Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and
Government Performance
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
May 6, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21922
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

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Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Summary
The performance and legitimacy of the Afghan government figured prominently in two reviews
of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan during 2009 and continues to color U.S. relations with Afghan
President Hamid Karzai. In his December 1, 2009, speech on Afghanistan, which followed the
second review, President Obama stated that the Afghan government would be judged on
performance, and “The days of providing a blank check are over.” President Obama pressed
Karzai to move more decisively to address his government’s deficiencies, particularly corruption,
during a March 28, 2010, visit to Afghanistan. The Obama visit may have contributed to two
subsequent statements by Karzai accusing the international community of exercising undue
pressure on him and on Afghanistan. These issues will likely be further discussed during Karzai’s
planned May 12, 2010, meeting with President Obama in Washington, DC (a visit that was nearly
scuttled following Karzai’s comments).
The Afghan government’s widespread official corruption, as well as its ineffectiveness, is
identified by U.S. officials as feeding the insurgency. At the same time, Karzai’s alliances with
key ethnic and political faction leaders have reduced his ability to fill the government with
politically neutral and technically competent officers. Despite diminished confidence in Karzai,
he went into the August 20, 2009, presidential election as the favorite. Amid widespread charges
of fraud, many substantiated by a U.N.-backed Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), nearly
one-third of Karzai’s votes were invalidated, leaving Karzai just short of the 50%+ total needed to
avoid a second-round runoff. Asserting that more fraud was likely, Karzai’s main challenger
dropped out of the race on November 1, 2009, and Karzai was declared the winner. He has since
had difficulty obtaining parliamentary confirmation of a full cabinet, and 11 permanent
ministerial posts remain unfilled. Most of the well-regarded economic ministers were confirmed.
Karzai’s hopes to rebuild international support for his leadership at a major international
conference on Afghanistan in Britain on January 28, 2010, were only partly fulfilled. The
conference endorsed—and agreed to begin to fund—his proposals to try to persuade insurgent
fighters to give up their fight. For his part, Karzai committed to several specific steps to try to
weed out official corruption and to ensure that all future elections are free and fair. That pledge
was undermined, to an extent, in February 2010 when Karzai issued an election decree to govern
the National Assembly elections on September 18, 2010. The decree eliminated the three U.N.-
appointed positions for international officials on the ECC, although a subsequent compromise
between Karzai and U.N. officials restored two non-Afghan seats on the ECC.
Because most insurgents are, like Karzai, ethnic Pashtuns, stabilizing Afghanistan requires
winning Pashtun political support for the Afghan government, which requires effective local
governing structures. The Obama Administration has emphasized empowering local governing
bodies in part by expanding the presence of U.S. government civilians as advisors outside Kabul.
The Administration also has appointed senior civilian officials to work jointly with their military
counterparts in the five regional commands around Afghanistan. For more information, see CRS
Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth
Katzman, and CRS Report R40747, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan:
Background and Policy Issues, by Rhoda Margesson.

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Contents
Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape .......................................................................... 1
Overview of Afghan Politics and Governance ....................................................................... 1
Ethnic Affiliations and Relations ..................................................................................... 2
Politics: Karzai and His Opponents ....................................................................................... 2
The Opposition and Its Strength ...................................................................................... 3
Enhancing Government Capacity and Performance ..................................................................... 5
Building Central Government Capacity ................................................................................. 5
The Afghan Civil Service ................................................................................................ 6
U.S.-Karzai Relations............................................................................................................ 6
The Influences of Regional Faction Leaders / “Warlords”...................................................... 7
Vice President Muhammad Fahim................................................................................... 8
Abdurrashid Dostam ....................................................................................................... 8
Isma’il Khan ................................................................................................................... 9
Helmand Province: Sher Mohammad Akhundzadeh and “Koka” ..................................... 9
Official Corruption.............................................................................................................. 10
Scope of the Problem .................................................................................................... 10
Other Karzai Responses ................................................................................................ 11
Expanding Local Governance/U.S. Civilian “Uplift” ........................................................... 13
Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils............................................................... 13
District-Level Governance ............................................................................................ 14
Community/Village Level ............................................................................................. 15
U.S. Local Governance Advisory Capacity.................................................................... 15
Human Rights Issues........................................................................................................... 16
Religious Freedom ........................................................................................................ 17
Human Trafficking........................................................................................................ 17
Advancement of Women ............................................................................................... 18
Democracy, Governance, and Elections Funding Issues ................................................. 20
2009 and 2010 Elections ........................................................................................................... 21
2009 Presidential Election................................................................................................... 22
Election Modalities and Processes................................................................................. 22
The Political Contest and Campaign.............................................................................. 23
The Campaign............................................................................................................... 24
The Election Results ..................................................................................................... 26
Post-Election Cabinet.................................................................................................... 28
2010 Parliamentary Elections and Election Law Dispute ..................................................... 30
Election Decree............................................................................................................. 31
Implications for the United States of the Afghan Elections................................................... 32

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Afghan Ethnicities.......................................................................................... 36

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Tables
Table 1. Afghanistan Political Transition Process....................................................................... 33
Table 2. Major Pashtun Tribal Confederations ........................................................................... 34

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 37
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 37

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Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape
A U.S. priority, particularly during the period from 2002 to 2007, was to extend the authority of
Afghanistan’s central government. The policy was predicated on the observation that weak
governance was causing some Afghans to acquiesce to, or even support, Taliban insurgents as
providers of security and impartial justice. Since 2007, the U.S. and Afghan focus has been on
reforming and reducing corruption within the central government, and on expanding and
strengthening local governance. The outgoing head of the U.N. Assistance Mission Afghanistan
(UNAMA), Kai Eide, said in a departing news conference on March 4, 2010, that improving
governance and political processes are “indispensable” for resolving the conflict in Afghanistan,
and that U.S. and partner efforts have, to date, focused too much on military approaches. (Eide
has since been succeeded by Staffan de Mistura.)
Overview of Afghan Politics and Governance
Afghanistan’s governing structure has historically been characterized by a weak central
government unwilling or unable to enforce significant financial or administrative mandates on
Afghanistan’s localities. About 80% of Afghans live in rural areas; there are at about 25,000
villages in Afghanistan. The tribal, clan, village, and district political structures that provided
government structure until the late 1970s were severely weakened by over 20 years of subsequent
war. Many traditional local authority figures fled or were killed, and were displaced by mujahedin
commanders, militia leaders, and others. These local power brokers are widely accused of
selectively applying Afghan law and have resisted ceding their influence back to traditional
leaders or to new central or local governing structures.
At the national level, Afghanistan did not have a tradition of Western-style democracy prior to the
international intervention that took place after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United
States. Karzai is the first directly elected president in Afghan history. There were parliamentary
elections during the reign of King Zahir Shah (the last were in 1969, before his reign was ended
in a 1973 military coup), but the parliament during that era did not have the political authority or
role as a check on presidential power that the post-Taliban National Assembly has. The elected
institutions and the 2004 adoption of a constitution were part of a post-Taliban transition roadmap
established by a United Nations-sponsored agreement of major Afghan factions signed in Bonn,
Germany, on December 5, 2001, (“Bonn Agreement”),1 after the Taliban had fallen. The political
transition process is depicted in Table 1.
Some believe that the elements of Western style democracy introduced since 2001 are supported
by traditional Afghan patterns of decision making that have some democratic and representative
elements. On the other hand, some see the traditional patterns as competing mechanisms that
resist change and modernization, and generally minimize the role of women, and do not meet
international standards of democratic governance. At the national level, the loya jirga, or
traditional Afghan assembly consisting of about 1,000 delegates from all over Afghanistan, has
been used to ratify some major decisions in the post-Taliban period (Karzai’s leadership, the post-
Taliban constitution, and long-term defense relations with the United States). At the local level,
shuras, or jirgas (consultative councils)2 composed of local notables, are key mechanisms for

1 For text, see http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm.
2 Shura is the term used by non-Pashtuns to characterize the traditional assembly concept. Jirga is the Pashtun term.
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making authoritative local decisions or dispensing justice. Afghans turn often to these local
mechanisms to adjudicate disputes rather than use the national court system. Some estimates say
that 80% of cases are decided in the informal justice system. However, this informal justice
system is dominated almost exclusively by males.
Ethnic Affiliations and Relations
Traditional patterns of political affiliation by family, clan, tribe, village, ethnicity, region, and
other relationships remain. These patterns were evident in the August 20, 2009, presidential
campaign in Afghanistan. Many presidential candidates, Karzai included, pursued campaign
strategies designed primarily to assemble blocs of ethnic and geographic votes, rather than
advance specific new ideas. These patterns were even more pronounced in campaigns for the
provincial councils, which were elected concurrently.
While Afghans continue to follow traditional patterns of affiliation, there has been a sense among
Afghans that their country now welcomes members of all political and ethnic groups and factions.
There have been very few incidents of ethnically based violence since the fall of the Taliban, but
the various ethnic communities continue to have political and economic differences. Each
community wants to maximize the proportion of the limited government resources and foreign
investment that benefits its community.
Ethnic Pashtuns (sometimes referred to as Pathans – pronounced pah-TAHNS), as the largest
single ethnicity, believe they have the right to rule; Pashtuns are about 42% of the population and,
with few exceptions, have governed Afghanistan. Karzai’s government, although not necessarily
the security forces, has come to be progressively dominated by Pashtuns. One recent exception
was the 1992-1996 presidency of the mujahedin government of Burhanuddin Rabbani, a Tajik.
The Taliban is composed almost completely of Pashtuns. A table on major Pashtun clans is
provided below (see Table 2), as is a map showing the distribution of Afghanistan’s various
ethnicities (see Figure 1). However, although they largely concede Pashtun rule, non-Pashtuns
have been and want to be well represented at high levels of the central government. Non-Pashtuns
also have achieved a large measure of control over how government programs are implemented in
their geographic regions.
The security organs are considered an arena where Pashtuns and Tajiks have worked together
relatively well. Currently, of the major security ministries and organizations, only the National
Directorate for Security (NDS, the Intelligence directorate) is still headed by a non-Pashtun
(Amrollah Saleh, a Tajik). Attempting to maintain the fragile consensus among the various
ethnicities, the other security ministries (Defense, Interior) tend to have non-Pashtuns in key
deputy or subordinate positions. In the Defense Ministry, the chief of staff is a Tajik (Bismillah
Khan), who reports to a Pashtun Defense Minister (Abdul Rahim Wardak). Some observers take a
different view, asserting that Tajiks continue to control many of the command ranks of the Afghan
security institutions, giving Pashtuns only a veneer of control of these organizations. U.S.
commanders in Afghanistan say the composition of the security forces has recently been brought
more into line with the population, although Pashtuns from the south remain underrepresented.
Politics: Karzai and His Opponents
In post-Taliban Afghanistan, the National Assembly (parliament)—particularly the 249-seat
elected lower house (Wolesi Jirga, House of the People)—has become the key institution for the
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non-Pashtun ethnic minorities to exert influence on Karzai. The December 2009-January 2010
process of confirming Karzai’s second term cabinet—in which about two-thirds of Karzai’s
nominees were voted down on two occasions—demonstrates that the Assembly is an increasingly
strong institution that is pressing for honest, competent governance. These principles are
advocated most stridently by the younger, more technocratic independent bloc in the lower house.
These independents were key to the lower house vote on March 31, 2010, to reject an election
decree that would structure the holding of September 18, 2010, National Assembly elections.
This institutional growth has come despite the fact that about one-third of the seats in the lower
house are held by personalities and factions prominent in Afghanistan’s recent wars, many of
whom are non-Pashtuns from the north and the west. Both houses of parliament, whose budgets
are controlled by the Ministry of Finance, are staffed by about 275 Afghans, reporting to a
“secretariat.” There are 18 oversight committees, a research unit, and a library.
The other factions in the lower house are not strictly organized according to Afghanistan’s 108
registered political parties. Karzai has not formed his own party, but his core supporters in the
Wolesi Jirga are about 50 former members of the conservative Pashtun-based Hizb-e-Islam party
(the same party as that headed by insurgent leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar); and supporters of Abd-
i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf—a prominent Islamic conservative mujahedin era party leader.3 Another base
of Karzai’s support are figures from Qandahar (Karzai’s home province) and Helmand provinces,
including several Karzai clan members. One clan member in the parliament is his cousin Jamil
Karzai, and another is relative by marriage Aref Nurzai, who was prominent in Karzai’s 2009
election campaign. Karzai’s elder brother, Qayyum, was in the lower house representing
Qandahar until his October 2008 resignation, although Qayyum continues to represent his brother
informally domestically and abroad, including at 2008 and 2009 meetings to explore negotiated
settlements with Taliban figures. Other pro-Karzai Pashtuns in the parliament are former militia
and Taliban leaders, including Hazrat Ali (Nangarhar Province), who led the Afghan component
of the failed assault on Osama bin Laden’s purported redoubt at Tora Bora in December 2001;
Pacha Khan Zadran (Paktia) who, by some accounts, helped Osama bin Laden escape Tora Bora;
and Mullah Abdul Salam (“Mullah Rocketi”), from Zabol. (Salam ran for President in 2009 but
garnered only about 0.5%.)
The Opposition and Its Strength
Although the political “opposition” to Karzai is fluid and often joins him on some issues, those
who can be considered opposition (putting aside Taliban and other insurgents) are mainly ethnic
minorities (Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara) who were in an alliance against Taliban rule that was called
the “Northern Alliance.” Leaders of these groups, and particularly Tajiks, view as a betrayal
Karzai’s firing of many of the non-Pashtuns from the cabinet—such as former Foreign Minister
Dr. Abdullah Abdullah (Tajik, dismissed from that post by Karzai in 2006, and the main
challenger for President in the August 2009 election).
The main ethnic opposition grouping is called the United Front (UF). It was formed in April 2007
by Wolesi Jirga Speaker Yunus Qanooni (Karzai’s main challenger in the 2004 presidential
election) and former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani (both, like Abdullah, are prominent
ethnic Tajik Northern Alliance figures and former associates of the legendary mujahedin
commander Ahmad Shah Masood). It is broader than the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance in

3 Sayyaf led the Ittihad Islami (Islamic Union) mujahedin party during the war against the Soviet occupation.
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that it includes some Pashtuns, such as prominent Soviet-occupation era security figures Sayed
Muhammad Gulabzoi and Nur ul-Haq Ulumi, who has chaired the defense committee. Both of
Karzai’s vice presidents joined the UF when it was formed, although they subsequently continued
to serve as vice presidents (one, Ahmad Zia Masoud, is no longer Vice President following the
2009 presidential election). The UF advocates amending the constitution to give more power to
parliament and to empower the elected provincial councils (instead of the President) to select
governors and mayors. Fearing Pashtun consolidation, the UF has been generally opposed to
Karzai’s overtures to Taliban fighters and leaders to end their fight and join the political
process—an initiative called “reintegration and reconciliation that is now fully backed by the
Obama Administration.
Even before the formation of the UF, the opposition bloc in the Wolesi Jirga first showed its
strength in March 2006, following the December 19, 2005, inauguration of parliament, by
requiring Karzai’s cabinet to be approved individually, rather than en bloc, increasing opposition
leverage. However, Karzai rallied his support and all but 5 of the 25 nominees were confirmed. In
May 2006, the opposition compelled Karzai to change the nine-member Supreme Court, the
highest judicial body, including ousting 74-year-old Islamic conservative Fazl Hadi Shinwari as
chief justice. The proximate justification for the ouster was Shinwari’s age, which was beyond the
official retirement age of 65. Parliament approved his new Court choices in July 2006, all of
whom are trained in modern jurisprudence.
Karzai and the UF have often competed for the support of the “independents” in the lower house.
Among them are several outspoken women, intellectuals, and business leaders, such as the 39-
year-old Malalai Joya (Farah Province), a leading critic of war-era faction leaders. In May 2007
the lower house voted to suspend her for this criticism for the duration of her term. Others in this
camp include Ms. Fauzia Gailani (Herat Province); Ms. Shukria Barekzai, editor of Woman
Mirror magazine; and Mr. Ramazan Bashardost, a former Karzai minister who champions
parliamentary powers and has established a “complaints tent” near the parliament building to
highlight and combat official corruption. (He ran for President in the 2009 elections on an anti-
corruption platform.) U.S.-based International Republican Institute (IRI) has helped train the
independents; the National Democratic Institute (NDI) has assisted the more established factions.
The Upper House of the National Assembly
Karzai has relatively fewer critics in the 102-seat Meshrano Jirga (House of Elder, upper house),
partly because of his bloc of 34 appointments (one-third of that body). He engineered the
appointment of an ally as Speaker: Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, a noted Islamic scholar and former
mujahedin party leader who headed the post-Communist mujahedin government for one month
(May 1992).4 However, because it is composed of more elderly, established, notable Afghans who
are traditionalist in their political outlook, the upper house has tended to be more Islamist
conservative than the lower house, advocating a legal system that accords with Islamic law, and
restrictions on press and Westernized media broadcasts. As an example of the upper house’s
greater support for Karzai, it voted on April 3, 2010, not to act on the election decree that the
lower house had rejected on March 31, 2010, meaning that the decree is being considered
operable for the parliamentary election in September 2010.

4 The mujahedin party he headed during the anti-Soviet war was the Afghan National Liberation Front.
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Karzai also has used his bloc of appointments to the upper house to co-opt potential antagonists
or reward his friends. He appointed Northern Alliance military leader Muhammad Fahim to the
upper body, perhaps to compensate for his removal as Defense Minister, although he resigned
after a few months and later joined the UF. (He was Karzai’s primary running mate in the 2009
elections and is now a Vice President.) A Karzai ally, former Helmand governor Sher Mohammad
Akhunzadeh, was appointed to the body (see below). There is one Hindu, and 23 women; 17 are
Karzai appointees and six were selected in their own right.
Enhancing Government Capacity and Performance5
Since 2001, U.S. policy has been to help expand Afghan institutions. Since 2007, but with a
particular focus of the Obama Administration, U.S. policy has been to also urge Afghan
government reform. The anti-corruption and governmental performance aspect of U.S. policy was
emphasized in two major Afghanistan policy statements by President Obama—March 27, 2009,
and December 1, 2009. Both statements stressed that more needed to be done to promote the
legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan government at both the Kabul and local levels. The
latter statement indicated that “The days of providing a blank check [to the Afghan government]
are over.”
Building Central Government Capacity
Governmental reforms, some of which President Karzai says are being implemented or planned,
include instituting merit-based performance criteria, ending the practice of hiring based on
kinship and ethnicity rather than qualifications, and weeding out of rampant official corruption.
Afghan ministries based in Kabul are growing their staffs and technological capabilities, although
they still suffer from a low resource and skill base, and corruption is fed, in part, by the fact that
government workers receive very low salaries.
One idea that surfaced in 2009, but has since receded, was to prod Karzai to create a new position
to help the Karzai government’s administrative abilities. Several potential officials reportedly
negotiated with Karzai about playing that role, including one of Karzai’s 2009 election
challengers, Ashaf Ghani. Karzai did not mention this issue in his second-term inaugural speech
on November 19, 2009.6 However, observers say Ashraf Ghani has been advising Karzai on
government reform and administration after reconciling with him in November 2009 (after the
election was settled). Ghani has been part of Karzai’s advisory team since the January 28, 2010,
London conference, focusing on institution building.
The Administration has developed about 45 different metrics to assess progress in building
Afghan governance and security, as it was required to do so (by September 23, 2009) under P.L.
111-32, an FY2009 supplemental appropriation.7 To date, and under separate authorities such as

5 Some information in this section is from the State Department reports on human rights in Afghanistan for 2009,
March 11, 2010; for text, see http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/sca/136084.htm and the International Religious
Freedom Report, released October 26, 2009, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127362.htm
6 Text of unofficial translation of Karzai speech provided by the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in
Washington, DC.
7 “Evaluating Progress in Afghanistan-Pakistan” Foreign Policy website, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/
09/16/evaluating_progress_in_afghanistan_pakistan.
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provisions of supplemental appropriations and foreign aid appropriations, only small amounts of
U.S. aid have been made conditional on Afghanistan’s performance on such metrics, and no U.S.
aid has been permanently withheld.
The Afghan Civil Service
The low level of Afghan bureaucratic capacity is being addressed in a number of ways, although
slowly. The United States and its partners do not have in place a broad program to themselves
train Afghan government officials, but instead fund Afghan institutions to conduct such training.
Issues of standardizing job descriptions, salaries, bonuses, benefits and the like are being
addressed by Afghanistan’s Civil Service Commission. According to the April 2010 version of the
mandated Defense Department report on Afghanistan,8 the Commission has thus far redefined
more than 80,000 civil servant job descriptions. From January 2010 until early 2011, the United
States is giving $85 million to programs run by the Commission to support the training and
development of Afghan civil servants. One of the Commission’s subordinate organizations is the
Afghan Civil Service Institute, that has thus far graduated 1,300 government employees. Many
Afghan civil service personnel have undergone training in India, building on growing relations
between Afghanistan and India.
U.S.-Karzai Relations
U.S. relations with President Hamid Karzai, and U.S. assessments of his performance, are a key
part of the international effort to build governance in Afghanistan. Obama Administration
assessments of the failings of the Karzai government have caused substantial frictions in U.S.-
Karzai relations. Administration testimony before Congress following President Obama’s
December 1, 2009, policy statement, reiterated Administration concerns about the Karzai
shortcomings but also noted his late 2009 anti-corruption pledges and some positive
accomplishments of his government. Ambassador Eikenberry, who in reported cables to
Washington, DC, in September 2009 expressed numerous concerns about Karzai’s leadership,
testified in December 2009 that Karzai should receive credit for some of the well-regarded
economic sector ministerial appointments he made in 2008 and 2009.
Continuing U.S. concerns prompted President Obama to make anti-corruption efforts a particular
focus of his talks with President Karzai in Kabul on March 28, 2010. The meeting in Kabul was
said to be productive, if somewhat tense, but Karzai’s frustrations at what he sees as U.S. and
international pressure on him to reform emerged in his comments on April 1, 2010, and April 4,
2010, both to groups of Afghans. On both occasions, and the latter of which was to National
Assembly members, Karzai expressed frustration with what he claims was international meddling
in the August 20, 2009, presidential election and, more generally, what he sees as his
subordination to the decisions of Afghanistan’s international partners. The April 4, 2010,
comments were more specifically critical of the United States and suggested that Western
meddling in Afghanistan was fueling support for the Taliban as a legitimate resistance to foreign
occupation. An exact English translation of his April 4 comments, in which he purportedly said
that even he might consider joining the Taliban if U.S. pressure on him continues, is not available.
Karzai called Secretary of State Clinton following his April 1, 2010, comments, seeking to

8 Department of Defense. “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan.” April 2010.
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/report_final_secdef_04_26_10.pdf.
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“clarify” his comments, but the reportedly productive discussion did not prevent the additional
sharp comments by Karzai on April 4. White House spokesperson Robert Gibbs said on April 6,
2010, that the May 12, 2010, Karzai visit to Washington D.C. might be called off if Karzai
continues to make similar remarks.
Subsequently, top Obama Administration officials, including Secretary of Defense Gates,
Secretary of State Clinton, and CENTCOM commander Gen. David Petraeus, issued comments
apparently designed to put the relationship back on an even footing.9 Still, a perception has taken
hold that Karzai’s closest U.S. interlocutor is the top commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley
McChrystal, and that Karzai’s relations with the Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, and with Ambassador Eikenberry, are severely strained. The
Administration has announced that the Karzai visit is going forward. The election issues is
discussed later.
The Influences of Regional Faction Leaders / “Warlords”
A major international concern about Karzai’s governing style is his consistent reluctance to
confront (and his willingness to sometimes ally himself with) unelected, unappointed, and often
well-armed faction leaders. The Obama Administration’s March 27, 2009, and December 1, 2009,
strategy statements did not outline new measures to sideline these strongmen, who are sometimes
referred to by experts and others as “warlords.” General McChrystal, in his August 2009, “initial
assessment,” cited below, indicated that some of these faction leaders—most of whom the United
States and its partners regularly deal with and have good working relations with—cause
resentment among some sectors of the population and complicate U.S. stabilization strategy.
Some assert that the Obama Administration criticism of Karzai has caused him to become more
reliant on these personalities than he was previously. Karzai’s position is that confront faction
leaders outright would likely cause their follower—who usually belong to ethnic or regional
minorities—to go into armed rebellion. Even before the Obama Administration came into office,
Karzai argued that keeping the faction leaders on the government side is needed in order to keep
the focus on fighting “unrepentant” Taliban insurgents (who are almost all ethnic Pashtuns).
Perhaps taking umbrage to international criticism, some Soviet-era faction leaders did not attend
the April 28, 2010, celebration in Kabul of the anniversary of the mujahedin victory over the pro-
Soviet Communist government (1992).
In February 2007, both houses passed a law giving amnesty to faction leaders and others who
committed abuses during Afghanistan’s past wars. Karzai altered the draft to give victims the
right to seek justice for any abuses; Karzai did not sign a modified version in May 2007, leaving
the status unclear. However, in November 2009, the Afghan government published the law in the
official gazette, giving it the force of law.
The following sections analyze some of the main faction leaders who often attract criticism and
commentary from U.S. and international partners in Afghanistan:

9 Dreazen, Yochi, and Sarah Lynch. “U.S. Seeks to Repair Karzai Tie.” Wall Street Journal, April 12, 2010.
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Vice President Muhammad Fahim
Karzai’s choice of Muhammad Fahim, a Tajik from the Panjshir Valley region who is military
chief of the Northern Alliance/UF faction, as his first vice presidential running mate in the August
2009 elections might have been one manifestation of Karzai’s growing reliance on faction
leaders. The Fahim choice was criticized by human rights and other groups because of Fahim’s
long identity as a mujahedin commander/militia faction leader. However, the alliance was viewed
as a major political coup for Karzai by splitting off a major figure from the UF bloc. A New York
Times story of August 27, 2009, said that the Bush Administration continued to deal with Fahim
when he was Defense Minister (2001-2004) despite reports that he was involved in facilitating
narcotics trafficking in northern Afghanistan. Other allegations suggest he has engineered
property confiscations and other benefits to feed his and his faction’s business interests. He also
has reportedly withheld turning over some heavy weapons to U.N. disarmament officials who
have been trying to reduce the influence of local strongmen such as Fahim. U.S. officials have not
announced any limitations on dealings with Fahim now that he is vice president.
Abdurrashid Dostam
Some observers cite Karzai’s handling of prominent Uzbek leader Abdurrashid Dostam as
evidence of political weakness. Dostam commands numerous partisans in his redoubt in northern
Afghanistan (Jowzjan and Balkh provinces), where he was widely accused of human rights
abuses of political opponents. To try to separate him from his armed followers, in 2005 Karzai
appointed him to the post of chief of staff of the armed forces. On February 4, 2008, Afghan
police surrounded Dostam’s villa in Kabul in response to reports that he attacked an ethnic
Turkmen rival, but Karzai did not order his arrest for fear of stirring unrest among Dostam’s
followers. To try to resolve the issue without stirring unrest, in December 2008 Karzai
purportedly reached an agreement with Dostam under which he resigned as chief of staff and
went into exile in Turkey in exchange for the dropping of any case against him.10
Dostam returned to Afghanistan on August 16, 2009, and subsequently held a large pro-Karzai
election rally in his home city of Shebergan. Part of his intent has been to weaken and oust
another strong figure in the north, Balkh Province governor Atta Mohammad, who views himself
as relatively independent of Kabul’s writ. Mohammad is a Tajik but, under a 2005 compromise
with Karzai, is in control of a province that is inhabited mostly by Uzbeks—a source of irritation
for Dostam and other Uzbek leaders. Mohammad supported Dr. Abdullah in the 2009 presidential
race. Dostam’s support apparently helped Karzai carry several provinces in the north, including
Jowzjan, Sar-i-Pol, and Faryab, although Dr. Abdullah won Balkh and Samangan, according to
certified results (see “The Election Results ” below). Dostam reportedly went back into exile as of
October 2009 and was not himself nominated for any cabinet or other major post in the post-
election cabinet presentations. At least two members of his “Jombush Melli” organization were
nominated for cabinet seats, although they were voted down by the National Assembly because
the Assembly insisted on competent officials rather than party loyalists in the new cabinet.
Dostam returned to Afghanistan in January 2010 and was restored to his previous, primarily
honorary, position of chief of staff of the armed forces.
Dostam’s reputation is further clouded by his actions during the U.S.-backed war against the
Taliban. On July 11, 2009, the New York Times reported that allegations that Dostam had caused

10 CRS e-mail conversation with National Security aide to President Karzai, December 2008.
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the death of several hundred Taliban prisoners during the major combat phase of OEF (late 2001)
were not investigated by the Bush Administration. In responding to assertions that there was no
investigation of the “Dasht-e-Laili” massacre because Dostam was a U.S. ally,11 President Obama
said any allegations of violations of laws of war need to be investigated. Dostam responded to
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (which carried the story) that only 200 Taliban prisoners died
and this was due to combat and disease, and not due to intentional actions of forces under his
command.
Isma’il Khan
Another strongman that Karzai has sought to simultaneously engage and weaken is prominent
Tajik political leader and former Herat governor Ismail Khan. In 2006, Karzai appointed him
Minister of Energy and Water, taking him away from his political base in the west. However,
Khan remains influential there, and maintaining ties to Khan has won Karzai Khan’s election
support. Khan apparently was able to deliver potentially decisive Tajik votes in Herat Province
that might otherwise have gone to Dr. Abdullah. Afghan certified results showed Karzai winning
that province, indicating that the deal with Khan was helpful to Karzai.
Still, Khan is said to have several opponents in Herat, and a bombing there on September 26,
2009, narrowly missed his car, causing Khan to threaten to resign his ministry post. U.S. officials
purportedly would prefer that Khan not be in the new cabinet because of his checkered record,
even though some U.S. officials credit him with cooperating with the privatization of the power
sector of Afghanistan. Karzai renominated Khan in his ministry post on December 19, 2009,
causing purported disappointment by parliamentarians and western donor countries who want
Khan and other faction leaders weakened. His renomination was voted down by the National
Assembly and no new nominee for that post was presented on January 9, 2010. Khan remains as
head of the ministry but in an acting capacity.
Helmand Province: Sher Mohammad Akhundzadeh and “Koka”
Karzai’s relationship with another Pashtun strongman, Sher Mohammad Akhundzadeh,
demonstrates the dilemmas facing Karzai in governing Afghanistan. Akhunzadeh was a close
associate of Karzai when they were in exile in Quetta, Pakistan, during Taliban rule. Karzai
appointed him governor of Helmand after the fall of the Taliban, but in 2005, Britain demanded
he be removed for his abuses and reputed involvement in drug trafficking, as a condition of
Britain taking security control of Helmand. Karzai reportedly wants to reappoint Akhundzadeh,
who Karzai believes was more successful against militants in Helmand using his local militiamen
than Britain has been with its more than 9,000 troops there. Akhunzadeh said in a November 2009
interview that many of his followers joined the Taliban insurgency after Britain insisted on his
ouster. However, Britain and the United States have strongly urged Karzai to keep the existing
governor, Ghulab Mangal, who is winning wide praise for his successes establishing effective
governance in Helmand (discussed further under “Expanding Local Governance,” below) and for
reducing poppy cultivation there. Akhunzadeh attempted to deliver large numbers of votes for
Karzai in Helmand, although turnout in that province was very light partly due to Taliban
intimidation of voters.

11 This is the name of the area where the Taliban prisoners purportedly died and were buried in a mass grave.
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An Akhunzadeh ally, Abdul Wali Khan (nicknamed “Koka”), was similarly removed by British
pressure in 2006 as police chief of Musa Qala district of Helmand. However, Koka was reinstated
in 2008 when that district was retaken from Taliban control. The Afghan government insisted on
his reinstatement and his militia followers subsequently became the core of the 220-person police
force in the district.
Official Corruption
President Obama and his senior aides, including Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and Ambassador
to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry, have been publicly critical of Karzai’s shortcomings on the
corruption issue. U.S. officials apparently believe that the corruption within the Afghan
government is contributing to a souring of Western publics on the mission as well as causing
some Afghans to embrace Taliban insurgents.
The Obama Administration’s March 2009 and December 2009 strategy announcements
highlighted the need to reduce official corruption. The December 1, 2009, strategy announcement
did not specifically make U.S. forces or assistance contingent on progress on this issue. However,
the statement’s stipulation of July 2011 as the beginning of a “transition” process to Afghan
leadership implied that U.S. support is not open-ended or unconditional. In the December 1,
2009, statement, the President said “We expect those [Afghan officials] who are ineffective or
corrupt to be held accountable.” As noted, pressing Karzai on corruption reportedly was a key
component of President Obama’s brief visit to Afghanistan on March 28, 2010.
Official corruption was identified as a key problem in the August 30, 2009, assessment of the
Afghanistan situation by Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal, overall commander of U.S. and
international forces there. Several of the required “metrics” of progress, cited above, involve
Afghan progress against corruption. A FY2009 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 111-32) withheld
10% of about $90 million in State Department counter-narcotics funding subject to a certification
that the Afghan government is acting against officials who are corrupt or committing gross human
rights violations. No U.S. funding for Afghanistan has been withheld because of this or any other
legislative certification requirement.
Scope of the Problem
Partly because many Afghans view the central government as “predatory,” many Afghans and
international donors have lost faith in Karzai’s leadership. A U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime
report released in January 2010 said 59% of Afghans consider corruption as a bigger concern than
the security situation and unemployment. Transparency International, a German organization that
assesses governmental corruption worldwide, ranked Afghanistan in 2008 as 176th out of 180
countries ranked in terms of government corruption.
Some observers have asserted that Karzai deliberately tolerates officials who are allegedly
involved in the narcotics trade, in exchange for their support. The Afghan figure exemplifying
that allegation has been Karzai’s brother, Qandahar provincial council chief Ahmad Wali Karzai.
Numerous press stories have asserted that he has protected narcotics trafficking in the province,
although some pieces say he is also a paid informant and helper for CIA and Special Forces
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operations in the province.12 Some Afghans explain Ahmad Wali Karzai’s activities as an effort to
ensure that his constituents in Qandahar have financial means to sustain themselves, even if
through narcotics trade, before there are viable alternative sources of livelihood. Still, observers
report that President Karzai has repeatedly rebuffed U.S. and other suggestions to try to remove
his brother from Qandahar.
Another brother, Mahmoud Karzai, has apparently grown wealthy through real estate and auto
sales ventures in Qandahar and Kabul, purportedly by fostering the impression he can influence
his brother, President Karzai. Mahmoud Karzai held a press conference in Washington, DC, on
April 16, 2009, denying allegations of corruption.
Observers who follow the issue say that most of the corruption takes place in the course of
performing mundane governmental functions, such as government processing of official
documents, in which processing services routinely require bribes in exchange for action.13 In
other cases, Afghan security officials are said to sell U.S./internationally provided vehicles, fuel,
and equipment to supplement their salaries. In other cases, local police or border officials may
siphon off customs revenues or demand extra payments to help guard the U.S. or other militaries’
equipment shipments.
Other observers who have served in Afghanistan say that Karzai has appointed some provincial
governors to “reward them” and that these appointments have gone on to “prey” economically on
the populations of that province. Several high officials, despite very low official government
salaries, have acquired ornate properties in west Kabul since 2002, according to Afghan
observers.
Because of corruption, only about 10% of U.S. aid is channeled through the Afghan government,
although Ambassador Holbrooke said in May 2009 (and in his strategy document of January
2010), that empowering Afghan governance requires raising that to about 40% (direct support to
ministries or Afghan NGOs and firms). Currently, the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry
of Communications qualify to have U.S. funds channeled through them, and the FY2011 Obama
Administration aid request expressed the goal that six ministries would qualify for direct funding
by the end of 2010. Among others, direct aid is expected to be extended to the Ministry of Rural
Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), which runs the widely praised National Solidarity
Program, which awards local development grants for specific projects. The Ministry has
developed a capability, widely praised by Britain and other observers, to account for large
percentages of donated funds to ensure they are not siphoned off by corruption.
Other Karzai Responses
Karzai has taken note of the growing U.S. criticism, and Obama Administration officials have
credited him with taking several steps, tempered by criticism of slow implementation. In August
2008 Karzai, with reported Bush Administration prodding, set up the “High Office of Oversight
for the Implementation of Anti-Corruption Strategy” (commonly referred to as the High Office of
Oversight, HOO) with the power to identify and refer corruption cases to state prosecutors, and to
catalogue the overseas assets of Afghan officials. Karzai himself declared his assets on March 27,

12 Filkins, Dexter, Mark Mazetti and James Risen, “Brother of Afghan Leader Is Said to be on C.I.A. Payroll,” New
York Times, October 28, 2009.
13 Filkins, Dexter, “Bribes Corrode Afghan’s Trust in Government,” New York Times, January 2, 2009.
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2009. In his public appearances during his visit to the United States in May 2009, Karzai
repeatedly stressed what he said were efforts by him and his government to remove corrupt
officials and combat official corruption.
In late 2008, he replaced the ministers of Interior, of Education, Agriculture, and Finance with
officials believed to be dedicated to weeding out official corruption. U.S. embassy officials
suggest these cabinet ministers are the best members of what they consider the most effective
cabinet Karzai has had since he became leader in 2001, and were heartened that they were
reappointed to the cabinet in December 2009 and confirmed by the National Assembly. (The
Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Ehsan Zia, was not reappointed.)
Subsequently:
• In his November 19, 2009, inaugural address, Karzai announced the upgrading of
the High Office of Oversight by increasing its scope of authority and resources,
and by reforming relevant anti-corruption laws. The United States gave the High
Office about $1 million in assistance during FY2009 and its performance was
audited by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
(SIGAR), in an audit released in December 2009.14 On March 18, 2010, Karzai,
as he promised during the January 28, 2010, international meeting on
Afghanistan in London, issued a decree giving the High Office direct power to
investigate corruption cases rather than just refer them to other offices.
• During December 15-17, 2009, Karzai held a conference in Kabul to combat
corruption. It debated, among other ideas, requiring deputy ministers and others
to declare their assets, not just those at the ministerial level. That requirement has
now been imposed. On the other hand, during the conference Karzai defended
Kabul mayor Abdul Ahad Sahibi, who was convicted earlier in December of
embezzlement. On December 13, 2009, the deputy Kabul mayor (Wahibuddin
Sadat) was arrested at Kabul airport for alleged misuse of authority. In November
2009, the Afghan government also has announced an increase in police salaries
(from $180 per month to $240 per month), in part to attract recruits and reduce
their inclination to demand bribes.
• A Major Crimes Task Force and Anti-Corruption Tribunal have been established.
Eleven judges have been appointed to the Tribunal. A headquarters for the Major
Crimes Task Force – Afghanistan, at which U.S. and international law
enforcement agencies investigate official links to illicit activities, was
inaugurated on February 25, 2010.
• Some prosecutions have been undertaken. In November 2009, Attorney General
Mohammad Ishaq Aloko announced that two ministers were under investigation
for corruption, including the Minister of Mines Mohammad Ibrahim Adel, who
reportedly accepted a $30 million bribe to award a key mining project in Lowgar
Province (Aynak Copper Mine) to China.15 Neither was reappointed to the
cabinet named December 19. In April 2010, Afghan authorities said that at least
17 officials of ministerial rank are under investigation for corruption.

14 http://www.sigar.mil/reports/pdf/audits/SIGAR20Audit-10-2.pdf.
15 Partlow, Joshua, “Afghanistan Investigating 5 Current and Former Cabinet Members,” Washington Post, November
24, 2009.
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• Additional steps pledged at the January 2010 London conference are expected to
be taken prior to an international conference on Afghanistan, to be held in Kabul
in June 2010, with additional measures to be undertaken by the end of 2010.
Some of Karzai’s anti-corruption steps have been recommended in studies within the State
Department, the Afghan government, and the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime, which is
responsible for assisting Afghanistan on counter-narcotics. The Afghan government initially
committed itself to stepped up anti-corruption efforts in the so-called “Afghanistan Compact”
adopted at an international meeting in London on February 1, 2006, and it ratified the U.N.
Convention Against Corruption in August 2008.
Expanding Local Governance/U.S. Civilian “Uplift”
U.S. emphasis on local governance since 2007 has enabled U.S. policy to reduce dependence on
the Afghan central government, in part to try to circumvent its flaws. The U.S. shift in emphasis
complements those of the Afghan government, which asserts that it itself wants to promote local
governance as the next stage in Afghanistan’s political and economic development. A key
indicator of this Afghan attention to local governance came in August 2007 when Karzai placed
the selection process for local leaders (provincial governors and down) in a new Independent
Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG)—and out of the Interior Ministry. As noted above, the
IDLG is headed by Jelani Popal, a member of Karzai’s Popolzai tribe and a close ally. Some
international officials say that Popal packed local agencies with Karzai supporters, where they
were able to fraudulently produce votes for Karzai in the August 2009 presidential elections.
Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils
Many believe that the key to effective local governance is the appointment of competent
governors. U.N., U.S., and other international studies and reports all point to the beneficial effects
(reduction in narcotics trafficking, economic growth, lower violence) of some of the strong
Afghan civilian appointments at the provincial level. One of the most widely praised
gubernatorial appointments has been the March 2008 replacement of the weak and ineffective
governor of Helmand with Gulab Mangal, who is from Laghman Province. A U.N. Office of
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) praised Mangal in its September 2009 report for taking effective
action to convince farmers to grow crops other than poppy. The UNODC report said his efforts
account for the 33% reduction of cultivation in Helmand in 2009, as compared with 2008.
Mangal has played a key role in convening tribal shuras and educating local leaders on the
benefits of the U.S.-led offensive to remove Taliban insurgents from Marjah town and install new
authorities there (“Operation Moshtarek,” which began in February 2010.)
Another key appointment has been Ghul Agha Shirzai as governor of Nangarhar. He has been
effective in curbing poppy cultivation there, although he reportedly has also not remitted all the
customs duties collected at the Khyber Pass/Torkham crossing to the central government.
One problem noted by governance experts is that the role of the elected provincial councils is
unclear. The elections for the provincial councils in all 34 provinces were held on August 20,
2009, concurrent with the presidential elections. The previous provincial council elections were
held concurrent with the parliamentary elections in September 2005. The 2009 election results for
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the provincial councils were certified on December 29, 2009, although international officials say
that there continues to be unrest over some of the results.16 In most provinces, the provincial
councils do not act as true legislatures, and they are considered weak compared to the power and
influence of the provincial governors.
Still, the provincial councils play a major role in choosing the upper house of the National
Assembly (Meshrano Jirga); in the absence of district councils (no elections held or scheduled),
the provincial councils choose two-thirds of the 102-seat Meshrano Jirga. The councils elected in
2009 will select their portion of new Meshrano Jirga representatives when the upper body is
selected again (after the parliamentary elections planned for September 2010).
Qandahar Governance
Governing Qandahar is a sensitive issue in Kabul because of Karzai’s active interest in his home
province and his expectations of large numbers of Pashtun votes from the province (as well as
from Helmand). Qandahar governance is particularly crucial to an anticipated U.S.-led offensive
to clear militants from surrounding districts, announced to begin in earnest in June 2010. In
Qandahar, Ahmad Wali Karzai, Karzai’s elder brother, is chair of the provincial council. He has
always been more powerful than any appointed governor of Qandahar. Yet, because of his close
interest in the province, President Karzai has frequently rotated the governors of Qandahar,
putting in place relatively weak officials who will not impinge on Ahmad Wali’s authority.
President Karzai appointed General Rahmatullah Raufi to replace Asadullah Khalid after an
August 7, 2008, Taliban assault on the Qandahar prison that led to the freeing of several hundred
Taliban fighters incarcerated there.
Karzai changed that governorship again in December 2008, naming Canadian-Afghan academic
Tooryalai Wesa as governor, perhaps hoping that his ties to Canada would assuage Canadian
reticence to continuing its mission in Qandahar beyond 2011. That effort has not succeeded. In
May 2010, Ahmad Wali publicly admitted to unspecified “mistakes,” and backed the forthcoming
U.S.-led “offensive” to stabilize Qandahar. That backing came amid reports that the United States
is trying to bolster the clout in Qandahar of the appointed governor, Tooryalai Wesa. The United
States and its partners are trying to assist Wesa with his efforts to equitably distribute
development funds and build local governing structures out of the tribal councils he has been
holding. U.S. officials reportedly have south to keep Ahmad Wali from interfering in Wesa’s
efforts.17
District-Level Governance
Central government representation in outlying provinces is expanding very slowly and unevenly.
Only about half of all district governors (there are 364 districts) have any staff or vehicles. Efforts
to expand village local governance have been hampered by corruption and limited availability of
skilled Afghans. In some districts of Helmand that had fallen under virtual Taliban control until
the July 2009 U.S.-led offensives in the province, there were no district governors in place at all.

16 Comments by Electoral Complaints Commission Chair Grant Kippen at a meeting with CRS experts, January 7,
2010.
17 Partlow, Joshua, “U.S. Seeks to Bolster Kandahar Governor, Upend Power Balance,” Washington Post, April 29,
2010.
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Some of the district governors, including in Nawa and Now Zad district, have returned in concert
with the U.S. expulsion of Taliban militants.
The ISAF campaign plan to retake the Marjah area of Helmand (Operation Moshtarak), which
began on February 14, 2010, and succeeded in ousting Taliban control of the town by February
25, 2010, included recruiting, in advance, civilian Afghan officials who would govern the district
once military forces had expelled Taliban fighters from it. Haji Zahir, a businessman who was in
exile in Germany during Taliban rule, has taken up his position to become the chief executive in
Marjah (which is to become its own district). He has held meetings with Marjah residents, one of
which included hosting a visit to Marjah by President Karzai (March 7, 2010). Zahir is expected
to remain in his post even though press reports in March 2010 assert he had been convicted of
domestic violence during his exile in Germany. Zahir denies the story. He has told journalists he
is planning to expand his staff to facilitate the “build phase” of the ISAF counter-insurgency plan
for the area.
No elections for district councils have been held due to boundary and logistical difficulties.
However, in his November 19 inaugural speech, Karzai said the goal of the government is to hold
these elections along with the 2010 parliamentary elections. However, subsequently, Afghan
officials have said that there will not be district elections in May 2010 when the parliamentary
elections are to be held. Karzai also pledged that “mayoral” elections would be held “for the
purpose of better city management.”
Community/Village Level
The IDLG, with advice from India and other donors, is also in the process of empowering
localities to decide on development priorities by forming Community Development Councils
(CDC’s). Thus far, there are about 30,000 CDC’s established, and they are eventually to all be
elected.
U.S. Local Governance Advisory Capacity
As a consequence of the March 2009 Obama Administration review, to help build local governing
capacity, the Administration recruited about 500 U.S. civilian personnel from the State
Department, USAID, the Department of Agriculture, and several other agencies—and many
additional civilians from partner countries will join them—to advise Afghan ministries, and
provincial and district administrations. That effort raised the number of U.S. civilians in
Afghanistan to about 975 U.S. civilians in Afghanistan by early 2010. Of these, nearly 350 are
serving outside Kabul, up from 67 in early 2009. A strategy document released by the office of
Ambassador Holbrook in January 2010 said that the number of U.S. civilians is slated to grow by
another 30% in 2010.18

18 For text, see http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135728.pdf.
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Senior Civilian Representative Program
The Administration also has instituted appointments of “Senior Civilian Representatives”(SCR),19
who are counterparts to the military commanders of each NATO/ISAF regional command (there
are currently five of them. Each Senior Civilian Representative is to have 10-30 personnel on
their team. Two examples are: Ambassador Frank Ruggiero, who is serving in Qandahar as the
SCR for Regional Command South; he is based at Qandahar airfield and interacts closely with the
military command of the southern sector. He testified before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on May 6, 2010. USAID official Dawn Liberi is SCR for Regional Command East
(RC-E), which is U.S.-run. She was mentioned specifically by President Obama in his address to
U.S. forces at Bagram Airfield (headquarters of RC-E) on March 28, 2010.
Human Rights Issues
None of the Obama Administration strategy reviews in 2009 specifically changed U.S. policy on
Afghanistan’s human rights practices, although this issue could be deemed addressed implicitly
by the Administration’s December 1, 2009, statement that policy is intended to make the Afghan
government more “accountable.” On human rights issues, the overall State Department judgment
is that the country’s human rights record remains poor, according to the Department’s report for
2009 (issued March 11, 2010).20 The latest State Department report was similar in tone and
substance to that of previous years, citing Afghan security forces and local faction leaders for
abuses, including torture and abuse of detainees. In October 2007, Afghanistan resumed enforcing
the death penalty after a four-year moratorium, executing 15 criminals.
Afghanistan’s conservative traditions have caused some backsliding in recent years on media
freedoms, which were hailed during 2002-2008 as a major benefit of the U.S. effort in
Afghanistan. A press law was passed in September 2008 that gives some independence to the
official media outlet, but also contains a number of content restrictions, and requires that new
newspapers and electronic media be licensed by the government. Backed by Islamic
conservatives in parliament, such as Sayyaf (referenced above), and Shiite clerics such as
Ayatollah Asif Mohseni, Afghanistan’s conservative Council of Ulema (Islamic scholars) has
been ascendant. With the Council’s backing, in April 2008 the Ministry of Information and
Culture banned five Indian-produced soap operas on the grounds that they are too risque,
although the programs were restored in August 2008 under a compromise that also brought in
some Islamic-oriented programs from Turkey. At the same time, according to the State
Department there has been a growing number of arrests or intimidation of journalists who
criticize the central government or local leaders. As another example of the growing power of
Islamists, alcohol is increasingly difficult to obtain in restaurants and stores, although it is not
banned for sale to non-Muslims. There were reports in April 2010 that Afghan police had raided
some restaurants and prevented them from selling alcoholic beverages at all.

19 For more information, see the Defense Department report on Afghanistan stability, April 2010, cited earlier.
pp. 19-20.
20 Department of State. 2009 Human Rights Report: Afghanistan, March 11, 2010.
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Religious Freedom
The October 2009 International Religious Freedom report (released October 26, 2009) says the
Afghan government took limited steps during the year to increase religious freedom, but that
“serious problems remain.” Members of minority religions, including Christians, Sikhs, Hindus,
and Baha’i’s, often face discrimination; the Supreme Court declared the Baha’i faith to be a form
of blasphemy in May 2007. Northeastern provinces have a substantial population of Islamailis, a
Shiite Muslim sect often called “Seveners” (believers in the Seventh Imam as the true Imam).
Many Ismailis follow the Agha Khan IV (Prince Qarim al-Husseini), who chairs the large Agha
Khan Foundation that has invested heavily in Afghanistan.
One major case incurring international criticism has been the January 2008 death sentence,
imposed in a quick trial, against 23-year-old journalist Sayed Kambaksh for allegedly distributing
material critical of Islam. On October 21, 2008, a Kabul appeals court changed his sentence to 20
years in prison, a judgment upheld by another court in March 2009. He was pardoned by Karzai
and released on September 7, 2009.
A positive development is that Afghanistan’s Shiite minority, mostly from the Hazara tribes of
central Afghanistan (Bamiyan and Dai Kundi provinces) can celebrate their holidays openly, a
development unknown before the fall of the Taliban. Some Afghan Shiites follow Iran’s clerical
leaders politically, but Afghan Shiites tend to be less religious and more socially open than their
co-religionists in Iran. The Hazaras are also advancing themselves socially and politically through
education in such fields as information technology.21 The former Minister of Justice, Sarwar
Danesh, is a Shiite, the first of that sect to hold that post. He studied in Qom, Iran, a center of
Shiite theology. (Danesh was voted down by the parliament for reappointment on January 2,
2010.) The minister who was approved on January 16, 2010, Habibullah Ghalib, is part of Dr.
Abdullah’s faction, but not a Shiite Muslim. Ghaleb previously (2006) was not approved by the
Wolesi Jirga for a spot on the Supreme Court. There was unrest among some Shiite leaders in late
May 2009 when they learned that the Afghan government had dumped 2,000 Iranian-supplied
religious texts into a river when an Afghan official complained that the books insulted the Sunni
majority.
A previous religious freedom case earned congressional attention in March 2006. An Afghan
man, Abd al-Rahman, who had converted to Christianity 16 years ago while working for a
Christian aid group in Pakistan, was imprisoned and faced a potential death penalty trial for
apostasy—his refusal to convert back to Islam. Facing international pressure, Karzai prevailed on
Kabul court authorities to release him (March 29, 2006). His release came the same day the
House passed H.Res. 736 calling on protections for Afghan converts.
Human Trafficking
Afghanistan was again placed in Tier 2 in the State Department report on human trafficking
issued in June 2009 (Trafficking in Persons Report for 2009, released June 15, 2009). The
government is assessed as not complying with minimum standards for eliminating trafficking, but
making significant efforts to do so. The says that women (reportedly from China and Central
Asia) are being trafficked into Afghanistan for sexual exploitation. Other reports say some are

21 Oppel, Richard Jr. and Abdul Waheed Wafa, “Hazara Minority Hustles to Head of the Class in Afghanistan,” New
York Times, January 4, 2010.
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brought to work in night clubs purportedly frequented by members of many international NGOs.
In an effort to also increase protections for Afghan women, in August 2008 the Interior Ministry
announced a crackdown on sexual assault—an effort to publicly air a taboo subject. The United
States has spent about $500,000 to eliminate human trafficking in Afghanistan since FY2001.
Advancement of Women
Freedoms for women have greatly expanded since the fall of the Taliban with their elections to
the parliament, their service at many levels of government. According to the State Department
human rights report for 2009, numerous abuses, such as denial of educational and employment
opportunities, continue primarily because of Afghanistan’s conservative traditions. Other
institutions, such as Human Rights Watch, report backsliding due in part to the lack of security.22
Many Afghan women are concerned that the efforts by Karzai and the international community to
persuade insurgents to end their fight and rejoin the political process could result in backsliding
on women’s rights. Most insurgents are highly conservative Islamists who oppose the
advancement of women that has occurred and might try to demand some reversals of that trend.
Women have been a target of attacks by Taliban supporters, including attacks on girls’ schools
and athletic facilities.
A major development in post-Taliban Afghanistan was the formation of a Ministry of Women’s
Affairs dedicated to improving women’s rights, although numerous accounts say the ministry’s
influence is limited. It promotes the involvement of women in business ventures, and it plays a
key role in trying to protect women from domestic abuse by running a growing number of
women’s shelters across Afghanistan. Husn Banu Ghazanfar remains minister in an acting
capacity, having been voted down by the lower house for reappointment.
The Afghan government tried to accommodate Shiite leaders’ demands in 2009 by enacting
(passage by the National Assembly and signature by Karzai in March 2009) a “Shiite Personal
Status Law,” at the request of Shiite leaders. The law was intended to provide a legal framework
for members of the Shiite minority in family law issues. However, the issue turned controversial
when international human rights groups and governments—and Afghan women in a
demonstration in Kabul—complained about provisions that would appear to sanction marital rape
and which would allow males to control the ability of females in their family to go outside the
home. President Obama publicly called these provisions “abhorrent.” In early April 2009, taking
into account the outcry, Karzai sent the law back to the Justice Ministry for review, saying it
would be altered if it were found to conflict with the Afghan constitution. On April 19, 2009,
Karzai said on CNN that his government’s review of specific provisions of the law, which was
long and highly detailed, had been inadequate, and Karzai reiterated during his U.S. visit in May
2009 that the controversial provisions would be removed. The offending clauses were
substantially revised by the Justice Ministry in July 2009, requiring that wives “perform
housework,” but also apparently giving the husband the right to deny a wife food if she refuses
sex. The revised law was passed by the National Assembly in late July 2009, signed by Karzai,
and published in the official gazette on July 27, 2009, although it remains unsatisfactory to many
human rights and women’s rights groups.

22 “We Have the Promises of the World:Women’s Rights in Afghanistan,” Human Rights Watch, December 2009,
http://www.wluml.org/sites/wluml.org/files/hrw_report_2009.pdf.
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On August 6, 2009, perhaps in an effort to address some of the criticisms of the Shiite law, Karzai
issued, as a decree, the “Elimination of Violence Against Women” law. Minister of Women’s
Affairs Ghazanfar told CRS in October 2009 that the bill was long contemplated and not related
to the Shiite status law.23 However, it is subject to review and passage by the National Assembly,
where some Islamic conservatives, such as Sayyaf (cited above) are said to be blocking final
approval. Sayyaf and others reportedly object to the provisions of the law criminalizing child
marriages.
Women in Key Positions
Despite conservative attitudes, women have moved into prominent positions in all areas of
Afghan governance, although with periodic setbacks. Three female ministers were in the 2004-
2006 cabinet: former presidential candidate Masooda Jalal (Ministry of Women’s Affairs), Sediqa
Balkhi (Minister for Martyrs and the Disabled), and Amina Afzali (Minister of Youth). Karzai
nominated Soraya Sobhrang as Minister of Women’s Affairs in the 2006 cabinet, but she was
voted down by Islamist conservatives in parliament. He eventually appointed another female,
Husn Banu Ghazanfar, as Minister. Ghazanfar, who is a Russian-speaking Uzbek from northern
Afghanistan, has been the only woman in the cabinet for several years. She was renominated on
December 19, 2009, but was voted down on January 2, 2010. Karzai subsequently named three
women in new selections presented on January 9, 2010, including Afzali (to Labor and Social
Affairs). Of the three, however, only Afzali was confirmed on January 16, 2009; the other two
may have been opposed by Islamic conservatives. In March 2005, Karzai appointed a former
Minister of Women’s Affairs, Habiba Sohrabi, as governor of Bamiyan province, inhabited
mostly by Hazaras. (She hosted then First Lady Laura Bush in Bamiyan in June 2008.) A female,
Dr. Sima Samar (Hazara from Ghazni Province), heads the Afghanistan Independent Human
Rights Commission (AIHRC).
The constitution reserves for women at least 17 of the 102 seats in the upper house and 62 of the
249 seats in the lower house of parliament. There are 68 women in the lower house, meaning 6
were elected without the quota. There are 23 serving in the upper house, 6 more than Karzai’s
mandated bloc of 17 female appointees. Two women ran for President for the August 20, 2009,
election, 2009, as discussed below, although preliminary results show each receiving less than
one-half of 1%. Some NGOs and other groups believe that the women elected by the quota
system are not viewed as equally legitimate parliamentarians.
More generally, women are performing jobs that were rarely held by women even before the
Taliban came to power in 1996, including in the new police force. There are over 200 female
judges and 447 female journalists working nationwide. The most senior Afghan woman in the
police force was assassinated in Qandahar in September 2008. Press reports say Afghan women
are increasingly learning how to drive. Under the new government, the wearing of the full body
covering called the burqa is no longer obligatory, and fewer women are wearing it than was the
case a few years ago.

23 CRS meeting with the Minister of Women’s Affairs, October 13, 2009.
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U.S. and International Posture
U.S. officials have had some influence in persuading the government to codify women’s rights.
After the Karzai government took office, the United States and the new Afghan government set
up a U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council to coordinate the allocation of resources to Afghan women.
Some believe that, in recent years, the U.S. government has dropped women’s issues as a priority
for Afghanistan. Some criticized President Obama’s speech on December 1, 2009, for its absence
of virtually any mention of women’s rights. Promoting women’s rights was discussed at the
January 28, 2010, London conference but primarily in the context of how women might be
affected by any “deal” to bring Taliban or other insurgents out from their fight.
Specific earmarks for use of U.S. funds for women’s and girls’ programs in Afghanistan are
contained in recent annual appropriations, and these earmarks have grown steadily. The United
States provided $153 million to programs for Afghan women in FY2009, and expects to provide
$175 million for FY2010, in line with these earmarks.24According to State Department reports on
U.S. aid to women and girls, covering FY2001-2008, and then FY2008-9, the United States has
numerous, multi-faceted projects directly in support of Afghan women, including women’s
empowerment, maternal and child health and nutrition, funding the Ministry of Women’s Affairs,
and micro-finance projects. Some programs focus on training female police officers.25 Some
donors, particularly those of Canada, have financed specific projects for Afghan women farmers.
The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (AFSA, P.L. 107-327) authorized $15 million per
year (FY2003-FY2006) for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. Those monies are donated to the
Ministry from Economic Support Funds (ESF) accounts controlled by USAID. S. 229, the
Afghan Women Empowerment Act of 2009, introduced in the 111th Congress, would authorize
$45 million per year in FY2010-FY2012 for grants to Afghan women, for the ministry of
Women’s Affairs ($5 million), and for the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission ($10
million).
Democracy, Governance, and Elections Funding Issues
U.S. funding for democracy, governance, and rule of law programs has grown, in line with the
Obama Administration strategy for Afghanistan. During FY2002-FY2008, a total of $1.8 billion
was spent on democracy, governance, rule of law and human rights, and elections support. Of
these, by far the largest category was “good governance,” which, in large part, are grant awards to
provinces that make progress against narcotics.
The following was spent in FY2009:
• $881 million for all of democracy and governance, including
• $283 million for good governance;
• $150 million for National Solidarity Program and direct budget support to
Afghan government;

24 For prior years, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by
Kenneth Katzman, in the section on aid to Afghanistan, year by year.
25 Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, “Report on U.S. Government Activities 2008-
2009 For Women and Girls in Afghanistan,” October 20, 2009.
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• $174 million for election support;
• $50 million for strategic program development; and
• $212 million for rule of law, funded by both USAID and State Department
Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE).
Planned for FY2010 (regular appropriation and FY2010 supplemental request):
• $1.7 billion for all democracy and governance, including
• $1.15 billion for “good governance”;
• $411 million for rule of law and human rights (ESF funds controlled by
USAID and INCLE funds);
• $113 million for “civil society” building programs; and
• $25 million for political competition and consensus building (elections).
Key Components of FY2011 request:
• $1.388 billion for all democracy and governance funds, including
• $1.01 billion for good governance;
• $248 million for rule of law and human rights;
• $80 million for civil society building; and
• $50 million for political competition and consensus building.
For comprehensive tables on U.S. aid to Afghanistan, by fiscal year and by category and type of
aid, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,
by Kenneth Katzman.
2009 and 2010 Elections
As noted throughout, the 2009 presidential and provincial elections were anticipated to be a major
step in Afghanistan’s political development. They were the first post-Taliban elections run by the
Afghan government itself in the form of the Afghanistan Independent Electoral Commission.
There were assertions of a lack of credibility of the IEC, because most of its commissioners,
including Chairman Azizullah Ludin, were selected by and politically close to Karzai. As a check
and balance to ensure electoral credibility, there was also a U.N.-appointed Elections Complaints
Commission (ECC) that reviews fraud complaints. Under the 2005 election law, there were three
seats for foreign nationals, appointed by the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary
General/head of U.N. Assistance Mission–Afghanistan, UNAMA. The two Afghans on the ECC
governing council26 were appointed by the Supreme Court and Afghanistan Independent Human
Rights Commission, respectively. Some fear that the difficulties that plagued the 2009
presidential election have not been adequately addressed to ensure that the September 18, 2010,

26 ECC website, http://www.ecc.org.af/en/.
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parliamentary elections are free and fair, and the dispute over a new election decree that will
govern that election is discussed below.
2009 Presidential Election
Special Representative Holbrooke said at a public forum on August 12, 2009, that the August 20,
2009 presidential elections were key to legitimizing the Afghan government, no matter who wins.
Yet, because of the widespread fraud identified by Afghanistan’s U.N.-appointed “Elections
Complaints Commission (ECC)” in the first round of the elections, the process did not produce
fully legitimacy. The marred elections process was a major factor in a September-November 2009
high-level U.S. strategy reevaluation because of the centrality of a credible, legitimate partner
Afghan government to U.S. strategy.27
Problems with the election began in late 2008 with a dispute over the election date. On February
3, 2009, Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission (IEC) set August 20, 2009, as the
election date (a change from a date mandated by Article 61 of the Constitution as April 21, 2009,
in order to allow at least 30 days before Karzai’s term expired on May 22, 2009). The IEC
decision on the latter date cited Article 33 of the Constitution as mandating universal accessibility
to the voting—and saying that the April 21 date was precluded by difficulties in registering
voters, printing ballots, training staff, advertising the elections, and the dependence on
international donor funding, in addition to the security questions.28
In response to UF threats not to “recognize” Karzai’s presidency after May 22, Karzai issued a
February 28, 2009, decree directing the IEC to set the elections in accordance with all provisions
of the constitution. The IEC reaffirmed on March 4, 2009, that the election would be held on
August 20, 2009.
The official decision did not stop the UF from insisting that Karzai step down on May 22 in favor
of a caretaker government. Karzai argued that the Constitution does not provide for any transfer
of power other than in case of election or death of a President. The Afghan Supreme Court backed
that decision on March 28, 2009, and the Obama Administration publicly backed these rulings.
Election Modalities and Processes
Despite the political dispute between Karzai and his opponents, enthusiasm among the public
appeared high in the run-up to the election. Registration, which updated 2005 voter rolls, began in
October 2008 and was completed as of the beginning of March 2009. About 4.5 million new
voters registered, and about 17 million total Afghans were registered. However, there were
widespread reports of registration fraud (possibly half of all new registrants), with some voters
registering on behalf of women who do not, by custom, show up at registration sites. U.S. and
other election observers found instances of fraudulent registration cards and evidence that cards
had been offered for sale. U.S./NATO military operations in some areas, including in Helmand in
January 2009, were conducted to secure registration centers; however, some election observers

27 Fidler, Stephen and John W. Miller, “U.S. Allies Await Afghan Review,” Wall Street Journal, September 25, 2009.
28 Statement of the Independent Election Commission Secretariat, February 3, 2009, provided to CRS by a Karzai
national security aide.
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noted that there was insufficient international assistance to the IEC, which ran the election, to
ensure an untainted registration process.
With the August 20 date set, candidates filed to run during April 24-May 8, 2009. A total of 44
registered to run for President, of which three were disqualified for various reasons, leaving a
field of 41 (later reduced to 32 after several dropped out).
In the provincial elections, 3,200 persons competed for 420 seats nationwide. Those elections
were conducted on a “Single Non-Transferable Vote” (SNTV) system, in which each voter votes
for one candidate in a multi-member constituency. That system encourages many candidacies and
is considered to discourage the participation of political parties. Although about 80% of the
provincial council candidates ran as independents, some of Afghanistan’s parties, including Hezb-
i-Islam, which is a prominent grouping in the National Assembly, fielded multiple candidates in
several different provinces. Still, the provincial elections component of the election received little
attention, in part because the role of these councils is unclear. Of the seats up for election, about
200 women competed for the 124 seats reserved for women (29%) on the provincial councils,
although in two provinces (Qandahar and Uruzgan) there were fewer women candidates than
reserved seats. In Kabul Province, 524 candidates competed for the 29 seats of the council.
The European Union, supported by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) sent a few hundred observers, and the International Republican Institute and National
Democratic Institute sent observers as well. About 8,000 Afghans assisted the observation
missions, according to the U.N. Nations Development Program. Because much of Afghanistan is
inaccessible by road, ballots were distributed (and were brought for counting) by animals in
addition to vehicles and fixed and rotary aircraft.
Security was a major issue for all the international actors supporting the Afghan elections process,
amid open Taliban threats against Afghans who vote. In the first round, about 7,000 polling
centers were to be established (with each center having multiple polling places, totaling about
29,000), but, of those, about 800 were deemed too unsafe to open, most of them in restive
Helmand and Qandahar provinces. A total of about 6,200 polling centers opened on election day.
The total cost of the Afghan elections in 2009 were about $300 million. Other international
donors contributing funds to close the gap left by the U.S. contribution of about $175 million.
The Political Contest and Campaign
The presidential competition took shape in May 2009. In the election-related political deal-
making,29 Karzai obtained an agreement from Fahim to run as his first vice presidential running
mate. Karzai, Fahim, and incumbent second Vice President Karim Khalili (a Hazara) registered
their ticket on May 4, 2009, just before Karzai left to visit the United States for the latest round of
three-way strategic talks (U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan).
Karzai convinced several prominent Pashtuns not to run. Ghul Agha Shirzai, a member of the
powerful Barakzai clan, reportedly reached an arrangement with Karzai the week of the
registration period that headed off his candidacy. Anwar al-Haq Ahady, the former Finance

29 Some of the information in this section obtained in CRS interviews with a Karzai national security aide, December
2008.
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Minister and Central Bank governor, did not run. (He did receive a cabinet nomination in the
December 19 ministry list but was voted down by the parliament). Nor did Bush Administration
U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Afghan-born Zalmay Khalilzad run.
Anti-Karzai Pashtuns did not succeed in coalescing around one challenger. Former Interior
Minister Ali Jalali (who resigned in 2005 over Karzai’s compromises with faction leaders), and
former Finance Minister (2002-2004) and Karzai critic Ashraf Ghani did not reach agreement to
forge a single ticket. In the end, Ghani, the 54-year-old former World Bank official, registered his
candidacy, but without Jalali or prominent representation from other ethnicities in his vice
presidential slots. As noted above, Ghani has reconciled with Karzai and is now a key adviser.
The UF also failed to forge a united challenge to Karzai. Burhanuddin Rabbani (Afghanistan
President during 1992-1996), the elder statesman of the UF bloc, reportedly insisted that an ethnic
Tajik (the ethnic core of the UF) head the UF ticket. Former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah
Abdullah, the 50-year-old former ophthalmologist and foreign envoy of the legendary Tajik
mujahedin leader Ahmad Shah Masoud, registered to run with UF backing. His running mates
were Dr. Cheragh Ali Cheragh, a Hazara who did poorly in the 2004 election, and a little known
Pashtun, Homayoun Wasefi. Another problem for the UF was that Ahmad Zia Massoud (a Vice
President) did not win support of the bloc to head its ticket. Massoud is the brother of Ahmad
Shah Masoud (see above), who was killed purportedly by Al Qaeda two days before the
September 11 attacks on the United States.
The Campaign
Karzai went into the election as a clear favorite, but the key question was whether he would win
in the first round (more than 50% of the vote). IRI and other pre-election polls showed him with
about 45% support. Dr. Abdullah polled about 25% and emerged as the main challenger. The
conventional wisdom has always been that the two-round format favors a Pashtun candidate.
Although Karzai’s public support was harmed by perceptions of ineffectiveness and corruption,
although many Afghan voters apparently see many of Afghanistan’s problems as beyond Karzai’s
control. He used some U.S. policy setbacks to bolster his electoral prospects, for example by
railing against civilian casualties resulting from U.S./NATO operations, and by proposing new
curbs on international military operations in Afghanistan. During the campaign, Karzai
announced new measures to limit international forces’ operations in civilian areas and said he
would hold a loya jirga, if elected, including Taliban figures, to try to reach a settlement with the
insurgency. He restated that intent in his November 19, 2009, inaugural speech.
Karzai was criticized for a campaign that relied on personal ties to ethnic faction leaders rather
than a retail campaign based on public appearances. Karzai agreed to public debates with rivals,
although he backed out of a scheduled July 23 debate with Abdullah and Ghani (on the private
Tolo Television network) on the grounds that the event was scheduled on short notice and was
limited to only those three. Abdullah and Ghani debated without Karzai, generating additional
criticism of Karzai. Karzai did attend the next debate (on state-run Radio-Television Afghanistan)
on August 16, debating Ghani and Bashardost, but Abdullah did not participate. There was also a
radio forum in which all major candidates participated. Karzai was said to benefit from his ready
access to media attention, which focuses on his daily schedule as President, including meetings
with foreign leaders.
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Dr. Abdullah stressed his background of mixed ethnicity (one parent is Pashtun and one is Tajik)
to appeal to Pashtuns, but his experience and background has been with other Tajik leaders and he
campaigned extensively in the north and west, which are populated mainly by Tajiks. However,
he also campaigned in Qandahar, in Pashtun heartland. Both Karzai and Abdullah held large
rallies in Kabul and elsewhere.
Ghani polled at about 6% just before the election, according to surveys. Ghani appeared
frequently in U.S. and Afghan media broadcasts criticizing Karzai for failing to establish
democratic and effective institutions, but he has previously spent much time in the United States
and Europe and many average Afghans view him as a global technocrat who is not necessarily in
touch with day-to-day problems in Afghanistan. Ghani made extensive use of the Internet for
advertising and fundraising, and he hired political consultant James Carville to advise his
campaign.30 He emphasized new programs for women in the August 16 debate.
Another candidate who polled unexpectedly well was 54-year-old anti-corruption parliamentarian
Ramazan Bashardost, an ethnic Hazara. He was polling close to 10% just before the election. He
ran a low-budget campaign with low-paid personnel and volunteers, but attracted a lot of media.
This suggests that, despite most Hazara ethnic leaders, such as Mohammad Mohaqiq, endorsing
Karzai, Bashardost would do well among Hazaras, particularly those who are the most educated.
Some believe the Shiite personal status law, discussed above, was an effort by Karzai to win
Hazara Shiite votes. According to the preliminary results, Bashardost carried several Hazara
provinces, including Ghazni and Dai Kondi, but Mohaqiq’s backing apparently helped Karzai
carry the Hazara heartland of Bamiyan province. Other significant candidates are shown below.
Other Candidates
Abd al-Salam Rocketi ("Mullah Rocketi”). A Pashtun, reconciled Taliban figure, member of the lower house of
parliament. Was expected to do well if Taliban sympathizers participated, but received less than 1% (preliminary
totals), putting him in 9th place out of 32.
Hedayat Amin Arsala. A Pashtun, was a Vice President during 2001-2004. He is a prominent economist and
perceived as close to the former royal family. Finished 30th out of 32.
Abd al Jabbar Sabit. A Pashtun, was fired by Karzai in 2007 for considering a run against Karzai in the election.
Finished in 19th place.
Shahnawaz Tanai. A Pashtun. Served as Defense Minister in the Communist government of Najibullah (which was
left in place after the Soviets withdrew in 1989) but led a failed coup against Najibullah in April 1990. Finished an
unexpectedly strong sixth place and did wel in several Pashtun provinces.
Mirwais Yasini. Another strong Pashtun candidate, was viewed as a dark horse possible winner. 48-year-old deputy
speaker of the lower house of parliament, but also without wel -known non-Pashtun running mates. Finished fifth.
Frozan Fana and Shahla Ata. The two women candidates in the race. Fana is the wife of the first post-Taliban
aviation minister, who was killed during an altercation at Kabul airport in 2002. These two candidates are widely given
almost no chance of winning, but attracted substantial media attention as trail-blazers. Fana finished seventh but Ata
finished in 14th place.


30 Mulrine, Anna, “Afghan Presidential Candidate Takes a Page From Obama’s Playbook,” U.S. News and World
Report, June 25, 2009.
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The Election Results
Taliban intimidation and voter apathy appears to have suppressed the total turnout to about 5.8
million votes cast, or about a 35% turnout, far lower than expected. Twenty seven Afghans,
mostly security forces personnel, were killed in election-day violence. Turnout was said by
observers and U.S. and other military personnel based there to have been very low in Helmand
Province, despite the fact that Helmand was the focus of a U.S. military-led stabilization
offensive that began July 2, 2009, with the participation of about 8,000 U.S. Marines.
Some observers said that turnout among women nationwide was primarily because there were not
sufficient numbers of female poll workers recruited by the IEC to make women feel comfortable
enough to vote. In general, however, election observers reported that poll workers were generally
attentive and well trained, and the voting process appeared orderly.
In normally secure Kabul, turnout was said to be far lighter than in the 2004 presidential election.
Turnout might have been dampened by a suicide bombing on August 15, 2009, outside
NATO/ISAF military headquarters and intended to intimidate voters not to participate. In
addition, several dozen provincial council candidates, and some workers on the presidential
campaigns, were killed in election-related violence. A convoy carrying Fahim (Karzai vice
presidential running mate, see below) was bombed, although Fahim was unharmed.
Clouding the election substantially were the widespread fraud allegations coming from all sides.
Dr. Abdullah held several news conferences after the election, purporting to show evidence of
systematic election fraud by the Karzai camp. Karzai’s camp made similar allegations against
Abdullah as applied to his presumed strongholds in northern Afghanistan. The ECC, in
statements, stated its belief that there was substantial fraud likely committed, and mostly by
Karzai supporters. However, the low turnout in the presumed Karzai strongholds in southern
Afghanistan led Karzai and many Pashtuns to question the election’s fairness as well, on the
grounds that Pashtuns were intimidated from voting in greater proportions than were others.
The IEC released vote results slowly. Preliminary results were to be announced by September 3.
However, the final, uncertified total was released on September 16, 2009. It showed Karzai at
54.6% and Dr. Abdullah at 27.7%. Bashardost and Ghani received single-digit vote counts (9%
and 3% respectively), with trace amounts for the remainder of the field.
Vote Certified/Runoff Mandated
The constitution required that a second-round runoff, if needed, be held two weeks after the
results of the first round are certified. Following the release of the vote count, the complaints
evaluation period began which, upon completed, would yield a “certified” vote result. On
September 8, 2009, the ECC ordered a recount of 10% of polling stations (accounting for as many
as 25% total votes) as part of its investigations of fraud. Polling stations were considered
“suspect” if: the total number of votes exceeded 600, which was the maximum number allotted to
each polling station; or where any candidate received 95% or more of the total valid votes cast at
that station (assuming more than 100 votes were cast there). Perhaps reflecting political
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sensitivities, the recount consisted of a sampling of actual votes.31 Throughout the investigation
period (September 16-October 20), the ECC said it was not “in a rush” to finish.
On October 20, 2009, the ECC determined, based on its investigation, that about 1 million Karzai
votes, and about 200,000 Abdullah votes, were considered fraudulent and were deducted from
their totals. The final, certified, results of the first round were as follows: Karzai—49.67%
(according to the IEC; with a slightly lower total of about 48% according to the ECC
determination); Abdullah—30.59%; Bashardost—10.46%; Ghani—2.94%, Yasini—1.03%, and
lower figures for the remaining field.32
During October 16-20, 2009, U.S. and international officials, including visiting Senator John
Kerry, met repeatedly with Karzai to attempt to persuade him to acknowledge that his vote total
did not legitimately exceed the 50%+ threshold to claim a first-round victory. On October 21,
2009, the IEC accepted the ECC findings and Karzai conceded the need for a runoff election. A
date was set as November 7, 2009. Abdullah initially accepted.
In an attempt to produce a fair second round, UNAMA, which provided advice and assistance to
the IEC, requested that about 200 district-level election commissioners be replaced. In addition, it
recommended there be fewer polling stations—about 5,800, compared to 6,200 previously—to
eliminate polling stations where very few votes are expected to be cast. Still, there were concerns
that some voters may be disenfranchised because snow had set in some locations. Insurgents were
expected to resume their campaign to intimidate voters from casting ballots.
After a runoff was declared, no major faction leader switched support of either candidate, making
it difficult to envision an Abdullah victory. Prior to the ECC vote certification, Dr. Abdullah told
CRS at a meeting in Kabul on October 15, 2009, that he might be willing to negotiate with Karzai
on a “Joint Program” of reforms—such as direct election of governors and reduced presidential
powers—to avoid a runoff. Abdullah told CRS he himself would not be willing to enter the
cabinet, although presumably such a deal would involve his allies doing so. However, some said
the constitution does not provide for a negotiated settlement and that the runoff must proceed.
Others said that a deal between the two, in which Abdullah dropped his candidacy, could have led
the third-place finisher, Ramazan Bashardost, to assert that he must face Karzai in a runoff. Still
others say the issue could be resolved by Afghanistan’s Supreme Court.
If a second round were held and proved equally flawed, it is possible that a loya jirga could have
been called to determine who would lead Afghanistan for the next five years. As the favorite in a
two-man race, Karzai presumably had an interest in avoiding this outcome because a loya jirga
could conceivably select a new figure as Afghanistan’s next President.
Election Conclusion
The various pre-runoff scenarios were mooted on November 1, 2009, when Dr. Abdullah refused
to participate in the runoff on the grounds that the problems that plagued the first round were
likely to recur. He asserted that Karzai, in negotiations during October 2009, was refusing to
replace the IEC head, Azizullah Ludin, to fire several Cabinet ministers purportedly campaigning
for Karzai, or to address several other election-related complaints. The IEC refused to follow a

31 “Afghan Panel to Use Sampling in Recount,” USA Today, September 22, 2009.
32 See IEC website for final certified tallies, http://www.iec.org.af/results.
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UNAMA recommendation to reduce the number of polling stations. Some believe Abdullah
pulled out because of his belief that he would not prevail in the second round.
On November 2, 2009, the IEC issued a statement saying that, by consensus, the body had
determined that Karzai, being the only candidate remaining in a two-person runoff, should be
declared the winner and the second round not held. The Obama Administration accepted the
outcome as “within Afghanistan’s constitution,” on the grounds that the fraud had been
investigated. On that basis, the United States, as well as U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon
(visiting Kabul), and several governments, congratulated Karzai on the victory. U.S. officials,
including Secretary of State Clinton, praised Dr. Abdullah for his relatively moderate speech
announcing his pullout, in particular his refusal to call for demonstrations or violence by his
supporters, and called on him to remain involved in Afghan politics. Dr. Abdullah denied that his
pullout was part of any “deal” with Karzai for a role for his supporters in the next government.
Amid U.S. and international calls for Karzai to choose his next cabinet based on competence,
merit, and dedication to curbing corruption, Karzai was inaugurated on November 19, 2009, with
Secretary of State Clinton in attendance.
As noted above, the election for the provincial council members were not certified until
December 29, 2009. The council members have taken office.
Fallout for UNAMA
The political fallout for UNAMA continues. During the complaint period, a dispute between
UNAMA head Kai Eide and the American deputy, Ambassador Peter Galbraith, broke out over
how vigorously to press for investigation of the fraud. This led to the September 29, 2009,
dismissal by Secretary General Ban Ki Moon of Galbraith, who had openly accused UNAMA
head Kai Eide of soft-pedaling on the fraud charges and siding with Karzai. Galbraith has
appealed his dismissal, amid press reports that he had discussed a plan with some U.S. officials to
replace Karzai with an interim government, if the second round could not be held until after the
winter. In December 2009, Eide announced he would not seek to renew his two year agreement to
serve as UNAMA chief. The replacement named at the January 28, 2010, London conference is
Staffan de Mistura, who previously played a similar U.N. role in Iraq. He arrived in Kabul in mid-
March 2010. In his April 1, 2010, allegations of Western interference in the August 2009 election,
Karzai named Galbraith and EU chief election observer Phillipe Morillon, specifically, as
responsible for the interference.
Post-Election Cabinet
U.S. officials stated they would scrutinize the new cabinet for indications that Karzai would
professionalize his government and eliminate corruption. Complicating Karzai’s efforts to obtain
confirmation of a full cabinet was the need to present his choices as technically competent while
also maintaining a customary and expected balance of ethnic and political factions. In the
parliamentary confirmation process that has unfolded, National Assembly members, particularly
the well-educated independents, have objected to many of his nominees as “unknowns,” as
having minimal qualifications, or as loyal to faction leaders who backed Karzai in the 2009
election. Karzai’s original list of 24 ministerial nominees (presented December 19) was generally
praised by the United States for retaining the highly praised economic team (and most of that
team was confirmed). However, overall, only 7 of the first 24 nominees were confirmed (January
2, 2010), and only 7 of the 17 replacement nominees were confirmed (January 16, 2010), after
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which the Assembly went into winter recess. This left Karzai with 11 vacant cabinet seats as he
went into the major international meeting on Afghanistan in Britain on January 28, 2010,
although caretakers (many of them the ex-ministers) are in charge in the vacant ministerial posts.
The permanent posts remain unfilled. Although then UNAMA head Kai Eide called the vetoing of
many nominees a “setback” to Afghan governance, Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell said
on January 6, 2010, that the vetoing by parliament reflected a “healthy give and take” among
Afghanistan’s branches of government. Outside experts have said the confirmation process—and
the later parliamentary review of a 2010 election decree, discussed below—reflects the growing
institutional strength of the parliament and the functioning of checks and balances in the Afghan
government.
Of the major developments in the cabinet selection process to date:
• The main security ministers—Defense Minister Abdal Rahim Wardak and
Interior Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar—were renominated by Karzai and
confirmed on January 2. They work closely with the U.S. military to expand and
improve the Afghan national security forces.
• Three key economic/civilian sector officials who work very closely with USAID
and U.S. Embassy Kabul—Finance Minister Omar Zakhiwal, Agriculture
Minister Mohammad Rahimi, and Education Minister Ghulam Faruq Wardak—
were renominated and also were confirmed on January 2. The highly praised
Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (Ehsan Zia), which runs the
widely touted and effective National Solidarity Program, was not renominated, to
the chagrin of U.S. officials. His named replacement (Wais Barmak, a Fahim and
Dr. Abdullah ally) was voted down. The second replacement, Jarullah Mansoori,
was confirmed on January 16.
• The U.S.-praised Commerce Minister Wahidollah Sharani was selected to move
over to take control of the Mines Ministry from the former minister, who is under
investigation for corruption. Sharani was confirmed on January 2. Also
confirmed that day was the Minister of Culture, Seyyed Makhdum Raheen. He
had been serving as Ambassador to India.
• The clan of former moderate mujahedin party leader Pir Gaylani rose to
prominence in the December 19 list. Gaylani son-in-law Anwar al-Haq Al Ahady
(see above) was named as Economy Minister and Hamid Gaylani (Pir Gaylani’s
son) was named as Minister of Border and Tribal Affairs. However, neither was
confirmed and neither was renominated.
• Ismail Khan was renominated as Minister of Energy and Water on December 19,
disappointing U.S. officials and many Afghans who see him as a faction leader
(Tajik leader/mujahedin era commander, Herat Province) with no technical
expertise. He was voted down and no new replacement nominee has been
submitted by Karzai, likely indicating that Khan will ultimately leave the cabinet.
• Karzai initially did not nominate a permanent Foreign Minister, leaving Spanta in
place as a caretaker. However, in the second nomination round, Karzai selected
his close ally Zalmay Rassoul, who has been National Security Adviser since
2004, to the post. Rassoul was confirmed on January 16.
• Minister of Women’s Affairs Ghazanfar was renominated to remain the only
female minister, but was voted down (January 2). In the cabinet renominations,
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Karzai named three women—Suraiya Dalil to Public Health, Pelwasha Hassan to
Women’s Affairs, and Amina Afzali (Minister of Youth in an earlier Karzai
cabinet) to Labor and Social Affairs. Of those, only Afzali was confirmed on
January 16. In the original December 16, 2009, list, Karzai proposed a woman to
head a new Ministry of Literacy, but parliament did not vote on this nomination
because it had not yet acted to approve formation of the ministry.
• Of the other nominees confirmed on January 16, at least one has previously
served in high positions. The Assembly confirmed that day: Zarar Moqbel as
Counternarcotics Minister (who previously was Interior Minister); Economy
minister Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal, who belongs to the party linked with pro-
Taliban insurgent leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (although the faction in the
parliament and the government has broken with Hikmatyar and rejects violence
against the government); Yousaf Niazi, Minister of Hajj and Waqf (Religious
Endowments) Affairs; and Habibullah Ghalib, Minister of Justice.
• The following ten were voted down on January 16 and their ministries are headed
by caretakers: (1) Palwasha Hassan, nominated to head the Ministry of Women’s
Affairs; (2) Suraya Dalil, Public Health; (3) Muhammad Zubair Waheed,
Minister of Commerce; (4) Muhammad Elahi, Minister of Higher Education; (5)
Muhammad Laali, Public Welfare; (6) Abdul Rahim, who was
Telecommunications Minister in the first Karzai cabinet, as Minister of Refugee
Affairs; (7) Arsala Jamal, formerly the governor of Khost Province who was
widely praised in that role by Secretary Gates, as Minister of Border and Tribal
Affairs Minister; (8) Abdul Qadus Hamidi, Minister of Telecommunications; (9)
Abdur Rahim Oraz, Minister of Transport and Aviation; and (10) Sultan Hussein
Hesari, Minister of Urban Development.
2010 Parliamentary Elections and Election Law Dispute
The 2009 presidential election is resolved, but concerns envelop the 2010 parliamentary elections.
On January 2, 2010, the IEC set National Assembly elections for May 22, 2010. The IEC view
was that this date was in line with a constitutional requirement for a new election to be held well
prior to the expiry of the current Assembly’s term. Planning for a May 22 election, on January 7,
2010, the IEC issued its roadmap of dates in relation to the election. It called for the launching of
a candidate registration during January 16-22, 2010.
U.S., ECC, UNAMA, and officials of donor countries argued that Afghanistan’s flawed
institutions will not be able to hold free and fair elections under this timetable, maintaining that
the problems that plagued the August 2009 election cannot be overcome by then; that the IEC
lacks sufficient staff, given that some were fired after the 2009 election; that the IEC lacks funds
to hold the election under that timetable; that the U.S. military buildup will be consumed with
securing still restive areas at election time; and that the ECC’s term expired at the end of January
2010. A functioning ECC is needed to evaluate complaints against registered parliamentary
candidates because there are provisions in the election law to invalidate the candidacies of those
who have previously violated Afghan law or committed human rights abuses. These international
figures pressed for a delay of all of these elections until August 2010 or, according to some
donors, mid-2011.33 Bowing to funding and the wide range of other considerations mentioned, on

33 Trofimov, Yaroslav, “West Urges Afghanistan to Delay Election,” Wall Street Journal, December 11, 2009.
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January 24, 2010, the IEC announced that the parliamentary elections would be postponed until
September 18, 2010. Among other steps, the Afghan Interior Ministry plans, by that time, to
institute a national identity card system to curb voter registration fraud.
About $120 million is budgeted by the IEC for the parliamentary elections, of which at least $50
million is needed from donor countries, giving donors leverage over when the election might take
place. The remaining $70 million are funds left over from the 2009 elections. Donors had held
back the needed funds, possibly in an effort to pressure the IEC to demonstrate that it is
correcting the flaws identified in the various “after-action” reports on the 2009 election. With the
compromises and Karzai announcements below, those funds are in the process of being released.
Election Decree
With the dispute between the Karzai government and international donors continuing over how to
ensure a free and fair election, the Afghan government drafted an election decree that would
supersede the 2005 election law and govern the 2010 parliamentary election.34 Karzai signed the
decree in February 2010. The Afghan government argues that the decree supersedes the
constitutional clause that any new election law not be adopted less than one year prior to the
election to which that law will apply.
Substantively, some of the provisions of the election decree—particularly the proposal to make
the ECC an all-Afghan body—caused alarm in the international community. Another issue of
concern is the reduction in the number of women to the “two per province” target level of the
previous law, therefore not allowing for more women who might be elected beyond the target
quota. Another controversial element is a requirement of a $100,000 financial deposit for
candidates. On March 14, 2010, after discussions with outgoing UNAMA head Kai Eide, Karzai
reportedly agreed to cede to UNAMA two “international seats” on the ECC, rather than to insist
that all five ECC members be Afghans. Still, the majority of the ECC seats are Afghans.
The election decree became an issue for Karzai opponents and others in the National Assembly
who seek to assert parliamentary authority. On March 31, the Wolesi Jirga voted to reject the
election decree, leaving its status unclear. However, on April 3, 2010, the Meshrano Jirga decided
not to act on the election decree, meaning that it was not rejected by the Assembly as a whole and
will likely stand to govern the September 18, 2010, National Assembly elections. Karzai has
pledged to implement the March 2010 compromise with then UNAMA head Eide by allowing
UNAMA to appoint two ECC members and for decisions to require that at least one non-Afghan
ECC member concur. On April 17, 2010, he also appointed a new IEC head, Fazel Ahmed
Manawi, who drew praise from many factions (including “opposition leader” Dr. Abdullah) for
impartiality.


34 Partlow, Joshua, “Afghanistan’s Government Seeks More Control Over Elections,” Washington Post, February 15,
2010.
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Implications for the United States of the Afghan Elections
U.S. officials expressed clear U.S. neutrality vis-à-vis the 2009 presidential election, although
Karzai reportedly believed the United States was hoping strong candidates might emerge to
replace him. This perception was a function of the strained relations between Karzai and some
Obama Administration officials, particularly Ambassadors Holbrooke and Eikenberry.
Ambassador Timothy Carney was appointed to head the U.S. election support effort at U.S.
Embassy Kabul, tasked to ensure that the United States was even-handed.
The legitimacy of the Afghan partner of the United States was a major factor in the
Administration’s consideration of the McChrystal initial assessment of August 2009, 35 which
recommended pursuing a classic counterinsurgency strategy to protect the Afghan population. If
there is no legitimate Afghan partner available, then some might argue that McChrystal’s
recommended strategy might not succeed because U.S. forces are not authorized or able to reform
the Afghan government. According to the DOD report of April 2010, cited earlier, the strategy is
focused on 120 restive districts (of the 364 total Afghan districts). Administration officials
clarified that any July 2011 deadline to begin transitioning to Afghan security leadership would
be subject to evaluation of conditions that would be determined in a December 2010 review.


35 Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan.
“Commander’s Initial Assessment,” August 30, 2009, available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?.
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Table 1. Afghanistan Political Transition Process
Interim Administration
Formed by Bonn Agreement. Headed by Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, but key
security positions dominated by mostly minority “Northern Alliance.” Karzai
reaffirmed as leader by June 2002 “emergency loya jirga.” (A jirga is a traditional
Afghan assembly).
Constitution
Approved by January 2004 “Constitutional Loya Jirga” (CLJ). Set up strong
presidency, a rebuke to Northern Alliance that wanted prime ministership to balance
presidential power, but gave parliament significant powers to compensate. Gives men
and women equal rights under the law, allows for political parties as long as they are
not “un-Islamic”; allows for court rulings according to Hanafi (Sunni) Islam (Chapter
7, Article 15). Set out electoral roadmap for simultaneous (if possible) presidential,
provincial, and district elections by June 2004. Named ex-King Zahir Shah to non-
hereditary position of “Father of the Nation;” he died July 23, 2007.
Presidential Election
Elections for President and two vice presidents, for 5-year term, held Oct. 9, 2004.
Turnout was 80% of 10.5 million registered. Karzai and running mates (Ahmad Zia
Masud, a Tajik and brother of legendary mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud,
who was assassinated by Al Qaeda two days before the Sept. 11 attacks, and Karim
Khalili, a Hazara) elected with 55% against 16 opponents. Second highest vote getter,
Northern Alliance figure (and Education Minister) Yunus Qanooni (16%). One female
ran, got about 1%. Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqiq got 11.7%; and Dostam won
10%. Funded with $90 million in international aid, including $40 million from U.S.
(FY2004 supplemental, P.L. 108-106).
First Parliamentary Elections
Elections held Sept. 18, 2005, on “Single Non-Transferable Vote” System; candidates
stood as individuals, not part of party list. Parliament consists of a 249 elected lower
house (Wolesi Jirga, House of the People) and a selected 102 seat upper house
(Meshrano Jirga, House of Elders). Voting was for one candidate only, although
number of representatives varied by province, ranging from 2 (Panjshir Province) to
33 (Kabul Province). Herat has 17; Nangahar, 14; Qandahar, Balkh, and Ghazni, 11
seats each. The body is 28% female (68 persons), in line with the legal minimum of 68
women - two per each of the 34 provinces. Upper house appointed by Karzai (34
seats, half of which are to be women), by the provincial councils (34 seats), and
district councils (remaining 34 seats). There are 23 women in it, above the 17
required by the constitution. Because district elections (400 district councils) were
not held, provincial councils selected 68 on interim basis. 2,815 candidates for
Wolesi Jirga, including 347 women. Turnout was 57% (6.8 million voters) of 12.5
million registered. Funded by $160 million in international aid, including $45 million
from U.S. (FY2005 supplemental appropriation, P.L. 109-13).
First Provincial Elections/
Provincial elections held Sept. 18, 2005, simultaneous with parliamentary elections.
District Elections
Exact powers vague, but now taking lead in deciding local reconstruction Provincial
council sizes range from 9 to the 29 seats on the Kabul provincial council. Total seats
are 420, of which 121 held by women. l3,185 candidates, including 279 women. Some
criticize the provincial election system as disproportionately weighted toward large
districts within each province. District elections not held due to complexity and
potential tensions of drawing district boundaries.
Second Presidential and
Presidential and provincial elections were held Aug. 20, 2009, but required a runoff
Provincial Elections
because no candidate received over 50% in certified results issued October 20.
Second round not held because chal enger, Dr. Abdul ah, pulled out of a second-
round runoff vote. Election costs about $300 million.
Parliamentary Elections
Original y set for May 22, 2010, now set for September 18, 2010.




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Table 2. Major Pashtun Tribal Confederations
Clan/Tribal
Confederations
Location Example
Durrani
Mainly southern Afghanistan:

Qandahar, Helmand, Zabol,
Uruzgan,Nimruz
Popalzai
Qandahar
Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan; Jelani Popal,
head of the Independent Directorate of Local
(Zirak branch
Governance; Mullah Bradar, the top aide to Mullah
of Durrani
Umar, captured in Pakistan in Feb. 2010. Two-
Pashtun)
thirds of Qandahar’s provincial government posts
held by Zirak Durrani Pashtuns
Alikozai Qandahar
N/A
Barakzai
Qandahar, Helmand
Ghul Agha Shirzai (Governor, Nangarhar Province)
Achakzai
Qandahar, Helmand
Abdul Razziq, Chief of Staff, Border Police,
Qandahar Province
Alozai
Helmand (Musa Qala district)
Sher Mohammad Akhunzadeh (former Helmand
governor); Hajji Zahir, governor of Marjah town
Noorzai
Qandahar
Noorzai brothers, briefly in charge of Qandahar
after the fal of the Taliban in November 2001
Ghilzai
Eastern Afghanistan: Paktia, Paktika,

Khost, Nangarhar, Kunar
Ahmadzai

Mohammed Najibullah (pres. 1986-1992); Ashraf
Ghani, Finance Minister 2002-2004
Hotak

Mullah Umar, but hails from Uruzgan, which is
dominated by Durranis
Taraki

Nur Mohammed Taraki (leader 1978-1979)
Kharoti

Hafizullah Amin (leader September -
December1979); Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, founder of
Hezb-e-Islami (Gulbuddin), former mujahedin party
leader now anti-Karzai insurgent.
Zadran
Paktia, Khost
Pacha Khan Zadran; Insurgent leader Jalaluddin
Haqqani
Kodai


Mangal
Paktia, Khost
Ghulab Mangal (Governor of Helmand Province)
Orkazai

Shinwari
Nangarhar province
Fasl Ahmed Shinwari, former Supreme Court Chief
Justice
Mandezai

Sangu Khel


Sipah

Wardak
Wardak Province
Abdul Rahim Wardak (Defense Minister)
(Pashtu-speaking
non-Pashtun)
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Clan/Tribal
Confederations
Location Example
Afridis
Tirah, Khyber Pass, Kohat

Zaka khel


Jawaki

Adam khel


Malikdin, etc


Yusufzais
Khursan, Swat, Kabul

Akozais

Malizais

Loezais

Khattaks
Kohat, Peshawar, Bangash

Akorai

Terai

Mohmands
Near Khazan, Peshawar

Baizai


Alimzai


Uthmanzais

Khawazais


Wazirs Mainly
in
Waziristan

Darwesh khel


Bannu

Source: This table was prepared by Hussein Hassan, Information Research Specialist, CRS.
Note: N/A indicates no example is available.

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Figure 1. Map of Afghan Ethnicities

Source: 2003 National Geographic Society, http://www.afghan-network.net/maps/Afghanistan-Map.pdf. Adapted by Amber Wilhelm, CRS
Notes: This map is intended to be illustrative of the approximate demographic distribution by region of Afghanistan. CRS has no way to confirm exact population
distributions.
CRS-36

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Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612

Acknowledgments
The table of major Pashtun tribes was prepared by Hussein Hassan, Information Research Specialist, CRS.


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