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Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement:
Background, Issues, and Options for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
May 26, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL34476
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
c11173008

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Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement

Summary
The Navy’s FY2011-FY2015 shipbuilding plan calls for procuring an 11th and final San Antonio
(LPD-17) class amphibious ship in FY2012. The Navy estimates the procurement cost of this ship
at $2,040.6 million. The ship received $184.0 million in FY2010 advance procurement funding,
and the Navy plans to request the remaining $1,856.6 million of the ship’s procurement cost in
the FY2012 budget. Accordingly, the Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget does not request any
procurement or advance procurement funding for the LPD-17 program.
Some observers have suggested using the LPD-17 design as the basis for the LSD(X), a new class
of amphibious ships that the Navy plans to start procuring in FY2017 as replacements for the
Navy’s 12 aging Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry (LSD-41/49) class amphibious ships. Procuring a
12th LPD-17 in FY2014 or FY2015 might be consistent with a strategy of using the LPD-17
design as the basis for the LSD(X) because it would keep the LPD-17 production line open until
the start of LSD(X) procurement. Navy officials have mentioned the option of modifying the
LPD-17 design as one possible approach for developing the LSD(X) design, but the Navy is also
studying other possible approaches, including developing an all-new design. Navy plans do not
call for procuring any LPD-17s beyond the 11th ship planned for FY2012.
Although the Navy’s planned 313-ship fleet, first presented to Congress in February 2006, calls
for a 31-ship amphibious force that includes 10 LPD-17s, Navy and Marine Corps officials agree
that a 33-ship amphibious force that includes 11 LPD-17s would be needed to minimally meet the
Marine Corps’ goal of having an amphibious ship force with enough combined capacity to lift the
assault echelons (AEs) of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs). A 33-ship force would
include 15 amphibious ships for each MEB, plus three additional ships to account for 10% to
15% of the amphibious ship force being in overhaul at any given time.
Marine Corps and Navy officials agree that a 38-ship amphibious force would more fully meet
the Marine Corps’ 2.0 MEB AE amphibious lift requirement. Such a force would include 17
amphibious ships for each MEB, plus four additional ships to account for 10% to 15% of the
amphibious ship force being in overhaul at any given time. Although a 38-ship force would more
fully meet the Marine Corps’ lift requirement, the Navy and Marine Corps have agreed to accept
the operational risks associated with having a 33-ship force rather than a 38-ship force.
FY2011 issues for Congress include whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s proposed
funding profile for procuring the 11th LPD-17, and whether to provide the Navy with any
direction concerning the design of the LSD(X) or procurement of LPD-17s beyond the 11th ship.
Congress’s decisions on these issues will affect, among other things, Navy and Marine Corps
funding requirements and capabilities, and the shipbuilding industrial base.
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-491 of May 21, 2010) on the
FY2011 defense authorization bill (H.R. 5136), does not recommend any FY2011 procurement or
advance procurement funding for the LPD-17 program (page 73). Section 121(b) of H.R. 5136 as
reported by the committee would authorize the use of incremental funding for LPD-26, the 10th
ship in the class, through FY2012, if the Navy determines that it is needed and would be
beneficial in certain ways.

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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Background ................................................................................................................................ 2
Amphibious Ships in General................................................................................................ 2
Types of Amphibious Ships............................................................................................. 2
Roles and Missions of Amphibious Ships ........................................................................ 2
Amphibious Lift Goal ..................................................................................................... 4
Current Force of Amphibious Ships................................................................................. 4
Projected Force of Amphibious Ships.............................................................................. 5
LPD-17 Program................................................................................................................... 5
Program Origin ............................................................................................................... 5
Construction Shipyards ................................................................................................... 5
Procurement History ....................................................................................................... 6
Cost Growth, Schedule Delays, and Construction Problems............................................. 6
Option of Using LPD-17 Design as Basis for LSD(X) ..................................................... 6
FY2011 Funding Request ................................................................................................ 6
Issues for Congress ..................................................................................................................... 7
Navy’s Proposed Funding Profile for 11th LPD-17................................................................. 7
Option of Using LPD-17 Design as Basis for LSD(X) ........................................................... 7
Legislative Activity for FY2011 .................................................................................................. 9
FY2011 Funding Request ...................................................................................................... 9
FY2011 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5136) ................................................................... 9
House ............................................................................................................................. 9

Tables
Table 1. Projected Number of Amphibious Ships, FY2011-FY2040............................................. 5
Table 2. LPD-17 Procurement, FY1996-FY2010 ......................................................................... 6
Table A-1. Amphibious Lift Goals Since 1980 ........................................................................... 10
Table A-2. MEB AE Lift Elements ............................................................................................ 12
Table A-3. Ships Required for Various Potential Lift Goals........................................................ 13

Appendixes
Appendix A. Amphibious Lift Goal ........................................................................................... 10
Appendix B. LPD-17 Cost Growth and Construction Problems ................................................. 15

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 39

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Introduction
The Navy’s FY2011-FY2015 shipbuilding plan calls for procuring an 11th and final San Antonio
(LPD-17) class amphibious ship in FY2012. The Navy estimates the procurement cost of this ship
at $2,040.6 million. The ship received $184.0 million in FY2010 advance procurement funding,
and the Navy plans to request the remaining $1,856.6 million of the ship’s procurement cost in
the FY2012 budget. Accordingly, the Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget does not request any
procurement or advance procurement funding for the LPD-17 program.
Some observers have suggested using the LPD-17 design as the basis for the LSD(X), a new class
of amphibious ships that the Navy plans to start procuring in FY2017 as replacements for the
Navy’s 12 aging Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry (LSD-41/49) class amphibious ships. Procuring a
12th LPD-17 in FY2014 or FY2015 might be consistent with a strategy of using the LPD-17
design as the basis for the LSD(X) because it would keep the LPD-17 production line open until
the start of LSD(X) procurement. Navy officials have mentioned the option of modifying the
LPD-17 design as one possible approach for developing the LSD(X) design, but the Navy is also
studying other possible approaches, including developing an all-new design. Navy plans do not
call for procuring any LPD-17s beyond the 11th ship planned for FY2012.
Although the Navy’s planned 313-ship fleet, first presented to Congress in February 2006, calls
for a 31-ship amphibious force that includes 10 LPD-17s, Navy and Marine Corps officials agree
that a 33-ship amphibious force that includes 11 LPD-17s would be needed to minimally meet the
Marine Corps’ goal of having an amphibious ship force with enough combined capacity to lift the
assault echelons (AEs) of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs). A 33-ship force would
include 15 amphibious ships for each MEB, plus three additional ships to account for 10% to
15% of the amphibious ship force being in overhaul at any given time.
Marine Corps and Navy officials agree that a 38-ship amphibious force would more fully meet
the Marine Corps’ 2.0 MEB AE amphibious lift requirement. Such a force would include 17
amphibious ships for each MEB, plus four additional ships to account for 10% to 15% of the
amphibious ship force being in overhaul at any given time. Although a 38-ship force would more
fully meet the Marine Corps’ lift requirement, the Navy and Marine Corps have agreed to accept
the operational risks associated with having a 33-ship force rather than a 38-ship force.
FY2011 issues for Congress include whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s proposed
funding profile for procuring the 11th LPD-17, and whether to provide the Navy with any
direction concerning the design of the LSD(X) or procurement of LPD-17s beyond the 11th ship.
Congress’s decisions on these issues will affect, among other things, Navy and Marine Corps
funding requirements and capabilities, and the shipbuilding industrial base.
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Background
Amphibious Ships in General
Types of Amphibious Ships
U.S. Navy amphibious ships have designations starting with the letter L, as in amphibious
landing. Navy amphibious ships can be divided into two main groups—the so-called “big-deck”
amphibious assault ships, designated LHA and LHD, which look like medium-sized aircraft
carriers, and the smaller (but still sizeable) amphibious ships designated LSD or LPD,1 which are
sometimes called “small-deck” amphibious ships. The LHAs and LHDs have large flight decks
and hangar decks for embarking and operating numerous helicopters and VTOL fixed-wing
aircraft, while the LSDs and LPDs have much smaller flight decks and hangar decks for
embarking and operating smaller numbers of helicopters. The LHAs and LHDs, as bigger ships,
in general can individually embark more Marines and equipment than the LSDs and LPDs.
Roles and Missions of Amphibious Ships
The primary function of Navy amphibious ships is to lift (i.e., transport) U.S. Marines and their
equipment and supplies to distant operating areas, and enable Marines to conduct expeditionary
operations ashore in those areas. Amphibious ships have berthing spaces for Marines, flight decks
and hangar decks for their helicopters and vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) fixed-wing
aircraft, well decks for storing and launching their landing craft,2 and storage space for their
wheeled vehicles, their other combat equipment, and their supplies. Although amphibious ships
are designed to support Marine landings against opposing military forces, they can also be used
for Marine landings in so-called permissive or benign situations where there are no opposing
forces.
The large storage spaces on amphibious ships, and the ability of amphibious ships to use
helicopters and landing craft to transfer people, equipment, and supplies from ship to shore
without need for port facilities, make amphibious ships potentially useful for a range of non-
combat and combat operations. Amphibious ships and their embarked Marine forces can be used
for launching and conducting
• humanitarian-assistance and disaster-response (HA/DR) operations;
• peacetime engagement and partnership-building activities, such as exercises;
• other nation-building operations, such as reconstruction operations;
• operations to train, advise, and assist foreign military forces;

1 LHA can be translated as landing ship, helicopter-capable, assault. LHD can be translated as landing ship, helicopter-
capable, well deck. LSD can be translated as landing ship, well deck. LPD can be translated as landing ship, helicopter
platform, well deck. Whether noted in the designation or not, all these ships have well decks.
2 A well deck is a large, garage-like space in the stern of the ship. It can be flooded with water so that landing craft can
leave or return to the ship. Access to the well deck is protected by a large stern gate that is somewhat like a garage
door.
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• peace-enforcement operations;
• non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs);
• maritime-security operations, such as anti-piracy operations;
• smaller-scale strike and counter-terrorism operations; and
• larger-scale ground combat operations.
Amphibious ships and their embarked Marine forces can also be used for maintaining forward-
deployed naval presence for purposes of deterrence, reassurance, and maintaining regional
stability.
Although the Marines have not conducted a large-scale amphibious assault against opposing
military forces since the Korean War, Marine Corps officials state that there have been about 85
U.S. amphibious operations of other kinds between 1990 and April 2008.3 In addition, presenting
the potential for conducting an amphibious landing can generate tactical benefits, even if the
landing is not carried out. During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, for example, the potential for
conducting an amphibious landing by a force of about 17,000 Marines embarked on amphibious
ships in the Persian Gulf tied down several Iraqi divisions in coastal-defense positions. Those
Iraqi divisions positions were not available for use against U.S.-coalition ground forces moving
north from Saudi Arabia.4
On any given day, some of the Navy’s amphibious ships, like some of the Navy’s other ships, are
forward-deployed to various overseas operating areas. Forward-deployed U.S. Navy amphibious
ships are often organized into formations called amphibious ready groups (ARGs). An ARG
notionally includes three amphibious ships—one LHA or LHD, one LSD, and one LPD. These
three amphibious ships, which are referred to as an amphibious ready group (ARG), together can
embark a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) consisting of about 2,200 Marines, their aircraft, their
landing craft, their combat equipment, and about 15 days worth of supplies. ARGs can operate in
conjunction with carrier strike groups (CSGs) to form larger naval task forces. On average, two or
perhaps three ARGs might be forward-deployed at any given time.
Amphibious ships are also sometimes forward-deployed on an individual basis to certain lower-
threat operating areas, particularly for conducting peacetime engagement activities with foreign
countries or for responding to smaller-scale contingencies. In such deployments, an amphibious
ship might serve as the core of a new kind of Navy formation called a Global Fleet Station (GFS).
The Navy announced the GFS concept in 2006 and has implemented it in certain areas around the
world, including the Caribbean and the Gulf of Guinea, off the western coast of Africa. A core of
a GFS consists of an amphibious ship or a high-speed sealift ship that is forward-deployed to a
region of interest. Smaller Navy ships, such as Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), might then operate
in conjunction with this core ship. The Navy states that the GFS
is a persistent sea base of operations from which to coordinate and employ adaptive force
packages within a regional area of interest. Focusing primarily on Phase 0 (shaping)
operations, Theater Security Cooperation, Global Maritime Awareness, and tasks associated

3 Source for the figure of about 85 amphibious operations between 1990 and April 2008: Marine Corps briefing to CRS
on April 25, 2008.
4 See CRS Report 91-421, Persian Gulf War: Defense Policy Implications for Congress, coordinated by Ronald
O’Rourke, p. 41. (May 15, 1991; out of print and available directly from the report coordinator.)
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specifically with the War on Terror, GFS offers a means to increase regional maritime
security through the cooperative efforts of joint, inter-agency, and multinational partners, as
well as Non-Governmental Organizations.5
Amphibious Lift Goal
Although the Navy’s planned 313-ship fleet, first presented to Congress in February 2006, calls
for a 31-ship amphibious force that includes 10 LPD-17s, Navy and Marine Corps officials agree
that a 33-ship amphibious force that includes 11 LPD-17s would be needed to minimally meet the
Marine Corps’ goal of having an amphibious ship force with enough combined capacity to lift the
assault echelons (AEs) of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs). A 33-ship force would
include 15 amphibious ships for each MEB, plus three additional ships to account for 10% to
15% of the amphibious ship force being in overhaul at any given time.
Marine Corps and Navy officials agree that a 38-ship amphibious force would more fully meet
the Marine Corps’ 2.0 MEB AE amphibious lift requirement. Such a force would include 17
amphibious ships for each MEB, plus four additional ships to account for 10% to 15% of the
amphibious ship force being in overhaul at any given time. Although a 38-ship force would more
fully meet the Marine Corps’ lift requirement, the Navy and Marine Corps have agreed to accept
the operational risks associated with having a 33-ship force rather than a 38-ship force.
For further discussion of the amphibious lift goal, see Appendix A.
Current Force of Amphibious Ships
As of the end of FY2009, the Navy’s amphibious force included the following 31 ships:
8 Wasp (LHD-1) class ships, each displacing about 40,500 tons;
2 Tarawa (LHA-1) class ships, each displacing about 40,000 tons;
5 San Antonio (LPD-17) class ships, each displacing about 26,000 tons;
4 Austin (LPD-4) class ships, each displacing about 17,000 tons; and
12 Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry (LSD-41/49) class ships, each displacing
about 16,000 tons.

5 U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Operations Concept 2006, Washington, 2006, pp. 30. The Navy states further on
pages 30-31 that:
Like all sea bases, the composition of a GFS depends on Combatant Commander requirements, the
operating environment, and the mission. From its sea base, each GFS would serve as a self-
contained headquarters for regional operations with the capacity to repair and service all ships,
small craft, and aircraft assigned. Additionally, the GFS might provide classroom space, limited
medical facilities, an information fusion center, and some combat service support capability. The
GFS concept provides a leveraged, high-yield sea based option that achieves a persistent presence
in support of national objectives. Additionally, it complements more traditional CSG/ESG [carrier
strike group/expeditionary strike group] training and deployment cycles.
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Projected Force of Amphibious Ships
Table 1 shows the projected total number of amphibious ships under the Navy’s 30-year
(FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan.
Table 1. Projected Number of Amphibious Ships, FY2011-FY2040
Under Navy’s 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan
Number
Number
Number
FY
of ships
FY
of ships
FY
of ships
2011 29 2021 34 2031 33
2012 30 2022 34 2032 32
2013 30 2023 35 2033 31
2014 30 2024 36 2034 33
2015 31 2025 35 2035 30
2016 33 2026 36 2036 30
2017 33 2027 35 2037 29
2018 33 2028 36 2038 29
2019 33 2029 34 2039 29
2020 33 2030 33 2040 30
Source: Department of the Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for
FY 2011, February 2010, Table 5 (p. 22).
LPD-17 Program
Program Origin
The Navy initiated the LPD-17 program in the 1990s to provide replacement ships for the Navy’s
aging Austin (LPD-4) class amphibious ships, which entered service between 1965 and 1971, and
three other, older classes of amphibious ships that have already been removed from Navy service.
Construction Shipyards
LPD-17s are built primarily by the Avondale shipyard near New Orleans, LA, and the Ingalls
shipyard near Pascagoula, MS, that form part of Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB).6

6 Portions of LPD-17s are built at a fabrication facility at Gulfport, MS, that forms another part of NGSB. NGSB
subcontracted portions of some early LPD-17s to a shipyard in Texas operated by Signal International
(www.signalint.com), and more recently has subcontracted portions of LPD-24 (i.e., the eighth LPD-17) to General
Dynamics’ Bath Iron Works shipyard of Bath, ME. Parts of LPD-24 are also being built at Newport News
Shipbuilding, of Newport News, VA, another yard that forms part of NGSB. (See Peter Frost, “Labor Market, Schedule
Forces Outsourcing of Work,” Newport News Daily Press, April 1, 2008; Holbrook Mohr, “Northrop Gets LPD Help
From General Dynamics,” NavyTimes.com, April 1, 2008; and Geoff Fein, “Northrop Grumman Awards Bath Iron
Works Construction Work On LPD-24,” Defense Daily, April 2, 2008.)
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Procurement History
As shown in Table 2, the first LPD-17 was procured in FY1996, and a total of 10 have been
procured through FY2010. As of the end of FY2009, the first five had entered service.
Table 2. LPD-17 Procurement, FY1996-FY2010
96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
Cost Growth, Schedule Delays, and Construction Problems
The LPD-17 program has experienced considerable cost growth, schedule delays, and
construction problems, particularly on the earlier ships in the program. The first ship in the
program experienced cost growth of about 70%, and later ships in the program were substantially
more expensive to build than originally estimated. The design and construction of the first ship
were delayed by about two years. Delays in building the first ships were a primary reason for the
FY2001-FY2002 hiatus in LPD-17 procurement shown in Table 2. The first and second ships
were delivered to the Navy in incomplete form, and numerous construction problems were
identified on the first two ships. There have been recurrent reports of construction problems on
in-service LPD-17s. For additional details, see Appendix B.
Option of Using LPD-17 Design as Basis for LSD(X)
Some observers have suggested using the LPD-17 design as the basis for the LSD(X), a new class
of amphibious ships that the Navy plans to start procuring in FY2017 as replacements for the
Navy’s 12 aging Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry (LSD-41/49) class amphibious ships. Procuring a
12th LPD-17 in FY2014 or FY2015 might be consistent with a strategy of using the LPD-17
design as the basis for the LSD(X) because it would keep the LPD-17 production line open until
the start of LSD(X) procurement. Navy officials have mentioned the option of modifying LPD-17
design as one possible approach for developing the LSD(X) design, but the Navy is also studying
other possible approaches, including developing an all-new design. Navy plans do not call for
procuring any LPD-17s beyond the 11th ship planned for FY2012.
FY2011 Funding Request
The Navy’s FY2011-FY2015 shipbuilding plan calls for procuring an 11th and final LPD-17 in
FY2012. The Navy estimates the procurement cost of this ship at $2,040.6 million. The ship
received $184.0 million in FY2010 advance procurement funding, and the Navy plans to request
the remaining $1,856.6 million of the ship’s procurement cost in the FY2012 budget.
Accordingly, the Navy’s FY2011 budget does not request any additional advance procurement
funding for the ship.
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Issues for Congress
FY2011 issues for Congress include whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s proposed
funding profile for procuring the 11th LPD-17, and whether to provide the Navy with any
direction concerning the design of the LSD(X) or procurement of LPD-17s beyond the 11th ship.
Navy’s Proposed Funding Profile for 11th LPD-17
Potential alternatives to the Navy’s proposed funding profile for the 11th LPD-17 include the
following, among others:
• providing a second increment of advance procurement funding for the ship in
FY2011;
• accelerating the procurement of the ship to FY2011 and using split-funding (i.e.,
two-year incremental funding) in FY2011 and FY2012 to procure the ship;
• accelerating the procurement of the ship to FY2011 and fully funding the ship in
FY2011; and
• funding the procurement of two LPD-17s (the 11th and 12th ships in the class) in
FY2012, perhaps with supporting advance procurement funding in FY2011, and
executing the second of these two ships as if it were procured in FY2014 or
FY2015,7 perhaps as a bridge to production of an LPD-17-based LSD(X).
Option of Using LPD-17 Design as Basis for LSD(X)
Supporters of using the LPD-17 design as the basis for the LSD(X) could argue that doing so
could substantially reduce LSD(X) design costs by avoiding the need for creating an all-new
design for the LSD(X), and help constrain LSD(X) production costs and risks by taking
advantage of the LPD-17 production learning curve, particularly if a 12th LPD-17 were procured
in FY2014 or FY2015 so as to keep the LPD-17 production line open until the scheduled start of
LSD(X) production in FY2017. An amphibious force with 12 LPD-17s and 10 LSD(X)s, they
could argue, would be able to meet the 2.0 MEB (AE) amphibious lift goal as well as would an
amphibious force with 11 LPD-17s and 11 LSD(X)s. An LSD(X) based on the LPD-17 design,
they could argue, could have its features optimized so that a force with 12 LPD-17s and 10
LSD(X)s would meet the goal. The production-cost and production-risk advantages of taking
advantage of the existing LPD-17 production learning curve, they could argue, outweigh the
potential cost-reduction advantages of staging a competition between shipyards for the right to
build LSD(X)s.
Skeptics of using the LPD-17 design as the basis for the LSD(X) could argue that it is too early to
know whether an LPD-17-based LSD(X) would be a good approach, because operational
requirements for the LSD(X) have not yet been determined. They could argue that an LPD-17-
based LSD(X) could be bigger and more expensive to procure and operate than what the Navy
needs, and that while a brand-new LSD(X) design would likely have higher design costs than an

7 Congress funded the procurement of two aircraft carriers in FY1983, and did so again in FY1988. Congress did so in
the knowledge that the second ship in each pair would be executed as if it were procured about two years later.
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LPD-17-based design, an all-new LSD(X) design might be smaller and less expensive to procure
and operate than an LPD-17-based design, eventually offsetting its higher initial design cost.
They could argue that an all-new LSD(X) design could more comprehensively incorporate newer
technologies, including technologies for reducing crew size, than could an LPD-17 based design.
They could also argue that competition is an important mechanism for restraining shipbuilding
costs, and that it would be easier for the Navy to stage an effective competition between
shipbuilders for the right to build an all-new LSD(X) design than an LPD-17-based design,
because no shipbuilder would have a significant cost advantage going into the bidding for an all-
new LSD(X) design by virtue of having previously built LPD-17s.
At a May 6, 2010, hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs before the Seapower subcommittee of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, the following exchange occurred between Senator Kay
Hagan and Sean Stackley, the Navy’s acquisition executive (i.e., the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy [Research, Development and Acquisition]):
SENATOR HAGAN:
The 2011-2015 shipbuilding plan calls for procuring the 11th and the final of the San Antonio
class landing platform dock amphibious ship in 2012.
In 2017, the 30-year shipbuilding plan calls for the start of procurement of a replacement for
aging landing ship dock amphibious ships.
Secretary Stackley, or all of you, can the LPD 17 design be used for the basis of the LSD
replacement? And would the procurement of a 12th LPD 17 in 2014 or 2015 support keeping
the production line open while transitioning to the start of the LSD replacement?
STACKLEY:
Yes, ma'am. Let me—let me start that. In general terms, the Navy would look for reuse of
design and common hull forms to improve affordability of any new program.
The timing for the LSD(X), I mentioned in my opening remarks is ahead of need.8 The LSD
41 and 49 class do not exit the service until the mid-2020s. We look at concerns with the
industrial base, so we have pulled that replacement program as early as we can without
pushing some other requirement out that’s, frankly, more urgent on a schedule basis.
So we have the LSD(X) just outside of the FYDP. And this year and next year we are going
through the definition of the requirements to determine exactly what is the lift fingerprint
that the replacement ship has to provide, and does that, in fact, line up with an LPD 17 hull
form?
If it turns out that the LPD 17 is more capability than what the LSD(X) is, then we have to
do the affordability and trades review to balance off what’s the cost of a new start versus the
cost of re-use. And affordability and capability requirements and schedules are all going to
be brought to the table in that—in that review and, frankly, that debate.9

8 Stackley here is stating that, given the ages of the LSD-41/49 class ships, the currently scheduled procurement date of
FY2017 for the first LSD(X) is years earlier than what would be nominally be needed to provide a timely replacement
for the first of the retiring LSD-41/49 class ships.
9 Source: Transcript of hearing.
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Legislative Activity for FY2011
FY2011 Funding Request
The Navy’s FY2011-FY2015 shipbuilding plan calls for procuring an 11th and final LPD-17 in
FY2012. The Navy estimates the procurement cost of this ship at $2,040.6 million. The ship
received $184.0 million in FY2010 advance procurement funding, and the Navy plans to request
the remaining $1,856.6 million of the ship’s procurement cost in the FY2012 budget.
Accordingly, the Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget does not request any procurement or advance
procurement funding for the LPD-17 program.
FY2011 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5136)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-491 of May 21, 2010) on the
FY2011 defense authorization bill (H.R. 5136), does not recommend any FY2011 procurement or
advance procurement funding for the LPD-17 program.
Section 121(b) of H.R. 5136 as reported by the committee states the following regarding LPD-26,
the 10th ship in the class:
LPD 26- With respect to the vessel designated LPD 26, the Secretary [of the Navy] may use
incremental funding for the procurement of such vessel through fiscal year 2012 if the
Secretary determines that such incremental funding—
(1) is in the best interest of the overall shipbuilding efforts of the Navy;
(2) is needed to provide the Secretary with the ability to facilitate changes to the shipbuilding
industrial base of the Navy; and
(3) will provide the Secretary with the ability to award a contract for construction of the
vessel that provides the best value to the United States.
Section 1024 of H.R. 5136 as reported by the committee would require the Navy to keep the
amphibious assault ships Nassau (LHA-4) and Peleliu (LHA-5) in commissioned and operational
status until the new amphibious ships America (LHA-6) and LHA-7, respectively, are delivered to
the Navy.


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Appendix A. Amphibious Lift Goal
This appendix presents additional background information on the amphibious lift goal.10
Expressed in Terms of MEBs
The Marine Corps’ goal for amphibious lift is to have a force of amphibious ships with enough
combined lift capacity to simultaneously land the assault echelons (AEs) of two Marine
Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs), or 2.0 MEB AEs for short. This goal, Marine Corps officials
state, reflects responsibilities assigned to Marine Corps forces in U.S. regional war plans.
A MEB is a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) of 14,484 Marines and their equipment and
supplies. The AE of a MEB is the initial part of the MEB to go ashore. The remaining part that
goes ashore later is called the assault follow-on echelon (AFOE). Marine Corps doctrine calls for
the AE to go ashore from amphibious ships, and for the AFOE to go ashore from less-survivable
sealift (i.e., cargo-type) ships controlled by the Military Sealift Command (MSC). The AE of a
MEB includes 10,055 of the MEB’s Marines, plus equipment and supplies for these 10,055
Marines.
The amphibious lift goal as approved by the Secretary of Defense has changed numerous times
since the Korean War, reflecting changes in strategic or budgetary circumstances. One such
change occurred in 1991, as the Cold War was ending.11 The most recent change occurred in
2006, when the goal was reduced from 2.5 MEB AEs to 2.0 MEB AEs. Table A-1 shows
amphibious lift goals since 1980.
Table A-1. Amphibious Lift Goals Since 1980
Year Goal
Troopsa
1980 1.15
MEFsb 66,252
1981
1 MEF AE + 1 MEB
53,240
1982
1 MEF AE + 1 MEB AE
46,810
1991 2.5
MEB
AEs
33,793
2006 2.0
MEB
AEs
23,016
Sources: For list of amphibious lift goals prior to 2006: Matthew T. Robinson, Integrated Amphibious Operations
Update Study, (DoN Liftt 2+)—A Short History of the Amphibious Lift Requirement, Center for Naval Analyses,
Alexandria (VA), CRM D0005882.A3/Final, July 2002, p. 2 (Table 2). For troop levels associated with each lift
goal: Marine Corps data provided to CRS on May 2, 2008.
a. Troop totals shown include a Navy Support Element (NSE) consisting of Navy units that help to move the
Marines’ equipment and supplies from ship to shore. In the case of the 2006 goal for 2.0 MEB AEs, the total
of 23,016 troops includes an NSE of 2,906 Navy personnel.
b. MEF stands for Marine Expeditionary Force—a Marine air-ground task force with more than twice as many
troops as a MEB.

10 Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is based on a briefing from Marine Corps officials to CRS on
April 25, 2008, and on Marine Corps point papers provided to CRS in association with this briefing.
11 Key events marking the end of the Cold War include fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the disintegration
of the Soviet Union in December 1991.
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In discussions of the current 2.0 MEB AE amphibious lift goal, the “AE” part is often dropped for
convenience, even though the current requirement still relates to MEB AEs rather than complete
MEBs.
Marine Corps officials state that the 2006 reduction in the amphibious lift goal to 2.0 MEB AEs is
acceptable because the Navy and Marine Corps also plan to field a new squadron of 14 next-
generation maritime prepositioning force ships called the Maritime Prepositioning Force of the
Future, or MPF(F). The planned 14-ship MPF(F) squadron, which is to include three modified
LHA/LHD-type ships and 11 sealift (i.e., cargo-transport) ships, is to have a capability for putting
an additional MEB ashore. Unlike the amphibious ship force, the MPF(F) squadron is not
intended as assault shipping—the sealift ships in the MPF(F) squadron have less survivability and
self-defense capability than the Navy’s amphibious ships, and are therefore considered unsuitable
for use in forcible-entry operations. MPF(F) ships, however, are in general less expensive to
procure than amphibious ships, and they are designed to remain prepositioned at sea in a theater
of interest for long periods of time before returning the port for maintenance. Together, the
Navy’s amphibious ship force and the MPF(F) squadron are to provide a total of 3.0 MEB AEs of
lift, or 30,165 troops.
Translated into Numbers of Amphibious Ships
The Marine Corps states the 2.0 MEB AE amphibious lift goal translates into a requirement for a
force of 33 amphibious ships, including
• 11 LHAs/LHDs,
• 11 LSD-41/49 class ships, and
• 11 LPD-17s.
In explaining how the requirement for 2.0 MEB AEs translates into this 33-ship requirement, the
Marine Corps states the following:
• Given the lift capabilities of the Navy’s current amphibious ships, each MEB AE
would require 19 operational amphibious ships to lift: 6 LHAs/LHDs, 7 LSD-
41/49s, and 6 LPD-17s.
• To arrive at a more fiscally constrained goal, the Marine Corps reduced the above
19-ship total to 17 operational ships: 5 LHAs/LHDs, 7 LSD-41/49s, and 5 LPD-
17s. This 17-ship force requires about 11% of the MEB AE’s vehicles to be
shifted to the AFOE, which creates a degree of operational risk. This 17-ship
force was presented to Navy officials in mid-2007.
• To arrive at a still-more fiscally constrained goal, Navy and Marine Corps
officials in mid-2007 agreed to reduce the 17-ship total to 15 operational ships—
5 of each kind. This 15-ship force requires about 20% of the MEB AE’s vehicles
and about 12% of its cargo to be shifted to the AFOE, which creates an additional
degree of operational risk.
The Marine Corps testified in April 2008 that:
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Each MEB AE requires seventeen amphibious warfare ships.... However, given current fiscal
constraints, the Navy and Marine Corps have agreed to assume a degree of operational risk
by limiting the assault echelon of each MEB by using only fifteen ships per MEB....
12
Table A-2 shows the five elements of the amphibious lift footprint, and how limiting each MEB
AE to 17 or 15 operational ships results in some of the MEB AE’s vehicles and cargo being
shifted to the AFOE.
Table A-2. MEB AE Lift Elements
% of lift element
Operational ships per MEB AE
shifted to AFOE
17 ships
19 ships
(somewhat
15 ships
with 17
with 15
(full MEB
fiscally
(more fiscally
ships per
ships per
Lift element
AE)
constrained)
constrained)
MEB AE
MEB AE
Troop berthing
10,055
10,055
10,055


Vehicle storage space
(square feet)
352,340 312,601
281,694
11.3% 20.1%
Cargo storage (cubic
feet)
553,009 553,009
486,638
— 12.0%
VTOL aircraft
operating spots
254 254
254
— —
LCAC operating
spots
24 24
24 — —
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Marine Corps data provided by telephone to CRS on April 29, 2008.
Notes: VTOL means vertical takeoff and landing. LCAC means air-cushioned landing craft.
Using 15 operational ships per MEB AE, providing lift for 2.0 MEB AEs would require 30
operational ships: 10 LHAs/LHDs, 10 LSD-41/49s, and 10 LPD-17s. The Marine Corps states
that, in light of ship maintenance requirements, maintaining a force of 30 operational ships (i.e.,
ships not in maintenance) would require having an additional 15% in total inventory, meaning a
total of 34.5 ships (11.5 of each kind) for 2.0 MEB AEs. The figure of 34.5 ships, the Marine
Corps states, was then rounded down to 33 ships (11 of each kind).13
Table A-3 shows the total number of amphibious ships that the Marine Corps states would be
needed to lift 2.0 MEBs (the current goal), 2.5 MEBs (the goal from 1991 to 2006), and 3.0
MEBs (the broader current goal currently being met through a combination of amphibious and
MPF[F] ships), using 15, 17, or 19 operational ships per MEB AE, and including an additional
allowance to account for ships in maintenance. The first column shows the current 33-ship
requirement for 2.0 MEB AEs using 15 operational ships per MEB.

12 Statement of Lieutenant General James F. Amos, Deputy Commandant of the marine Corps (Combat Development
and Integration), Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower, Concerning Shipbuilding
and Force Structure on April 08, 2008, pp. 6-7. Italics as in the original.
13 As shown in Appendix A, the Marine Corps alternatively has stated that in light of ship maintenance requirements,
maintaining a force of 30 operational ships would require having an additional 10% in total inventory, meaning a total
of 33 ships (11 of each kind).
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Table A-3. Ships Required for Various Potential Lift Goals
(including allowance for ships in overhaul)

2.0 MEB AEs
2.5 MEB AEs
3.0 MEB AEs
Operational
ships per
MEB AEa
15
17
19
15
17
19
15
17
19
LHA/LHDa
11 11 13 14 14 17 17 17 20
LSD-41/49a
11 13 15 14 16 19 16 20 23
LPD-17a
11 13 13 14 16 16 16 20 20
Totala
33 37 41 42 46 52 49 57 63
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Marine Corps data provided to CRS on May 1, 2008.
a. Required numbers of ships shown include additional al owance to account for ships in maintenance, so as to
support 15, 17, or 19 operational ships per MEB AE.
Table A-3 shows a total of 37 amphibious ships would be needed to meet the 2.0 MEB AE using
17 amphibious ships per MEB. In April 2009 testimony to Congress, the Navy revised this figure
to 38 ships, including 17 ships for each MEB plus four (rather than three) additional ships to
account for 10% to 15% of the amphibious ship force being in overhaul at any given time.14
Marine Corps Testimony in 2008
Regarding the amphibious lift goal, the Marine Corps testified in April 2008 as follows:
Shipbuilding Requirements
Based on strategic guidance, in the last several years the Navy and Marine Corps have
accepted risk in our Nation’s forcible entry capacity, and reduced amphibious lift from 3.0
MEB assault echelon (AE) to 2.0 MEB AE. In the budgetary arena, the value of amphibious
ships is too often assessed exclusively in terms of forcible entry—discounting their
demonstrated usefulness across the range of operations and the clear imperative for Marines
embarked aboard amphibious ships to meet Phase 0 demands. The ability to transition
between those two strategic goalposts, and to respond to every mission-tasking in between,
will rely on a strong Navy-Marine Corps Team and the amphibious ships that facilitate our
bond. The Navy and Marine Corps have worked diligently to determine the minimum
number of amphibious ships necessary to satisfy the Nation’s needs.
The Marine Corps’ contribution to the Nation’s forcible entry requirement is a single,
simultaneously-employed two MEB assault capability—as part of a seabased MEF.
Although not a part of the MEF AE, a third reinforcing MEB is required and will be
provided through MPF(F) shipping. Each MEB AE requires seventeen amphibious warfare
ships—resulting in an overall ship requirement for thirty-four amphibious warfare ships.
However, given current fiscal constraints, the Navy and Marine Corps have agreed to
assume a degree of operational risk by limiting the assault echelon of each MEB by using


14 Statement of Vice Admiral Bernard J. McCullough, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities
and Resources, and Ms. Allison Stiller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Ship Programs), before the
Subcommittee on Defense of the House Appropriations Committee [hearing] on Shipbuilding, April 1, 2009, p. 7. See
also McCullough’s spoken testimony at the hearing.
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only fifteen ships per MEB—in other words, a Battle Force that provides thirty “operationally
available” amphibious warfare ships.
Amphibious Ships
In that thirty-ship Battle Force, ten aviation-capable big deck ships (LHA / LHD / LHA(R)),
ten LPD 17 class ships, and ten LSD class ships are required to accommodate the MAGTF
[Marine Air-Ground Task Force] capabilities. In order to meet a thirty-ship availability
rate—based on a CNO-approved maintenance factor of ten percent—a minimum of eleven
ships of each of the current types of amphibious ships are required—for a total of thirty-three
ships. The CNO has concurred with this requirement for thirty-three amphibious warfare
ships, which provide the “backbone” of our maritime capability—giving us the ability to
meet the demands of harsh environments across the spectrum of conflict.
The LPD 17 San Antonio class of amphibious warfare ships represents the Department of the
Navy’s commitment to a modern expeditionary power projection fleet enabling our naval
force to operate across the spectrum of warfare. The LPD 17 class replaces four classes of
older ships—LKA, LST, LSD 36, LPD 4—and will have a forty-year expected service life. It
is imperative that eleven of these ships be built to meet the minimum of ten necessary for the
2.0 MEB AE amphibious lift requirement. Procurement of the tenth and eleventh LPDs
remains a priority.15

15 Statement of Lieutenant General James F. Amos, Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps (Combat Development
and Integration), before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower, Concerning Shipbuilding
and Force Structure, April 8, 2008, pp. 6-7. Italics as in the original.
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Appendix B. LPD-17 Cost Growth and
Construction Problems

This appendix provides details on cost growth and construction problems in the LPD-17 program.
Cost Growth
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) testified in July 2007 that the first LPD-17 experienced
cost growth of about 70% and is, on a per-ton basis, the most expensive amphibious ship ever
built for the Navy.16 When LPD-17 procurement began, follow-on ships in the class were
estimated to cost roughly $750 million each. Estimated procurement costs for the follow-on ships
subsequently grew to figures between about $1,200 million and about $1,500 million. The Navy
estimates the procurement cost of the 11th ship at $2,040.6 million.
A relatively small portion of the cost growth in the program since its inception is attributable to
the decision to reduce the program’s sustaining procurement rate from two ships per year to one
ship per year. Most of the program’s cost growth is attributable to other causes.17
Construction Problems
The first LPD-17, which was procured in FY1996, encountered a roughly two-year delay in
design and construction. It was presented to the Navy for acceptance in late June 2005. A Navy
inspection of the ship conducted June 27-July 1, 2005, found numerous construction
deficiencies.18

16 CBO Testimony, Statement of J. Michael Gilmore, Assistant Director for National Security, and Eric J. Labs, Senior
Analyst, [on] The Navy’s 2008 Shipbuilding Plan and Key Ship Programs, before the Subcommittee on Seapower and
Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, July 24, 2007, pp. 13 and 20.
CBO reiterated in March 2008 testimony and a June 2008 report that the first LPD-17 is, on a per-ton basis, the most
expensive amphibious ship ever built for the Navy. (See CBO Testimony, Statement of Eric J. Labs, Senior Analyst,
[on] Current and Projected Navy Shipbuilding Programs, before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 14, 2008, p. 27; and Congressional
Budget Office, Resource Implications of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2009 Shipbuilding Plan, June 9, 2008, p. 31.
17 RAND estimates that halving a shipbuilding program’s annual procurement rate typically increases unit procurement
cost by about 10%. (Mark V Arena, et al, Why Has the Cost of Navy Ships Risen? A Macroscopic Examination of the
Trends in U.S. Naval Ship Costs Over the Past Several Decades
. RAND, Santa Monica (CA), 2006. p. 45. (National
Defense Research Institute, MG-484-NAVY). The December 2006 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) summary table,
available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/am/sar/2006-DEC-SST.pdf, states that in then-year dollars, changes in the
LPD-17 program’s production schedule (including the reduction in annual procurement rate) account for $768.1million
in increased costs for the program, or about 11.2% of the increased costs caused by all factors. The other factors
leading to increased costs were economic errors (meaning errors in projected rates of inflation), which account for
$361.7 million; estimating errors, which account for $4,648.8 million; and “other,” which accounts for $1,093.4
million. The LPD-17 program’s total cost was also reduced by $4,037.8 million because of the reduction in program
quantity from an originally planned total of 12 ships to the currently planned total of 9 ships. The resulting net change
in the program’s estimated cost is an increase of $2,832.2 million.
18 Associated Press, “Shipbuilder: Navy Will Accept New Vessel,” NavyTimes.com, July 21, 2005; Christopher J.
Castelli, “Naval Inspection Report Finds Numerous Problems With LPD-17,” Inside the Navy, July 18, 2005; Dale
Eisman and Jack Dorsey, “Problems On New Ship A Bad Sign, Analyst Warns,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, July 14,
2005; Nathan Hodge, “Navy Inspectors Flag ‘Poor Construction’ On LPD-17,” Defense Daily, July 14, 2005. A copy
of the Navy’s inspection report, dated July 5, 2005, is posted online at http://www.coltoncompany.com/
(continued...)
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The Navy accepted delivery of LPD-17 with about 1.1 million hours of construction work
remaining to be done on the ship. This equated to about 8.7% of the total hours needed to build
the ship, and (with material costs included) about 7% of the total cost to build the ship.
The Navy accepted delivery of LPD-18 with about 400,000 hours of construction work remaining
to be done on the ship. This equated to about 3.3% of the total hours needed to build the ship.
The Navy accepted delivery of LPD-19 with about 45,000 hours of construction work remaining
to be done on the ship. This equated to about 0.4% of the total hours needed to build the ship.
The Navy stated that it accepted LPD-17 in incomplete condition for four reasons:
• It permitted the fleet to begin sooner the process of evaluating LPD-17 through
operational use so as to identify problems with the LPD-17 class design that need
to be fixed in follow-on LPD-17s.
• It avoided further delays in giving the LPD-17’s crew an opportunity to conduct
post-delivery tests and trial events that are intended to identify construction (as
opposed to class design) problems with LPD-17 itself.
• It permitted LPD-17 to leave the shipyard sooner and thereby mitigated schedule
and cost impacts on other ships being built at the shipyard (other LPD-17s, LHD-
8, and DDG-51s) that would have resulted from having LPD-17 remain in the
shipyard longer.
• It reduced the cost of the remaining construction work to be done on LPD-17
because the work in question could be performed by repair shipyards that charge
lower rates for their work than the construction shipyard.
Of the approximately $160 million in post-delivery work performed on LPD-17, $108 million
was for the 1.1 million hours of construction work remaining to complete the ship. (The rest was
for post-shakedown and other work that normally occurs after a ship is completed and delivered
to the Navy.) This $160 million in work was funded through the post-delivery part of the
outfitting/post-delivery (OF/PD) line item in the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN)
account. Because OF/DP costs are not included in ship end cost, the reported end cost of LPD-17
will understate the ship’s actual construction cost by $108 million.
The Navy planned to fund post-delivery construction work on LPD-18 and LPD-19 through the
completion of prior-year shipbuilding line item in the SCN account—a line item that is included
in ship end cost.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) testified in July 2007 that:
The Navy moved forward with ambitious schedules for constructing LPD 17 and [the
Littoral Combat Ship] despite significant challenges in stabilizing the designs for these ships.
As a result, construction work has been performed out of sequence and significant rework
has been required, disrupting the optimal construction sequence and application of lessons
learned for follow-on vessels in these programs.

(...continued)
newsandcomment/comment/lpd17insurv.htm.
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In the LPD 17 program, the Navy’s reliance on an immature design tool led to problems that
affected all aspects of the lead ship’s design. Without a stable design, work was often
delayed from early in the building cycle to later, during integration of the hull. Shipbuilders
stated that doing the work at this stage could cost up to five times the original cost. The lead
ship in the LPD class was delivered to the warfighter incomplete and with numerous
mechanical failures, resulting in a lower than promised level of capability. These problems
continue today—2 years after the Navy accepted delivery of LPD 17. Recent sea trials of the
ship revealed problems with LPD 17’s steering system, reverse osmosis units, shipwide area
computing network, and electrical system, among other deficiencies. Navy inspectors noted
that 138 of 943 ship spaces remained unfinished and identified a number of safety concerns
related to personnel, equipment, ammunition, navigation, and flight activities. To date, the
Navy has invested over $1.75 billion constructing LPD 17.19
LPD-17 was commissioned into service on January 14, 2006. In April 2007, it was reported that
the first LPD-17 had thousands of construction deficiencies.20 In late June and early July 2007, it
was reported that Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter had sent a letter to the chairman and chief
executive officer of Northrop Grumman, Ronald Sugar, dated June 22, 2007, expressing deep
concerns about NGSS’s performance, particularly in connection with the LPD-17 program.
According to these news reports, Winter’s letter contained the following statements among others,
although not necessarily in the order shown below:
• “I am deeply concerned about Northrop Grumman Ship Systems’ (NGSS) ability
to recover in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, particularly in regard to
construction of LPD 17 Class vessels.”
• “I am equally concerned about NGSS’ ability to construct and deliver ships that
conform to the quality standards maintained by the Navy and that adhere to the
cost and schedule commitments agreed upon at the outset by both NGSS and the
Navy.”
• “... even prior to Katrina [NGSS’s performance] was marginal, resulting in
significant cost overruns that forces the Navy to take delivery of the LPD-17 with
numerous outstanding deficiencies.... ”
• “NGSS’ inefficiency and mismanagement of LPD 17 put the Navy in an
untenable position.”
• “By taking delivery of ships with serious quality problems, the Fleet has suffered
unacceptable delays in obtaining deployable assets. Twenty-three months after
commissioning of LPD 17, the Navy still does not have a mission-capable ship.”
• “These delays create further problems as work must be completed or redone by
other shipyards that are not as familiar with the ship’s design.”
• “The Navy also took delivery of LPD-18 (USS New Orleans) in an incomplete
fashion, albeit more complete than LPD-17.”

19 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Realistic Business Cases Needed to Execute Navy
Shipbuilding Programs, Statement of Paul L. Francis, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management Team,
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives
, July 24, 2007 (GAO-07-943T), p. 10.
20 See, for example, Louis Hansen, “New Navy Ship San Antonio Found To Be Rife With Flaws,” Norfolk Virginian-
Pilot
, April 14, 2007; Christopher P. Cavas, “Thousands of Problems Found On New Amphibious Ship,”
DefenseNews.com, April 23, 2007.
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• “... persistent shortcomings at the NGSS yards are troubling and causing me not
only grave concern about the LPD program, but also the LHA and DDG-1000
programs.”
• “The Navy does not wish to find itself in the same situation [with other ships
that] it faces with LPD 17 & 18.”
• “It is imperative that NGSS deliver future ships devoid of significant quality
problems and that it meet its cost and schedule obligations.”
• One press report stated: “‘Continued, focused management’ is necessary to
successfully deliver the remainder of the class, according to Winter.”
• “[Navy acquisition executive] Dr. [Delores] Etter will be closely monitoring
metrics with NGSS and the acquisition team as we move forward.”21
Sugar reportedly sent a reply letter to Winter dated June 29, 2007. According to one press report,
Sugar stated in the letter: “I share your concern regarding the need to fully recover and improve
our shipyards, and produce completed LPD 17 class vessels of the highest quality with increasing
efficiency.... Irrespective of Hurricane Katrina, Northrop has much work to do to meet the needs
of the U.S. Navy.”22 Another press report stated:
Northrop Grumman Corp (NOC) has ‘much more work to do’ to improve its performance on
Navy ships, but problems with a $13.6-billion amphibious ship program were not solely the
contractor’s making, Chief Executive Ron Sugar said in a June 29 letter.
“The original acquisition strategy was changed after contract award, there was funding
instability, limited early funding for critical vendor information, and the ‘integrated’
Navy/contractor design team produced constant design churn and thousands of design
changes,” Sugar wrote, responding to a tersely worded letter from Navy Secretary Donald
Winter.
Northrop “certainly had performance problems,” but the unprecedented effects of Hurricane
Katrina, which severely damaged Northrop’s three shipyards in the Gulf region in August
2005, “only served to greatly exacerbate the situation.... ”
Sugar said he shared Winter’s concerns and vowed that Northrop would invest, train and
manage its operations to produce Navy ships of the highest quality with increasing
efficiency. “Irrespective of Hurricane Katrina, Northrop has much more work to do to meet
the needs of the U.S. Navy.”
“We are not happy with this history,” Sugar added in the letter obtained by Reuters, “but we
are incorporating the lessons from this experience into our operational plans going forward
for new ships in the design, planning and production stages.”

21 Sources for these reported passages from the June 22 letter: Louis Hansen, “Navy Ship $840 Million Over Budget
And Still Unfinished,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, June 30, 2007; Tony Capaccio, “Northrop Grumman Criticized For
‘Mismanagement’ By U.S. Navy, Bloomberg News, July 2, 2007; Geoff Fein, “Navy To Monitor Work At Northrop
Grumman Gulf Coast Shipyards, Official Says,” Defense Daily, July 5, 2007; Christopher P. Cavas, “U.S. Navy
Furious Over LPD-17,” DefenseNews.com, July 9, 2007. InsideDefense.com on July 9, 2007, posted on the subscribers-
only portion of its website a copy of what it says is the June 22 letter.
22 Christopher P. Cavas, “U.S. Navy Furious Over LPD-17,” DefenseNews.com, July 9, 2007.
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He noted that Navy recently praised Northrop’s work on a destroyer that was damaged by
Hurricane Katrina, and termed it “one of the best ships ever delivered.”
Sugar said Northrop officials had given the Navy a list of efforts under way to improve
training, quality, processes, productivity and facilities at the Gulf Coast shipyards. He
promised “substantial investment,” but gave no details.
He said Northrop was aggressively reworking schedules for delivery of all ships affected by
the hurricane. “We know we must do our part,” Sugar said.23
After working to overcome construction problems, Navy officials in late 2007 stated that they
were “cautiously optimistic” that the LPD-17 construction effort is stabilizing. A December 24,
2007, press report stated:
As the Navy gears up for the first deployment of the new San Antonio-class amphibious
transport dock slated for next year, a senior service shipbuilding official is “cautiously
optimistic” the once-beleaguered program is on track....
On Dec. 15, the Navy commissioned the third ship, the Mesa Verde, in Panama City, Fla. It
was the first ship in the class to be delivered without significant problems.
The San Antonio class faced difficulties beginning in late 1998, when the initial construction
contract was awarded to Avondale Industries in New Orleans. Avondale beat out Litton
Ingalls Shipbuilding primarily because it planned to use a new computer program to design
the ships—the first time a Navy ship was designed entirety using computer tools. But the
computer systems didn’t work, the Navy kept making design changes, costs escalated and
major delays ensued.
Litton Ingalls bought Avondale in 1999, its owners mistakenly thinking they could fix the
program, and in late 2000 the shipyards were acquired by Northrop Grumman.
Meanwhile, a succession of service program managers and acquisition executives struggled
to hold down the design changes and manage costs, which have more than doubled from the
$750 million per ship the Navy forecast in the late 1990s.
All those problems and more affected the first two ships of the class. The San Antonio was
delivered, incomplete, in mid-2005. The Navy accepted the ship knowing it had numerous
construction defects, many of which would need to be fixed at extra costs after the shipyard’s
obligation period ended. The next ship, the New Orleans, was delivered in December 2007,
also with incomplete spaces. To make things more challenging, Hurricane Katrina had
wreaked havoc on the New Orleans-based Avondale shipyard in 2005.
Nevertheless, construction on the Mesa Verde, the third new ship, went more smoothly. The
Mesa Verde was built at Northrop Grumman’s Ingalls shipyard in Pascagoula, Miss....
The Mesa Verde “sets a new standard for the LPD class as far as being a complete ship,”
Capt. Beth Dexter, the Navy’s supervisor of shipbuilding in Pascagoula, told Military Times
in September. “My Navy team is proud to present it.”
Robert Work, a naval analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in
Washington, said it looks like the LPD 17 program is pulling away from its “checkered

23 Andrea Shalal-Esa, “Northrop Says Katrina Exacerbated Ship Problems,” Reuters, July 10, 2007.
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past.” He said it appears the program is “getting back on track” and that it will be exciting to
see the first ship as it enters the fleet.
American shipbuilders have historically had difficulties with lead ships, he said....
Stiller told Navy Times that after Hurricane Katrina the Navy re-established new milestones
to measure the new ships’ progress. So far, each ship under construction is meeting these
marks, she said.
“I believe we are turning the corner,” Stiller said. In 2008, she said, she hopes the service and
industry will be able to “not just meet but beat” these milestones.24
In August 2008, it was reported that the maiden deployment of LPD-17 was delayed by two days
due to problems with a hydraulic system that controls the stern gate used to gain access to the
ship’s well deck.25
In August 2008, it was also reported that:
Just under two years after the amphibious transport dock New Orleans [LPD-18] was
delivered incomplete, the amphib still can’t perform the central mission for which it was
designed: Carrying Marines, their gear and their vehicles into battle, according to a recent
report by the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey, or InSurv.
The San Diego-based New Orleans was “degraded” in its “ability to conduct sustained
combat operations,” and has a slew of other problems, according to the inspection, conducted
Aug. 11-15. The report, obtained by Navy Times, paints the picture of a ship not only
troubled by the same technical problems as its older sibling, the first-in-class gator San
Antonio, but also with many of its own.
“The ship cannot support embarked troops, cargo or landing craft,” the report said. Navy
engineers found “serious materials deficiencies in the well deck and vehicle stowage areas”;
the well deck’s ventilation fans didn’t work; the vehicle ramps were inoperative; and
berthing for Marines and the ships’ crew was found to be unsatisfactory.
Moreover, the ship’s propulsion system was unreliable, causing a 10-hour delay before it
could put to sea for its final contract trials. Much of its communications equipment didn’t
work. And when the ship tried to test its Rolling Airframe Missile launchers, both of them
fired just one missile at their targets and then lost power, forcing crews to reset their
computer systems.
The New Orleans InSurv arrived just as the Norfolk, Va.-based San Antonio [LPD-17] is
preparing to make its maiden deployment this week. That ship was delivered three years ago,
also incomplete. Like the San Antonio, the New Orleans’ electrical system had ship-wide
problems, according to Navy inspectors: “Significant electrical and electronic cable plant
installation deficiencies exist,” Navy inspectors wrote, including “dead-ended cables, cables

24 Zachary M. Peterson, “Troubled Amphib Program Appears On Track,” NavyTimes.com, December 24, 2007. See
also Dan Taylor, “Contract Awarded For Ninth LPD-17 As NGC Addresses Concerns,” Inside the Navy, January 7,
2008; and Christopher P. Cavas, “Third Time Could Be the Charm for LPD Program,” Defense News, September 10,
2007.
25 Andrew Scutro, “Mechanical Failure Keeps Troubled Amphib At Pier,” NavyTimes.com, August 26, 2008; Matthew
Jones, “Troubled Ship’s Departure Is Delayed By Gate Problem,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, August 27, 2008; Dan
Taylor, “After Delayed Start, Questions Abound on LPD-17s First Deployment,” September 1, 2008.
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improperly bundled and banded, cables exceeding nesting capacity, inadequate packing of
cables at watertight penetrations.”
The findings make for a total of three ships with widespread electrical problems that were
built at Northrop Grumman’s shipyards along the Gulf Coast: the first two San Antonios and
the amphibious assault ship Makin Island [LHD-8]. Northrop Grumman announced earlier
this year that it had to delay the delivery of the Makin Island by six months to fix its wiring
problems. The company agreed to bear the roughly $360 million cost.
Margaret Mitchell-Jones, a spokeswoman for Northrop Grumman, said the company did not
comment on ships it has already delivered to the Navy, but in a written statement Tuesday,
she said the San Antonio class was constantly improving:
“While we don’t comment on the capabilities of commissioned ships, we can say that with
each LPD, we continue to make significant improvements in all areas and this includes the
electrical systems. The latest LPD, Green Bay, will be delivered this week to the U.S. Navy
and, from a material and systems standpoint, was more complete than any other LPD at
acceptance trials. This is a testament to the benefits of series ship production and our ability
to come down the learning curve resulting in greater efficiencies.”26
In September 2008, it was reported that:
After facing a bevy of negative survey results for the first two LPD-17-class ships, the Navy
appears to be headed in the right direction, moving away from incomplete work and into
serial production, a Navy official said.
Earlier this year, the USS New Orleans (LPD-18) came under fire for a poor showing by the
Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey (InSurv). Last year, the USS San Antonio (LPD-17),
the lead ship of the new class of ambitious ships, suffered numerous issues with its InSurv
report.
The Navy took delivery of both the San Antonio and the New Orleans with a significant
amount of work left to complete.
About three years ago, the Navy was facing challenges with the construction schedule for
LPD-17.
Eventually, the Navy was forced to take delivery of the ship early because they had no
money to complete the work, Allison Stiller, deputy assistant secretary of the Navy ships,
told Defense Daily in a recent interview.
“With LPD-18, we knew we were going to be in a similar situation financially ... that we
were going to have to take delivery with a lot less incomplete,” she said, although not nearly
to the extent of LPD-17.
As the Navy and Northrop Grumman [NOC] Ship Systems began work on the USS Mesa
Verde (LPD-19), they began to believe that this ship, too, would have to be delivered
incomplete.

26 Philip Ewing, “InSurv: LPD 18’s Ability Degraded,” NavyTimes.com, August 30, 2008. See also Philip Ewing and
Andrew Scutro, “U.S. Navy Inspectors Pan 2nd LPD-17 Ship,” Defense News, September 1, 2008: 1, 8; “More Issues
For LPD Program,” Defense Daily, September 2, 2008; and Steve Liewer, “Troubles In Port, At Sea Weigh Down
Navy Ship,” San Diego Union-Trubune, October 1, 2008: 1.
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But the combined effort of the shipyard and the Navy helped deliver a completed ship, she
added.
LPD-19 wrapped up her shock trials, and the Navy is now compiling the date from the tests,
Stiller added.
“We saw what we expected to see. There were no surprises from the shock trial,” she said.
The USS Green Bay (LPD-20) was just delivered, and the follow-on ships are looking good,
Stiller noted.
Stiller acknowledges there were concerns about delivering finished LPDs. Until the Mesa
Verde, Northrop Grumman had not delivered a completed LPD.
“Certainly there are still challenges in getting the ship delivered, but we are in serial
production,” she said. “The yard is working hard at it. The ships are delivering. [We are]
seeing reduced trial cards on everyone of them. That’s the trend you want to see. It’s good
news to get into serial production, no doubt about it.”27
In October 2008, it was reported that:
The U.S. Navy’s third and fourth San Antonio-class amphibious transport docks show a
distinct improvement over the troubled first two ships in the class, inspectors have found.
According to reports by the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey, the third ship, Mesa
Verde [LPD-19], was much more complete than its earlier siblings when it was accepted by
the Navy Sept. 27, 2007.
And in their report on the fourth ship, Green Bay [LPD-20], inspectors included something
never seen before in an inspection report (referred to as an InSurv) about an LPD 17-class
ship—a compliment.
“Green Bay was found to be a highly capable and well built ship,” they wrote. “The main
spaces fit, finish and cleanliness were [satisfactory.]” To be sure, each InSurv still found
many problems aboard each ship, and it concluded Mesa Verde was “degraded in its ability
to conduct sustained combat operations,” as was New Orleans. Overall, however, the two
inspections seemed to reinforce statements by the Navy and shipbuilder Northrop Grumman
that the San Antonio class is gradually improving after its initial misfires, according to a
veteran skipper who examined the documents.
The reports showed that overall build quality on Mesa Verde and Green Bay was much
improved over San Antonio and New Orleans, and neither amphib seemed to have
experienced as many problems with shipwide networks or electrical systems as the first two.
Neither new ship had major problems with their propulsion systems, as the first two did.
Other major problems from the San Antonio and New Orleans—including incomplete
berthing spaces, broken gear in the galleys and medical spaces, and nonfunctioning
weapons—didn’t reoccur in Mesa Verde or Green Bay. Meanwhile, years of work have
helped transform San Antonio from one of the Navy’s most infamous ships into a fully
functional member of the fleet, the ship’s captain said.

27 Geoff Fein, “Navy Seeing Improvements In LHD, LPD-Class Ships, Official Says,” Defense Daily, September 23,
2008: 1-2. Ellipsis and brackets as in original.
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In a conference call with reporters Oct. 6, Cmdr. Kurt Kastner said San Antonio has had no
major problems since it sailed in August from Norfolk as part of the Iwo Jima Expeditionary
Strike Group.28
In November 2008, it was reported that:
The troubled amphibious transport dock San Antonio—in the middle of its first
deployment—has been forced to undergo two weeks of maintenance in Bahrain due to leaks
in its lube oil piping system, Navy officials said.
“They had a scheduled port visit,” said Lt. Nate Christensen, spokesman for 5th Fleet in
Bahrain. “They’re in port for two weeks for a maintenance availability on some lube oil
deficiencies. It’s related to the diesel generators.”
Pat Dolan, a spokeswoman at Naval Sea Systems Command, confirmed that the problem
involved leaks in the system.
The yard period began earlier this week, although the exact day was unavailable.29
It was also reported in November 2008 that:
The leaks were discovered while the ship was conducting maritime security operations in the
Persian Gulf, according to U.S. Naval Forces Central Command spokesman Lt. Nathan
Christensen....
The leaks were first discovered Oct. 9 and a second incident on Oct. 17 prompted the need
for a thorough inspection, Lt. Clay Doss, a Navy spokesman at the Pentagon told ITN [Inside
the Navy
] Nov. 6.
“We are confident this issue is limited to LPD-17 only,” Doss said.30
Later in November 2008, it was reported that:
Experts who have examined the photos of major oil leaks aboard the amphibious transport
dock San Antonio are calling the workmanship on the new amphib “sloppy,” “unacceptable”
and “criminal.” One former chief engineer said any other CHENG [Chief of Engineering] in
the Navy would be “thankful this wasn’t their ship.”
But it is someone’s ship, and despite the finger-pointing, experts say the Navy has a serious
problem on its hands....
“The secretary has been briefed on the issue and has been getting periodic extended updates
about the progress of the repairs,” said Capt. Beci Brenton, spokeswoman for Navy Secretary
Donald Winter.
While the brass is watching and the shipbuilder defends its work and promises to make fixes,
one question remains: How was this allowed to happen? And are other problems lurking?

28 Philip Ewing, “For LPDs, 3rd And 4th Time’s The Charm,” Defense News, October 13, 2008: 3. See also Andrew
Scutro, “Photos Show Extent of Oil Leaks on LPD 17,” NavyTimes.com, November 12, 2008.
29 Andrew Scutro, “San Antonio Laid Up in Bahrain,” NavyTimes.com, November 6, 2008.
30 Zachary M. Peterson, “First-Of-Class LPD-17 Pierside in Bahrain For Unexpected Repairs,” Inside the Navy,
November 10, 2008. See also Mark Thompson, “The Navy’s Floating Fiasco,” Time, November 12, 2008.
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‘I’m fuming’
Margaret Mitchell-Jones, spokeswoman for shipbuilder Northrop Grumman, defended the
contractor’s performance and said the company is taking “corrective actions.”
“The quality of our work is something we take very seriously, and we have a rigorous
program in place that includes inspecting and evaluating our work to ensure it adheres to the
Navy’s requirements,” she said in a statement. “When issues arise, we aggressively address
them in an immediate and methodical way. Upon hearing there may be a problem with lube
oil leaks on LPD 17, we immediately responded with technical staff to assist in the Navy’s
efforts and began our own in-house critique.”
She added that “we are proactively conducting a comprehensive review of our procedures,
processes and policies surrounding the LPD-class ships currently under construction at our
Gulf Coast shipyards. This effort includes the implementation of short-term corrective
actions until, aligned with our customer, we fully determine the cause and need for any long-
term corrective actions to ensure conformance and reinforce the commitment to quality we
have in our work. We have invited and welcomed Navy participation throughout our own
internal review process.”
On Capitol Hill, lawmakers also are taking notice. Josh Holly, a spokesman for the
Republican side of the House Armed Services Committee, said members “continue to follow
[San Antonio’s] challenges. The seapower subcommittee is aware of the most recent issues,
although the Navy has not briefed us yet.”
Rep. Joe Sestak, D-Pa., a former vice admiral, said after viewing the photos: “It looks like
more of a systemic problem from when it was built.”
“The ones who suffer are the bluejackets,” said Sestak, a member of the House Armed
Services Committee and former top warfare requirements and programs officer for the Navy.
Naval analyst and author Norman Polmar put it more bluntly.
“It’s criminal. It’s criminal that the Navy accepted this ship,” he said. “And this is two and a
half years after the Navy accepted the ship. It’s bad enough that it was delivered this way.”
Polmar said he thinks the San Antonio should be towed back to the shipyard.
“As a taxpayer and as a naval analyst,” he said, “I’m fuming.”...
Who’s to blame?
Those familiar with the situation do not blame the crew or Navy engineers for the problem,
comparing it with the discovery of a flaw in your car’s chassis during a road trip: You may
have topped off the oil and filled the gas tank before you left, they say, but you can’t be
expected to examine work completed long ago, when the car was built at the auto plant.
Even those responsible for ensuring the material condition of the fleet—the ultracritical
Board of Inspection and Survey—do so under certain assumptions, one Navy source said.
“Even InSurv wouldn’t have found faulty welds,” the Navy source said.
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Cmdr. Jensin Sommer, a spokeswoman for 2nd Fleet, said her command “certifies units for
deployment and for integrated training with carrier and expeditionary strike groups so
they’re ready for integrated operations.”
“That’s a different type of readiness than material condition,” she added.
Pat Dolan, spokeswoman for Naval Sea Systems Command, said naval engineers declined a
request to explain the damage because they refused to comment on photos that had not been
officially released.
The photos were posted on a blog and later authenticated by Dolan.
She did say that when the ship pulled into Bahrain, it was greeted by a crew of more than 30
engineers, pipefitters and welders flown to Bahrain from the U.S.
As of Nov. 13, there were no initial cost estimates and no available progress reports. “We’re
still looking at mid- to late November for the repairs to be completed,” Dolan said.
She added that engineers are conducting a “root-cause analysis” and the repair and ship
crews are fixing the flaws, noting “some that require replacing whole sections of pipe.”
Earlier, Dolan said the oil leaks had not posed a danger to sailors working near them.
Other problems lurking?
Naval experts and engineers familiar with the San Antonio’s history are concerned that if
these welding problems went undiscovered until now, what other problems are waiting to
pop up?
Jan van Tol, a retired captain who commanded the amphibious assault ship Essex, said he
had deployments during his career commanding three ships that were interrupted by major
breakdowns, and that it’s not unusual to have technical experts come aboard.
But the size of the repair team and the nature of this casualty is notable, he said.
“It surprises me to see oil leaking from such major points. I associate leaks with moving
parts,” he said. “What’s unusual is the sheer number of people who are going out to address
what appears to be a wider-ranging problem.”
Van Tol said he thinks any such flaw—if detected—would have prevented the ship’s
deployment. So how did the ship get as far as it did?
“Are these systemic problems in one or more of the ship’s systems and physical plant? If
they are, that goes to the question of craftsmanship and why did the Navy accept the ship?
Are there ship-wide problems of a similar nature of poor craftsmanship and quality
assurance? Who made the decisions to allow it to reach this point?” he said. “It raises the
question of supervision and oversight, both at the shipyard and on the Navy’s side.”
He won’t go as far as other critics, but he did say the situation “certainly doesn’t look good.”
“It’s imperative to take a harsh, harsh look at how they got to this place. The Navy really
needs to learn some harsh lessons,” he said.
Those lessons may soon be in the syllabus.
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Sestak, the former three-star, has called for a hard look at the defense acquisition process
since his arrival in Congress in 2007. He believes the problems aboard the San Antonio are a
symptom of a larger institutional breakdown among the defense industry, the Pentagon and
Congress.
As a former commander in the fleet, he said he finds it hard to believe that the San Antonio
could have been allowed to deploy if anyone knew these breakdowns were imminent.
“I expected to be handed machines of war that had a certain level of readiness I then had to
maintain. At times there were unexpected problems. Something could break. But I never
expected to deploy with a machine of war, particularly a relatively new one, that had
systemic problems that would take weeks at a time [to fix],” said Sestak, who commanded
the George Washington Carrier Strike Group.
“When it’s something that appears systemic to the construction of the machine of war, we’re
giving short shrift to our warriors out there.”
He said operators preparing for deployment care about how the ship and the crew perform;
it’s not their job to inspect welds. Quality construction is supposed to be a given, something
certified long before the ship is ever put into action.
In pre-deployment certifications, “they’re not looking inside the welds. They’re looking at
how it’s operating at that moment,” he said.
Sestak said the LPD 17 class is just one weapon system among many with major problems.
“I’d like to go back to ‘What are the institutional processes that permitted this to happen?’
That is where I’d like to go back to the sources and find out how this can be done better,” he
said. “I have proposed that we should have hearings on acquisition reform in the new
session, with LPD 17 part of that.”
For Polmar, the naval analyst, the Navy’s experience with the San Antonio is a scandal
worthy of investigation. He compares it to the infamous Air Force tanker deal that sent an
Air Force civilian and an industry executive to jail.
Besides the money and shoddy product, Polmar said putting such a problematic ship to sea
put sailors’ lives at risk.
“It’s as big in some respects as the tanker deal because it’s difficult to get to the truth of
this,” he said. “It’s difficult to find out who accepted the ship. People went to jail and were
fined in the tanker deal, and that’s the minimum of what should happen here.”
What’s particularly shocking, he said, are the repeated problems in such a new product.
“We’re talking about a warship,” he said. “You can see how the oil is leaking through those
welds. You may see that on a ship that is 20 or 30 years old, not a ship that’s two or three
years old.”
One naval historian, who asked not to be named because of his affiliations, was asked to
think of another surface Navy program this problematic.
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“The only thing I’d compare it to are [the littoral combat ship] and DDG 1000,” he said. “It
just seems like the Navy can’t get it right anymore.”31
It was also reported later in November 2008 that:
Navy Secretary Donald Winter said Monday [November 17] he “continues to be unsatisfied”
with the performance of the amphibious transport dock San Antonio, which has been
sidelined by emergency repairs since Oct. 31.
But after a speech in which he described the need for accountability and a “culture of
quality” for Navy acquisitions and its private-sector vendors, Winter did not commit to new
changes or penalties for problems with the San Antonio and its follow-on siblings.
“I continue to be unsatisfied with the performance there,” Winter said. “We are continuing to
look at it. It’s a matter I’ll be spending some time on over the next few weeks. We’ll adopt
an appropriate course of action ahead.”32
Still later in November 2008, it was reported that:
As the Navy continues to examine problems with the lube oil system on the USS San
Antonio (LPD-17), the service is taking steps to ensure there are no similar issues with the
remainder of the class of amphibious ships.
A team of 30 maintenance personnel from Norfolk Naval Shipyard Mid Atlantic Regional
Maintenance Center is in Bahrain, handling the repair work, which is focused on the main
propulsion lube oil system, Capt. Bill Galinis, program manager LPD-17, told Defense Daily
in a recent interview.
Galinis said initial inspections found a couple of issues.
One problem was improperly installed or missing pipe hangers. A second issue were welds
that Galinis noted “were on the lower side of the acceptable criteria.”
In some cases, those welds didn’t pass a visual inspection, he added.
“Those items combined resulted in some cracked welds that we found. We believe it was
fatigue failure,” he added. “A lot of that analysis is still ongoing.”
As of earlier this week, repairs to the San Antonio were 50 percent complete and the work
was expected to be wrapped up by mid to late November.
The main propulsion lube oil system problem on LPD-17 has led to a class-wide review, a
Navy source told Defense Daily. That review includes inspection of the weld quality and an
examination of whether the number of pipe supports on LPD-18, -19, and -20 are sufficient.
“We are doing engineering analysis and shipboard inspections, the source said “That
includes visual, radiological and dye penetration.”
The lube oil leaks occurred in the forward and aft machinery space, the source said.

31 Andrew Scutro, “Gator Oil Leaks: What Went Wrong?” NavyTimes.com, November 17, 2008. Bracketed material as
in the original. Gator, as in alligator, is an informal term for an amphibious ship.
32 Philip Ewing, “Winter Remains Unsatisfied With LPD 17,” NavyTimes.com, November 17, 2008.
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The inspections take place in two groups, one focusing on the welds and the other on the
pipe hangers, Galinis said.
Weld inspections in one of two machinery rooms have been completed on LPD-18, Galinis
added.
The results of that inspection show the welds are good, he noted.
“The ship is underway right now. When she pulls back in here ... we’ll do the second
machinery room,” Galinis said. “We also just completed the pipe hanger inspection, so we
have a list of pipe hangers we need to add.”
The pipe hanger work likely will get done before LPD-18’s deployment next year, he added.
The inspections are not limited to the ships, however. Galinis added the Navy is also looking
at the weld inspection techniques used in the shipyards. “We are doing that from a training
aspect, looking at the weld criteria that is applied when you do a visual inspection ... how
that’s applied to ensure there is uniformity.”
“[We are] also taking an opportunity to go back and look at the processes that are in place in
the shipyard, all the way from how the pipe is fabricated in the pipe shop and weld joints that
are installed, and how the welding is done, to installation on the ship and the way the pipe
gets ‘hangered’ on the ship,” Galinis said.
“If you follow that trend all the way, from material receipt, through the fabrication of pipe
details, to the installation of the pipe on the ship, to the testing of the pipe and inspection of
the welds and the installation of the system, if you follow that process all the way through,
there are things along the way here that we certainly can improve on,” he added. “And we
are taking that opportunity to do this.”
Northrop Grumman [NOC] Ship Systems said the quality of its work is something the
company takes very seriously.
“We have a rigorous program in place that includes inspecting and evaluating our work to
ensure it adheres to the Navy’s requirements. When issues arise, we aggressively address
them in an immediate and methodical way,” Margaret Mitchell-Jones, a Northrop Grumman
Shipbuilding spokeswoman, told Defense Daily. “Upon hearing there may be a problem with
lube oil leaks on LPD-17, we immediately responded with technical staff to assist in the
Navy’s efforts and began our own in-house critique. We have put our best people in place to
assist our customer and we are proactively conducting a comprehensive review of our
procedures, processes and policies surrounding the LPD-class ships currently under
construction at our Gulf Coast shipyards.”
Those efforts include the implementation of short-term corrective actions until, aligned with
the Navy, Northrop Grumman determines the cause and need for any long-term corrective
actions to ensure conformance and reinforce the commitment to quality the company has in
its work, Mitchell-Jones added.
“We have invited and welcomed Navy participation throughout our own internal review
process.”
Northrop Grumman builds the San Antonio-class amphibious ships at both its Pascagoula,
Miss., and New Orleans shipyards.
The fourth ship of the class, LPD-20, was just delivered, Galinis said.
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LPD-21 through -25 are under construction, with LPD-22 and -24 being built at Pascagoula
and LPD-21, -23, and -25 being built in New Orleans.
The Navy just received funding for LPD-26 in the FY ‘09 defense bill. “We are in the
process of putting together the RFP documents,” Galinis said.
Lessons learned from the lube oil leak on LPD-17 have been rolled into LDP-21, he added.
Currently, LPD-21 is about to begin the process where its lube oil system is flushed, Galinis
said.
“Obviously lessons learned from [LPD]-17 were immediately applied to [LPD]-21 because
that piping system, although it is installed and fully built, hasn’t been completed with all the
... insulation, so it was very easy to take what we were seeing on [LPD]-17 and go back and
look at [LPD]-21 ... look at the welds, look at where the pipe hangers are ... and in some
cases, quite frankly even now, not all the pipe hangers are installed. So we are kind of still in
that process.”
For the ships that have already been delivered, Galinis said there is a big focus on LPD-18,
which is out on the West Coast and will deploy next year. LPD-19 is currently going through
her (Post Shakedown Availability PSA) in Norfolk, Va., at BAE Systems. “We will do a
weld and hanger inspection on her during the current PSA period she is in,” Galinis said.
The Navy is doing an inspection right now on LPD-20. Earlier this month, she was going
through an engineering certification with her crew, Galinis said. “We didn’t want to get into
the machinery spaces while she was going through that inspection.”
That certification wrapped up last week, so the Navy is now going through the inspection on
her, he added. “So far the results look pretty good, but we are still in that process.”33
It was subsequently reported in November 2008 that:
While it might appear that the Navy’s San Antonio-class program is fraught with problems,
the Navy and industry team have been able to drastically reduce the number of inspection
trial cards and put in place construction practices to cut down on installation work and on
cost, according to a Navy official.
When the USS San Antonio (LPD-17) wrapped up her trials, the Navy’s Board of Inspection
and Survey (INSURV) wrote up just over 16,000 trial cards, Capt. Bill Galinis, LPD-17
program manager, told Defense Daily in a recent interview.
In April 2007, LPD-17 went into BAE Systems’ repair facility in Norfolk, Va., to fix the
problems found by the inspection.
The cost of Post Shakedown Authority (PSA) for the USS San Antonio was $36 million....
When the USS New Orleans (LPD-18) finished her trials earlier this year, the INSURV
board wrote up just under 14,000 trial cards, Galinis noted.

33 Geoff Fein, “Navy Making Sure LPD-17 Lube Oil Leak Problem Doesn’t Spread To Rest of Class,” Defense Daily,
November 20, 2008: 1-3. Ellipses and material in brackets as in the original.
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“When we delivered the ships, they were not quite finished,” he said of both the San Antonio
and New Orleans.
“When we got to [LPD]-19, that’s where we saw the big down shift. We had a little bit more
than a 50 percent reduction from hull 2 to hull 3, and that was a step increase for us,” Galinis
said. “Same thing on Part 1 cards, where you went from 740 cards to 257 ... better than a 50
percent decrease from the second to third ship.”
Part 1 cards note deficiencies that would affect a mission area of the ship, such as defensive
systems, the ability to get underway and embark Marines, Galinis said.
Part 2 cards are material deficiencies that would not necessarily degrade a mission area, he
added.
By the time the USS Mesa Verde (LPD-20) underwent her INSURV inspection, the amount
of Part 1 cards decreased almost 90 percent, Galinis said.
“That’s a real credit to the builder and the Navy team that’s down there on site, where
literally we go through and prepare a ship to go through the trial process,” Galinis said.
The first trial is conducted by the Navy’s Supervisor of Ships (SUPSHIP). Galinis said they
take the INSURV reports from the previous inspections and start from there.
“As we go through the test sequence, we are looking at these deficiencies and making sure
we are rolling those lessons in,” he said. “The shipyard has a process where they do that, and
the SUPSHIP does that as well.”
But it’s difficult to roll in those lessons learned. That’s because two different yards are
building the LPD-17 class: Northrop Grumman [NOC] Ship Systems Pascagoula, Miss.,
facility and the company’s shipyard in New Orleans.
“Across the class, you don’t get true learning because we are building ships in alternate
facilities,” Galinis said. “Although there is some part of the workforce that moves back and
forth across the two shipyards.”
Another issue has been that the lessons learned from LPD-17 and -18 have been rolled into
the follow-on ships out of sequence, Galinis said.
“On [LPD]-19 and -20, a lot of these lessons learned were cut in... out of sequence. In other
words, if you had to plan how you do the work, some of the changes as a result of some of
these earlier INSURV trials were rolled into these follow ships probably not at the optimum
time, if you had an opportunity to really plan it out,” he said. “That’s because if you take a
look at how the ships stack up on top of one another, they were just that close in the
construction sequence.”
Not being able to cut that work in, in sequence, affects not only the number of changes that
can be cut in but also what it cost to do that work, Galinis added.
That also affects the end cost of this ship in some cases because it takes more man hours to
do that. Galinis said it is the three, two, one rule.
“What would take you an hour to do in a unit would take you two hours to do when you
stack that on, and when the ship goes into the water that task would take you three hours to
do,” he said. “So you can see as a ship gets closer to delivery it gets more expensive to do the
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same amount of work, because you close the ship down and are working in a much more
confined space ... and it’s more difficult to do the work.
“That’s why when I say we are cutting corrections in, out of sequence here, you don’t
generally get as much learning and the same leverage,” Galinis added.
What people will start to see on the USS New York (LPD-21) and the follow ships, however,
is that a lot of this work is being done in sequence, Galinis said. “So we are able to sort of
pan that in, and certainly with [LPD-] 22 and follow-on you will see even more of that.”
The other thing the Navy and Northrop Grumman have been able to do on these ships is to
increase the amount of pre-outfit on the units, Galinis said.
There are 210 units on a LPD-17-class ship. Those units are built in modules. What the Navy
would like to try to do is get as much pre-outfitting done as they possibly can.
“By installing piping systems, equipment, some machinery units, ventilation, electrical
components, things of that nature ... on the earlier ships pre-outfitting has probably been in
the 70 percent range. We are moving up into the 90 percent, or even better, on these later
ships,” Galinis said. “Going back to that three-two-one rule, we are doing a lot more of that
work on the front end of the construction process at a lower cost. As we start to stack those
units, there is less installation work to do on the back end.
“The lessons learned in the items that were identified on the previous ships, that work is
being done more efficiently, in sequence on [LPD-] 21 and follow, and we are also able, on
[LPD-] 22 and follow, to pull that back further and include that as part of the pre-outfitting
work that we do. We are increasing that amount of work as well.”34
A November 2008 press report stated:
Pentagon acquisition czar John Young last week criticized the welds on the Northrop
Grumman-built San Antonio (LPD-17), but said it remains to be seen if current problems
with the ship lie with the builder or with the Navy.
The first-of-class amphibious transport dock ship San Antonio hit a snag recently during its
much-anticipated first deployment. The ship is pierside in Manama, Bahrain, where leaks in
the lube oil piping system are being investigated and ultimately repaired. “All the vessels of
the class are being reinspected,” Young said in a Nov. 20 breakfast meeting with reporters in
Washington. “I think the Navy is doing the prudent thing to go back and look through the
class.”
Yet, Allison Stiller, the deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for shipbuilding, told Inside
the Navy Nov. 12 that the service believes the problems with the San Antonio are exclusive
to that ship.
“Right now the issues that we’re experiencing on the lead ship [LPD-17], we believe are
isolated to the lead ship,” Stiller said in an interview in her Pentagon office.

34 Geoff Fein, “Lessons Learned From INSURV Inspections Lead To Improvements On San Antonio-Class,” Defense
Daily
, November 21, 2008: 3-5. Ellipses and bracketed material as in the original.
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“We’re still getting the data, but the indications are this is limited to the lead ship and, again,
it’s pipe hangers, welds or a combination, and we have to come through that analysis to
understand what the problem is,” she added.
Young noted last week that the investigation is not complete and he does yet know the extent
of the lube oil piping system problem.
“In the lube oil area, the Navy is still doing an investigation,” he said. “The initial results of
this are somewhat concerning, and that is both industry and the Navy may have inspected
these welds to a lesser standard than the Navy called for.”
Moreover, the acquisition chief argued Northrop Grumman, the shipbuilder, had higher-than-
normal defect rates on some of the ship’s welds, which could in turn have led to the current
problems.
“In the past, the company had defect rates over 30 percent or higher on high-temperature,
high-pressure welding and even on rather simple drain pipe welding,” Young said. “None of
those are the lube oil system, which I don’t know if we had excessive defect rates there.”
If the leaks are found to be the result of inadequate inspections by industry, and in turn, the
Navy, the taxpayer should not foot the bill, Young argued.
“The government should not be paying under cost-plus contracts, in any area of product
delivery, for poor standard of performance where we have to pay extra cost to have it re-
done,” he said. “I think the defect rates on some of those high-temperature, high-pressure
welds, drain-pipe welds were excessive and the government needs to find a different way to
do business with industry in any sector where we get something that’s totally anomalous to
what would be reasonable commercial practice.”
Northrop has launched its own investigation into the problem, the company’s president of
shipbuilding told ITN [Inside the Navy] last week.
“When we first heard of the specific set of issues on LPD-17, we immediately set up our own
investigation, our own team, to try to understand what are the issues to the best of our ability
to figure out. What are our processes, where are the gaps in our processes, do we have them,
have we already addressed them?” Mike Petters said in a Nov. 17 interview in Newport
News, VA.
“We have worked cooperatively with the Navy, and we’re providing whatever assistance
they’re asking for,” he added. “I don’t think we’re actually doing any of the repairs
ourselves. We have had people there to assist in some of the fact finding and to help
diagnose what’s going on.”
The shipyard is “conducting briefings and reviews throughout all Gulf Coast facilities of
Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding to include all quality inspectors, pipewelders, and
pipefitters,” a company spokeswoman said Nov. 20.
Moreover, Northrop is taking other measures to ensure its processes are working right,
including:
—Performing a comprehensive review of all documentation from LPD-17, focusing
specifically on pipe and weld design, quality inspection requirements and procedures as well
as procedural compliance to design specifications;
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—inspecting the piping system to verify the necessary support hangers have been installed;
and
—performing inspections—in conjunction with the Navy—of the pipe systems on LPD-20 to
ensure all weld standards are compliant before the ship leaves the yard in New Orleans.35
An August 2009 news report stated that: “The program manager for amphibious assault ships
pledged a ‘redoubling of efforts’ in quality assurance of new LPD-17 amphibious assault ships
after the lead ship in the class suffered a series of setbacks ranging from welding deficiencies to a
delayed first deployment.”36
An early January 2010 news report stated:
The amphibious transport dock New York has suffered a mechanical failure and can’t get
underway, Navy Times has learned. Engineers are investigating whether the ship’s problems
will affect its San Antonio-class siblings, several of which have struggled since joining the
fleet.
Inspectors discovered problems with the bearings on the New York’s diesel engines during
an assessment while the ship was at sea, but it was able to return to its dock at Naval Station
Norfolk, Va., under its own power, said Lt. Cmdr. Herb Josey, a spokesman for Naval
Surface Force Atlantic.
Bearings hold a ship’s engines and vital propulsion gear in place. The broken ones aboard
the New York are still under warranty and will be repaired by its builder, Northrop
Grumman, Josey said.
Northrop Grumman spokeswoman Margaret Mitchell-Jones issued this statement: “Northrop
Grumman is supporting the Navy in their analysis of this situation, however we defer any
additional comment on commissioned ships to the Navy.”
The New York—which enjoys international fame for the 7.5 tons of steel from the wreckage
of the World Trade Center built into its bow stem—was commissioned with national fanfare
Nov. 7 in its namesake city. Since then it has been doing at-sea tests and inspections,
including the week-long “diesel baseline assessment” that revealed its failed bearings, Josey
said....
New York sailors told Navy Times in November before the ship’s commissioning they were
working out their own bugs in their new ship; for example, New York’s helmsmen had
gotten used to piloting it manually because its fiber-optic control network tended to blink
out.37
Later in January 2010, it was reported that:
A fresh set of problems with the long-troubled LPD 17 San Antonio-class amphibious ships
has side-lined two of the vessels, led the U.S. Navy and its largest shipbuilder into a

35 Zachary M. Peterson (with additional reporting by Rebekah Gordon), Young: Navy Should Not Pay For Poor
Craftsmanship On LPD-17 Ships,” Inside the Navy, November 24, 2008.
36 Dan Taylor, “Graham: ‘Redoubling of Efforts’ To Avoid Repeat of LPD-17 Problems,” Inside the Navy, August 24,
2009.
37 Philip Ewing, “LPD Machinery Issue Could Affect Other Ships,” NavyTimes.com, January 7, 2010.
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passionate game of finger-pointing, and raised questions about Northrop Grumman’s ability
to deliver quality work and the Navy’s ability to carry out proper shipyard oversight.
The larger issues are coming from two core problems discovered aboard the LPD 17s, five of
which are in service with four still to come.
Of more immediate importance is a problem that, left untreated, could wreck the four large
diesel engines that drive the ships. The problem is not new but, having once thought a
solution was at hand, the Navy and Northrop are once again trying to figure out why a fix
hasn’t been found.
Another issue, affecting all the ships in the class and other ships built at Northrop’s Gulf
Coast ship-yards, could—unless it’s fixed—shorten the service lives of all the ships. But
how and why that problem arose could drive closer to the competence of Northrop and the
Navy’s inspectors to properly inspect weld work.
The Lube Oil Problem
Engineers are trying to figure out how debris—“contaminants” in engineer-speak—is getting
into lube oil in the large diesel engines that drive the ships. The contaminants cause
excessive wear on bearings that support a crankshaft at the bottom of each engine. If the
problem isn’t treated, the crankshaft will be thrown out of line and the engine could suffer
serious damage or even be wrecked.
The problem isn’t new, the Navy said, and showed up about a year ago in the third and
fourth ships of the class.
“We thought we had it licked,” Jay Stefany, the Navy’s program manager for the LPD 17
program, told reporters Jan. 21. “And that’s where we were until right before Christmas.”
That’s when the newest ship in the class, the USS New York (LPD 21), reported a bent
crankshaft in one of the four diesel engines that drive the ship. Engineers found that the shaft
was thrown out of alignment by scratches being made in the inner ring of the nine bearings
that support the shaft—scratches that caused enough of a difference in the thickness of the
bearings to make the shaft wobble. The scratches are caused by particles too small to see—
much of them between 20 and 40 microns wide, or about .00118 of an inch, according to
Stefany.
Such particles are found in all engines, but there are unofficial reports that the particles
causing the latest problems are coming from shipyard work: slag from welding waste and
grit from sand blasting.
The problems on the New York showed up in late November, after the ship returned to its
base at Norfolk, Va. The ship, commissioned on Nov. 7 during an emotional and highly
publicized ceremony at New York City, was widely proclaimed by Northrop as one of the
best ships it had ever built, particularly because of its symbolism of the Sept. 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center—steel from which was used in forging the ship’s
prow.
Stefany said the problems were a recurrence of similar issues discovered about a year ago on
the Mesa Verde (LPD 19) and Green Bay (LPD 20).
“The ships were down for a number of months,” he said, and stainless steel shavings were
discovered in the lube oil. The problem was not with the Colt-Pielstick PC2.5 STC engines
made by Fairbanks Morse Engine, he said, but changes were made in the piping between the
engine and a strainer meant to catch contaminants. A new process to flush out the engines
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was also created and made standard. The ships subsequently reported no problems. The two
earlier ships of the class, San Antonio (LPD 17) and New Orleans (LPD 18), also reported
their engines were fine.
More Examinations
But with the new problems on the New York, the ships were examined again. Three of the
ships were OK, but the San Antonio found contaminants in three of the four engines. The
amphib is now at a shipyard in Norfolk awaiting repairs. The New York is also at Norfolk,
where repairs are being made to the crankshaft bearings. Replacement of the bent crankshaft,
however, will have to wait for a more extensive shipyard period this spring.
Engineers working for the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), Northrop Grumman
and Fairbanks Morse are deeply perplexed by the problem, and a design review meeting is to
begin Jan. 26 in New Orleans, bringing together all the principals along with the fleet to
discover the cause and come up with a permanent solution.
The fleet also is looking into the problem. Early in December, Adm. John Harvey,
com-mander of Fleet Forces Command, ordered Rear Adm. Michelle Howard, commander
of Expeditionary Strike Group Two, to begin a Manual of the Judge Advocate General
investigation, or JAGMAN, of the problem. The effort reportedly is being led by NAVSEA’s
Rear Adm. Tom Eccles, the Navy’s chief engineer. The investigation is focused primarily on
the San Antonio and not the New York, which has yet to transfer to fleet operational control.
The lube oil problem is the latest embarrassment to hit the LPD 17 program, which has
suffered a string of well-publicized snags and setbacks almost since the initial construction
contract was awarded in 1998. Workmanship problems and bad luck have followed some of
the ships even after they entered service—on its long-delayed first deployment in fall 2008,
the San Antonio was forced to remain at Bahrain for more than a month to repair weld leaks
in the main propulsion lube oil system.
The vexing lube oil problem on the ships is causing nerves to be frayed all around. The
engines themselves are slightly modified versions of a tried-and-true model that is in wide
use on ships and ashore, and has powered the Navy’s LSD 41 Whidbey Island-class
amphibious ships since the 1980s. Unsubstantiated charges range from shipyard sloppiness
by Northrop Grumman or smaller yards that carry out overhauls to inadequate training of
sailors who oversee the operation of the automated engine rooms. There is also the
possibility that the fixes identified a year ago simply haven’t all been made, said one key
engineer.
“Replacing that section of piping from the filter to the intake, that was the main fix,” said
Lee Graeber, vice president of engineering at Fairbanks Morse and a former NAVSEA
en-gineer. That effort, he said, “is still going on.” And while “dirty lube oil is still the prime
suspect for the bearing failures,” Graeber feels the bent shaft “was due to engine operation
while the bearing on that engine was failing or in the process of failing.” Turning off the
engine, he said, would avoid such damage.
Contaminants are found in all diesel engines, Graeber said. “They can be created by the
combustion process in the engine itself—part of the lube oil filter process is to wash them
out. Normally a diesel plant would have several lube oil purifiers that would take these out,
and that also is being investigated—whether there are enough purifiers and they are of
sufficient size and capacity.” Virtually everything having to do with the engine and the
design of the oil lubrication system will be examined at the design review, sources said,
including design, welding, con-struction and maintenance procedures and other equipment.
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“They’re trying to figure out what’s wrong with the damn system,” said one exasperated
official. “Everybody could raise their hand.” And while the New York is undergoing repairs,
work on the San Antonio is on hold pend-ing conclusion of the JAGMAN investigation.
The Weld Problem
A more widespread problem that came to light during the 2008 Bahrain repairs on the San
Antonio has to do with substandard welds on pipe joints on ships delivered by Northrop’s
Gulf Coast yards at Avondale, New Orleans, and Ingalls, Pascagoula, Miss. The thickness of
many welds, Stefany said, is too thin, meeting commercial but not military specifications. A
design that featured too few hangars that hold pipes in place led to exces-sive vibration of the
pipes on the San Antonio, causing the welds to fail.
The welds would not have failed were there enough hangars, Stefany pointed out. Changes
were made to the ship’s design and more hangars were added in all the ships. The next ship
to be commissioned, the San Diego (LPD 22), will “have the right hangaring from the
beginning,” he said.
As a result of the problems, all Navy ships under construction at Northrop Grumman were
reinspected for weld problems.
“We found a higher-than-expected failure rate on quality of the thickness of the welds,”
Stefany said. The issue was not that, properly hangared, the welds would soon fail in service.
Rather, Stefany said, the welds are “critical for shock survivability and for service life. You
need [the thicker weld] dimensions to guarantee that.” As a result, he said, a ship de-signed
for a service life of 40 years might only make it to 30.
“It’s not as catastrophic [as the lube oil problem] but we’re working it,” Stefany said. “It’s
not as in-your-face as the engines are—basically it’s just putting more welding material on.”
Throughout the summer of 2009, Northrop Grumman and the Supervisor of Shipbuilding
(SUPSHIP) at Pascagoula reinspected all welds on all ships. All pipe welders were
de-certified and forced to go through retraining, Stefany said. “At the same time we retrained
the shipbuilders, we retrained the SUPSHIP guys,” he added. Delivery of the destroyer
Dewey was delayed so fixes could be made, and Northrop sent a contingent of engineers to
California aboard the new assault ship Makin Island to ensure the quality of repair work and
carry out repairs if needed.
While pipe weld problems were found on all the Navy ships under construction at Ingalls
and Avondale, the Coast Guard’s National Security Cutters (NSC) being built at Ingalls
apparently evaded the worst of the issue.
“The Coast Guard has not experienced any significant piping issues on its National Security
Cutters,” spokeswoman Laura Williams said Jan. 22. Some “piping discrepancies” were
found and corrected on the second NSC, she said, adding that the first NSC, the Bertholf,
“has not experienced any problems, but we are finishing follow up welding inspections to
make sure any potential discrepancies are addressed.” The ability of Northrop Grumman and
SU-SHIP to properly carry out weld inspections has also come into question because of the
pipe weld problem. Reversing a chronic shortage of oversight personnel has been a major
pledge of Navy officials over the past three years.
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“Last year we saw a marked improvement in the ability of SUPSHIP to hire people,” said a
Navy official. “But we’re going to have is-sues that come to light. The issues we’re talking
about go back long before we were able to hire people.”38
It was also reported at this time that:
The Navy’s top civilian acquisition official said he was confident in shipbuilder Northrop
Grumman’s “commitment to delivering quality ships to the Navy” even after the Navy
announced last week that all Northrop’s warships built on the Gulf Coast were being re-
inspected for faulty welds.
“In the rare instance where an issue like this arises, the Navy and industry have always
worked together toward a quick and effective resolution. This remains the case today,” said
Sean Stackley, the assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition,
in a statement released Monday.
“At no time did the weaknesses that were discovered endanger the safety of the crews, and
the Navy has determined that existing welds are satisfactory for current ship operation. We
have worked hard to ensure all ships meet or exceed fleet standards, and are reliable and
combat ready assets. Plans are in place for inspections and required repairs to all affected
ships during their normal industrial availabilities, with many already in progress.”
Stackley’s statement was the first public comment from the Navy Department’s leadership
on the Jan. 21 announcement by Naval Sea Systems Command about the weld problems.
Last week, a spokeswoman for Navy Secretary Ray Mabus referred questions to Stackley’s
office.
Still, Stackley’s statement did not answer the pressing questions raised by NavSea’s
announcement: How many warships—including destroyers and small- and large-deck
amphibs—are potentially affected by the faulty welds? How or why did Navy inspectors sign
off on out-of-spec welds that were discovered later on? How many of Northrop’s welders
and inspectors, and Navy inspectors, had to be decertified and recertified to work on ships
after the problems were discovered? Who will pay for repairs?
A spokesman for Stackley and a spokesman for NavSea’s Supervisor of Shipbuilding both
deferred those questions to NavSea. Navy Times has asked for answers and for comment
from NavSea’s senior leadership, but had not received a response by Monday morning.
NavSea spokeswoman Monica McCoy did issue a statement Friday [January 22] about
related problems with the San Antonio class of amphibious ships, blaming them in part on
high labor turnover caused by the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Northrop Grumman also
has blamed hurricane-caused worker problems for the heavy re-work necessary aboard the
amphibious assault ship Makin Island.39
A December 2009 report from the Department of Defense Director of Operational Test &
Evaluation (DOT&E) provided the following assessment of the LPD-17 program:

38 Christopher P. Cavas, “‘We Thought We Had It Licked,’” Defense News, January 25, 2010: 1,8. Material in brackets
as in original. See also Philip Ewing, “Widespread Problems On LPDs, Other Ships: U.S. Navy,” DefenseNews.com,
January 21, 2010; Dan Taylor, “Engine Issues Sideline Two LPD-17s; Bad Pipe Welds Prompt Northrop,” Inside the
Navy
, January 25, 2010; and Peter Frost, “Navy Reports Widespread Problems On Northrop’s Gulf Coast-Built Ships,”
Newport News (VA) Daily Press, January 22, 2010.
39 Philip Ewing, “Navy, Northrop Working On Faulty Welds,” NavyTimes.com, January 25, 2010.
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The following are DOT&E’s observations and assessments based on testing completed to
date:
• LPD-17 is able to meet its amphibious lift requirements for landing force vehicles, cargo,
personnel, fuel, hangar space, well-deck capacity, and flight-deck landing areas.
• Reliability problems related to well deck ramps, ventilation, bridge crane, and Cargo
Ammunition Magazine (CAM) elevators detracts from mission accomplishment and reduces
amphibious warfare suitability.
• The engineering plant, as designed, is effective and met its mobility (speed, endurance)
requirements.
• Reliability problems associated with the Engineering Control System (ECS), including
frequent failures and high false alarm rates, and the electrical distribution system, including
unexplained loss of service generators and the uncommanded opening of breakers, revealed
shortfalls in manning and training to support sustained manual operation of the plant.
• The Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) identified similar deficiencies in
identical areas (propulsion, auxiliaries, electrical, damage control, deck) during both
acceptance and final contract trials across all four of the first ships of the class. Catastrophic
casualties recorded prior to the Full Ship Shock Trial in LPD-19 and during LPD-17’s
deployment revealed serious fabrication and production deficiencies in the main lube oil
service system.
• The ship is capable of supporting Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and
Intelligence requirements in an ESG [expeditionary strike group] environment; however,
reliability problems with the SWAN and the Interior Voice Communications System degrade
command and control and are single points of failure during operations.
• The Navy still needs to validate critical Information Exchange Requirements and pursue a
formal Information Support Plan to support a Joint Interoperability Certification.
• The LPD-17 exhibited difficulty defending itself against several widely proliferated threats,
primarily due to:
- Persistent SSDS Mk 2-based system engineering deficiencies
- The ship’s RAM system provided the only hard kill capability, preventing layered air
defense
- Problems associated with SPS-48E and SPQ-9B radar performance against certain
Anti-Ship Cruise Missile attack profiles
- Degraded situational awareness due to Mk 46 Gun Weapon System console
configuration
• LPD-17 failed to satisfy its reliability requirement during the first five hours of an
amphibious assault and its total ship availability requirement during IOT&E.
• The survivability of the San Antonio class ships appear to be improved over the LPD class
ships they will replace. However, problems encountered with critical systems during testing
(particularly with the electrical distribution, chilled water, SWAN, and ECS) and difficulty
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recovering mission capability may offset some of the survivability improvements and have
highlighted serious reliability shortcomings.40

Author Contact Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610



40 Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation FY 2009 Annual Report, December 2009, p. 150.
See also Dan Taylor, “DOT&E: ‘Extensive List of Deficiencies’ On LPD-17 Class Needs Action,” Inside the Navy,
February 1, 2010.
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