Iran-Iraq Relations
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
April 15, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS22323
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Iran-Iraq Relations
Summary
With a conventional military and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat from Saddam
Hussein’s regime removed, Iran seeks to ensure that Iraq can never again become a threat to Iran,
either with or without U.S. forces present in Iraq. Some believe that Iran’s intentions go well
beyond achieving Iraq’s “neutrality”— that Iran wants to try to harness Iraq to Iran’s broader
regional policy goals and to help Iran defend against international criticism of Iran’s nuclear
program. Others believe Iran sees Iraq as providing lucrative investment opportunities and a
growing market for Iranian products and contracts. Still others believe that Iran wants only
stability in Iraq so that Iran’s leaders can concentrate on addressing the unrest in Iran that
followed that country’s June 12, 2009, presidential election. This domestic unrest has given Iran
another reason to exercise influence in Iraq—to try to suppress Iranian dissidents located over the
border inside Iraq.
Iran has sought to achieve its goals in Iraq through several strategies: supporting pro-Iranian
factions and armed militias; attempting to influence Iraqi political leaders and faction leaders; and
building economic ties throughout Iraq that might accrue goodwill to Iran. It is Iran’s support for
armed Shiite factions that most concerns U.S. officials. That Iranian activity hindered—and
continues to pose a threat to—U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq, and has heightened the U.S. threat
perception of Iran generally.
Many of Iraq’s current leaders were in exile in Iran or materially supported by Iran during
Saddam’s rule, and see Iran as a mentor and an influential actor in Iraq. Even those who have
longstanding ties to Iran have asserted themselves as nationalist defenders of Iraqi interests, but
Iraq appears to be a clearly subordinate partner in the relationship. Perhaps resenting this
relationship, many Iraqi citizens have appeared to reject parties and factions who accept
preponderant Iranian influence in Iraq. This sentiment has caused Iran to suffer key setbacks in
Iraq. The most pro-Iranian factions generally fared poorly in the January 31, 2009, provincial
elections and again in the March 7, 2010, national elections for the National Assembly that will
choose the next government. A political bloc that is decidedly against Iranian influence and which
is supported by Iraq’s Sunni Arabs won the most seats in the March 7 election, although this bloc
might not necessarily have enough support among other blocs to be able to assemble a
government. Still, virtually all political blocs are consulting with Iran to try to gain its support for
their inclusion in or dominance of any new government.
Also see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth
Katzman.
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Contents
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
Iranian Support to Armed Groups.......................................................................................... 2
Shiite Internecine Combat ............................................................................................... 3
The Decline of Militia Activity........................................................................................ 4
U.S. Efforts to Reduce Iran’s Activities in Iraq ...................................................................... 4
U.S. Negotiations With Iran ............................................................................................ 5
Iranian Political Influence ..................................................................................................... 6
Iranian Political Influence Following the January 31, 2009, Provincial Elections ............. 6
Iranian Efforts to Influence the March 7, 2010, Iraqi Elections and Their Outcome.......... 7
Iran’s Efforts to Deny Its Domestic Opponents Sanctuary in Iraq..................................... 8
Longstanding Territorial and Property Disputes ..................................................................... 9
Economic Relations ............................................................................................................ 10
Prospects .................................................................................................................................. 10
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 11
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Background
Iran has sought to shape and influence the post-Saddam political structure in Iraq to Iran’s
advantage by assuring the political success of pro-Iranian politicians, but with mixed success.
Tehran couches its policies in terms of friendship with Iraq and humanitarian assistance to the
Iraqi people, which has helped pro-Iranian Iraqi politicians justify their relationships with Iranian
leaders.
During 2003-2005, Iran calculated that it suited its interests to support the entry of Iraqi Shiite
Islamist factions into the U.S.-led election process, because the number of Shiites in Iraq (about
60% of the population) virtually ensured Shiite dominance of an elected government. To this
extent, Iran’s goals did not conflict with the U.S. objective of trying to establish representative
democracy in Iraq. Iran helped assemble a Shiite Islamist bloc (“United Iraqi Alliance”),
encompassing the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), the Da’wa (Islamic Call) party, and
the faction of the 35-year-old cleric Moqtada Al Sadr. This formidable bloc won 128 of the 275
seats in the December 15, 2005, election for a full-term parliament. Dawa senior leader Nuri al-
Maliki was selected as Prime Minister; several ISCI figures took other leadership positions, and
five Sadrists were given ministerial posts.
ISCI is the Iraqi faction with the longest and closest ties to Iran. ISCI’s leaders, including
Ayatollah Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim, who was killed in an August 2003 car bomb in Najaf, had
spent their years of exile in Iran and built ties to Iranian leaders.1 His younger brother, Abd al
Aziz al-Hakim, succeeded Mohammad Baqr. Hakim died of lung cancer in August 2009 and was
succeeded as party leader by his son, Ammar al-Hakim. Finance Minister Bayan Jabr and other
ISCI leaders, such as deputy president Adel Abd al-Mahdi and constitutional review commission
chair Hummam al-Hammoudi, are other senior leaders of the party.
During Saddam’s rule, ISCI fielded an underground militia, the “Badr Brigades” (renamed the
“Badr Organization”), which was recruited, trained, and armed by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard
Corps, the most politically powerful component of Iran’s military, during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq
war. In that war, Badr guerrillas conducted attacks from Iran into southern Iraq against Baath
Party officials, but did not shake the regime. After Saddam’s fall, Iran continued to provide
political, financial, and military support to ISCI and the Badr Brigades militia, which numbered
about 15,000. During 2005-6, apparently with the active work of then Interior Minister Bayan
Jabr, the militia burrowed into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), particularly the National Police
unit of the Iraqi police force. However, since 2007, the militia has become integrated into Iraq’s
political process and security forces.
The Sadr faction’s political ties to Iran were initially limited because his family remained in Iraq
during Saddam’s rule. Still, the Sadr clan has political and ideological ties to Iran; Moqtada’s
cousin, Mohammad Baqr Al Sadr, founded the Da’wa Party in the late 1950s and was a political
ally of Ayatollah Khomeini when Khomeini was in exile in Najaf (1964-1978). Baqr Al Sadr was
hung by Saddam Hussein in 1980 at the start of the Da’wa Party rebellion against Saddam’s
1 In 1982, Mohammad Baqr was anointed by then Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to head a future
“Islamic republic of Iraq.”
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regime. Moqtada is married to one of Baqr Al Sadr’s daughters. Since 2008, Sadr himself has
been studying in Iran to elevate his religious credentials, and running his movement from there.
Iran recognized political value and potential leverage in Sadr’s faction—which had 30 total seats
in the 2006-2010 parliament, a significant, dedicated following among lower-class Iraqi Shiites,
and which built an estimated 60,000-person “Mahdi Army” (Jaysh al-Mahdi, or JAM) militia
after Saddam’s fall. During 2004-2008, Sadr alternately unleashed and reined in the JAM as part
of a strategy of challenging what he asserted is U.S. occupation of Iraq. Although U.S. and Iraqi
military operations repeatedly defeated the JAM, Iran perceived it as useful against the United
States in the event of a U.S.-Iran confrontation, particularly for its ability to kill U.S. forces with
rockets and other weaponry. In 2005, Iran began arming it through the Revolutionary Guard’s
“Qods (Jerusalem) Force,” the unit that assists Iranian protégé forces abroad. During 2005-6, the
height of sectarian conflict in Iraq, JAM militiamen, as well as Badr fighters in and outside the
ISF, committed sectarian killings of Sunnis, which accelerated after the February 2006 bombing
of the Al Askari Mosque in Samarra.
Iranian Support to Armed Groups
Iran’s arming and training of Shiite militias in Iraq added to U.S.-Iran tensions over Iran’s nuclear
program and Iran’s broader regional influence, such as its aid to Lebanese Hezbollah and the
Palestinian organization Hamas (which controls the Gaza Strip). U.S. officials feared that, by
supplying armed groups in Iraq, Iran was seeking to develop a broad range of options that
included: pressuring U.S. and British forces to leave Iraq; to bleed the United States militarily;
and to be positioned to retaliate in Iraq should the United States take military action against Iran’s
nuclear program. As of early 2009, according to the Defense Department, “Tehran has selectively
reduced the number of militants it supports.” That U.S. assessment has continued over the
subsequent year, although some of the diminished Iranian materiel support might be attributed to
the decline in Iraqi Shiite militia activity more generally.
At the height of Iran’s support to Shiite militias (2005-2008), U.S. officials publicly discussed
specific information on Qods Force aid to the JAM. One press report said there are 150 Qods and
intelligence personnel there,2 but some U.S. commanders who have served in southern Iraq said
they believed that there were perhaps one or two Qods Force personnel in each Shiite province,
attached to or interacting with pro-Iranian governors in those provinces. Qods Force officers often
do not wear uniforms and their main role reportedly was to identify Iraqi fighters to train and to
organize safe passage for weapons and Iraqi militants between Iran and Iraq. In making specific
allegations:
• On February 11, 2007, U.S. military briefers in Baghdad provided what they said
was specific evidence that Iran had supplied armor-piercing “explosively formed
projectiles” (EFPs) to Shiite (Sadrist) militiamen. EFPs have been responsible for
over 200 U.S. combat deaths since 2003. In August 2007, Gen. Raymond
Odierno, then the second in command (now overall commander in Iraq), said that
Iran had supplied the Shiite militias with 122-millimeter mortars that are used to
fire on the Green Zone in Baghdad. On August 28, 2008, the Washington Times
reported that pro-Sadr militias were now also using “Improvised Rocket Assisted
2 Linzer, Dafna. “Troops Authorized To Kill Iranian Operatives in Iraq,” Washington Post, January 26, 2007.
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Munitions”—a “flying bomb” carrying 100 pounds of explosives, propelled by
Iranian-supplied 107 mm rockets.
• On July 2, 2007, Brig. Gen. Kevin Begner said that Lebanese Hezbollah was
assisting the Qods Force in aiding Iraqi Shiite militias, adding that Iran gives
about $3 million per month to these Iraqi militias. He based the statement on the
March 2007 capture of former Sadr aide Qais Khazali and Lebanese Hezbollah
operative Ali Musa Daqduq. They were allegedly involved in the January 2007
killing of five U.S. forces in Karbala. On October 7, 2007, Gen. David Petraeus,
then overall U.S. commander in Iraq, told journalists that Iran’s Ambassador to
Iraq, Hassan Kazemi-Qomi, is himself a member of the Qods Force. (Khazali
was released in December 2009 by the United States to help foster reintegration
of Shiite militias into the political process in Iraq.)
Shiite Internecine Combat
Continuing to present evidence of Iranian material assistance to Shiite militias, Gen. Petraeus
testified on April 8-9, 2008, that Iran was continuing to arm, train, and direct “Special Groups”—
radical and possibly breakaway elements of the JAM—and to organize the Special Groups into a
“Hezbollah-like force to serve [Iran’s] interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and
coalition forces....” The testimony was delivered as the Sadr faction fell out with its erstwhile ally,
Prime Minister Maliki. The Iraqi Shiite split had been growing for about a year, but broke out into
an all-out struggle with an ISF offensive (“Operation Charge of the Knights”), launched by
Maliki on March 26, 2008. Its objectives, largely accomplished were to clear JAM militiamen
from Basra, particularly the port area, which the JAM and other militias controlled for financial
benefit. Maliki reportedly launched the Basra offensive, in part, to reduce Sadrist strength in
provincial elections held on January 31, 2009. Although the ISF units (dominated by Badr
loyalists) appeared to falter, U.S. and British forces intervened with air strikes and military
advice, helping the ISF gain the upper hand and restore relative normality. Sadr agreed to an Iran-
brokered “ceasefire” on March 30, 2008, but not to disarm. JAM rocketing of U.S. installations in
Baghdad continued subsequently, and U.S. forces continued to fight JAM elements in Sadr City
until another Sadr-Maliki agreement on May 10, 2008.
The Basra battles were the most dramatic manifestation of a rift between Maliki and Sadr that had
begun in 2007. In 2007, Maliki and ISCI—viewing Sunni insurgents as the major threat to their
dominant positions—recognized the need to cooperate with the U.S. “troop surge” launched that
year. That cooperation required them to permit U.S. forces to place military pressure on the JAM,
which the United States considered a key threat equal to or in some instances greater than that
posed by Sunni insurgents. In 2006, Maliki had been preventing such U.S. operations in an effort
to preserve his alliance with Sadr. As a result of Maliki’s shift in 2007, Sadr broke with him,
pulled the five Sadrist ministers out of the cabinet, and withdrew his faction from the UIA. The
rift widened throughout 2007 as JAM fighters battled Badr-dominated Iraqi forces, and U.S. and
British forces, for control of such Shiite cities as Diwaniyah, Karbala, Hilla, Nassiryah, Basra,
Kut, and Amarah. This also caused a backlash against Sadr among Iraqi Shiite civilian victims,
particularly after the August 2007 JAM attempt to take control of religious sites in Karbala. The
backlash caused Sadr to declare a six-month “suspension” of JAM activities. (He extended the
ceasefire in February 2008 for another six months, although with the implicit understanding that
it would be an indefinite suspension.) The intra-Shiite fighting expanded as Britain drew down its
forces in the Basra area from 7,000 to 4,000 in concert with a withdrawal from Basra city to the
airport, and the transfer of Basra Province to ISF control on December 16, 2007.
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The Decline of Militia Activity
The Basra battles weakened Sadr politically, causing him to re-orient its fighters toward “peaceful
activities.” Sadr clarified this, on August 8, 2008, to be social and cultural work under a new
movement called “Mumahidun,” or “trail blazers;” and that a small corps of “special companies”
(the U.S.-described Special Groups) would be formed from the JAM to actively combat U.S. (but
not Iraqi) forces in Iraq. Subsequently, U.S. commanders began to observe new, smaller Shiite
militias emerging, with names such as Asa’ib al-Haq, Keta’ib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Battalions),
and the “Promised Day Brigade.” These splinter militia groups could have represented an
organizational manifestation of the Sadrist “Special Groups.” Many of the exact relationships
among these militia to each other, to Sadr, and to Iran and the Qods Force, remain unclear.
Since late 2008, U.S. commanders in Iraq have said they are observing a clear reduction of Shiite
militia activity. In December 2008, Lt. Gen. Thomas Metz said that there was a marked decline in
the number of explosive devices coming into Iraq from Iran.3 The September 2009 DoD
“Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq” report characterized Shiite militias as still active, but
plagued with internal conflicts and an absence of leadership. Overall, the tone of the report
indicated that the militias were less of a factor in Iraq’s internal security threat profile than they
had been in prior years.
U.S. Efforts to Reduce Iran’s Activities in Iraq
The United States sought to reduce Shiite militia activity not only to stabilize Iraq, but also to
reduce Iranian political influence there. In addition to the U.S. and Maliki efforts against the
JAM, U.S. forces arrested a total of 20 Iranians in Iraq, many of whom are alleged to be Qods
Forces officers, during December 2006-October 2007. On August 12, 2008, U.S.-led forces
arrested nine Hezbollah members allegedly involved in funneling arms into Iraq, and on August
29, 2008, U.S. forces arrested Ali Lami on his return to Iraq for allegedly being a “senior Special
Groups leader.” Five of the purported Qods Force members were arrested in January 2007 in the
Kurdish city of Irbil, and three of those were held until July 2009. In July 2009, the three were
handed over to Iraq in accordance with the provisions of the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, which
took effect January 1, 2009, and which, among many major provisions, requires U.S. forces to
turn over to Iraqi control all U.S.-held detainees. The three were immediately released by Iraq and
returned to Iran to a warm, public welcome. Iran maintained the three were diplomats, but the
United States Central Command insists they were Qods Forces officers and that their holding was
legitimate, even though they reportedly had not conducted any actual attacks on U.S. forces.
The United States and partner countries have sought to outlaw Iranian shipments to the Iraqi
militias (and other pro-Iranian groups in the region). On March 24, 2007, with U.S. backing, the
U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1747 (on the Iran nuclear issue), with a
provision banning arms exports by Iran—a provision clearly directed at Iran’s arms supplies to
Iraq’s Shiite militias and Lebanese Hezbollah. In 2007, the U.S. military built a base near the
Iranian border in Wasit Province, east of Baghdad, to stop cross-border weapons shipments. In
July 2008, U.S. forces and U.S. civilian border security experts established additional bases near
the Iran border in Maysan Province, to close off smuggling routes. However, these positions have
3 Barnes, Julian. “U.S. Says Drop in Iraq Deaths Tied to Iranian Arms Cutback.” Los Angeles Times, December 12,
2008
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largely been turned over to the ISF as part of the U.S. drawdown to about 50,000 forces in Iraq by
August 2010—a drawdown that is under way following the March 7, 2010, Iraqi election.
In an effort to financially squeeze the Qods Force, on October 21, 2007, the Bush Administration
designated the Qods Force (Executive Order 13224) as a terrorism-supporting entity. Also on
October 21, 2007, the Administration designated the Revolutionary Guard and several affiliates,
under Executive Order 13382, as proliferation-supporting entities. The designations carry the
same penalties as do those under Executive Order 13224. Neither the Guard or the Qods Force
was named a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under Section 219 of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act (Title 8 of the U.S. Code).
Since January 2008, the Treasury Department has taken action against suspected Iranian and pro-
Iranian operatives in Iraq by designating them as a threat to stability in Iraq under a July 17, 2007,
Executive Order 13438. The penalties imposed on designated entities are a freeze on their assets
and a ban on transactions with them. The most prominent entity designated is Khata’ib
Hezbollah, mentioned above, which is a splinter faction of the JAM Special Groups. Khata’ib
Hezbollah was designated under the Order on July 2, 2009, along with Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis,
who allegedly facilitated Iranian weapons deliveries to the Special Groups and other Shiite
militias. Al Muhandis was convicted by Kuwait of involvement in the Da’wa Party bombings in
Kuwait in December 1983 (U.S. and French embassies there) and the May 1985 bombing of the
Amir of Kuwait’s motorcade (he was slightly injured in that attack).
Other persons and entities named under the Order, in designations made on January 9, 2008, and
on September 16, 2008, are a blend of Qods Force members and Iraqi Shiite militia figures. The
designees include:4 Ahmad Forouzandeh, Commander of the Qods Force Ramazan Headquarters,
accused of fomenting sectarian violence in Iraq and organizing training in Iran for Iraqi Shiite
militiamen; Abdul Reza Shahlai, a deputy commander of the Qods Force; Abu Mustafa al-
Sheibani, the Iran-based leader of network that funnels Iranian arms to Iraqi Shiite militias;
Isma’il al-Lami (Abu Dura), a Shiite militia leader—who has broken from the JAM—alleged to
have planned assassination attempts against Iraqi Sunni politicians; and Akram Abbas al-Kabi, a
JAM Special Groups leader.
U.S. Negotiations With Iran
At the height of Shiite militia activity and instability in Iraq, the United States directly engaged
Iran in an effort to refrain from activities that undermine stability in Iraq. The Bush
Administration initially rejected the recommendation of the “Iraq Study Group” (December 2006)
to include Iran in multilateral efforts to stabilize Iraq, in part because of concerns that Iran might
use such meetings to discuss Iran’s nuclear program. However, in a shift conducted in concert
with the “troop surge,” the United States attended regional (including Iran and Syria) conferences
(“Expanded Neighbors Conference” process) in Baghdad on March 10, 2007, in Egypt during
May 3-4, 2007, and in Kuwait on April 22, 2008. Secretary of State Rice and Iranian Foreign
Minister Mottaki held no substantive discussions at any of these meetings.
In a more pronounced shift, the Bush Administration agreed to bilateral meetings with Iran, in
Baghdad, on the Iraq issue, led by U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and Iranian
4 Some persons designated under the Order are related to the Sunni insurgency in Iraq, and not to the Shiite militias that
are a key subject of this paper.
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Ambassador Kazemi-Qomi. The first meeting was on May 28, 2007. A second round, held on
July 24, 2007, established a lower-level working group; it met on August 6, 2007. Talks in
Baghdad scheduled for December 18, 2007, were postponed because Iran wanted them at the
ambassador level, not the working group level. On May 6, 2008, Iran said it would not continue
the dialogue because U.S. forces are causing civilian casualties in Sadr City, although the Iranian
position might have reflected a broader Iranian assessment that it needs to make no concessions
to the United States in Iraq. During a visit to Iraq by Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki
on February 11, 2009, Mottaki ruled out new talks with the United States on Iraq, saying that
improved security in Iraq made them unnecessary. The talks did not resume.
It is possible that the Iranian position reflected lack of a firm decision by Iran on how to respond
to the Obama Administration’s overtures toward Iran for a broader dialogue on the nuclear issue
and other outstanding issues. The U.S. offer to resume multilateral negotiations with Iran
continued even after the June 12, 2009, disputed election and subsequent crackdown against
protesters. However, suggesting a hardening of the Administration position in light of the Iranian
crackdown, the Obama Administration has, since the end of 2009, focused on talks with its allies
and other countries about imposing additional U.N. sanctions on Iran.
Iranian Political Influence
The March 2008 Charge of the Knights operation appeared to mark a turning point in Iranian
influence in Iraq. As noted above, Shiite militia activity, and Iranian support for the militias, has
since declined. As of early 2009, there has appeared to be a public Iraqi rejection of Iranian
political influence over Iraq. However, Iran has sought alternate channels to continue to influence
policy in Iraq and protect its interests there.
Iran’s declining political influence was in evidence through its failure to derail the forging of the
U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, mentioned above, that authorized the U.S. military presence
beyond December 31, 2008. Senior Iranian leaders publicly opposed the pact as an infringement
of Iraq’s sovereignty—criticism that likely masks Iran’s fears the pact is a U.S. attempt to
consolidate its “hold” over Iraq and encircle Iran militarily. However, this criticism might have
contributed to insistence by Iraqi leaders on substantial U.S. concessions to a final draft
agreement. As an example of the extent to which Iran was reputedly trying to derail the
agreement, Gen. Odierno said on October 12, 2008, that there were intelligence reports
suggesting Iran might be trying to bribe Iraqi parliamentarians to vote against it. In the end, Iran’s
concerns were attenuated by a provision in the final agreement (passed by Iraq’s parliament on
November 27, 2008, and in force as of January 1, 2009) that U.S. forces could not use Iraqi
territory as a base for attacks on any other nation. Iranian opposition was also reduced by U.S.
agreement to an Iraqi demand to set a timetable (end of 2011) for a full withdrawal of U.S. forces
from Iraq. However, even after the pact took effect, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i
(January 5, 2009) warned Maliki that the United States cannot be trusted to implement its pledges
under the pact.
Iranian Political Influence Following the January 31, 2009, Provincial Elections
During 2009, Iran’s political influence in Iraq was further jeopardized by widening political rifts
among the pro-Iranian Shiite factions. ISCI and Maliki’s Da’wa Party have long been the core of
the Shiite alliance that dominates Iraq, but they filed competing slates in the January 31, 2009,
provincial elections. ISCI activists assert that Maliki has surrounded himself with Da’wa veterans
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who have excluded ISCI from decision-making influence. Maliki, trying to compensate for
Da’wa’s organizational deficiencies, tried to align his party with tribal leaders in the south to win
provincial council seats.
The decline of the fortunes of the most pro-Iranian factions, particularly ISCI, was demonstrated
in the January 31, 2009, elections. ISCI, which was hoping to sweep the elections in the Shiite
south, did not come in first in any Shiite province. In most of the Shiite provinces, Maliki’s State
of Law slate—which benefitted from Maliki’s campaigning as an Iraqi nationalist—came in first.
The slate won 28 out of the 57 seats on the Baghdad provincial council, and it won an outright
majority in Basra—20 out of 35 seats on that provincial council. ISCI’s best showing in the south
was in Najaf, where it tied with the Maliki slate with 7 seats each on the 28-seat provincial
council. ISCI had little influence in determining provincial leaderships after those elections.
In many of the Shiite provinces of the south, the Sadrist list came in third. In Basra, the former
JAM stronghold, the Sadrist list won only 2 out of the 35 seats. Still, in some provinces, Sadr’s
faction has been a coalition partner that helped determine provincial leaderships. Through
coalition building, a Sadrist did gain the chairmanship of the provincial council of Babil Province.
The first Defense Department “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq” report since the
elections, released March 2009, acknowledged that Tehran suffered a setback in the elections,
which were viewed as victories for parties favoring a strong central government, by stating that
“Iraqi nationalism may act as a check on Iran’s ambitions. ...” The report added that “Tehran has
selectively reduced the number of militants it supports ... [h]owever, [it] has also simultaneously
improved the training and weapons systems received by the proxy militants.” Still, the report also
said that Iran “continues to pose a significant challenge to Iraq’s long-term stability and political
independence ...” and that “Iran continues to support Sadr’s religious studies in Qom, Iran [where
Sadr is believed to have been for at least a year].”
Iranian Efforts to Influence the March 7, 2010, Iraqi Elections and Their
Outcome
Perhaps seeking to restore its influence after the January 31, 2009, provincial elections, Iran set
out to try to shape to Tehran’s advantage the Iraq’s 2010 national elections for the National
Assembly, which chooses the next four year government. First and foremost, Tehran reportedly
sought to rebuild the pan-Shiite political coalition—the United Iraqi Alliance—that had competed
successfully in the 2005 Iraqi elections. That effort floundered over differences among Iraqi
Shiite leaders over whether to commit to retaining Maliki as Prime Minister, were the unified
coalition to prevail. Both ISCI and the Sadrists, given the rifts and differences discussed above,
refused to offer such a commitment, and Maliki decided to compete separately on March 7, 2010,
with his State of Law coalition.
Having failed to rebuild Shiite unity, Tehran reportedly began working with certain Shiite
politicians in Iraq to try to undermine the prospects for Sunni Arabs in the election. The Shiite
politicians who head a successor to the immediate post-Saddam era “Higher Commission for De-
Baathification” disqualified numerous prominent Sunnis from the main list supported by Sunnis
(the “Iraqiyya” coalition headed by former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi). The “disqualification
crisis,” which some U.S. officials feared might prompt a Sunni election boycott or renewed
Sunni-inspired violence, might account for February 16, 2010, comments by Gen. Ray Odierno,
the top U.S. commander in Iraq, that Iran is working through Chalabi and al-Lami to undermine
the legitimacy of the elections. Gen. Odierno specifically asserted that Chalabi is in close contact
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with a close Iraqi ally of Iranian Gen. Qasem Soleimani, who commands the Qods Force unit of
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).5 The Iraqi, whose name is Jamal al-Ibrahimi,
is a member of the COR. However, the effort did not cause a Sunni boycott nor did it prevent the
Iraqiyya slate from winning more seats than any other in the March 7, 2010, elections.
In the days and weeks following the election, representatives of all the major slates, except those
of Iraqiyya, visited Iran to consult on the formation of a new government. The Iraqi factions,
which included the Kurdistan Alliance, reportedly discussed with Iran the rebuilding of the Shiite-
Kurdish alliance that dominated Iraqi politics during 2005-2009. However, no firm agreement
was reached, in part because of Iraqi fears of a public backlash over any Iran-brokered political
deal, and because of continuing ISCI, Sadrist, and Kurdish resistance to Maliki remaining Prime
Minister.6 On April 10, 2010, following the visits, Iran—echoed by ISCI- appeared to shift
position by asserting that any new governing coalition should include Iraqiyaa.7 The shift was
viewed as an attempt by Iran and its Iraqi allies to placate the Sunni voters in Iraq that strongly
support Iraqiyya and who might inspire renewed violence if Iraqiyya is not given a prominent
role in the new government. The apparent Iranian shift could represent an Iranian calculation that
its interests are best served by a stable Iraq and inter-sect harmony rather than Shiite dominance.
Some factions also visited Saudi Arabia to elicit its views; the Kingdom is viewed as the principal
regional backer of Allawi’s attempts to become Prime Minister.
Iran’s Efforts to Deny Its Domestic Opponents Sanctuary in Iraq
Iran has apparently sought to use its relationship with Iraqi leaders to try to eliminate its Iraq-
based opposition. There are 3,400 members of the Iranian opposition People’s Mojahedin
Organization of Iran (PMOI), a group allied with Saddam against Iran, at “Camp Ashraf” near the
Iran border. Iran has urged Prime Minister Maliki and other pro-Iranian Shiite leaders in Iraq to
expel the group, possibly including extraditing its members to Iran. Before and since the U.S.-
Iraq Security Agreement took effect on January 1, 2009, Iraqi leaders, presumably reflecting
Iran’s orientation as well as their own resentment that the PMOI was close to Saddam politically,
said the Ashraf activists were no longer welcome and need to leave Iraq. (Shiites and Kurds in
Iraq say Saddam used PMOI forces to help put down uprisings by those communities after the
1991 Gulf war.) However, the State Department said in December 2008 that Iraqi leaders had
pledged, in writing, to respect the residents’ human rights and not to expel them or force them to
go to Iran.
Still, under the provisions of the U.S.-Iraq Agreement, in February 2009, the ISF took control of
the outer perimeter of Ashraf, with a small number of U.S. forces nearby but taking no active role
in guarding the camp any longer. On July 28, 2009, the ISF attempted to assert its full control
over Ashraf by establishing a police post inside its main gate, but the PMOI residents, although
unarmed, resisted the ISF (mainly police), and altercations ensued. PMOI leaders say at least 10
residents have been killed in the violence, and numerous others injured. Later, the Iraqi
government announced that the residents would be relocated to a remote site in Al Muthanna
Province, in southern Iraq. That move has not occurred to date. The U.S. position, articulated by
5 Gertz, Bill. “Inside the Ring.” Washington Times, February 18, 2010.
6 Parker, Ned and Usama Redha. “Maliki Warns Nearby Nations.” Los Angeles Times, April 13, 2010.
7 Nordland, Rod. “Iran Wants Sunnis in Iraqi Politics.” New York Times, April 11, 2010.
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Secretary of State Clinton on July 29, 2009, is that resolving the issue of Camp Ashraf and its
residents is now an Iraqi matter.
The Iraqi threats against Ashraf resident raises questions about whether the Iraqi government,
now fully sovereign, might abrogate its pledges to the United States to treat the residents
humanely. The options for the residents of Ashraf are unclear, as is their status under international
law. About 200 have thus far have used U.N.-led processes to leave Iraq as refugees, but the
remainder at Ashraf have refused to take advantage of these programs. The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) representatives say Iraq is considering moving the camp into
Anbar Province, far away from the Iranian border. Few countries will accept the PMOI activists
as residents—a consequence of the PMOI designation by many countries (including the United
States) as a terrorist organization. On January 26, 2009, the European Union removed the group
from its list of terrorist organizations, potentially opening up avenues for arranging relocation of
the Ashraf inhabitants to countries in Europe.
Longstanding Territorial and Property Disputes
Some of Iran’s interests have been served by post-Saddam Iraqi leaders, although Iraqi
nationalism that has been emerging since 2007 has reduced Iraq’s pliability to compromise with
Iran on longstanding disputes. During exchanges of high-level visits in July 2005, Iraqi officials
took responsibility for starting the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, indirectly blamed Saddam Hussein
for using chemical weapons against Iranian forces in it, signed agreements on military
cooperation, and agreed to Iranian consulates in Basra, Karbala, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyah. In
response to U.S. complaints, Iraqi officials subsequently said that any Iran-Iraq military
cooperation would not include Iranian training of Iraqi forces. On May 20, 2006, Iraq’s Foreign
Minister, Hoshyar Zebari, supported Iran’s right to pursue “peaceful” nuclear technology.8
On the other hand, Iran has not returned the 153 Iraqi military and civilian aircraft flown to Iran
at the start of the 1991 Gulf War, although it allowed an Iraqi technical team to assess the aircraft
in August 2005. The ICRC is continuing to try to resolve the approximately 75,000 total Iranians
and Iraqis9 still unaccounted for from the Iran-Iraq war, although the two have continued to
exchange bodies (most recently 241 exchanged in December 2008) and information when
discovered. Another source of tension is Iran’s allegation that Iraq is not doing enough to deny
safe haven to the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), an Iranian Kurdish separatist group,
which Iran says is staging incursions into Iran. On February 5, 2009, that group was named by the
U.S. Treasury Department as a terrorism supporting entity under Executive Order 13224.
Most territorial issues that have contributed to past disputes were resolved as a result of an
October 2000 rededication to recognize the thalweg, or median line of the Shatt al Arab waterway
as the water border (a provision of the 1975 Algiers Accords between the Shah of Iran and the
Baathist government of Iraq, abrogated by Iraq prior to its September 1980 invasion of Iran.) The
water border is subject to interpretation, but the two sides agreed to renovate water and land
border posts during the March 2008 Ahmadinejad visit. In February 2009, Foreign Minister
Zebari urged Iran to move forward with these demarcations, suggesting Iranian foot-dragging to
resolve an issue whose ambiguity now favors Iran.
8 “Clarification Statement” issued by Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari. May 29, 2006.
9 ICRC estimates the number still unaccounted for as: 25,000 Iranians; and 50,000 Iraqis. June 2009.
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As an example of how territorial and resource disputes continue to plague relations, on December
18, 2009, Iranian forces entered Iraq to seize control of the Fakkah oilfield in a remote section of
the Iraqi province of Maysan, near the Iranian border. The Iranian force surrounded the field with
tanks and dug defensive positions around it. Iran said the field was technically within its territory,
but the small Iranian force pulled back several days later after Iraqi complaints to Iranian
leaders.10 The incursion might have represented an effort by Iran to force Iraq to consult with
Tehran on any further approvals of outside investment in Iraq’s energy fields. Some viewed it as
an independent effort by elements of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard to assert themselves in the Iran-
Iraq border regions.
Economic Relations
Suggesting the degree to which the Iraqi government views Iran as a benefactor, Maliki has
visited Iran four times as Prime Minister to consult on major issues and to sign agreements. The
visits were: September 13-14, 2006, resulting in agreements on cross-border migration and
intelligence sharing; August 8-9, 2007, resulting in agreements to build pipelines between Basra
and Iran’s city of Abadan to transport crude and oil products for their swap arrangements
(finalized on November 8, 2007); June 8, 2008, resulting in agreements on mine clearance and
searches for the few Iran-Iraq war soldiers still unaccounted for; and January 4-5, 2009, primarily
to explain to Iran the provisions of the U.S.-Iraq pact but also to continue Iraqi efforts to buy
electricity from Iran. On March 2-3, 2008, Ahmadinejad visited Iraq, a first since the 1979
Islamic revolution. In conjunction, Iran announced $1 billion in credits for Iranian exports to Iraq
(in addition to $1 billion in credit extended in 2005, used to build a new airport near Najaf,
opened in August 2008, which helps host about 20,000 Iranian pilgrims per month who visit the
Imam Ali Shrine there). The visit also produced seven agreements for cooperation in the areas of
insurance, customs treatment, industry, education, environmental protection, and transportation.
In 2005, Iran agreed to provide 2 million liters per day of kerosene to Iraqis. Suggesting Iran’s
earlier generosity is being reciprocated, in February 2009, the Iraqi government awarded a $1
billion contract to an Iranian firm to help rebuild Basra, and to repair ancient Persian historical
sites in southern Iraq.
Trade relations have burgeoned. As of the beginning of 2009, the two countries now conduct
about $4 billion in bilateral trade, according to Iraq’s Trade Minister, and the February 2009 visit
of Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki resulted in a plan to increase that trade to $5 billion annually
through increases in oil and electricity-related trade. The two countries have developed a free
trade zone around Basra, which buys electricity from Iran.
Prospects
Iran’s influence in Iraq remains substantial but it has waned from a high point in 2005-2008.
Some experts have long predicted that Iran’s influence would fade as Iraq asserts its nationhood,
as the security situation has improved, and as Arab-Persian differences reemerge. Many experts
point out that Iraqi Shiites generally stayed loyal to the Iraqi regime during the 1980-1988 Iran-
Iraq war. Najaf, relatively secure and prosperous, might eventually meet pre-war expectations that
10 “Border Oil Risks Iran-Iraq Flare-Up.” Mianeh, February 2, 2010. http://www.mianeh.net/en/articles/?aid=0254
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it would again exceed Iran’s Qom as the heart of the Shiite theological world. As noted, some of
these trends are starting to appear, but it is unlikely that anything close to the enmity that existed
when Saddam Hussein was in power will return.
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
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