Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism
Operations: Background and Issues for
Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
March 31, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS22373
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Navy Role in Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism
Summary
The Department of Defense (DOD) is placing an increased planning and budgeting emphasis on
irregular warfare (IW) operations, such as counterinsurgency operations. In addition,
counterterrorism (CT) operations have been a DOD area of emphasis since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. The Navy for several years has carried out a variety of IW and CT activities,
and has taken some steps in recent years to strengthen its ability to conduct such activities. The
Navy’s IW and CT activities pose a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, including
the definition of Navy IW activities, specific Navy IW budget priorities, and how much emphasis
to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets.
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Navy Role in Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
Navy Irregular Warfare (IW) Operations ............................................................................... 1
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan ................................................................................. 1
Other Operations............................................................................................................. 3
Individual Augmentees (IAs)........................................................................................... 4
IW Initiatives in Navy Budget ......................................................................................... 4
Navy Counterterrorism (CT) Operations................................................................................ 8
Navy IW and CT Initiatives................................................................................................... 9
Navy Irregular Warfare Office....................................................................................... 10
Global Maritime Partnership ......................................................................................... 10
Partnership Stations....................................................................................................... 10
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC)........................................................... 10
Riverine Force .............................................................................................................. 12
Other Initiatives ............................................................................................................ 12
Potential Oversight Issues for Congress..................................................................................... 12
Definition of Navy IW Activities......................................................................................... 12
Navy IW Budget Priorities .................................................................................................. 13
Degree of Emphasis on IW and CT in Future Navy Budgets................................................ 13
Additional Oversight Questions........................................................................................... 14
Legislative Activity for FY2011 ................................................................................................ 14
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 15
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Navy Role in Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism
Introduction
The Department of Defense (DOD) is placing an increased planning and budgeting emphasis on
irregular warfare (IW) operations, such as counterinsurgency operations. In addition,
counterterrorism (CT) operations have been a DOD area of emphasis since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. The Navy for several years has carried out a variety of IW and CT activities,
and has taken some steps in recent years to strengthen its ability to conduct such activities. The
Navy’s IW and CT activities pose a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, including
the definition of Navy IW activities, specific Navy IW budget priorities, and how much emphasis
to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets.
Background
Navy Irregular Warfare (IW) Operations1
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
Among the most readily visible of the Navy’s current IW operations are those being carried out
by Navy sailors serving ashore in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Department of the Navy, which
includes the Navy and Marine Corps, stated in early 2010 that:
The Navy has 53,000 active and reserve sailors continually deployed in support of the
contingency operations overseas serving as members of carrier strike groups, expeditionary
strike groups, Special Operating Forces, Seabee units, Marine forces, medical units, and as
IAs [individual augmentees]. Our Sailors are fully engaged on the ground, in the air, and at
sea in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. On the ground, our Navy has 12,300
active and reserve Sailors in Central Command supporting Navy, Joint Force and Combatant
Commander requirements. Navy Commanders are leading six of the twelve U.S.-lead
Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. A significant portion of the combat air
missions over Afghanistan are flown by naval air forces. Our elite teams of Navy SEALs
[i.e., Sea-Air-Land special operations forces] are heavily engaged in combat operations,
Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal platoons are defusing Improvised Explosive Devices and
landmines. Our SEABEE construction battalions are rebuilding schools and restoring critical
infrastructure. Navy sealift is delivering the majority of heavy war equipment to
CENTCOM, while Navy logisticians are ensuring materiel arrives on time. Our Navy
doctors are providing medical assistance in the field and at forward operating bases. Navy
IAs are providing combat support and combat service support for Army and Marine Corps
personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. As IAs they are fulfilling vital roles by serving in
traditional Navy roles such as USMC support, maritime and port security, cargo handling,
airlift support, Seabee units, and as a member of joint task force/Combatant Commanders
staffs. On the water, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Riverine forces are working
closely with the Iraqi Navy to safeguard Iraqi infrastructure and provide maritime security in
key waterways. Navy forces are also intercepting smugglers and insurgents and protecting
Iraqi and partner nation oil and gas infrastructure. We know the sea lanes must remain open
1 Unless otherwise indicated, information in this section is taken from a Navy briefing to CRS on July 31, 2009, on
Navy IW activities and capabilities.
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for the transit of oil, the lifeblood of the Iraqi economy, and our ships and sailor are making
that happen.2
The Department of the Navy also stated:
On any given day there are approximately 12,300 Sailors ashore and another 9,800 afloat
throughout the U.S. Central Command region conducting riverine operations, maritime
infrastructure protection, explosive ordnance disposal, combat construction engineering,
cargo handling, combat logistics, maritime security, and other forward presence activities. In
collaboration with the U.S. Coast Guard, the Navy also conducts critical port operations, port
and oil platform security, and maritime interception operations. Included in our globally
sourced forces are 15,600 IAs serving in a variety of joint or coalition billets, either in the
training pipeline or on station. As these operations unfold, the size and type of naval forces
committed to them will likely evolve, thereby producing changes to the overall force posture
of naval forces. Long after the significant land component presence is reduced, naval forces
will remain forward....
Strike operations are conducted to damage or destroy objectives or selected enemy
capabilities. Recent examples include simultaneous close air support missions that are
integrated and synchronized with coalition ground forces to protect key infrastructure, deter
and disrupt extremist operations or hostile activities, and provide oversight for reconstruction
efforts in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom....
We are refocusing this strategic capability more intensely in Afghanistan in an effort to
counter the increasing threat of a well-armed anti-Coalition militia including Taliban, al
Qaeda, criminal gangs, narcoterrorists, and any other antigovernment elements that threaten
the peace and stability of Afghanistan. Our increased efforts to deter or defeat aggression and
improve overall security and counter violent extremism and terrorist networks advance the
interests of the U.S. and the security of the region. The FY 2010/FY 2011 contingency
operations requests support the expansion of capabilities sufficient to secure Afghanistan and
prevent it from again becoming a haven for international terrorism and associated militant
extremist movements. 3
More specifically, the Navy states that operations performed by Navy personnel in Iraq and
Afghanistan include the following:
• close air support (CAS) and airborne reconnaissance operations, in which
Navy aircraft account for 30% of all such missions;
• expeditionary electronic warfare operations, including operations to defeat
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 75% of airborne electronic attack
operations in Iraq, 100% of such operations in Afghanistan, and operations to
counter insurgent and extremist network communications;
• intelligence and signals intelligence operations, including operations to identify,
map, and track extremist activity, and operations involving tactical intelligence
support teams that are deployed with special operations forces (SOF);
2 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, pp. 2-3 and 2-4.
3 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, pp. 2-1 to 2-3.
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• explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations, including defusing IEDs,
clearing land mines, destroying captured weapon and explosive caches, and
investigating blast scenes so as to obtain evidence for later prosecution.
• riverine warfare operations to secure waterways such as the Tigris and
Euphrates rivers and the Haditha dam;
• maritime security operations, including operations to intercept smugglers and
extremists going to Iraq and Kuwait, and operations to guard Iraqi and U.S.
infrastructure, facilities, and supply lines, such as ports and oil and gas platforms
and pipelines;
• medical and dental services in Iraq and Afghanistan provided by a total of more
than 1,800 naval medical personnel;
• logistics operations, including transporting of 90% of military equipment for Iraq
and Afghanistan on military sealift ships, operating ports in Iraq and Kuwait, and
providing contracting services and reconstruction using Iraqi firms;
• engineering and construction operations, such as rebuilding schools, repairing
roads, reconstructing electrical, water and sewer systems, and training and
equipping Iraqi engineers;
• provincial reconstruction operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; and
• legal operations, including prosecution of special-group criminals and assisting
Iraqis in drafting governing documents.
Other Operations
In addition to participating in U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Navy states
that its IW operations also include the following:
• security force assistance operations, in which forward-deployed Navy ships
exercise and work with foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces,
so as to improve their abilities to conduct maritime security operations;
• civic assistance operations, in which forward-deployed Navy units, including
Navy hospital ships, expeditionary medical teams, fleet surgical teams, and naval
construction units provide medical and construction services in foreign countries
as a complement to other U.S. diplomatic and development activities in those
countries;
• disaster relief operations, of which Navy forces have performed several in
recent years; and
• counter-piracy operations, which have increased since 2008.4
The Navy states that enduring areas of focus for the Navy’s role in IW include the following:
• enhancing regional awareness, which enables better planning, decision making,
and operational agility;
4 For more on counter-piracy operations, see CRS Report R40528, Piracy off the Horn of Africa, by Lauren Ploch et al.
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• building maritime partner capability and capacity, so as to deny sanctuaries
to violent extremists; and
• outcome-based application of force, so as to maintain continuous pressure on
extremist groups and their supporting infrastructure.
Individual Augmentees (IAs)
Many of the Navy’s contributions to irregular warfare operations around the world are made by
Navy individual augmentees (IAs)—individual Navy sailors assigned to various DOD operations.
The Department of the Navy stated in early 2009 that:
The Navy provides approximately 15,600 sailors in the form of IA’s, including 3,800
personnel in the training pipeline, to fulfill the OCO mission requirements of the Combatant
Commanders (COCOM). Approximately 8,500 of these IA’s are funded in the baseline
budget filling core missions such as maritime and port security, airlift support, and
JTF/COCOM staff support. An additional 2,700 IA’s are funded in the baseline budget in
support of adaptive core missions including Counter IED, Combat Support, Military Police,
Base Operations, Intel and Medical. The overseas contingency request includes 4,400 over
strength requirements for temporary Navy overseas IA missions such as civil affairs,
provincial reconstruction, training teams, detainee operations and customs inspections. IAs
are making a significant impact in more than 20 countries around the world. They are
assigned individually, rather than as part of a traditional unit, to fill shortages or provide
specialized knowledge or skill sets. IAs have been assigned in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait,
Djibouti, Liberia, Chad, Cuba, Bahrain, Qatar, Colombia, Philippines, United Arab Emirates,
Sudan, Oman, Pakistan, Germany, Spain, Italy, Honduras, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and
Tobago, and Haiti. These IA’s provide commanders with mission tailored, globally
distributed forces. The Navy identifies both active and reserve service members with specific
skill sets to fill IA roles, and the Marine Corps relies principally on activated reserve
members to fill IA positions vacated by forward-deployed active component Marines.5
IW Initiatives in Navy Budget
Discussion in FY2011 Department of the Navy Budget Highlights Book
The Department of the Navy’s FY2011 budget highlight books states:
The FY 2011 [Department of the Navy] budget is the product of a holistic assessment of
capabilities, requirements and risks and is consistent with the 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR). Enhancements in the area of Irregular Warfare (IW) are realized through
increased support of Special Operations Forces and expanded capacity for littoral, brown
water, and riverine missions.6
It also states:
The FY 2011 budget includes the establishment of a new RC [reserve component] riverine
training squadron which will compliment the three existing AC [active component] riverine
5 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 1-10.
6 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 1-1.
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squadrons. The fourth riverine squadron will increase the riverine capacity to conduct brown
water training and partnership activities in order to meet COCOM demands.7
It also states:
In keeping with the priorities of the Secretary of Defense, the FY 2011 budget continues to
rebalance our investment programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to
fight the wars of today and the most-likely scenarios in the future, while at the same time
providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies.
The FY 2011 budget concentrates investment in platforms and systems that maintain the
advantage against future threats and across the full spectrum of operations. Procurement of
the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and other programs that support irregular warfare and
capacity building reflect that shift. However, even as the Department begins to shift
resources and institutional weight towards supporting the current conflicts and other
potential irregular campaigns, we still must contend with the security challenges posed by
the military forces of other countries – from those actively hostile to those at strategic
crossroads.8
It also states:
The Navy’s shipbuilding budget represents the best balance between high-end, hybrid and
irregular warfare capabilities. It funds a continuum of forces ranging from the covert
Virginia class submarine, the multi-mission DDG-51 destroyer, the multi-role Landing
Helicopter Assault Replacement (LHA(R)), to the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and the Joint
High Speed Vessel (JHSV) with their greater access to littoral areas. This balance continues
to pace future threat capabilities while fully supporting current irregular warfare operations
and supporting maritime security and stability operations in the littorals.9
The book mentions the irregular warfare capabilities of the Navy’s new P-8 aircraft,10 states that
Department of the Navy research and development initiatives support both traditional and
irregular warfare demands in several aviation programs,11 and states more generally that
asymmetric and irregular warfare constitute one of 13 focus areas for the science and technology
(S&T) portion of the Department of the Navy’s research and development efforts.12
The book states the following regarding the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) portion of
the Department of the Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget:
The current request includes incremental costs to sustain operations, manpower, equipment
and infrastructure repair, as well as equipment replacement. These costs include aviation and
ship operations, combat support, base support, USMC operations and field logistics, as well
as IAs, activated reservists and other special pays. Navy is requesting funding for 4,400 IAs
in the FY 2011 OCO request for service members filling non-traditional Navy missions such
as provincial reconstruction teams, detainee operations, civil affairs, training teams, customs
7 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 4-24.
8 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 5-1.
9 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 5-2.
10 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, pp. 1-8, 5-11
11 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 5-14.
12 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 5-31.
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inspections, counter IED, and combat support. Finally, both the FY 2010 and the FY 2011
full year requests reflect the initial shift in forces from Iraq to Afghanistan. The Department
of the Navy requests $3.9 billion in FY 2010 for supplemental requirements and $18.5
billion for FY 2011 to support increased OPTEMPO for contingency operations. Since 2009,
total funding trends reflect the Department’s efforts to reduce reliance on supplemental
appropriations and include OCO costs with the budget request. Figure 6 reflects the current
status of FY 2009, FY 2010, and FY 2011 funding for OCO.
The FY 2011 OCO O&M request specifically provides the resources required to meet
increased CENTCOM demand, to include a substantial increase in flight hours associated
with the shift from OIF [Operational Iraqi Freedom—i.e., operations in Iraq] to OEF
[Operation Enduring Freedom—i.e., operations in Afghanistan] and the increased Carrier
Strike Group presence that ensures there are no Air Tasking Order gaps; the Navy’s FY 2010
OCO appropriation did not fully capture OEF execution requirements.
The supplemental request for FY 2010 and the full-year request for FY 2011 supports the
deployment, operation and sustainment of two regimental combat teams, a division-level
headquarters unit, Seabee battalions, aviation and ship operations, combat support, base
support, transportation of personnel and equipment into theater, and associated enabling
forces to Afghanistan. The additional funding will support expansion into new areas of
operation and establishment of a new command within the southern region of Afghanistan.
Increased funding is also needed for service contracts supporting unmanned aerial systems
(UAS) providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and additional in-
theater maintenance. The amendment will also fund increased fuel costs in FY 2010.13
Longer List of Navy IW Budget Initiatives
The Navy states that a longer list of Navy budget initiatives for creating or expanding its IW
capabilities includes the following, which are not necessarily listed in any particular order of
priority:
• shifting funding for the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (or NECC—see
“Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC)” below) from the wartime
operations part of the Navy’s budget into the Navy’s “base” budget (aka, the
“regular” part of the Navy’s budget);
• delivering expanded counter-IED and EOD capabilities;
• deploying riverine squadrons and maritime expeditionary support squadrons;
• training Navy personnel in foreign languages, regional affairs, and cultures;
• using the JFK Irregular Warfare Center at the Office of Navy Intelligence (ONI)
to provide intelligence support to joint IW/SOF operations;
• ship operation and acquisition, including:
• using ships (such as amphibious ships) as partnership stations, such as the
Southern Partnership Station (SPS) and the Africa Partnership Station (APS)
(see “Partnership Stations” below);
13 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, pp. 2-4 and 2-5.
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• using ships (such as surface combatants and amphibious ships) for anti-
piracy operations;
• using hospital ships for humanitarian-assistance operations;
• procuring Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs);14
• procuring Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs), which are high-speed sealift
ships;
• ending procurement of DDG-1000 destroyers and restarting procurement of
DDG-51 Aegis destroyers;15
• operating four Trident submarines that have been converted into cruise
missile and SOF-support submarines (SSGNs);16
• accelerating acquisition of the P-8 multi-mission aircraft (MMA), the Navy’s
intended successor to the P-3 maritime patrol aircraft;
• accelerating acquisition of certain unmanned systems, including:
• the Navy Unmanned Combat Air System (N-UCAS—an unmanned aircraft
that is to be flown form Navy aircraft carriers);
• a sea-based, medium-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV);
• the small tactical unmanned aerial system (STUAS);
• expanding the Navy’s sea-based ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities;17
and
• expanding the Navy’s cyberwarfare operations force.
A separate list of Navy budgetary areas of emphasis for IW includes the following:
• ships and aircraft;
• persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities;
• unmanned systems;
• language skills, regional expertise, and cultural awareness (LREC);
• operations to build partnerships with other countries and to expand partner
capacities;
14 For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background,
Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
15 For more on the ending of DDG-1000 procurement and the restart of DDG-51 procurement, see CRS Report
RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
16 For more on the converted Trident submarines, see CRS Report RS21007, Navy Trident Submarine Conversion
(SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
17 For more on the Navy’s sea-based BMD capabilities, see CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) Program—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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• cybersecurity; and
• tools for fusing information from various sources.
In addition, the Navy states that with regard to rapidly fielding IW new capabilities, specific
current items of focus include the following:
• the Center for IW and Armed Groups (CIWAG)—an 18-month pilot project at
the Naval War College in Newport, RI, whose current grant funding expires in
June 2010;
• a large-diameter unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) for ISR operations;
• Saber Focus—a land-based unmanned air system (UAS) that would be
established in an overseas location and used for ISR to support IW operations;
• the use of ship-based Scan Eagle UAVs on converted Trident SSGNs for ISR
operations;
• a surface ship- or submarine-based Maritime UAS that would be used for ISR
operations and possibly signals intelligence operations;
• a naval intelligence fusion tool (NIFT) that is to integrate national and tactical
ISR sensors so as to create real-time, actionable intelligence and targeting
recommendations;
• a ship-based system called real time regional gateway (RTRG) for improved
exploitation of signals intelligence to support IW operations; and
• an expansion in the size of helicopter squadrons that directly support special
operations forces (SOF).
Navy Counterterrorism (CT) Operations
Navy CT operations including the following:
• Tomahawk cruise missile attacks on suspected terrorist training camps and
facilities, such as those reportedly conducted in Somalia on March 3 and May 1,
2008,18 and those conducted in 1998 in response to the 1998 terrorist bombings
of U.S. embassies in East Africa;19
• operations by Navy special operations forces, known as SEALs, that are directed
against terrorists;20
• surveillance by Navy ships and aircraft of suspected terrorists overseas;
18 Edmund Sanders, “U.S. Missile Strike in Somalia Kills 6,” Los Angeles Times, March 4, 2008; Stephanie
McCrummen and Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Airstrike Kills Somali Accused of Links to Al-Qaeda,” Washington Post,
May 2, 2008: A12; Eric Schmitt and Jeffrey Gettleman, “Qaeda Leader Reported Killed In Somalia,” New York Times,
May 2, 2008.
19 For a recent article on the 1998 strikes, see Pamela Hess, “Report: 1998 Strike Built bin Laden-Taliban Tie,”
NavyTimes.com (Associated Press), August 22, 2008.
20 SEAL is an acronym that stands for Sea, Air, and Land. For further discussion of the SEALs, see CRS Report
RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
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• maritime intercept operations (MIO) aimed at identifying and intercepting
terrorists or weapons of mass destruction at sea, or potentially threatening ships
or aircraft that are in or approaching U.S. territorial waters—an activity that
includes Navy participation in the multilateral Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI);21
• working with the Coast Guard to build maritime domain awareness (MDA)—a
real-time understanding of activities on the world’s oceans;
• assisting the Coast Guard in port-security operations;22
• protection of forward-deployed Navy ships, an activity that was intensified
following the terrorist attack on the Navy Aegis destroyer Cole (DDG-67) in
October 2000 in the port of Aden, Yemen;23
• protection of domestic and overseas Navy bases and facilities;
• developing Global Maritime Intelligence Integration (GMII) as part of Joint
Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) and Maritime Domain
Awareness (MDA); and
• engaging with the U.S. Coast Guard to use the National Strategy for Maritime
Security to more rapidly develop capabilities for Homeland Security, particularly
in the area of MDA.
The Department of the Navy stated in early 2010 that:
While forward, acting as the lead element of our defense-in-depth, naval forces will be
positioned for increased roles in combating terrorism.... Expanded Maritime Interdiction
Operations (EMIO) are authorized by the President and directed by the Secretary of Defense
to intercept vessels identified to be transporting terrorists and/or terrorist-related materiel that
poses an imminent threat to the United States and its allies.24
Navy IW and CT Initiatives
The Navy in recent years has implemented a number of initiatives intended to increase its IW and
CT capabilities and activities, including those discussed below.
21 For more on the PSI, see CRS Report RL34327, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), by Mary Beth Nikitin.
22 See, for example, Emelie Rutherford, “Navy’s Maritime Domain Awareness System ‘Up And Running’,” Defense
Daily, September 4, 2008; and Dan Taylor, “New Network Allows Navy To Track Thousands of Ships Worldwide,”
Inside the Navy, September 8, 2008. For more on the Coast Guard and port security, see CRS Report RL33383,
Terminal Operators and Their Role in U.S. Port and Maritime Security, by John Frittelli and Jennifer E. Lake, and
CRS Report RL33787, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities, by Paul W. Parfomak
and John Frittelli.
23 For a discussion of the attack on the Cole, see CRS Report RS20721, Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Raphael F. Perl and Ronald O'Rourke.
24 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 2-2.
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Navy Irregular Warfare Office
The Navy in July 2008 established the Navy Irregular Warfare Office, which is intended, in the
Navy’s words, to “institutionalize current ad hoc efforts in IW missions of counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency and the supporting missions of information operations, intelligence operations,
foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare as they apply to [CT] and
[counterinsurgency].” The office works closely with U.S. Special Operations Command, and
reports to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for information, plans, and strategy.25
Global Maritime Partnership
The Global Maritime Partnership, initially known as the 1,000-ship Navy concept, is a U.S. Navy
initiative to achieve an enhanced degree of cooperation between the U.S. Navy and foreign
navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces, for the purpose of ensuring global maritime
security against common threats. The Navy states that
There is no one nation that can provide a solution to maritime security problems alone. A
global maritime partnership is required that unites maritime forces, port operators,
commercial shippers, and international, governmental and nongovernmental agencies to
address our mutual concerns. This partnership increases all of our maritime capabilities, such
as response time, agility and adaptability, and is purely voluntary, with no legal or
encumbering ties. It is a free-form, self-organizing network of maritime partners – good
neighbors interested in using the power of the sea to unite, rather than to divide.26
Partnership Stations
The Southern Partnership Station (SPS) and the Africa Partnership Station (APS) are Navy ships,
such as amphibious ships or high-speed sealift ships, that have deployed to the Caribbean and to
waters off Africa, respectively, to support U.S. Navy engagement with countries in those regions,
particularly for purposes of building security partnerships with those countries, and for increasing
the capabilities of those countries for performing maritime-security operations. The SPS and APS
can be viewed as specific measures for promoting the above-discussed global maritime
partnership.
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC)
The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), headquartered at Naval Amphibious Base,
Little Creek, VA, was established informally in October 2005 and formally on January 13, 2006.
The creation of NECC consolidated and facilitated the expansion of a number of Navy
organizations that have a role in IW operations. Navy functions supported by NECC include the
following:
• riverine warfare;
• maritime civil affairs;
25 Zachary M. Peterson, “New Navy Irregular Warfare Office Works to Address ISR Shortfall,” Inside the Navy,
September 1, 2008.
26 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 1-5.
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• expeditionary training;
• explosive ordnance disposal (EOD);
• expeditionary intelligence;
• naval construction (i.e., the naval construction brigades, aka CBs or “Seabee”);
• maritime expeditionary security;
• expeditionary diving;
• combat camera;
• expeditionary logistics;
• guard battalion; and
• expeditionary combat readiness.
The Department of the Navy stated in early 2010 that NECC:
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) is a global force provider of expeditionary
combat service support and force protection capabilities to joint warfighting commanders,
centrally managing the current and future readiness, resources, manning, training, and
equipping of a scalable, selfsustaining and integrated expeditionary force of active and
reserve sailors. Expeditionary sailors are deployed from around the globe in support of the
new “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.” NECC forces and capabilities are
integral to executing the maritime strategy which is based on expanded core capabilities of
maritime power: forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime
security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. To enable these, NECC provides a full
spectrum of operations, including effective waterborne and ashore anti-terrorism force
protection; theater security cooperation and engagement; and humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief. NECC is also a key element of the Navy’s operational Irregular Warfare (IW)
efforts in the area of operational support to the Navy forces in OIF and OEF. In the FY 2011
budget, NECC funding is increased to address increased requirements for NECC Global
Force Management (GFM) presence, operational plans surge, and equipment life cycle
sustainment.
NECC provides integrated active and reserve forces, highlighted by the seamlessly integrated
operational forces of naval construction (Seabees), maritime expeditionary security (formerly
coastal warfare), navy expeditionary logistics (Cargo Handling Battalions), and the
remaining mission capabilities throughout the command.
NECC is not a standalone or combat force, but rather a force protection and combat service
force of rapidly deployable mission specialists that fill the gaps in the joint battle space and
compliment joint and coalition capabilities.27
The Department of the Navy also stated that:
The Reserve Component expeditionary forces are integrated with the Active Component
forces to provide a continuum of capabilities unique to the maritime environment within
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC). Blending the AC and RC brings strength to
27 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, pp. 4-14 and 4-
15.
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the force and is an important part of the Navy’s ability to carry out the Naval Maritime
Strategy from blue water into green and brown water and in direct support of the Joint Force.
The Navy Reserve trains and equips 51% of Sailors supporting NECC missions, including
Naval construction and explosive ordnance disposal in the CENTCOM AOR as emphasis
shifts from Iraq to Afghanistan, as well as maritime expeditionary security, expeditionary
logistics (cargo handling battalions), maritime civil affairs, expeditionary intelligence, and
other mission capabilities seamlessly integrated with operational forces around the world.28
Riverine Force
The riverine force is intended to supplement the riverine capabilities of the Navy’s SEALs (the
Navy’s Sea-Air-Land special operations forces) and relieve Marines who had been conducting
maritime security operations in ports and waterways in Iraq. The riverine force currently consists
of three active-duty squadrons of 12 boats each, and includes a total of about 900 sailors. The
Navy established Riverine Group 1 (which oversees the three squadrons) at the Naval
Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA, in May 2006. The three current riverine squadrons were
established in 2006-2007.
As mentioned earlier, the Department of the Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requests funding
for “the establishment of a new RC [reserve component] riverine training squadron which will
compliment the three existing AC [active component] riverine squadrons. The fourth riverine
squadron will increase the riverine capacity to conduct brown water training and partnership
activities in order to meet COCOM demands.”29 The Navy states that the creation of the fourth
riverine squadron is to involve the realignment of 238 Full Time Support and Selected Reservist
billets, and that the new squadron is to be the first-ever reserve component riverine training
squadron within NECC.30
Other Initiatives
Other Navy initiatives in recent years for supporting IW and CT operations include establishing a
reserve civil affairs battalion, a Navy Foreign Area Officer (FAO) community consisting of
officers with specialized knowledge of foreign countries and regions, a maritime interception
operation (MIO) intelligence exploitation pilot program, an intelligence data-mining capability at
the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC).
Potential Oversight Issues for Congress
Definition of Navy IW Activities
Potential oversight questions for Congress regarding the definition of Navy IW activities include
the following:
28 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 4-24.
29 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 4-24.
30 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 3-7.
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• Should security force assistance operations, civic assistance operations, disaster
relief operations, and counter-piracy operations be included in the definition of
Navy IW operations?
• Should operations to build partnerships, and to build partner capacities for
conducting maritime security operations, be included in the definition of Navy
IW operations?
• Has the Navy included the kinds of operations listed in the two previous points in
its definition of Navy IW operations in part to satisfy a perceived requirement
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to show that the Navy is
devoting a certain portion of its personnel and budgets to irregular warfare?
• Should the Navy’s CT operations be considered a part of its IW operations? What
is the relationship between IW operations and CT operations?
Navy IW Budget Priorities
Potential oversight questions for Congress regarding Navy IW budget priorities include the
following:
• Is the Navy’s list of IW budget items sufficiently organized and prioritized to
support congressional understanding and oversight, or to permit Congress to
know where any additional dollars available for Navy IW operations might best
be added?
• Should items such as expanding Navy sea-based BMD capabilities, procuring
DDG-51 destroyers, and Navy cyber security operations be included in a list of
Navy IW budgetary initiatives?
• Are the Navy’s current IW-oriented UAV/UAS programs sufficiently
coordinated?
Degree of Emphasis on IW and CT in Future Navy Budgets
A third oversight issue for Congress—an issue related to, but more general than the previous
one—is how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets.
Supporters of placing increased emphasis on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets could
argue that the experience of recent years, including U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
suggests that the United States in coming years will likely need to be able to conduct IW and CT
operations, that the Navy has certain specialized or unique IW and CT capabilities that need to be
supported as part of an effective overall U.S. IW or CT effort, and that there are programs relating
to Navy IW and CT activities that could be funded at higher levels, if additional funding were
made available.
Opponents of placing an increased emphasis on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets
could argue that these activities already receive adequate emphasis on Navy budgets, and that
placing an increased emphasis on these activities could reduce the amount of funding available to
the Navy for programs that support the Navy’s role in acting, along with the Air Force, as a
strategic reserve for the United States in potential conventional inter-state conflicts.
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Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
• To what degree can or should Navy IW and CT activities be used to reduce the
burden on other services for conducting such activities?
• Are the Navy’s steps to increase its role in IW and CT partly motivated by
concerns about its perceived relevance, or by a desire to secure a portion of IW
and CT funding?
• Is the Navy striking an appropriate balance between IW and CT activities and
other Navy concerns, such as preparing for a potential future challenge from
improved Chinese maritime military forces?31
Additional Oversight Questions
In addition to the issues discussed above, the Navy’s IW and CT activities pose some additional
potential oversight issues for Congress, including the following:
• How many Navy personnel globally are involved in IW and CT activities, and
where are they located? How much funding is the Navy expending each year on
such activities?
• Is the Navy adequately managing its individual augmentee (IA) program?32
• Is the Navy devoting sufficient attention and resources to riverine warfare?33
• Aside from the establishment of the riverine force and a reserve civil affairs
battalion, what implications might an expanded Navy role in IW and CT have for
Navy force-structure requirements (i.e., the required size and composition of the
Navy)?
• Is the Navy adequately coordinating its IW and CT activities and initiatives with
other organizations, such as the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the
Coast Guard?
• Are the Navy’s recent IW and CT organizational changes appropriate? What
other Navy organizational changes might be needed?
Legislative Activity for FY2011
The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget was submitted to Congress on February 1, 2010.
31 For additional discussion of this issue, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S.
Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
32 For a discussion of the Navy’s management of the IA program, see Andrew Scutro, “Fleet Forces Takes Charge of
IA Program,” NavyTimes.com, July 7, 2008.
33 For an article that discusses this question from a critical perspective, see Daniel A. Hancock, “The Navy’s Not
Serious About Riverine Warfare,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2008: 14-19.
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Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
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