Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations: Background and Issues for Congress

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Summary

The Department of Defense (DOD) is placing an increased planning and budgeting emphasis on irregular warfare (IW) operations, such as counterinsurgency operations. In addition, counterterrorism (CT) operations have been a DOD area of emphasis since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The Navy for several years has carried out a variety of IW and CT activities, and has taken some steps in recent years to strengthen its ability to conduct such activities. The Navy’s IW and CT activities pose a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, including the definition of Navy IW activities, specific Navy IW budget priorities, and how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets.
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Introduction

The Department of Defense (DOD) is placing an increased planning and budgeting emphasis on irregular warfare (IW) operations, such as counterinsurgency operations. In addition, counterterrorism (CT) operations have been a DOD area of emphasis since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The Navy for several years has carried out a variety of IW and CT activities, and has taken some steps in recent years to strengthen its ability to conduct such activities. The Navy’s IW and CT activities pose a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, including the definition of Navy IW activities, specific Navy IW budget priorities, and how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets.

Background

Navy Irregular Warfare (IW) Operations

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan

Among the most readily visible of the Navy’s current IW operations are those being carried out by Navy sailors serving ashore in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Department of the Navy, which includes the Navy and Marine Corps, stated in early 2010 that:

1 Unless otherwise indicated, information in this section is taken from a Navy briefing to CRS on July 31, 2009, on Navy IW activities and capabilities.
for the transit of oil, the lifeblood of the Iraqi economy, and our ships and sailor are making that happen.\(^2\)

The Department of the Navy also stated:

On any given day there are approximately 12,300 Sailors ashore and another 9,800 afloat throughout the U.S. Central Command region conducting riverine operations, maritime infrastructure protection, explosive ordnance disposal, combat construction engineering, cargo handling, combat logistics, maritime security, and other forward presence activities. In collaboration with the U.S. Coast Guard, the Navy also conducts critical port operations, port and oil platform security, and maritime interception operations. Included in our globally sourced forces are 15,600 IAs serving in a variety of joint or coalition billets, either in the training pipeline or on station. As these operations unfold, the size and type of naval forces committed to them will likely evolve, thereby producing changes to the overall force posture of naval forces. Long after the significant land component presence is reduced, naval forces will remain forward.

Strike operations are conducted to damage or destroy objectives or selected enemy capabilities. Recent examples include simultaneous close air support missions that are integrated and synchronized with coalition ground forces to protect key infrastructure, deter and disrupt extremist operations or hostile activities, and provide oversight for reconstruction efforts in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

We are refocusing this strategic capability more intensely in Afghanistan in an effort to counter the increasing threat of a well-armed anti-Coalition militia including Taliban, al Qaeda, criminal gangs, narcoterrorists, and any other antigovernment elements that threaten the peace and stability of Afghanistan. Our increased efforts to deter or defeat aggression and improve overall security and counter violent extremism and terrorist networks advance the interests of the U.S. and the security of the region. The FY 2010/FY 2011 contingency operations requests support the expansion of capabilities sufficient to secure Afghanistan and prevent it from again becoming a haven for international terrorism and associated militant extremist movements.\(^3\)

More specifically, the Navy states that operations performed by Navy personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan include the following:

- **Close air support (CAS) and airborne reconnaissance** operations, in which Navy aircraft account for 30% of all such missions;

- **Expeditionary electronic warfare** operations, including operations to defeat improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 75% of airborne electronic attack operations in Iraq, 100% of such operations in Afghanistan, and operations to counter insurgent and extremist network communications;

- **Intelligence and signals intelligence** operations, including operations to identify, map, and track extremist activity, and operations involving tactical intelligence support teams that are deployed with special operations forces (SOF);

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\(^3\) Department of the Navy, *Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget*, February 2010, pp. 2-1 to 2-3.
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- **explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)** operations, including defusing IEDs, clearing land mines, destroying captured weapon and explosive caches, and investigating blast scenes so as to obtain evidence for later prosecution.

- **riverine warfare** operations to secure waterways such as the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and the Haditha dam;

- **maritime security** operations, including operations to intercept smugglers and extremists going to Iraq and Kuwait, and operations to guard Iraqi and U.S. infrastructure, facilities, and supply lines, such as ports and oil and gas platforms and pipelines;

- **medical and dental** services in Iraq and Afghanistan provided by a total of more than 1,800 naval medical personnel;

- **logistics** operations, including transporting of 90% of military equipment for Iraq and Afghanistan on military sealift ships, operating ports in Iraq and Kuwait, and providing contracting services and reconstruction using Iraqi firms;

- **engineering and construction** operations, such as rebuilding schools, repairing roads, reconstructing electrical, water and sewer systems, and training and equipping Iraqi engineers;

- **provincial reconstruction** operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; and

- **legal** operations, including prosecution of special-group criminals and assisting Iraqis in drafting governing documents.

**Other Operations**

In addition to participating in U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Navy states that its IW operations also include the following:

- **security force assistance operations**, in which forward-deployed Navy ships exercise and work with foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces, so as to improve their abilities to conduct maritime security operations;

- **civic assistance operations**, in which forward-deployed Navy units, including Navy hospital ships, expeditionary medical teams, fleet surgical teams, and naval construction units provide medical and construction services in foreign countries as a complement to other U.S. diplomatic and development activities in those countries;

- **disaster relief operations**, of which Navy forces have performed several in recent years; and

- **counter-piracy operations**, which have increased since 2008.4

The Navy states that enduring areas of focus for the Navy’s role in IW include the following:

- **enhancing regional awareness**, which enables better planning, decision making, and operational agility;

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4 For more on counter-piracy operations, see CRS Report R40528, *Piracy off the Horn of Africa*, by Lauren Ploch et al.
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- **building maritime partner capability and capacity**, so as to deny sanctuaries to violent extremists; and
- **outcome-based application of force**, so as to maintain continuous pressure on extremist groups and their supporting infrastructure.

**Individual Augmentees (IAs)**

Many of the Navy’s contributions to irregular warfare operations around the world are made by Navy individual augmentees (IAs)—individual Navy sailors assigned to various DOD operations. The Department of the Navy stated in early 2009 that:

The Navy provides approximately 15,600 sailors in the form of IA’s, including 3,800 personnel in the training pipeline, to fulfill the OCO mission requirements of the Combatant Commanders (COCOM). Approximately 8,500 of these IA’s are funded in the baseline budget filling core missions such as maritime and port security, airlift support, and JTF/COCOM staff support. An additional 2,700 IA’s are funded in the baseline budget in support of adaptive core missions including Counter IED, Combat Support, Military Police, Base Operations, Intel and Medical. The overseas contingency request includes 4,400 over strength requirements for temporary Navy overseas IA missions such as civil affairs, provincial reconstruction, training teams, detainee operations and customs inspections. IAs are making a significant impact in more than 20 countries around the world. They are assigned individually, rather than as part of a traditional unit, to fill shortages or provide specialized knowledge or skill sets. IAs have been assigned in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, Djibouti, Liberia, Chad, Cuba, Bahrain, Qatar, Colombia, Philippines, United Arab Emirates, Sudan, Oman, Pakistan, Germany, Spain, Italy, Honduras, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Haiti. These IA’s provide commanders with mission tailored, globally distributed forces. The Navy identifies both active and reserve service members with specific skill sets to fill IA roles, and the Marine Corps relies principally on activated reserve members to fill IA positions vacated by forward-deployed active component Marines.5

**IW Initiatives in Navy Budget**

**Discussion in FY2011 Department of the Navy Budget Highlights Book**

The Department of the Navy’s FY2011 budget highlight books states:

The FY 2011 [Department of the Navy] budget is the product of a holistic assessment of capabilities, requirements and risks and is consistent with the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Enhancements in the area of Irregular Warfare (IW) are realized through increased support of Special Operations Forces and expanded capacity for littoral, brown water, and riverine missions.6

It also states:

The FY 2011 budget includes the establishment of a new RC [reserve component] riverine training squadron which will compliment the three existing AC [active component] riverine

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squadrons. The fourth riverine squadron will increase the riverine capacity to conduct brown water training and partnership activities in order to meet COCOM demands.\(^7\)

It also states:

In keeping with the priorities of the Secretary of Defense, the FY 2011 budget continues to rebalance our investment programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars of today and the most-likely scenarios in the future, while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies.

The FY 2011 budget concentrates investment in platforms and systems that maintain the advantage against future threats and across the full spectrum of operations. Procurement of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and other programs that support irregular warfare and capacity building reflect that shift. However, even as the Department begins to shift resources and institutional weight towards supporting the current conflicts and other potential irregular campaigns, we still must contend with the security challenges posed by the military forces of other countries – from those actively hostile to those at strategic crossroads.\(^8\)

It also states:

The Navy’s shipbuilding budget represents the best balance between high-end, hybrid and irregular warfare capabilities. It funds a continuum of forces ranging from the covert Virginia class submarine, the multi-mission DDG-51 destroyer, the multi-role Landing Helicopter Assault Replacement (LHA(R)), to the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) with their greater access to littoral areas. This balance continues to pace future threat capabilities while fully supporting current irregular warfare operations and supporting maritime security and stability operations in the littorals.\(^9\)

The book mentions the irregular warfare capabilities of the Navy’s new P-8 aircraft,\(^10\) states that Department of the Navy research and development initiatives support both traditional and irregular warfare demands in several aviation programs,\(^11\) and states more generally that asymmetric and irregular warfare constitute one of 13 focus areas for the science and technology (S&T) portion of the Department of the Navy’s research and development efforts.\(^12\)

The book states the following regarding the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) portion of the Department of the Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget:

The current request includes incremental costs to sustain operations, manpower, equipment and infrastructure repair, as well as equipment replacement. These costs include aviation and ship operations, combat support, base support, USMC operations and field logistics, as well as IAs, activated reservists and other special pays. Navy is requesting funding for 4,400 IAs in the FY 2011 OCO request for service members filling non-traditional Navy missions such as provincial reconstruction teams, detainee operations, civil affairs, training teams, customs

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\(^7\) Department of the Navy, *Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget*, February 2010, p. 4-24.
\(^8\) Department of the Navy, *Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget*, February 2010, p. 5-1.
\(^10\) Department of the Navy, *Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget*, February 2010, pp. 1-8, 5-11
\(^12\) Department of the Navy, *Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget*, February 2010, p. 5-31.
inspections, counter IED, and combat support. Finally, both the FY 2010 and the FY 2011 full year requests reflect the initial shift in forces from Iraq to Afghanistan. The Department of the Navy requests $3.9 billion in FY 2010 for supplemental requirements and $18.5 billion for FY 2011 to support increased OPTEMPO for contingency operations. Since 2009, total funding trends reflect the Department’s efforts to reduce reliance on supplemental appropriations and include OCO costs with the budget request. Figure 6 reflects the current status of FY 2009, FY 2010, and FY 2011 funding for OCO.

The FY 2011 OCO O&M request specifically provides the resources required to meet increased CENTCOM demand, to include a substantial increase in flight hours associated with the shift from OIF [Operational Iraqi Freedom—i.e., operations in Iraq] to OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom—i.e., operations in Afghanistan] and the increased Carrier Strike Group presence that ensures there are no Air Tasking Order gaps; the Navy’s FY 2010 OCO appropriation did not fully capture OEF execution requirements.

The supplemental request for FY 2010 and the full-year request for FY 2011 supports the deployment, operation and sustainment of two regimental combat teams, a division-level headquarters unit, Seabee battalions, aviation and ship operations, combat support, base support, transportation of personnel and equipment into theater, and associated enabling forces to Afghanistan. The additional funding will support expansion into new areas of operation and establishment of a new command within the southern region of Afghanistan. Increased funding is also needed for service contracts supporting unmanned aerial systems (UAS) providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and additional in-theater maintenance. The amendment will also fund increased fuel costs in FY 2010.13

### Longer List of Navy IW Budget Initiatives

The Navy states that a longer list of Navy budget initiatives for creating or expanding its IW capabilities includes the following, which are not necessarily listed in any particular order of priority:

- shifting funding for the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (or NECC—see “Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC)” below) from the wartime operations part of the Navy’s budget into the Navy’s “base” budget (aka, the “regular” part of the Navy’s budget);
- delivering expanded counter-IED and EOD capabilities;
- deploying riverine squadrons and maritime expeditionary support squadrons;
- training Navy personnel in foreign languages, regional affairs, and cultures;
- using the JFK Irregular Warfare Center at the Office of Navy Intelligence (ONI) to provide intelligence support to joint IW/SOF operations;
- ship operation and acquisition, including:
  - using ships (such as amphibious ships) as partnership stations, such as the Southern Partnership Station (SPS) and the Africa Partnership Station (APS) (see “Partnership Stations” below);

13 Department of the Navy, *Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget*, February 2010, pp. 2-4 and 2-5.
• using ships (such as surface combatants and amphibious ships) for anti-piracy operations;
• using hospital ships for humanitarian-assistance operations;
• procuring Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs);\(^\text{14}\)
• procuring Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV), which are high-speed sealift ships;
• ending procurement of DDG-1000 destroyers and restarting procurement of DDG-51 Aegis destroyers;\(^\text{15}\)
• operating four Trident submarines that have been converted into cruise missile and SOF-support submarines (SSGNs);\(^\text{16}\)
• accelerating acquisition of the P-8 multi-mission aircraft (MMA), the Navy’s intended successor to the P-3 maritime patrol aircraft;
• accelerating acquisition of certain unmanned systems, including:
  • the Navy Unmanned Combat Air System (N-UCAS—an unmanned aircraft that is to be flown from Navy aircraft carriers);
  • a sea-based, medium-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV);
  • the small tactical unmanned aerial system (STUAS);
• expanding the Navy’s sea-based ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities;\(^\text{17}\) and
• expanding the Navy’s cyberwarfare operations force.

A separate list of Navy budgetary areas of emphasis for IW includes the following:

• ships and aircraft;
• persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities;
• unmanned systems;
• language skills, regional expertise, and cultural awareness (LREC);
• operations to build partnerships with other countries and to expand partner capacities;

\(^\text{14}\) For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

\(^\text{15}\) For more on the ending of DDG-1000 procurement and the restart of DDG-51 procurement, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

\(^\text{16}\) For more on the converted Trident submarines, see CRS Report RS21007, Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

\(^\text{17}\) For more on the Navy’s sea-based BMD capabilities, see CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
cybersecurity; and

tools for fusing information from various sources.

In addition, the Navy states that with regard to rapidly fielding IW new capabilities, specific current items of focus include the following:

- the Center for IW and Armed Groups (CIWAG)—an 18-month pilot project at the Naval War College in Newport, RI, whose current grant funding expires in June 2010;

- a large-diameter unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) for ISR operations;

- Saber Focus—a land-based unmanned air system (UAS) that would be established in an overseas location and used for ISR to support IW operations;

- the use of ship-based Scan Eagle UAVs on converted Trident SSGNs for ISR operations;

- a surface ship- or submarine-based Maritime UAS that would be used for ISR operations and possibly signals intelligence operations;

- a naval intelligence fusion tool (NIFT) that is to integrate national and tactical ISR sensors so as to create real-time, actionable intelligence and targeting recommendations;

- a ship-based system called real time regional gateway (RTRG) for improved exploitation of signals intelligence to support IW operations; and

- an expansion in the size of helicopter squadrons that directly support special operations forces (SOF).

**Navy Counterterrorism (CT) Operations**

Navy CT operations including the following:

- Tomahawk cruise missile attacks on suspected terrorist training camps and facilities, such as those reportedly conducted in Somalia on March 3 and May 1, 2008, and those conducted in 1998 in response to the 1998 terrorist bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa;19

- operations by Navy special operations forces, known as SEALs, that are directed against terrorists;20

- surveillance by Navy ships and aircraft of suspected terrorists overseas;

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20 SEAL is an acronym that stands for Sea, Air, and Land. For further discussion of the SEALs, see CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
Navy Role in Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism

- maritime intercept operations (MIO) aimed at identifying and intercepting terrorists or weapons of mass destruction at sea, or potentially threatening ships or aircraft that are in or approaching U.S. territorial waters—an activity that includes Navy participation in the multilateral Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI);\(^{21}\)

- working with the Coast Guard to build maritime domain awareness (MDA)—a real-time understanding of activities on the world’s oceans;

- assisting the Coast Guard in port-security operations;\(^{22}\)

- protection of forward-deployed Navy ships, an activity that was intensified following the terrorist attack on the Navy Aegis destroyer Cole (DDG-67) in October 2000 in the port of Aden, Yemen;\(^{23}\)

- protection of domestic and overseas Navy bases and facilities;

- developing Global Maritime Intelligence Integration (GMII) as part of Joint Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) and Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA); and

- engaging with the U.S. Coast Guard to use the National Strategy for Maritime Security to more rapidly develop capabilities for Homeland Security, particularly in the area of MDA.

The Department of the Navy stated in early 2010 that:

> While forward, acting as the lead element of our defense-in-depth, naval forces will be positioned for increased roles in combating terrorism.... Expanded Maritime Interdiction Operations (EMIO) are authorized by the President and directed by the Secretary of Defense to intercept vessels identified to be transporting terrorists and/or terrorist-related materiel that poses an imminent threat to the United States and its allies.\(^{24}\)

Navy IW and CT Initiatives

The Navy in recent years has implemented a number of initiatives intended to increase its IW and CT capabilities and activities, including those discussed below.

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\(^{21}\) For more on the PSI, see CRS Report RL34327, *Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)*, by Mary Beth Nikitin.


Navy Irregular Warfare Office

The Navy in July 2008 established the Navy Irregular Warfare Office, which is intended, in the Navy’s words, to “institutionalize current ad hoc efforts in IW missions of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and the supporting missions of information operations, intelligence operations, foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare as they apply to CT and counterinsurgency.” The office works closely with U.S. Special Operations Command, and reports to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for information, plans, and strategy.

Global Maritime Partnership

The Global Maritime Partnership, initially known as the 1,000-ship Navy concept, is a U.S. Navy initiative to achieve an enhanced degree of cooperation between the U.S. Navy and foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces, for the purpose of ensuring global maritime security against common threats. The Navy states that

There is no one nation that can provide a solution to maritime security problems alone. A global maritime partnership is required that unites maritime forces, port operators, commercial shippers, and international, governmental and nongovernmental agencies to address our mutual concerns. This partnership increases all of our maritime capabilities, such as response time, agility and adaptability, and is purely voluntary, with no legal or encumbering ties. It is a free-form, self-organizing network of maritime partners — good neighbors interested in using the power of the sea to unite, rather than to divide.

Partnership Stations

The Southern Partnership Station (SPS) and the Africa Partnership Station (APS) are Navy ships, such as amphibious ships or high-speed sealift ships, that have deployed to the Caribbean and to waters off Africa, respectively, to support U.S. Navy engagement with countries in those regions, particularly for purposes of building security partnerships with those countries, and for increasing the capabilities of those countries for performing maritime-security operations. The SPS and APS can be viewed as specific measures for promoting the above-discussed global maritime partnership.

Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC)

The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), headquartered at Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA, was established informally in October 2005 and formally on January 13, 2006. The creation of NECC consolidated and facilitated the expansion of a number of Navy organizations that have a role in IW operations. Navy functions supported by NECC include the following:

- riverine warfare;
- maritime civil affairs;


26 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 1-5.
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The Department of the Navy stated in early 2010 that NECC:

Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) is a global force provider of expeditionary combat service support and force protection capabilities to joint warfighting commanders, centrally managing the current and future readiness, resources, manning, training, and equipping of a scalable, self-sustaining and integrated expeditionary force of active and reserve sailors. Expeditionary sailors are deployed from around the globe in support of the new “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.” NECC forces and capabilities are integral to executing the maritime strategy which is based on expanded core capabilities of maritime power: forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. To enable these, NECC provides a full spectrum of operations, including effective waterborne and ashore anti-terrorism force protection; theater security cooperation and engagement; and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. NECC is also a key element of the Navy’s operational Irregular Warfare (IW) efforts in the area of operational support to the Navy forces in OIF and OEF. In the FY 2011 budget, NECC funding is increased to address increased requirements for NECC Global Force Management (GFM) presence, operational plans surge, and equipment life cycle sustainment.

NECC provides integrated active and reserve forces, highlighted by the seamlessly integrated operational forces of naval construction (Seabees), maritime expeditionary security (formerly coastal warfare), navy expeditionary logistics (Cargo Handling Battalions), and the remaining mission capabilities throughout the command.

NECC is not a standalone or combat force, but rather a force protection and combat service force of rapidly deployable mission specialists that fill the gaps in the joint battle space and compliment joint and coalition capabilities.27

The Department of the Navy also stated that:

The Reserve Component expeditionary forces are integrated with the Active Component forces to provide a continuum of capabilities unique to the maritime environment within Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC). Blending the AC and RC brings strength to

27 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, pp. 4-14 and 4-15.
the force and is an important part of the Navy’s ability to carry out the Naval Maritime Strategy from blue water into green and brown water and in direct support of the Joint Force. The Navy Reserve trains and equips 51% of Sailors supporting NECC missions, including Naval construction and explosive ordnance disposal in the CENTCOM AOR as emphasis shifts from Iraq to Afghanistan, as well as maritime expeditionary security, expeditionary logistics (cargo handling battalions), maritime civil affairs, expeditionary intelligence, and other mission capabilities seamlessly integrated with operational forces around the world.\footnote{Department of the Navy, \textit{Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget}, February 2010, p. 4-24.}

**Riverine Force**

The riverine force is intended to supplement the riverine capabilities of the Navy’s SEALs (the Navy’s Sea-Air-Land special operations forces) and relieve Marines who had been conducting maritime security operations in ports and waterways in Iraq. The riverine force currently consists of three active-duty squadrons of 12 boats each, and includes a total of about 900 sailors. The Navy established Riverine Group 1 (which oversees the three squadrons) at the Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA, in May 2006. The three current riverine squadrons were established in 2006-2007.

As mentioned earlier, the Department of the Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requests funding for “the establishment of a new RC [reserve component] riverine training squadron which will compliment the three existing AC [active component] riverine squadrons. The fourth riverine squadron will increase the riverine capacity to conduct brown water training and partnership activities in order to meet COCOM demands.”\footnote{Department of the Navy, \textit{Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget}, February 2010, p. 4-24.} The Navy states that the creation of the fourth riverine squadron is to involve the realignment of 238 Full Time Support and Selected Reservist billets, and that the new squadron is to be the first-ever reserve component riverine training squadron within NECC.\footnote{Department of the Navy, \textit{Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget}, February 2010, p. 3-7.}

**Other Initiatives**

Other Navy initiatives in recent years for supporting IW and CT operations include establishing a reserve civil affairs battalion, a Navy Foreign Area Officer (FAO) community consisting of officers with specialized knowledge of foreign countries and regions, a maritime interception operation (MIO) intelligence exploitation pilot program, an intelligence data-mining capability at the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC).

**Potential Oversight Issues for Congress**

**Definition of Navy IW Activities**

Potential oversight questions for Congress regarding the definition of Navy IW activities include the following:
• Should security force assistance operations, civic assistance operations, disaster relief operations, and counter-piracy operations be included in the definition of Navy IW operations?

• Should operations to build partnerships, and to build partner capacities for conducting maritime security operations, be included in the definition of Navy IW operations?

• Has the Navy included the kinds of operations listed in the two previous points in its definition of Navy IW operations in part to satisfy a perceived requirement from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to show that the Navy is devoting a certain portion of its personnel and budgets to irregular warfare?

• Should the Navy’s CT operations be considered a part of its IW operations? What is the relationship between IW operations and CT operations?

**Navy IW Budget Priorities**

Potential oversight questions for Congress regarding Navy IW budget priorities include the following:

• Is the Navy’s list of IW budget items sufficiently organized and prioritized to support congressional understanding and oversight, or to permit Congress to know where any additional dollars available for Navy IW operations might best be added?

• Should items such as expanding Navy sea-based BMD capabilities, procuring DDG-51 destroyers, and Navy cyber security operations be included in a list of Navy IW budgetary initiatives?

• Are the Navy’s current IW-oriented UAV/UAS programs sufficiently coordinated?

**Degree of Emphasis on IW and CT in Future Navy Budgets**

A third oversight issue for Congress—an issue related to, but more general than the previous one—is how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets.

Supporters of placing increased emphasis on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets could argue that the experience of recent years, including U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, suggests that the United States in coming years will likely need to be able to conduct IW and CT operations, that the Navy has certain specialized or unique IW and CT capabilities that need to be supported as part of an effective overall U.S. IW or CT effort, and that there are programs relating to Navy IW and CT activities that could be funded at higher levels, if additional funding were made available.

Opponents of placing an increased emphasis on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets could argue that these activities already receive adequate emphasis on Navy budgets, and that placing an increased emphasis on these activities could reduce the amount of funding available to the Navy for programs that support the Navy’s role in acting, along with the Air Force, as a strategic reserve for the United States in potential conventional inter-state conflicts.
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:

- To what degree can or should Navy IW and CT activities be used to reduce the burden on other services for conducting such activities?
- Are the Navy’s steps to increase its role in IW and CT partly motivated by concerns about its perceived relevance, or by a desire to secure a portion of IW and CT funding?
- Is the Navy striking an appropriate balance between IW and CT activities and other Navy concerns, such as preparing for a potential future challenge from improved Chinese maritime military forces?  

**Additional Oversight Questions**

In addition to the issues discussed above, the Navy’s IW and CT activities pose some additional potential oversight issues for Congress, including the following:

- How many Navy personnel globally are involved in IW and CT activities, and where are they located? How much funding is the Navy expending each year on such activities?
- Is the Navy adequately managing its individual augmentee (IA) program?
- Is the Navy devoting sufficient attention and resources to riverine warfare?
- Aside from the establishment of the riverine force and a reserve civil affairs battalion, what implications might an expanded Navy role in IW and CT have for Navy force-structure requirements (i.e., the required size and composition of the Navy)?
- Is the Navy adequately coordinating its IW and CT activities and initiatives with other organizations, such as the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Coast Guard?
- Are the Navy’s recent IW and CT organizational changes appropriate? What other Navy organizational changes might be needed?

**Legislative Activity for FY2011**

The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget was submitted to Congress on February 1, 2010.

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31 For additional discussion of this issue, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

32 For a discussion of the Navy’s management of the IA program, see Andrew Scutro, “Fleet Forces Takes Charge of IA Program,” NavyTimes.com, July 7, 2008.

33 For an article that discusses this question from a critical perspective, see Daniel A. Hancock, “The Navy’s Not Serious About Riverine Warfare,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2008: 14-19.
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