U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement: Issues for Congress
Mary Beth Nikitin
Analyst in Nonproliferation
May 28, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL34655
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress
Summary
The United States and Russia signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement on May 6, 2008.
President Bush submitted the agreement to Congress on May 13. The agreement was withdrawn
from congressional consideration by President George W. Bush on September 8, 2008, in
response to Russia’s military actions in Georgia. President Obama transmitted the proposed text
of the agreement to Congress on May 10, 2010, along with the required Nuclear Proliferation
Assessment (NPAS) and his determination that the agreement promotes U.S. national security.
Congress has 30 days of continuous session for consultations with the administration, followed
by an additional 60 days of continuous session to review the agreement. If not opposed by a joint
resolution of disapproval or other legislation, then the agreement will be considered approved at
the end of this time period.
This report discusses key policy issues related to the agreement, including future nuclear energy
cooperation with Russia, U.S.-Russian bilateral relations, nonproliferation cooperation, and
Russian policies toward Iran. These issues were also relevant to the debate when the agreement
was being considered in the 110th Congress.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
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U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress
Contents
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
Congressional Consideration................................................................................................. 3
Legislation in the 110th Congress..................................................................................... 3
Legislation in the 111th Congress ..................................................................................... 5
Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation Cooperation ...................................................................... 6
Nuclear Liability ................................................................................................................... 8
U.S.-Russian Relations................................................................................................................ 9
Russian Policy Toward Iran....................................................................................................... 10
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 12
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U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress
n May 10, 2010, President Obama transmitted the proposed text of the U.S.-Russian
civilian nuclear cooperation agreement to Congress for approval, along with the required
O Nuclear Proliferation Assessment (NPAS) and his determination that the agreement
promotes U.S. national security. The annexed classified NPAS was to be submitted separately.
The agreement was signed by the two countries in Moscow on May 6, 2008. President George W.
Bush first submitted it to Congress on May 13, 2008,1 but in September 2008 rescinded the
national security determination following Russian military actions in the Republic of Georgia.
This had the effect of removing the agreement from congressional consideration. President
Obama stated his commitment to seeing the agreement enter into force in summit statements with
Russian President Medvedev in April and July 2009. President Obama’s May 10, 2010, letter of
transmittal says that the situation in Georgia is no longer an obstacle and that “the level and scope
of U.S.-Russian cooperation on Iran are sufficient to justify resubmitting the proposed
agreement.”2
According to President Obama’s letter, the agreement meets all the terms of the Atomic Energy
Act3 and therefore does not require any exemptions from the law’s requirements. Therefore, the
agreement will enter into effect after a 30-day consultation period and a review period of 60 days
of continuous session4 unless Congress enacts a joint resolution of disapproval. Congress also has
the option of adopting either a joint resolution of approval with (or without) conditions, or
standalone legislation that could approve or disapprove the agreement.5
The agreement would permit the export, subject to licensing, of technology, material, equipment,
and components for nuclear research and nuclear power production. The agreement would not
permit transfer of restricted data. The agreement need to be amended before any transfer of
sensitive nuclear technology, sensitive nuclear facilities, and major critical components of those
facilities. The parties would also need to agree to reprocessing of material transferred under the
agreement. Some limited enrichment and blending or down-blending for LEU fuel production
would be permitted.
Background
Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.) governs
significant nuclear cooperation between the United States and other states.6 The United States has
agreements for civil nuclear cooperation in place with almost 50 countries. Such agreements,
1 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/05/20080513-1.html.
2 Message from the President regarding a Peaceful Nuclear Agreement with Russia, May 10, 2010,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/message-president-regarding-a-peaceful-nuclear-agreement-with-russia
3 Under section 123.a., codified at 42 U.S.C. 2153(a)), Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (1946), as
amended.
4 Days on which either House is in a recess of more than three days (pursuant to a concurrent resolution authorizing the
recess) do not count toward the total. If Congress adjourns its session sine die, continuity is broken, and the count starts
anew when it reconvenes.
5 See CRS Report RL34541, Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with Russia: Statutory Procedures for Congressional
Consideration and Their Implementation, by Richard S. Beth.
6 Nuclear cooperation includes the distribution of special nuclear material, source material, and byproduct material, to
licensing for commercial, medical, and industrial purposes. These terms, “special nuclear material,” “source material,”
and “byproduct material,” as well as other terms used in the statute, are defined in 42 U.S.C. §2014. See also CRS
Report RS22937, Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin.
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known as “123 agreements,” provide the framework and authorization for cooperation, but do not
guarantee certain exports, technology, or material. Before significant nuclear exports7 can occur,
the State Department, with the advice of the Department of Energy, negotiates an agreement,
which must meet criteria listed in Section 123.a., (1) through (9), 42 U.S.C. 2151.8 Russia is the
only NPT-recognized nuclear weapon state and the only major nuclear energy producer with
whom the United States does not yet have a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. In the case of
the agreement with China, Members of Congress attached conditions to a joint resolution of
approval of the agreement, based on concerns, among others, that China was exporting materials
and equipment relevant for nuclear weapons development to non-nuclear weapon states.9
Cooperation between the United States and Russia on civilian nuclear energy is not new, but the
level has fluctuated depending on broader political developments. The United States and the
Soviet Union concluded a limited 10-year agreement for nuclear cooperation in 1973 to allow for
cooperation in controlled thermonuclear fusion, fast breeder reactors, and fundamental research.
The 1973 agreement also established a Joint Committee on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy that was to meet annually. This agreement was extended in 1983 and in 1988, and
exchanges on safety practices significantly increased after the 1986 Chernobyl power plant
accident. The two superpowers convened a Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian Reactor
Safety starting in 1988.10
After the fall of the Soviet Union and prior to July 2006, Moscow’s nuclear commerce with Iran
presented the chief obstacle to concluding a broad U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation under
section 123. Project-specific agreements were concluded throughout this period. Several factors
may have contributed to the shift in U.S. policy under the George W. Bush administration: a
tougher line by Moscow since 2003 with respect to Iran, especially Russia’s agreement with Iran
to take back spent nuclear fuel from the Russian-built Bushehr reactor; President Bush’s embrace
of nuclear power as an alternative to reliance on hydrocarbons; President Bush’s proposals to
multi-lateralize the nuclear fuel cycle and develop proliferation-resistant technologies through the
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP); and Russia’s own proposals to host an international
fuel center that would store and reprocess spent fuel and enrich uranium for fresh fuel.
Under the Obama Administration, officials have expressed support for the nuclear cooperation
agreement with Russia, but were waiting for the “appropriate time” to submit the agreement to
Congress.11 President Obama’s letter of May 10, 2010, outlines ways in which the current
administration sees this agreement as being beneficial for U.S. interests, primarily in that it would
contribute to “the growth of clean, safe and secure nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.” The
7 Significant nuclear cooperation includes the physical transfer of reactors, reactor components, or special nuclear
material, source material, and byproduct material, under license for commercial, medical, and industrial purposes.
8 The Atomic Energy Act also sets out procedures for licensing exports to states with whom the United States has
nuclear cooperation agreements. (Sections 126, 127, and 128 codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 2155, 2156, 2157.)
Even with a 123 agreement in place, each export of nuclear material, equipment, or technology requires a specific
export license or other authorization.
9 See P.L. 99-183 and CRS Report RL33192, U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, coordinated by Shirley A.
Kan.
10 CRS Report 89-671, U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Energy Cooperation: Time for a Full Scope Agreement? by Warren H.
Donnelly (out of print; available from the author upon request).
11 Hearing of the Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, “The
Future of U.S. International Nuclear Cooperation,” May 6, 2010.
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letter cites several areas of recent “progress” in cooperation between the United States and
Russia:
• Russian support for a new United Nations Security Council Resolution on Iran.
• Signature on April 8, 2010, of the New START Treaty that would reduce the
number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons.12
• Signature on April 13, 2010, of the Protocol to amend the 2000 U.S. Russian
Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, which will dispose of at
least 34 metric tons of excess weapons plutonium in each country.
• Russia’s establishment of an international nuclear fuel reserve in Angarsk.
• Continued joint support for the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
Congressional Consideration
Congressional debate over the agreement in the past has focused on several key issues: the nature
of Russian-Iranian cooperation, the impact of a U.S.-Russian agreement on the future of nuclear
fuel cycle policies, and the impact of the agreement on bilateral relations including nuclear
nonproliferation cooperation. While some view the agreement as promoting bilateral cooperation
on U.S. nonproliferation goals and as a recognition of recent Russian cooperation, others believe
the United States could gain leverage on negotiations with Russia on Iran and other matters by
delaying approval of the agreement.
Legislation in the 110th Congress
Even before the crisis in the Republic of Georgia in August 2008, approval of a US-Russia 123
agreement by Congress was not certain. Legislation both supporting and opposing the agreement
was introduced in the 110th Congress:
• Representative Edward Markey on May 14, 2008, introduced H.J.Res. 85
expressing disfavor of the agreement.
• On June 24, 2008, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Joseph
Biden and Senator Richard Lugar submitted a joint resolution of approval,
S.J.Res. 42. It was discharged from committee but indefinitely postponed by
unanimous consent in September 2008.
• Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Howard Berman and
Ranking Member Ileana Ros-Lehtinen introduced a resolution of disapproval,
H.J.Res. 95, on June 24, 2008.
• The House Committee on Foreign Affairs reported H.R. 657413 on July 23, 2008.
This bill would have approved the U.S.-Russia 123 agreement, notwithstanding
the AEA, with certain conditions. Under this resolution, no license could be
issued for the export of nuclear material, equipment, or technology to Russia
unless the President certified to Congress that Russia (1) is not transferring
12 CRS Report R41219, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions, by Amy F. Woolf
13 The United States-Russian Federation Nuclear Cooperation Agreement Act of 2008.
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sensitive nuclear, biological- or chemical-weapons-related, ballistic or cruise
missile technologies, goods, or services to Iran; (2) is cooperating with the
United States on international sanctions on Iran; and (3) had ratified appropriate
nuclear liability conventions or enacted domestic laws to protect U.S. firms.
In response to Russian actions in August over the conflict in Georgia, some members of Congress
called on the Bush administration to withdraw the agreement from congressional consideration.14
There was no precedent for the President withdrawing a 123 from congressional consideration,
and the Atomic Energy Act does not specify procedures for doing so. On September 8, 2008, the
Secretary of State issued a statement saying that the President would notify Congress that “he has
today rescinded his prior determination” regarding the agreement and therefore there is no basis
for Congress to consider it. Secretary Rice states that “the U.S. nonproliferation goals contained
in the proposed Agreement remain valid: to provide a sound basis for U.S.-Russian civil nuclear
cooperation, create commercial opportunities, and enhance cooperation with Russia on important
global nonproliferation issues.” She expresses regret for the decision but says that “unfortunately,
given the current environment, the time is not right for this agreement.”15 In his message to
Congress, President Bush wrote that this decision is “in view of recent actions by the Government
of the Russian Federation incompatible with peaceful relations with its sovereign and democratic
neighbor Georgia.” In the original determination of May 5, 2008 (Presidential Determination
2008-19), the President determined that the agreement will promote and will not pose an
unreasonable risk “to the common defense and security.”16 The President’s message of September
8 says this determination “is no longer effective.” It also says that “if circumstances should permit
future reconsideration of the proposed Agreement, a new determination will be made and the
proposed Agreement will be submitted for congressional review pursuant to section 123 of the
Act.”17
Additional legislation proposed in the 110th Congress focused on Iran’s nuclear programs and also
sought to condition nuclear cooperation with Russia. The Iran Counter-Proliferation Act of 2007
(H.R. 1400), passed by the House, would prohibit any “agreement for cooperation between the
United States and the government of any country that is assisting the nuclear program of Iran or
transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles to Iran.” Similarly, S. 970 specifically
would have prohibited a 123 agreement with Russia until “Russia has suspended all nuclear
assistance to Iran and all transfers of advanced conventional weapons and missiles to Iran” or
“Iran has completely, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantled all nuclear enrichment-related and
reprocessing-related programs.”
The Iran Sanctions Act of 2008 (S. 3227) included a prohibition on entering into a nuclear
cooperation agreement with Russia or granting licenses for the direct or indirect export or the
direct or indirect transfer of nuclear-related goods, services, or technologies to Russia until certain
14 For example, House Foreign Affairs Committee Republicans press release, August 19, 2008,
http://foreignaffairs.republicans.house.gov/list/press/foreignaffairs_rep/081908123.shtml, and Joseph Biden, “Op-Ed:
Russia Must Stand Down,” The Financial Times, August 12, 2008.
15 Statement on U.S.-Russia 123 Agreement, September 8, 2008, at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/09/
109256.htm.
16 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/05/20080506-4.html.
17 Message to the Congress of the United States, September 8, 2008, at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
news/releases/2008/09/20080908-3.html.
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presidential certifications are made. S. 3227 was reported out of the Senate Finance Committee
on July 7, 2008, but was not passed by the full Senate.
The Security through Termination of Proliferation Act of 2008 (H.R. 6178, introduced on June 4,
2008) included similar provisions, including that a nuclear cooperation agreement with a country
proliferating to Iran, North Korea, or Syria may not enter into force. These bills, as well as letters
sent to the President from Members of Congress after submittal of the 123 agreement to the
Congress, showed a linkage between Russia’s policies toward Iran and support for a bilateral
civilian nuclear accord in Congress.
The 2008 Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS)
In 2008, some Members of Congress raised concerns about the information contained in the
Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS). The NPAS is described in section 123.a. (42
U.S.C. 2153(a)) and is required part of a 123 agreement package for Congress. An unclassified
NPAS is submitted along with the proposed text of the agreement, and a classified annex is
submitted separately. The NPAS is to be prepared by the State Department in consultation with
the Director of National Intelligence. Its purpose is to explain how the agreement meets the AEA
nonproliferation requirements. The unclassified NPAS usually includes an overview of the
country’s nuclear energy program and related infrastructure, nuclear weapons program (if
relevant), nonproliferation policies, and relations with third countries of concern in the nuclear
arena.
Some Members of Congress were concerned that the 2008 NPAS for the US-Russia 123
agreement excluded information regarding nuclear trade between Russia and Iran. This prompted
then-Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee John Dingell and Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigations Chairman Bart Stupak to request that the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) evaluate the inter-agency process for development of U.S.-Russia
NPAS, whether the NPAS conclusions were supported, and whether any information was omitted
that might change these conclusions.18 The GAO also lists Chairman Henry Waxman and
Representative Edward Markey as report requesters. The GAO issued its report in July 2009.19
The findings were related primarily to the inter-agency review process and recommended that the
State Department should clarify interagency roles, allow adequate time for review by the
intelligence community and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and establish written
procedures for development and review of 123 agreements and associated documents.
Legislation in the 111th Congress
Upon the Obama administration’s transmittal of the agreement to Congress in 2010, Chairman of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee Howard Berman said that the top nonproliferation policy
priority should be preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons and that “at the appropriate
time, we will examine the agreement more fully.”20 On May 21, 2010, Representative Edward
18 http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_110/110-ltr.052208.GAO.123.ltr.pdf
19 “U.S.-Russia Nuclear Agreement: Interagency Process Used to Develop the Classified Nuclear Proliferation
Assessment Needs To Be Strengthened,” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09743r.pdf
20 “Chairman Berman responds to Administration’s U.S.-Russia nuclear proposal,” House Committee on Foreign
Affairs Press Release, May 11, 2010.
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Markey and co-sponsor Representative Jeff Fortenberry introduced a joint resolution (H.J.Res.
85) expressing disfavor of the agreement.
The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2009 (H.R. 2194) is
currently in conference. The House version of the bill, passed in December 2009, would amend
section 5(b) of the Iran Support Act by adding an additional restriction. It says that no 123
agreement may be submitted or enter into force, and no export license subject to a 123 agreement
may be issued, with a country that has jurisdiction over a person that is engaged in sanctioned
activities related to the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons or related technologies or
of missiles or other advanced conventional weapons that are capable of delivering a nuclear
weapon. The President may waive this by making a determination and notification to the
appropriate congressional committees that the government has taken effective actions to penalize
the person and “prevent a reoccurrence of such activity in the future.” The House Report on the
bill (H.Rept. 111-342) states that “the Committee believes that a country that is, as a matter of
policy or through willful inaction, allowing its citizens or companies to provide equipment,
technology or materials to Iran that make a material contribution to its nuclear capabilities should
not at the same time benefit from nuclear cooperation with the United States.”
Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation Cooperation
The United States and Russia currently cooperate on a variety of nuclear nonproliferation and
nuclear energy initiatives, under ad hoc agreements. While this cooperation is focused primarily
on nuclear nonproliferation measures, in recent years the United States and Russia have explored
ways to develop civilian nuclear energy cooperation. Presidents Bush and Putin in July 2006
established a working group21 whose report defined an Action Plan for cooperation that led to the
bilateral Presidential Declaration on Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation of July 3, 2007.22 The
working group discussions also contributed to conclusion of a draft agreement on civilian nuclear
cooperation in spring 2007. U.S. officials have stated that a 123 agreement is needed to
implement this action plan—for example, full scale technical cooperation on fast reactors and
demonstration of advanced spent fuel processing and waste management technologies.23
In an effort to continue this process and as part of the Obama administrations “reset” of relations
with Russia, in July 2009 Presidents Obama and Medvedev established a Bilateral Presidential
Commission that included a Working Group on Nuclear Energy and Security chaired by Sergei V.
Kiriyenko, Head of Rosatom, and Daniel Poneman, Deputy Secretary of Energy. The July 2009
Joint Statement reaffirmed their intention to bring a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement into
force and said that the two countries would focus on
• development of prospective and innovative nuclear energy systems;
21 “Joint Working Group on the Development of a Bilateral Action Plan to Enhance Global and Bilateral Nuclear
Energy Cooperation,” at http://www.doe.gov/news/4553.htm.
22 Text of Declaration on Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation Joint Actions, July 3, 2007, at
http://moscow.usembassy.gov/st_07032007.html.
23 This effort would be part of GNEP and the multi-nation Generation IV initiative to develop the next generation of
civil nuclear power reactors. Collaboration may also take place under the rubric of the IAEA International Project on
Innovative Nuclear Rectors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO).
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• research into methods and mechanisms for the provision of reliable nuclear fuel
cycle services;
• research into international approaches for the establishment of nuclear fuel cycle
services to secure the nuclear weapons nonproliferation regime; and
• improvement of the international safeguards system.
The working group agreed on an Action Plan for nuclear security and civil nuclear energy
cooperation in September 2009. A commission report said that the working group identified
research and development areas for collaboration and is working on a “new fuel services
framework.”24
Proponents of a 123 agreement with Russia argue that future cooperation under such an
agreement could include development of advanced nuclear fuel cycle technologies and a future
generation of proliferation-resistant reactors25 through joint commercial partnerships. A common
argument in favor of the agreement is that the United States could gain from Russian advanced
fuel cycle research and development experience. Because the United States does not operate fast
neutron reactors or reprocess, testing of fuels could be done in Russia, including post-irradiation
examination. Supporters argue that U.S. partnership in developing these technologies could help
ensure that proliferation resistance remains a priority. On the other hand, critics point out that the
agreement risks entrenching a policy of accepting reprocessing as a necessary part of the future of
nuclear energy (although a future administration and Congress would always have the ability to
guide the pace and direction of these developments).
A 123 agreement could provide Russia with access to U.S. nuclear technologies and markets, the
right to receive U.S.-origin nuclear materials into Russia for storage or processing, and an
improved international image for its nuclear industry. Some argue that the agreement might be
construed as U.S. approval for Russia’s civilian nuclear industry, thereby enabling Moscow to
conclude similar agreements with other countries. Some have criticized the agreement on this
basis—that safety and environmental problems with the Russian nuclear industry remain and
therefore it would be premature to give approval until these problems were remedied. Others
counter that only through such an agreement will U.S. safety technology and standards be
available to Russia. Russia could potentially expand its reach into new nuclear power markets by
adding U.S. safety and automated control systems to its exported reactors, or partnering with U.S.
multinationals. Russia could also potentially improve the operational efficiency of its own
reactors with U.S. technology.26
The United States and Russia both promote a future global nuclear energy framework that
addresses emerging nuclear energy states’ fuel needs while dissuading them from pursuing
indigenous enrichment and reprocessing technologies. This includes a “cradle to grave” approach
to nuclear fuel. As part of this effort, recent Russian nuclear power plant exports, such as with
24 “Joint Statement by the U.S. - Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission Coordinators on Commission Progress,”
December 31, 2009, http://moscow.usembassy.gov/st_123109.html.
25 “Proliferation-resistant” generally refers to reactors or fuel cycle technologies specifically developed to make it more
difficult to divert material for weapons use, and can sometimes refer to reprocessing technology that would not result in
separated plutonium.
26 For a detailed description of advantages of a U.S.-Russia 123 agreement for Russian nuclear industry, see Anton
Khlopkov, “What Will a Nuclear Agreement with the United States Bring Russia?” Security Index, No. 2 (82), Volume
13.
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Turkey, are a “package deal” that would include construction, operation, fuel services, and spent
fuel return.27 Broader proposals to discourage new states from building fuel cycle facilities
include the development of multilateral fuel assurances and international fuel service centers.28
For this purpose, Russia has set up the joint venture International Uranium Enrichment Center at
Angarsk, which is under international safeguards. An international LEU fuel reserve will also be
hosted at the site. Proponents of the agreement say that collaboration between the United States
and Russia on providing nuclear fuel cycle services to nonnuclear weapon states could increase
the confidence of customer states and therefore increase participation.
Experts and policy makers have also been exploring what role Russia could play in addressing the
issue of nuclear waste and spent fuel disposition. Some have proposed that a 123 agreement with
Russia could open the possibility of reprocessing U.S.-origin spent fuel from third countries
(although Russia has not yet decided to do this) or long-term spent fuel storage of such material
in Russia.29 The enrichment of U.S.-obligated reprocessed uranium, and the re-enrichment of U.S.
uranium tails or U.S.-origin tails, using Russian enrichment facilities, could likewise occur only if
a 123 agreement was in force.30 Under Article 9 of the proposed agreement, conversion and
enrichment to less than 20%, fabrication of LEU fuel, irradiation, blending, or down-blending to
LEU would be permitted under the agreement. The parties would have to agree to reprocessing of
U.S.-origin spent fuel before this occurred.
Analysts also discuss the possibility of Russia establishing an International Spent Fuel Storage
Facility (ISFSF) that could accept U.S.-origin spent fuel, for example from Taiwan or South
Korea, or as part of a Russian fuel leasing and return program for future nuclear power plants
abroad.31 The U.S. may encourage an ISFSF in Russia as a way to prevent countries from
pursuing reprocessing technologies. The Russian Duma passed a law in 2001 allowing for Russia
to accept foreign spent fuel imports, but because of public opposition, Russian officials have
stated that Russia does not now plan to import non-Russian-origin spent fuel for storage. Russia
currently imports Russian-origin spent fuel for storage.
Nuclear Liability
Nuclear liability coverage for U.S. companies doing business in Russia is a key factor for
implementation of a U.S.-Russia section 123 agreement. The Russian Federation has been party
to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage since 2005. However, Rosatom
Corporation enjoys sovereign immunity as a partially state-owned enterprise. Russia has not yet
signed or ratified the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC).32
27 “Akkuyuu plant construction to begin in 2011, says Turkish energy ministry,” Platts Nucleonics Week, May 27,
2010.
28 See CRS Report RL34234, Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy Implications of Expanding Global Access to
Nuclear Power, coordinated by Mary Beth Nikitin.
29 According to the Atomic Energy Act, this would be considered a subsequent arrangement, under Section 131.
30 Import of tailings to Russia from European countries was halted in 2007 because of public protest and environmental
concerns. “Russia quits uranium tailings imports over safety concerns,” RIA Novosti, June 22, 2007. Existing contracts
will be fulfilled (two with URENCO until 2009; two with EURODIF until 2014).
31 “Analysis: Storage needs for nuclear growth,” UPI Energy, May 6, 2008.
32 The United States’ ratification of the CSC came into effect on May 21, 2008. The CSC has not yet entered into force.
Article XX.1 of the CSC states that it “shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the date on which at least 5
States with a minimum of 400,000 units of installed nuclear capacity have deposited an instrument referred to in Article
XVIII.” Thirteen countries have signed the CSC, but only four have ratified it.
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Currently, ad hoc bilateral agreements with liability coverage are in place for U.S. safety and
nonproliferation assistance programs. Some U.S. companies have stated that they would need
Russia ratify the CSC or adopt domestic laws that would provide liability protection for U.S.
firms before doing business in Russia. In a 2003 letter to the Bush Administration, the
Contractors International Group on Nuclear Liability (CIGNL) wrote that “the various bilateral
and multilateral indemnity agreements that have been concluded to date are not considered to
provide adequate nuclear liability protection by most large, well-capitalized U.S. companies.”33
As cited above, the proposed legislation reported out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee
(H.R. 6574) in 2008 would have approved the agreement with conditions that included the
stipulation that Russia would have to ratify appropriate nuclear liability conventions or enact
domestic laws to protect U.S. firms before a license under the agreement could be issued.
U.S.-Russian Relations34
The main focus of U.S.-Russia relations over the past year has been the negotiation of a follow-on
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.35 However, Presidents Obama and Medvedev set up a process
to review engagement in many sectors, as part of a “reset.” The NATO-Russia Council resumed
its meetings in April 2009, and in July 2009, the Russian President announced that Russia would
grant supply rights to NATO forces in Afghanistan overland and in Russian airspace. Differences
remain over a number of foreign policy issues, particularly Russian military bases in and
diplomatic recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, characteristics of future missile defense
systems in Eastern Europe, the expansion of NATO and how to deal with the Iranian nuclear
program. In this context, some argue that expanding cooperation with Russia on civilian nuclear
energy is premature. Others argue that nonproliferation, nuclear terrorism prevention, and nuclear
energy may have particular value for the bilateral relationship in this context, and that a 123
agreement could be used to influence Russian policies.36
U.S. Ambassador Burns remarked at the May 2008 signing ceremony that the 123 agreement
marks Washington and Moscow’s transition from “nuclear rivals” to “nuclear partners.” Although
a 123 agreement will not itself stipulate new programs or collaborative projects, it may have
symbolic value and remove a longtime irritant in bilateral relations. Supporters argue that
rejecting the agreement could embolden anti-U.S. sentiment and be counter-productive to
cooperation in other areas. Critics counter that its symbolic value is a reason not to enact it at this
time—it could be viewed as a reward for a Russian government that critics view as
antidemocratic and repressive, and whose foreign policy often has been at odds with U.S.
interests. President Bush’s rescission of the national security determination as related to the
proposed 123 agreement in 2008 following Russian military actions in Georgia clearly
demonstrated the possibility of other foreign policy priorities overshadowing U.S.-Russian
nuclear energy cooperation.
33 See letter from the Contractors International Group on Nuclear Liability of December 18, 2003, annexed to the
testimony of Henry Sokolski to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, June 12, 2008, at
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/sok061208.pdf.
34 See also CRS Report RL33407, Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests, coordinated by
Jim Nichol.
35 CRS Report R41219, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions, by Amy F. Woolf.
36 Richard Lugar and Sam Nunn, “Help Russia Help Us,” New York Times, May 30, 2008, at http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/05/30/opinion/30lugar.html?th&emc=th.
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U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress
Russian Policy Toward Iran
During the Clinton Administration and the early Bush Administration, the United States had a
policy not to conclude a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia while it was building
a nuclear power reactor for Iran at Bushehr. After details about Iran’s clandestine nuclear
activities came to light during 2002-2006, Russia began to step up cooperation with the United
States and other countries negotiating with Iran over its nuclear program. Russia has insisted on
IAEA safeguards on any transfers to Iran’s civilian nuclear reactor at Bushehr. The 2005 Russian-
Iranian agreement on fuel supply for Bushehr requires the return of spent fuel to Russia, in order
to prevent Iran from extracting plutonium from the spent fuel. Moscow also invited Tehran to
participate in its newly established international uranium enrichment center at Angarsk, as an
alternative to an indigenous Iranian enrichment capability—an offer that Iran has rejected. The
Bush administration supported this approach and since 2002 no longer objected to Russia’s
building the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran. The Bush and Obama administrations viewed
the Russian provision and take-back of nuclear fuel for the Bushehr reactor as demonstrating that
it is possible for Iran to have access to nuclear energy without developing its own fuel cycle.37
Russia has generally been only reluctantly supportive of U.N. Security Council Resolutions
(UNSCRs) imposing sanctions on Iran, preferring a primarily diplomatic solution to the crisis.
However, President Putin signed decrees to fully implement UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803 in
2008,38 and Russia also supported UNSCR 1835. In 2009, Russia and the United States worked
closely on proposals to supply the Tehran Research Reactor with fuel.39 In May 2010, Russia
announced its support for a new UN Security Council sanctions resolution, an objective of the
Obama administration. In general, analysts argue that Russian and American views about the
nature of the Iranian nuclear program have come closer in recent years, particularly following the
revelation in September 2009 of the enrichment facility being built at Qom.
Continued questions about the nature and extent of Russian cooperation with Iran remain a
potential obstacle to future approval of the 123 agreement by Congress. The 2006 Iran Freedom
Support Act (P.L. 109-293) stated the sense of Congress that no nuclear cooperation agreement
should be entered into with a country that is assisting the nuclear program of Iran. As noted
above, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2009 (H.R.
2194) would amend the Iran Support Act to prohibit peaceful nuclear cooperation with a country
if one of its citizens or companies was assisting Iran in its nuclear weapons program.
Both the 2008 and 2010 NPAS state that the United States “has received assurances from Russia
at the highest levels that its government would not tolerate cooperation with Iran in violation of
its U.N. Security Council obligations.” Some reports in 2008 said that Russian entities had
transferred sensitive nuclear technology to Iran, but this activity was ended by high-level Russian
governmental intervention and assurances were given to the highest levels of the U.S.
government.40 Additional details on the proliferation concerns associated with Russian-Iranian
cooperation are likely part of the classified annex.
37 Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, 2008, 2010.
38 “Medvedev Likely to Face Problems with Iran,” RIA Novosti, May 13, 2008, at http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080513/
107253545.html.
39 CRS Report RL34544, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status, by Paul K. Kerr.
40 “Prospects for a U.S.-Russian Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation in Congress: Robert Einhorn and Jon
(continued...)
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U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress
The 2009 Director of National Intelligence report to Congress on WMD Acquisition says that
“entities in Russia and China continue to sell technologies and components in the Middle East
and South Asia that are dual use and could support WMD and missile programs…. Russian
entities have provided assistance to missile and civil nuclear programs in Iran and India.” The
report also says that Russian entities have been a source of dual-use biotechnology equipment and
expertise, including for Iran.41
Another issue of congressional interest is the planned Russian sale of five S-300 air defense
systems to Iran. Russia has so far stalled on completing this transaction. It is expected to be
deployed near Iranian nuclear facilities. The May 2010 draft of the UN Security Council
sanctions resolution on Iran would not prohibit this transfer. Air defense systems are not
prohibited under international export control regimes, nor would the transfer automatically fall
under any current U.S. sanctions.
On May 21, 2010, the State Department announced it was removing sanctions on four sanctioned
entities in Russia.42 Since 1998, at least 19 different Russian entities have been placed under
proliferation-related sanctions on over 20 different occasions. However, with the removals on
May 21, there appear to be no current proliferation-related sanctions against Russian entities.43
Some observers have asserted that removal of sanctions was done in exchange for Russian
support for a draft UN Security Council resolution that strengthens sanctions against Iran. The
State Department spokesman has said that, regardless, there was no evidence that the companies
removed from the sanctions list were currently transferring arms or technology.44 In March 2010,
the administration lifted sanctions on two other Russian entities, Glavkosmos and the Baltic State
Technical University, both sanctioned in 1998 for helping Iran’s missile and weapons programs.
Additionally, the Department of Commerce lists entities subject to license requirements for
proliferation-related end-use or end-user controls under Part 744 Supplement of the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR). As of February 19, 2010, there were eight Russian entities on
this list.45 Three of these entities’ license applications are reviewed on a case-by-case basis, while
five are under “presumption of denial.” According to Commerce Department officials, this list is
currently under review.
Some argue that maximum leverage has already been gained in coaxing Russian behavior on Iran
in exchange for the signing of a 123 agreement, and that there will be opportunities in the future
to exercise further leverage if necessary, because each transaction under a 123 agreement must be
(...continued)
Wolfsthal,” Remarks at the Carnegie Moscow Center, April 15, 2008, http://www.carnegie.ru/en/news/78128.htm.
41 Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Advanced Conventional Munitions Covering 1 January to 31 December 2009. http://www.dni.gov/reports/
2009_721_Report.pdf.
42 Sanctions were lifted on Rosoboronexport, Dmitry Mendeleev University of Chemical Technology, the Moscow
Aviation Institute and the Tula Instrument Design Bureau. Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 98, May 21, 2010.
43 This include sanctions under Executive Order 12938, the Iran, North Korea, Syria Nonproliferation Act, the Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 2000, missile sanctions laws, etc. Available at “Nonproliferation Sanctions,” State Department
website, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c15231.htm There are some Russian entities still under State Department sanctions
for “Transfer of Lethal Military Equipment.”
44 Peter Baker and David Sanger, “Gains for Moscow in Iran deal: U.S. lifts sanctions, allows loophole to win support
for resolution,” New York Times, May 22, 2010.
45 http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/744spir.pdf.
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U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress
approved for licensing.46 Supporters may also see the 123 agreement as a way to encourage
Russia to continue pressing Iran on such issues as the Bushehr reactor safeguards. Some argue
that engaging Russia on the scientific level would improve transparency and could provide a
deterrent to Russian technical cooperation with Iran. Others are reluctant to approve the
agreement when questions remain unanswered about the Russian government’s control over
transfers to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.
Author Contact Information
Mary Beth Nikitin
Analyst in Nonproliferation
mnikitin@crs.loc.gov, 7-7745
46 Thomas Graham, “The Friend of My Enemy,” National Interest Online, April 1, 2008,
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=17266; Einhorn, Gottemoeller, McGoldrick, Poneman, Wolfsthal,
“The U.S.-Russian Civil Nuclear Agreement: A Framework for Cooperation,” CSIS, May 2008, http://www.csis.org/
component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,4499/type,1/.
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