Understanding China’s Political System
Michael F. Martin
Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance
April 14, 2010
Congressional Research Service
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www.crs.gov
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CRS Report for Congress
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repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Understanding China’s Political System
Summary
Opaque and shrouded in secrecy, China’s political system and decision-making processes are
mysteries to many Westerners. At one level, China is a one-party state that has been ruled by the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since 1949. But rather than being rigidly hierarchical and
authoritarian, which is often the assumption, political power in China now is diffuse, complex,
and at times highly competitive. Despite its grip on power, the Party and its senior leaders (the
Politburo and its Standing Committee) are not always able to dictate policy decisions as they once
did. Instead, present-day China’s political process is infused with other political actors that
influence and sometimes determine policy.
Three other main actors co-exist with the Party at the top of China’s political system. Chief
among these is the muscular state government bureaucracy, whose structures closely parallel the
Party’s throughout China, operating in a largely separate but interlocking way to implement and
administer state business. Another key institution is the People’s Liberation Army, operating again
largely separately and with a tenuous distinction between civilian, military, and Party leadership.
Completing the top political institutions is the National People’s Congress, constitutionally the
highest organ of state power but in practice the weakest of the top political institutions.
Other political actors in China include provincial and local officials; a growing body of official
and quasi-official policy research groups and think tanks that feed proposals into the policy
process; a collection of state sector, multinational, and even private business interests exerting
pressure on policy decisions; a vigorous academic and university community; a diverse media
that informs public opinion; and an increasingly vocal and better-informed citizenry that are
demanding more transparency and accountability from government. New forms of
communication and information availability also have pressured the PRC government to make
changes in its political system, and have provided the Party with new means of maintaining
political control. The political story in China today is the extent to which these multiple actors
and changing circumstances have helped blur the communist regime’s lines of authority.
Chinese politics is further complicated by other factors. In the absence of a more formalized
institutional infrastructure, personal affiliations can play a significant role in political decisions,
adding unpredictability to an already murky process. In addition, discipline between the different
levels of party and government structure can be tenuous, leading to ineffective implementation of
policy and, in some cases, serious problems with corruption.
Despite its internal problems, the PRC’s Communist Party-led political system has proven
exceedingly resilient to past and current challenges, but nevertheless is under stress and
undergoing reluctant transition. Ironically, the Party’s commitment to remaining in power appears
to be forcing it to adapt continually to changing circumstances and to make incremental
compromises with other participants in the political process when it is pragmatic to do so. A
better understanding of how China’s political system functions, as well as its strengths and
weaknesses, may help U.S. lawmakers make more effective policy decisions that directly benefit
U.S. interests.
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Understanding China’s Political System
Contents
Introduction and Overview.......................................................................................................... 1
China’s Preeminent Political Institutions ............................................................................... 2
The Chinese Communist Party .................................................................................................... 3
The Political Bureau (Politburo)............................................................................................ 4
The Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) ............................................................................. 5
The Secretariat ...................................................................................................................... 5
Party Discipline .................................................................................................................... 5
The Chinese Government ............................................................................................................ 7
The State Council.................................................................................................................. 7
The Ministries....................................................................................................................... 8
Government Control .............................................................................................................9
The National People’s Congress .................................................................................................. 9
The People’s Liberation Army................................................................................................... 10
Relationships Among Leaders ................................................................................................... 10
Other Important Political Actors................................................................................................ 11
Leading Small Groups......................................................................................................... 11
Government-Sponsored Research Institutions...................................................................... 12
Central Party School ........................................................................................................... 13
The “Princelings”................................................................................................................ 14
Provincial, Municipal, and Local Governments ......................................................................... 15
Trends and Idiosyncrasies of China’s Political System............................................................... 16
China’s View of Democracy and Political Reform ............................................................... 16
Coordination of Central and Local Governments ................................................................. 18
Factionalism ....................................................................................................................... 19
Modern Media .................................................................................................................... 20
Implications for Congress ......................................................................................................... 21
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 21
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 21
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Understanding China’s Political System
Introduction and Overview
Analyzing the political system of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is difficult for many
reasons. The inner workings of China’s government have been shrouded in secrecy, and formal
institutions can mask the underlying dynamics of political power. In addition, because of China’s
Leninist history, it is easy to assume that politics in China is rigidly hierarchical and authoritarian,
whereas in reality, political power in China is diffuse, complex, and at times highly competitive.
Since the victory of Mao Ze-dong’s communist forces in 1949, the Chinese mainland has been a
communist state ruled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Although other minor political
parties exist, they are authorized by the CCP, operate under its leadership, and are effectively
powerless. No independently organized and established political parties are tolerated, effectively
making the PRC a one-party state.
Despite its position at the nexus of Chinese political life, the CCP1 and its leadership are not
always able to dictate policy decisions. Instead, the Chinese political process is infused with a
number of bureaucratic and non-central government actors that both influence and sometimes
determine government policy. These political actors include a muscular ministerial bureaucracy;
provincial and local officials; a growing body of official and quasi-official policy research groups
and think tanks that feed proposals directly into the policy process; a collection of state sector,
multinational, and even private business interests that bring more pressure to bear on policy
decisions; a vigorous academic and university community; a diverse media that increasingly
brings issues of official malfeasance to light; and an increasingly vocal and better-informed
citizenry who are demanding more transparency and accountability from government. In addition,
China’s approximately 3,000-member National People’s Congress (NPC), largely a symbolic
organization for much of its existence, has become somewhat more assertive in recent years,
although it still cannot veto basic Party policies. To a great extent, the fragmentation of process
and decision making has blurred lines of authority in China.
Chinese politics is further complicated by other factors. One is the role that personal, ideological,
or geographical affiliations can play in political decisions in the absence of a more formalized
institutional infrastructure. Individuals located in different arms of China’s institutional political
system may form political alliances on issues based on a history of personal friendship, shared
doctrines, or common regional ties. As the issue at hand changes, these affiliations also can
change, sometimes resulting in allies on one issue being opponents on another issue.
Another complicating factor is the propensity of PRC officials at all levels of government to
render Machiavellian interpretations of provisions in the national constitution.2 Officially
considered the highest law in the land, the PRC constitution lays out a series of universally
accepted principles, a number of which appear to suffer seriously in implementation. Among
noted examples are provisions setting up the relatively acquiescent NPC as the “highest organ of
state power;” and provisions guaranteeing freedom of religious belief as well as “freedom of
speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration.”3 PRC
1 China’s ruling party is sometimes referred to as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and sometimes as the
Communist Party of China (CPC). This report will generally use the former.
2 The current version, adopted in 1982, has been further revised on four occasions, in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004. See
http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html.
3 For the fundamental rights and duties of citizens, see PRC Constitution, Chapter II, Article 35 (freedom of speech)
(continued...)
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officials routinely justify actions to inhibit such freedoms by citing other constitutional articles
requiring citizens to keep “state secrets” and not take acts detrimental to “the security, honour and
interests of the motherland.”4 What constitutes a state secret or an act detrimental to national
interests is left wholly undefined. This opaqueness leaves citizens at the mercy of whatever
definition suits a presiding Chinese official on any given occasion, allowing the state easily to
prosecute individuals for a wide range of politically related activities.
This report provides an overview of contemporary PRC politics by analyzing the main
institutional actors and their interactions. The goal is not so much to provide the definitive study
of the current political dynamics in China, but to offer a framework for examining and
understanding PRC politics as they play out with respect to particular policies or issues.
China’s Preeminent Political Institutions
The main political structure of the PRC is comprised of two vertically integrated, but interlocking
institutions: the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or Party), headed by the Party Politburo and its
Standing Committee; and the state government (state, or government) apparatus, headed by the
premier, who presides over the State Council,
a de-facto cabinet. Throughout China, Party
Deng Xiao-ping’s Political Reforms
and government structures closely parallel one
The dynamic between the Party and the government
another, with Party committees and
began to change in the 1980s under a political coalition
representatives present not only in government
led by Deng Xiao-ping. A contemporary of Chairman
agencies, but also in most organizations and
Mao, Deng had been purged from leadership positions
institutions, including universities and foreign-
several times under Mao for his reformist views. After
Mao’s death in 1976, Deng was able to gain enough
owned enterprises. The nominal leader of the
support from other reform-minded colleagues to initiate
CCP is the general secretary, but control of the
economic and political reforms. In 1982, the Party
Party is held collectively by its Standing
eliminated the position of chairman, instead making the
Committee. China’s government is managed
general secretary the Party’s highest-ranking official. To
by the State Council, which is headed by its
inject more pragmatism, practical experience, and
efficiency into decision-making processes, reformers in
premier. China’s current Party general
the 13th Party Congress in 1987 instituted political
secretary is Hu Jin-tao; the premier of the
reforms aimed at separating Party and government
State Council is Wen Jia-bao.6
structures and removing the Party from most
administrative duties, while allowing the Party to retain
Two other major institutions play a role in
its supremacy in defining broad policy goals and making
final decisions on Asensitive@ issues.5
Chinese politics. One is the National People’s
Congress (NPC). According to Article 57 of
China’s constitution, “The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China is the
highest organ of state power.” Its highest officers are the president and vice president of the NPC,
(...continued)
and Article 36 (freedom of religious belief); for the status of the NPC, see Chapter III, Article 57.
4 See PRC Constitution, Chapter III, Articles 51, 53, and 54.
5 How an issue becomes Asensitive@ in China is not clearly understood. It may be an issue of vital importance to the
Chinese leadership (such as the Taiwan issue) or anything involving a major country or trading partner (such as Russia)
or anything involving U.S.-China relations. It may also be an issue that the leadership perceives as having an impact on
either the party’s legitimacy or on an individual leader or group of leaders, such as the Falun Gong spiritual movement.
6 There are several conventions used to Romanize Chinese names, differing in the spelling, order and division of the
names. This report will use Pinyin for spelling, follow Chinese convention in the order by presenting the surname first,
and separate the given names with a hyphen to clarify where to split the given names.
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who are directly elected by the members of the NPC. Articles 85 and 92 of China’s constitution
state that the State Council is the executive arm of the government and reports to the NPC. As
will be described in more detail below, in reality, for all of the PRC’s 60-year history, the NPC
has been subordinate to the State Council and the Party Standing Committee.
The other key institution in Chinese politics is the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The
distinction between civilian and military leadership in the PRC is tenuous. There are, for instance,
two authoritative bodies ostensibly tasked with authority over military policy and decisions: the
Central Military Commission of the PRC, a state entity; and the Central Military Commission of
the Communist Party, a party organ. Although the former is nominally considered to be in
supreme command of military and defense affairs, including the formulation of military strategy,
in reality it is the Party-controlled Central Military Commission (CMC) that exercises command
and control over the PLA. Since the membership of the two 11-member commissions is usually
identical, it has become customary to refer to the CMC alone without distinguishing between the
two. The CMC is chaired by the Party general secretary, emphasizing that leadership of the
military is a Party prerogative.
The diffusion of political power between the Party and government, and to a lesser degree, to the
NPC and the PLA, can make it a difficult and complex proposition to determine who has
authority to set and/or implement specific policies. The dominance of economic players, a
proliferation of research groups and other actors in the political system, and the explosion of the
Internet and other alternative sources of information have further decentralized policy and
administrative processes and diffused power.
The Chinese Communist Party
To a certain extent, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has never rid itself of its revolutionary
roots.7 Formally established in Shanghai on July 20, 1921, the CCP began as an underground,
Marxist-Leninist party organized into smaller groups (often referred to as “cells”) that operated
based upon the principle of “democratic centralism.” In theory, the CCP’s democratic centralism
allows for debate and discussion of policy among Party members, but requires unquestioning
support of policy once a decision is made. In practice, democratic centralism has created a
hierarchal political dynamic where senior Party officials expect disciplined compliance from
junior officials, but junior officials are allowed to comment on policy proposals before decisions
have been made. The Party’s most powerful policy- and decision-making entity is the Politburo
and its Standing Committee, comprised of the Party’s two dozen or so most powerful senior
officials.
The rest of the Party’s formal structure consists of layers of local, municipal, and provincial party
congresses and committees. The most important body in this structure of congresses is the
National Party Congress, a key meeting that the Party convenes in Beijing once every five years
to set the country’s overall policy direction and choose the members of the Party’s Political
7 For background, see works such as: Brandt, Conrad; Schwartz, Benjamen; Fairbank, John King, A Documentary
History of Chinese Communism, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London, 1952; Barnett, Doak, ed., Chinese Communist
Politics in Action, University of Washington Press, Seattle & London, 1969; Uhalley, Stephen, A History of the
Chinese Communist Party, Hoover Institution Press, 1988; Shambaugh, David, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and
Adaptation, University of California Press, 2009.
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Bureau (Politburo) and other senior Party officials. Lower party organizations are subordinate to
higher organizations, but the members of higher party congresses are selected by lower party
committees. The result is an interactive relationship where senior party officials obtain and retain
political power by maintaining the loyalty or support of lower party organizations.
The contemporary CCP is organized into an expansive, hierarchal network of organizations that
reach into many aspects of society. A wide variety of institutions—including universities and
schools, think tanks, state-owned enterprises, private corporations, and foreign-owned
companies—frequently have a party committee.8 Depending on the attitude of their leadership,
these party committees often wield significant power within the institution, even though they may
not have any formal authority.
The Political Bureau (Politburo)
At the top of the Chinese Communist Party’s political structure is its Political Bureau (Politburo),
generally regarded as the most important formal political institution in China. The official head of
the Politburo is the Party’s general secretary. The size and membership of the Politburo changes
with each Party Congress, a major meeting of the Communist Party held approximately every
five years. When the last (17th) Party Congress met from October 15-21, 2007, it announced the
selection of the current 25-member Politburo, including nine new members.
Although officially the Politburo is the chief political decision-making body, its relatively
unwieldy size and its lack of a known formalized meeting schedule have suggested that the full
body is involved in decision-making only when the stakes are high—as when considering major
policy shifts, dealing with matters of immediate urgency, or when a higher level of legitimization
of a particular policy direction is necessary. However, some analysts maintain that broader
Politburo participation appears more likely under the increasingly collective leadership that the
PRC has been moving toward since the Deng reforms of the 1980s.9
One notable factor in the establishment of the current Politburo was the retirement at the 17th
Party Congress of four very senior Politburo members, all born before 1940.10 The retirements of
these four senior officials demonstrated the Party’s continued willingness to adhere to agreements
for mandatory retirement for Politburo members at the age of 68—one of the by-products of the
Deng-era reforms. In the absence of statutory discipline or electoral fiat, then, the Party appears to
be counting on precedent and its own internal discipline to try to institutionalize leadership
succession issues and avert potentially divisive power struggles.
8 According to the Party’s webpage, “Primary Party organizations are formed in China's mainland enterprises, rural
areas, government departments, schools, scientific research institutes, communities, mass organizations, intermediaries,
companies of the People's Liberation Army and other basic units, where there are at least three full Party members.”
9 Remarks by Jing Huang at The Brookings Institution, “China’s 17th Party Congress: Looking Ahead to Hu Jintao’s 2nd
Term,” October 30, 2007.
10 They included Wu Yi, a frequent contact for U.S. government officials and named by Forbes in 2007 as the world’s
second most powerful woman; Zeng Qing-hong, China’s then Vice-President; Wu Guan-zheng, primarily responsible
for China’s anti-corruption work; and Luo Gan, the only remaining protégé of former Premier Li Peng (the public face
of the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown) in the Politburo.
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The Politburo Standing Committee (PSC)
Of more significance than the full Politburo is its Standing Committee, the smaller group of elite
Party members that wields much of the political power in China. The Politburo Standing
Committee (PSC) that emerged from the 17th Party Congress has nine members, including five
returning members and four new members. Two of the latter group—Xi Jin-ping and Li Ke-
qiang—have been tipped as frontrunners to be Hu Jin-tao’s successor as Party secretary at the 18th
Party Congress in 2012. The two are the only PSC members to have been born in the 1950s,
making them the first of the “fifth generation” of China’s potential leadership to rise to this
level.11 If the accepted retirement age of 68 holds true, only these two will be young enough to
remain in the Politburo after the 18th Party Congress; all others will have to retire.
One expert holds that Xi and Li each sit at the pinnacle of what effectively is an equal PSC split
between two distinct leadership camps: the “populist” group, represented by Li Ke-qiang, and the
“elitist” group, represented by Xi Jin-ping, one of the so-called “princelings”—meaning a child of
one of the early senior CCP officials and thus someone with elite personal connections.12
According to this analyst, the “populist” group favors balance in economic development, focus on
improving the lots of the poor and disenfranchised, and an emphasis on the principles of
“harmonious society.” The “elitist” group favors continued rapid economic development, less
emphasis on social issues, and seeks to nurture China’s growing capitalist and middle-class
populations.
The Secretariat
Another important political institution for the Chinese Communist Party is its Secretariat.
Officially listed under the Politburo, the Secretariat is described in China’s constitution as an
administrative rather than a decision-making body. Its role is to oversee the daily operation of the
Party and implement the decisions made by the Politburo and its Standing Committee.
Party Discipline
The CCP has over 66 million members involved in over 3.5 million organizations.13 Membership
in the CCP is open to any Chinese citizen over the age of 18 who is willing to accept and abide by
the Party’s constitution and policies. An applicant for Party membership must fill in an
application form and be introduced by two Party members. Every Party member, irrespective of
position, must be organized into a branch, cell, or other specific unit of the Party to participate in
the regular activities of the Party organization. While joining the Party was once a wholly
ideological act, it is thought now that many young people join the Party to make the personal
connections important for career advancement.
11 Chairman Mao Zedong was considered the head of the “first generation” of PRC leaders; Deng Xiao-ping the
second; Party Secretary Jiang Ze-min the third; and Party Secretary Hu Jin-tao the fourth.
12 Cheng Li, ibid. Xi Jin-ping’s father was Xi Zhong-xun, a top government official in early Communist China. The
elder Xi served as Vice-Premier, State Councilor, Deputy Premier (1959-1962), and Governor of Guangdong Province
(1979-1981).
13 Data in this section from an official webpage for the CCP: http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/.
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The CCP’s “Chinese-style” meritocracy is
somewhat reminiscent of China’s governance
The Rise and Fall of Zhao Zi-yang
system in imperial times before the 20th
Zhao Zi-yang rose through the ranks of the CCP to its
century. Promotion within the Party is based
highest post—general secretary—only to be removed
on a combination of support from senior
from office because of his failure to prevent and suppress
officials and one’s effectiveness in performing
the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. His career is an
one’s duties. Loyalty to officials higher in the
example of how the CCP selects, rewards, and punishes
Party officials for positions of power.
Party organization can be crucial to a person’s
career and, at the same time, having loyal
Zhao joined the CCP in 1932 and fought during China’s
junior party officials can bolster the political
revolution. Following the establishment of the PRC in
1949, he worked for the Party in Guangdong Province,
power of a senior official. As a result,
rising to the position of provincial party secretary in
successful and efficient party officials are
1965. A protégé of “rightist” Liu Shao-qi, Zhao was sent
frequently given more prestigious jobs in
to work in a factory during the Great Proletarian
preferred locations, while unsuccessful or
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), a period of enormous
difficult party officials are transferred to less
political upheaval in China.
desirable jobs in less desirable locations. An
In 1972, Zhao was “rehabilitated” by then-Premier Zhou
example of the Party’s meritocracy and
En-lai and was appointed to the Party’s Central
political correctness at work was the career of
Committee and assigned to head up the Party in Inner
Mongolia. Over the next three years, Zhao held senior
Zhao Zi-yang (see textbox at right.)
Party positions in Guangdong Province, the Chengdu
military region, and Sichuan Province.
However, the CCP’s meritocracy frequently
Based on his successful agricultural reforms in Sichuan
breaks down when dealing with the children
Province, Zhao was made an alternate member of the
and relatives of senior party officials. Some
Politburo in 1977 and a ful member in 1979, the year in
CCP leaders use their influence to secure
which a political coalition led by another “rightist,” Deng
positions of authority for their family
Xiao-ping, consolidated power and initiated a major shift
in economic policy. In 1982, Zhao was chosen as a
members, regardless of their abilities, training,
member of the Politburo’s Standing Committee.
or experience. To many in China, this
constitutes a low-level form of corruption that
In 1980, Zhao was selected to replace the discredited
Hua Guo-feng as premier, the nominal head of the
has from time to time led to more blatant and
government. He remained in this position until 1987,
serious cases of corruption. Dubbed
when he was chosen as the Party’s general secretary to
“princelings” (taizi) in colloquial Chinese, the
replace Hu Yao-bang, who had been forced to resign.
relatives of senior officials have become a
After the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, Zhao was
significant political force in China.
subjected to the harshness of Party discipline when he
was removed from office and placed under house arrest.
Party policy is communicated down the layers
He remained under house arrest until his death in 2005.
of the Party organization by means of
directives and Party committee meetings. At these meetings, Party members review and discuss
the directives. In many cases, the directives do not give specific guidance on how to implement
the new policies, thereby allowing the committee to develop a plan of action compatible with
local conditions. However, this also provides lower-level Party organizations with the power to
passively or actively resist or reinterpret Party policy.
In cases where lower-level Party organizations are viewed as being ineffective or non-compliant,
the Standing Committee may send out a “work team” to assist the local organization in carrying
out Party policies or to carry out investigations.14 However, the political, economic, and social
14 In March 2009, for instance, the State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS) sent a work team from Beijing to
investigate an explosion in China’s Jiangsu Province. According to a news account, the team would “work with local
officials” to determine the cause of the blast. “Work safety team dispatched to investigate fatal blast,” China.org.cn,
citing Xinhua News Agency, March 12, 2009.
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costs of taking such actions can be high. Party officials who are unsuccessful in securing the
support of lower levels of the Party organization are frequently dismissed or demoted. In addition,
factional and bureaucratic politics are still a potent force in behind-the-scenes maneuvering,
providing a further variable that keeps the CCP’s decision-making processes fluid, unpredictable,
and a mystery to outsiders.
The Chinese Government
The second major institution of the Chinese political structure is the entire governmental
apparatus. China’s government is effectively divided into two parts—a system of ministerial
organizations and a system of geographic organizations. China’s ministerial system is generally
organized by the type of activity, such as the Ministry of Communications, Ministry of
Commerce, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Public Health.15 In addition, the
ministerial arm of the PRC government includes many special agencies and commissions,
including bureaus such as the General Administration of Customs, the National Tourism
Administration, the State Education Commission, the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, and
the China Welfare Fund for the Handicapped.
The other arm of the Chinese government consists of the layers of provincial, municipal, county,
township, and village governments. Their role in China’s political system is discussed in a
separate section later in this report (see “Provincial, Municipal, and Local Governments”).
The State Council
Under China’s constitution, the highest government administrative body is the State Council. The
State Council functions essentially as the cabinet of the PRC government. The current State
Council is composed of its premier, vice premiers, and state councilors; the State Council’s
secretary general; the ministers in charge of ministries and commissions; the governor of the
People's Bank of China; and the auditor general of the National Audit Office. The official head of
the State Council is the premier. The body itself purportedly meets about once a month.
Given the size of the State Council—about 50 people—the daily administration of the
government is generally handled by the State Council’s Standing Committee (SCSC). The SCSC
includes the premier, four vice premiers, the five state councilors, and the State Council’s
secretary general. The SCSC generally meets twice a week. Each vice premier and state councilor
oversees different aspects of the administration of the government.
15 See http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/data/organs/statecouncil.shtml.
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The Ministries
A broader definition of China’s government apparatus would include not only the State Council
itself, but all of China’s government ministries. Despite their effective subordination to the State
Council and CCP, the ministries wield decisive tactical influence over policy by virtue of their
role in interpreting, implementing, and overseeing what central leaders often broadly and
somewhat ambiguously define as Chinese policy goals.16
Like the Party, the ministries are organized
The Rise of Zhu Rong-ji
into hierarchical layers with offices at the
provincial and local levels. Ministries are
The career of Zhu Rong-ji, one of China’s most
influential figures from the 1980s to the early 2000s, is an
often also divided according to areas of
example of how a successful government official can rise
responsibility. For example, the Ministry of
from a junior position to a leadership role.
Agriculture is divided into 18 departments,
Zhu Rong-ji joined the CCP in 1949 and graduated in
including the Department of Animal
1951 from the prestigious Tsinghua University, where he
Husbandry and the Bureau for Agricultural
majored in electrical engineering. From 1952 to 1958, he
Food Quality and Safety. Depending on the
worked at the State Planning Commission as deputy
nature of the policy or issue in question, the
division chief. He was purged from the CCP for
criticizing China’s economic policies in the 1950s and was
minister will direct the appropriate department
sent to teach at a Party school. In 1962, he was
or regional office to oversee implementation.
“pardoned” and assigned to work as an engineer at the
State Planning Commission’s National Economic Bureau.
Government ministries often function like
From 1970 to 1975, Zhu was sent to a farm to be “re-
independent operators, with the minister
educated” as part of the Great Proletarian Cultural
functioning like a chief executive officer over
Revolution. From 1975 to 1979, he worked first as an
his or her agency. Because the political future
engineer for the Ministry of Petroleum Industry and later
of a ministerial official is closely tied to her or
as a director of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’
Industrial Economics Institute. Zhu was then transferred
his effectiveness as an administrator, China’s
to the State Economic Commission, where he worked
ministries and their sub-offices are often very
for three years.
protective of the perceived interests and goals
In 1982, Zhu was promoted to be a member of the State
of the ministry. For example, the Ministry of
Economic Commission, and then in 1987, he was
Agriculture may oppose or resist policies that
reassigned to become the mayor of Shanghai. From 1989
could be harmful to China’s agricultural
to 1991, Zhu oversaw the development of Shanghai’s
sector. However, ministers are still answerable
Pudong District. Based on the success of the Pudong
project, he was made a vice premier of the State Council
ultimately to the government’s “board of
in 1991. In 1993, he was selected as a member of the
directors”—the Politburo—and must
Politburo’s Standing Committee, as well as governor of
frequently contend with the secretaries of the
the People’s Bank of China. In 1998, Zhu was chosen as
ministerial Party Committees when
China’s fifth premier, in part because of the success of his
establishing and carrying out policies.
macroeconomic policies during the 1990s.
Zhu stepped down as premier in 2003 and was
succeeded by Wen Jia-bao.
16 In a conference paper presented in 1998, one scholar cited the 1982 example of then-Party Secretary Hu Yao-bang’s
pronouncement at the 12th Party Congress that China would pursue Aan independent foreign policy@ and make decisions
based on the merits of various international issues. It was up to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to interpret that general
pronouncement and turn it into an effective, sustainable policy. Paper by Lu Ning (The Business Times, Singapore),
entitled ASupraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments,@ presented at a
conference, AThe Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform: 1978-2000,@ February 27-
March 1, 1998.
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Government Control
The personnel working for the government are civil servants. While most senior government
officials are CCP members, it is not a requirement for higher government positions. Advancement
within China’s civil service is generally based on performance, which is measured by how
effectively civil servants carry out their responsibilities and achieve their specified goals. As a
result, one of the government’s main means of political control is the evaluation of its personnel.
The evaluation of Chinese civil servants can be a complex process, involving performance
assessments with respect to many specific goals and objectives. China’s meritocracy is far from
perfect, but has a record of finding and selecting individuals who rise through the government
bureaucracy and emerge as national leaders. An example of China’s meritocracy at work
(although lots of political maneuvering was also involved) was the rehabilitation and ascendancy
of Zhu Rong-ji (see textbox, “The Rise of Zhu Rong-ji”).
The National People’s Congress
The National People’s Congress (NPC) is China’s unicameral legislative body and, according to
the constitution, the ultimate power of the Chinese government. Its approximately 3,000 deputies
meet annually for about 15 days to officially set government policy and select China’s leadership.
In part because of the short duration of its sessions and despite the stature accorded to the NPC in
China’s constitution, analysts have generally regarded the NPC as having very little political
power.
The NPC is not China’s sole legislative body, but is it is the uppermost layer of a nation-wide
system of “people’s congresses” at various levels of government in the PRC. These congresses
are loosely linked together in process and function. The NPC’s deputies are not popularly elected,
but instead are selected for five-year terms by the next lower tier of “people’s congresses”—
deputies at the provincial and municipal level, as well as by members of the armed forces. The
candidate pool for these elections is a list of candidates approved by the Party, with the entire
process being overseen by CCP “election committees.” Deputies in the people’s congresses at the
provincial and municipal levels, in turn, are selected by people’s congress deputies at the county
and township level. Deputies for the lowest level of people’s congresses are directly elected.
Candidates for the lower levels of people’s congresses are also subject to approval by Party
officials.
The full NPC officially selects the PRC’s president, premier, and cabinet-level officials, allowing
the PRC government to assert that these officials have been vetted through “elections” by
representatives of the Chinese people. For much of its existence, the NPC has simply “rubber-
stamped” leadership decisions made earlier and in secret by senior Party officials after a lengthy
process of negotiation and maneuvering. Although this is largely still true in many respects—an
outright NPC rejection of a candidate at this level, for instance, would be unthinkable—NPC
delegates and the various people’s congresses in recent years have become more assertive and
independent. This trend is most noticeable at local and provincial levels, where officially
sanctioned candidates indeed, occasionally, have been rejected.17
17 The move toward more autonomy also is occurring more often within the NPC. At the March 2008 NPC session,
(continued...)
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The People’s Liberation Army
According to some analysts, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is as crucial to Chinese politics
as the Party and the government. Other analysts, however, contend that organizational and
administrative reforms have at least partially transformed the PLA into a professional military
which is less involved in politics.
The PLA is China’s unified military organization, responsible for all air, land, and sea forces. The
PLA is divided into five main service branches: air force; ground forces; naval force; the reserve
force; and the second artillery command (responsible for nuclear and missile weaponry). There
are currently approximately 3 million people serving in China’s military.
Officially, the PLA reports to the 11-member government Central Military Commission (CMC).
In practice, the Party CMC and the government CMC are effectively the same group of people,
and the Party Standing Committee selects the people to serve on the CMC. The CMC is believed
to meet regularly to address routine administrative matters and to formulate policies.
Although the offices of the CMC are housed in the Ministry of Defense, the principal state
bureaucracy for dealing with foreign militaries, the Ministry is considered a weaker authoritative
body that is subordinate to the CMC. Apart from its policy formulation and decision-making roles
for military affairs, key members of the CMC also serve a bridging function between the PLA and
the leadership of the CCP and the government.18
Relationships Among Leaders
While systems of power in China appear distinct, many in China’s central leadership wear
multiple hats, holding positions concurrently in all three systems—the Party, the government, and
the military. This adds to the difficulty of knowing more about the process of PRC decision
making. In addition, even supreme decision-making bodies at the highest level are hierarchical on
an informal level; their members are not necessarily of equal status, but hold authority and
influence derived from a range of intangible factors apart from their actual position. These
intangible factors include experience, seniority, personal connections, degree of expertise, and, to
some extent, their association with past Asuccessful@ policies, particularly in the economic realm.
This informal power hierarchy may be well-known to the respective parties involved, although it
is not necessarily apparent to outside observers.
Illustrating the inter-linkages between the three tiers, China’s current foremost leader, Hu Jin-tao,
sits at the top of all three pillars. As Party secretary he heads the Chinese Communist Party and
presides over the Party Politburo. As president of the country, he is the titular head of the state
(...continued)
each candidate for higher office received at least a few “no” votes.
18 For instance, one Chinese-language article on military leadership issues in China, in referring to past CMC vice-
chairman Zhang Wan-nian, said he would Amainly be in charge of the work within the Army and, as member of the
secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, will communicate the Army’s internal affairs to the center and receive
relevant instructions from the latter.@ See Kuan Cha-chia, ABeijing Holds Enlarged Meeting of Central Military
Commission ... ,@ Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), December 22, 1997 (FBIS online).
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government, although practically speaking, the state government apparatus is presided over and
run by Premier Wen Jia-bao. Hu Jin-tao also is chairman of the Central Military Commission, and
thus formally the head of the PLA. Hu is, in fact, the only Politburo Standing Committee member
on the CMC, which includes only two other Politburo members (Executive Vice Chairman
General Guo Boxiong, and Vice Chairman General Xu Caihou).
In what some see as a significant development given the PLA’s status, neither of the two “heirs
apparent” to Hu Jintao—Xi Jin-ping or Li Ke-qiang—have yet been named to the CMC as of
December 2009, leaving them without significant military contacts or experience during their
ostensible apprenticeship to senior status. For some, the absence of stronger connections between
the military and the younger generation on the Politburo raises questions about the strength of the
formal lines of communication between the PLA and the rest of the Party and the government as
well as the political clout and role of the PLA in the near future.
Other Important Political Actors
In addition to the more formal institutions of government and party power, the PRC political
system is influenced greatly by other political actors. These include a growing body of official
and quasi-official policy research groups and think tanks; a collection of state sector, PRC
multinational, and even private business interests that attempt to influence policy decisions; an
academic and university community that comments with greater vigor on various policy problems
and leadership decisions; a diverse media that is becoming more adept at escaping the Party’s
control; and an increasingly vocal and better-informed citizenry who are demanding more
transparency and accountability from government. At times, these influential actors operate
opaquely and behind the scenes, making it difficult to determine the exact extent of their
influence on any given policy issue. In other cases, these actors are playing an increasingly
visible role in debating, recommending, and influencing particular policy actions.
Leading Small Groups
As explained earlier, the components of the PRC’s central political system—the Party, the
government, and to a lesser extent, the military—are largely separate though sometimes
redundant interlocking structures. Leading Party Members’ Groups, or “Leading Small Groups”
(LSGs) as they often are translated, are supra-ministerial bodies created to facilitate consensus-
building and coordination among these separate Party, government, and military structures in
ways that the official bureaucratic structure cannot.19 In some respects, they are similar in
function and design to interagency bodies in the United States. Although they date back to the
1950s, LSGs since the 1990s have become more important in policy coordination and guidance in
the PRC. They operate within the Party, within the State Council and its government ministries,
and within the PLA. The authority for LSGs is contained in Chapter IX of the Party’s
constitution.20
19 In pin-yin, “ling-dao xiao-zu.”
20 For the full text of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-
10/25/content_6944738.htm.
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LSGs are the embodiment of opaqueness in China’s political system. Despite their evidently
critical policy role, they never appear on public organizational charts of the current PRC
leadership. They do not publicize their membership. They are rarely referred to in the media.
They do not appear to have permanent staff. Only recently has the Party begun to publish lists of
LSGs that have existed in the past, along with their memberships, but little still is known about
the workings and membership makeup of current LSGs. Scholars only derive conclusions about
the very existence and/or makeup of an LSG by combing through vast quantities of press
accounts in search of the occasional reference.
According to one noted scholar on the subject, LSGs can come and go—some function more or
less as task forces—but it is thought that there currently are eight “primary,” and more or less
permanent, LSGs, each thought to be headed by a member of the Politburo Standing
Committee.21 These include LSGs on finance and economy; politics and law; national security;
foreign affairs; Hong Kong and Macau; Taiwan affairs; propaganda and ideology; and Party-
building. An LSG’s relative importance in the hierarchy can be determined by who heads it: in
recent years, the foreign affairs and the national security LSGs have been headed by the Party
secretary. If the data and scholarship on LSGs are accurate, recent trends suggest that Politburo
Standing Committee members who are being groomed to succeed the current party secretary or
premier may first follow the same trajectory of leadership in the LSGs as did their predecessors.22
If true, this could provide observers with a small kernel of information about the future identities
of the PRC’s top two leaders.
Government-Sponsored Research Institutions
Think tanks and other research institutions, usually sponsored by and often linked to various
government entities, have proliferated greatly in China in recent years. There appear to be several
forces driving this trend. Not the least of these is the need for officials to have access to greater
professional expertise as they wrestle with policy decisions that have become increasingly
complex and sophisticated. More recently, according to China’s official news agency, the
formation of think tanks has come to be regarded as a method of extending the “sustainable
utility” of senior retired or semi-retired PRC officials.23
Although there are many think tanks and research institutions in China, the text box “Top Ten
Prominent PRC Think Tanks” lists what PRC authorities in 2006 considered to be the most
prominent.24 With one exception, all are in Beijing. They are all long-standing institutions, and all
are sponsored by a state entity. The China Institute of Contemporary International Relations
(CICIR), for instance, is operated by the Ministry of State Security. For the most part, China’s
think-tank world is more transparent and operates with greater visibility than other parts of the
21 For a discussion of the history of Leading Small Groups and their current role, see the work of noted scholar Alice
Miller, “The CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups,” in the China Leadership Monitor, No. 26. Additional
work on LSGs has been done by Lu Ning, “The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council
Ministries, and Party Departments,” in David M. Lampton, ed., The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in
an Era of Reform, Stanford University Press, 2001.
22 Miller, ibid.
23 Cited by Cheng Li, “China’s New Think Tanks: Where Officials, Entrepreneurs, and Scholars Interact,” in China
Leadership Monitor, No. 29. Much of the information on government think-tanks in this section is based on the work of
this noted scholar of PRC leadership.
24 Cheng Li, ibid. p. 6.
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PRC government. Researchers and scholars from these institutions make themselves widely
accessible. They often meet, both in China and in the United States, with foreign scholars,
officials, and visitors from the U.S. Congress. They attend international conferences, publish
papers and journal articles on issues in their fields, and in other ways play a crucial role in
informing the policy discourse and proposing alternative courses of action for PRC policymakers.
PRC think tanks received renewed attention in March 2009, when the State Council approved the
founding of a new think tank in Beijing, the China Center for International Economic Exchanges
(CCIEE—operating under the auspices of the PRC’s National Development and Reform
Commission). The formation of the CCIEE reinforces what some scholars see as an emerging
trend in China’s research institutions: a
Top Ten Prominent PRC Think Tanks
concerted effort to facilitate broad domestic
and international policy discussion by knitting
• Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)
together and drawing on the expertise of
• Development Research Center of the State
government officials, private entrepreneurs,
Council
and internationally renowned scholars, as well
• Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)
as Chinese students and scholars returning from
• Academy of Military Science
overseas study.25 The first international
conference organized by the CCIEE, held
• China Institute of International Study
shortly after the institute’s founding, attracted
• China Institute of Contemporary International
approximately 900 attendees, including former
Relations (CICIR)
and current government officials, journalists,
• China National Committee for Pacific
business people, and scholars from around the
Economic Cooperation
world.
• China Association for Science and Technology
China’s think tanks serve multiple roles for the
• China International Institute of Strategic
government. As described above, they can
Society
function as intelligence-gathering bodies for
• Shanghai Institute for International Studies
government officials and agencies. They also
(SIIS)
provide analysis and recommendations on
potential new policies, laws, and regulations—
Source: PRC authorities ranked these institutions as
including, on occasion, actually drafting the
China’s top ten at the “First Forum on China’s Think
proposed legal documents to be considered by
Tanks,” held in Beijing in 2006.
government leaders. Because many think tanks
are closely associated with a particular government entity, they also provide assessments of new
policies or recent events on their government “sponsor.” In addition, think tank scholars often
serve as unofficial “messengers” for the government, presenting China’s views on various
subjects at conferences, seminars, and meetings around the world.
Central Party School
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintains a large system of Party schools, serving as
training facilities for the Party elite. Within this system, the Central Party School (CPS) in Beijing
is the most prestigious and important, although since 2005 it has seen competition from the
25 Cheng Li, ibid., p. 1. According to this scholar, nearly 1.4 million Chinese nationals have pursued studies overseas
since 1978, and many are returning to China. The returnees, dubbed the “sea turtles,” are becoming increasingly
prominent in PRC think tanks.
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establishment of three new CCP “cadre academies” elsewhere in China.26 Originally established
in 1933 as the Marx School of Communism (now commonly known as the Central Party School,
or CPS), the CPS is the highest institution of learning for Communist Party officials in China.27
The school’s curriculum includes a wide range of subjects, including Western political theory and
cutting-edge issues in economics, law, military affairs, and science and technology. All high-
ranking Party officials must attend some course of training at the Central Party School. In keeping
with its crucial role for the Party, security at the CPS is tight, and it is not readily accessible by
outsiders.
Apart from its educational mission, the CPS also plays a crucial role, in the words of one U.S.
scholar, as the “primary think-tank for generating new ideas and policies concerning political and
ideological reform.”28 It reportedly has played a crucial role in preparing content and speeches for
past Party Congresses, and many policy initiatives are said to originate in the CPS. Despite its
Party affiliation, those who have visited the CPS and attended conferences on its campus have
found its students and professors to demonstrate some of the most creative and unfettered
thinking in China.
The “Princelings”
An important but informal politically influential group in China are the so-called “princelings.”
This group consists of relatives (most frequently, the sons and daughters) of senior Chinese
government officials who use their family relationship to obtain access to privilege, positions of
power, and wealth—often by circumventing the official channels and procedures. For many
people in China, the “princelings” represent that type of “class privilege” that the Cultural
Revolution was supposed to eradicate. Because their access to power and privilege is seen not
necessarily to be based on merit, some view the “princelings” at least as a minor source of
corruption and at worst as a serious threat to the Party’s legitimacy with the public.
The “princelings” have chosen different avenues to power in China. Some have used their access
to better education and job opportunities to become important figures within the Party or the
government. Others chose to focus their energies on obtaining economic power by establishing
private companies (often by securing special loans from state-run banks) or being appointed the
leading officials of important state-run enterprises.29
Although some of the “princelings” have used their preferential access to power for social causes,
some have been accused of serious corruption. Deng Pu-fang, son of Deng Xiao-ping and himself
a paraplegic,30 is widely known in China as a leading advocate for the rights of the handicapped.
Hu Hai-feng—son of President Hu Jin-tao and party secretary for Tsinghua Holdings, a multi-
billion dollar state-owned conglomerate, was accused of bribery by the Namibian government
during the summer of 2009.
26 Shambaugh, David, “Training China’s political elite: the Party School system.” The China Quarterly, Vol. 197,
December 2008, pp. 827-844.
27 The official current title of the school is the Party School of the Central Committee of the People’s Republic of China
28 Shambaugh, ibid., p. 841.
29 According to various reports, over 90% of China’s billionaires are children of senior government officials.
30 The circumstances surrounding Deng’s loss of the use of his legs are a matter of contention. The current official
account states that he was thrown out of a window by Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. However, accounts
at the time of the event stated that he jumped.
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Provincial, Municipal, and Local Governments
A more complete understanding of China’s political system requires an examination of the
relationship between the central government and the numerous provincial, municipal, and local
governments spread across the country. China officially has 34 provincial-level governments;31
over 300 prefecture-level governments; nearly 3,000 county-level governments; and over 40,000
township-level governments. As was the case with the central government, virtually all of the
lower-tier governments contain a parallel Party administration (headed by the secretary of the
Party Committee) and a governmental body (headed by the governor, mayor, or county head).
Unlike the United States, China’s constitution does not provide for a division of power among the
various tiers of government. Officially, each successive tier of government down from the top
reports to the preceding tier above it. Although all political power resides with central
government, the constitution does allow local governments to “conduct the administrative work
concerning the economy, education, science, culture, public health, physical culture, urban and
rural development, finance, civil affairs, public security, nationalities affairs, judicial
administration, supervision and family planning in their respective administrative areas.” In
practice, each tier of government exercises varying degrees of autonomy.
The relationship between the local Party leader and the local top government official is critical to
the effectiveness of the local government. At the provincial level, these are almost always two
separate people; at the county level, one person may serve both roles. It is the usual practice of
the central government to appoint provincial leaders who are not from the province, and to rotate
them with some regularity. This is done to avoid an individual developing too strong a local
political base, to reduce the risk of corruption, and to promote provincial leaders who are
considered successful. County officials, by contrast, are generally from the region, and are less
likely to be removed from their local office unless they are promoted or dismissed.
Whereas the Party Standing Committee or the State Council can use their authority over the local
party or government leader, the ministries have less direct control over the actions of lower tiers
of government. In general, the ministries rely on local authorities to implement national laws and
regulations. Because of a lack of personnel, local officials frequently are responsible for carrying
out the policies of the Party, the central government, and multiple ministries—often forcing them
to prioritize among competing requirements and restrictions.32 The maintenance of local party
discipline has long been perceived as a major challenge for the Chinese government.
Another major challenge for the Chinese government is local government corruption. Because
local government officials are generally from the region, infrequently rotated, and on occasion
serve as both party and government leader, the potential for abusing power is comparatively high.
Many of the complaints about government corruption in China are allegations against county and
municipal officials, rather than provincial and central government leaders. Local corruption takes
many forms from the lack of enforcement of laws and regulations to cases where officials have
treated the local community like their own private fiefdom.
31 This includes 23 provinces (sheng) (including Taiwan), five autonomous regions (zizhiqu), four municipalities, and
two special administrative regions (tèbié xíngzhèngqū).
32 The lack of dedicated local personnel is a common issue for local enforcement. For example, during a recent trip to
China, one of the authors met with one of the three government officials responsible for IPR protection in a city of over
3 million people.
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Trends and Idiosyncrasies of China’s Political
System
There are several aspects of China’s current political system that make it distinctive and/or are
important to understanding recent trends. Contrary to a common misperception, China has a long
history of political reforms, dating back to its early days in the 1950s, but the goals and values of
the Chinese government are fundamentally different from those in the United States. In addition,
China has long struggled to find an efficient and effective means to coordinate governance
between the central and local governments—a problem that remains unresolved to the satisfaction
of top political figures. Also, despite its appearance as a “one-party state,” Chinese politics is rife
with a fluid form of factionalism. Finally, the invention of new communications technology over
the years—including fax machines, cell phones, text messaging, and the Internet—has both
challenged China’s political system and created new tools for maintaining control.
China’s View of Democracy and Political Reform
Although it is a broad U.S. perception that little or no political liberalization has taken place in
the PRC since its creation in 1949, PRC leaders have periodically experimented with incremental
reforms in the country’s Party and government systems, often followed by periods of anti-reform
activity during which the Party strives to regain control and power. However, in contrast to the
United States, where democracy is viewed as a goal, China has generally seen democratic reforms
as a means to an end or ends.
For example, the Chinese
The Issue of Timing in the Selection of
government began experimenting
Leadership
with limited village elections in the
Under the PRC constitution, officials of the Chinese government are
1980s and has continued to allow
chosen by the National People’s Congress (NPC), which meets only
some form of local elections to this
annual y—general y in March—for approximately two weeks. As a
day. Under the reforms, local
consequence of the different timetables by which the five-year Party
Congress and the NPC meet, PRC leadership transitions can be
officials were to be selected by
oddly bifurcated, with senior Party leaders chosen for five-year terms
secret ballots and universal suffrage
in the fall and senior government leaders, including president, vice
among the adult population of the
president, and premier, not chosen for five-year terms until the
community, with competing
following spring.
candidates who may or may not be
This was the case, for instance, between the Party Congress in
Party members. However, in many
October 2002 and the National People’s Congress meeting in March
cases, local party officials and
2003, which left the transition to a new generation of leaders frozen
part-way through the process. During that four-month period,
higher-tier government officials had
neither the head of the military, the president of the country, nor
the authority to disallow candidates
most of the PRC’s still-serving senior government officials were
from being listed on the ballot.
members of the newly selected Politburo, the Party’s most powerful
decision-making body. In addition, that particular leadership transition
The reasons given for the
period coincided with the outbreak in China of SARS (Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome), which surfaced in China in November 2002
experimentation with local elections
and reached its apex in March-April 2003. The SARS outbreak
were varied, but generally did not
presented a serious crisis to the PRC central government at a time
present democracy as a goal in its
when the country’s overall leadership structure was least equipped
own right. Arguments to support
to respond because of the structure of its leadership selection
local elections included fostering
process.
greater support for local leaders
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among the community; creating incentives for more effective local governance; and providing a
disincentive for local government corruption.
Another area where China has experimented with democratic reforms is in factory management.
In the 1950s, China tentatively allowed some factories to elect their top management to foster
workers’ support for the new government, indentify better managers (based on the assumption
that workers knew who were the capable managers), and improve the quality of factory
operations (under the assumption that elected managers would be more concerned about effective
management, or risk losing their positions). Although this experiment with workplace democracy
was largely abandoned, it reappeared for a limited period of time in the 1980s for virtually the
same reasons—workplace democracy was viewed as a means of improving production efficiency.
China’s political reforms have not been limited to experiments with democratic local elections.
Among other changes, the PRC leadership has implemented the following:
• Aterm limits@ for top-level positions in the Party and government;
• unofficial retirement age requirements for Party cadres at senior levels of
leadership;
• regular rotation of provincial and military leaders;
• equal representation and voting status for each province on the CCP Central
Committee;
• “decisions by votes” (piaojuezhi); and
• multiple-candidate choices for some Party and governmental seats.33
More recently, the Party has implemented changes in the selection of senior party officials that
purportedly introduce limited competition.34 Referred to as “intra-Party democracy” (dangnei
minzhu), the system operates by allowing more candidates than there are open positions (in
Chinese, this is called cha’e xuanju). Like local elections, intra-Party democracy is seen as a
means of solidifying the legitimacy of the CCP, providing for “checks and balances” among top
officials, and improving government management.
Although these and other political reforms have brought more rationality to the political process,
they have their limitations. They have not, for instance, led to the establishment of opposition
political parties, opened political and policy processes to broader public debate, or provided
predictable and regularized methods for selecting the next top leaders. Despite the above reforms,
then, the process of political succession in the PRC is still characterized by uncertainty. Decisions
often are made through a combination of internal campaigning, behind-the-scenes manipulation,
negotiation, and compromise among approximately 30 top senior leaders.
33 Cheng Li, Professor of Government, Hamilton College, AChina’s Political Succession: Four Mis-perceptions in the
West,@ a paper delivered at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, February 21, 2001.
34 For more on China’s experiments with intra-Party democracy, see Cheng Li, “Intra-Party Democracy in China:
Should We Take It Seriously,” Leadership Monitor, No. 30, Brookings Institute, Fall 2009.
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Coordination of Central and Local Governments
In a country with over 1.4 billion people and tens of thousands of government entities, it is a
daunting task to coordinate policy and effectively administer the country’s laws and regulations.
Officially, China’s political system remains highly centralized and hierarchal, with lower levels of
government reporting to higher-level officials. In reality, it is impossible for higher officials to
fully monitor the activities of lower-level officials, and it is equally impossible for lower-level
officials to fully comply with the instructions from their superiors. As a result, there is a fair
amount of policy slippage between the directives of the central government and the actions of
local officials.
This relationship is further complicated when directives from higher officials create a
contradiction for junior officials (see the text box about the SARS outbreak). Faced with an
apparent dilemma, local officials will frequently choose to comply with one directive and ignore
the other, based on their own criteria of which policy should take priority. This decision may be
based on the best of intentions or on pure self-interest. In either case, the goals and objectives of
the central authorities may not be adequately reflected in the local situation.
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China’s SARS Outbreak of 2002-2003
One can glimpse the strains and contradictions in the PRC’s political system by reviewing the case of the outbreak of
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in China in 2002-2003. The official response to the SARS outbreak
illustrates that the universe of what effectively can be controlled by the PRC’s core central elite today is shrinking,
while the capacity of non-central actors to manage, influence, inform, and interfere in political decisions and day-to-
day activities is expanding.
Harkening back to an earlier era in its history when central government powers were more comprehensive, PRC
officials in 1996 reportedly adopted a law, the text of which does not appear to be available, that serious infectious
diseases shall be considered state secrets unless and until the government makes an official public announcement
about the disease.35 The definition of what are “state secrets” and who is entitled to know them is vague and
arbitrary, as evidenced by the general description contained in Article 2 of the state secrets law:
State secrets shall be matters that have a vital bearing on state security and national interests and, as
specified by legal procedure, are entrusted to a limited number of people for a given period of time.36
Theoretical y, PRC Party and government officials should have had extensive power to control and manage
developments in the SARS outbreak, and PRC officials attempted to do so. The first official announcement about the
disease was made by the Guangdong Provincial Health Bureau on February 11, 2003, which reported limited cases of
a mysterious illness. The following day, the official Xinhua News Agency announced that the mysterious illness had
been “brought under control” and no new cases had been reported. Despite reports that millions of text messages
were reporting daily on the progress of the disease, PRC officials struggled to maintain this official story through mid-
March 2003, when officials from all over China attended the week-long first plenary session of the 10th National
People’s Congress (NPC) in Beijing.37 On the second day of the NPC, a state-owned newspaper in Guangdong
Province reportedly incurred the wrath of the Guangdong Party secretary by violating the official blackout on SARS
reporting.38
Government officials appeared unable to prevent mass migrations from SARS-affected areas, prompting the Supreme
People’s Court to announce new measures threatening to jail and even execute citizens who did not comply with
quarantine and travel restrictions.39 Vil ages and townships took independent action not authorized or coordinated by
Beijing, putting up barricades to keep travelers out. Statements and actions by various PRC officials were
uncoordinated and contradictory. On April 3, 2003, PRC Minister of Health Zhang Wen-kang, despite evidence to the
contrary, reported that the disease had been contained and urged people to proceed with their plans to travel to
China despite a World Health Organization travel advisory. It was not until April 20, 2003, that PRC officials, faced
with overwhelming evidence of a SARS epidemic, apologized publicly for their “leadership failure” and began reporting
on SARS cases.
Factionalism
As previously discussed, there are currently differences in opinion among the Party’s top
leadership concerning the best path for future development that can be roughly divided into the
“populists” and the “elitists” (see “The Politburo Standing Committee”). This sort of factionalism
is common within Chinese politics, but is distinctive in two ways.
35 Internal report prepared by the Library of Congress Asian Law Division, 2003.
36 The Congressional-Executive Commission on China provides the text of the “Law of the People’s Republic of China
on Guarding State Secrets,” at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/newLaws/protectSecretsENG.php.
37 The number of text messages was attributed to a report by a PRC publication, Southern Weekend, that on February 8,
2003, the text message “Fatal flu occurring in Guangdong” was sent 40 million times, and was repeated 86 million
times more over the next two days. McDonald, Joe, “China Cracks Down on High-Tech SARS Rumors,” in Associated
Press, AP Online, May 14, 2003.
38 Washington Post foreign correspondent Philip Pan, in Out of Mao’s Shadow The Struggle for the Soul of a New
China, Simon & Schuster, 2008. The Guangdong paper was the Southern Metropolis Daily.
39 The Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate announced the new measures on May 14, 2003.
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Understanding China’s Political System
First, coalitions may be based on multiple factors in addition to similar political ideologies. Place
of birth, familiar ties, political mentorship, and common educational history may also lead
individuals to form political alliances, regardless of their political views. For example, the
“Shanghai Clique” rose to prominence during the presidency of Jiang Ze-min. One of the major
ties binding together this faction was that they all had been senior officials in the Shanghai
municipal government.
Second, political factions in China are comparatively unstable. Individuals may be allies on one
issue and opponents on another issue. One of the factors contributing to the instability of factions
is the history of informal decision-making, which can force individuals to shift loyalty or risk loss
of power. One recent description of shifting political alliances in Chinese history is Zhao Zi-
yang’s recounting of the dynamics among China’s top leaders during the Spring Uprising of 1997
in his memoirs, Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang.
Modern Media
The introduction of new forms of communication has both pressured the Chinese government to
make changes in its political system, as well as provided the Party with new means of
maintaining political control. Such technical developments as the fax machine, the cell phone, the
Internet, blogs, and text messaging have altered the speed and ease of communication in China.
At times, the new technologies have been used to question and/or challenge the Party’s political
power. At other times, the Chinese government has used the communications breakthroughs as an
instrument of political control.
In the spring of 1997, as demonstrations spread across China, local organizers used the relatively
new technology of fax machines to communicate with each other. The fax machines not only
allowed people to share news and information, they also provided a low-cost means of
distributing announcements or official documents that were potentially damaging to Chinese
officials. At the time, the Chinese government had not gathered information on the locations of
fax machines, making it difficult to control the dissemination of information about the protests.
More recently, the widespread use of cell phones—especially phones that take photos or videos—
has allowed people to take images and broadcast information about perceived government abuse
of power. In some cases, these images and messages quickly become viral, spreading across
China and Hong Kong’s web space (via blogs and Web pages like YouTube or its Chinese
version, You Ku) rendering it difficult for Chinese officials to suppress awareness of events. This
dissemination of information about party corruption is supposed to be a significant factor in
popular dissatisfaction with the CCP and the Chinese government.
At times, Chinese officials have used these new communications systems to help in their
governance. For example, there are reports that some Chinese officials monitor reports of local
government officials’ abusing power as a means of regulating lower-level officials and preventing
corruption. In addition, the Chinese government allegedly has supported both formal and informal
use of blogs, chat rooms, and other Internet techniques to present its views of recent events. One
supposed such group is the “Fifty Cent Party” (Wumaodang), an informal group of “netizens”
reportedly paid 50 cents each time they post a positive statement about Chinese government
policy on the Internet. President Hu Jin-tao reportedly referred to the Fifty Cent Party as “a new
pattern of public-opinion guidance.”
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Understanding China’s Political System
Implications for Congress
Because the inner workings of China’s government have been shrouded in secrecy, it would be
easy to presume that a “one-party state” would think, speak, and act with one mind, one voice,
and one purpose. This report has attempted to challenge this line of reasoning by providing a
glimpse behind China’s curtain of secrecy and into the internal dynamics of Chinese politics.
At a very basic level, the report is designed to provide the reader with a more sophisticated
perspective on contemporary Chinese politics and a means by which to analyze the statements
and actions of Chinese officials. For example, the report may be useful for Members of Congress
when they meet with Chinese government officials or think tank scholars by offering a way to
understand the content of the meeting, the bureaucratic connections of the scholars involved, and
the degree and manner to which the statements by the Chinese visitor may or may not reflect
official Chinese policy. In addition, the report offers a method for determining the relative
position or significance of a visiting delegation from China or the officials hosting a meeting in
China.
Moving beyond the basics, the analysis in this report may prove useful in ascertaining where and
how the United States could possibly influence Chinese policies and practices in several ways.
For example, the report may help identify individuals who may have unknown influence on
China’s political decisions. In addition, it might help in the evaluation of the importance of the
statements of Chinese officials with respect to official policy.
Author Contact Information
Michael F. Martin
Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance
mfmartin@crs.loc.gov, 7-2199
Acknowledgments
Kerry Dumbaugh was an author on the original version of this report. She left CRS at the end of December
2009.
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