida Funding for Mexico by Aid Account and
Appropriations Measure
($ in millions)
FY2009
FY2008
FY2009
FY2009
Supp.
FY2010
Supp. (P.L. Bridge (P.L.
(P.L. 111-
(P.L. 111-
(P.L. 111-
Account
Account
110-252)
110-252)
8)
32)
117)
Totals
ESF
20.0 0.0 15.0 0.0 15.0 50.0
INCLE 215.5 48.0 246.0 160.0 190.0 859.5
FMF 116.5
0.0
39.0
260.0
5.3
420.8
Total 352.0 48.0
300.0
420.0
210.3
1,330.3
Sources: U.S. Department of State, FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan; FY2009 Appropriations
Spending Plan, and FY2009 Supplemental Spending Plan; FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117).
Notes: ESF=Economic Support Fund; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; INCLE=International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement.
To date, Congress has appropriated a total of $1.3 billion for Mexico under the Mérida Initiative.
Legislative action on Mérida appropriations has included the following:
• In June 2008, the 110th Congress appropriated $352 million in FY2008
supplemental assistance and $48 million in FY2009 bridge fund supplemental
assistance for Mexico in P.L. 110-252, the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations
Act. Congress divided the funding for Mexico in P.L. 110-252 between the
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), Foreign Military
Financing (FMF), and Economic Support Fund (ESF) aid accounts. Congress
limited the amount of FMF and INCLE available to provide equipment to the
Mexican military and made 15% of FMF and IMET contingent on meeting
certain human rights conditions.41 Congress also earmarked $73.5 million for
judicial reform, institution building, rule of law, and anti-corruption activities.
39 For more information, see CRS Report RS22837, Mérida Initiative: U.S. Anticrime and Counterdrug Assistance for
Mexico and Central America, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
40 U.S. Department of State and Government of Mexico, “Joint Statement on the Mérida Initiative,” October 22, 2007.
41 Human rights conditions for Mexico in P.L. 110-252 include (1) improving transparency and accountability of
federal police forces; (2) establishing a mechanism to conduct regular consultations among relevant Mexican
(continued...)
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• In March 2009, the 111th Congress passed the Omnibus Appropriations Act, (P.L.
111-8) providing $300 million for Mexico within the INCLE, ESF, and FMF
accounts with not less than $75 million for judicial reform, institution building,
anti-corruption, and rule of law activities. The measure continues human rights
conditions similar to those set forth in P.L. 110-252.42
• In June 2009, the 111th Congress passed the FY2009 supplemental appropriations
measure, P.L. 111-32, which includes $160 million in INCLE assistance and $260
million in FMF for Mexico, $354 million more than the Administration’s request.
The $160 million in INCLE funds can be used to supply the Mexican federal
police with items such as fixed and rotary wing aircraft (including three
requested Blackhawk helicopters). The $260 million in FMF funding is for
expedited aviation assistance to the Mexican Navy (SEMAR) to enhance air
transport ability and aerial surveillance. While the INCLE funds provided by P.L.
111-32 are subject to the same human rights conditions as in P.L. 111-8, the FMF
funds provided are not subject to human rights conditions.
• On December 13, 2009, Congress passed the FY2010 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (H.R. 3288/P.L. 111-117), which allows for $210.3 million
for Mexico in the INCLE, ESF, and FMF accounts subject to the same human
rights conditions as P.L. 111-8. While Congress provided less funding for
Mérida-related programs in Mexico and Central America than the
Administration’s FY2010 request, Congress had appropriated significantly more
for Mexico than requested in the FY2009 supplemental spending measure, and
considered $254 million of the funds provided in P.L. 111-32 as intended to
address in advance a portion of the FY2010 request.43
The August 2009 submission of the State Department’s human rights progress report for Mexico
met the statutory requirement for the release of the FY2008 supplemental and FY2009 regular
FMF and IMET funds that had been on hold. Those funds totaled roughly $88.5 million.
There has been concern in Congress about the slow delivery of Mérida assistance. On December
3, 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a preliminary report for Congress
on the status of funding for the Mérida Initiative. By the end of September 2009, GAO found that
$830 million of the $1.3 billion in Mérida funds appropriated for Mexico and Central America as
of that time had been obligated by the State Department, but only $26 million of the funds had
actually been spent (roughly 2% of the total). As of late November 2009, the State Department
(...continued)
government authorities, Mexican human rights organizations, and other relevant Mexican civil society organizations, to
make consultations concerning implementation of the Mérida Initiative in accordance with Mexican and international
law; (3) ensuring that civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities are investigating and prosecuting, in accordance with
Mexican and international law, members of the federal police and military forces who have been credibly alleged to
have committed violations of human rights, and the federal police and military forces are fully cooperating with the
investigations; and (4) enforcing the prohibition, in accordance with Mexican and international law, on the use of
testimony obtained through torture or other ill-treatment.
42 P.L. 111-8 also has a provision requiring that prior to the procurement or lease of aircraft, that the Director of the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the Committees on
Appropriations an analysis of alternatives for the acquisition of all aircraft for the Merida Initiative.
43 In the Joint Explanatory Statement to P.L. 111-117, the conferees direct the Secretary of State to submit a report to
within 90 days of the enactment of the Act addressing how prior Mérida funds have been used, progress to date, any
planned adjustments in the uses of funds, and post-Merida plans.
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reported that approximately $359 million (28% of the total funds appropriated) in Mérida funding
was actively supporting projects in Mexico and Central America.44
State Department officials in Mexico City have continued to report progress in Mérida
implementation since the GAO reporting period ended. According to a State Department report,
which is attached to this memorandum, a total of $159 million worth of training and equipment
had been provided by May 11, 2010. The $118.7 million in equipment provided thus far has
included five Bell helicopters valued at $66 million for the Mexican Army and a $28 million
software package for the Attorney General’s Office (PGR). Another $145.5 million in equipment
is scheduled to be delivered by the end of 2010, including three UH-60 helicopters valued at
$76.5 million for the Secretariat for Public Security (SSP).45 Among Mérida-funded training
programs, police professionalization programs appear to have advanced the furthest.
Approximately 4,300 university-educated police officers have graduated from the basic
investigative training course offered at the refurbished federal police institute at San Luis Potosi.
And, although many judicial training programs are just getting underway, at least 87 judges and
prosecutors had completed U.S.-funded courses on administering oral trials by late March 2010.46
Beyond Mérida: the Future of U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation
Even though the implementation of Mérida-funded programs is likely to continue for several
more years, budgetary support for the Initiative as it was originally conceived ended with the
FY2010 budget cycle. As a result, the Obama Administration and the Mexican government have
agreed to a new strategic framework for security cooperation post-Mérida. The four pillars of the
new strategy are outlined in the FY2011 budget request and include: 1) disrupting organized
criminal groups; 2) institutionalizing the rule of law; 3) building a 21st century border; and 4)
building strong and resilient communities. In terms of funding priorities, the Administration plans
to move away from providing equipment to Mexican security forces to supporting institutional
reform programs in Mexico with training and technical assistance. It intends to provide assistance
to one or two border cities as U.S. assistance is expanded from the federal to the state and local
levels. The FY2011 request included at least $310 million for these programs.
Department of Defense Assistance to Mexico
Apart from the Mérida Initiative, DOD has its own legislative authorities to provide certain
counterdrug assistance. DOD programs in Mexico are overseen by the U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM), which is located on Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado, whereas programs in
Central America are managed by U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), which is based in
Miami, FL. DOD can provide counterdrug assistance under certain circumstances outlined in Sec.
1004 of P.L. 101-150 as amended through FY2010, and can provide additional assistance to 22
countries as provided for in Sec. 1033 of P.L. 105-85 as amended through FY2010. Under these
authorities, DOD counternarcotics assistance to Mexico totaled roughly $12.1 million in FY2008
and $34.2 million in FY2009.
44 Roughly $12.3 million of that funding was supporting programs in Central America. Data provided in an email from
State Department official, January 13, 2010.
45 U.S. Department of State, “Mérida Initiative – Significant Activities,” May 11, 2010.
46 U.S. Department of State, “United States-Mexico Security Partnership: Progress and Impact,” May 19, 2010.
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In the FY2006-FY2010 annual Department of Defense (DOD) authorization bills, Congress also
provided DOD with authority to train and equip foreign military forces to perform
counterterrorism operations. DOD used this "Section 1206" authority, as it is known, to provide a
total of $13.9 million in counterterrorism training and equipment to the Mexican military in
FY2007 and FY2008.
On December 16, 2009, Congress appropriated an additional $50 million in funding for
counternarcotics communication equipment for Mexico in the FY2010 Department of Defense
Appropriations Act (H.R. 3326/P.L. 111-118).47
Related Security Cooperation with Mexico48
In March 2009, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano announced a set of Southwest
border initiatives aimed at (1) guarding against violent crime spillover into the United States; (2)
supporting Mexico’s crackdown campaign against drug cartels in Mexico; and (3) reducing the
movement of contraband in both directions across the border.49
Components of the Department of Homeland Security are providing significant assistance to
advance those aims. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has created eleven Border
Enforcement Security Task Forces (BESTs) since 2006, including ten on the Southwest border
and one in Mexico City. The task forces serve as platforms for cooperation among local, state,
and federal agencies as well as a point of cooperation with Mexico’s Secretary of Public Security
(SSP). ICE has also coordinated the establishment of Special Investigative Units in Mexico that
work with ICE special agents on criminal investigations and prosecutions in such areas as money
laundering, human trafficking, and alien smuggling. DHS components such as ICE, Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), and the U.S. Coast Guard have longstanding relationships with their
Mexican counterparts to jointly disrupt the activities of drug trafficking organizations.
In March 2009, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced increased efforts to combat Mexican
drug cartels in the United States and to help Mexican law enforcement battle the cartels in their
own country. Department of Justice components involved in the increased efforts include the FBI,
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
(ATF), U.S. Marshals Service (USM), the Department’s Criminal Division and the Office of
Justice Programs. On August 20, 2009, U.S. Attorney General Holder announced indictments
against 43 Mexican drug dealers accused of exporting narcotics into the United States and
distributing them in U.S. cities. He praised Mexico-U.S. cooperation in the investigations that led
to those indictments. In October, 2009, agents from several U.S. federal agencies, as well as state
and local police, engaged in a joint operation in 38 U.S. cities against La Familia Michoacana.
The raid resulted in 300 arrests.
ATF has begun a new intelligence-driven effort known as Gunrunner Impact Teams (GRITs),
deployed eTrace firearms tracking technology to Mexico, and beefed up its Project Gunrunner
47 Funding for this equipment is listed as “Digital Communications Equipment” on p.352 of the Joint Explanatory
Statement for the FY2010 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 3326/P.L.-111-118).
48 For information on U.S. efforts to combat flows of drugs, weapons, and money into Mexico, see the Appendix of
CRS Report R41075, Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence.
49 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Press Release: Secretary Napolitano Announces Major Southwest Border
Security Initiative,” March 24, 2009.
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program as a part of its efforts to stop the flow of guns into Mexico. (For more see “Weapons
Trafficking”” section below).
DEA has worked with the Mexican government for decades and has 11 offices in the country. The
agency is increasing its agents allocated to the Southwest border field divisions and is forming
mobile teams to target Mexican methamphetamine trafficking operations. DEA’s cooperation with
Mexico has included Project Reckoning targeting the Gulf Cartel and Operation Xcellerator
targeting the Sinaloa Cartel. DEA also is the lead agency at the El Paso Intelligence Center
(EPIC), a national tactical intelligence center that emphasizes law enforcement efforts on the
Southwest border.
Pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act), the U.S. Department
of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control targets and blocks financial assets, subject to
U.S. jurisdiction, of drug kingpins and related associates and entities. Since October 2009, the
U.S. Treasury Department has designated 38 individuals and 16 entities as tied to the illicit
activities of the Arellano Felix Organization, the Beltran Leyva Organization, the Sinaloa Cartel,
and La Familia Michoacana.
Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling
Interrupting the flow of money from drug sales in the United States to Mexico, estimated to range
from $19 billion to $29 billion annually,50 may be one of the most effective ways to disrupt the
activities of the Mexican DTOs. A portion of this money is used to buy weapons in the United
States to arm the DTOs and their drug enforcers. Other drug proceeds are used to corrupt law
enforcement and public officials, enabling the DTOs to continue to operate with impunity. Some
analysts suggest that the U.S. Treasury is doing a good job of making it difficult to launder money
within financial institutions. Therefore, the preferred mode to transfer drug proceeds by the
Mexican DTOs is through shipments of bulk cash, although some organizations also use stored
value cards (including prepaid gift cards) and other means to transport illicit proceeds.51
In order to address the problem of bulk cash smuggling, the DEA has carried out bulk cash
seizures with the FBI, ICE, and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). In 2005, ICE and CBP
launched a program known as “Operation Firewall,” which resulted in increased operations
against bulk cash smuggling in the U.S.-Mexico border region. Since 2005, Operation Firewall
has resulted in 679 arrests and the seizure of more than $302 million.52 Many operations have
been carried out in coordination with Mexican customs and the Mexican money laundering vetted
unit. In 2008, ICE created a Trade Transparency Unit (TTU) in Mexico. Mexican TTU
representatives are receiving training and technical support from ICE officials in how to identify
cross-border trade anomalies that could be indicative of bulk cash smuggling. In December 2009,
ICE opened a Bulk Cash Shipment Center to help gather data and provide technical assistance tor
federal, state, and local officials engaged in anti-money laundering efforts. Experts have urged the
U.S. government to increase information-sharing with vetted units in Mexico, to gather more
50 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, ICE, “United States of America-Mexico Binational Criminal Proceeds
Study,” May 2010.
51 Ibid.
52 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Statement of John T. Morton, Assistant Secretary, ICE, before the House
Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security, April 14, 2010.
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intelligence by infiltrating the DTOs and their associated networks, and to help state and local
officials build their capacity to trace illicit financial transactions.53
Weapons Trafficking54
In recent years, Mexican drug traffickers and enforcer gangs have increasingly relied on military-
style firearms, a large percentage of which are purchased in the United States. The cartels often
obtain their weapons through “straw purchases,” whereby people who are legally qualified buy
the weapons from licensed gun dealers or at gun shows in border states and sell them to
smugglers who take them across the border.
ATF began a Southwest border initiative dubbed Project Gunrunner in FY2004 that aims to
disrupt illegal flows of weapons from the United States into Mexico. In FY2006 and FY2007,
around 100 ATF special agents and 25 industry operations investigators were dedicated to Project
Gunrunner, while by February 2010, the numbers had increased to 190 special agents and 145
industry operations investigators. As of March 2010, ATF had referred 984 cases for prosecution
involving more than 2,034 defendants and almost 14,923 guns.55
In addition to these efforts in the United States, ATF received $4.5 million in Mérida funds and
$4.5 million in asset forfeiture funds from the Department of the Treasury for the deployment of
eTrace firearms tracking technology to U.S. Consulates in Mexico to combat arms trafficking. In
FY2008, Mexico submitted more than 7,500 recovered guns for tracing, showing that most
originated in Texas, Arizona, and California. Roughly 93% of those firearms were either made in,
or imported to, the United States.56 On December 30, 2009, ATF announced that it had deployed a
bilingual version of its “e-Trace” firearms tracing technology to Mexico and Central America.
The Department of Homeland Security, especially ICE and CBP, are also involved in taking
action to stop the southbound flow of weapons to Mexico. Both ICE and CBP have the authority
to enforce export provisions of the Arms Exports Control Act. In collaboration with Mexican law
enforcement authorities, ICE launched a new bilateral program against weapons smuggling in
June 2008 known as Operation Armas Cruzadas. Among other activities, the program involves
intelligence sharing and joint law enforcement efforts with vetted Mexican units. It has resulted in
more than 749 criminal arrests and the seizure of more than 3,877 weapons.57
Mexico, for its part, began a pilot program in February 2009 to screen incoming traffic to look for
guns, bulk cash, and other contraband, and is expanding the program across the entire border. On
August 16, 2009, the Mexican government replaced all of the customs inspectors posted at the
country’s airports and border crossings with 1,454 new, better-trained inspectors. Those
53 Douglas Farah, “Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling: Challenges for the Mérida Initiative,” Woodrow
Wilson Center, Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation, May 2010.
54 For more information, see CRS Report R40733, Gun Trafficking and the Southwest Border, by Vivian S. Chu and
William J. Krouse.
55 Statement of Kenneth E. Melson, Deputy Assistant Director, ATF, before the House Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Appropriations, March 4, 2010.
56 U.S. Department of Justice, “Department of Justice Announces Resources for Fight against Mexican Drug Cartels,”
Fact Sheet, March 24, 2009.
57 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Statement of John T. Morton, Assistant Secretary, ICE, before the House
Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security, April 14, 2010.
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inspectors are now using non-intrusive inspection equipment provided through the Mérida
Initiative to check vehicles entering Mexico for arms and cash smuggled from the United States.
Beginning in August 2010, Mexican customs inspectors will receive investigative training from
ICE and other U.S. officials at a new customs academy.
In light of intensified U.S. efforts to curb weapons trafficking to Mexico, some advocates have
called for the U.S. Senate to act on a pending treaty, the Inter-American Convention Against the
Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related
Materials (CIFTA).58 The treaty, which was signed by the United States in 1997 entered into
force in July 1998, was submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent in June 1998.59
Human Smuggling
CBP and the Mexican government have partnered through the Operation Against Smuggling
Initiative on Safety and Security (OASISS), a bi-lateral program aimed at enhancing both
countries’ abilities to prosecute alien smugglers and human traffickers along the Southwest
border. Through OASISS, the Mexican government is able to prosecute alien smugglers
apprehended in the United States. From the time of its inception in 2005 through the end of
FY2009, OASISS generated 1,579 cases.60 This program is supported by the Border Patrol
International Liaison Unit, which is responsible for establishing and maintaining working
relationships with foreign counterparts in order to enhance border security.
Trafficking in Persons(TIP)
Mexico is a significant source, transit, and destination country for people trafficked for forced
labor or sexual exploitation. According to the Mexican government, some 20,000 children are
trafficked within the country each year for sexual exploitation. Mexico is also a transit country for
Central American TIP victims, among them, an increasing number of child victims. In the State
Department’s Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report, June 2010, Mexico was listed as a Tier 2
country that has taken steps to implement a federal anti-trafficking law passed in late 2007.61
Mexico recently opened its first shelter specifically designated for trafficking victims, and
recorded its first TIP convictions in early December 2009 in a case involving five individuals
from Tlaxcala, Mexico accused of trafficking for sexual exploitation.62
58 Peter DeShazo and Johnna Mendelson Forman, “A treaty that can help stem drug violence in Mexico,” Washington
Times, February 24, 2009.
59 U.S. Department of State, The Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials,” Fact Sheet, March 25, 2009
60 Data provided to CRS by DHS Congressional Affairs.
61 Since 2001, the U.S. State Department has evaluated foreign governments’ efforts to combat trafficking in persons in
its annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) reports, which are issued each June. Countries are grouped into four categories
according to the U.S. assessment of efforts they are making to combat trafficking. Tier 1 is made up of countries
deemed by the State Department to have a serious trafficking problem but fully complying with the minimum standards
for the elimination of trafficking. Those standards are defined in the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection
Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-386) as amended. Tier 2 is composed of governments not fully complying with those standards
but which are seen as making significant efforts to comply. Tier 2 Watch List, first added as a category in the 2004
report, is made up of countries that are on the border between Tier 2 and Tier 3. Tier 3 includes those countries whose
governments the State Department deems as not fully complying with TVPA’s anti-TIP standards and not making
significant efforts to do so. Tier 3 countries have been made subject to U.S. sanctions since 2003.
62 U.S. Department of State, 2009 Human Rights Report: Mexico, March 2010.
(continued...)
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Human Rights Issues
According to the State Department’s human rights report covering 2009, the Mexican government
generally respected human rights at the national level, but serious problems remained. These
included unlawful killing by security forces; kidnappings; physical abuse; poor and overcrowded
prison conditions; arbitrary arrests and detention; corruption, inefficiency and lack of
transparency that engendered impunity in the judicial system; confessions coerced through
torture; and threats against journalists leading to self-censorship. In 2009, twelve Mexican
journalists died and one disappeared. Societal problems highlighted in the report included
domestic violence; trafficking in persons; social and economic discrimination against some
members of the indigenous population; and child labor.
The State Department report maintained that neither the government nor its forces committed any
politically motivated killings, but that there were reports that security forces killed several people
during the year, including youth. The report asserted that the number of allegations of human
rights violations committed by military and police forces engaged in counterdrug efforts brought
before Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) increased as compared to 2008.
Corruption was reported to be a major problem, particularly at the state and local level, with
police involved in kidnapping, extortion, or providing protection for organized crime and drug
traffickers. Impunity was pervasive, according to the report, and was a reason that many victims
were reluctant to file complaints.
The report provided an update on several pending human rights cases, including the 2006 San
Salvador Atenco confrontation between street vendors and state and local police in the state of
Mexico and the 2006 killing of Bradley Will, an American filmmaker who was shot while
documenting civil unrest in Oaxaca. As of December 2009, none of the 2,500 police officers who
had participated in the Atenco operation, which resulted in two deaths and the alleged rape of 47
women by police, had been convicted of any crime. In the Brad Will case, Juan Manuel Martínez,
an antigovernment protestor who was arrested in October 2008 for the crime, remained in custody
at year’s end as the Mexican Attorney General’s Office planned to appeal a federal judge’s ruling
that the government lacked sufficient evidence to convict him.
Compliance with Human Rights Conditions in the Mérida Initiative
Human rights organizations generally lauded the inclusion of human rights conditions in Mérida
Initiative appropriations legislation. More recently, however, there have been concerns that
Mexico has not been fulfilling the conditions set forth in the legislation. In particular, Mexican
and international human rights groups have criticized the Mexican government for failing to hold
military and police officials accountable for past abuses.63 On July 13, 2009, Human Rights
Watch issued a statement asserting that “Mexican military courts ... have not convicted a single
member of the military accused of committing a serious human rights violation.”64 The head of
(...continued)
63 See, for example, Human Rights Watch, “Uniform Impunity, Mexico’s Misuse of Military Justice to Prosecute
Abuses in Counternarcotics and Public Security Operations,” April 2009, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/
2009/04/29/mexico-hold-military-account-rights-abuses.
64 Human Rights Watch, “Mexico: U.S. Should Withhold Military Aid: Rights Conditions in Merida Initiative Remain
Unmet,” July 13, 1009, available at: http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/07/13/mexico-us-should-withhold-military-aid.
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the Mexican military’s human rights office held a press conference on July 23, 2009, to dispute
those assertions, but reportedly did not provide details on particular cases that had been
successfully prosecuted in the military justice system.65 In late July, a coalition of U.S. and
Mexican human rights groups sent a letter to the State Department urging it not to issue a
favorable report on the Mexican government’s human rights record.66
On August 13, 2009, the State Department submitted a human rights progress report for Mexico
to Congress, thereby meeting the statutory requirements for FY2008 supplemental and FY2009
regular funds that had been on hold to be released. While acknowledging that serious problems
remain, the report outlined steps that the Mexican government has made to improve police
transparency and accountability, consult with Mexican human rights organizations and civil
society on the Mérida Initiative, investigate and prosecute allegations of human rights abuses by
security forces, and prohibit the use of torture. 67 Human rights groups have criticized the State
Department report, and the release of Mérida funds that were on hold. They have urged the State
Department not to issue another favorable human rights progress report to Congress until
measurable improvements have been made.68
Accountability for Abuses Committed During the “Dirty War” Period
During his administration, President Fox pledged to investigate and prosecute those responsible
for past human rights violations, including the “Dirty War” period from the 1960s to 1980s. The
CNDH presented a report to President Fox in November 2001 that documented human rights
abuses and disappearances of persons in the 1970s and early 1980s, and President Fox named
legal scholar Ignacio Carrillo in January 2002 as a Special Prosecutor to investigate these and
other cases. In November 2006, Ignacio Carrillo presented his final report on the repressive era
from the late 1960s to 1982. The report found that the repression was a matter of state policy and
led to the summary execution of over 700 Mexicans, torture, and the razing of villages.
The report was praised by some as an acknowledgment of state responsibility. Others remain
critical since no one has been convicted of charges relating to these alleged crimes. Only one of
the three presidents from this period, Luis Echeverria (1970-1976), is still alive. President
Echeverria faced genocide charges for his role in the repression of a 1968 student protest that left
dozens dead when he was interior minister. Echeverria tried to evade prosecution by claiming the
30-year statute of limitations had expired. A judge rejected this argument and reinstated the arrest
order in November 2006 after he determined that the statute of limitations did not go into effect
until Echeverria left public office in December 1976. In July 2007, the Criminal Tribunal
absolved Echeverria of any responsibility for the 1968 killings. This ruling was upheld by a
Mexican federal court in March 2009, and was criticized by human rights organizations. Amnesty
65 Booth and Fainaru, August 5, 2009. In November 2009, Mexico’s Secretary of Governance Fernando Gomez Mont
said that one soldier had been convicted as of that point in the Calderón Administration. U.S. Department of State,
2009 Human Rights Report: Mexico, March 2010.
66 Letter from Amnesty International and Other Human Rights Groups to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “Human
Rights Concerns to Inform the U.S. Department of State’s Merida Initiative Reporting on Mexico, July 24, 2009.
67 U.S. Department of State, “Mexico- Merida Initiative Report,” August 2009.
68 Fundar, et al., “Obama Administration’s Alleged Release of Mérida Funds: A Violation of U.S. Law That Will
Encourage Serious Human Rights Violations in Mexico,” August 2009; Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)
et al., “Joint Letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: Human Rights Concerns to Inform the U.S. Department of
State’s Merida Initiative Reporting on Mexico,” May 27, 2010.
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International maintains that the Mexican government is effectively condoning the abuses of the
past by not effectively prosecuting past human rights cases.69
Migration: Trends and Reactions to SB 107070
Mexico is the leading country of origin of the legal permanent residents (LPR) population and
unauthorized migrant population in the United States. According to the Department of Homeland
Security Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS), Mexico was the leading country of origin of legal
permanent residents (LPRs) in 2009. While the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) sets a
ceiling on immigration from any one country at 7%, many Mexicans are exempt from the
statutory numerical limits as immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. For example, 58% of Mexicans
who became LPRs in FY2009 did so as immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. Only 5% of
Mexicans who became LPRs in FY2009 were employment-based immigrants.71 An estimated 3.4
million or 26.9% of LPRs living in the United States in 2008 had emigrated from Mexico.72
Mexicans made up 62% of the unauthorized aliens living in the United States in 2009 according
to estimates based upon the American Community Survey (ACS) of the U.S. Census Bureau. OIS
demographers estimated from the ACS that there were 6.7 million Mexican nationals among the
estimated 10.8 million unauthorized resident population in 2009.73
According to a 2009 report by the Pew Hispanic Center, migration from Mexico to the United
States has declined sharply since mid-decade, but there is no evidence of an increase in the
number of Mexican-born migrants returning home during this period. This analysis drew on data
from Mexico’s National Survey of Employment and Occupation as well as the U.S. Current
Population Survey. The authors concluded: “It remains to be seen whether either trend points to a
fundamental change in U.S.-Mexico immigration patterns or is a short-term response to
heightened border enforcement, the weakened U.S. economy or other forces.”74
Mexico takes the view that the migrants are “undocumented workers,” making the point that
since the U.S. market attracts and provides employment for the migrants, it bears some
responsibility. Mexico regularly voices concern about alleged abuses suffered by Mexican
workers in the United States, and for the loss of life and hardships suffered by Mexican migrants
as they utilize increasingly dangerous routes and methods to circumvent tighter border controls.
However, Mexico benefits from unauthorized migration in at least two ways: (1) it is a “safety
valve” that dissipates the political discontent that could arise from higher unemployment in
69 “Mexico: Hopes of Justice Vanish,” Amnesty International, March 27, 2009.
70 Ruth Ellen Wasem, Specialist in Immigration Policy, and Chad C. Haddal, Analyst in Immigration Policy,
contributed to this section. For information on the U.S. government’s border security strategy, see CRS Report R41237,
People Crossing Borders: An Analysis of U.S. Border Protection Policies, by Chad C. Haddal.
71 Office of Immigration Statistics, 2009 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC, 2010, http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm.
72 Nancy Rytina, Estimates of the Legal Permanent Resident Population in 2008, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, October 2009,
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_lpr_pe_2008.pdf.
73 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant
Population Residing in the United States: January 2009, by Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan C. Baker, 2010.
For alternative analyses, see Jeffrey S. Passel and D'Vera Cohn, A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United
States, Pew Hispanic Center, April 14, 2009.
74 Jeffrey S. Passel and D'Vera Cohn, Mexican Immigrants: How Many Come? How Many Leave?, Pew Hispanic
Center, July 22, 2009.
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Mexico, and (2) it is a source of remittances by workers in the United States to families in
Mexico.
In February 2006, the Mexican Congress approved a concurrent resolution on migration and
border security calling for the development of a guest worker program in the United States under
the principle of shared responsibility. The resolution commits Mexico to enforcing legal
emigration “if a guest country offers a sufficient number of appropriate visas.”75 In the resolution,
Mexico also accepts the need to revisit its migration policies to consider enforcement of its
northern and southern borders, enforcement of Mexican immigration laws that respect the human
rights of migrants, and the need to combat human trafficking. The Mexican government further
acknowledges that Mexican workers will continue to emigrate until there are more opportunities
in Mexico. The February 2006 resolution remains the most detailed explanation to date of the
major principles behind Mexico’s policy on immigration.
In the 110th Congress, the U.S. Senate voted against cloture on the Comprehensive Immigration
Reform Act of 2007 (S. 1348) in June 2007, and the measure was not considered after that vote.
The bill would have improved border security, established a temporary worker program, and
normalized the status of most illegal immigrants in the United States. Mexico has long lobbied for
such reforms. Immigration reform legislation also was introduced in the House of Representatives
in March 2007. The House measure, the Security Through Regularized Immigration and Vibrant
Economy Act of 2007 (H.R. 1645), would have set border and document security benchmarks to
be met before normalizing the status of illegal immigrant or the creation of a guest worker
program. A variety of other migration-related legislative initiatives were introduced in the 110th
Congress, but none were enacted.76
It is still unclear whether comprehensive immigration legislation will be considered in the 111th
Congress.77 During Secretary of State Clinton’s March 2009 visit to Mexico, she maintained that
“President Obama remains committed to comprehensive immigration reform” and that
immigration reform “is and will be a high priority for him and his presidency.” On June 25, 2009,
President Obama announced the formation of a high-level working group headed by DHS
Secretary Napolitano to work with Members from the relevant House and Senate committees that
would be drafting immigration legislation.78 At the North American Leaders Summit in August
2009, President Obama acknowledged that since several of his other major legislative initiatives
were still pending, immigration reform was unlikely to occur until early 2010.79 A bill to enact
comprehensive immigration reform was introduced on December 15, 2009, but few observers are
predicting that it will be taken up prior to the 2010 mid-term elections.
On April 23, 2010, Arizona enacted SB 1070, which is designed to discourage and deter the entry
to or presence of aliens in Arizona who lack lawful status under federal immigration law.
Potentially sweeping in effect, the measure requires state and local law enforcement officials to
75 “Mexico-U.S.: Migration and Border Security,” Embassy of Mexico, February 2006.
76 For a brief history of U.S.-Mexican migration policies, see: Marc R. Rosenblum, “U.S.-Mexican Migration
Cooperation: Obstacles and Opportunities,” in Migration, Trade and Development: Conference Proceedings, Hollifield
et al, eds., Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 2007.
77 For more information, see: CRS Report R40501, Immigration Reform Issues in the 111th Congress, by Ruth Ellen
Wasem.
78 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President After Meeting with Members of
Congress to Discuss Immigration,” June 25, 2009.
79 Karoun Demirjian, “Obama Says Immigration Overhaul Will Slide Until 2010,” CQ Today, August 11, 2009.
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facilitate the detection of unauthorized immigrants in their daily enforcement activities. The
measure also establishes criminal penalties under state law, in addition to those already imposed
under federal law, for alien smuggling offenses and failure to carry or complete alien registration
documents. Further, it makes it a crime under Arizona law for an unauthorized alien to apply for
or perform work in the state, either as an employee or an independent contractor.
The enactment of SB 1070 has sparked significant legal and policy debate. Supporters argue that
federal enforcement of immigration law has not adequately deterred the migration of
unauthorized aliens into Arizona, and that state action is both necessary and appropriate to
combat the negative effects of unauthorized immigration.80 Opponents argue, among other things,
that SB 1070 will be expensive and disruptive, will be susceptible to uneven application, and can
undermine community policing by discouraging cooperation with state and local law
enforcement. President Obama publically criticized SB 1070, stating that the law threatened “to
undermine basic notions of fairness that we cherish as Americans, as well as the trust between
police and our communities that is so crucial to keeping us safe.”81 In part to respond to these
concerns, the Arizona State Legislature modified SB 1070 on April 30, 2010, through the
approval of H.B. 2162.82
In the immediate aftermath of SB 1070’s enactment, Mexican President Felipe Calderón
expressed his disapproval of the measure and stated that it “opens the door to intolerance and
hatred.”83 On April 27, 2010, the Government of Mexico issued travel warnings to Mexicans
planning to travel to Arizona and stated that Arizona’s recent immigration changes show “an
adverse political atmosphere for migrant communities and for all Mexican visitors.”84 On May
20, 2010, President Calderón again criticized S.B.1070 during his address to a joint session of
Congress by stating that it creates a dangerous precedent of “using racial profiling as a basis for
law enforcement.”
While President Obama has remained critical of SB 1070, he has also acknowledged the
increasing frustration that some states and localities are feeling as a result of the federal
government’s failure to tackle immigration reform. President Obama reiterated his support for
comprehensive immigration reform effort during a joint press appearance with President
Calderón on May 19, but also said that at this time he lacks the votes in Congress to move a
reform bill forward.85 Some analysts have interpreted President Obama’s recent decision to send
up to 1,200 National Guard troops to the border as an effort to gain support for an immigration
reform measure from Members of Congress whose top priority is border security.86
80 Kris W. Kobach, "Why Arizona Drew a Line," The New York Times, April 28, 2010, online edition.
81 Randal C. Archibold, "Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration," The New York Times, April 23, 2010, online
edition.
82 CRS Report R41221, State Efforts to Deter Unauthorized Aliens: Legal Analysis of Arizona’s SB 1070.
83 Sara Miller Llana, "Mexico Issues Sharp Rebuttal to Arizona Immigration Law," The Christian Science Monitor,
April 26, 2010.
84 Martha Mendoza, "Mexico Issues Travel Alert over New Arizona Law," The Washington Post, April 27, 2010.
85 Michael Muskal, “Obama Calls for Help with Immigration Reform,” Los Angeles Times, May 20, 2010.
86 Jennifer Benderyand John Stanton, “Obama Sends Mixed Messages on Immigration,” Roll Call, June 1, 2010.
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Environmental Cooperation87
The U.S.-Mexico border region has been the focal point of bilateral conservation and
environmental efforts, and some argue that it is an appropriate place to intensify U.S.-Mexican
environmental cooperation.88 The 2,000 mile border region includes large deserts, numerous
mountain ranges, rivers, wetlands, large estuaries, and shared aquifers. According to the
Environmental Protection Agency, border residents “suffer disproportionately from many
environmental health problems, including water-borne diseases and respiratory problems.”89 The
United States and Mexico have been working to address many of these issues through bilateral
programs like Border 2012, which relies on local level input, decision-making, and project
implementation to address environmental challenges, such as water scarcity.
The United States and Mexico have also been collaborating on geothermal energy projects since
the 1970s, but the possibility of expanding joint efforts to produce renewable energy sources has
just recently returned to the bilateral agenda. On April 16, 2009, President Obama and Mexican
President Calderón announced the Bilateral Framework on Clean Energy and Climate Change to
jointly develop clean energy sources and encourage investment in climate-friendly technologies.
Among others, its goals include enhancing renewable energy, further exploring the potential of
carbon markets, and strengthening the reliability of cross-border electricity grids. On January 26,
2010, the U.S. Department of State hosted the framework’s first bilateral meeting, which was
attended by officials from an array of agency officials from both countries. Some maintain that
efforts to advance progress under the bilateral framework may hasten as Mexico prepares to host
the Sixteenth U.N. Climate Change Conference in Cancún from November to December 2010,
while others are less certain.
Many experts have emphasized the mutual benefits that could result for both countries should
Mexico and the United States further integrate their renewable energy markets. With the U.S.
demand for renewable energy increasing, Mexico could position itself to act as a reliable and
somewhat low-cost supplier of wind energy coming from the states of Oaxaca and Baja
California. Some also argue that renewable energy projects could promote development in
Mexico. They maintain that several USAID-funded energy programs introduced in the 1990s
provided new jobs and foreign investment in Mexico.90 For example, the Mexico Renewable
Energy Program (MREP), which was created by USAID in 1994, sought to ensure long-term
partnerships with several U.S. and Mexican organizations. When the program was assessed in
1998, it was noted that MREP helped to bring electricity to remote Mexican communities that
were not connected to the cross-border electricity grid and significantly improved not only quality
of life in the area but also the people’s ability to contribute to the local economy.91
87 This section was prepared by Jessica Krowsosi, a CRS Research Associate.
88 Duncan Wood, “Environment, Development and Growth: US-Mexico Cooperation in Renewable Energies,”
Working Paper, May 2010.
89 http://www.epa.gov/usmexicoborder/framework/index.html.
90 Woodrow Wilson Center event, “U.S.-Mexico Cooperation in Renewable Energy: Building a Green Agenda,” May
24, 2010.
91 Wood, May 2010.
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Trade Issues92
Trade between Mexico and the United States has tripled since the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States, Mexico, and Canada entered into force in
1994.93 The United States is Mexico’s most important customer by far, receiving about 80% of
Mexico’s exports, including petroleum, automobiles, auto parts, and winter vegetables, and
providing about 50% of Mexico’s imports. The United States is the source of over 60% of foreign
investment in Mexico, and the primary source of important tourism earnings. Mexico is also the
leading country in Latin America in terms of U.S. investment, with the total stock of U.S.
investment reaching more than $120 billion in 2008 before declining in 2009.94
While NAFTA has increased Mexican trade with the United States and contributed to rising
foreign investment in the country, it has also increased Mexico’s dependence on the U.S.
economy. In 2009, U.S. imports from Mexico decreased by 18.5% to $176.3 billion, while U.S.
exports to Mexico decreased by 19.6% to $105.7 billion. U.S. foreign direct investment also fell
significantly in 2009. According to Mexico’s Central Bank, remittances fell from $25.1 billion in
FY2008 to $21.1 billion in 2009. As a result of these trends, coupled by declining tourism
revenues, the Mexican economy contracted by almost 7% in 2009, the worst performance of any
Latin American country. Some have attributed the severity of the crisis in Mexico to a lack of
diversification in the country’s export markets.
Functioning of NAFTA Institutions
Several NAFTA institutions mandated by the agreements have been functioning since 1994. The
tripartite Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC) was established in Montreal,
Canada; and the Commission for Labor Cooperation (CLC) was established in Dallas, Texas. In
addition, the bilateral Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC), located in Ciudad
Juárez, Mexico; and the North American Development Bank (NADBank), headquartered in San
Antonio, Texas, were created to promote and finance environment projects along the U.S.-Mexico
border. Following up on a March 2002 agreement by Presidents Bush and Fox in Monterrey,
Mexico, to broaden the mandate of the NADBank, Congress agreed in March 2004 to permit the
NADBank to make grants and nonmarket rate loans for environmental infrastructure along the
border. The NAFTA institutions have operated to encourage cooperation on trade, environmental
and labor issues, and to consider nongovernmental petitions under the labor and environmental
side agreements.
92 For more information, see CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and
Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
93 The NAFTA agreement was negotiated in 1991 and 1992, and side agreements on labor and environmental matters
were completed in 1993. The agreements were approved by the respective legislatures in late 1993 and went into force
on January 1, 1994. Under the agreements, trade and investment restrictions were eliminated over a 15-year period,
with most restrictions eliminated in the early years of the agreement.
94 U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, Mexico, “U.S.-Mexico at a Glance: Foreign Direct Investment,” June 2009.
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Trade Disputes
Outstanding trade disputes between the countries include access for Mexican trucks to operate in
the United States and access for Mexican tuna to the U.S. market. A longstanding dispute
involving sugar and high fructose corn syrup was resolved in 2006.95
Trucking96
Since 1995, the implementation of NAFTA trucking provisions has been in dispute. In March
2009, Congress included a provision in P.L. 111-8, the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, to
terminate a pilot program that had allowed Mexican-registered trucks to operate beyond the 25-
mile border commercial zone inside the United States. This move prompted retaliation from
Mexico, which argued that the U.S. action was protectionist. Mexico imposed tariffs on over 90
U.S. agricultural and industrial products. The goods accounted for a value of $2.4 billion in U.S.
exports to Mexico in 2007, and most now face Mexican import duties of between 10-20% of their
value, although in the case of fresh grapes, a 45% duty was imposed.97
Obama Administration officials have repeatedly expressed confidence that a resolution to the
current trucking dispute can be found that will satisfy congressional concerns about the safety of
Mexican trucks, but still fulfill U.S. market access obligations under NAFTA. Transportation
Secretary Ray LaHood submitted a set of principles on how to resolve the issue to the White
House in May 2009. President Obama reiterated his commitment to resolving the issue to
President Calderón at their August 9, 2009 meeting in Mexico, but did not present a proposal. The
FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117), signed into law on December 16, 2009,
did not include language that was in P.L. 111-8 prohibiting the Department of Transportation from
funding a pilot project for Mexican-registered trucks to operate beyond the border commercial
zone. In early May 2010, U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk said that the Obama Administration
planned to present a proposal for resolving the trucking dispute during President Calderón’s May
19-20, 2010 state visit. U.S. officials did not unveil a plan during Calderón’s visit.98
Tuna
On tuna issues, the Clinton Administration lifted the embargo on Mexican tuna in April 2000
under relaxed standards for a dolphin-safe label in accordance with internationally agreed
procedures and U.S. legislation passed in 1997 that encouraged the unharmed release of dolphins
from nets. However, a federal judge in San Francisco ruled that the standards of the law had not
been met, and the Federal Appeals Court in San Francisco sustained the ruling in July 2001.
Under the Bush Administration, the Commerce Department ruled on December 31, 2002, that the
dolphin-safe label may be applied if qualified observers certify that no dolphins were killed or
seriously injured in the netting process, but Earth Island Institute and other environmental groups
95 For more information on recent trade disputes, see CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends,
Issues, and Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
96 For further information, see CRS Report RL31738, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
Implementation: The Future of Commercial Trucking Across the Mexican Border, by John Frittelli.
97 Christopher Conkey, Jose de Cordoba, and Jim Carlton, “Mexico Issues Tariff List in U.S. Trucking Dispute,” Wall
Street Journal, March 19, 2009.
98 “No Solution to Mexican Trucking Spat Unveiled During Calderón Visit,” Inside U.S. Trade, May 21, 2010.
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filed suit to block the modification. On April 10, 2003, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California enjoined the Commerce Department from modifying the standards for the
dolphin-safe label. On August 9, 2004, the federal district court ruled against the Bush
Administration’s modification of the dolphin-safe standards, and reinstated the original standards
in the 1990 Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act. That decision was appealed to the
U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled against the Administration in April 2007,
finding that the Department of Commerce did not base its determination on scientific studies of
the effects of Mexican tuna fishing on dolphins.
In late October 2008, Mexico initiated World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute proceedings
against the United States, maintaining that U.S. requirements for Mexican tuna exporters prevents
them from using the U.S. “dolphin-safe” label for its products.99 In April 2009, the WTO agreed
to set up a dispute panel to rule on Mexico’s complaint. The United States prefers that the dispute
should be handled by a NAFTA dispute panel instead of a WTO panel. On November 5, 2009, the
U.S. government announced that it had requested formal dispute settlement consultations under
NAFTA.100
North American Cooperation on Security and Economic Issues
In addition to the increased U.S.-Mexican bilateral cooperation that has occurred during the past
two decades, trilateral cooperation between the United States, Mexico, and Canada has also
increased, particularly since NAFTA took effect. During the second George W. Bush
Administration, annual meetings between the North American leaders and their ministers took
place within the framework of the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) of North America,
established in March of 2005. 101 Through the SPP, which consisted of expanded cooperation and
harmonization of policies, the three governments sought to advance the common security and
prosperity of their countries. To make this partnership operational, the leaders established
ministerial-led working groups to develop measurable and achievable goals in priority areas:
competitiveness, smart and secure borders, energy security and environmental protection, food
and product safety, and emergency response. Beginning in June 2005, the SPP working groups
provided annual reports to the three North American leaders on their work and key
accomplishments, with the last SPP report submitted prior to the April 2008 North American
Leaders’ Summit.
Although President Obama and his counterparts in Mexico and Canada no longer refer to
trilateral cooperation as occurring under the SPP initiative, North American cooperation continues
to occur on a wide range of economic and security issues. As previously discussed, the most
recent North American Leaders’ Summit took place in Guadalajara, Mexico on August 9-10,
2009. In addition to important discussions that occurred with respect to combating drug
trafficking and preparing for the fall flu season, the leaders produced, among other things, a list of
99 “Mexico Initiates WTO Dispute Proceeding Against U.S. ‘Dolphin-Safe’ Label for Tuna,” International Trade
Reporter, October 30, 2008.
100 “U.S. Seeks NAFTA Consultations In Tuna Labeling Dispute With Mexico,” Inside U.S. Trade, November 13,
2009.
101 For more information, see CRS Report RS22701, Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America: An
Overview and Selected Issues, by M. Angeles Villarreal and Jennifer E. Lake; also see the website of the SPP, available
at http://www.spp.gov/.
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energy deliverables aimed at reducing carbon emissions in North America.102 The leaders also
committed to meet again in Canada in 2010.
Legislation in the 111th Congress
Enacted and Considered Legislation
P.L. 111-5 (H.R. 1), American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Signed into law
February 17, 2009, the measure provides $220 million for construction for the water quantity
program of the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico. The
measure also provides $40 million in Department of Justice state and local law enforcement
assistance for competitive grants to provide assistance and equipment along the southern border
and in high-intensity drug trafficking areas to combat criminal narcotics activity, of which $10
million is to be transferred to ATF for Project Gunrunner.
P.L. 111-8 (H.R. 1105), Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009. Signed into law March 11, 2009.
In Division H, the measure appropriates $300 million for Mexico as a second installment under
the Mérida Initiative. Human rights conditions similar to those included in the FY2008
Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-252) apply to 15% of the total funds provided, not
including assistance for judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption, and rule of law
activities. In Division I, Section 136, the measure prohibits funds in the Act from being used for a
pilot program granting certain Mexican trucks access to U.S. highways beyond the commercial
zone. In the joint explanatory statement for Division B, not less than $5 million is provided for
Project Gunrunner and other firearms trafficking efforts targeting Mexico and the border region.
P.L. 111-32 (H.R. 2346), Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009. Signed into law June 24,
2009, the measure appropriates $420 million in Mérida Initiative funding for Mexico: $160
million in INCLE assistance and $260 million in FMF assistance. Of the $420 million in FY2009
supplemental assistance to Mexico, 15% of the $160 million in INCLE assistance is subject to the
same human rights conditions set forth in P.L. 111-8, section 7045(e) of Division H. However, the
FMF funds appropriated are not subject to human rights conditions. According to the conference
report (H.Rept. 111-151), the supplemental measure requires a report from the Secretary of State
within 45 days of enactment of the measure detailing actions by the government of Mexico since
June 30, 2008, to investigate and prosecute human rights violations by members of the Mexican
federal police and military forces. The report also calls for a “thorough, independent, and credible
investigation” of the murder of Bradley Will, an American journalist killed while covering a
protest in Oaxaca in 2006.
P.L. 111-84 (H.R. 2647), National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010. Signed into law
October 28, 2009, the measure contains a provision that allows for the Department of Defense to
continue providing support for counter-drug activities in Mexico.
P.L. 111-117 (H.R. 3288), Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2010, Signed into law
December 16, 2009. In Division F, the measure appropriates up to $210.3 million in Mérida
102 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “North American Leaders’ Declaration on Climate Change and
Clean Energy,” August 10, 2009.
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Initiative funding for Mexico: $190 million in INCLE assistance, $15 million in ESF, and $5.25
million in FMF assistance. Human rights conditions apply to 15% of the total funds provided, not
including assistance for judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption, and rule of law
activities. In the Joint Explanatory Statement to P.L. 111-117, the conferees direct the Secretary of
State to submit a report to within 90 days of the enactment of the Act addressing how prior
Mérida funds have been used, progress to date, any planned adjustments in the uses of funds, and
post-Merida plans. Apart from the Mérida Initiative, the measure includes $10 million in DA
assistance for Mexico. The measure does not include language prohibiting funds appropriated in
the Act from being used for a pilot program granting certain Mexican trucks access to U.S.
highways beyond the commercial zone.
P.L. 111-118 (H.R. 3326), Defense Appropriations Act, FY2010, Signed into law December 19,
2009, the measure appropriates $50 million in funding for counternarcotics communication
equipment for Mexico.
H.Res. 1032 (Chu). Introduced January 21, 2010; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs.
House approved March 9, 2010. The resolution expresses support for continued U.S. assistance to
the Mexican government for fighting drug traffickers and curbing the violence they commit
against Mexican and U.S. citizens.
H.R. 2410 (Berman) Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2010 and FY2011. Introduced
May 14, 2009; House Committee on Foreign Affairs held markup and ordered the bill reported
(H.Rept. 111-136). House approved June 22, 2009. Title IX, Subtitle A of the bill, as introduced,
consists of actions to enhance the Mérida Initiative, including the designation of a high-level
coordinator within the Department of State to implement the program; the addition of Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) countries to the Mérida Initiative; the establishment and
implementation of a program to assess the effectiveness of assistance provided under the Mérida
Initiative; within 180 days and not later than December 1 of each year thereafter, a reporting
requirement regarding the programs and activities carried out under the Mérida Initiative. Title
IX, Subtitle B of the bill would require the President to establish an inter-agency task force on the
prevention of illicit small arms trafficking in the Western Hemisphere; increase penalties for illicit
trafficking in small arms and light weapons; and express congressional support for the ratification
by the United States of the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and
Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA).
H.Amdt. 201 (Peters) to H.R. 2410, introduced and agreed to on June 10, 2009, provides that
the Secretary of State shall report to Congress on the flow of people, goods, and services across
the borders shared by the United States, Canada, Mexico, Bermuda, and the Caribbean nations.
H.R. 4899 (Obey), Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010. Introduced March 21, 2010.
House approved March 24, 2010. Senate approved May 27, 2010. Senate version includes $175
million in assistance for “judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption, and rule of law
activities” in Mexico (under the State Department's INCLE account) and $5 million in funds for
emergency diplomatic security support in Mexico (under the State DC&P account).
S.Res. 535 (Dodd). Introduced May 19, 2010. Senate approved May 19, 2010. The resolution
honors President of Mexico, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, for his service to the people of Mexico,
and welcomes him to the United States.
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Additional Legislative Initiatives
H.Res. 258 (Giffords)/S.Res. 72 (Menendez). H.Res. 258 introduced March 18, 2009; referred
to Committee on Foreign Affairs. S.Res. 72 introduced March 10, 2009; referred to Committee on
Foreign Relations. The identical resolutions would express full support for Mexico’s efforts to
confront drug trafficking organizations, apprehend their members, and bring them to justice. The
resolutions would also call on the Department of State to ensure the prompt delivery of Mérida
Initiative equipment and training and to ensure full accountability for all assistance and
equipment provided by the United States to Mexico.
H.Res. 273 (Poe). Introduced May 4, 2010; referred to Committee on Armed Services. The
resolution would express the sense of the Congress that violence along the U.S.-Mexico border is
a national security threat to the United States and that the Administration should deploy National
Guard troops to the border region.
H.R. 495 (Rodriguez)/S. 205 (Bingaman), Southwest Border Violence Reduction Act of 2009.
H.R. 495 introduced January 14, 2009; referred to the Committee on the Judiciary and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs. S. 205 introduced January 12, 2009; referred to the Committee on
the Judiciary. Both bills would direct the Attorney General to expand the resources provided for
the Project Gunrunner initiative of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives to
identify, investigate, and prosecute individuals involved in the trafficking of firearms across the
international border between the United States and Mexico.
H.R. 937 (Filner), Visitors Interested in Strengthening America (VISA) Act of 2009.
Introduced February 10, 2009; referred to Committee on the Judiciary. The bill would waive
certain entry documentary requirements for a non-immigrant child (unmarried and under the age
of 16) who is a citizen or national of Mexico and accompanying parent or adult chaperone in
instances of medical visits, student groups, and/or special community events.
H.R. 1437 (Cuellar), Southern Border Security Task Force Act of 2009. Introduced March 11,
2009; referred to Committees on Homeland Security and the Judiciary. Would establish a task
force to coordinate the efforts of federal, state, and local border law enforcement officials and
task forces to protect U.S. border cites and communities from violence associated with drug
trafficking, gunrunning, illegal alien smuggling, violence, and kidnapping along and across the
international border between the United States and Mexico.
H.R. 1448 (Rodriguez), Border Reinforcement and Violence Reduction Act of 2009.
Introduced March 11, 2009; referred to Committees on the Judiciary, Homeland Security, and
Foreign Affairs. The bill would authorize the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney
General to increase resources to identify and eliminate illicit sources of firearms smuggled into
Mexico for use by violent drug trafficking organizations and for other unlawful activities by
providing for border security grants to local law enforcement agencies and reinforcing Federal
resources on the border. It would authorize: $150 million for FY2010 and each succeeding fiscal
year to the Secretary of Homeland Security for a border relief grant program; $9.5 million for
each of FY2010 and FY2011 for Project Gunrunner (an ATF program) and $15 million for each
of FY2010 and FY2011 for Operation Armas Cruzadas (an ICE program).
H.R. 2076 (Grijalva), Border Security and Responsibility Act 2009. Introduced April 23,
2009; referred to Committees on Homeland Security, Armed Services, and Agriculture. The bill
would require the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with other federal, state and
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local authorities, to submit a new border protection strategy to Congress that, among other
measures, would not involve the construction of border fencing.
H.R. 2083 (Hunter), Border Sovereignty and Protection Act. Introduced April 23, 2009;
referred to Committees on the Judiciary, Homeland Security, and Education and Labor. The bill
would require the completion of at least 350 miles of reinforced fencing along the southwest
border within one year of the enactment of the measure.
H.R. 3239 (Kirkpatrick) Introduced July 16, 2009; referred to Committees on Homeland
Security and Foreign Affairs. House Committee on Homeland Security ordered the bill reported
March 9, 2010. The bill would require the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with
the Secretary of State, to submit a report on the effects of the Mérida Initiative on the border
security of the United States.
H.R. 3252 (Hinojosa). Introduced July 17, 2009; referred to Committee on Financial Services.
The bill would authorize the President to agree to an amendment to the agreement between the
U.S. and Mexican governments to expand the purposes and functions of the Border Environment
Cooperation Commission and the North American Development Bank to allow the Commission
to certify, and the Bank to finance, any type of border infrastructure project.
H.R. 3308 (Schuler)/S. 1505 (Pryor), Secure America Through Enforcement and
Verification Act of 2009 or SAVE Act of 2009. Introduced July 23, 2009; referred to
Committees on Homeland Security, the Judiciary, Ways and Means, Education and Labor,
Oversight and Government Reform, Armed Services, Agriculture, and Natural Resources. The
bill sets forth a wide range of border security and enforcement provisions.
H.R. 4321 (Ortiz) Comprehensive Immigration Reform for America's Security and
Prosperity Act of 2009, CIR ASAP Act of 2009. Introduced December 15, 2009; referred to
Committees on the Judiciary, Homeland Security, Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, Natural
Resources, Ways and Means, Education and Labor, Oversight and Government Reform, and
Administration. The bill contains both border enforcement and legalization provisions and would
attempt to address visa backlogs in the current immigration system.
H.R. 4759 (Taylor). Introduced March 4, 2010; referred to Committee on Ways and Means. The
bill would provide for the withdrawal of the United States from the North American Free Trade
Agreement and would direct the President of the United States to provide the governments of
Canada and Mexico with written notice of withdrawal.
H.R. 4966 (Giffords) Stored Value Device Registration and Reporting Act of 2010.
Introduced April 22, 2010; referred to Committee on Financial Services. The bill would impose
new regulations on stored-value devices, a money-transfer mechanism that has been used by
Mexican drug trafficking organizations to launder money.
H.R. 5173 (Tiahrt) Secure the Border Act of 2010. Introduced April 28, 2010; referred to
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism on May 5, 2010. The bill would
amend the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 to require the
Secretary of Homeland Security to construct two layers of reinforced fencing along the entire
international land border between the United States and Mexico, in addition to providing for the
installation of additional physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors along the entire
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length of the international border between the United States and Mexico and the United States
and Canada within two years.
H.R. 5357 (Mitchell). Introduced May 20, 2010; referred to Committee on Armed Services. The
bill would provide for the deployment of additional National Guard troops along the U.S.-Mexico
border to support the border control activities of CBP and DHS.
S. 91 (Vitter). Introduced January 6, 2009; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations. The bill
would reduce the amount of financial assistance provided to the government of Mexico in
response to the illegal border crossing from Mexico into the United States.
S. 339 (Bingaman), Border Law Enforcement Relief Act of 2009. Introduced January 28,
2009; referred to Committee on the Judiciary. The bill would provide financial aid to local law
enforcement officials along the nation’s borders. It would authorize $100 million for each of
FY2010 through FY2014 for a border relief grant program run by the Attorney General.
S. 1190 (Bingaman), Border Law Enforcement Anti-Drug Trafficking Act of 2009.
Introduced June 4, 2009; referred to Committee on the Judiciary. The bill, related to S. 339,
would authorize the Attorney General to award competitive grants to local law enforcement
agencies and institutions of higher education for combating drug-related criminal activity.
S. 3273 (Cornyn) Southern Border Security Assistance Act. Introduced April 28, 2010,
referred to Committee on the Judiciary. The bill would authorize the Secretary of Homeland
Security to award border security assistance grants to law enforcement entities located in the
Southern Border Region to address drug trafficking, smuggling, and border violence and direct
the President to appoint additional district judges for Arizona, California, New Mexico, and
Texas.
S. 3332 (McCain) Border Security Enforcement Act of 2010. Introduced May 7, 2010; referred
to Committees on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. The bill would direct the
Secretary of Homeland Security to implement a comprehensive border security plan to combat
illegal immigration, drug and alien smuggling, and violent activity along the southwest border of
the United States, particularly in the Tucson and Yuma sectors of Arizona.
Author Contact Information
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
cseelke@crs.loc.gov, 7-5229
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Acknowledgments
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, June S. Beittel, Analyst in Latin American Affairs,
and Jessica Krowsoski, a CRS Research Associate, contributed to this report.
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