FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster
Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Court Cases
Amy Belasco, Coordinator
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget
Daniel H. Else
Specialist in National Defense
Bruce R. Lindsay
Analyst in Emergency Management Policy
Rhoda Margesson
Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy
Kennon H. Nakamura
Analyst in Foreign Affairs
Maureen Taft-Morales
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Curt Tarnoff
Specialist in Foreign Affairs
May 12, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41232
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Court Cases
Summary
The Administration has requested $63 billion in FY2010 supplemental appropriations:
• $33 billion for the Department of Defense (DOD) primarily for deploying 30,000
additional troops to Afghanistan;
• $4.5 billion in war-related foreign aid to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan;
• $5.1 billion to replenish the U.S. Disaster Relief Fund administered by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA);
• $2.8 billion for Haiti reconstruction and foreign aid in the wake of the
earthquake;
• $13.4 billion to compensate veterans exposed to Agent Orange;
• $3.4 billion to settle land trust claims of American Indians in the long-standing
Cobell case; and
• $1.2 billion to settle the discrimination claims of 70,000 black farmers in the
Pigford II case.
These requests were included as part of the Administration’s FY2011 budget request, and in two
budget amendments sent to Congress on February 12 and March 24, 2010. It is currently not clear
whether Congress will consider all of this spending in one bill. Press reports suggest that the
Senate Appropriations Committee may mark up an FY2010 supplemental this week.
The Defense Department, the State Department, FEMA, and the court plaintiffs have all cited
deadlines in May and June for when funding is needed, but there appears to be some flexibility in
these dates. Because DOD has already received 80% of its war funding, the supplemental monies
may not be needed until the end of July. FEMA has suggested that additional disaster funding is
needed by June. Because its disaster funding was tapped to meet Haiti’s needs, the State
Department argues that it needs its funding by June. And while the plaintiffs in the Cobell and
Pigford cases could reject the settlements if funding is not provided by this spring’s deadlines, the
Administration’s support may dissuade them.
Congress will consider this supplemental appropriations request within the constraints set forth in
the FY2010 congressional budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 13), and other budget rules. Some
Members may believe that the request should be exempt from such constraints by designating the
additional spending as an emergency, as provided under the rules. Others, in light of the current
fiscal environment, may believe that all or portions of the additional spending should be offset, so
as not to increase the deficit.
Congress could change the Administration’s request. For DOD’s request, issues could include
whether to set a timeline to evaluate the Afghan war troop surge; whether plans and funding to
accelerate the training of Afghan security forces are achievable; and whether DOD’s basing
request signifies a permanent presence. Concerns about the State Department’s foreign aid
request for Afghanistan and Iraq could include whether the funding will be effective and free of
corruption. Questions about FEMA’s reliance on supplementals for its disaster funding could be
raised. Finally, questions about the focus of Haiti foreign assistance could arise.
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Court Cases
Contents
Overview, Deadlines, and Potential Issues ................................................................................... 1
Budget Rules and Supplemental Requests ............................................................................. 2
Potential Deadlines ............................................................................................................... 3
Defense Department Deadline Could Be End of July 2010 .............................................. 4
FEMA Disaster Assistance Fund Could Run Out in June ................................................. 4
State Department Disaster Funding May Run Low by June ............................................. 5
Deadline for Funding Court Settlements Uncertain.......................................................... 5
Potential Issues: Emergency Designations, Timelines and Effectiveness ................................ 5
War-Related Supplemental Requests ........................................................................................... 5
Department of Defense War Funding Request ....................................................................... 6
Increases in U.S., NATO Troops, and Afghan Security Forces ......................................... 6
DOD Request Shifts Bulk of War Funding to Afghanistan ............................................... 7
Timeline for U.S. Military’s Role in Afghanistan............................................................. 9
Most of DOD’s Request Is for Afghanistan.................................................................... 10
Questions May Be Raised About Per Troop Costs ......................................................... 10
Funds to Accelerate Training Afghan Security Forces .................................................... 12
Whether Some of DOD’s Request Could Be Funded in the Regular Bill ........................ 16
More Spending for Bases in Afghanistan Raises Questions of Permanency and
Executability.................................................................................................................... 17
Building to Fight vs. Building to Stay: Congressional Restrictions................................. 18
“Permanent Stationing” and “Long-term Presence” ....................................................... 19
Higher Funding and DOD’s Proposed Legislative Change............................................. 20
Execution Issues ........................................................................................................... 22
War-Related Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Operations .......................................................... 23
Afghanistan .................................................................................................................. 25
Iraq............................................................................................................................... 27
Pakistan ........................................................................................................................ 29
FY2010 Supplemental Request for U.S. Disaster Assistance...................................................... 30
Potential Issues ................................................................................................................... 30
Regular vs. Emergency Budgeting for Disasters ............................................................ 31
Justifying Current Estimate ........................................................................................... 32
Mandatory Spending: Adding Veterans’ Benefits and Settling Court Cases ................................ 32
Additional Benefits for Veterans Exposed to Agent Orange ................................................. 33
Potential Change in the Estimate ................................................................................... 34
Resolving Black Farmers and American Indian Trust Lands Court Cases............................. 34
Settlement of the Black Farmers Discrimination Case ................................................... 34
Indian Trust Litigation Settlement ................................................................................. 35
Congressional Actions................................................................................................... 36
Haiti FY2010 Supplemental Proposal........................................................................................ 36
Humanitarian Relief Funding .............................................................................................. 38
Relief Funding: International Disaster Assistance and Emergency Food Aid .................. 38
Key Concerns and Priorities .......................................................................................... 41
Department of Defense and U.S. Coast Guard Relief Activities ..................................... 42
State Department’s Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) ........ 43
Assistance to Haitian Evacuees and Migrants ................................................................ 43
Recovery and Reconstruction Funding for Haiti .................................................................. 46
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Court Cases
Key Concerns: Priorities, Decentralization, Poverty Reduction, and
Capacity Building ...................................................................................................... 46
Economic Support Funds for Infrastructure ................................................................... 48
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Funds for Security ..................... 49
USAID and Treasury Funds for Oversight and Advisors ................................................ 49
U.S. Funds for International Donor Trust Fund and Debt Relief..................................... 50
Funding for Diplomatic Operations in Haiti......................................................................... 50
Figures
Figure 1. Boots on the Ground in Afghanistan and Iraq, 2001-2010 ............................................. 7
Figure 2. U.S. Disaster Relief Funding, FY2000-FY2011 Request ............................................. 31
Tables
Table 1. FY2010 Supplemental Requests..................................................................................... 3
Table 2. DOD War Funding, FY2001-FY2011 Request ............................................................... 8
Table 3. DOD Functional Categories for War Funding: Afghanistan, FY2009-FY2011 .............. 11
Table 4. Funding for Afghan Security Forces (ASFF), FY2009-FY2011 .................................... 14
Table 5. Military Construction for the Afghan War, FY2003-FY2011 ........................................ 18
Table 6. War-Related Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Operations Supplemental Request ................ 24
Table 7. Haiti Supplemental: Relief, Reconstruction and Diplomatic Operations,
FY2009-FY2011 .................................................................................................................... 36
Table 8. Haiti Relief Funding, FY2009-FY2011 ........................................................................ 39
Table 9. Haiti Recovery and Reconstruction Funding, FY2009-FY2011 .................................... 47
Table 10. Diplomatic Operations Funding for Haiti, FY2009-FY2011 ....................................... 51
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 52
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 52
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Court Cases
Overview, Deadlines, and Potential Issues
The Administration requested a total of $63 billion in supplemental funding in FY2010 to deploy
more U.S. troops for the Afghan War, Disaster Assistance Funds, recovery and foreign aid funds
for Haiti in response to the January 2010 earthquake, and to settle two recently-decided court
cases for American Indians and black farmers. Specifically, the FY2010 supplemental requests
include
• $33.0 billion for the Defense Department, primarily to deploy 30,000 more
troops to Afghanistan;
• $4.5 billion in foreign assistance for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan;
• $5.1 billion to replenish the U.S. Disaster Relief Fund administered by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency;
• $2.8 billion for Haiti reconstruction and foreign aid in the wake of January’s
earthquake;
• $13.4 billion to compensate veterans exposed to Agent Orange;
• $3.4 billion to settle land trust claims of American Indians in the long-standing
Cobell case; and
• $1.2 billion to settle the discrimination claims of 70,000 black farmers in the
Pigford II case (see Table 1).
Federal budget rules distinguish between two types of federal spending, discretionary spending
(e.g., annual appropriations acts) and direct (or mandatory) (e.g., Medicare) spending.1 Of the
$63.3 billion in the President’s supplemental request, $45.4 billion is discretionary spending and
$17.9 billion is direct spending (see Table 1).
The Administration submitted these requests to Congress in supplemental proposals included as
part of the Administration’s FY2011 budget, and in budget amendments submitted on February
12, 2010, and March 24, 2010.2
1 Discretionary spending is provided in appropriations acts generally on an annual basis. Direct spending, in contrast, is
generally provided (in many cases, on a permanent basis, and in other cases, for a set number of fiscal years) in
authorizing legislation that requires federal payments to individuals or entities, often based on eligibility criteria and
benefit formulas set forth in statute. Some direct spending is provided in appropriations acts but is controlled by the
authorizing statute(s) or provided by legislative language in an appropriations acts, such as legislative language
authorizing a litigation settlement.
2 Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States, FY2011, “Supplemental Proposals,” 2-1-10,
hereinafter OMB, “FY2010 War-Related Supplemental;” http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2011/assets/
sup.pdf; OMB, FY2010 Supplemental, “Estimate No. 2, Request for Department of Homeland Security for Disaster
Relief, for continued response and recovery efforts associated with prior large events, such as Hurricane Katrina and
the Midwest floods; and for general provisions,” February 12, 2010, hereinafter, OMB, “FY2010 Disaster Relief and
Court Case Supplemental;” Request; Office of Management and Budget, “Estimate No. 3, March 24, 2010; FY2010
Emergency Supplemental Proposals in the FY2011 Budget for Costs Associated with Relief and Reconstruction
Support for Haiti following the Earthquake of January 12, 2010, for the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Health
and Human Services, Homeland Security, State, and the Treasury,“ March 24, 2010, hereinafter, OMB, “FY2010 Haiti
Supplemental,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/budget_amendments/amendment_03_24_10.pdf.
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Press reports suggest that the Senate Appropriations Committee may mark up an FY2010
supplemental this week, and add war funding and the Haiti supplemental requests to H.R. 4899, a
bill passed by the House on March 24, 2010 that currently includes $5.1 billion for FEMA’s
Disaster Relief Fund and $600 million for the Labor Department for a summer jobs program.3
That bill could then be sent back to the House for conference. The funding in H.R. 4899 is
designated as emergency appropriations.
Many see emergency supplemental appropriations as undermining budgetary discipline because
funding is not subject to annual caps in budget resolutions on overall discretionary spending that
often require trade-offs between different types of spending. Supplementals are also perceived as
receiving less scrutiny than regular appropriations. In the current fiscal environment, some
Members are also concerned about the impact of this additional spending on the deficit.
Budget Rules and Supplemental Requests4
Congress may debate, as it does with any supplemental appropriations request, whether to
increase spending above the existing level for FY2010 and, in some cases, levels for subsequent
fiscal years. If Congress decides the additional spending is necessary, it must also decide whether
the request warrants increasing the budget deficit or whether to offset the additional spending by
either cutting federal spending or increasing revenues.
Congress considers all spending or revenue legislation, including supplemental appropriations
bills, within rules and procedures that are intended to address these policy options.5 In particular,
Congress will consider this FY2010 supplemental appropriations request within the constraints
set by the FY2010 budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 13, H.Rept. 111-89), as well as other budget
rules, such as congressional pay-as-you-go rules and the recently enacted Statutory PAYGO Act
of 2010 (P.L. 111-139).
Under these budget rules, Congress could exempt all or portions of the spending from these
constraints by designating the spending as an emergency (or as being for “overseas deployments
or other activities” in the House).6 Alternatively, under congressional rules, the applicable points
of order may be waived or simply not raised during consideration of the supplemental
appropriation measure.
While an emergency designation would exempt spending from these budget rules, the emergency
designation itself could be subject to a point of order.7 This applicable point of order may be
3 H.R. 4899 as referred to the Senate, May 7, 2010.
4 Written by William Heniff, Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process, Government and Finance Division,
CRS.
5 For an overview of federal budget procedures, see CRS Report 98-721, Introduction to the Federal Budget Process,
by Robert Keith; for more detailed information on points of order that apply to budgetary legislation, see CRS Report
97-865, Points of Order in the Congressional Budget Process, by James V. Saturno; for information on PAYGO rules,
see CRS Report RL33850, The House’s “Pay-As-You-Go” (PAYGO) Rule in the 110th Congress: A Brief Overview, by
Robert Keith, CRS Report RL31943, Budget Enforcement Procedures: Senate Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) Rule, by Bill
Heniff Jr., and CRS Report R41157, The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010: Summary and Legislative History, by
Robert Keith.
6 The emergency and overseas deployments designations are provided for in Sections 403 and 423 of S.Con.Res. 13,
the FY2010 congressional budget resolution, as applicable to the Senate and House, respectively.
7 For additional information on the emergency designation, see CRS Report RS21035, Emergency Spending: Statutory
(continued...)
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waived in both houses. In the House, it can be waived by a special rule reported by the House
Rules Committee and agreed to by the House, and in the Senate, by waiver motion, which
requires a three-fifths affirmative vote of Senators (60 votes if there is no more than one vacancy
in the Senate).
Table 1. FY2010 Supplemental Requests
(in billions of dollars)
FY2010
FY2010
FY2010
Supp.
Total with
Agency/Purpose
Enacted
Request
Request
Brief Description
Defense: Afghanistan and Iraq
129.6
33.0
162.6
Provides $30 billion for Afghanistan, $1 billion
for Iraq, and $2 billion for baseline fuel costs.
State/USAID: Afghanistan, Iraq,
5.6
4.5
10.1
Includes $2 billion for Afghanistan, $2.1 billion
and Pakistan
for Iraq, and $370 million for Pakistan for
foreign aid and diplomatic operations.
State/USAID: Haiti
.9
2.8
3.7
Includes $1.6 billion for disaster assistance,
$1billion for foreign aid activities and $155
million for diplomatic operations.
Federal Emergency Management
1.6
5.1
6.7
Replenishes Disaster Relief Fund in danger of
Agency (FEMA): Disaster Relief
being depleted.
Fund
DISCRETIONARY TOTAL
137.7
45.4
183.1
Department of Veterans’ Affairs:
0
13.4
13.4
Provides compensation for veterans exposed to
Compensation and Pensions
Agent Orange in Vietnam.
Treasury: Settling Cobell v.
0
3.4
3.4
Authorizes and funds recently awarded claims
Salazar
about management and accounting of Indian
land trusts.
Agriculture: Settling Pigford
0
1.2
1.2
Funds recent court-approved settlement of
Discrimination Claims
discrimination claims by black farmers.
MANDATORY TOTAL
0
17.9
17.9
TOTAL: DISCRETIONARY
137.7
63.3
201.0
and MANDATORY
Source: OMB, FY2010 War-Related Supplemental; OMB,FY2010 Disaster Relief Supplemental; OMB,FY2010 Haiti
Supplemental.
Note: CRS calculations based on sources above.
Potential Deadlines
According to recent press reports, House Majority Leader Steny H. Hoyer said that the House
was committed to action before the Memorial Day recess, and Senator Inouye, Chair of the
Senate Appropriations Committee, has called for congressional action to begin.8
(...continued)
and Congressional Rules, by Bill Heniff Jr..
8 Congress Daily, “Hoyer Wants Resolution, Supplemental By Memorial Day,“ May 7, 2010; Foreign Policy, The
Cable, “Inouye Wants to Know: Where is the War Funding Bill,” April 29, 1010.
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At this time, it is not clear whether Congress will consider all these supplemental requests in the
one bill. The House passed FEMA’s Disaster Assistance request in H.R. 4899 and Senator Inouye
has suggested that the Senate may soon consider that bill.9 Attempts in the Senate to attach the
Indian Trust Fund settlement (Cobell case) to another bill have so far been unsuccessful. There is
also speculation in the press that other funding could be added—such as $23 billion in emergency
Education Department funds to prevent layoffs of teachers and $1.3 billion for a summer jobs
program (funded last year in the Economic Stimulus Act).10
The Defense Department, State Department, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and
plaintiffs in the Cobell and Pigford II cases have all cited deadlines for when the supplemental
funding would be needed, although there appears to be some flexibility in the dates.
Defense Department Deadline Could Be End of July 2010
The Department of Defense (DOD) received $129.6 billion, 80% of its total FY2010 war funding
in bridge funds included in its regular appropriations acts enacted last December (P.L. 111-118
and P.L. 111-117), almost double the 45% received in the bridge the previous year. Secretary of
Defense Gates recently reiterated that DOD would need the additional $33 billion for the 30,000
troops deploying to Afghanistan by Memorial Day, the same date cited in previous years when the
funding available was substantially lower.11
In February testimony, the Secretary of the Army, which faces the greatest need for war funding,
testified that the timeframe for the Army “in which we can comfortably fund this [war funding]
would be at the end of June, beginning of July.”12 Based on CRS calculations using Army data, it
appears that the Army could, if necessary, cover both its regular base activities and war operations
through July 2010 if obligations follow the pattern of recent years, and even later if funds were
temporarily transferred from other appropriation accounts using currently available authority.13
FEMA Disaster Assistance Fund Could Run Out in June
To make the Disaster Relief Fund last longer, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) has limited the release of funds for claims, delayed interagency reimbursements, and
recovered funds from previous years. Nevertheless, its current estimate is that the Fund will
become insolvent sometime in June, assuming average monthly spending of $350 million and the
current balance of $600 million.14
9 Congressional Quarterly, Budget Tracker, “Morning Briefing,” May 7, 2010.
10 Congress Daily, “Supp Eyed as Vehicle for Ed Bill,” May 4, 2010; The Washington Post, “The Congressional Black
Caucus and the Politics of Summer Jobs,” May 4, 2010.
11 CQ, Budget Tracker, “Morning Briefing,” May 7, 2010.
12 Senate Armed Services Committee, Transcript, “Fiscal 2011 Army Budget Request,” p. 16, February 23, 2010
13 CRS calculation based on Army data on Operation and Maintenance obligations to date for both base funding and
war operations compared to obligation patterns in FY2008 and FY2009.
14 CQ, Budget Briefing, “A Bit More Breathing Room for FEMA,” May 7, 2010; Statement of James L. Oberstar,
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, May 5, 2010; telephone
conversation with a legislative liaison for the Department of Homeland Security, April 28, 2010.
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State Department Disaster Funding May Run Low by June
The State Department reports that in order to respond to future humanitarian crises, these
resources would need to be replenished by June 1, 2010. If not replenished, U.S. capacity to
respond to other emergencies could be curtailed.
Deadline for Funding Court Settlements Uncertain
Congress did not enact the $1.15 billion appropriation by the mid-April 2010 deadline to settle
the Pigford II court case to recompense black farmers. Although the claimants could theoretically
void the settlement, plaintiffs are unlikely to exercise that right knowing that the settlement is
clearly a priority of both the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the White House.
The latest deadline for Congress to approve the settlement of the Cobell suit for government
mismanagement of funds and lands held in trust for individual American Indians is May 28, 2010.
While deadlines have been extended several times by mutual agreement, it is not clear whether
another extension will be accepted by the parties or the presiding judge.
Potential Issues: Emergency Designations, Timelines and
Effectiveness
Members of Congress may raise several types of issues about these FY2010 Supplemental
requests including whether
• a timeline to evaluate the Afghan War would be appropriate, the plans to
accelerate training of Afghan security forces are achievable, and all of DOD’s
request qualifies as emergency war costs;
• DOD’s ramp-up in basing requests signifies a permanent presence;
• additional foreign aid for Afghanistan and Iraq is likely to be effective and well-
spent;
• the amount for FEMA disaster relief is justified;
• Haiti relief funding is adequate or appropriately shared; and
• the Haiti aid request is appropriately targeted.
War-Related Supplemental Requests
The DOD and State Department/USAID supplemental requests provide funding primarily to
deploy the additional 30,000 troops being deployed to Afghanistan and for economic assistance
intended to reinforce military operations. These two elements are considered essential to the
counterinsurgency strategy adopted by the Administration to “clear, build, hold, and transition” as
DOD and the State Department focus on population centers in Afghanistan.15
15 Secretary of Defense, “Report to Congress in accordance with Section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181) as amended and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National
(continued...)
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Department of Defense War Funding Request16
In its FY2011 budget submission, the Obama Administration requested a supplemental
appropriation of $33 billion in FY2010 primarily to deploy the additional 30,000 troops to
Afghanistan announced by President Obama on December 1, 2009. According to the President,
these additional troops are intended to reverse a deteriorating security situation and “break the
Taliban’s momentum” by targeting the insurgency, securing key population centers, and training
more Afghan forces, which, in turn, is expected to ”help create the conditions” to transfer
responsibility to the Afghans beginning in July 2011.17 Frequent evaluations are promised.18
Increases in U.S., NATO Troops, and Afghan Security Forces
According to the DOD, as of early May, some 15,000 of the 30,000 troops are in-country with the
remainder expected to arrive by September 2010, several months later than originally anticipated
by the White House.19 By this fall, some 98,000 troops would be deployed in Afghanistan trebling
the number of U.S. troops since October 2008 (see Figure 1).
Before leaving office in January 2009, then-President Bush increased the number of troops in
Afghanistan in response to requests from the U.S. Commander in Afghanistan concerned about
the deteriorating security situation, which brought troop levels close to 46,000 in May 2009.20
After completion of the Obama Afghanistan strategy review in March 2009, the President
approved another increase of about 22,000 troops, bringing the total to 68,000 as of November
2009. The second Obama increase of 30,000 troops now underway will bring the U.S. total to
98,000 by this fall.21 The FY2011 budget adds another 4,000 support troops in Afghanistan.22
After repeated requests from the United States, NATO allies troop levels have grown from 38,370
in December 2009 to 48,000 troops in March 2010. By this fall, this will bring the total number of
(...continued)
Security Forces Report to Congress in accordance with section 1231 of the National Defense Authorization for Fiscal
Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181),” hereinafter DOD, “Section 1230 and Section 1231 Report; http://www.defense.gov/pubs/
pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_26_10.pdf.
16 Written by Amy Belasco, Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division.
17The White House, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and
Pakistan,” Delivered at West Point, December 1, 2009; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-
address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan. In the President’s speech, the additional troops were to be
deployed in the first half of the year, but more recently, the Defense Department has estimated that all 30,000 troops
will not be deployed until September 2010.
18The White House, Press Release, “What’s New in the Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan;”
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Whats-New-in-the-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/THE
BRIEFING ROOM, March 27, 2009.
19 PBS, The Charlie Rose Show, “All Eyes on Kandahar, Interview with General Petraeus,” April 22, 2010.
20 DOD, “Boots on the Ground Report,” May 1, 2009 show a total of 45,000.
21 DOD, “Press Conference with Secretary of Defense Gates,” December 14, 2009; http://www.defenselink.mil/
transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4333. The 21,000 increase was funded in the FY2009 Supplemental and the
FY2010 DOD Appropriations Act (Title IX, P.L. 111-118, enacted December 16, 2009).
22 Then-President Bush increased troops in Afghanistan by about 15,000. For FY2011 increase, see Figure 6-2, DOD,
FY2011 Budget Request: Overview, February 1, 2010; http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/
FY2011_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
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foreign troops in Afghanistan to about 148,000.23 By that time, plans call for Afghan security
forces to total 243,000, bringing the total number of foreign and Afghan forces to 389,000.24
Figure 1. Boots on the Ground in Afghanistan and Iraq, 2001-2010
Sources: DOD, Boots on the Ground Reports to Congress; CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban
Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and
Security, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RL34387, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and
Issues for Congress, by Catherine Dale; CRS Report R40156, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and
Issues for Congress, by Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale.
Note: Figure by Amber Wilhelm, CRS Graphics.
DOD Request Shifts Bulk of War Funding to Afghanistan
The Defense Department’s $33 billion request would provide
• $30 billion to support the additional troops deploying to Afghanistan;
23 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Facts and Figures, “International Security Assistance Force and
Afghan National Army Strength & Laydown,” December 23, 2009, and February 1, 2010; http://www.nato.int/isaf/
docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf.
24 Figure 6-3, DOD, FY2011 Budget Request: Overview, February 1, 2010; http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/
fy2011/FY2011_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
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• $1 billion more to train Iraq Security Forces; and
• $2 billion for higher-than-anticipated fuel costs in DOD’s regular (baseline)
budget.
If enacted, total DOD war spending in FY2010 would rise from the $129 billion already enacted
to $160 billion.25 Of that total, $99 billion would be for Afghanistan and $61 billion for Iraq,
reversing the funding shares for the two wars. The total in FY2010 would be about $12 billion
more than in FY2009 and almost the same as the FY2011 request (Table 2).26
Currently, DOD appropriations enacted for the Afghan War totals $284 billion. If the FY2010
Supplemental and the FY2011 request are enacted, that total would rise to $428 billion. By
comparison, the enacted total for Iraq is now $705 billion and would increase to $752 billion if
the pending requests are enacted. These figures do not include war funding for State/USAID and
VA Medical.27
Table 2. DOD War Funding, FY2001-FY2011 Request
(in billions of dollars and shares of total)
Total:
FY2010
FY2010
FY2001-
FY2010
Supplemental Total with
FY2011
Operation
FY2008
FY2009
Enacted
Request
Request
Request
IRAQ
Funding
$553.5
$92.0 $59.6 $1.0
$60.6 $45.8
Share
of
Total
78%
62% 46% 3%
38% 29%
AFGHANISTAN
Funding $159.2
$56.1
$69.1
$30.0
$99.1
$113.5
Share
of
Total
22%
38% 54% 97%
62% 71%
TOTAL
Funding
$712.7
$148.2 $128.7 $31.0
$159.7 $159.3
Share
of
Total
100% 100% 100%
100% 100% 100%
Source: Table 8-5 in DOD, FY2011 Budget Request: Overview, February 1, 2010; http://comptrol er.defense.gov/
defbudget/fy2011/FY2011_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
Notes: CRS calculations exclude non-war funding in supplementals, and include funds from DOD’s regular budget
used for war needs.
25 This total includes funds enacted in the FY2010 DOD Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-118), and the FY2010 Veterans
and Military Construction Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117).
26 FY2009 figure is CRS calculation excluding funding in supplementals not related to war, and including $2.4 billion
in funding that DOD tapped from its base budget for war needs; For FY2011 total, see Table 8-5 in DOD, FY2011
Budget Request: Overview, February 1, 2010; http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/
FY2011_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
27 CRS calculations based on DOD data; see Table 2.
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Court Cases
Timeline for U.S. Military’s Role in Afghanistan
One potential issue in DOD’s FY2010 Request is the timeline for evaluating the effectiveness of
President’s Obama’s new strategy. When President Obama approved the new deployment, he
warned that the U.S. commitment was not “open-ended,” and “will allow us to begin the transfer
of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011” after a review in December 2010.28 Based on
recent testimony and DOD statements, the timeframe could slip and the U.S. drawdown in July
2011 could be minor.29
Both Secretary of Defense Gates and Admiral Mullen, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have
cautioned that the July 2010 date is “a day we start transitioning ... not a date that we're leaving,”
that would be based on “conditions on the ground.”30 Recently, Secretary Gates said, “I think this
is a several-year process.”31 In March 2010, General Petraeus, now head of U.S. Central
Command, characterized the initiative as “an 18-month campaign, as we see it,”32 to be evaluated
according to JCS Chair Admiral Mullen “eighteen months from now, ” which would be
September 2011.33
Members of Congress may be concerned about the timing of the initial evaluation, the length of
the new campaign, and the long-term future of U.S. military involvement. The FY2010
Supplemental may provide another vehicle for looking at ways to increase congressional
participation in decision making about the extent and nature of the U.S. military commitment.
The first operation using the additional U.S. troops was the re-taking of Marjah, a town of 85,000,
in Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan launched on February 13, 2010. While DOD
considers Marjah to be free of Taliban, recent press reports suggest a mixed picture. The key test
is the campaign for Kandahar, a Taliban stronghold and city of 1 million in southern Afghanistan,
expected to get fully underway by June 2010. 34 It is not clear whether the FY2010 Supplemental
will be passed by then.
28 The White House, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and
Pakistan,” Delivered at West Point, December 1, 2009; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-
address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan.
29 Testimony of Robert Gates before the Senate Armed Services Committee, “Afghanistan Assessment,” December 2,
2009: “we will have a thorough review in December 2010. If it appears that the strategy’s not working and that we are
not going to be able to transition in 2011, then we will take a hard look at the strategy itself. [The plan would be to]
begin the transition [to Afghan forces] in local areas in July of 2011.... General Petraeus would tell you by six or seven
months later [after the Iraq surge began], he had enough indications of things happening on the ground that he could
tell that this effort was going to work within six months.”
30 Ibid.
31 Department of Defense, Press conference with Secretary of Defense Gates and Chair, Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen,
March 25, 2010; http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4592.
32 Testimony of General Petraeus before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans
Affairs, and Related Agencies Budget Request for the U.S. Central Command,” March 17, 2010.
33 House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, “Hearing on President Obama’s Fiscal 2011 Budget Request fore
the Defense Department,” March 24, 2010, p. 10 of transcript.
34 DOD, “Transcript, Press conference with Geoff Morrell,” March 30, 2010; http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/
Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4595; The New York Times, “Elite U.S. Units Step Up Drive in Kandahar,” April 26,
2010.
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Court Cases
Most of DOD’s Request Is for Afghanistan
Of the $33 billion in DOD’s supplemental request, $30 billion is for Afghanistan, $1 billion to
train Iraqi Security Forces, and $2 billion to pay for higher fuel prices in DOD’s base budget (see
Table 3). The $30 billion for Afghanistan includes
• $19 billion for “Operations” including Military Personnel and Operation and
Maintenance costs to pay, conduct operations and support deployed soldiers;
• $3.3 billion for force protection;
• $2.6 billion to accelerate the training of Afghan security forces;
• $2.0 billion to pay for higher fuel costs in DOD’s regular budget;
• $1.7 billion for reconstitution or reset of war-worn equipment;
• $1.3 billion for military intelligence;
• $1.2 billion for national intelligence;
• $500 million for military construction;
• $400 million to defeat Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) (see Table 3).
Questions May Be Raised About Per Troop Costs
Some policy makers have suggested that the DOD cost for deploying 30,000 more troops would
average $1 million per troop (including both the White House and Secretary of Defense Gates).35
While dividing the $30 billion request for Afghanistan by the 30,000 additional troops yields an
average of $1 million, this does not reflect the different types of activities and programs that
DOD is requesting or the factors affecting the cost of these activities.
To describe its request, DOD developed functional categories ranging from “Operations,” which
includes military personnel and O&M costs, to Coalition Support Funds for Pakistan’s counter-
terror operations. Different categories increase at rates ranging from 123% for Operations to 35%
for Coalition Support. Table 3 shows funding between FY2009 and FY2011 for the Afghan war.
Unlike other categories, the Operations category would be expected to increase at least roughly in
concert with troop levels. DOD estimates differ substantially from CBO estimates. Reported
obligations from the first five months of the fiscal year also suggests that DOD’s estimates may
be somewhat high.
DOD estimates for the FY2010 cost deploying 30,000 troops to Afghanistan reflect a per troop
cost of $875,000 based on the “Operations” category in the FY2010 Supplemental request and
taking into account changes in funding since enactment (see Table 3). The DOD per troop cost is
not quite double the $467,000 in CBO’s estimate. Both DOD and CBO assume the same average
monthly troop strength which reflects the gradual deployment of troops over the fiscal year, and
CBO’s estimate builds on DOD reported war obligations.36
35 The Los Angeles Times, “Pricing an Afghanistan troop buildup is no simple calculation,” November 23, 2009.
36 The monthly average increase in troop levels as a result of the surge is assumed to be 16,000 by DOD and 15,000 by
CBO, both averages taking into account the gradual deployment of additional troops during FY2010. For DOD, see
(continued...)
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Court Cases
Table 3. DOD Functional Categories for War Funding: Afghanistan, FY2009-FY2011
(in billions of dollars)
Cumulative
FY2010
FY2010
FY2010
Change,
FY2009
FY2010
Supp.
with
Total vs.
FY2011 vs.
By DOD Functional Category
Requesta
Enacted
Request
Request
FY2009
FY2011
FY2009
Operations
Request
23.9 36.0 19.0 55.0 130% 62.7 163%
Operations Adjustedb
24.6 41.0 14.0 55.0 123% 62.7 155%
Overseas Contingency Operations
0 5.0
0 5.0
NA [.4]
NA
Fund (OCOTF)b
Force Protection
4.7
7.8
3.3
11.1
135%
10.5
122%
Improvised Explosive Device
0.7 0.9 0.4 1.3 78% 2.7
266%
(IED)Defeat Fund
Military Intelligence Program
1.9 3.7 1.3 5.0
156% 6.1
216%
Afghan National Security Forces
5.6
6.6
2.6
9.2
63%
11.6
107%
Pakistan Counterinsurgency
0.4 0 0 0 -100% 0 -100%
Capability c
Coalition Support
1.4
1.8
0
1.8
35%
2.0
45%
Commanders Emergency
0.7 1.0 0 1.0 39% 1.1 53%
Response Program (CERP)
Military Construction
0.9
1.4 0.5 1.9
117% 1.2 37%
Army Temporary End Strength
0
0.4
0
0.4
NA
1.1
NA
Navy
Individual
Augmentees
0 0.1
0 0.1
NA 0.2
NA
Subtotal: Ongoing Operationsc
41.0
69.7
27.1
91.8
124%
99.2
142%
Reconstitution/Reset
6.6 7.7 1.7 9.4 41% 11.2 68%
Total War-Related
47.6
72.4
28.8
96.2
102%
110.3
132%
Additional Requests
Baseline Fuel/Add'l Requestsd
0
0
2.0
2.0
NA
0
NA
Non-DOD Classified
NR
NR
1.2
NR
NA
NR
NA
Subtotal Additional Requests
NA
NA
3.2
NA
NA
NA
NA
TOTAL DOD REQUESTc
47.6
69.2
32.0
96.2
102%
110.3
132%
(...continued)
DOD, FY2011 Budget Request: Overview, Figure 6-3, February 1, 2010; http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/
fy2011/FY2011_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. For CBO, see CBO, “Letter to Congressman Spratt on
Analysis of Scenarios for Funding Iraq and Afghanistan,” January 21, 2010, Table 1; http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/
109xx/doc10995/01-20-CostOfChangesinTroops.pdf; DOD, FY2011 Budget Request: Overview, February 1, 2010,
Figure 6-2; CBO’s estimate assumes that per person costs for operations, transportation, supplies, and services will be
50% higher in Afghanistan than in Iraq based on DOD data; http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/
FY2011_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. This comparison is based on “Adjusted Operations” figures that
exclude $5 billion in the FY2010 Supp. Request that is intended to restore funds originally allocated to O&M that were
used instead to purchase additional Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles, as permitted P.L. 111-118, the FY2010
DOD Appropriations Act.
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Source: : DOD, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request, Summary Justification, May 2009, Table 5-11; Additional DOD
tables provided to CRS, March 2010.
Notes: NR = Not reported; NA = Not applicable.
a. FY2009 figures reflect DOD’s FY2010 Summary Justification, and adjustment to add $2.4 billion that DOD
used to cover war costs that came from DOD baseline accounts.
b. The “Operations Adjusted” figure moves $5 billion requested in the FY2010 Supplemental Request to
FY2010 Enacted to reflect the fact that DOD used $5 billion requested for operations and moved by
Congress to the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) to purchase Mine Resistant
Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles as permitted by law (see OCOTF in P.L. 111-118).
c. Total reflects amount requested for “Operations,” not amount al ocated in the adjusted figure.
DOD would argue that operations costs in the FY2010 supplemental request are particularly high
because the new troops will be deploying primarily to southern Afghanistan where the United
States has had few troops, requiring DOD to set up, expand, and operate many more facilities. It
is not clear, however, whether these factors are sufficient to account for the difference.
Last year, citing concerns about whether DOD could “accurately budget” for the Afghan and Iraq
wars in light of significant changes in military operations, the FY2010 DOD Appropriations Act
transferred $5 billion of DOD’s request for Operation and Maintenance funding to the Overseas
Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) to be held aside until DOD notified
congressional defense committees of where the funds were needed.37 Similar concerns may be
raised about DOD’s FY2010 request for all of the reasons above.38
Another indicator that DOD’s estimates may be high is the fact that obligations reported in the
first five months of FY2010 for operational costs are about 22% of the total amount that DOD has
requested assuming the FY2010 supplemental is enacted. To use all these funds, monthly
spending would need to more than double in the next seven months, suggesting that DOD
estimates—developed last fall—may be somewhat high.39 Although obligations are typically
lower in the first few months of the fiscal year and only some of the 30,000 troops were in-
country, the rate of spending still appears to be lower than would be expected. Congress could
again choose to put aside some of DOD’s O&M request in the OCOTF as they did last year.
Funds to Accelerate Training Afghan Security Forces
To accelerate the training and expand Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), and hence be able to
reduce the U.S. role, DOD is requesting an additional $2.6 billion. If this request is approved,
ASFF funding would total $9.2 billion in FY2010, an increase of 63% (see Table 3).
37 House Appropriations Committee, H.Rept. 111-230, p. 329; the enacted version endorsed this House action.
38 Congressional Quarterly,“Extra War Funding Is Anticipated, But Lawmakers Are Not in Any Rush,” April 20, 2010.
39 CRS average strength calculation is based on DOD’s Boots on the Ground Report and Cost of War Reports.
Like DOD’s Operations category, CRS adjusted reported obligations for O&M and Military personnel to exclude the
following categories that are not related to changes in troop strength: coalition support, Commanders Emergency
Response Program (CERP), depot maintenance, and body armor. DOD’s Operations category, with a somewhat lower
per troop cost, may exclude additional O&M costs that CRS cannot capture from the Cost of War Reports. O&M funds
are only available for one year and so would lapse if not used by September 30, 2010.
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Court Cases
Concerns that may be raised about this request include
• whether DOD needs all the additional funds requested in FY2010 to meet current
plans in light of current spending rates.
• whether the ramp-up in DOD’s plan is achievable and whether there is sufficient
oversight given persistent training problems, recent contracting disputes, and
possible shortages in trainers.
Relating DOD’s Plan to Its Funding Request
Under the new plan, the Afghan Security forces would reach a total of 243,000 by October
2010—higher levels to be achieved over a year earlier—and 305,600 by FY2011. The Afghan
Army would grow from 97,000 in November 2009 to 134,000 in October 2010 and 171,000 in
October 2011, a 76% increase in two years. The Afghan Police would grow from 93,800 in
November 2009 to 109,000 this October and to 134,000 in October 2011, a 43% increase over
two years.40 In January 2010, NATO partners endorsed these increases.41
It is not clear whether DOD’s FY2010 supplemental request is necessary to meet these levels or
entails some forward-financing or requirements—providing funds before they are needed. DOD
states that the additional $2.6 billion is necessary to “sustain the growth” of the Afghan Army “on
a glide slope that exceeds 134,000,” to pay Afghan Army soldiers more, and provide additional
infrastructure and equipment.42 The same question can be raised about DOD’s FY2011 request.43
40 For prior plan, see DOD, Fiscal Year 2010: Summary Justification, May 2009, pp. 4-33-4-34;
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2010/fy2010_SSJ.pdf. For current plan, see DOD, FY2011 Budget
Request:Overview, February 1, 2010, p. 6-7 to 6-8; http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/
FY2011_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
41 DOD, “Section 1230 and Section 1231 Report,” p. 6; http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/
Report_Final_SecDef_04_26_10.pdf.
42 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, “Justification for FY
2010 Supplemental Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), p. 4, p.8, p.25, and passim, February 2010;
http://asafm.army.mil/Documents/OfficeDocuments/Budget/BudgetMaterials/FY11/OCO//asff-sup.pdf.
43 DOD’s additional $11.6 billion is “to procure long-lead items in fiscal year 2011 in order to remain on a growth glide
slope for a force beyond 171,600 and 134,000;” see Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Budget
Fiscal Year (FY) 2011, “Justification for FY 2011 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF); http://asafm.army.mil/
Documents/OfficeDocuments/Budget/BudgetMaterials/FY11/OCO//asff.pdf.
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Table 4. Funding for Afghan Security Forces (ASFF), FY2009-FY2011
(in billions of dollars)
FY2009
Pending
Bridge
Requests:
(P.L. 110-252)
FY2010
FY2010
and
FY2010
Total
Supplemental
Supplemental
Enacted
FY2010
with
FY2011
and FY2011
Category
(P.L. 110-32)
(P.L. 111-118) Supp.Request
Request
Request
Request
Afghan Police
1.5
2.5
1.1
3.6
4.1
5.2
Afghan Army
4.0
4.0
1.5
5.6
7.5
9.0
Related 0.1
0
0
0
0.1
0.1
TOTAL ASFF
5.6
6.6
2.6
9.2
11.6
14.2
Source: Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal Year (FY) 2011, Justification for FY 2010 Supplemental, Afghanistan
Security Forces Fund (ISFF), February 2010, p.2; http://asafm.army.mil/Documents/OfficeDocuments/Budget/
BudgetMaterials/FY11/OCO//asff.pdf.
Altogether, Congress has appropriated $25.5 billion for the Afghan Security Forces thus far.44 The
pending requests for FY2010 and FY2011 would provide another $14.2 billion and bring the total
through FY2011 to $39.8 billion (see Table 4). DOD has not provided an estimate of the ultimate
cost or number of years that the United States would need to support Afghan Security forces.
While General McChrystal, U.S. NATO Commander in Afghanistan, has proposed doubling the
Afghan Army and Police from the current goal of 243,000 to 400,000. General Mullen
characterized this as “an aspirational goal out several years from now,” and one that has not been
endorsed by the Obama Administration.45
Problems in Training Afghan Security Forces
While DOD has responsibility to train the Afghan Army, DOD and the State Department jointly
manage training of the Afghan police. The training of Afghan Security forces is actually carried
out by U.S. military personnel, NATO coalition teams, and private contractors
DOD and the State Department have experienced a myriad of problems in carrying out this
training. For the Afghan Army, problems include attrition rates of about 20%, deficiencies in
leadership, frequent absenteeism that can reduce units to 50% of their strength, limited logistical
capabilities, and questionable behavior. For the police, training has been hampered by illiteracy,
corruption, and the targeting and killing of police recruits and police by insurgents.46
44 CRS Report R40699, Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff.
45 CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman, p.
46; House Armed Services Committee, Transcript, “Afghanistan Assessment,” p. 18, December 3, 2009.
46 Ibid. and p. 47-p. 48; GAO, Afghanistan Security: U.S. Programs to Further Reform Ministry of Interior and
National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation, GAO-09-280, March 2009;
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09280.pdf; Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan, Quarterly Report,
January 2010; http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/jan2010/pdf/SIGAR_Jan2010.pdf.
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A recent hearing on Afghan police training cited the following problems, which have also been
identified in GAO, Special Inspector General Reports, audit reports by the State and Defense
Departments, and press articles:
• Difficulties in coordinating DOD, State Department, and NATO coalition
training;
• Persistent problems in relying on private contractors including poor performance
and bad behavior, unauthorized use of firearms and inadequate vetting, and
shortages of contractor personnel; and
• Lack of sufficient personnel to manage contracts and insufficient contract
oversight including invalid invoices as well as inadequate performance.47
Although DOD has sent additional trainers, and requested more from NATO allies, there still are
reported shortages, which could increase reliance on contractors and raise more concerns among
Members. Senator Levin recently cited his concern about a shortfall in trainers for the Afghan
army and police, a shortfall acknowledged in DOD’s April 1, 2010 Afghan Section 1230 Metrics
report, which noted that 44% of the 4,083 trainers required are currently assigned.48
To gauge whether sufficient trainers are available and whether the current ramp-up is realistic,
Members may want to know
• How many trainers are needed for initial and follow-on training to meet the
higher targets funded in the FY2010 supplemental request for Afghanistan?
• How is that requirement to be met in terms of the number of U.S. military
personnel, coalition partner teams, and contractor personnel?
• How many of those trainers are currently in-country, scheduled to arrive, pledged
but not yet available, or still to be hired?
• How would DOD’s funding change if these personnel are not available as
anticipated?
Since it is already halfway through FY2010, current shortfalls could hamper the ramp-up.
The plan to speed up training of the Afghan police could also be affected by a recently sustained
bid-protest, which may delay contract award.49 When asked to describe DOD’s plan for providing
47 Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight, “Hearing on
Contracts for Afghan National Police Training,” Transcript, April 15, 2010; statements and video of hearing at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=6ad2b464-2877-4107-9159-
da85dc461030; Senate Armed Services Committee, “Contracting in a counterinsurgency: an examination of the
Blackwater-Paravant contract and the need for oversight,” February 24, 2010; http://armed-services.senate.gov/
e_witnesslist.cfm?id=4419.
48 Congressional Quarterly, “Levin Pushes Back Against Veto Threat on F-35 Engine, Transport Plane,” by Eugene
Mulero, February 2, 2010; Secretary of Defense, “Report to Congress in accordance with section 1230 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181) as amended and United States Plan for Sustaining the
Afghanistan National Security Forces Report to Congress in accordance with section 1231 of the National Defense
Authorization At for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181),” hereinafter DOD, “Section 230 and Section 1231 Report;
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_26_10.pdf.
49DynCorp protested being excluded from bidding on the contract; see GAO, “Matter of: DynCorp International LLC;
File: B-402349; Date: March 15, 2010;” http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/402349.pdf.
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Afghan police training since there was no longer a contract in effect, DOD Assistant Secretary
David Sedney stated that “We don’t have a final answer for you on that,” and suggested that DOD
intended to do a full and open competition, which could take more time and delay training, and
reduce the funding needed in FY2010.50
Current Spending Rates
Based on DOD’s February 2010, Cost of War obligation reports, DOD still has available almost
$6.4 billion in funding appropriated in FY2009 and FY2010. In the first five months of FY2010,
DOD obligated $1.6 billion, or an average of $320 million per month, somewhat below the
FY2009 average. 51 In order to obligate all funds requested, DOD’s monthly obligation rate for
ASFF would need to almost triple from $320 million to $920 million in the second half of
FY2010. In light of these figures, it is not clear that DOD urgently needs the additional $2.6
billion.
Whether Some of DOD’s Request Could Be Funded in the Regular Bill
As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continue, some Members have raised concerns about whether
emergency supplementals for war are still justified, or whether war spending should be included
in regular appropriations acts. Because the February 2009 budget submission of FY2010 war
funding preceded the Administration’s decision in December 2009 to deploy 30,000 more troops,
some would argue that an emergency designation for the FY2010 supplemental request is
appropriate.52 Some of DOD’s request, however, including the $1 billion for training in the Iraqi
Security Forces Fund (ISFF), the $2 billion to offset fuel increases, and the $1.7 billion for reset
or replacement of war-worn equipment is less clearly related to the new deployments, and some
could argue should be considered as part of DOD’s regular FY2011 appropriation request.
With the turnover of responsibility for security to the Iraqi government, and the rise in oil prices
in 2008, Congress has been less willing to pay for Iraqi security forces. DOD argues that the $1
billion for the ISFF is necessary to complete and sustain modernization efforts underway, and
ensure that Iraq can provide for its security particularly when faced with lower revenues as oil
prices have fallen.53 While these are important policy considerations, some may challenge
whether the funds should be designated as emergency.
Some may also argue that providing $2 billion to cover higher than expected fuel costs in DOD’s
base budget could be covered in other ways. Typically, DOD has financed unanticipated increases
50 See Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight, “Hearing on
Contracts for Afghan National Police Training,” Transcript, April 15, 2010, p. 18.
51 CRS calculations based on DOD Table entitled FY 2010 Cost of War for FY 2010 Appropriations in “Cost of War
Report As of February 28,2010.” To compute the funding available, CRS subtracted obligations as of February 28,
2010 (latest) reported in the Cost of War Report from the amounts appropriated. For example, of the $6.6 billion
appropriated in the FY2010 DOD Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-118), DOD has obligated $793 million leaving $5.9
billion still available. DOD still has available $563 million from the $3.6 billion appropriated in the FY2009
Supplemental (P.L. 111-32) for a total of $6.4 billion.
52 Section 403 (f) in S.Con.Res. 13 defines spending as emergency if it is “essential ... sudden ... compelling ...
unanticipated,” but it is a congressional prerogative to decide where the emergency designation is appropriate.
53 Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, Justification for FY 2010 Supplemental, Iraq Security Forces
Fund (ISFF), February 2010.
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in fuel prices by using cash resources in the Working Capital Funds, which provide oil to the
services, or by transferring funds from less urgent needs.54 DOD may argue that these actions
would be difficult so an infusion of budget authority is needed.
Another request that could be considered more loosely tied to the additional 30,000 troops is the
$1.7 billion for reset, to replace war-worn equipment, particularly losses. Some might argue that
the effect of the additional combat operations on equipment in Afghanistan is likely to be gradual
particularly with the phasing-in of troops over the course of the year making it particularly
difficult to predict the need to replace war-worn equipment. Others would argue that replacement
needs from the additional deployment of troops can be estimated based on past experience. As in
the case of the ASFF, DOD also has a substantial backlog of war-related procurement that
remains to be spent.
More Spending for Bases in Afghanistan Raises Questions of
Permanency and Executability55
The Administration’s supplemental war request for an additional $521 million for military
construction would bring the FY2010 total to $1.9 billion—double the FY2009 level—and raises
questions about whether DOD is building facilities to support the temporary stationing of
warfighting troops or creating permanent bases in Afghanistan (see Table 5). In recent statutory
language, Congress permitted spending for a “long-term presence” but prohibited spending for
“permanent stationing” of U.S. troops in Afghanistan (see “War-Related Military Construction
Provisions”). In light of current spending rates for military construction in Afghanistan, it is also
not clear how urgently the current funds are needed.
DOD’s $521 million request would create and expand basic infrastructure at various locations in
Afghanistan including roads, runways, quarters, and other facilities to support the deployment of
30,000 additional U.S. troops. The justification for the request states that the construction “will
expand airfield capacity for increased airlift and combat operations, increase logistics capacity at
key locations, and provide the minimum infrastructure necessary.... ”56
The supplemental request is split roughly evenly between Army and Air Force construction. Army
projects are focused in the southern provinces of Helmand, Nimruz, and Kandahar, the area of
most new military operations, and Balkh and Kunduz provinces in the north, where Afghanistan
borders the three former Soviet republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Air Force
construction is planned for Nimruz province in the south, Balkh province in the north, and
Herand province in the west of the country in support of airlift and special operations forces.
54 The Working Capital Funds are set up to include cash reserves to cover unanticipated price changes, with reserves
replenished by charging service customers higher prices the following year.
55 Written by Daniel H. Else, Specialist in National Defense, and Amy Belasco, Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and
Budget, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.
56 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request: Overview, Department of
Defense, Washington, DC, February 2010, pp. 6-8.
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Table 5. Military Construction for the Afghan War, FY2003-FY2011
(in billions of dollars)
FY2003-
FY2010
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
Supplemental FY2010
FY2011
Total
Enacted
Enacted
Request
Total
Request
Total
Military
1.3 0.9 1.4 0.5
1.9 1.3 5.4
Construction
O&M-
0.8 0.4
TBDa 0 TBDa 0 0.5
Funded
Construction
TOTAL
1.4
1.3
1.4
0.5
1.9
1.3
5.9
Sources: Department of Defense budget justification materials (various years) and briefing to Senate
Appropriations Committee staff.
a. DOD can use up to $500 million in previously appropriated O&M funds for military construction for
contingency operations in Central Command according to Sec. 2806, P.L. 111-84, the FY2010 National
Defense Authorization Act (see “War-Related Military Construction Provisions”).
Army construction includes waste and waste water management systems, fuel storage and
distribution facilities, utilities infrastructure, gravel roads, and a command and control
headquarters at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Tombstone near Lashkar Gah in Helmand in the
south. Projects also include perimeter security facilities and a helicopter apron at Kunduz and
Mazar e Sharif in the country’s extreme north.
Air Force construction includes a runway and associated apron at FOB Delaram, located in the
west approximately halfway between Kandahar and the Iranian border, a Special Operations
helicopter apron at FOB Dwyer (in southern Helmand province near the town of Garmsir),
helicopter and airlift aprons at Mazar e Sharif in the north, and aircraft aprons and fuel and
munitions storage at Shindad Airfield in the west.
A fundamental issue for Congress, expressed in legislation over a number of years, is whether
spending on construction signals a long-term, indefinite U.S. troop commitment to Afghanistan.
Building to Fight vs. Building to Stay: Congressional Restrictions
Both appropriators and authorizers in Congress have sought to distinguish between military
construction intended to support expeditionary, short-term warfighting and military construction
for permanent stationing of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. As it did in the case of Iraq, Congress
has adopted language intended to prevent the establishment of permanent bases in Afghanistan
(see “War-Related Military Construction Provisions”).
In the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84), Congress banned “any defense
funds” from being “obligated or expended by the United States Government to establish any
military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of United
States Armed Forces in Afghanistan [italics added].”57 The FY2009 Supplemental Appropriation
adopted the same language but stated that none of the funds “available by this or any other Act
shall be obligated or expended by the United States Government for the purpose of establishing
57 P.L. 111-84, Secs. 1237 and 2806.
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any military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of
United States Armed Forces in Afghanistan [italics added].”58 There is no definition of the types
of projects that would signal permanency.
At the same time, Congress carved out an exception to this ban in P.L. 111-84 to permit DOD to
use Operation & Maintenance (O&M) funds for military construction that supports a “long-term
presence” in Afghanistan, reversing language from prior years that limited such funding to
“urgent ... temporary“ facilities (see “War-Related Military Construction Provisions”).Where the
line exists between funding for facilities to support permanent stationing of U.S. troops, which is
banned, and facilities to support a long-term presence, which is permitted, may be unclear, as
some projects (housing, waste treatment, etc.) could plausibly be devoted to either purpose.
Congress has periodically denied funds in supplemental appropriations requests for projects
perceived as signaling a permanent presence—a permanent fuel facility and power generation
plant at Bagram, for example, in the FY2005 supplemental appropriations request—without first
seeing them justified as part of a comprehensive plan for troop stationing.59 Some of the projects
proposed in the FY2010 Supplemental could fall into this category.
“Permanent Stationing” and “Long-term Presence”
To respond to rapidly changing military situations in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD requested and
received additional flexibility to use already-appropriated O&M funds to build facilities to meet
“urgent military operational requirements of a temporary nature[italics added]”starting in
FY2004.60 Congress renewed this authority every year until FY2009 while at the same time
capping the amount between $100 million and $200 million and forbidding funds from being
used for construction at a military installation “where the United States is reasonably expected to
have a long-term presence.”61
Over the years, DOD planners have concluded that some form of U.S. military presence in
Afghanistan is likely to continue for several years, possibly even after military operations end. In
response, Congress changed the law in 2009 and permitted DOD to use $200 million in O&M
funds for projects in U.S. Central Command and an additional $300 million in O&M funds for
construction in Afghanistan to meet “urgent military requirements” as certified by the Secretary
of Defense, and exempted installations there from the ban on the use of O&M construction funds
“deemed as supporting a long-term presence.”62 The FY2010 NDAA again extended the authority
to use O&M funding for military construction and continued the $500 million total limit on
projects in Central Command (see “War-Related Military Construction Provisions”).
58 P.L. 110-32, Sec. 315.
59 For example, the Senate Committee on Appropriations wrote, “A longer-term presence with more permanent force
structure may be in the interests of the United States, but plans for such a presence—and requests for the facilities to
support that presence—should be presented to the Congress in the regular authorization and appropriation process.”
U.S. Congress, Senate Appropriations, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on
Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Report to Accompany H.R. 1268, 109th Cong., 1st sess., April 6, 2005, S.Rept. 109-
52 (Washington: GPO, 2005), pp. 35-36.
60 P.L. 108-136, Sec. 2808.
61 Ibid.
62 P.L. 110-417, Sec. 2806.
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Higher Funding and DOD’s Proposed Legislative Change
Taking O&M funding for military construction into account increases the amount spent for
military construction appreciably. For example, in FY2009, DOD added $409 million from O&M
accounts for construction in Afghanistan to the $900 million appropriated, raising the total to $1.4
billion. This amount nearly equaled the total spent on construction between FY2003 and FY2008
and in a single year, doubled DOD’s construction investment in Afghanistan (see Table 5).
If DOD dedicated the full $500 million in O&M available to military construction in Afghanistan,
the total in FY2010 would reach $2.4 billion, which would again almost double the entire prior
seven-year investment. DOD has also submitted new legislative proposal to use 0&M monies for
unspecified minor construction in support of contingency operations until October 1, 2012. If that
proposal is approved by Congress, total funding for military construction in Afghanistan could
rise further (see “War-Related Military Construction Provisions”).
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War-Related Military Construction Provisions
Prohibitions on Establishing Permanent Bases in Afghanistan [italics added]
FY2009 (Sec. 315, P.L. 110-32,)
The FY2009 Supplemental Appropriation Act states “None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by
this or any other Act shal be obligated or expended by the United States Government for the purpose of establishing
any military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of United States Armed
Forces in Afghanistan.
FY2010 (Secs. 1237 and 2806, P.L. 111-84)
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) bars any defense funds from being “obligated or expended by the
United States Government to establish any military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent
stationing of United States Armed Forces in Afghanistan
Using Operation and Maintenance Funds for Urgent, Temporary Operational Needs
FY2004 (Sec. 2808, P.L. 108-136)
NDAA temporarily authorizes DOD to obligate up to $200 million of FY2004 O&M funds "to carry out a
construction project outside the United States" that is necessary to meet "urgent military operational requirements of a
temporary nature in support of a declaration of war, the declaration by the President of a national emergency ..., or a
contingency operation [italics added]."
Authorization does not apply to a military installation "where the United States is reasonably expected to have a long-
term presence”
FY2005 (Sec. 2810, P.L. 108-375)
NDAA extends authority to obligate up to $200 million in O&M funds for urgent, temporary military construction
through FY2005 contingent upon submitting FY2004 quarterly reports.
FY2006 (Sec. 2809, P.L. 109-163)
NDAA extends but halves authority to $100 million in O&M funds for urgent, temporary military construction but
only if DOD submits quarterly report by deadline.
FY2007 (Sec. 2802, P.L. 109-702)
NDAA extends authority to use $100 million for urgent, temporary military construction for a year.
FY2008 (Sec. 2801, P.L. 110-181)
NDAA extends and raises authority to use $200 million for urgent, temporary military construction for a year and
requires 7-10-day advance notification for projects of $2 million or more (i.e. “minor construction”).
FY2009 (Sec. 2806, P.L. 110-417)
NDAA authorizes up to $200 million in O&M funds for urgent, temporary military construction only for U.S. Central
Command and U.S. Africa Command.
Exempts military installations located in Afghanistan from the ban on the use of O&M construction funds "deemed as
supporting a long-term presence"[italics added].
Authorizes up to $300 million of O&M funds for Afghanistan if the Secretary of Defense certifies to the congressional
defense committees that additional construction "is required to meet urgent military requirements in Afghanistan."
FY2010 (Secs. 1237 and 2806, P.L. 111-84)
NDAA authorizes up to $200 million of O&M funds until the later of September 30, 2010, or enactment of FY2011
military construction. Limits authority to U.S. Central Command.
FY2011 (DOD Legislative Proposals, April 1, 2010)
DOD requests authorization through FY2012 to spend from O&M funds “amounts necessary to carry out unspecified
minor construction projects in support of contingency operations,” and raises the threshold on these unspecified
minor construction projects in support of contingency operations from $750,000 to $3 million.
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Another possible sign of DOD’s commitment in Afghanistan is the amount invested in certain key
bases of the more than 25 identifiable sites. This includes:
• $1.3 billion invested in Bagram Air Base, $248 million requested for a total of
$1.6 billion if the request is approved;
• $767 million appropriated for Kandahar Air Base, $181 million requested for a
total of $948 million if the request is approved;
• $595 million for Forward Operating Base Tombstone/Bastion (U.S. and U.K
funding),$299 million requested for a total of $894 million if the request is
approved.
DOD has also requested new language for the FY2011 DOD authorization that would permit
DOD to use O&M funds in “amounts necessary to carry out unspecified minor military
construction projects of up to $3 million each in support of contingency operations” through
September 30, 2012 [italics added].63 If enacted, this would create a temporary two-year authority
allowing DOD to draw on O&M funds up to any amount for unspecified military construction in
support of contingency operations anywhere in the world.
For these projects, the proposal also raises the current per project cap for unspecified minor
construction projects from $750,000 to $3 million, which DOD argues is necessary because
construction costs in Afghanistan have grown.64 Because the proposal says that DOD could spend
“amounts necessary,” for these types of projects, there would be no limit on the total amount of
O&M funds that could be drawn upon for military construction in support of contingency
operations anywhere in the world. DOD proposes after-the-fact quarterly reporting to the four
congressional defense committees within 60 days rather than the 7-10 day pre-notification
required to use O&M funds for Central Command projects.
Like the current authority to use O&M funds for regular military construction, this would give
DOD additional flexibility to respond to the need for projects that arise unexpectedly, but at the
same time would reduce congressional oversight of those projects before construction begins.
Execution Issues
Another issue that could arise is whether the $521 million supplemental request is urgently
needed in light of DOD’s current spending rates for military construction projects in Afghanistan.
While DOD’s request identifies individual projects the services consider needed, DOD currently
has $2.1 billion in budget authority available from previous appropriation acts that has not yet
been obligated (i.e., placed on contract). In FY2009, DOD obligated about $607 million for
military construction projects in Afghanistan or an average of about $50 million a month. For the
first five months of FY2010, that average has fallen to $26 million a month for reasons that are
not identified in DOD’s report.65
63 DOD, “Enhanced Authority for Use of Operation and Maintenance Funds for Unspecified Minor Military
Construction Projects in Support of Contingency Operations;” 3rd package of Legislative Proposals, April 1, 2010.
64 DOD, “Enhanced Authority for Use of Operation and Maintenance Funds for Unspecified Minor Military
Construction Projects in Support of Contingency Operations,” 3rd package of Legislative Proposals, April 1, 2010.
65 CRS calculations based on DOD, Cost of War Report, September 30, 2009; and DOD, Cost of War Report, February
(continued...)
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To obligate all of the $2.1 billion in funds currently available by the end of this fiscal year, DOD
would have to increase its monthly average obligations six-fold to $300 million. Not all of those
monies have to be obligated before the end of this fiscal year. The $2.1 billion includes $700
million that has to be obligated by September 30, 2010 or the monies return to the Treasury and
another $1.4 billion that has to be obligated by September 30, 2011.
To spend all of the FY2009 monies before they lapse, DOD would need to increase its current
$26 million monthly obligation rate four-fold to $100 million in the second half of this fiscal year.
Similarly, to spend the $1.4 billion already available for FY2010 projects, monthly obligations
would need to average $116 million, or more than four times as high as the current rate.
If DOD receives the additional supplemental funds, monthly obligations would have to treble
from the FY2009 rate (to $150 million a month) and increase six-fold from the current FY2010
rate.66 Some may argue that in light of how quickly current monies are being spent, the FY2010
supplemental request could be considered as part of DOD’s FY2011 war request when there
could be additional evidence about current spending rates and the prospects for the Afghan war.
War-Related Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Operations67
The Administration’s FY2010 Supplemental request under the 150 international affairs budget
function addresses specific foreign economic assistance and related civilian operational
requirements of three strategic frontline nations—Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. In the case of
Iraq, the request is meant to respond to the drawdown of U.S. military forces and the consequent
shift of greater responsibility to civilian personnel. In the case of Afghanistan, it reflects a
strategy that increases both U.S. military and civilian responsibilities. The Pakistan request
addresses the Administration’s desire to demonstrate U.S. support to Pakistan and to strengthen
the Pakistan government’s presence in insurgent areas of the country.
The total international affairs budget request for these war-related programs is $4.46 billion, $1.8
billion of which comes under the State Department portion of the account, and largely provides
personnel and infrastructure to enable diplomatic and assistance programs. The Foreign
Operations, i.e. foreign aid, segment of the request, amounting to $2.6 billion, provides a wide
range of aid in support of U.S. security, economic growth, social service, and democratization
objectives. For each country, the Administration is only requesting funding in discrete sub-
accounts that address certain needs. It is not requesting funding for P.L.480 food aid, Global
Health/Child Survival, or other accounts (see Table 6).
If the request is approved, the FY2010 total of those specific accounts for the three countries
affected by the request would increase by more than two-thirds over the FY2009 figure from
roughly $6 billion to $10 billion.
(...continued)
28, 2010.
66 CRS calculations based on data in DOD’s Cost of War reports for FY2009 and February 28, 2010.
67 Written by Curt Tarnoff, Specialist in Foreign Affairs, and Kennon Nakamura, Analyst in Foreign Affairs, Foreign
Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.
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Table 6. War-Related Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Operations Supplemental Request
(rounded to millions of dollars)
FY2010
FY2010
Total
FY2010
Supp.
with
FY2011
Accounts
FY2009 Enacted Request Request Request
AFGHANISTAN
Economic Support Fund (ESF)
2,048 2,037 1,576
3,613 3,316
Int’l Narcotics & Law Enforcement (INCLE)
484 420 200
620 450
State Diplomatic and Consular Programs—Operations
(D&CP)a
369a 486a
211
697 754b
State Inspector General
0c 5 3
8 7
SIGAR
12 23 14
37 35
Total Afghanistan, FY2010 Supp.
Request Accounts
2,913 2,970 2,004 4,974 4,563
IRAQ
Int’l Narcotics & Law Enforcement (INCLE)
20 52 517
569 315
State Operations (D&CP)d
1,507d 1,122d
1,570
2,692 1,787e
Total Iraq, FY2010 Supp. Request Accounts
1,527 1,174 2,087 3,261 2,1012
PAKISTAN
Economic Support Fund (ESF)
1,114 1,033 244
1,277 1,322
Int’l Narcotics & Law Enforcement (INCLE)
88 130 40
170 140
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
300 238 60
298 296
State Operations (D&CP)
65 46 26
72 102
Total Pakistan, FY2010 Supp. Request Accounts
1,567 1,447 370 1,817 1,859
TOTAL INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: FY2010
SUPP. REQUEST ACCOUNTS
6,006
5,591
4,461
10,055
8,524
Source: Department of State FY2011 Executive Budget Summary.
a. $25 million provided under the FY2009 supplemental (P.L.111-32) and counted here as FY2009 funding was
considered by appropriators forward funding to address in advance a portion of the FY2010 request.
b. Figure does not include security.
c. Breakdown for Afghanistan/Pakistan oversight not available.
d. $336 million provided under the FY2009 supplemental (P.L.111-32) and counted here as FY2009 funding
was considered by appropriators forward funding to address in advance a portion of the FY2010 request.
e. Figure includes security.
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Afghanistan68
The Administration’s international affairs State, Foreign Operations request for Afghanistan
reflects a strategy that asserts the importance of civilian programs in governance, economic
growth, and social services, provided in conjunction with U.S. military efforts in the country.
While the approach of strengthening the U.S. civilian presence, increasing aid to local
government, and enhancing the role of the national government in providing local services, has
been in effect for nearly a year, the December 2009 “surge” strategy might be seen to have
accelerated and heightened the need for civilian assistance delivery, especially as follow-up in
insurgent areas presently being contested by the U.S. military. A major element of the new
strategy is to rapidly increase stability and reduce the strength of the insurgency in problematic
provinces by creation of jobs and provision of social services through a more capable and visible
Afghan government.
The coming months will tell whether this strategy is working. However, key concerns include the
extent to which the Afghan government is prepared to provide sufficient leadership, staff, and
support to local communities in the forefront of the conflict, the ease of coordination between the
U.S. military and civilian aid programs and personnel, and the level of cooperation offered by the
local populace. One question is whether high levels of corruption in the Afghan government will
impede its ability to provide services effectively. As increasing amounts of aid are made available
through the supplemental, the ability of the U.S. government to monitor and insure accountability
is an associated concern. The corresponding increase in numbers of U.S. aid personnel as well as
an increase in the request for the offices of inspector general reflects U.S. government worries
about the impact of corruption on aid programs.
The Afghanistan supplemental request would provide a significant boost to total U.S.
international affairs funding levels for that country. The State Department diplomatic operations
account, already under the regular FY2010 appropriations a third larger than in FY2009, would
rise by nearly 90% above the previous year’s level if the request is approved.69 If the foreign aid
portion of the supplemental request is approved, it will raise total FY2010 levels of all the major
non-humanitarian civilian aid accounts going to Afghanistan by 67% over the equivalent FY2009
level of assistance.
Elements of the Afghanistan Foreign Aid and Diplomatic
Operations Supplemental
The Administration seeks $1.6 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) and $200 million in
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding under the foreign operations
portion of the request, and $211 million in Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP) funds
under the State Department portion.
ESF is a main source of economic, political, and social aid, mostly channeled through the Agency
for International Development (USAID). The ESF request breaks downs as follows:
68 For further discussion on Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security,
and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman, and CRS Report R40699, Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance, by Curt
Tarnoff.
69 And rise by 110%, if amounts considered by appropriators as forward funded are counted in FY2010.
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• Alternative development: $135 million, mostly for agriculture in poppy-
production areas;
• Conflict mitigation and reconciliation: $216 million to support consultative
processes in local communities, including quick impact, small grants projects;
• Rule of law: $50 million to support the judicial system, especially in recently
secured areas;
• Good governance: $760 million to strengthen Afghan government agencies,
including $450 million in support of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
which funnels funds to the National Solidarity Program, and $115 million in
direct budget support to the Ministry of Finance;
• Health: $50 million to expand Ministry of Health services;
• Education: $50 million to expand secondary and vocational education;
• Macroeconomic growth: $7 million to help the Ministry of Finance improve
revenue collection through tax administration reform;
• Trade and investment: $19.5 million to support implementation of trade
agreements and support trade infrastructure, such as industrial parks and border
facilities;
• Financial sector: $4.5 million to strengthen branches of the Central Bank;
• Agriculture: $215 million to build capacity countrywide in the Ministry of
Agriculture, and support watershed rehabilitation and irrigation, agriculture
credit, extension services, and market development;
• Private sector development: $60.4 million; and
• Economic opportunity: $8.6 million to expand credit union services, including
Islamic-compliant financing.
The INCLE account is implemented by the State Department. Three quarters of the $200 million
request is aimed at supporting the justice sector, especially to inject rule of law activities into the
provinces. The remainder targets counter-narcotics programs. The request includes
• $60 million to expand the corrections program;
• $25 million for model prisons;
• $50 million to increase the number of judges, prosecutors, criminal investigators;
• $25 million for the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center, the Criminal Justice Task
Fore, the Anti-Corruption Unit and Anti-Corruption Tribunal;
• $5 million to support legal aid;
• $8 million specifically for women’s justice activities;
• $22 million for counternarcotics police; and
• $2 million for drug treatment facilities and support for children.
Largely to support the full range of ongoing and proposed international affairs assistance
programs, the FY2010 State Department Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP) request of
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$211 million furthers the growth of civilian personnel begun in the FY2010 regular request. The
Supplemental proposes a 457 position increase, in addition to the 764 positions funded in the
regular FY2010 appropriations, at a cost of $211 million. These positions include 212 U.S. direct
hires to work at the district level and startup funding to hire 245 staff for work with Kabul
ministries and in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The Administration states that it is
applying a “whole of government” approach with federal employees drawn on an as-needed
reimbursable basis from the Department of State, USAID, Department of Agriculture,
Department of Justice, and eight other federal agencies to provide the vital expertise in
specialized skills. The Department also proposes the hiring of about 200 locally employed staff
(LES) to provide administrative and local knowledge support to American personnel working in
the field.
A recent Department of State Inspector General’s report praises management and personnel
working at the U.S. embassy in Kabul, but expresses concern that they are overworked and
struggling to meet the demands resulting from a tripling of staff over the past year.70 The
expansion proposed under the supplemental would further strain resources. This rapid expansion
has its implications in management of staff and providing for their housing and office space in
Kabul or just basic housing and sanitation in the field. Not addressed in the supplemental request
are the added security needs that are a further consequence of increased civilian staff.
An additional $14 million in funding for the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR) and $3 million for the State Department Inspector General has also been
requested to support their continuing oversight of the assistance program.
Iraq71
The Administration’s international affairs request for Iraq in the FY2010 supplemental has two
components, both reflecting the new strategic environment created by the drawdown of U.S.
military forces. The response to this dramatic change in the U.S. role in Iraq is, perhaps counter-
intuitively, a significant increase in U.S. assistance and State Department operations. Counting all
major non-humanitarian foreign economic aid accounts, the total FY2010 U.S. assistance
program to Iraq would rise by 64% from the FY2009 level, if the supplemental request is
approved. Taken alone, the State operations account would rise by 79%.72
Elements of the Iraq Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Operations Supplemental
The most significant element in the international affairs component of the supplemental for Iraq is
the request for $517.4 million in INCLE funds, a down payment on the transition of responsibility
for police training from the Department of Defense to the Department of State, effective October
1, 2011. While the State Department has responsibility for training police forces in most other
countries, it ceded that role to DOD in the case of Iraq prior to the invasion. Its new duties will
include advising the Ministry of Interior, police, and border forces. According to the State
70 Office of the Inspector General, Report of Inspection: Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan, Department of State, ISP-I-10-
32A, Washington, DC, February 2010, http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/138084.pdf .
71 For further discussion on Iraq, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth
Katzman.
72 And by 159%, if forward funded amounts are counted in FY2010.
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Department, a smooth transition from DOD to the State Department requires that a successor
program be in place at the end of FY2010. Training of the Iraqi military remains in the hands of
DOD.
The INCLE request includes the deployment of 350 advisors who will work at the Ministry and
police colleges, academies, and headquarters throughout the country. It also supports construction
of necessary infrastructure and security staff to support expert personnel—INCLE’s program
ultimately is expected to employ up to 2,000 U.S. government and contractor personnel. To
permit efficient staff travel around the country, funding will provide aircraft and expanded
aviation facilities.
The FY2010 supplemental request also includes funding for State Department operational costs
under the D&CP account amounting to $1.57 billion. This significant boost in Iraq operations
funding is meant to address the problem of maintaining civilian outreach to the provinces
following the U.S. military drawdown. Currently, the United States maintains over 1,200 direct-
hire Americans employees from 14 civilian agencies in Iraq. These civilian federal employees are
posted at the Embassy in Baghdad, the Regional Embassy Office in Basrah, or one of the 16
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), often co-located with the military with the logistical and
security costs supported by the military. During the 2007 surge, a number of embedded PRTs
(ePRTs) were also established that allowed a civilian presence in additional locations protected by
the combat battalions with which they were embedded. These civilian federal employees conduct
business on a broad range of bilateral and multilateral missions from the regular diplomatic work
of furthering U.S. economic and commercial interests, and providing U.S. policy makers with
political analysis, public diplomacy outreach, and oversight of U.S. government assistance
programs. These employees also support reconstruction and economic assistance efforts, rule of
law programs supporting development in the legal and judicial areas, and training and liaison
with various Iraqi ministry and local government personnel.
As combat battalions have withdrawn from the cities, the embedded PRTs are being phased out,
and most regular PRTs are expected to be terminated by 2011. To enable a continued U.S. civilian
presence outside of Baghdad, the State Department will establish, in their place, two consulates
and three temporary Provincial Diplomatic Teams (PDTs). Additionally, two U.S. Forces-Iraq
managed PRTs will remain through the end of 2011.
The supplemental funding would provide for:
• realigning infrastructure to transition to the presence of an Embassy, two
consulates, three State managed PDTs and two interim Defense Department
PRTs. As the State Department assumes greater responsibility for the interim and
final infrastructure, costs previously borne by the military, which include utilities,
storage, housing, furniture, information technology infrastructure and equipment,
building leases, dining, and general support costs, ultimately will have to be
assumed by the State Department ($307.8 million);
• beginning the site and construction development for the planned consulate
facilities to meet full Diplomatic Security and Overseas Buildings Operations
standards ($526.8 million); and
• phasing in the security requirements associated with the new field facilities,
including physical and technical security and static and movement security
($735.3 million).
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As the Department of State takes over responsibilities from the Department of Defense for
housing, protecting, and maintaining its staff, the Department will have to provide for large
increases in contract employees who will provide a vast array of services from security and
operations planning and implementation support to maintenance of vehicles in several motor
pools, cleaning facilities, and food preparation. In the past, the Department has been criticized for
not having appropriate numbers of personnel to manage and oversee its contracts and the
implementation of these contracts. As more contracts and task orders are awarded to meet its
growing responsibilities in Iraq, it is not clear whether the Department has sufficiently also
expanded its capabilities in contract management.
Pakistan
Unlike the requests for Afghanistan and Iraq, the Pakistan supplemental request does not appear
to reflect any significant change in U.S. policy. Taking all funding sources into account, including
DOD aid, there appear to be only modest shifts in funding for Pakistan from year to year between
FY2009 and FY2011, assuming current requests are approved. The Administration’s FY2010
supplemental request for Pakistan is largely aimed at specific infrastructure needs meant to
demonstrate continued U.S. support to the government of Pakistan and bolster the perception that
the Pakistan government is able to meet the needs of its population in areas vulnerable to
insurgency and militant extremist ideologies.
Elements of the Pakistan Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Operations Supplemental
The largest portion of the request is for $244 million in ESF, including
• $50 million for cash payments made through the government of Pakistan to help
people displaced by the military actions taken against extremists in recent
months;
• $65 million for water and sanitation infrastructure;
• $65 million for agriculture irrigation systems; and
• $64 million for solutions to Pakistan’s energy crisis, including hydro/irrigation
infrastructure and alternative energy.
The request also includes $40 million in INCLE funds, for police training and related
infrastructure ($32 million), training and support for the corrections administration ($4 million),
and program administration and police advisor positions ($4 million). Foreign Military Financing
assistance amounting to $60 million will provide five Bell-412 utility and troop transport
helicopters to enhance the Pakistan military’s ability to support counterinsurgency operations.
In its FY2010 supplemental, the Administration is requesting $26 million for State Department
operations to increase staffing at U.S. diplomatic facilities in Pakistan by 56 positions in addition
to the 58 new positions already funded under the FY2010 regular appropriations. These positions
would include both U.S. direct-hire personnel and Locally Employed Staff (LES). The increased
staffing is to serve several purposes including
• to better manage and support the increased military and economic assistance
being provided to Pakistan by providing more contracting and management
officers;
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• to increase embassy staff to enhance logistical support with housing, general
service, and financial officers to meet the embassy’s needs in accommodating the
rapid growth of U.S. government civilian personnel in Pakistan;
• to increase staffing at the U.S. consulates in the provincial capitals of Lahore,
Karachi, and Peshawar. The Administration states that the increased staffing is to
strengthen U.S. outreach and programs at the provincial and local levels; and
• to begin meeting FY2011 staffing requirements earlier.
FY2010 Supplemental Request for U.S.
Disaster Assistance73
The Administration requested $5.1 billion for the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s
(FEMA) Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) because FEMA anticipates that this fund will run out of
funds to meet expected disaster needs and pay unanticipated claims awarded by arbitrators to
state, local, and nonprofits for Public Assistance (PA) recovery projects such as debris removal
and rebuilding public structures (see Table 1).74 According to FEMA, DRF spending averages
about $350 million a month and the current DRF balance is $600 million. Based on these figures,
FEMA projects the account will run out in May or June 2010.
In response to the anticipated shortage, FEMA sent guidance in February 2010 to reduce the rate
of expenditures of the Disaster Relief Fund by limiting payments to arbitration awards and
projects considered immediate needs and delaying payments for other projects, like mitigation
work. Testifying May 6, 2010, FEMA head James Oberstar explained that FEMA has limited
claims payments, delayed interagency reimbursements, and recovered funds from previous years
in order to stretch its available funds.75
The House passed H.R. 4899 on March 25, 2010, to provide the $5.1 billion for FEMA but the
Senate chose not to act on the bill. If the Senate does not pass H.R. 4899, a larger FY2010
supplemental may be an alternate vehicle to provide the funding.
Potential Issues
Two potential issues that may be addressed by Congress are (1) whether the FEMA monies are
appropriately considered to be emergencies; and (2) whether current estimates that the Disaster
Relief Fund is running low are reasonable. Some Members may challenge whether the FEMA
disaster assistance qualifies as emergency spending in light of spending levels in the past several
years. Members may have some concerns about the limited information FEMA has provided
73 Written by Bruce R. Lindsay, Analyst in American National Government, Government and Finance Division.
74 PA provides for debris removal, emergency protective measures, and the repair, replacement, or restoration of
disaster-damaged, publicly owned facilities and the facilities of certain Private Non-Profit (PNP) organizations.
75 CQ, Budget Briefing, “A Bit More Breathing Room for FEMA,” May 7, 2010; Statement of James L. Oberstar,
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, May 5, 2010; telephone
conversation with a legislative liaison for the Department of Homeland Security, April 28, 2010; email received from a
legislative liaison from the Department of Homeland Security.
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about why the Disaster Relief Fund is running low or the likely scope or timing of compensation
payments that may result from arbitration rulings.
Regular vs. Emergency Budgeting for Disasters
In its first budget blueprint A New Era of Responsibility, the Obama Administration criticized
previous Administrations as “irresponsible” for unrealistic budgeting practices.76 In the FY2010
request, the Administration requested $2.0 billion for the DRF. Congress then provided $1.6
billion, $400 million below the request. In FY2011 the Obama Administration is requesting $1.9
billion for the DRF. Compared to previous years, it could be argued that neither request represents
significant increases (see Figure 2)
Figure 2. U.S. Disaster Relief Funding, FY2000-FY2011 Request
(in billions of dollars)
Source: CRS data using Administration budget documents and appropriations statutes.
Notes: CRS calculations based on source above. Figure by Amber Wilhelm, CRS Graphics.
The rationale for the request and the current moratorium provided by OMB is that 59 disasters
have occurred in 2009 and another 18 have already taken place in 2010.77 By comparison, 74
76 Office of Management and Budget, A New Era of Responsibility: Renewing America’s Promise, Washington, DC,
February 26, 2009, p. 36.
77 Office of Management and Budget, Statement of Administration Policy, Washington, DC, March 24, 2010,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/sap_111/saphr4899h_20100324.pdf.
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disasters were declared in 2008 and 63 in 2007. The need for the current supplemental request is
mainly additional arbitration rulings, some related to the Katrina hurricane in 2005.
In recent years, regular requests have been insufficient to meet needs. Higher levels may continue
to be necessary to meet the devastation wrought by Gulf Coast hurricanes in 2005 and 2008
because recovery could take five years or longer. Some might argue that given the number of
disasters and carryover needs from the Gulf hurricanes, Congress might consider appropriating
the DRF at a higher level to avoid the need for supplemental funding. On the other hand, others
would argue that disasters are inherently unpredictable, and hence qualify as emergency needs. If
this is so, Congress may choose to maintain the status quo if Members prefer waiting for large-
scale disasters to occur before providing disaster funding for recovery.
Justifying Current Estimate
Although the replenishment of the DRF may be justified, FEMA has provided little information
to evaluate its request. The only example cited by FEMA in its current request is an arbitration
ruling awarding $475 million to the Charity Hospital which has been closed since Hurricane
Katrina in 2005. If FEMA wishes to make the case that there is a need to supplement the DRF, it
may need to provide more information about how the DRF was drawn down and the nature and
the scope of the arbitration cases.
Mandatory Spending: Adding Veterans’ Benefits
and Settling Court Cases
The Administration is requesting a total of $17.9 billion in additional mandatory spending
including
• $13.4 billion to provide additional benefits for veterans exposed to Agent Orange
in Vietnam;
• $3.4 billion to settle the longstanding Cobell case about government
responsibility for handling Indian land trusts; and
• $1.2 billion to settle the Pigford II case about discrimination claims of black
farmers.
In the case of the VA benefits, the Secretary of the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (VA) currently
has the statutory authority to determine whether certain circumstances—such as exposure to
hazardous substances like Agent Orange—merit a presumption that specific later health problems
are service-connected. Under current scorekeeping conventions, spending for new benefits that is
based on exercising current authority is not counted as new, or an increase in, federal spending for
budget enforcement purposes. Therefore, the spending for the VA benefits presumably would not
be subject to budget procedural constraints, such as PAYGO rules.
Spending for the two court settlements, however, requires new legislative authority as well as
funds and therefore would count as new spending for budget enforcement purposes, and may be
subject to certain budget rules, such as PAYGO rules (see “Budget Rules and Supplemental
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Requests”). Some Members have proposed finding offsets and others have suggested designating
the funding as emergency.78
Additional Benefits for Veterans Exposed to Agent Orange79
The Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has statutory authority to determine
presumptions of service-connection for conditions determined to be associated with exposure to
Agent Orange.80 On October 13, 2009, the Secretary of the VA announced his intention81 to
establish a presumption of service connection for Parkinson’s disease, ischemic heart disease, and
hairy cell/B cell leukemia for veterans who served in the Republic of Vietnam and were exposed
to Agent Orange compounds.82 Proposed regulations were issued on March 25, 2010.83 OMB
estimates that the costs for the new presumptions of service connection for these conditions will
be $13.4 billion in FY2010 (see Table 1).84
The VA estimates that there are approximately 86,000 veterans who will be able to receive
retroactive benefits for the new presumptive conditions. In addition, there are veterans who will
be eligible for an increase in their current disability rating, or will be able to begin disability
compensation based on the new presumptions.85 Payments of disability compensation related to
the new presumptions will begin when final regulations are published. The impact of the
presumptions on disability compensation and pensions is in the baseline for FY2011.
While the Administration has requested the $13.4 billion as a supplemental appropriation for
FY2010 in its FY2011 budget, the Secretary of the VA already has the authority under current law
to make this determination, which requires the VA to compensate veterans once regulations are
issued.
78 Congressional Quarterly, “Content, Costs and Timetable for War Supplemental Remain Uncertain,” April 30, 2010.
For more information on budget rules and offsets, see CRS Report RL32835, PAYGO Rules for Budget Enforcement in
the House and Senate, by Robert Keith and Bill Heniff Jr., and CRS Report RL31943, Budget Enforcement
Procedures: Senate Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) Rule, by Bill Heniff Jr.
79 Written by Christine Scott, Specialist in Social Policy, Domestic Social Policy Division.
80 For more information on service-connection of conditions associated with Agent Orange, see CRS Report RL34370,
Veterans Affairs: Health Care and Benefits for Veterans Exposed to Agent Orange, by Sidath Viranga Panangala and
Douglas Reid Weimer.
81 See Department of Veterans Affairs news release on October 13, 2009, available at http://www1.va.gov/opa/pressrel/
pressrelease.cfm?id=1796.
82 In 1991, the Agent Orange Act (P.L. 102-4) established for the first time a presumption of service-connection for
diseases associated with herbicide exposure. P.L. 102-4 authorized the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to
contract with the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to conduct a scientific review of the evidence linking certain medical
conditions to herbicide exposure. Under this law, the VA is required to review the reports of the IOM and issue
regulations, establishing a presumption of service-connection for any disease for which there is scientific evidence of a
positive association with herbicide exposure.
83 Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 57, March 25, 2010, 14391-14401.
84 Ibid.
85 Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2011, Appendix, p. 1345.
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Potential Change in the Estimate
CBO has estimated that $5 billion rather than $13.4 billion would be needed in FY2010.86 The
differences between the CBO and OMB estimate for FY2010 is due to the uncertainty about
when the final regulations for the service connection presumptions will be released and the length
of time for processing disability compensation claims by the VA (179 days in FY2009 for initial
disability compensation claims). The appropriators may consider adjusting the OMB estimate in
light of these factors.
Resolving Black Farmers and American Indian Trust Lands
Court Cases
The Administration is requesting $4.6 billion to settle two longstanding cases against the
government:
• $1.15 billion for the Pigford Black Farmers Discrimination Case; and
• $3.4 billion for the Cobell Indian Trust Litigation Settlement.
In both cases, the claimants argue that unless funds are appropriated before a certain date, the
settlements could be voided, but it is not clear that these are hard deadlines. Unsuccessful
attempts have been made in the Senate to attach the provisions to other bills, so the FY2010 War
and Haiti supplemental could provide another vehicle.
Settlement of the Black Farmers Discrimination Case87
The FY2010 budget supplemental requests $1.15 billion in emergency appropriation to settle the
Pigford II discrimination case brought by 70,000 black farmers against the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, who were not covered by the original 1999 Pigford class-action settlement.88 A
settlement in the Pigford II case was announced on February 18, 2010 by Secretary of Agriculture
Tom Vilsack and Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr.89 The Administration had requested $1.15
billion for the claimants in its FY2010 Budget but funds were not appropriated.
Senator Inouye introduced an amendment (SA 3407) to H.R. 4213 (Tax Extenders Act of 2009) to
provide the requested $1.15 billion appropriation, but the amendment was blocked as non-
germane. Senator Inouye stated at the time that he planned to introduce a similar amendment to
the war supplemental bill.
86 Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the President’s Budgetary Proposals for FY2011, page 17, available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/112xx/doc11280/03-24-apb.pdf; and CBO, Budget Projections, Data, Table 1-7, Changes
in CBO’s Baseline Projections of the Deficit or Surplus Since January 1, 2010, available at http://www.cbo.gov/
budget/budproj.shtml.
87Written by Tadlock Cowan, Analyst in Natural Resources and Rural Development Policy, Resources, Science, and
Industry Division.
88 For details on the Pigford settlement, see CRS Report RS20430, The Pigford Case: USDA Settlement of a
Discrimination Suit by Black Farmers, by Tadlock Cowan and Jody Feder.
89 U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litigation. Misc. No. 08-mc-
0511.
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The Pigford II settlement is final and non-appealable. A provision of the settlement states that
should Congress fail to make the $1.15 billion appropriation by March 31, 2010, the claimants
could void the settlement. No funds were appropriated by this deadline. Because the settlement is
clearly a priority of both the USDA and the White House, plaintiffs are unlikely to exercise their
right to void the settlement in the near term.
Indian Trust Litigation Settlement90
The Administration is requesting $3.4 billion in FY2010 supplemental appropriations to settle
litigation over mismanagement of individual Indian trust fund accounts in the Cobell v. Salazar
case (Civil No. 96-1285 (JR), D.D.C.)).91 Of that total, $1.4 billion would be transferred to a fund
to distribute to plaintiffs and $2 billion would be used to purchase and consolidate fractionated
trust land interests (owned by the plaintiffs) and to award $60 million in education scholarships.
The settlement, agreed to by the plaintiffs and the departments of the Interior, Treasury, and
Justice on December 7, 2009, requires legislative authorization by May 28, 2010, unless the
deadline is again extended.92 While the deadline has been extended several times by mutual
agreement, it is not clear whether another extension will be accepted by the parties or the
presiding judge.93
The Cobell lawsuit arose from Interior’s inability to account accurately for payments into and
from Individual Indian Monies (IIM) trust accounts set up in the 19th century to deposit income
from individuals’ trust lands as well as other payments. Interior management of these accounts
was difficult, not only because of the allotments’ age, but also because of the splitting of interests
in each tract as each generation of heirs divided their allotments, creating an estimated 384,000
IIM accounts with a current total asset value over $460 million.94
Both the plaintiffs and the defendants may have reason to support the Cobell settlement in order
to end 14 years of “contentious and acrimonious litigation”95 that has cost both parties millions of
dollars. Some Indian organizations and plaintiffs oppose Congressional approval of the Cobell
settlement, and some approve.96
90 Written by Roger Walke, Specialist in American Indian Policy, Domestic Social Policy Division; for details, see
CRS Report RL34628, The Indian Trust Fund Litigation: An Overview of Cobell v. Salazar, by Yule Kim.
91 The Judgment Fund, authorized at 31 U.S.C. § 1304, is a permanent, indefinite appropriation from the Treasury for
paying judgments against, and settlements by, the U.S. government.
92 Mike Scarcella, “Deadline Extended for Third Time in $1.4 Billion Indian Trust Case,” National Law Journal, April
9, 2010; http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202447787400.
93 Cobell v Salazar settlement agreement, pp. 12, 15; http://www.justice.gov/civil/cases/cobell/docs/pdf/
settlement_12082009.pdf; United States District Court for the District of Columbia, “Transcript of Status Conference
before the Honorable James Robertson, United States District Judge,” April 8, 2010, pp. 3-5; http://www.justice.gov/
civil/cases/cobell/docs/pdf/20100408_transcript.pdf.
94 U.S. Department of the Interior, Budget Justifications and Performance Information, Fiscal Year 2011, Office of the
Special Trustee for American Indians, p. OST-78
95 “Statement of David J. Hayes, Deputy Secretary of the Interior, on the Proposed Settlement of Cobell v. Salazar,” at
U.S. House Committee on Natural Resources, “Proposed Settlement of the Cobell v. Salazar Litigation,” oversight
hearing held March 10, 2010, p. 1; http://resourcescommittee.house.gov/images/Documents/20100310/
testimony_hayes.pdf.
96 See for instance the testimony presented to the House Natural Resources Committee at its March 10, 2010, hearing;
http://resourcescommittee.house.gov/index.php?option=com_jcalpro&Itemid=27&extmode=view&extid=333.
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Congressional Actions
Since the announcement of the Cobell settlement in December 2009, the Administration
submitted legislation to ratify the Cobell settlement, and require appropriations from the
Judgment Fund, for inclusion in FY2010 supplemental appropriations.97 Similar legislative
language was included in Senate amendment 3407 to H.R. 4213 (a tax act) submitted March 4,
2010, but not yet been taken up on the floor.
Haiti FY2010 Supplemental Proposal98
The Obama Administration is requesting $2.8 billion in FY2010 supplemental funding to cover
costs associated with relief and reconstruction support for Haiti following the earthquake that
devastated parts of Haiti, primarily the capital, Port-au-Prince, on January 12, 2010.
The Administration has requested that all of the proposed funds be considered as emergency
requirements, in response to urgent and essential needs in Haiti. Some of the funds are available
until September 30, 2012, others until expended. The supplemental request covers both
reimbursement of obligations already incurred and new activities by various U.S. agencies. CRS
estimates that 55% percent of the total Haiti supplemental request is for reimbursement of relief
activities related to the earthquake disaster, 40% for new recovery and reconstruction activities,
and 6% for diplomatic operations administration (see Table 7).99
Table 7. Haiti Supplemental: Relief, Reconstruction and Diplomatic Operations,
FY2009-FY2011
(rounded to millions of dollars)
FY2010
Supp.
FY2010
FY2010
Request
Total
FY2009
FY2010
Supplemental
as Share
with
FY2011
Category
Enacted
Enacted
Request
of Total
Request
Request
Relief
184
210 1,532
55% 1,742 213
Reconstructiona
619
705 1,114
40% 1,820 646
Diplomatic
Operations
12
13 155
6% 168 17
TOTAL
816
929
2,801
100%
3,730
876
97 U.S. Congress, House, A Request for Budget Amendments for Fiscal Year 2011, Communication from the President
of the United States, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., February 22, 2010, H.Doc. 111-92 (Washington: GPO, 2010), pp. 6-9.
98 Prepared by Maureen Taft-Morales, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, and Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in
International Humanitarian Policy, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division.
99 In the Haiti Supplemental Budget Justification, some of the accounts listed under Relief Funding, such as
Logistics/Non-Food, Shelter/Settlement/Livelihoods, Health and Nutrition, and Child Protection programs, include
programs continuing in the recovery phase. Funding for these programs had to be obligated at the program’s outset,
often from other countries’ programs and other accounts, so requires reimbursement. Similarly, under the Recovery and
Reconstruction Funding accounts, the Economic Support Fund account allows for some reimbursement for expenses
incurred in responding to the Haitian earthquake. According to the State Department, this would allow for
reimbursement for expenses incurred, if any, between the time calculations were made for the supplemental proposal,
and when the supplemental is passed.
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Sources: OMB, “FY2010 Haiti Supplemental,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/budget_amendments/
amendment_03_24_10.pdf. State Department, USAID, FY2010 Haiti Supplemental Budget Justification, April
2010; http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141243.pdf.
Notes: CRS calculations based on sources above.
a. Reconstruction funds in FY2009, FY2010 Enacted and FY2011 Request include development accounts such
as Global Health and Child Survival that are not funded in the FY2010 Supplemental request; see Table 9
for details.
According to an Inter-American Development Bank study, the Haiti earthquake may have been
the most devastating catastrophe that any country has ever experienced.100 Approximately 3
million people, roughly one-third of the overall population in Haiti, have been affected by the
earthquake with more than 2 million displaced. The government of Haiti is reporting an estimated
230,000 deaths and 300,600 injured.101 The relief effort is expected to last for many months. Prior
to the earthquake, the United Nations had already designated Haiti as one of the 50 least
developed countries in the world, facing higher risk than other countries of failing to come out of
poverty, and therefore needing the highest degree of attention from the international
community.102
Protection of the displaced population is currently one of the most challenging and critical issues.
It is estimated that there may be as many as 1.69 million displaced in Port-au-Prince, and up to
597,000 thought to have relocated in areas outside the capital that largely escaped earthquake
damage, but were already poverty-stricken and lacking in basic services. Much smaller numbers
of Haitians have left the country, some as refugees, for other countries such as the Dominican
Republic, nearby islands, and the United States.
In Haiti, aid workers are delivering basic necessities to areas with concentrations of Internally
Displaced Populations (IDPs), but emergency shelter is in short supply. As the rainy season
begins (and with the hurricane season not far behind), providing adequate shelter and sanitation
for the displaced has become an urgent priority. Attention is focused on providing waterproof
emergency shelter, improving sanitation, and meeting basic needs of the displaced and other
vulnerable Haitians.
According to the Haiti Post Disaster Needs Assessment conducted by Haiti and international
institutions, the total value of recovery and reconstruction needs is $11.5 billion 103 At the
international donors conference held March 31, 2010, 48 countries, multilateral institutions, and a
coalition of non-governmental organizations pledged nearly $10 billion toward the long-term
reconstruction efforts in Haiti. The U.S. pledge of $1.2 billion is included in the FY2010
supplemental request.
100 Eduardo A. Cavallo, Andrew Powell, and Oscar Becerra, Estimating the direct economic damage of the Earthquake
in Haiti, Inter-American Development Bank, February 11, 2010, available at http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/
getdocument.aspx?docnum=35072649; and Mary Beth Sheridan, “Haiti earthquake damage estimated up to $14
billion,” The Washington Post, February 17, 2010.
101 USAID/OFDA, Haiti-Earthquake, Fact Sheet #52, FY2010, April 30, 2010.
102 United Nations Office for Least Developed Countries. Facts About Least Developed Countries (LDCs) available at
http://www.unohrlls.org/UserFiles/File/Publications/Factsheet.pdf, accessed January 15, 2010.
103 Government of Haiti, the United Nations, the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the
World Bank, “Haiti Post Disaster Needs Assessment: draft executive summary,” March 10, 2010;
http://www.haitisantodomingo2010.org/hsd2010/content/documents.
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The Obama Administration, other international donors, the Haitian government, and others have
all stated the need for improved accountability of all donor assistance to Haiti, to improve aid
effectiveness and reduce the potential for corruption. The government of Haiti made major
progress in recent years in reducing corruption, increasing transparency, and improving fiscal
management. These improvements qualified Haiti for Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC)
debt relief last year. To ensure transparency further, the U.S. Agency for International
Development has helped Haiti establish an online system to monitor both donor pledges, and
spending and implementation of assistance.104
Humanitarian Relief Funding105
The Administration is requesting a total of $1.5 billion in relief and disaster assistance funding for
Haiti, which would reimburse U.S. government agencies for services provided and for funds
already obligated for ongoing relief activities. The humanitarian relief funding request also covers
other relief-related assistance. The $1.5 billion request includes $350.7 million for USAID
International Disaster Assistance (IDA); $150 million for Agriculture Department emergency
food assistance; $96.5 million for State Department: Contributions to International Peacekeeping
Activities; $655 million for Department of Defense and $45 million for U.S. Coast Guard relief
activities; $220 million for Department of Health and Human Services to provide grants to States
to cover services to Haitian evacuees; and $15 million for Department of Homeland Security
immigration fees (see Table 8).
Relief Funding: International Disaster Assistance and Emergency Food Aid
On January 14, 2010, President Obama announced $100 million in humanitarian assistance (in
addition to pre-existing funding appropriated for Haiti) to meet immediate needs. As of April 2,
2010, USAID reported that the United States has provided more than $1 billion in humanitarian
funding for Haiti.106
The FY2010 supplemental request includes $350.7 million for International Disaster Assistance
(IDA). This amount includes $126.6 million for USAID, as the lead agency, to reimburse five
other U.S. government agencies for providing earthquake relief to Haiti through interagency
agreements.107 In addition, IDA funding would cover other support, mostly for services already
provided, in the amount of $35.6 million for Search and Rescue (SAR) agreements ($11 million);
USAID/Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) Program Support ($0.6 million); and
USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) Relief Commodities ($24 million.)108
104 The Haiti Reconstruction Platform is available at http://www.refondation.ht/index.jsp?sid=1&id=1&pid=1.
105 This section prepared and coordinated by Rhoda Margesson, CRS Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy,
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.
106 USAID/OFDA, Haiti-Earthquake, Fact Sheet #52, FY2010, April 30, 2010.
107The five agencies (with request amounts in parentheses) are: Federal Emergency Management Agency/Department
of Homeland Security ($49 million); Department of Health and Human Services ($36.2 million); Department of
Defense, ($40.5 million); the Peace Corps ($0.32 million); and the U.S. Geological Survey ($0.59 million). Most of the
reimbursement to DOD is for the provision and transportation of ready-to-eat meals and does not include costs of
transportation and logistical support, which is addressed later in this section.
108 The USAID/DART is also ongoing as it is transitioning to a liaison role in working with the Government of Haiti on
emergency programming and recovery phase activities.
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Table 8. Haiti Relief Funding, FY2009-FY2011
(rounded to millions of dollars)
FY2010
FY2010
Total
FY2009
FY2010
Supp.
with
FY2011
Account/Agency
Enacted
Enacted Request
Request
Request
Brief Description
International Disaster
6 0
351
351 0
Reimburses
worldwide
Assistance,
humanitarian assistance account
State/USAID
for Haiti aid.
Food for Peace,
64 46
150
196 36
Funds
emergency
food
Agriculture
assistance.
Operation and
0
0
133
133
0 Reimburses DOD accounts for
Maintenance, Army,
Haiti relief.
DOD
Operation and
0
0
115
115
0 Reimburses DOD accounts for
Maintenance, Navy,
Haiti relief.
DOD
Operation and
0
0
19
19
0 Reimburses DOD accounts for
Maintenance, Marine
Haiti relief.
Corps, DOD
Operation and
0
0
133
133
0 Reimburses DOD accounts for
Maintenance, Air
Haiti relief.
Force, DOD
Overseas
0
0
255
255
0 Adds DOD disaster assistance
Humanitarian,
for Haiti.
Disaster, and Civic
Aid, DOD
US Coast Guard
0
0
45
45
0 Reimburses Coast Guard for
Operating Expenses,
Haiti relief.
DHS
Public Health and
0
0
220
220
0 Reimburses states for benefits
Social Services
for Haitian evacuees.
Emergency Fund, HHS
Immigration
0
0
15
15
0 Reimburses US Customs &
Examinations Fee,
Immigration Service for fees.
DHS
Contributions to
114 164 97 261 177
Funds
U.S.
contributions
to
International
U.N. peacekeeping force in
Peacekeeping,
Haiti.
State/USAIDa
Any Federal Agency,
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Authorizes emergency relief
Sec, 11
funding by federal agencies.
DOD, Sec. 12
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Exempts transfers to DOD’s
OHDCA from caps.
RELIEF TOTAL
184
210
1,532
1,742
213
Sources: OMB, “FY2010 Haiti Supplemental,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/budget_amendments/
amendment_03_24 _10.pdf. State Department, USAID, FY2010 Haiti Supplemental Budget Justification, April
2010; http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141243.pdf.
Notes: CRS calculations based on source above.
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a. The CIPA account funds U.S. assessed contributions to MINUSTAH, a U.N. peacekeeping operation
established by the U.N. Security Council in 2004. In response to the earthquake, the Council emphasized
MINUSTAH’s support of “recovery, reconstruction and stability efforts” in Haiti. Assessments funded for
FY2009 and FY2010, and requested for FY2011, prior to the earthquake, were directed to the MINUSTAH
mandates set by the Council in 2004, which for the most part did not focus on relief activities. In its FY2010
supplemental request, the Administration placed MINUSTAH assessed contributions under the Relief
category. The amounts listed under CIPA for FY2009, FY2010, and FY2011 have been left in the Relief
category for ease of comparison across years.
The balance of $188.5 million of the IDA request would cover ongoing humanitarian assistance
activities that have already been obligated. The United States is working closely with the
Government of Haiti, the United Nations, other donor nations, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), and the private sector through the U.N. cluster system.109 In Haiti, relief activities have
been organized into twelve clusters led by various agencies. IDA funding is targeting several of
these, including humanitarian coordination programs ($9 million); logistics and non-food item
programs ($20.7 million); shelter/settlement/livelihoods programs ($93.43 million); health and
nutrition programs ($42 million); water, sanitation and hygiene programs ($18 million); and child
protection programs ($5.4 million).
Under Food for Peace (FFP) Title II Grants, the request includes $150 million for emergency food
assistance, $68 million of which would be to supply the World Food Program (WFP) with 55,000
metric tons of Title II Emergency Food Assistance and $55 million of which would fund
proposals from Private Voluntary Organizations. It is currently estimated that up to two million
people may need food assistance in Haiti due to the earthquake. As recovery and reconstruction
proceed, it is expected that overall food needs will decline, at which time food activities would
target the most vulnerable and would also focus on food-for-work programs.
Relief operations in Haiti will continue at least through 2010. It is typical in most natural disasters
that as recovery begins, there is an overlap in activities that might otherwise be considered purely
relief or purely reconstruction. In the recovery and reconstruction part of the supplemental request
discussed below, it should be noted that some activities will address humanitarian concerns as
well.110
109 Humanitarian relief sectors or clusters are typically established by the United Nations during humanitarian crises to
help coordinate partners, prioritize resources, and facilitate planning.
110 For example, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives, through its Community Stabilization Program, would
provide resettlement support to IDPs in Port-au-Prince, and to other areas that have received large influxes of IDPs; and
the program to enhance citizen participation would provide support to vulnerable groups and to IDP-camp based
recovery initiatives. The Economic Support Fund (ESF) would provide funding for investments in new settlements for
the displaced; some of the funding for health would also focus on critical populations displaced by the earthquake and
those in need of long-term rehabilitation and disability care. Programs through ESF and International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement (INCLE) would in part address security concerns among the displaced, the capacity of local
government authorities to deliver essential services to IDPs, and the protection of human rights among the most
vulnerable Haitian citizens.
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Key Concerns and Priorities
Consequences of Natural Disasters
A number of natural disasters have struck Haiti in the last decade, mostly in the form of
hurricanes.111 The international community has provided significant humanitarian assistance in
response to these disasters and their ongoing impact.112 The United Nations, along with other
partners, including the United States, has had a strong presence in Haiti, and remains at the
forefront of the on-the-ground response for humanitarian assistance. Disaster risks in Haiti are
significant. Experts recognize that finding ways to overcome the cycle of disaster and develop a
disaster response capacity are critical not only to minimize humanitarian consequences, but also
to sustain reconstruction efforts in the future.
Replenishing Disaster Accounts
Humanitarian assistance generally receives strong bipartisan congressional support and the
United States is typically a leader and major contributor to relief efforts in humanitarian
disasters.113 When disasters require immediate emergency relief, the Administration may fund
pledges by depleting its disaster accounts intended for worldwide use throughout a fiscal year. To
date, disaster accounts are being drawn down to provide relief to Haiti. The State Department
reports that in order to respond to future humanitarian crises, these resources would need to be
replenished by June 1, 2010. If not replenished, U.S. capacity to respond to other emergencies
could be impacted. The relief funding in the current request would provide reimbursement for
funding already provided or obligated.
Burdensharing and Donor Fatigue
The earthquake disaster in Haiti has received worldwide attention and focus. On February 19,
2010, the United Nations put forward its Revised Humanitarian Appeal for Haiti in the amount of
$1.44 billion and extended the humanitarian operation through 2010. As of April 29, 2010,
commitments of $831 million (55.4%) had been received. It is not always evident whether figures
listing donor amounts represent pledges of support or more specific obligations. Furthermore,
pledges made by governments do not necessarily result in actual contributions. It also cannot be
assumed that the funds committed to relief actually represent new contributions, since the money
may previously have been allocated elsewhere. It will take time for a more complete picture to
reveal how the actual costs of the Haiti disaster will be shared among international donors. As the
situation in Haiti stabilizes, sustaining donor interest in Haiti (and commitment to honor existing
111 Previous disasters include floods in May 2002 and November 2006; tropical storms in September 2004, October
2007, and September 2008; and hurricanes in August and September 2007 and September 2008.
112 Many international actors have provided humanitarian relief to Haiti, either through financial contributions to the
government of Haiti or aid organizations or by directly providing relief supplies and emergency personnel.
International recovery efforts are typically complex because they require coordination among numerous different
actors, including other governments and international entities. Apart from U.N. agencies, those responding to
humanitarian crises include international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Private Voluntary
Agencies (PVOs), and bilateral and multilateral donors.
113 For background information, see CRS Report RL33769, International Crises and Disasters: U.S. Humanitarian
Assistance, Budget Trends, and Issues for Congress, by Rhoda Margesson.
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pledges) could be a challenge. Moreover, this challenge is compounded by the need to maintain
funding priorities and secure funds needed for other disaster areas worldwide.
Coordinating the Relief Response in Haiti
Some have criticized the initial response by the international community in the actual delivery of
humanitarian assistance as far too slow. Others have argued that there has been a great deal of
unfair criticism of the pace of the international aid effort. The weakened capacity of the Haitian
government, critically damaged infrastructure, and logistical challenges posed by the influx of
massive aid into a city largely destroyed by the earthquake all contributed to delay and difficulties
on the ground. Evaluations of the relief response in Haiti will likely continue to be conducted and
debated as the humanitarian and recovery efforts move ahead. Some experts remain concerned
about bureaucratic red tape in the humanitarian response, the capacity of the Haitian government,
the role of the United States, and overall coordination issues between and among members of the
international community, including the United Nations. Response to a disaster of this scope is
almost certain to run into many obstacles because the challenges on the ground are so daunting.
While managing expectations of what is possible under these circumstances is important, so too,
are the observations and lessons learned that with time and hindsight may benefit the actions and
plans of ongoing relief efforts in Haiti.
Department of Defense and U.S. Coast Guard Relief Activities114
The DOD is requesting $655 million and the U.S. Coast Guard is requesting $45 million to cover
its humanitarian relief efforts in Haiti in Operation Unified Response (OUR) (see Table 8). This
includes funds to reimburse the services the U.S. Coast Guard for drawing down funds from other
accounts as well as additional funds for the Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Account
(OHDACA), the account used by DOD for humanitarian relief efforts.115 The request largely
covers expenses already incurred though operations are expected to continue through June 15,
2010. The funding provided soldier subsistence; personal, operational, and transportation support;
humanitarian relief supplies; and several humanitarian relief projects.
DOD’s response to the Haitian earthquake was both rapid and extensive. At the height of the
operation, over 20,000 U.S. military personnel were in the operational area, both ashore and
afloat, transporting emergency relief personnel and supplies, evacuating people including U.S.
citizens residing in Haiti, providing security for the distribution of humanitarian supplies; making
repairs to the Port-au-Prince airport and seaports, and recovering the remains of U.S. citizens.
Over the last few weeks, there has been a substantial drawdown of U.S. military personnel and by
June 15, 2010, a withdrawal is expected to be complete. Some have voiced concerns that this date
may be premature, and could worsen the security situation, given the weakened state of Haitian
security forces and the limited capabilities of the United Nations security personnel. Should the
security situation deteriorate significantly, the Administration may change that date, which could
then require additional supplemental appropriations.
114 Written by Stephen Bowman, CRS Specialist in National Security, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.
115 Title X U.S Code, Sections 2561 and 404 direct that DOD’s humanitarian relief and foreign disaster assistance
operations be funded through the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Account.
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State Department’s Contributions to International Peacekeeping
Activities (CIPA)116
The Administration is requesting $96.5 million for the State Department’s Contributions to
International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account to fund U.S. assessed contributions to the
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), a peacekeeping operation. The
increased assessment responds to the U.N. Security Council’s January increase in MINUSTAH
levels by 3,500, after the earthquake, with military personnel growing from 6,940 to 8,940 and
the police component growing from 2,211 to 3,711.117
Assistance to Haitian Evacuees and Migrants118
In addition to relief and reconstruction aid provided in Haiti, the Administration is requesting
funds to aid Haitian evacuees and migrants to the United States.
Department of Health and Human Services119
The President’s request would provide $256.2 million, to be available until expended, for
activities of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Of this amount, $220.0
million would be provided directly to HHS for certain completed and ongoing activities.120 The
additional $36.2 million would be provided to USAID to reimburse HHS for certain activities
conducted under interagency agreements.121
According to the President’s request, the $220.0 million amount would fund four types of
activities, which are described further below: (1) the state share of Medicaid and Children’s
Health Insurance Program (CHIP) costs for eligible evacuees; (2) costs associated with medical
evacuations; (3) cash, medical, and repatriation assistance for eligible evacuees; and (4) costs for
116 Written by Marjorie Ann Browne, CRS Specialist in International Relations, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division.
117 This information is taken from the U.S. Department of State and Agency for International Development. FY2010
Haiti Supplemental Budget Justification. p. 17. For more detailed information on MINUSTAH, see CRS Report
R41023, Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response, by Rhoda Margesson and Maureen Taft-Morales. Another $45
million is provided for MINUSTAH through the INCLE account to fund additional U.S. personnel in MINUSTAH,
construction of a temporary camp, enough supplies to make them self-sustaining, as well as emergency supplies,
replacement uniforms and equipment, and training and equipping a police unit in crowd/riot control and protection of
U.N. facilities and personnel.
118 Written by Sarah A. Lister, Specialist in Public Health and Epidemiology, and Ruth Ellen Wasem, Specialist in
Immigration Policy, Domestic Social Policy Division.
119 Written by Sarah A. Lister, Specialist in Public Health and Epidemiology, and Ruth Ellen Wasem, Specialist in
Immigration Policy, Domestic Social Policy Division.
120 OMB, “FY2010 Haiti Supplemental,” pp. 13-14; http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/budget_amendments/
amendment_03_24_10.pdf. Funds would be provided to the HHS Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund
(PHSSEF), an account administered by the HHS Secretary that has been used to provide annual or emergency
supplemental appropriations for one-time or short-term activities in a variety of HHS agencies and offices. For more
information, see CRS Report RL33579, The Public Health and Medical Response to Disasters: Federal Authority and
Funding, by Sarah A. Lister.
121 This amount is included in the $350.7 million requested for USAID for International Disaster Assistance, OMB,
“FY2010 Haiti Supplemental,” , p. 25, and as described in U.S. Department of State and USAID, FY2010 Haiti
Supplemental Budget Justification, p. 23.
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HHS public health activities in Haiti. The request does not specify how much funding would be
allocated to each of these activities. Also, the request does not propose any changes or expansions
in eligibility for assistance or benefits.
First, supplemental funds would provide payment of the state share of Medicaid and CHIP costs
for health care services for eligible medical and non-medical evacuees. (Typically, each state is
required to “match” or pay a portion of the costs of care for eligible individuals in the state.)
Those Haitians who enter the United States with humanitarian parole status are deemed to be
Cuban-Haitian Entrants, and thus are eligible for Medicaid until they have been in the United
States for seven years.122 After the initial seven years, states have the option to continue to
provide Medicaid.123 The request does not specify the proposed duration of this assistance to
states.124
Second, requested funds would be used to reimburse the HHS National Disaster Medical System
(NDMS) for costs associated with medical evacuation of seriously injured earthquake victims to
the United States, and their subsequent care in U.S. hospitals.125 Under HHS policy for this
incident, NDMS will reimburse hospitals for the costs of care, for 30 days, for any individual who
was medically evacuated from Haiti by NMDS, regardless of citizenship or nationality.126 NDMS
does not pay costs beyond 30 days, costs for services provided by non-hospital facilities (such as
rehabilitation facilities), or costs for the care of individuals who were not evacuated through the
NDMS system.
Third, requested funds would be used to provide cash and medical assistance to Haitian
humanitarian parolees, and repatriation costs as appropriate. These Haitian parolees are eligible
for the federal resettlement assistance program for refugees and entrants, which is partially
funded through the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) in HHS.127 In addition to providing a
range of social services, primarily administered by states, the ORR provides funding to states for
transitional cash and medical assistance through the Transition and Medical Services program.128
Haitian parolees who meet the income and resource eligibility requirements for Supplemental
Security Income (SSI), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), or Medicaid, but are
122 For a complete explanation, see CRS Report RS21349, U.S. Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants, by Ruth Ellen
Wasem, pp. 8-11.
123 CRS Report RL33809, Noncitizen Eligibility for Federal Public Assistance: Policy Overview and Trends, by Ruth
Ellen Wasem. Haitians who enter the United States as legal permanent residents (LPRs) may become eligible for
Medicaid after five years in the United States, at the state’s option. Under current law, states also have the option of
providing Medicaid and CHIP to children and pregnant women who are LPRs and battered individuals lawfully
residing in the United States during the first five years that they are living in the United States. CRS Report R40144,
State Medicaid and CHIP Coverage of Noncitizens, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
124 Federal coverage of the state matching requirement is likely to be temporary. For example, following Hurricane
Katrina, Congress waived the state matching requirement for eligible individuals displaced by the disaster for a period
of six months. Specific information regarding Medicaid reimbursement for Haitian earthquake victims can be found at
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), “Questions and Answers,” https://questions.cms.hhs.gov/cgi-bin/
cmshhs.cfg/php/enduser/std_alp.php?p_sid=5MTSe8Tj&p_lva=&p_li=&p_redirect=&p_page=1&p_cv=&p_pv=
4.1122&p_prods=1,476,1122.
125 See “Medical Evacuation” in CRS Report R41023, Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response, by Rhoda Margesson
and Maureen Taft-Morales.
126 HHS, “Payments for National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) Patients and Other Medical Evacuees from Haiti,”
questions and answers, March 19, 2010, provided to CRS by the HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Legislation.
127 CRS Report RL31269, Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Policy, by Andorra Bruno.
128 ORR cannot reimburse states for SSI, TANF, or Medicaid programs.
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not otherwise eligible (e.g., single males or childless females and couples), may receive benefits
under the ORR-funded Refugee Cash Assistance (RCA) and Refugee Medical Assistance (RMA)
programs.129
Finally, requested funds would be used to support certain public health activities in Haiti,
including disease surveillance, the reestablishment of laboratory capacity, and environmental
health activities.130
The $36.2 million requested for USAID reimbursements to HHS would pay for a number of
medical, surgical, and mortuary assistance teams and associated assets that were deployed to
Haiti, including personnel and supplies for a 250-bed hospital.131
U.S. disaster assistance to other nations does not typically involve the acceptance of large
numbers of disaster victims into the United States. Some forms of assistance rendered to Haitian
earthquake victims may be without precedent. For example, NDMS was developed to provide the
capability for mass medical evacuation of injured U.S. combat forces for treatment in U.S.
hospitals, and is also intended as a domestic civilian mass casualty management system. The
system had not previously been used to airlift victims of foreign disasters into the United States
for medical care. Its use for this purpose required the rapid development of policies regarding
patient selection, assignment to domestic hospitals, hospital reimbursement, and other logistical
matters.
U.S. Citizens and Immigration Services (USCIS): Waiving Fees132
The President’s supplemental request includes $15 million for the U.S. Citizens and Immigration
Services (USCIS) to enable the agency to cover the immigration-related costs associated with
Haitian migrants affected by the January 12, 2010 earthquake.133 USCIS funds the processing and
adjudication of immigrant, nonimmigrant, refugee, asylum, and citizenship benefits almost
entirely through monies generated by the Examinations Fee Account.134 USCIS charges fees for
almost all adjudications and services. Foreign nationals applying for Temporary Protected Status
(TPS) pay as well.135 USCIS traditionally has not charged the Examination Fee for refugees and
asylum seekers.
129 HHS, Administration for Children and Families, Annual ORR Reports to Congress-2005, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/orr/data/arc.htm.
130 For more information, see HHS, “Haiti–HHS Relief and Support Activities,” at http://www.hhs.gov/haiti/.
131 U.S. Department of State and USAID, FY2010 Haiti Supplemental Budget Justification, p. 23.
132 Written by Ruth Ellen Wasem, Specialist in Immigration Policy, Domestic Social Policy Division.
133 For a full discussion of the immigration issues arising in the aftermath of the January 12, 2010 earthquake in Haiti,
see CRS Report RS21349, U.S. Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
134 Most notably, §286(m) of the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 USC §1356(m)] states that “fees for providing
adjudication and naturalization services may be set at a level that will ensure recovery of the full costs of providing all
such services, including the costs of similar services provided without charge to asylum applicants or other immigrants.
Such fees may also be set at a level that will recover any additional costs associated with the administration of the fees
collected.” For further discussion and analysis, see CRS Report RL34040, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’
Immigration Fees and Adjudication Costs: The FY2008 Adjustments and Historical Context, by Chad C. Haddal.
135 CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Current Immigration Policy and Issues, by Ruth Ellen Wasem
and Karma Ester.
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For FY2010, UCIS has a budget authority of $2,727 million, of which $2,503 million comes from
the fees collected (mandatory fee funded offsets). The Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act 2010 (P.L. 111-83) also provided $224 million in direct appropriations to
USCIS, including $50 million for processing refugee applications and asylum claims.136 The
Administration proposes to use the $15 million requested in the supplemental appropriations for
fee waivers for eligible Haitians granted TPS; those given humanitarian parole to bring medical
evacuees and certain categories of Haitians into the United States; and to cover costs associated
with processing the adoption of Haitian orphans.
The prospects for the $15 million request is unclear, given how Congress has responded to
previous requests for direct appropriations to cover fees waived for humanitarian reasons. For
example, USCIS received only 24% of the amount it requested ($206 million) for processing
refugee applications and asylum claims in FY2010, and the Senate-passed bill for FY2010 would
have provided no direct appropriations for processing refugee applications and asylum claims.
Recovery and Reconstruction Funding for Haiti137
The total request for Recovery and Reconstruction funding in this supplemental proposal is $1.1
billion. This is primarily for new activities (see Table 9).138
The 111th Congress has expressed bipartisan support for providing Haiti with substantial
assistance in response to the crisis generated by the January earthquake. At hearings in both the
Senate and the House, Members and witnesses alike stressed the need for a massive, coordinated
international effort not only for immediate humanitarian needs, but also for long-term
development. Moving forward, they said, strategies must consider new approaches, aim to create
a more sustainable Haiti, and increase Haitian capacity to utilize foreign aid effectively and to
provide services and direct its own economy.
Key Concerns: Priorities, Decentralization, Poverty Reduction, and
Capacity Building
Choosing Priorities
To coordinate aid programs better, donors have agreed to focus on certain areas of assistance. For
this reason, the U.S. programs in the supplemental focus on urgent infrastructure repairs,
especially in the energy and agricultural sectors; critical health care; governance; and security.
Some observers have expressed concern that U.S. assistance is neglecting other areas crucial to
Haitian recovery, such as improving the educational system, which is to be the focus of Canada
and France. While advocates say this approach avoids duplication among donors, critics question
the priorities, or the limited approach to aid.
136 CRS Report R40642, Homeland Security Department: FY2010 Appropriations, coordinated by Jennifer E. Lake and
Chad C. Haddal.
137 This section prepared and coordinated by Maureen Taft-Morales, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, Foreign
Affairs, Defense and Trade Division.
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Table 9. Haiti Recovery and Reconstruction Funding, FY2009-FY2011
(rounded to millions of dollars)
FY2010
FY2010
Total
FY2009
FY2010
Supp.
with
FY2011
Account/Agency
Enacted
Enacted
Request
Request
Request
Brief Description
RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING: FY2010 SUPPLEMENTAL ACCOUNTS
Economic Support Fund (ESF), State/USAID
134
161
749
910
146
Provides infrastructure
and technical assistance
to gov’t.
International Narcotics Control and Law
18 21 144 165 19
Strengthens
Haiti’s
Enforcement, State/ USAID
security forces.
Inspector General, USAID
0
0
2
2
0
Funds add’l oversight.
Salaries and Expenses, Treasury
0
0
1
1
0
Supports Treasury
attache.
International Affairs Technical Assistance
0 0 7 7 0
Provides
technical
Program, Treasury
advisors for banking and
finance sectors.
General Provisions
Economic Support Fund, Sec. 3,
0 0
[120]0 0 0
Sets
maximum
State/USAID
contribution for Haiti
Multi-Donor Trust Fund
within ESF.
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Trust
0 40b [40]b
40
0
Al ocates up to $40
Fund, (HIPC) Sec. 4 , Treasuryb
million for Haiti debt
relief.
International Debt Cancellation, Sec.5,
0
0
212
212
0
Provides funds for Haiti
Treasury
debt relief.
Subtotal: FY FY2010 Supplemental
152 222
1,114 1,336 165
Accounts
OTHER DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ACCOUNTS
Development Assistance (excluding PL480),
290
333
0
333
324
Provides food aid.
State/USAID
Foreign Military Financing, State
3
2
0
2
2
Finances military sales.
Global Health & Child Survival, State/USAID
135
144
0
144
156
Provides humanitarian aid
Intern’l Mil. Ed. & Training, State
0c
0c 0 0c
0c Funds military training.
Transition Initiatives, State
0
5
0
5
0
Funds transitions.
Subtotal: Other Development
427 484 0 484 481
Accounts
RECONSTRUCTION TOTAL:
ALL ACCOUNTS
579
705
1,114
1,820
646
Source: OMB, FY2010 Supplemental, “Disaster Relief,” February 12, 2010; OMB, “Haiti Relief,” March 24,
2010;” http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/budget_amendments/amendment_03_24_10.pdf; State
Department, USAID, FY2010 Haiti Supplemental Budget Justification, April 2010; http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/141243.pdf.
Note: CRS calculations based on source above.
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a. Included in ESF funds listed above.
b. The HIPC fund did not al ocate funds for Haiti in FY2009 and in FY010. The FY2010 supplemental request
would allocate $40 million of the funds already appropriated to Haiti so no additional budget authority
would be needed. CRS includes these funds in the FY2010 column as a way to show the additional
resources available to Haiti.
c. Less than $500,000.
Decentralization and Economic Growth: Will they lead to Poverty Reduction?
A key element of the revised Haitian development strategy, supported by the supplemental
request, is to catalyze economic growth and provide services and opportunities outside of Port-au-
Prince. The Haitian government and donors agree that the current crisis provides an opportunity
to correct what had become an unsustainable urban-rural imbalance in the country, with the rest
of the country suffering neglect while people, resources, and services were concentrated in the
capital.
Funds in the supplemental request would address both short- and long-term elements involved in
this decentralization strategy—meeting the immediate needs of newly displaced populations that
have migrated to less developed areas of the country, and strengthening local governance,
infrastructure, and agriculture to develop new “growth poles” outside of Port-au-Prince. Scientists
are helping Haitian authorities to select areas for development that are less vulnerable to natural
disasters. While there is general support of this strategy, officials also note that developing areas
long-neglected will be costly. Some also warn that populations should not be forcibly relocated in
executing these plans. Experts also warn that economic growth is not sufficient to reduce poverty
in Haiti, and that programs specifically targeted at poverty reduction are needed.
Effective Capacity Building?
Most observers agree that one goal of aid to Haiti should be to build the capacity of Haitians so
they can eventually assume responsibility for the project at hand. Yet there is a tension between
the standard definition of effectiveness and efficiency, and the time and money required for
capacity building. Aid organizations are pressed to have measureable outcomes and usually
operate on short-term contracts. If thorough training and coordinating with Haitian ministries is to
be an element of all foreign aid programs, which many experts advocate, there will have to be a
recognition that those programs may require more time, funding, and personnel, and measureable
results may take longer to achieve.
Economic Support Funds for Infrastructure
The supplemental proposal requests $749 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for
International Assistance programs in Haiti, to remain available until September 30, 2012.
Programs will focus on helping the Haitian government to rehabilitate infrastructure and provide
technical assistance to help improve its public outreach, as well as working on reconstruction
projects that provide essential services such as shelter and infrastructure for water, sanitation,
healthcare, and electricity, as well as finance projects in agriculture, farm to market roads, and
major roads, bridges, and ports.
The Administration requests that up to $120 million of the ESF be transferred to the Department
of the Treasury to a multi-donor trust fund for Haiti, that could be used to leverage the
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contribution of significant resources from other donors. The proposal would also allow ESF
monies to be transferred to USAID’s Operating Expenses account for unanticipated staffing needs
and other related expenses. To ensure that other projects are not displaced, the Administration
requests that any transfers to the Development Credit Authority (DCA) account would be in
addition to already appropriated amounts.
Key Concerns
Some experts suggest developing small-scale, alternative or clean energy sources at the local
level rather than trying to rebuild the previously ineffectual Haitian electricity service would
increase the quality of life of many Haitians and have a positive impact on economic growth.139
Some Members have expressed concern that insufficient funding is being focused on the needs of
children, or on psychological support for the traumatized population. There is no additional
funding for Global Health and Child Survival in the supplemental request.
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Funds for Security
Under the Haiti supplemental request, the State Department would receive about $144 million for
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) activities to meet a renewed need
for security in broader areas of Haiti. This funding would strengthen law enforcement by
purchasing equipment and adding police advisors for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in
Haiti (MINUSTAH) to re-establish and expand its presence in Haiti. Many of MINUSTAH’s
troops had shifted to development work because security had improved dramatically.140
INCLE funds would strengthen the Haiti National Police (HNP) by restoring training capacity,
providing equipment, supplies, and infrastructure, and by re-building prisons destroyed by the
earthquake. Other programs would enhance criminal justice sector support; restore the ability of
the HNP and the Haitian Coast guard to conduct counter-narcotics operations; and help prevent
and combat human trafficking.
USAID and Treasury Funds for Oversight and Advisors
To improve accountability and oversight, and reduce corruption as funding for relief,
rehabilitation and reconstruction in Haiti rises, the supplemental requests $1.5 million for the
Office of the Inspector General of USAID.
The Administration requested $1.5 million for a Treasury Department attaché to work with the
Ambassador, senior Haitian officials, and other donors, and oversee additional technical advisors.
The request includes $7 million for these advisors, who would work with the government to
restore basic treasury processes; continue to reduce corruption through improved procurement
processes and fiscal transparency; and enhance economic management skills. Because the
earthquake killed government officials and destroyed Ministry of Finance and other government
buildings, along with records and equipment, much of the financial management progress that
had been made has been set back.
139 Dan Schnitzer, “Avoid the Old Poverty Traps,” Foreign Policy, January 19, 2010.
140 Jonathan M. Katz, “Largest UN force in Haiti to focus on development,” Associated Press, April 25, 2009.
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Court Cases
U.S. Funds for International Donor Trust Fund and Debt Relief
The Administration is requesting that up to $120 million in Economic Support Funds be
contributed to a Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Haiti to facilitate better coordination,
implementation, and tracking of foreign assistance to Haiti. Although some in Haiti criticize the
trust fund as giving too much control to foreign entities, both Haitian President Rene Preval and
Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive have acknowledged that Haitian capacities were already
limited, and considerably diminished by the earthquake. A development authority, with Haitian
government and international officials guiding long term development, is also being set up.
Providing Multilateral Debt Relief to Haiti141
To help Haiti in its recovery from the earthquake, the Administration is proposing U.S.
contributions of $252 million to help cancel Haiti’s debts of $781 million to three international
organizations: the Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank, and International Fund for
Agriculture and Development. The Administration requests reallocating up to $40 million from
the Treasury Department’s Debt Restructuring Account appropriated for the multilateral Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Trust Fund from this or subsequent fiscal years.142 The
Administration also seeks new contributions of $212 million for multilateral debt relief.
Congressional authorization is required for the $40 million reallocation, and both authorization
and appropriations are required for the additional $212 million.
Funding for Diplomatic Operations in Haiti143
The Administration is requesting $155 million for diplomatic and broadcasting operations in Haiti
(see Table 10). The $149.5 million requested for the State Department would provide $65 million
for logistical support and assistance for the additional U.S. government personnel posted to Haiti,
and $84.5 million to repair or replace staff housing and other buildings associated with the
Embassy.
141 Written by Martin Weiss, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division
142 The HIPC Trust Fund, administered by the World Bank, provides grants to eligible heavily indebted poor countries
(HIPCs) to make debt payments on multilateral debt on behalf of the indebted country. More information is available
in: “Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI)—Status of
Implementation,” September 15, 2009, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/091509.pdf. Haiti was
graduated from this program in 2009.
143 Written by Ken Nakamura, Analyst in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Court Cases
Table 10. Diplomatic Operations Funding for Haiti, FY2009-FY2011
(rounded to millions of dollars)
FY2010
FY2010
Total
FY2009
FY2010
Supp.
with
FY2011
Account
Agency
Enacted
Enacted
Request
Request
Request
Brief Description
Diplomatic
State/
USAID 11 12 65 77 13
Provides
temporary
housing
and
and Consular
logistical support to U.S.
Programs
diplomatic personnel.
Embassy
State/
USAID 0 0 85 85 0
Replaces
U.S.
embassy
housing
Security,
and other buildings damaged in
Construction,
earthquake.
and
Maintenance
International
Broadcasting
1
1
5
6
4 Provides funds for Creole Service
Broadcasting
Board of
Operations
Governors
TOTAL
12
13
155
168
17
Sources: OMB, FY2010 Supplemental, “Disaster Relief,” February 12, 2010; OMB, “Haiti Relief,” March 24,
2010;” http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/budget_amendments/amendment_03_24_10.pdf; and State
Department FY2011 Budget Justification materials.
Note: CRS calculations based on sources above.
A portion of these funds could be used to reimburse accounts for evacuation of Embassy family
members and non-essential personnel, and for repatriation loans to American citizens who needed
assistance to return to the United States. The State Department funds would reimburse accounts
used for this emergency and also continue staffing support for the relief and reconstruction
efforts. Without these reimbursements, shortages would develop in other countries for diplomatic
and consular programs and embassy construction and repair.
The request also includes $5 million for the Broadcasting Board of Governors’ (BBG) Creole
Language Service which increased its broadcasts five-fold—from 2 to 10.5 hours a day—after the
earthquake. The funds would be used to repair and support the affiliate broadcasting stations used
by the Creole Service, hire additional staff, and establish a Reporting Center in Port-au-Prince.
These broadcasts have been and continue to be a major source of accurate information for the
people of Haiti regarding relief, recovery, and family reunification efforts (see Table 10).
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Court Cases
Author Contact Information
Amy Belasco, Coordinator
Kennon H. Nakamura
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget
Analyst in Foreign Affairs
abelasco@crs.loc.gov, 7-7627
knakamura@crs.loc.gov, 7-9514
Daniel H. Else
Maureen Taft-Morales
Specialist in National Defense
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
delse@crs.loc.gov, 7-4996
mtmorales@crs.loc.gov, 7-7659
Bruce R. Lindsay
Curt Tarnoff
Analyst in Emergency Management Policy
Specialist in Foreign Affairs
blindsay@crs.loc.gov, 7-3752
ctarnoff@crs.loc.gov, 7-7656
Rhoda Margesson
Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy
rmargesson@crs.loc.gov, 7-0425
Acknowledgments
In addition to the authors listed the following individuals contributed to this report: Christine Scott, Specialist in Social
Policy, Sarah A. Lister, Specialist in Public Health and Epidemiology, Ruth Ellen Wasem, Specialist in Immigration
Policy, and Roger Walke, Specialist in American Indian Policy, of the Domestic Social Policy Division; Tadlock
Cowan, Analyst in Natural Resources and Rural Development Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry Division;
William Heniff, Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process, Government and Finance Division; Stephen
Bowman, CRS Specialist in National Security, Marjorie Ann Browne, CRS Specialist in International Relations, and
Martin Weiss, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, of the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
(FDT). Thanks also to peer reviewers Pat Towell and Moshe Schwartz in FDT.
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