The April 2010 Coup in Kyrgyzstan: Context
and Implications for U.S. Interests
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
April 12, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41178
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
The April 2010 Coup in Kyrgyzstan: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests
Summary
Kyrgyzstan is a small and poor country in Central Asia that gained independence in 1991 with the
breakup of the Soviet Union (see Figure A-1). It has developed a notable but fragile civil society.
Progress in democratization has been set back by problematic elections (one of which helped
precipitate a coup in 2005 that brought Kurmanbek Bakiyev to power), contention over
constitutions, and corruption. The April 2010 coup appears to have been triggered by popular
discontent over rising utility prices and government repression. After two days of popular unrest
in the capital of Bishkek and other cities, opposition politicians ousted the Bakiyev administration
on April 8 and declared an interim government pending a new presidential election in six months.
Roza Otunbayeva, a former foreign minister and ambassador to the United States, was declared
the acting prime minister.
The United States has been interested in helping Kyrgyzstan to enhance its sovereignty and
territorial integrity, increase democratic participation and civil society, bolster economic reform
and development, strengthen human rights, prevent weapons proliferation, and more effectively
combat transnational terrorism and trafficking in persons and narcotics. The significance of
Kyrgyzstan to the United States increased after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the
United States. The Kyrgyz government permitted the United States to establish a military base at
the Manas international airport outside Bishkek that trans-ships personnel, equipment, and
supplies to support U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan. The former Bakiyev government
had renegotiated a lease on the airbase in June 2009 (it was renamed a transit center), in
recognition that ongoing instability in Afghanistan jeopardized regional security. The lease is up
for renewal in July 2010. Otunbayeva has declared that the interim government will uphold
Kyrgyzstan’s existing foreign policy, including the presence of the “transit center,” although some
changes to the lease may be sought.
Cumulative U.S. budgeted assistance to Kyrgyzstan for FY1992-FY2008 was $953.5 million
(FREEDOM Support Act and agency funds). Kyrgyzstan ranks third in such aid per capita among
the Soviet successor states, indicative of U.S. government and Congressional support in the early
1990s for its apparent progress in making reforms and more recently to support anti-terrorism,
border protection, and operations in Afghanistan.
As Congress and the Administration consider how to assist democratic and economic
transformation in Kyrgyzstan, several possible programs have been suggested, including those to
buttress civil rights, bolster political institutions and the rule of law, and encourage private sector
economic growth. (See also CRS Report RL33458, Central Asia: Regional Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol.)
Congressional Research Service
The April 2010 Coup in Kyrgyzstan: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests
Contents
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
The Coup and Its Aftermath ........................................................................................................ 1
Bakiyev’s Ouster................................................................................................................... 2
Implications for Kyrgyzstan ........................................................................................................ 4
International Response .......................................................................................................... 5
Implications for Russia and Other Eurasian States ....................................................................... 5
Implications for China................................................................................................................. 7
Implications for U.S. Interests ..................................................................................................... 7
The U.S. Transit Center and Northern Distribution Network.................................................. 8
Figures
Figure A-1. Map of Kyrgyzstan ................................................................................................. 12
Appendixes
Appendix A. Opposition Leaders in the New Government ......................................................... 11
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 12
Congressional Research Service
The April 2010 Coup in Kyrgyzstan: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests
Background
Kyrgyzstan is a small and poor Central Asian country that gained independence in 1991 with the
breakup of the Soviet Union. The United States has been interested in helping Kyrgyzstan to
enhance its sovereignty and territorial integrity, increase democratic participation and civil
society, bolster economic reform and development, strengthen human rights, prevent weapons
proliferation, and more effectively combat transnational terrorism and trafficking in persons and
narcotics. The United States has pursued these interests throughout Central Asia, with special
strategic attention to oil-rich Kazakhstan and somewhat less to Kyrgyzstan. The significance of
Kyrgyzstan to the United States increased after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the
United States. The U.S. military repaired and upgraded the air field at the Manas international
airport outside of the capital, Bishkek for aerial refueling, airlift and airdrop, medical evacuation,
and support for U.S., NATO, and coalition personnel and cargo transiting in and out of
Afghanistan. In 2010, the Manas Transit Center hosted about 1,100 U.S., Spanish, and French
troops and a fleet of KC-135 refueling tankers.1
The Coup and Its Aftermath
According to most observers, the proximate causes of the April 2010 coup include massive utility
price increases that went into effect on January 1, 2010, during the height of winter weather, and
increasing popular perceptions that President Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s administration was rife with
corruption and nepotism. The latter appeared to include Bakiyev’s appointment of his son
Maksim in late 2009 as head of a new Central Agency for Development, Investment and
Innovation. It was widely assumed that Maksim was being groomed to later assume the
presidency. On March 10, 2010, demonstrators held massive rallies in the town of Naryn, calling
on the government to withdraw its decision on price increases and the privatization of energy
companies. This demonstration appeared to exacerbate security concerns in the government about
other protests planned by the opposition and triggered added efforts to suppress media freedom.
Several internet websites, including opposition websites, were closed down, rebroadcasts by
RFE/RL and the BBC were suspended, and two opposition newspapers were closed down. At an
opposition party bloc meeting in Bishkek on March 17, participants accused the president of
usurpation of power, political repression, corrupt privatizations, and unjustified increases in
prices for public utilities. They elected Roza Otunbayeva, the head of the Social Democratic Party
faction in the legislature, as the leader of the opposition bloc and announced that nationwide
rallies would be held to demand reforms.
President Bakiyev had presumed that a planned annual meeting of the Assembly of Peoples of
Kyrgyzstan (a consultative conclave composed of representatives of ethnic groups) on March 23
would result in an affirmation of his policies, but many participants harshly criticized his rule. He
complained that the participants from rural and mountainous areas who were critical were
uninformed, and that legislators should visit the areas to educate the voters. He claimed that the
Assembly had endorsed plans to change the constitution to reorganize the government to elevate
the status of the Assembly as part of a new “consultative democracy.” Elections would be
1 Biography of Col. Blaine D. Holt, U.S. Air Force, at http://www.manas.afcent.af.mil. See also CRS Report R40564,
Kyrgyzstan and the Status of the U.S. Manas Airbase: Context and Implications, by Jim Nichol.
Congressional Research Service
1
The April 2010 Coup in Kyrgyzstan: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests
abolished and the “egoism” of human rights would be replaced by “public morals,” he stated.
These proposals appeared similar to those taken in Turkmenistan by the late authoritarian
president Saparamurad Niyazov. Bakiyev also had moved the Border Service and Emergencies
Ministry headquarters to Osh and was planning on moving the Defense Ministry offices there,
claiming that more security was needed in the south. Other observers viewed the moves as a
means of shifting some economic power and authority to the south of the country.
Problems of democratization and human rights in Kyrgyzstan were highlighted during a visit by
U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on April 3, 2010. He stated in a speech to the Kyrgyz
legislature that “the protection of human rights is a bedrock principle if a country is to prosper....
Recent events have been troubling, including the past few days.... All human rights must be
protected, including free speech and freedom of the media.” He also reported that during a
meeting with President Bakiyev, he “urged the president to orient his policies to promote the
democratic achievements of Kyrgyzstan, including its free press.”2
Bakiyev’s Ouster
Faced with the rising discontent, Kyrgyz Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov ordered the government
on April 5 to pay half the power bills of rural households. However, the next day a reported 1,000
or more protesters stormed government offices in the western city of Talas. Security forces flown
from Bishkek retook the building in the evening, but were forced out by protesters. Responding to
the violence in Talas, government security forces on April 6 reportedly accused the head of the
Social Democratic Party and former presidential candidate Almazbek Atambayev of fomenting
the unrest and detained him. Other opposition leaders also were detained, including Temir
Sariyev, the head of the Ak-Shumkar Party; Omurbek Tekebayev, head of the Ata Meken Party;
Isa Omurkulov, a member of the legislature from the Social Democratic Party, and others. Police
released them the next day.
On April 7, unrest spread to the Naryn, Chui, Talas, and Issyk-Kul regions, where regional and
district government buildings were overrun by protesters. Even some district administrations in
southwestern Jalabad Region, President Bakiyev’s home region, were occupied by protesters. In
Bishkek, police and about 400 protesters violently clashed on the morning of April 7 outside the
headquarters of the Social Democratic Party in Bishkek. Prime Minister Usenov declared a
nationwide state of emergency. Hundreds of protesters then gathered and soon overwhelmed the
police, taking control of two armoured vehicles and automatic weapons.
The protesters, now numbering between 3-5,000, surrounded the presidential offices. They asked
President Bakiyev and Prime Minister Usenov to come out and talk to them, and after the two
leaders refused, the protesters stormed the building. After tear gas, rubber bullets, and stun
grenades failed to disperse the protesters, police reportedly opened fire with live ammunition,
killing and wounding dozens. Later that day, demonstrators led by Tekebayev occupied the
legislative building, other protesters seized the state television and radio building, and the
Defense Department and attorney-general’s offices were in flames. Protesters marched on a
prison holding former defense minister Ismail Isakov, who had just been sentenced to eight years
in prison on corruption charges, and the prison released him.
2 U.N. Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General. Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 3 April 2010: Secretary-General’s
Remarks to the Jogorku Kenesh (Parliament of Kyrgyzstan), April 3, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
2
The April 2010 Coup in Kyrgyzstan: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests
Late on April 7, Temir Sariyev and Roza Otunbayeva held talks with Prime Minister Usenov at
the government building. Otunbayeva announced early on April 8 that Usenov had tendered his
resignation, that his cabinet ministers had been dismissed, that the sitting legislature had been
dissolved because it had been illegitimately elected, and that an interim government had taken
over the powers of the prime minister, president, and legislature. Otunbayeva announced that her
government included First Deputy Prime Minister Almaz Atambayev, in charge of economic
issues; Deputy Minister Temir Sariyev, in charge of finances and loans; Deputy Minister
Omurbek Tekebayev, in charge of constitutional reform and planning for the future of the
country; and Deputy Minister Azimbek Beknazarov, in charge of public prosecution, courts and
the financial police. She stated that the interim government would rule until presidential elections
are held in six months. As one of her first acts as prime minister, she announced that the prices
paid for water, electricity, and heat would be rolled back to last year’s prices.
She also announced that:
• “We will hundred percent comply with all international agreements of the
republic.”
• The status of the U.S. transit center at Manas (airbase) would not immediately be
affected. However, she appeared to hint that possible corruption involving
commercial contracts with the airbase and the airbase leasing arrangements
would be examined.
• The Central Agency for Development, Investment and Innovations, formerly
headed by President Bakiyev’s son, was abolished.
• The existing constitution would remain in place until a new one is drafted and
approved by the citizenry. A new electoral code also would be written.
• Bakiyev had fled first to Osh and then to Jalabad, where he was attempting to
raise forces for a counter-coup.
In addition, Ismail Isakov was reappointed defense minister to consolidate the interim
government’s control over the security apparatus. This appointment seems to have secured the
support of the Uzbek military for the interim government. Bolot Sherniyazov, who had been
named the acting interior minister, warned that in order to reestablish calm, he had authorized the
use of firearms against looters. It was widely reported that the scant police presence in Bishkek
on April 7-8, had given impetus to looting and arson. New Deputy Prime Minister Atambayev
stated that the government already was working on a new constitution, electoral code, and law on
peaceful assembly.
Baytemir Ibrayev, who had been appointed as the interim prosecutor-general, issued a warrant for
the arrest of Usenov and several relatives of Bakiyev on charges of corruption or involvement in
the deaths of protesters. Former President Bakiyev was said to have immunity from prosecution
as a past head of state, but Otunbayeva called for him to cease his alleged efforts to foment a
counter-coup or civil war and to leave the country.
Congressional Research Service
3
The April 2010 Coup in Kyrgyzstan: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests
Implications for Kyrgyzstan
The coup resulted in relatively large-scale casualties and much property damage, compared to the
2005 coup that brought Bakiyev to power.3 The health ministry reported that 81 people had been
killed and some 500 injured. There was extensive damage to government buildings in Bishkek
and elsewhere that will take some time to repair.
While some observers argue that economic discontent reached a tipping point that resulted in a
spontaneous uprising by mainly unemployed or underemployed youth, others suggest that
political opposition leaders planned and instigated the takeover. The periodical Eurasia Insight
has suggested that the events precipitating the uprising included the late March meeting held by
Bakiyev, which showed his weakness, and heavy criticism of Bakiyev by Moscow.4
There are parallels between the coup in 2005 and the most recent coup. Both arguably were
revolts against increasingly authoritarian regimes rife with corruption and nepotism. Analyst
Alisher Ilkhamov has pointed out differences between the two coups, including a higher level of
casualties during the most recent coup, since government security forces opened fire on many
demonstrators. He also argues that the 2005 coup was led by disaffected elites, while the most
recent coup was more a grass-roots effort and was more chaotic in execution. Just as the
opposition leaders were not in control of the uprising, they are having difficulty in restoring
peace, he states.5
Analyst Monika Shepherd argues that in the face of the global economic downturn—which
heavily impacted Kyrgyzstan because of the decline of remittances from migrant workers in
Russia and Kazakhstan—Bakiyev did not meet with opposition leaders or otherwise reach out to
the population but instead increasingly used repression to quell discontent.6
Bakiyev’s refusal to resign could exacerbate north-south tensions, possibly even leading to civil
war, some observers warn. Bakiyev is a southerner, and virtually all of the disorder that led to the
overthrow of Bakiyev took place in the north. Others discount this concern, asserting that
Bakiyev will not be able to gain wide southern backing for (counter)-insurgency.7
The disruption of the coup is likely to add to Kyrgyzstan’s economic problems. The interim
government has called for the international community to provide immediate and long-term
assistance.
3 CRS Report RL32864, Coup in Kyrgyzstan: Developments and Implications, by Jim Nichol, April 14, 2005.
4 “Kyrgyzstan: Bakiyev Confronts Political Crisis,” Eurasia Insight, April 6, 2010.
5 Alisher Ilkhamov, “Not the Tulip Revolution All Over Again,” Transitions On Line (TOL), April 8, 2010.
6 Monika Shepherd, “Regime Change in Kyrgyzstan: A New Beginning or More of the Same?” The ISCIP Analyst
(Caucasus/ Central Asia): An Analytical Review, April 8, 2010.
7 David Trilling, “Kyrgyzstan: Experts Voice Concern About Possibility of Prolonged Strife,” Eurasia Insight, April 8,
2010.
Congressional Research Service
4
The April 2010 Coup in Kyrgyzstan: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests
International Response
During the violence on April 7, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Dunja
Mijatovic, called for the Bakiyev government to cease censorship and allow journalists to report
on the situation in the country. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated on April 7 that he was
“shocked” over the deadly clashes in Kyrgyzstan just days after his visit and appealed for
concerned parties to show restraint. The next day, he announced that he would send a special
envoy to Kyrgyzstan, Slovak diplomat Jan Kubis. The OSCE Chairperson-in-Office has
appointed Zhanybek Karibzhanov as a special envoy to Kyrgyzstan. In addition, Adil Akhmetov,
a member of the Kazakh delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, was appointed a
Special Envoy to Kyrgyzstan by Assembly President Joao Soares. It was agreed that the envoys
would coordinate their efforts. EU foreign affairs chief Catherine Ashton stated on April 8 that “I
welcome the early signs of stabilization in Kyrgyzstan and an end to the confrontation.... The EU
stands ready to provide urgent humanitarian assistance if necessary.”8
Implications for Russia and Other Eurasian States
During the initial violence, Russia urged restraint between Kyrgyz authorities and the opposition
and called on them to resolve their disputes through democratic means instead of violence.
Indicating a bias against Bakiyev, President Medvedev reportedly stated on April 7 that “this
situation is Kyrgyzstan’s internal affair but the form in which the protests erupted testifies to the
utmost degree of discontent that the actions of the authorities produced among the rank-and-file
people.”9 After the coup, Prime Minister Putin publicly denied that Russia had any direct role in
the coup, but he moved quickly to recognize the new interim government and to offer
humanitarian assistance.10 Otunbayeva and Tekebayev praised Putin for quickly offering
humanitarian assistance to Kyrgyzstan. On April 11, Atambayev visited Moscow and reported
that Kyrgyzstan had been offered a multimillion dollar grant of humanitarian aid.
Some Western and Russian media and Russian analysts have asserted that Russia largely
orchestrated the coup because of dissatisfaction that Baliyev had not closed the Manas Transit
Center as promised.11 In contrast, the coup in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 was attributed by some officials
in Russia and Central Asia to influence by the United States through pro-democracy assistance to
non-governmental organizations. The United States denied any direct influence. According to this
Russian triumphalist view, however, Bakiyev’s ouster represents the removal of a regional leader
who had been backed by the United States. They point to what they claim were successful
Russian machinations in Kyrgyzstan to warn other regional leaders, particularly President
Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia, that they must pursue pro-Russian policies.
Months before the coup, Prime Minister Putin had indicated that $1.7 billion of a pledged $2
billion in loans to Kyrgyzstan (proffered the same day that Bakiyev had announced that the
airbase would be closed) would not be forthcoming. According to one article in the Kyrgyz press,
Prime Minister Putin allegedly raised concerns with Kyrgyz Prime Minister Usenov that “talk is
8 Agence France Presse, April 8, 2010.
9 ITAR-TASS, April 7, 2010.
10 ITAR-TASS, April 8, 2010.
11 Philip Pan, “Russia Is Said to have Fueled Kyrgyz Unrest,” The Washington Post, April 12, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
5
The April 2010 Coup in Kyrgyzstan: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests
reaching me of family business in Kyrgyzstan at state level. What is going on? How should this
be understood?... I wish to remind you also that one of the conditions for receiving the loan was
the withdrawal of the U.S. military base from Kyrgyzstan.”12 In another move viewed by many in
Kyrgyrstan as retaliation against Bakiyev, Russia had announced in late March 2010 that it would
greatly increase customs duties on gasoline exported to members of the Commonwealth of
Independent States that did not belong to a customs union (members of the customs union include
Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan). The increased duties disrupted supplied to Kyrgyzstan in early
April, causing increased prices. On April 8, a Russian official reportedly renewed the call for
Kyrgyzstan to close the Manas Transit Center (see below).13
On March 29, 2010, Nikolay Bordyuzha, the secretary general of the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO; a Russia-led military cooperation group that also includes Armenia,
Belarus, and the Central Asian states, except Turkmenistan), visited Kyrgyzstan and stated that
“there are no grounds to speak about any kind of chill in Russian-Kyrgyz relations... The Russian
and Kyrgyz presidents have a busy schedule working [together].” Bakiyev reported that
Bordyuzha, contacted him during the uprising, but he did not mention whether Bordyuzha had
offered the CSTO’s assistance in quelling it. Bordyuzha led a CSTO delegation to Bishkek on
April 9 to assess the situation and make a report to the CSTO Collective Security Council.
Tekebayev stressed that Kyrgyzstan would only permit CSTO peacekeepers into the country in
the extreme case that Bakiyev caused more bloodshed.14 The Chief of the Russian General Staff,
Nikolai Makarov, reported that President Medvedev had ordered that two paratroop companies
comprised of 150 officers and men be deployed to the Kant airbase (a Russian airbase east of
Bishkek) “to protect the families of [the Russian] military there, if need be, and they are on the
way.” The Russian government stressed that the paratroopers were carrying only small arms.
Further troops reportedly were deployed on April 11, 2010.15
Kazakhstan closed its borders after numbers of Kyrgyz reportedly attempted to cross the border to
find refuge in Kazakhstan. On April 9, however, it indicated that it would soon reopen the borders
and pledged humanitarian assistance to Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan also closed its borders and
official media paid scant attention to the turmoil in Kyrgyzstan, in what seemed like a replay of
its reaction to the 2005 coup, which it feared could have contagion effects. The border closures
exacerbate already problematic inter-regional trade and economic cooperation and could affect
the land transport of U.S. and NATO supplies to Afghanistan (see below). Georgian officials
raised concerns about Russia’s reputed involvement in the coup, but visiting Kyrgyz officials
reportedly stated that the coup was “a result of the accumulated discontent of the Kyrgyz people
with actions of the former authorities, in particular the difficult social and economic situation,
nepotism and corruption.”16
12 CEDR, December 7, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-9008.
13 “U.S. Air Base at Center of Kyrgyz Crisis,” MSNBC, April 8, 2010.
14 ITAR-TASS, April 9, 2010.
15 ITAR-TASS, April 8, 2010.
16 Statement of the Kyrgyz Foreign Ministry, reported in CEDR, April 12, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950029.
Congressional Research Service
6
The April 2010 Coup in Kyrgyzstan: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests
Implications for China
China is concerned that the coup could lead to a more democratic Kyrgyzstan that would inspire
Chinese democrats and embolden some ethnic Uighurs (a Turkic people) who advocate
separatism in China's Xinjiang region bordering Kyrgyzstan. Groups such as the East Turkestan
Independence Movement (ETIM; designated by the United States as a terrorist group) have bases
in Central Asia. China may also be concerned that peaceful Uighurs within a democratic
Kyrgyzstan might become more politically active in advocating for their kin in Xinjiang. There
was some looting and destruction of Chinese businesses in Kyrgyzstan during the coup that might
be classified as hate crimes. China is also concerned that instability in Kyrgyzstan could result in
increased cross-border smuggling and other crime. More widely, instability in Kyrgyzstan could
spread to other Central Asian countries, harming regional trade relations with China.
China has stressed that its paramount concern is that law and order be reestablished in
Kyrgyzstan and that “good neighborly relations” between the two states continue, including
cooperation in combating terrorists. The latter includes work within the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO; formed in by China, Russia, and most of the Central Asian states),
headquartered in Bishkek. Matching in some respects Russian concerns about the CSTO, the
coup reportedly raised questions in China about the effectiveness of the SCO’s emergency
consultation provisions.
Implications for U.S. Interests
The U.S. embassy in Bishkek on April 7 issued a statement raising deep concerns about the unrest
in some Kyrgyz cities and calling on all parties concerned to solve their conflict within the
framework of the rule of law. White House National Security Council spokesman Mike Hammer
similarly stated that the United States was closely following the situation and felt concerned about
reports of violence and looting, and urged all parties to refrain from violence and exercise
restraint. After the announcement that an interim government had been formed, U.S. Embassy
Chargé d’Affaires Larry Memmott met with Otunbayeva on April 8, reportedly to urge
nonviolence and a quick restoration of order and democracy. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
called Otunbayeva on April 10, and Michael McFaul, the Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Russian Affairs, reported that he also had talked
to Otunbayeva. On April 12, President Obama raised concerns about Kyrgyzstan with visiting
Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev.
Maksim Bakiyev, Foreign Minister Kadyrbek Sarbayev, and other Kyrgyz officials had traveled
to the United States for meetings, including with Administration officials as part of bilateral
dialogues with Central Asian countries launched last year. The bilateral dialogue was
“postponed,” according to the State Department, although a brief meeting was held between
Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake and Sarbayev.
The United States recently had decided to allocate $5.5 million for the construction of a counter-
terrorism training center in the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan. Russia had objected, since
Kyrgyzstan earlier had balked (including because Uzbekistan had strongly objected) at permitting
Russia to establish another airbase there. The status of plans for the counter-terrorism training
center is now uncertain.
Congressional Research Service
7
The April 2010 Coup in Kyrgyzstan: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests
Unlike Russia, the United States hesitated to recognize the interim government. McFaul stated on
April 8 that “the people that are allegedly running Kyrgyzstan—and I emphasize that word
because it’s not clear who is in charge right now—these are all people that we’ve had contact
with for many years.... This is not some anti-American coup. That we know for sure and this was
not a ‘sponsored by the Russians’ coup.” Instead of competition between Russia and the United
States over influence in Kyrgyzstan, McFaul suggested, President Medvedev had “pulled the
President aside” during their meeting in Prague on April 8 to discuss developments in Kyrgyzstan
and possible cooperative actions, including the involvement of the OSCE in facilitating peace.17
If a more democratic and stable Kyrgyzstan emerges, many observers argue, it could more
effectively combat cross-border terrorism and drug trafficking that could have a positive effect on
internal developments in Afghanistan.
The U.S. Transit Center and Northern Distribution Network
The Manas Transit Center near Bishkek (see Figure A-1) plays a vital role in the U.S. surge in
Afghanistan. Most U.S. troops enter and leave Afghanistan through the Transit Center. U.S. and
French KC-135 tankers based there provide refueling services for U.S. and NATO aircraft flying
missions in Afghanistan. In addition, the Transit Center plays a vital role as part of the Northern
Distribution Network (NDN), a number of rail, road, and air routes transiting the Caspian region
to deliver supplies for U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan. Some weapons and classified
cargoes are sent via air routes to the Transit Center, and thence to Afghanistan. In addition, some
supplies are sent by land through Kazakhstan to the Transit Center, where they are then flown to
Afghanistan, although this is not a major NDN land route. In March 2010, about 50,000 troops
passed through Manas, en route to or out of Afghanistan, according to the Air Force, a substantial
increase over the average number of troops transiting per month in 2009.18
Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman reported on April 8 that “currently there are limited
operations at the Manas airfield,” but that the Transit Center hoped to “be able to resume full
operations soon.” He also stated that in the meantime, alternative transit routes would be used.19
According to a U.S. Central Command spokesman, troop flights through the Transit Center were
again temporarily interrupted on April 9, but resupply and refueling missions continued. Troop
flights were renewed by April 12.
The Transit Center leasing arrangement comes up for annual review in July 2010, and some
officials in the interim government have stated or implied that the conditions of the lease would
be examined. Otunbayeva warned on April 8 that questions of corruption involving commercial
supplies for the Transit Center would be one matter of investigation. Analyst Deirdre Tynan has
reported that a company with a contract to supply jet fuel to the airbase may be linked to
Bakiyev.20
17 The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs Holds a White House
News Briefing, April 8, 2010.
18 Staff Sgt. Carolyn Viss, “LRS breaks 2 of their own records,” 376th Air Expeditionary Wing Public Affairs, April 5,
2010.
19 U.S. Department of Defense. American Forces Information Service, Press Release: U.S. Afghan Supply Mission
Continues at Manas, April 8, 2010.
20 Deirdre Tynan, “Kyrgyzstan: U.S. Air Base Contracts To Face Scrutiny,” Eurasia Insight, April 8, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
8
The April 2010 Coup in Kyrgyzstan: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests
Among other statements:
• Otunbayeva stated on April 12 that she realized that 2010 was a seminal year for
U.S. operations in Afghanistan and that President Obama planned on drawing
down troops thereafter. She implied that ultimately she hoped there were no
bases in the country.21 In March 2009, she had voted against closing the Manas
airbase when the legislature decided to rescind agreements with the United States
and other NATO countries on the use of the airbase. At that time, she raised
concerns that Russia would gain undue influence in Kyrgyzstan as a result. She
also has stated that the lease and other payments for use of the Transit Center
benefit Kyrgyzstan’s economy.22
• Tekebayev has suggested that Kyrgyzstan may decide not to renew the lease on
the Transit Center as a sign of gratitude for Russia’s support for the interim
government.23
• In late March 2010, Sariyev had been detained during an unauthorized
demonstration that among other issues had denounced the planned U.S. facility at
Batken.
• Following Bakiyev’s announcement in early February 2009 of his intention to
close the airbase, Beknazarov had called for also closing Russia’s Kant airbase
and for Kyrgyzstan to adopt a neutrality policy.24
• Atambayev has asserted that the leasing arrangements for the Transit Center
would be examined, but like Otunbayeva he acknowledged that President Obama
planned to reduced the numbers of troops in Afghanistan in coming years.25
Some observers argue that the United States de-emphasized its concerns over human rights and
democratization problems in Kyrgyzstan in order to maintain good relations with the Bakiyev
government and retain leasing rights for the Transit Center.26 The U.S. State Department and
other observers, however, disagree that the United States de-emphasized concerns over human
rights and democratization.27 These observers also argue that, while some Kyrgyz politicians
decry an alleged de-emphasis, they do not equally criticize Russia for not emphasizing human
rights and democratization in its relations with Bakiyev. Also, Russia is not being asked to close
its airbase at Kant as a result, while the United States is being asked to close its Transit Center,
they point out.
21 Open Source Center. Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter CEDR), April 12, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-600.
22 CEDR, March 6, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950134; June 24, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-358001.
23 Philip Pan and Craig Whitlock, “Fate of U.S. Base in Kyrgyzstan Uncertain,” Washington Post, April 9, 2010. In an
interview on April 8, however, Tekebayev stated that “I have a pretty good attitude toward the United States, but I
would like to state that we are all pro-Kyrgyz politicians. Opinions concerning the future of Manas in the provisional
government differ, and there is no one position as yet. There will be discussion, this is for certain.” CEDR, April 9,
2010, Doc. No. CEP-49005.
24 CEDR, February 4, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950035.
25 CEDR, April 12, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950139.
26 Alexander Cooley, quoted in The Washington Post, April 9, 2010.
27 Tekebayev stressed on April 9 that the United States and Europe had criticized the 2009 presidential election in
Kyrgyzstan, while Russia had praised it as “fair and just.” However, he praised the Russian government for changing
its view and making contact with the political opposition in Kyrgyzstan. CEDR, April 9, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-49005.
Congressional Research Service
9
The April 2010 Coup in Kyrgyzstan: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests
Reporting on the meeting between Presidents Obama and Medvedev in Prague on April 8,
McFaul asserted that Russia had changed its view of the Manas airbase from that it held in
February 2009, when it offered $2 billion in aid to Kyrgyzstan as an implicit quid pro quo for
closing the airbase. Instead, the two Presidents had held “an entirely different conversation today.
We have interest in stability. We want to make, we want to monitor that the troops stay where
they are.” In response to a question about an alleged statement by a Russian official that Moscow
would urge that Kyrgyzstan close the “Transit Center,” McFaul stated that “I was standing next to
the two Presidents discussing Kyrgyzstan and the notion that we need to close the ... Manas
Transit Center was not discussed. That [alleged statement] just simply seems spurious to me.”28
28 The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs Holds a White House
News Briefing, April 8, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
10
The April 2010 Coup in Kyrgyzstan: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests
Appendix A. Opposition Leaders in the New
Government
Roza Otunbayeva, head of the Social Democratic Party. She was a former deputy prime minister,
foreign minister, ambassador to the United Kingdom and the United States, and U.N. emissary.
Temir Sariyev, the leader of the Ak-Shumkar party. He ran as an opposition candidate in the 2009
presidential election.
Omurbek Tekebayev, head of the Ata Meken Party. He was a former speaker of the legislature. He
is a member of the United People's Movement opposition bloc of parties.
Almazbek Atambayev, head of the Social Democratic Party. He served as prime minister under
President Bakiyev in March-November 2007. He resigned and accused the Bakiyev government
of corruption and nepotism. He was the main opposition candidate in the 2009 presidential
election. He is a member of the United People's Movement opposition bloc of parties.
Azimbek Beknazarov, leader of the People’s Revolutionary Movement. He was a former
prosecutor-general. He is a member of the United People's Movement opposition bloc of parties.
Congressional Research Service
11
The April 2010 Coup in Kyrgyzstan: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests
Figure A-1. Map of Kyrgyzstan
Author Contact Information
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
jnichol@crs.loc.gov, 7-2289
Congressional Research Service
12