Cuba: Issues for the 111th Congress
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
March 25, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40193
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

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Cuba: Issues for the 111th Congress

Summary
Cuba remains a hard-line communist state with a poor record on human rights. The country’s
political succession from the long-ruling Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl was characterized by a
remarkable degree of stability. Fidel stepped down from power in July 2006 because of health
reasons, and Raúl assumed provisional control of the government until February 2008 when he
officially became President. His government has implemented limited economic policy changes,
but there has been disappointment that further reforms have not been forthcoming. The economy
was hard hit by storms in 2008 and the global financial crisis has caused further strains. Few
observers expect the government to ease its tight control over the political system.
Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy has consisted largely of isolating Cuba through economic
sanctions. A second policy component has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people,
including private humanitarian donations, U.S.-sponsored broadcasting to Cuba, and support for
human rights activists. In light of Fidel Castro’s departure as head of government, many observers
have called for a re-examination of sanctions policy. In this new context, two broad approaches
have been advanced: an approach that would maintain the dual-track policy of isolating the
Cuban government while providing support to the Cuban people; and an approach aimed at
changing attitudes in the Cuban government and society through increased engagement. The
Obama Administration has lifted restrictions on family travel and remittances; eased restrictions
on telecommunications links with Cuba; restarted semi-annual migration talks; and initiated talks
on resuming direct mail services. The Administration has also strongly criticized Cuba’s human
rights situation, including the death of hunger striker Orlando Zapata Tamayo in February 2010
and the repression of peaceful protests and dissent. Cuba’s imprisonment of a U.S. government
contactor since December 2009 could affect the future of bilateral relations.
In March 2009, the 111th Congress approved three provisions in the FY2009 omnibus
appropriations measure (P.L. 111-8) that eased sanctions on family travel, travel for the marketing
of agricultural and medical goods, and payment terms for U.S. agricultural exports. In December
2009, Congress included a provision in the FY2010 omnibus appropriations legislation (P.L. 111-
117) that eased payments terms for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba during FY2010 by defining
the term “payment of cash in advance,” and also continued funding for Cuba democracy
programs and Radio and TV Martí broadcasting. In May 2009, the Senate approved S.Res. 149,
related to freedom of the press, while in March 2010 it approved S.Con.Res. 54, as amended by
S.Amdt. 3552, in the aftermath of the death of imprisoned Cuban dissident from a hunger strike
(two similar House resolutions have been introduced: H.Con.Res. 251 and H.Con.Res. 252).
Numerous initiatives have been introduced that would ease sanctions: H.R. 188, H.R. 1530, and
H.R. 2272 (overall sanctions); H.R. 874/S. 428 and H.R. 1528 (travel); H.R. 332 (educational
travel); H.R. 1531/S. 1089 and H.R. 4645/S. 3112 (agricultural exports and travel); H.R. 1737
(agricultural exports); and S. 774, H.R. 1918, and S. 1517 (hydrocarbon resources). H.R. 1103/S.
1234 would modify a trademark sanctions, while several bills cited above would repeal the
sanction. S. 1808 would eliminated Radio and TV Martí. Measures that would increase sanctions
are H.R. 2005 (related to fugitives) and H.R. 2687 (OAS participation), while H.Con.Res. 132
calls for the fulfillment of certain democratic conditions before the United States increases trade
and tourism to Cuba. Also see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and
Remittances and CRS Report R40566, Cuban Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends.

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Contents
Recent Developments.................................................................................................................. 1
Political Conditions..................................................................................................................... 3
March 2009 Government Shake-Up ...................................................................................... 4
Background to the Succession ............................................................................................... 5
Human Rights ....................................................................................................................... 7
Overview ........................................................................................................................ 7
Death of Hunger Striker Orlando Zapata Tamayo ............................................................ 9
Economic Conditions ................................................................................................................ 10
Economic Changes Under Raúl........................................................................................... 12
Cuba’s Foreign Policy ............................................................................................................... 14
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba .......................................................................................................... 15
Policy Overview ................................................................................................................. 15
Debate on the Direction of U.S. Policy ................................................................................ 16
Clinton Administration’s Easing of Sanctions ...................................................................... 17
Bush Administration Policy................................................................................................. 18
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba .................................................................... 18
U.S. Reaction to Cuba’s Political Succession................................................................. 20
Obama Administration Policy.............................................................................................. 22
Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations ................................................................................................. 24
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances ............................................................................... 24
Agricultural Exports and Sanctions ..................................................................................... 26
Legislative Action and Initiatives on Agricultural Sanctions .......................................... 27
Trademark Sanction ............................................................................................................ 29
Offshore Oil and Natural Gas Development ........................................................................ 31
Drug Interdiction Cooperation............................................................................................. 32
Legislative Initiatives .................................................................................................... 33
Cuban Spies in the United States ......................................................................................... 34
Cuba and Terrorism............................................................................................................. 35
Cuba as the Victim of Terrorism .................................................................................... 37
U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights...................................................... 38
Oversight of U.S. Democracy Assistance to Cuba.......................................................... 39
December 2009 Detainment of American Subcontractor................................................ 41
Radio and TV Marti ............................................................................................................ 42
Controversies ................................................................................................................ 43
Funding for Cuba Broadcasting..................................................................................... 45
Migration Issues.................................................................................................................. 46
1994 and 1995 Migration Accords................................................................................. 46
Coast Guard Interdictions.............................................................................................. 47
Migration Talks............................................................................................................. 48
Guantanamo Naval Base ..................................................................................................... 49
Cuba and the Organization of American States .................................................................... 50
Background on Cuba’s Exclusion from the OAS in 1962............................................... 51
Efforts to Reinstate Cuba’s Participation in the OAS ..................................................... 52
Legislative Initiatives in the 111th Congress ............................................................................... 55
Approved and Considered Measures ................................................................................... 55
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Other Introduced Measures ................................................................................................. 58
Legislation in the 110th Congress............................................................................................... 61
Approved Measures ............................................................................................................ 61
Additional Considered Measures with Cuba Provisions ....................................................... 62

Appendixes
Appendix A. Developments in 2009-2010 ................................................................................. 65
Appendix B. For Additional Reading......................................................................................... 70

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 71

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Recent Developments
On March 24, 2010, President Obama issued a statement expressing deep concern about the
human rights situation in Cuba, including the death of Orlando Zapata Tamayo, the repression of
the Ladies in White (Damas de Blanco) human rights organization, and increased harassment of
those who dare to express the desires of their fellow Cuban citizens. He asserted that these events
underscore that “Cuban authorities continue to respond to the aspirations of the Cuban people
with a clenched fist.” The President called for the end of repression, the immediate and
unconditional release of all political prisoners, and respect for the basic rights of the Cuban
people. (See the statement at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-
human-rights-situation-cuba.)
On March 18, 2010, the Senate approved S.Con.Res. 54 (Nelson, Bill) by Unanimous Consent.
The resolution recognized the life of Orlando Zapata Tamayo, who died on February 23, 2010, in
the custody of the Cuban government, and called for a continued focus on the promotion of
internationally recognized human rights in Cuba. (See “Death of Hunger Striker Orlando Zapata
Tamayo” below.)
On March 16-17, 2010, Cuban security forces and government-orchestrated mobs forcefully
broke up protests of the Ladies in White human rights organization consisting of the female
relatives of political prisoners. (See “Human Rights” below.)
On March 11, 2010, the House Committee on Agriculture held a hearing to review U.S.
agricultural sales to Cuba. (See “Agricultural Exports and Sanctions” below.)
On March 11, 2010, the State Department released its 2009 human rights report on Cuba, stating
that the Cuban government continued to deny its citizens basic human rights and committed
numerous and serious abuses. (See http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/wha/136108.htm.)
On March 3, 2010, the House Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing on the “Domestic and
International Trademark Implications of HAVANA CLUB and Section 211 of the Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 2009.” (See http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_100303.html.) (See
“Trademark Sanction” below.)
On March 1, 2010, the State Department released its 2010 International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report (INCSR). The Cuba chapter noted that some of Cuba’s interdiction operations
were undertaken in coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Specialist at the
U.S. Interests Section in Havana. The report stated that “both nations may gain by pressing
forward with expanded cooperation, especially considering Cuba’s location in the Caribbean, and
the potential for the island and its territorial seas to be utilized for drug transshipments to the
United States.” (See “Drug Interdiction Cooperation” below.)
On February 26, 2010, Amnesty International adopted Darsi Ferrer, Director of the Juan Bruno
Zayas Health and Human Rights Center, as its 55th Cuban prisoner of conscience. According to
Amnesty, Ferrer has been detained since July 2009 on charges of receiving illegally obtained
goods, an offense that normally would result in his immediate release on bail. Amnesty believes
that the case is politically motivated because of Ferrer’s work to promote freedom of expression.
For entries earlier this year and 2009, see Appendix A.
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Figure 1. Map of Cuba
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Political Conditions
Raúl Castro officially became Cuba’s President on February 24, 2008. On that day, Cuba’s
legislature selected him as President of the 31-member Council of State, a position that officially
made him Cuba’s head of government and state. Most observers expected this since he already
had been heading the Cuban government on a provisional basis since July 2006 when his brother
Fidel Castro, Cuba’s long-ruling communist leader, stepped down as President because of poor
health.1
For many years, Raúl, as First Vice President of the Council of State and the Council of
Ministers, had been the officially designated successor and was slated to become chief of state
with Fidel’s departure. Raúl also had served as Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces
(FAR) since the beginning of the Cuban Revolution. When Fidel stepped down from power in
late July 2006 because of poor health, he signed a proclamation that ceded political power to Raúl
on a provisional basis, including the positions of First Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party
(PCC), Commander in Chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), and President of the
Council of State. Despite the change in government in February 2008, Fidel still holds the official
title of First Secretary of the PCC.
While it was not a surprise to observers for Raúl to succeed his brother Fidel as head of
government, the selection of José Ramón Machado Ventura as the Council of State’s First Vice
President was a surprise. A physician by training, Machado is 77 years old, and is part of the older
generation of so-called históricos of the 1959 Cuban revolution. He has been described as a hard-
line communist party ideologue, and reportedly has been a close friend and confident of Raul for
many years.2 Machado’s position is significant because it makes him the official successor to
Raúl, according to the Cuban Constitution. Many observers had expected that Carlos Lage, one of
five other Vice Presidents on the Council of State, would have been chosen as First Vice
President. He was responsible for Cuba’s economic reforms in the 1990s, and at 56 years of age,
represents a younger generation of Cuban leaders.
Several key military officers and confidants of Raúl also became members of the Council,
increasing the role of the military in the government. General Julio Casas Regueiro, 72 years of
age, who already was on the Council, became one of its five vice presidents. Most significantly,
Casas, who had been first vice minister in the FAR, was selected by Raúl as the country’s new
Minister of the FAR, officially replacing Raúl in that position. Casas also is chairman of GAESA
(Grupo de Administracion Empresarial, S.A.), the Cuban military’s holding company for its
extensive business operations. Two other military appointments to the Council were Gen. Alvaro
López Miera, the army’s chief of staff, and Gen. Leopoldo Cintra Frías, who commanded the
Western army, one of Cuba’s three military regions.3

1 For more on Cuba’s political succession, see CRS Report RS22742, Cuba’s Political Succession: From Fidel to Raúl
Castro, by Mark P. Sullivan.
2 Daniel Dombey, Richard Lapper, and Andrew Ward, “A Family Business, Cuban-Americans Look Beyond the
Havana Handover,” Financial Times, February 27, 2008.
3 Pablo Bachelet, “New Cuban Leader Adds Military Loyalists to Team,” Miami Herald, February 25, 2008.
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Since Fidel stepped down from power in 2006, Cuba’s political succession from Fidel to Raúl
Castro has been characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. Although initially there were
not any significant economic changes under Raúl, there were signs that changes could be coming.
In a July 2007 speech, Raúl maintained that structural changes were needed in the Cuban
economy in order to increase efficiency and production. In his first speech as President in
February 2008, Raúl promised to make the government smaller and more efficient, to review the
potential revaluation of the Cuban peso, and to eliminate excessive bans and regulations that curb
productivity.4 Since March 2008, the government has implemented a number of economic
changes that from the outside might not seem significant, but are noteworthy policy changes for a
government that has heretofore followed a centralized communist economic model. (See
“Economic Changes Under Raúl” below.)
While additional economic changes under Raúl Castro are likely, few expect there will be any
change to the government’s tight control over the political system, which is backed up by a strong
security apparatus. Some observers point to the reduced number of political prisoners, from 283
at the beginning of 2007 to around 205 at the beginning of 2009, as evidence of a lessening of
repression, but dissidents maintain that the overall situation has not improved. Some observers
contend that if the new government of Raúl Castro becomes more confident of ensuring social
stability and does not feel threatened, it could move to soften its hard repression, but for now the
government is continuing its harsh treatment of the opposition. The selection of José Ramón
Machado as First Vice President also appears to be a clear indication that the Cuban government
has no intention of easing tight control over the political system.
The PCC’s sixth congress was expected to be held at end of 2009 (the last was held in 1997), but
in late July 2009, the PCC indefinitely postponed plans to hold it (some observers expect it to be
held at the end of 2010 or early 2011). Raúl Castro justified the delay by saying that additional
and extensive preparation was needed for the meeting. Some observers maintain that Cuba’s poor
economic situation prompted the postponement of the congress, which was supposed to deal with
potential economic changes. Some analysts had speculated that Fidel Castro would be officially
replaced as head of the party during the congress, and that it was likely that some of the PCC’s
25-member Political Bureau (Politburo) would also be replaced.
Some analysts maintain that once Fidel is gone, hardliners in Cuba’s political system will have a
more difficult time holding back the advance of needed economic reforms.5 Some maintain that
Raúl will be liberated to move more quickly to usher in needed economic reforms, although few
observers believe that the Cuban leader will take any actions that could threaten the stability of
the communist government. Some observers also do not expect Raúl Castro to serve another term
as President, and believe that the government will pass to a younger generation after the next
National Assembly election and selection of a new President in early 2013.
March 2009 Government Shake-Up
In early March 2009, President Raúl Castro orchestrated a government shake-up that combined
four ministries into two and ousted a dozen high-ranking officials, most notably including

4 “Cuba: Full Text of Raúl Castro’s National Assembly Address,” Cubavisión, Havana (as translated by Open Source
Center) February 24, 2008.
5 Frances Robles, “Raúl Castro May Usher in More Economic Reforms,” Miami Herald, January 15, 2009.
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Foreign Minister Felipe Pérez Roque, Council of Ministers Secretary Carlos Lage, and Minister
of Economy and Planning José Luis Rodriguez García. The streamlining combined the portfolios
of food and fishing into one ministry and the foreign investment and trade portfolios into another
ministry. Changes in the bureaucracy had been anticipated since February 2008 when Raúl Castro
vowed to make the government smaller and more efficient, but the ouster of both Felipe Pérez
Roque and Carlos Lage, who lost all their government and party positions, caught many observers
by surprise. Pérez Roque was replaced by career diplomat Bruno Rodriguez Parrilla, who served
for eight years (1995-2003) as Cuba’s UN Ambassador and most recently served as vice foreign
minister. Carlos Lage, who most significantly lost his position as a Vice President of the Council
of State, was replaced by military General José Amado Guerra who had worked for Raúl Castro
as secretary of the FAR.
What was unexpected about the simultaneous ouster of both Pérez Roque and Lage was that they
represented different tendencies within Cuba’s communist political system. Pérez Roque, a
former private secretary to Fidel, was known as a hardliner, while Carlos Lage, who was
responsible for Cuba’s limited economic reforms in the 1990s, was viewed as a potential
economic reformer. Some observers maintain that the ouster of both Pérez Roque and Lage was a
move by Raúl to replace so-called Fidelistas with his own supporters. Fidel, however, wrote in
one of his reflections in the Cuban press that both officials had been seduced by ambitions for
power, and that a majority of the other officials who were replaced by Raúl had not originally
been appointed by Fidel.6 Along these lines, a number of observers maintain that the ouster of
Pérez Roque and Lage had more to do with removing potential contenders for power in a post-
Castro Cuba.
What appears clear from the recent government shake-up is that Raúl Castro has begun to put his
mark on the Cuban government bureaucracy. Some observers contend that Raúl is moving
forward with his pledge to make the government more efficient. According to this view, ideology
did not play a role in the appointments, and several of those brought in as ministers were
relatively unknown technocrats.7
The new appointments also continued the trend toward bringing more military officials into the
government. In addition to Gen. José Amado Guerra becoming Secretary of the Council of
Ministers, another military official, General Salvador Pardo Cruz, became Minister of the
Steelmaking Industry. Three other military officials already head the ministries of the FAR,
Interior, and Agriculture.
Background to the Succession
Until Fidel stepped down in 2006, he had ruled the island nation since the 1959 Cuban
Revolution, which ousted the corrupt government of Fulgencio Batista. In April 1961, Castro
stated that the Cuban Revolution was socialist, and in December 1961, he proclaimed himself to
be a Marxist-Leninist. From 1959 until 1976, Castro ruled by decree. A Constitution was enacted
in 1976 setting forth the PCC as the leading force in state and society, with power centered in a
Political Bureau headed by Fidel Castro. In October 1997, the Cuban Communist Party held its

6 According to Fidel, “The sweetness of power for which they had made no sacrifice awoke in them ambitions that led
them to an unworthy role. The external enemy was filled with illusion about them.” See Reflections of Fidel, “Health
Changes within the Council of Ministers,” from CubaDebate as translated by Granma International, March 3, 2009.
7 Frances Robles, “Cuban Government Undergoes Massive Restructuring,” Miami Herald, March 3, 2009.
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5th Congress (the prior one was held in 1991) in which the party reaffirmed its commitment to a
single party state and reelected Fidel and Raúl Castro as the party’s first and second secretaries.
Cuba’s Constitution also outlines national, provincial, and local governmental structures.
Legislative authority is vested in a National Assembly of People’s Power that meets twice
annually for brief periods. When the Assembly is not in session, a Council of State, elected by the
Assembly, acts on its behalf. According to Cuba’s Constitution, the President of the Council of
State is the country’s head of state and government. Executive power in Cuba is vested in a
Council of Ministers, also headed by the country’s head of state and government, i.e. the
President of the Council of State. From the promulgation of the 1976 Constitution until February
24, 2008, Fidel served as served as head of state and government through his position as President
of the Council of State.
Although National Assembly members were directly elected for the first time in February 1993,
only a single slate of candidates was offered. Direct elections for the National Assembly were
again held in January 1998 and January 2003, but voters again were not offered a choice of
candidates. In contrast, municipal elections at the local level are competitive, with from two to
eight candidates. To be elected, the candidate must receive more than half of the votes cast. As a
result, runoff elections between the two top candidates are common.
National Assembly elections were held on January 20, 2008 (along with elections for 1,201
delegates to 14 provincial assemblies), and Fidel Castro was once again among the candidates
elected to the now 614-member legislative body. As in the past, voters were only offered a single
slate of candidates.
On February 24, 2008, the new Assembly was scheduled to select from among its ranks the
members of the Council of State and its President. Many observers speculated that because of his
poor health, Fidel would choose not be re-elected as President of the Council of State, which
would officially confirm his departure from heading the Cuban government. Statements from
Castro himself in December 2007 hinted at his potential retirement. That proved true on February
19, 2008, when Fidel announced that he would not accept the position as President of the Council
of State, essentially confirming his departure as titular head of the Cuban government.
Before Fidel stepped down from power in July 2006 for health reasons, observers discerned
several potential scenarios for Cuba’s future after Fidel. These fit into three broad categories: the
continuation of a communist government; a military government; or some type of democratic
government, whether it be a democratic transition or fully democratic government. According to
most observers, the most likely scenario, at least in the short term, was the continuation of the
regime under the leadership of Raúl. This was likely for a variety of reasons, but especially
because of Raúl’s designation by Fidel as successor in the party and his position as leader of the
FAR. The FAR has been in control of the government’s security apparatus since 1989 and has
played an increasing role in Cuba’s economy through the ownership of numerous business
enterprises. The scenario of a military-led government was viewed by some observers as a
possibility only if a successor communist government failed because of divisiveness among
leaders or political instability. For many observers, the least likely scenario upon Fidel’s death or
departure was a democratic transition government. With a strong totalitarian security apparatus,
the Castro government successfully impeded the development of independent civil society, with
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only a small and tightly regulated private sector, no independent labor movement, and no unified
political opposition.8
Human Rights
Overview
Cuba has a poor record on human rights, with the government sharply restricting freedoms of
expression, association, assembly, movement, and other basic rights. It has cracked down on
dissent, arrested human rights activists and independent journalists, and staged demonstrations
against critics. Although some anticipated a relaxation of the government’s oppressive tactics in
the aftermath of the January 1998 visit of Pope John Paul II, government attacks against human
rights activists and other dissidents have continued since that time.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights maintained in its 2008 annual human rights
report that the Cuban government’s “restrictions on political rights, freedom of expression, and
dissemination of ideas have created, over a period of decades, a situation of permanent and
systematic violations of the fundamental rights of Cuban citizens, which is made notably worse
by the lack of independence of the judiciary.”9
Human Rights Watch issued a report in November 2009 criticizing Cuba’s human rights record
under the government of Raúl Castro. According to the report, Raúl has kept Cuba’s repressive
machinery in place, with scores of political prisoners languishing in jail and the use of “draconian
laws and sham trials to incarcerate scores more who have dared to exercise their fundamental
freedoms.” In particular, the report notes that the Cuban government has relied on a
“dangerousness” provision of the Cuban criminal code that allows the state to imprison
individuals before they have committed a crime.10
According to the State Department’s human rights report for 2009, issued in March 2010, the
Cuban government continued to commit numerous serious abuses during the year. Among the
human rights problems cited in the State Department report were “beatings and abuse of prisoners
and detainees, harsh and life-threatening prison conditions, including denial of medical care;
harassment, beatings, and threats against political opponents by government-recruited mobs,
police, and state security officials acting with impunity; arbitrary arrest and detention of human
rights advocates and members of independent professional organizations; and denial of fair trial,
including for at least 194 political prisoners and as many 5,000 persons who have been convicted
of potential ‘dangerousness’ without being charged with any specific crime.” As noted in the
report, Cuban authorities engaged in pervasive monitoring of private communications and
severely limited freedoms of speech and press, peaceful assembly, and association and freedom of

8 For further discussion of potential Cuban political scenarios in the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s stepping down from
power in 2006 because of poor health, see CRS Report RL33622, Cuba’s Future Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy
Approaches, by Mark P. Sullivan
9 Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Annual Report of the IACHR
2008,” February 25, 2009, “Chapter IV, Cuba” available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2008eng/
Chap4.c.eng.htm
10 “New Castro, Same Cuba: Political Prisoners in the Post-Fidel Era,” Human Rights Watch, November 2009,
available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/11/18/new-castro-same-cuba
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movement. (See the full State Department human rights report on Cuba, available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/wha/136108.htm.)
The Cuban government conducted a severe crackdown in March 2003 (often referred to as the
Primavera Negra, or Black Spring) and imprisoned 75 democracy activists, including
independent journalists and librarians and leaders of independent labor unions and opposition
parties. At present, 53 of the “group of 75” political prisoners remain incarcerated. In October
2009, one of the 75 detainees, Nelson Alberto Aguiar Ramírez, who had been sentenced to 13
years in prison, was released following a visit to Cuba by Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel
Moratinos. In January 2009, detainee Reynaldo Labrada Pena who had worked with the Varela
Project was released from prison after completing his sentence.
The independent Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation (CCDHRN)
documented in its January 2010 report that Cuba held at least 201 political prisoners, down
slightly from the 205 prisoners documented in January 2009. The figures reflect a continuing
decline from previous years when the Commission estimated at least 283 prisoners at the
beginning of 2007 and 333 at the beginning of 2006. Despite the reduction in the number of
prisoners, human rights activists maintain that the overall situation has not improved. As noted in
the Commission’s most recent report, the government has adopted lower-profile tactics of
political repression against human rights activists over the past several years, including arbitrary
short-term detentions, threats, and other forms of harassment or intimidation. The Commission
maintained that Cuba continued to have the worst situation of fundamental rights in the entire
hemisphere.11
Cuba signed two U.N. human rights treaties in 2008: the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Some
considered this a positive step, but others maintain that the Cuban government has not taken any
significant action to guarantee civil and political freedoms. In March 2008, the Cuban
government did lift the ban on Cubans staying at tourist hotels. Although few Cubans will be able
to afford the cost of staying in such hotels, the move was symbolically significant and ended the
practices of what critics had dubbed “tourism apartheid.”
On December 17, 2008, Cuban President Raúl Castro offered to exchange some imprisoned
Cuban political dissidents for five Cubans imprisoned in the United States since 2001 for
espionage. The so-called “Cuban five” are serving sentences ranging from 15 years to life. (For
additional background, see “Cuban Spies in the United States” below.) In response, the State
Department rejected the offer, insisting that the jailed dissidents in Cuba should be released
immediately without any conditions.12
Although Cuban authorities continue to stifle dissent and repress freedoms, pro-democracy and
human rights activists continue to call attention to Cuba’s poor human rights record and many
have been recognized over the years by the international community for their efforts.

11 Comisión Cubana de Derechos Humanos y Reconciliacion Nacional, “Cuba a Inicios del 2010: Continúa
empeorando la situación de derechos humanos,” January 19, 2010.
12 Marco Sibaja, “Raul Castro Offers To Free Dissidents in Exchange for Alleged Cuban Spies Jailed in U.S.,”
Associated Press Newswires, December 18, 2008.
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A human rights group known as the Ladies in White (Damas de Blanco) was formed in April
2003 by the wives, mothers, daughters, sisters, and aunts of the members of the “group of 75”
dissidents arrested a month earlier in Cuba’s human rights crackdown.13 The group conducts
peaceful protests calling for the unconditional release of political prisoners. Dressed in white, its
members attend Mass each Sunday at St. Rita’s church in Havana and then walk silently through
the streets to a nearby park. In April 2008, 10 members of the Ladies in White were physically
removed from a park near the Plaza of the Revolution in Havana when they demanded the release
of their husbands and the other members of the “group of 75” still imprisoned. The group held
protests during the third week of March 2010 to commemorate the March 2003 crackdown.
Cuban security forces and government-orchestrated mobs forcefully broke up the protests on
March 16 and 17, while protests on other days were subject to verbal abuse by mobs.
Cuban Internet blogger Yoaní Sánchez has received considerable international attention since late
2007 for her website, Generación Y, that includes commentary critical of the Cuban government.
In May 2008, Sánchez was awarded Spain’s Ortega y Gasset award for digital journalism, but the
Cuban government did not provide her with an exit permit to accept the award. (Sánchez’s
website is available at http://www.desdecuba.com/generaciony/). On November 6, 2009, Sánchez
and two other bloggers, Orlando Luis Pardo and Claudia Cadelo, were intercepted by state
security agents while walking on a Havana street on their way to participate in a march against
violence. Sánchez and Pardo were beaten in the assault. The Department of State issued a
statement deploring the assault, and expressed its deep concern to the Cuban government for the
incident.
The National Endowment for Democracy presented its 2009 democracy award to five Cuban
democracy activists: imprisoned dissidents José Daniel Ferrer García, a youth activist and
member of the Christian Liberation Movement, Librado Linares García, a founder of the Cuban
Reflection Movement, and Ivan Hernandez Carrillo, an independent labor activist; Jorge Luis
Garcia Pérez (“Antúnez”), a civic resistance movement leader released from prison in 2007 after
17 years; and Iris Tamara Pérez Aguilera, founder of the Rosa Parks Women’s Movement.
Death of Hunger Striker Orlando Zapata Tamayo
The death of imprisoned Cuban dissident Orlando Zapata Tamayo on February 23, 2010, after an
83-day hunger strike focused increased U.S. and world attention on the plight of Cuba’s political
prisoners. Zapata, who was 42 years old at the time of his death, was arrested on March 20, 2003,
while taking part in a hunger strike to demand the release of political prisoner Oscar Biscet. He
was a member of the Alternative Republican Movement and the National Civic Resistance
Committee. Zapata was not counted among the “group of 75”political prisoners arrested in 2003,
but in January 2004, Amnesty International declared that he was a prisoner of conscience. In May
2004, Zapata was sentenced to three years in prison for “disrespect, public disorder, and
resistance,” but he was subsequently tried on further charges and was serving a total sentence of
36 years.14

13 The website of the Damas de Blanco is available at http://www.damasdeblanco.com/.
14 Amnesty International, “Death of Cuban Prisoner of Conscience on Hunger Strike Must Herald Change,” February
24, 2010, and “Cuba: Newly Declared Prisoners of Conscience,” January 29, 2004.
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U.S. officials maintained that Zapata’s death highlighted the injustice of Cuba’s holding of more
than 200 political prisoners and called for their immediate release.15 President Obama issued a
statement on March 24, 2010, expressing deep concern about the human rights situation in Cuba,
including the death of Zapata, the repression of the Ladies in White, and increased harassment of
those who dare to express the desires of their fellow Cuban citizens. The President called for the
end of repression, the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners, and respect
for the basic rights of the Cuban people. On March 18, 2010, the Senate approved S.Con.Res. 54
(Nelson, Bill), which recognized Zapata’s life and called for a continued focus on the promotion
of internationally recognized human rights in Cuba. Similar resolutions have been introduced in
the House: H.Con.Res. 251 (McGovern) and H.Con.Res. 252 (Ros-Lehtinen).
Zapata’ s death also prompted considerable criticism from human rights organizations and other
countries. Amnesty International expressed strong criticism of the death of Zapata, which it
maintained was an “indictment of the continuing repression of political dissidents in Cuba.” It
called for Cuba to invite international human rights experts to visit Cuba to verify respect for
human rights.16 The European Parliament condemned the death of Zapata and called for the
“immediate and unconditional release of political prisoners,” and even Spain, which had been
lobbying the European Union for a relaxation of its common policy on Cuba, urged the release of
Cuban political prisoners. Chile and Costa Rica also criticized Cuba for Zapata’s death, and
Mexico expressed concern for the health of Cuban dissidents.
In Cuba, President Raúl Castro said the he regretted Zapata’s death, but also maintained that no
one has been tortured or murdered in Cuba.17 Zapata’s death prompted protests by other dissidents
and several dissidents vowed to undertake hunger strikes. Cuban dissident Guillermo Fariñas
began a hunger strike on February 24, 2010, and has been hospitalized since March 11 in Santa
Clara. Fariñas, who has undertaken numerous hunger strikes in the past, is calling for the release
of 26 political prisoners reported to be in ill health.18
Economic Conditions
After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Russian financial assistance to Cuba practically
ended, and as a result, Cuba experienced severe economic deterioration from 1989-1993, with
estimates of economic decline ranging from 35-50%. Since then, however, there has been
considerable improvement. From 1994-2000, as Cuba moved forward with some limited market-
oriented economic reforms, economic growth averaged 3.7% annually.
Economic growth was strong in the 2005-2007 period, registering an impressive 11.2% in 2005
(despite widespread damage caused by Hurricanes Dennis and Wilma), 12.1% in 2006, and 7.3%

15 U.S. Department of State, Philip J. Crowley, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Public Affairs, “Death of Cuban
Dissident Orlando Zapata Tamayo,” February 24, 2010.
16 Amnesty International, “Death of Cuban Prisoner of Conscience on Hunger Strike Must Herald Change,” February
24, 2010.
17 “Cuba: Raúl Castro ‘Regrets’ Political Prisoner Death, Blames United States,” CubaDebate, Havana (Open Source
Center) February 24, 2010; Tracy Wilkinson, “Castro ‘Lamenting Dissident’s Death,” Los Angeles Times, February 25,
2010; Juan O. Tamayo, “Raúl Castro: Hunger Striker’s Death ‘Lamentable,’” Miami Herald, February 25, 2010.
18 “Cuban Dissident Vows to Continue Hunger Strike,” EFE News Service, March 22, 2010.
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in 2007.19 The economy benefitted from the growth of the tourism, nickel, and oil sectors, and
support from Venezuela and China in terms of investment commitments and credit lines. Cuba
also benefits from a preferential oil agreement with Venezuela, which provides Cuba with more
than 90,000 barrels of oil a day. The market value of Venezuela’s oil to Cuba reportedly amounted
to over $2 billion annually in 2006 and 2007, and over $3 billion in 2008.20 Venezuela also helped
Cuba upgrade an oil refinery in Cienfuegos, which was inaugurated in 2007.
In 2008, economic growth slowed to an estimated 4.3%. This was prompted by several problems,
including the declining price of nickel, which accounts for a major share of Cuba’s exports, the
rising cost of food imports, and the devastation wrought by Hurricanes Gustav and Ike,
particularly in the agricultural sectors.
The global financial crisis has had a negative effect on the Cuban economy in 2009 because of
lower world prices for nickel and a reduction in tourism from Canada and Europe. As a result,
economic growth slowed to an estimated 1.4% in 2009.21 In June 2009, the government
announced austerity measures that included energy rationing and cutbacks in transportation and
some food programs.
Nevertheless, over the years, Cuba has expressed pride for the nation’s accomplishments in health
and education. According to the U.N. Development Program’s 2009 Human Development Report,
life expectancy in Cuba in 2007 was 78.5 years and adult literacy was estimated at almost 100%.
Cuba has also boasted a 2009 infant mortality rate of 4.8 per 1,000 live births.22
When Cuba’s economic slide began in 1989, the government showed little willingness to adopt
any significant market-oriented economic reforms, but in 1993, faced with unprecedented
economic decline, Cuba began to change policy direction. Beginning in 1993, Cubans were
allowed to own and use U.S. dollars and to shop at dollar-only shops previously limited to tourists
and diplomats. Self-employment was authorized in more than 100 occupations in 1993, most in
the service sector, and by 1996 that figure had grown to more than 150 occupations. Also in 1993,
the government divided large state farms into smaller, more autonomous, agricultural
cooperatives (Basic Units of Cooperative Production, UBPCs). It opened agricultural markets in
1994, where farmers could sell part of their produce on the open market, and it also permitted
artisan markets for the sale of handicrafts. In 1995, the government allowed private food catering,
including home restaurants (paladares), in effect legalizing activities that were already taking
place), and approved a new foreign investment law that allows fully owned investments by
foreigners in all sectors of the economy with the exception of defense, health, and education. In
1996, it authorized the establishment of free trade zones with tariff reductions typical of such
zones. In 1997, the government enacted legislation to reform the banking system and established
a new Central Bank (BCC) to operate as an autonomous and independent entity.
After Cuba began to recover from its economic decline, the government began to backtrack on
some of its reform efforts. Regulations and new taxes made it extremely difficult for many of the
nation’s self-employed. Some home restaurants were forced to close because of the new

19 “Cuba Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, March 2010.
20 Jorge R. Piñon, “Cuba – 2008 Petroleum Supply Demand Analysis,” Center for Hemispheric Policy, University of
Miami, July 6, 2009.
21 “Cuba Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, March 2010.
22 “Infant Mortality, 5.3 in 2007!” Granma Internacional, January 4, 2008.
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regulations. In 2004, the Cuban government limited the use of dollars by state companies for any
services or products not considered part of their core business. Some analysts viewed the measure
as an effort to turn back the clock on economic reform measures.23 Also in 2004, Fidel Castro
announced that U.S. dollars no longer would be used in entities that at the time accepted dollars
(such as stores, restaurants, and hotels). Instead, dollars had to be exchanged for “convertible
pesos,” with a 10% surcharge for the exchange. Dollar bank accounts are still allowed, but
Cubans are not able to deposit new dollars into the accounts. Beginning in April 2005, convertible
pesos were no longer on par with the U.S. dollar, but instead were linked to a basket of foreign
currencies. This reduces the value of dollar remittances sent to Cuba and provides more hard
currency to the Cuban government.24
Economic Changes Under Raúl
When Raúl Castro assumed provisional power in July 2006, there was some expectation that the
government would be more open to economic policy changes, and a debate about potential
economic reforms re-emerged in Cuba. On July 26, 2007, in a speech commemorating Cuba’s
revolutionary anniversary, Raúl Castro acknowledged that Cuban salaries were insufficient to
satisfy needs, and maintained that structural changes were necessary in order to increase
efficiency and production. Some observers maintain that the speech was a forecast for economic
reforms under Raúl, while others stress that only small marginal changes occurred in Raúl’s first
year in power.25
In the aftermath of Raúl’s July 2007 speech, Cuban public expectations for economic reform
increased. Thousands of officially sanctioned meetings were held in workplaces and local PCC
branches around the country where Cubans were encouraged to air their views and discuss the
future direction of the country. Complaints focused on low salaries and housing and
transportation problems, and some participants advocated legalization of more private
businesses.26 Raised expectations for economic change in Cuba increased the chance that the
government actually would adopt some policy changes. Doing nothing would run the risk of
increased public frustration and a potential for social unrest. Increased public frustration was
evident in a clandestine video, widely circulated on the Internet in early February 2008, of a
meeting between Ricardo Alarcón, the head of Cuba’s legislature, and university students in
which a student was questioning why Cuban wages are so low and why Cubans are prohibited
from visiting tourist hotels (a policy subsequently changed in late March 2008) or traveling
abroad. The video demonstrated the disillusionment of many Cuban youth with the poor
economic situation and repressive environment in Cuba.
Since Raúl Castro officially assumed the presidency in 2008, his government has announced a
series of economic changes. In his first speech as President in February 2008, Raúl promised to
make the government smaller and more efficient, to review the potential revaluation of the Cuban
peso, and to eliminate excessive bans and regulations that curb productivity.27 In mid-March, the

23 Larry Luxner, “New Decree Limits Dollar Transactions as Cuba Tightens Controls Once Again,” CubaNews, April
2004.
24 Larry Luxner, “Cuba’s ‘Convertible Peso’ No Longer Linked to U.S. Dollar,” CubaNews, April 2005, p. 3.
25 Manuel Roig-Franzia, “Cuba’s Call for Economic Detente,” Washington Post, July 27, 2007.
26 Frances Robles, “Cubans Urged to Vent Views,” Miami Herald, October 2, 2007.
27 “Cuba: Full Text of Raúl Castro’s National Assembly Address,” Cubavisión, Havana (as translated by Open Source
Center) February 24, 2008.
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government announced that restrictions on the sales of consumer products such as computers,
microwaves, and DVD and video players would be lifted. In late March, it announced that it
would lift restrictions on the use of cell phones. This officially occurred in mid-April.
In April 2008, the government announced that it would begin revamping the state’s wage system
by removing the limit that a state worker can earn. This is an effort to boost productivity and to
deal with one of Cuba’s major economic problems: how to raise wages to a level where basic
human needs can be satisfied. The promised revamp of the wage system, however, has been
delayed, reportedly by poor preparation and bureaucratic hurdles. The government’s introduction
of austerity measures in June 2009 will likely contribute to further delays in wage reforms.
According to some analysts, the policy of fiscal austerity will supersede economic reform
efforts.28
The problem of low wages in Cuba is closely related to another major economic problem: how to
unify the two official currencies circulating in the country—the Cuban convertible peso (CUC)
and the Cuban peso, which traded at about 24 to 1 CUC in 2008. Most people are paid in Cuban
pesos, and the minimum monthly wage in Cuba is about 225 pesos (about $9 U.S. dollars29), but
for increasing amounts of consumer goods, convertible pesos are used. Cubans with access to
foreign remittances or who work in jobs that give them access to convertible pesos are far better
off than those Cubans who do not have such access.
Perhaps the most significant reform effort under Raúl Castro has focused on the agriculture
sector, a vital issue because Cuba reportedly imports some two-thirds of its food needs.30 In an
effort to boost food production, the government began in 2008 to give farmers more discretion
over how to use their land and what supplies to buy. Decision-making on agriculture reportedly
has shifted from the national government to the local municipal level, with government
bureaucracy cut significantly.31 The government also began a program of turning idle land into
productive use through a land grant program, whereby private farmers and cooperatives can apply
for land. Under the program, land was distributed to 70,000 farmers by the end of 2009, but it
remains to be seen whether these new farms will be receive the materials needed to become
productive.32 Despite these reform efforts, it has been reported in 2010 that overall food
production is significantly below targets, and shortages of some basic agricultural products have
been reported in Havana and elsewhere. Continued problems in the agricultural sector focus on an
entrenched system whereby famers depend on the state for fuel, pesticides, fertilizers and other
resources in exchange for 70%-80% of what they produce. The government’s inability to provide
enough resources to farmers has hampered production, and its domination of the distribution
process has hampered the delivery of products to market.33
Overall, there has been disappointment that more significant economic reforms have not
materialized under Raúl Castro. There was some expectation that the President would announce
additional economic reforms in his July 26, 2008 speech on Cuba’s revolutionary anniversary, but
there were no such announcements. Instead, Castro acknowledged the “large number of problems

28 “Cuba Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, June 2009.
29 U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2007, Cuba,” March 11, 2008.
30 Helen Popper, “Cuban Farm Reforms Sow Seeds of Enterprise,” Reuters News, December 17, 2009
31 Marc Frank, “Raúl Castro Overhauls Cuba’s Farm Bureaucracy,” Reuters News, May 1, 2008.
32 Helen Popper, op. cit.
33 Marc Frank, “Havana Food Production Plummets Despite Reforms,” Reuters News, March 3, 2010.
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that still need to be resolved, the majority of which directly affect the population.”34 While the
government has been candid in acknowledging Cuba’s economic problems and there have been
some reform efforts in the agricultural sector, it has been slow to implement reforms in other
areas. According to one analysis, the government has not taken advantage of a number of policy
options, such as foreign investment or market mechanisms, that could be used to improve
economic performance.35 In his July 26, 2009, Revolutionary Day speech, President Castro
exhorted Cubans to work idle land that is being distributed in order to increase food production
and reduce Cuban food imports. The subsequent postponement of the PCC’s sixth party Congress
planned for late 2009 was, according to some observers, an indication that Cuba is focusing on
austerity measures and delaying any additional economic changes.
Looking ahead, several factors could continue to restrain economic policy changes in Cuba. A
number of observers believe that as long as Fidel Castro is around, it will be difficult for the
government to move forward with any major initiatives that are viewed as deviating from Fidel’s
orthodox policies. Other observers point to the significant oil subsidies and investment that Cuba
receives from Venezuela and maintain that such support lessens the government’s impetus for
economic reforms. Another factor that bodes against rapid economic policy reform is the fear that
it could spur momentum for political change. Given that one of the highest priorities for Cuba’s
government has been maintaining social and political stability, any economic policy changes are
likely to be smaller changes introduced over time that do not threaten the state’s control.
Finally, some observers maintain that economic difficulties caused by the global economic
downturn could forestall any significant reform efforts as the Cuban government enacts austerity
measures to deal with the decline in foreign exchange earnings. On the other hand, such a
difficult environment could force the Cuban government to reduce its role in the economy. As
Cuban Minister of Economy and Planning Marino Murillo reportedly said in January 2010, “the
gigantic paternalist state can no longer be, because there is no longer any way to maintain it.”
Murillo reportedly suggested to Cuban government officials that the government could lease
small businesses such as barber shops, beauty parlors, or appliance and watch repair shops.36
Cuba’s Foreign Policy
During the Cold War, Cuba had extensive relations with and support from the Soviet Union, with
billions in annual subsidies to sustain the Cuban economy that helped fund an activist foreign
policy and support for guerrilla movements and revolutionary governments abroad in Latin
America and Africa. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, an end to the Cold War, and the
loss of Soviet financial support, Cuba was forced to abandon its revolutionary exploits abroad. As
its economy reeled from the loss of Soviet support, Cuba was forced to open up its economy and
economic relations with countries worldwide, and developed significant economic linkages with
Canada, Spain, other European countries, and China. In recent years, Venezuela—under populist
President Hugo Chávez—has become a significant source of support for subsidized oil imports
and investment. Relations with Russia have also intensified recently, with the visit of Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev to Havana in November, the visit of several Russian warships to

34 “Cuba: Raúl Castro’s 26 July Rebellion Day Speech,” Havana Cubavisión (Open Source Center), July 26, 2006.
35 Philip Peters, Raulonomics: Tough Diagnosis and Partial Prescriptions in Raul Castro’s Economic Policies,
Lexington Institute, July 2009, p. 9.
36 Marc Frank, “Cuban Economy Minister Pushes for Less State Role,” Reuters News, March 8, 2010.
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Cuba in December 2008, and Raúl Castro’s visit to Moscow in late January 2009. Chinese
President Hu Jintao also visited Cuba in November 2008 signing a dozen agreements.
With El Salvador’s restoration of relations with Cuba in June 2009, all Latin American nations
now have official diplomatic relations with Cuba. Cuba has increasingly become more engaged in
Latin America beyond the already close relations with Venezuela. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio
Lula da Silva visited Cuba twice in 2008, and Cuba seems especially interested in expanding
relations with Brazil. Cuba became a full member of the 23 member Rio Group of Latin
American and Caribbean nations in November 2008; some observers see the group, which
excludes the United States, as an alternative to the Organization of American States (OAS). Raúl
Castro made his first foreign trip as President in December 2008, when he traveled to Venezuela,
and then to Bahia, Brazil, where he attended the Latin American and Caribbean Integration and
Development Summit, a regional initiative of President Lula.37
Cuba is an active participant in international forums, including the United Nations and the
controversial United Nations Human Rights Council. Cuba hosted the 14th summit of the Non-
aligned Movement (NAM) in 2006, and held the Secretary Generalship of the NAM until its July
2009 summit in Egypt. Cuba is a member of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas,
(ALBA), a Venezuelan-led integration and cooperation scheme founded as an alternative to U.S.
efforts to negotiate a region-wide Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).
Cuba was excluded from participation in the OAS in 1962 because of its identification with
Marxism-Leninism, but in early June 2009, the OAS overturned the 1962 resolution in a move
that could eventually lead to Cuba’s reentry into the regional organization. While the Cuban
government welcomed the OAS vote to overturn the 1962 resolution, it asserted that it would not
return to the OAS. (For additional information on the OAS vote, see “Cuba and the Organization
of American States.”)
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
Policy Overview
In the early 1960s, U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated sharply when Fidel Castro began to build a
repressive communist dictatorship and moved his country toward close relations with the Soviet
Union. The often tense and hostile nature of the U.S.-Cuban relationship is illustrated by such
events and actions as U.S. covert operations to overthrow the Castro government culminating in
the ill-fated April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion; the October 1962 missile crisis in which the United
States confronted the Soviet Union over its attempt to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba;
Cuban support for guerrilla insurgencies and military support for revolutionary governments in
Africa and the Western Hemisphere; the 1980 exodus of around 125,000 Cubans to the United
States in the so-called Mariel boatlift; the 1994 exodus of more than 30,000 Cubans who were
interdicted and housed at U.S. facilities in Guantanamo and Panama; and the February 1996
shootdown by Cuban fighter jets of two U.S. civilian planes operated by the Cuban American
group, Brothers to the Rescue, which resulted in the death of four U.S. crew members.

37 “Cuba: Bringing Cuba in from the cold,” Latin American Regional Report, Caribbean & Central America, December
2008.
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Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the island nation
through comprehensive economic sanctions, including an embargo on trade and financial
transactions. The Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), first issued by the Treasury
Department in July 1963, lay out a comprehensive set of economic sanctions against Cuba,
including a prohibition on most financial transactions with Cuba and a freeze of Cuban
government assets in the United States. The CACR have been amended many times over the
years to reflect changes in policy, and remain in force today.
These sanctions were made stronger with the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 (P.L. 102-
484, Title XVII) and with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-
114), the latter often referred to as the Helms/Burton legislation. The CDA prohibits U.S.
subsidiaries from engaging in trade with Cuba and prohibits entry into the United States for any
sea-borne vessel to load or unload freight if it has been involved in trade with Cuba within the
previous 180 days. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, enacted in the aftermath of
Cuba’s shooting down of two U.S. civilian planes in February 1996, combines a variety of
measures to increase pressure on Cuba and provides for a plan to assist Cuba once it begins the
transition to democracy. Most significantly, the law codified the Cuban embargo, including all
restrictions under the CACR. This provision is especially noteworthy because of its long-lasting
effect on U.S. policy options toward Cuba. The executive branch is circumscribed in lifting or
substantially loosening the economic embargo without congressional concurrence until certain
democratic conditions are met, although the CACR includes licensing authority that provides the
executive branch with some administrative flexibility (e.g. travel-related restrictions in the CACR
have been eased and tightened on numerous occasions). Another significant sanction in the law is
a provision in Title III that holds any person or government that traffics in U.S. property
confiscated by the Cuban government liable for monetary damages in U.S. federal court. Acting
under provisions of the law, however, both President Clinton and President Bush have suspended
the implementation of Title III at six-month intervals.
In addition to sanctions, another component of U.S. policy, a so-called second track, consists of
support measures for the Cuban people. This includes U.S. private humanitarian donations,
medical exports to Cuba under the terms of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, U.S. government
support for democracy-building efforts, and U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to
Cuba. In addition, the 106th Congress approved the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export
Enhancement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) that allows for agricultural exports to Cuba,
albeit with restrictions on financing such exports. This led to the United States becoming Cuba’s
largest supplier of food and agricultural products since 2002.
Debate on the Direction of U.S. Policy
Over the years, although U.S. policymakers have agreed on the overall objectives of U.S. policy
toward Cuba—to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island—there have
been several schools of thought about how to achieve those objectives. Some have advocated a
policy of keeping maximum pressure on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted, while
continuing efforts to support the Cuban people. Others argue for an approach, sometimes referred
to as constructive engagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they believe are hurting
the Cuban people, and move toward engaging Cuba in dialogue. Still others call for a swift
normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations by lifting the U.S. embargo. Legislative initiatives
introduced over the past decade have reflected these three policy approaches.
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Dating back to 2000, there have been significant efforts in Congress to ease U.S. sanctions, with,
one or both houses at times approving amendments to appropriations measures that would have
eased U.S. sanctions on Cuba. Until March 2009, these provisions were stripped out of final
enacted measures, in part because of presidential veto threats.
In light of Fidel Castro’s departure as head of government, many observers have called for a re-
examination of U.S. policy toward Cuba. In this new context, there are two broad policy
approaches to contend with political change in Cuba: a status-quo approach that would maintain
the U.S. dual-track policy of isolating the Cuban government while providing support to the
Cuban people; and an approach aimed at influencing the attitudes of the Cuban government and
Cuban society through increased contact and engagement.
In general, those who advocate easing U.S. sanctions on Cuba make several policy arguments.
They assert that if the United States moderated its policy toward Cuba—through increased travel,
trade, and diplomatic dialogue—then the seeds of reform would be planted, which would
stimulate and strengthen forces for peaceful change on the island. They stress the importance to
the United States of avoiding violent change in Cuba, with the prospect of a mass exodus to the
United States and the potential of involving the United States in a civil war scenario. They argue
that since the demise of Cuba’s communist government does not appear imminent, even without
Fidel Castro at the helm, the United States should espouse a more pragmatic approach in trying to
induce change in Cuba. Supporters of changing policy also point to broad international support
for lifting the U.S. embargo, to the missed opportunities for U.S. businesses because of the
unilateral nature of the embargo, and to the increased suffering of the Cuban people because of
the embargo. Proponents of change also argue that the United States should be consistent in its
policies with the world’s few remaining communist governments, including China and Vietnam,
and also maintain that moderating policy will help advance human rights.
On the other side, opponents of changing U.S. policy maintain that the current two-track policy of
isolating Cuba, but reaching out to the Cuban people through measures of support, is the best
means for realizing political change in Cuba. They point out that the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 sets forth the steps that Cuba needs to take in order for the
United States to normalize relations. They argue that softening U.S. policy at this time without
concrete Cuban reforms would boost the Castro government, politically and economically, and
facilitate the survival of the communist regime. Opponents of softening U.S. policy argue that the
United States should stay the course in its commitment to democracy and human rights in Cuba,
and that sustained sanctions can work. Opponents of loosening U.S. sanctions further argue that
Cuba’s failed economic policies, not the U.S. embargo, are the causes of Cuba’s difficult living
conditions.
Clinton Administration’s Easing of Sanctions
The Clinton Administration made several changes to U.S. policy in the aftermath of Pope John
Paul II’s 1998 visit to Cuba, which were intended to bolster U.S. support for the Cuban people.
These included the resumption of direct flights to Cuba (which had been curtailed after the
February 1996 shootdown of two U.S. civilian planes), the resumption of cash remittances by
U.S. nationals and residents for the support of close relatives in Cuba (which had been curtailed
in August 1994 in response to the migration crisis with Cuba), and the streamlining of procedures
for the commercial sale of medicines and medical supplies and equipment to Cuba.
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In January 1999, President Clinton announced several additional measures to support the Cuban
people. These included a broadening of cash remittances to Cuba, so that all U.S. residents (not
just those with close relatives in Cuba) could send remittances to Cuba; an expansion of direct
passenger charter flights to Cuba from additional U.S. cities other than Miami (direct flights later
in the year began from Los Angeles and New York); and an expansion of people-to-people
contact by loosening restrictions on travel to Cuba for certain categories of travelers, such as
professional researchers and those involved in a wide range of educational, religious, and sports
activities.
Bush Administration Policy
The Bush Administration essentially continued the two-track U.S. policy of isolating Cuba
through economic sanctions while supporting the Cuban people through a variety of measures.
However, within this policy framework, the Administration emphasized stronger enforcement of
economic sanctions and further tightened restrictions on travel, remittances, and humanitarian gift
parcels to Cuba. There was considerable reaction to the Administration’s June 2004 tightening of
restrictions for family visits and other categories of travel, and to the Administration’s February
2005 tightening of restrictions on payment terms for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba.
Nevertheless, the Bush Administration did not completely eliminate the easing of sanctions that
occurred under the Clinton Administration. For example, Americans may travel to Cuba to
participate in educational activities, but these now need to be part of a structured academic
program. Direct flights to Cuba also still run from Miami and New York, although flights from
Los Angeles were curtailed for economic reasons in the aftermath of the tightening of travel
restrictions in 2004 that reduced the number of Americans visiting Cuba.
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba
In October 2003, President Bush called for the establishment of an interagency Commission for
Assistance to a Free Cuba, a Cabinet-level commission chaired by then -Secretary of State Colin
Powell. The Commission, which had its first meeting in December 2003, was tasked with the
objectives of (1) identifying additional means to help the Cuban people bring about an
expeditious end to Cuba’s dictatorship and (2) considering the requirements for U.S. assistance to
a post-dictatorship Cuba.38
In May 2004, President Bush endorsed the recommendations of the Commission’s first report,
which made recommendations for immediate measures to “hasten the end of Cuba’s dictatorship”
as well as longer-term recommendations to help plan for Cuba’s transition from communism to
democracy in various areas. The President directed that up to $59 million be committed to
implement key recommendations of the Commission, including support for democracy-building
activities and for airborne broadcasts of Radio and TV Marti to Cuba. The report’s most
significant recommendations included a number of measures to tighten economic sanctions on
family visits and other categories of travel and on private humanitarian assistance in the form of
remittances and gift parcels. Subsequent regulations issued by the Treasury and Commerce
Departments in June 2004 implemented these new sanctions. (The full Commission report is on
the State Department website at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/cuba/commission/2004/.) In
February 2005, the Administration continued to tighten U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba by

38 U.S. Department of State, “Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba,” White House Fact Sheet, December 8, 2003.
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further restricting the process of how U.S. agricultural exporters may be paid for their cash sales,
a move opposed by many U.S. agricultural exporters ( For more, see “Agricultural Exports and
Sanctions” below.)
In July 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice appointed Caleb McCarry as the State
Department’s new Cuba Transition Coordinator to direct U.S. government “actions in support of a
free Cuba.” Secretary Rice reconvened the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba in
December 2005 to identify additional measures to help Cubans hasten the transition to democracy
and to develop a plan to help the Cuban people move toward free and fair elections.
In July 2006, the Commission issued its second report, making recommendations to hasten
political change in Cuba toward a democratic transition. (The full report is available at
http://www.cafc.gov/rpt/.)
In the report, the Commission called for the United States to provide $80 million over two years
for the following: to support Cuban civil society ($31 million); to fund education programs and
exchanges, including university training in Cuba provided by third countries and scholarships for
economically disadvantaged students from Cuba at U.S. and third country universities ($10
million); to fund additional efforts to break the Cuban government’s information blockade and
expand access to independent information, including through the Internet ($24 million); and to
support international efforts at strengthening civil society and transition planning ($15 million).
According to the Cuba Transition Coordinator, this assistance would be additional funding
beyond what the Administration is already currently budgeting for these programs.39 Thereafter,
the Commission recommended funding of not less than $20 million annually for Cuba democracy
programs “until the dictatorship ceases to exist.” This would roughly double the amount currently
spent on Cuba democracy programs.
The report also set forth detailed plans of how the U.S. government, along with the international
community and the Cuban community abroad, could provide assistance to a Cuban transition
government to help it respond to critical humanitarian and social needs, to conduct free and fair
elections, and to move toward a market-based economy. The report also outlined a series of
preparatory steps in the areas of government organization, electoral preparation, and anticipating
humanitarian and social needs that the U.S. government could take now, before Cuba’s transition
begins, so that it would be well prepared in the event that assistance was requested by the new
Cuban government.
The Commission’s second report received a mixed response from Cuba’s dissident community.
Although some dissidents, like former political prisoner Vladimiro Roca, maintain that they
would welcome any U.S. assistance that helps support the Cuban dissident movement, others
expressed concerns about the report. Dissident economist and former political prisoner Oscar
Espinosa Chepe stressed that Cubans have to be the ones to solve their own problems. According
to Chepe, “We are thankful for the solidarity we have received from North America, Europe, and
elsewhere, but we request that they do not meddle in our country.”40 Miriam Leiva, a founding
member of the Ladies in White, a human rights organization, expressed concern that the report
could serve as a rationale for the government to imprison dissidents.41 Leiva also faulted the

39 U.S. Department of State, Second Report of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, Briefing, July 10, 2006.
40 Nicholas Kralev, “Bush OKs Initiative to Support Opposition,” Washington Times, July 11, 2006.
41 Frances Robles and Pablo Bachelet, “Plan for Change in Cuba Gets OK,” Miami Herald, July 11, 2006.
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Commission’s report for presuming what a Cuban transition must be before U.S. recognition or
assistance can be provided. According to Leiva, “Only we Cubans, of our own volition ... can
decide issues of such singular importance. Cubans on the island have sufficient intellectual ability
to tackle a difficult, peaceful transition and reconcile with other Cubans here and abroad.”42
U.S. Reaction to Cuba’s Political Succession
In response to Fidel Castro’s announcement that he was temporarily ceding power to his brother
Raúl, President Bush issued a statement on August 3, 2006, that “the United States is absolutely
committed to supporting the Cuban people’s aspiration for democracy and freedom.” The
President urged “the Cuban people to work for democratic change” and pledged U.S. support to
the Cuban people in their effort to build a transitional government in Cuba. At the time, U.S.
officials indicated that there were no plans for the United States to “reach out” to the new leader.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reiterated U.S. support for the Cuban people in an August 4,
2006, statement broadcast on Radio and TV Marti. According to Secretary Rice, “All Cubans who
desire peaceful democratic change can count on the support of the United States.”43
Although there was some U.S. concern that political change in Cuba could prompt a migration
crisis, there was no unusual traffic after Castro ceded provisional power to his brother. The U.S.
Coast Guard had plans to respond to such a migration crisis, with support from the Navy if
needed. In her August 4, 2006, message to the Cuban people, Secretary of State Rice encouraged
“the Cuban people to work at home for positive change.” Department of Homeland Security
officials also announced several measures to discourage Cubans from risking their lives on the
open seas. U.S. officials also discouraged those in the Cuban American community wanting to
travel by boat to Cuba to speed political change in Cuba. (For more, see “Migration Issues”
below.)
Response to Raúl’s Overtures
Raúl Castro asserted in an August 18, 2006, published interview that Cuba has “always been
disposed to normalize relations on an equal plane,” but at the same time he expressed strong
opposition to current U.S. policy toward Cuba, which he described as “arrogant and
interventionist.”44 In response, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs
Thomas Shannon reiterated a U.S. offer to Cuba, first articulated by President Bush in May 2002,
that the Administration was willing to work with Congress to lift U.S. economic sanctions if Cuba
were to begin a political opening and a transition to democracy. According to Shannon, the Bush
Administration remained prepared to work with Congress for ways to lift the embargo if Cuba
was prepared to free political prisoners, respect human rights, permit the creation of independent
organizations, and create a mechanism and pathway toward free and fair elections.45
In a December 2, 2006 speech, Raúl reiterated an offer to negotiate with the United States. He
said that “we are willing to resolve at the negotiating table the longstanding dispute between the

42 Miriam Leiva, “We Cubans Must Decide,” Miami Herald, July 15, 2006.
43 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice Message to the People of Cuba,” August 4, 2006.
44 “No Enemy Can Defeat Us,” interview of Raúl Castro by Laszar Barredo Medina, Diario Granma, August 18, 2006.
45 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Policy Toward Cuba,” Thomas Shannon, Assistant Secretary for Western
Hemisphere Affairs, August 23, 2006.
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United States and Cuba, of course, provided they accept, as we have previously said, our
condition as a country that will not tolerate any blemishes on its independence, and as long as
said resolution is based on the principles of equality, reciprocity, non-interference, and mutual
respect.”46
On July 26, 2007, in a speech on Cuba’s revolutionary anniversary (commemorating the 1953
attack on the Moncada military barracks), Raúl Castro reiterated for the third time an offer to
engage in dialogue with the United States, and strongly criticized U.S. trade and economic
sanctions on Cuba. A U.S. State Department spokesman responded that “the only real dialogue
that’s needed is with the Cuban people.”47
In the second half of 2007, President Bush and other U.S. officials continued to call for a
transition to democracy in Cuba. In a September 25, 2007 speech before the U.N. General
Assembly, President Bush stated that “the long rule of a cruel dictator is nearing its end,” and
called on the United Nations to insist on free speech, free assembly, and free elections as Cuba
“enters a period of transition.”48 U.S. Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez stated in a speech on
September 17 that “unless the regime changes, our policy will not,” but indicated that the United
States is “prepared to respond to genuine democratic change in Cuba.”49
On October 24, 2007, President Bush made a policy speech on Cuba that reflected a continuation
of the sanctions-based approach toward Cuba. According to the President: “As long as the
[Cuban] regime maintains its monopoly over the political and economic life of the Cuban people,
the United States will keep the embargo in place.” In his speech, President Bush also sent a
message to Cuban military, police, and government officials that “when Cubans rise up to
demand their liberty,” they have a choice to embrace the Cuban people’s desire for change or
“defend a disgraced and dying order by using force.” The President conveyed to these officials
that “there is a place for you in a free Cuba.”50
Response to Raúl’s Official Selection as President
In the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s February 19, 2008 announcement that he was officially
stepping down as head of state, President Bush maintained that he viewed “this as a period of
transition and it should be the beginning of a democratic transition in Cuba.” State Department
officials made clear that U.S. policy would not change. On February 24, 2008, the day that Raúl
Castro officially became Cuba’s head of state, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice issued a
statement urging “the Cuban government to begin a process of peaceful, democratic change by
releasing all political prisoners, respecting human rights, and creating a clear pathway towards
free and fair elections.”

46 “English Transcript of Raul Castro’s Speech,” Miami Herald, December 2, 2006.
47 Frances Robles, “Raúl Again Offers ‘Olive Branch’ to U.S.,” Miami Herald, July 27, 2007; “U.S. Government
Rejects Dialogue with Cuba,” EFE, July 27, 2007.
48 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “President Bush Addresses the United Nations General Assembly,”
September 25, 2007.
49 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Commerce Secretary Carlos M. Gutierrez Remarks at the Heritage Foundation,”
September 17, 2007.
50 White House, “President Bush Discusses Cuba Policy,” October 24, 2007.
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In remarks on Cuba policy in early March 2008, President Bush maintained that in order to
improve U.S.-Cuban relations, “what needs to change is not the United States; what needs to
change is Cuba.” The President asserted that Cuba “must release all political prisoners ... have
respect for human rights in word and deed, and pave the way for free and fair elections.”51 He
reiterated these words again in a speech to the Council of the Americas on May 7, 2008.52 On
May 21, 2008, President Bush called for the Cuban government to take steps to improve life for
the Cuban people, including opening up access to the Internet. He also announced that the United
States would change regulations to allow Americans to send mobile phones to family members in
Cuba.53
Obama Administration Policy
During the electoral campaign, President Obama had pledged to lift restrictions on family travel
to Cuba as well as restrictions on Cuban Americans sending remittances to Cuba. At the same
time, he also pledged to maintain the embargo as a source of leverage to bring about change in
Cuba. However, Obama also asserted that if the Cuban government takes significant steps toward
democracy, beginning with the freeing of all political prisoners, then the United States would take
steps to normalize relations and ease the embargo. He also maintained that, after careful
preparation, his Administration would pursue direct diplomacy with Cuba without preconditions,
but only when there is an opportunity to advance U.S. interests and advance the cause of freedom
for the Cuban people.54
In March 2009, Congress took some action ahead of the Administration to change U.S. policy
toward Cuba when it approved the FY2009 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 111-8). The
measure included several provisions easing Cuba sanctions, including restrictions on family
travel.
Observers had anticipated that President Obama would fulfill his campaign pledges with regard to
lifting restrictions on family travel and remittances before the fifth Summit of the Americas in
Trinidad and Tobago scheduled for April 17-19, 2009. This in fact occurred on April 13, 2009,
when the Obama Administration announced several significant measures to ease U.S. sanctions
on Cuba. The President announced that all restrictions on family travel and on remittances to
family members in Cuba would be lifted. This superseded the action taken by Congress in March
that had essentially reverted family travel restrictions to as they were in 2004 before they were
tightened. The Administration also announced that measures would be taken to increase
telecommunications links with Cuba and to expand the scope of eligible humanitarian donations
through gift parcels.55 (Both the Treasury and Commerce Department amended the Cuba embargo
regulations in early September 2009 to implement these policy changes.)


51 White House, “President Bush Delivers Remarks on Cuba,” March 7, 2008.
52 “Text of Bush Speech to Council of the Americas,” Miami Herald, May 9, 2008.
53 White House, “President Bush Discusses Cuba, Marks Day of Solidarity,” May 21, 2008.
54 “Remarks of Senator Barack Obama, Renewing U.S. Leadership in the Americas,” May 23, 2008, and “Renewing
U.S. Leadership in the Americas,” Factsheet, June 6, 2008, BarackObama.com
55 White House, “Fact Sheet: Reaching Out to the Cuban People,” April 13, 2009.
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At the Summit of the Americas, President Obama maintained that “the United States seeks a new
beginning with Cuba.” While recognizing that it will take time to “overcome decades of
mistrust,” the President said “there are critical steps we can take toward a new day.” He stated
that was prepared to have his Administration “engage with the Cuban government on a wide
range of issues—from drugs, migration, and economic issues, to human rights, free speech, and
democratic reform.”56 The President maintained that he was “not interested in talking just for the
sake of talking,” but said he believed that U.S.-Cuban relations could move in a new direction.
In June 2009, the State Department turned off the electronic billboard at the U.S. Interests Section
in Havana that had been had been setup in 2006 and had featured news and pro-democracy
messages that irked the Cuban government. Earlier in the year, the Cuban government had taken
down anti-U.S. billboards around the U.S. mission.
Cuba and the United States also agreed to restart the semi-annual migration talks that had been
suspended by the United States in 2004 and to begin new talks on direct postal service between
the two countries. To date, two rounds of migration talks have been held; the first took place in
July 2009 in New York, and the second took place in February 2010 in Havana. (For more details,
see “Migration Talks” below.)
In September 2009, the United States and Cuba held talks in Havana on resuming direct mail
service between the two countries.57 The Department of State expressed satisfaction with the
talks, which included discussion on issues related to the transportation, quality, and security of
mail service. According to the State Department, both sides agreed that they would meet again
after consultations with their governments.58 There reportedly has been working level discussion
and cooperation on the issue, but no new talks have been scheduled.
In early December 2009, Alan Gross, an American contractor working on USAID-funded Cuba
democracy projects in Cuba was arrested in Havana. He was reported to have distributed
communications equipment such as cell phones and laptops. In early January 2010, Cuban
officials claimed that the contractor was a spy, but U.S. officials strongly denied that he was
working with the U.S. intelligence services. The fate of the detained U.S. contractor could have a
significant effect on the course of U.S.-Cuban relations. Members of Congress have raised
considerable concern about Mr. Gross’s detention. (Also see “December 2009 Detainment of
American Subcontractor” below.)
In late 2009, Cuban officials had become increasingly critical of the Obama Administration. In
December 2009, Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez criticized President Obama as
“imperial” and “arrogant,” which prompted former U.S. drug czar Barry McCaffrey to withdraw
from a planned trip to Cuba in early January 2010 to discuss drug trafficking issues.

56 White House, “Remarks by the President At the Summit of the Americas Opening Ceremony,” April 17, 2009.
57 Since the early 1960s, mail to and from Cuba has arrived via third countries, which results in extensive delays in mail
between the two countries. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-484, Title XVII, Section 1705(f)) has a
provision requiring the U.S. Postal Service to take necessary actions to provide direct mail service to and from Cuba,
including, in the absence of common carrier service between the 2 countries, the use of charter service providers. Past
U.S. attempts to negotiate such service were rejected by Cuba, reportedly because Cuba wanted the issue to be part of a
larger normalization of commercial air traffic. Both the Clinton and Bush Administrations had called for negotiations to
restore direct mail service.
58 “Cuba: U.S.-Cuba Postal Talks,” U.S. Department of State, Question taken at September 17, 2009 Daily Press
Briefing, September 18, 2009.
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In 2010, the Obama Administration has expressed significant concern about the poor human
rights situation. In the semi-annual migration talks in February, U.S. officials urged Cuban
officials to provide imprisoned hunger striker Orlando Zapata Tamayo with all necessary medical
care. After Zapata’s death, U.S. officials called attention to the more than 200 political prisoners
held by Cuba and called for their immediate release.59
President Obama issued a statement on March 24, 2010, expressing deep concern about the
human rights situation in Cuba, including the death of Zapata, the repression of the Ladies in
White, and increased harassment of those who dare to express the desires of their fellow Cuban
citizens. He asserted that these events underscore that “Cuban authorities continue to respond to
the aspirations of the Cuban people with a clenched fist.” The President called for the end of
repression, the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners, and respect for the
basic rights of the Cuban people. The President noted that he has taken steps during the year to
reach out to the Cuban people and to signal his desire to seek a new era in relations with the
government of Cuba. He asserted that he remains “committed to supporting the simple desire of
the Cuban people to freely determine their future and to enjoy the rights and freedoms that define
the Americas, and that should be universal to all human beings.”60
Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances
Restrictions on travel to Cuba have been a key and often contentious component of U.S. efforts to
isolate the communist government of Fidel Castro for much of the past 40 years. Over time there
have been numerous changes to the restrictions and for five years, from 1977 until 1982, there
were no restrictions on travel. Restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba are part of the
CACR, the overall embargo regulations administered by the Treasury Department’s Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
Under the Bush Administration, enforcement of U.S. restrictions on Cuba travel increased, and
restrictions on travel and on private remittances to Cuba were tightened. In March 2003, the
Administration eliminated travel for people-to-people educational exchanges unrelated to
academic course work. In June 2004, the Administration significantly restricted travel, especially
family travel, and the provision of private humanitarian assistance to Cuba in the form of
remittances and gift parcels.
As noted above, during the 2008 electoral campaign, Barack Obama pledged to lift restrictions on
family travel to Cuba as well as restrictions on Cuban Americans sending remittances to Cuba.
Senator Hillary Clinton reiterated President Obama’s pledge during her confirmation hearing for
Secretary of State in January 2009.
In March 2009, Congress took action on its own in the 111th Congress by including two
provisions in the FY2009 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 111-8) that ease sanctions on

59 U.S. Department of State, Philip J. Crowley, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Public Affairs, “Death of Cuban
Dissident Orlando Zapata Tamayo,” February 24, 2010.
60 White House, “Statement by the President on the Human Rights Situation in Cuba,” March 24, 2010.
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travel to Cuba. As implemented by the Treasury Department, family travel was once again
allowed once every 12 months to visit a close relative for an unlimited length of stay, and the
limit for daily expenditure allowed by family travelers became the same as for other authorized
travelers to Cuba (State Department maximum per diem rate for Havana, currently $179 day).
The definition of “close relative” was expanded to mean any individual related to the traveler by
blood, marriage, or adoption who is no more than three generations removed from that person.
The omnibus measure also included a provision requiring a general license for travel related to
the marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods to Cuba. The Treasury Department’s
Office of Foreign Assets Control ultimately issued regulations implementing this omnibus
provision on September 3, 2009. The regulations require a written report at least 14 days before
departure identifying both the traveler and the producer or distributor and describing the purpose
and scope of such travel. Another written report is required within 14 days of return from Cuba
describing the activities conducted, the persons met, and the expenses incurred. The regulations
also require that such travelers under this provision be regularly employed by a producer or
distributor of the agricultural commodities or medical products or an entity duly appointed to
represent such a producer or distributor. The activity schedules for such travelers cannot include
free time, travel, or recreation in excess of that consistent with a full work schedule.
On April 13, 2009, the Obama Administration announced several significant measures to ease
U.S. sanctions on Cuba. Fulfilling a campaign pledge, President Obama announced that all
restrictions on family travel and on remittances to family members in Cuba would be lifted. This
significantly superseded the action taken by Congress in March that had essentially reverted
family travel restrictions to as they had been before they were tightened in 2004. Under the new
policy announced by the Administration in April, there would be no limitations on the frequency
or duration of family visits, and the 44-pound limitation on accompanied baggage would be
removed. Family travelers would be able to spend the same as allowed for other travelers, up to
$179 per day. With regard to family remittances, the previous limitation of no more than $300 per
quarter would be removed and there would be no restriction on the amount or frequency of the
remittances. Authorized travelers would be able once again carry up to $3,000 in remittances.61
Regulations for the above policy changes were issued by the Treasury and Commerce
Departments on September 3, 2009.
On November 19, 2009, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing on U.S.
restrictions on travel to Cuba entitled “Is it Time to Lift the Ban on Travel to Cuba?” that featured
former U.S. government officials and other private witnesses.
Major arguments made for lifting the Cuba travel ban are that it abridges the rights of ordinary
Americans to travel; it hinders efforts to influence conditions in Cuba and may be aiding Castro
by helping restrict the flow of information; and Americans can travel to other countries with
communist or authoritarian governments. Major arguments in opposition to lifting the Cuba travel
ban are that more American travel would support Castro’s rule by providing his government with
potentially millions of dollars in hard currency; that there are legal provisions allowing travel to
Cuba for humanitarian purposes that are used by thousands of Americans each year; and that the
President should be free to restrict travel for foreign policy reasons.

61 White House, “Fact Sheet: Reaching Out to the Cuban People,” April 13, 2009.
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Several legislative initiatives have been introduced in the 111th Congress that would further ease
Cuba travel restrictions: H.R. 874 (Delahunt)/S. 428 (Dorgan) and H.R. 1528 (Rangel) would
prohibit restrictions on travel to Cuba; H.R. 188 (Serrano), H.R. 1530 (Rangel), and H.R. 2272
(Rush), which would lift the overall embargo on Cuba, would also lift travel restrictions; H.R.
1531 (Rangel)/S. 1089 (Baucus) and H.R. 4645 (Peterson)/S. 3112 (Klobuchar) remove some
restrictions on the export of U.S. agricultural products to Cuba and would prohibit Cuba travel
restrictions; H.R. 332 (Lee) would ease restrictions on educational travel; S. 774 (Dorgan), H.R.
1918 (Flake), and S. 1517 (Murkowski) would allow for travel related to hydrocarbon exploration
and extraction activities. In contrast, H.Con.Res. 132 (Tiahrt) would call for the fulfillment of
certain democratic conditions before the United States increases trade and tourism to Cuba.
(For additional information, see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and
Remittances.)
Agricultural Exports and Sanctions
U.S. commercial agricultural exports to Cuba have been allowed for several years, but with
numerous restrictions and licensing requirements. The 106th Congress passed the Trade Sanctions
Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 or TSRA (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) that allows for
one-year export licenses for selling agricultural commodities to Cuba, although no U.S.
government assistance, foreign assistance, export assistance, credits, or credit guarantees are
available to finance such exports. TSRA also denies exporters access to U.S. private commercial
financing or credit; all transactions must be conducted in cash in advance or with financing from
third countries. TSRA reiterates the existing ban on importing goods from Cuba but authorizes
travel to Cuba, under a specific license, to conduct business related to the newly allowed
agricultural sales.
Since 2002, the United States has been Cuba’s largest supplier of food and agricultural products.62
Cuba has purchased over $3.2 billion in agricultural products from the United States since late
2001. Overall U.S exports to Cuba rose from about $7 million in 2001 to $404 million in 2004.
U.S. exports to Cuba declined in 2005 and 2006 to $369 million and $340 million, respectively,
but increased to $447 million in 2007. In 2008, U.S. exports to Cuba rose to $712, far higher than
in previous years, in part because of the rise in food prices and because of Cuba’s increased food
needs in the aftermath of several hurricanes and tropical storms that severely damaged the
country’s agricultural sector. In 2009, however, U.S. exports to Cuba declined to $533 million,
25% lower than the previous year.63 The decline was largely related to Cuba’s shortage of hard
currency.64
In February 2005, OFAC amended the Cuba embargo regulations to clarify that TSRA’s term of
“payment of cash in advance” means that the payment is received by the seller or the seller’s
agent prior to the shipment of the goods from the port at which they are loaded. U.S. agricultural
exporters and some Members of Congress strongly objected that the action constituted a new
sanction that violated the intent of TSRA and could jeopardize millions of dollars in U.S.

62 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, Office of Global Analysis, “Cuba’s Food &
Agriculture Situation Report,” March 2008.
63 World Trade Atlas, which uses Department of Commerce Statistics.
64 Larry Luxner. “Cash-Strapped Cuba Cut U.S. Food Imports by 26% in ’09,” CubaNews, February 2010, p. 2.
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agricultural sales to Cuba. OFAC Director Robert Werner maintained that the clarification
“conforms to the common understanding of the term in international trade.”65 On July 29, 2005,
OFAC clarified that, for “payment of cash in advance” for the commercial sale of U.S.
agricultural exports to Cuba, vessels can leave U.S. ports as soon as a foreign bank confirms
receipt of payment from Cuba. OFAC’s action was aimed at ensuring that the goods would not be
vulnerable to seizure for unrelated claims while still at the U.S. port. Supporters of overturning
OFAC’s February 22, 2005 amendment, such as the American Farm Bureau Federation, were
pleased by the clarification but indicated that they would still work to overturn the February
rule.66
Some groups favor further easing restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba. They argue that the
restrictions harm the health and nutrition of the Cuban population. U.S. agribusiness companies
that support the removal of restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba believe that U.S. farmers
are missing out on a market so close to the United States. Some exporters want to change U.S.
restrictions so that they can sell agriculture and farm equipment to Cuba.67 Agricultural exporters
who support the lifting of the prohibition on financing contend that allowing such financing
would help smaller U.S. companies expand purchases to Cuba more rapidly.68 On July 19, 2007,
the U.S. International Trade Commission issued a report, requested by the Senate Committee on
Finance, maintaining that the U.S. share of Cuba’s agricultural, fish, and forest imports would rise
from one-third to between one-half and two-thirds if trade restrictions were lifted. (See the full
report available at http://www.usitc.gov/ext_relations/news_release/2007/er0719ee1.htm.)
Opponents of further easing restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba maintain that U.S. policy
does not deny such sales to Cuba, as evidenced by the large amount of sales since 2001.
Moreover, according to the State Department, since the Cuban Democracy Act was enacted in
1992, the United States has licensed billions of dollars in private humanitarian donations.
Opponents further argue that easing pressure on the Cuban government would in effect be lending
support and extending the duration of the Castro regime. They maintain that the United States
should remain steadfast in its opposition to any easing of pressure on Cuba that could prolong the
Castro regime and its repressive policies. Some agricultural producers that export to Cuba support
continuation of the prohibition on financing for agricultural exports to Cuba because it ensures
that they will be paid.
The House Committee on Agriculture held a hearing to review U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba on
March 11, 2010.
Legislative Action and Initiatives on Agricultural Sanctions
The 111th Congress took action in the March 2009 by including two provisions in the FY2009
omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 111-8) intended to ease sanctions related to the payment
terms and travel related to the export of U.S. agricultural products to Cuba.

65 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Testimony of Robert Werner, Director, OFAC, before the House Committee on
Agriculture, March 16, 2005.
66 Christopher S. Rugaber, “Treasury Clarifies Cuba Farm Export Rule, and Baucus Relents on Nominees,”
International Trade Reporter, August 4, 2005.
67 “Ag Groups Split Over Trade With Cuba,” Congress Daily AM, National Journal, February 11, 2003.
68 “Farm Equipment Exports Likely to Face Tough Opposition from White House, Congress,” Cuba Trader, Vol. III,
No. 7, February 17, 2003.
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• Section 620, Division D, of the FY2009 omnibus measure amended TSRA to
require the Secretary of the Treasury to issue regulations for travel to, from, or
within Cuba under a general license for the marketing and sale of agricultural and
medical goods. Such travel had required a specific license from OFAC, issued on
a case by case basis. On March 9, 2009, Secretary of the Treasury Geithner stated
in a letter published in the Congressional Record that the regulations issued
pursuant to this provision “would provide that the representatives of only a
narrow class of businesses would be eligible, under a new general license, to
travel to market and sell agricultural and medical goods.” The Secretary also
maintained that “any business using the general license would be required to
provide both advance written notice outlining the purpose and scope of the
planned travel and, upon return, a report outlining the activities conducted,
including the persons with whom they met, the expenses incurred, and business
conducted in Cuba.”69 The regulations ultimately were issued on September 3,
2009, and included the reporting requirements promised by Secretary Geithner.
• Section 622, Division D, of the FY2009 omnibus measure prohibited funds in the
Act from being used to administer, implement, or enforce an amendment to the
Cuban embargo regulations on February 25, 2005 requiring that U.S. agricultural
exporters using the “payment of cash in advance’” payment mechanism for
selling their goods to Cuba must be paid in cash for their goods before the goods
leave U.S. ports. As noted above, TSRA requires either the “payment of cash of
advance” for such exports (or financing by third country financial institutions),
but does not provide a definition of cash in advance. Prior to the February 2005
amendment to the Cuban embargo regulations, U.S. exporters could be paid for
the goods before they were unloaded in Cuba. OFAC guidance on the
implementation of this provision stated that TSRA’s statutory provisions remain
in place that agricultural exports to Cuba be either paid for by “cash in advance”
or financed using a third-country bank.70 Secretary of the Treasury Geithner
provided additional guidance on the implementation of this provision in a letter
published in the Congressional Record that stated that, “exporters will still be
required to receive payment in advance of shipment.”71 This continued the Bush
Administration policy imposed in February 2005. Given the Secretary’s
interpretation, this provision had little, if any, practical effect. While the
Secretary’s response ameliorated the concerns that several Senators had
regarding the provision, it also triggered concerns by other Senators who
maintained that the Secretary’s action ignored the legislative intent of the Cuba
provision to ease restrictions on agricultural sales to Cuba.72
In other significant legislative action in December 2009, Congress included a clarifying provision
in the Section 619 of Division C of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (H.R. 3288/P.L.
111-117) related to the issue of payment of cash in advance for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba.

69 Congressional Record, March 10, 2009, p. S2933.
70 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, “Guidance on Implementation of Cuba Travel
and Trade-Related Provisions of the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009,” March 11, 2009.
71 Congressional Record, March 10, 2009, p. S2933.
72 Caitlin Webber, “Obama Accused of Ignoring Legislators’ Bid to Ease Cuba Trade Restrictions,” CQ Today, March
18, 2009; and Jerry Hagstrom, “Bipartisan Senate Group Pushes Geithner on Cuba Trade,” Congress Daily PM,
National Journal, March 17, 2009.
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The provision states that during FY2010, the term “payment of cash in advance” as used in TSRA
“shall be interpreted as payment before the transfer of title to, and control of, the exported items
to the Cuban purchaser.” Supporters of the provision maintain that it restores congressional intent
on the matter, and will make it easier for U.S. agricultural producers to export to Cuba, while
opponents maintain the provision constitutes a foreign policy change included in a must-pass
spending bill without appropriate congressional consideration.73
This provision had been included in the House version of the FY2010 Financial Services and
General Government Appropriations Act, H.R. 3170, approved on July 16, 2009. The Senate
version of the bill, S. 1432, reported out of committee on July 10, 2009 (S.Rept. 111-43), also had
an identical provision. In its report to the bill (S.Rept. 111-43), the Senate Appropriations
Committee maintained that it was aware that the Treasury Department was continuing to require
the sellers of agricultural goods to Cuba to receive cash payments in advance of shipping rather
than in advance of delivering the goods, and asserted that the policy impedes U.S. sales since it
increases the cost of doing business. In the report, the committee urged the Treasury Department
to use its rulemaking authority to permanently amend the Cuban Assets Control Regulations and
remove impediments to U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba.
Several other legislative initiative in the 111th Congress have been considered or introduced that
would ease restrictions on the sale U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba. H.R. 188 (Serrano), H.R.
1530 (Rangel), and H.R. 2272 (Rush) would lift overall economic sanctions on Cuba, including
restrictions on agricultural exports. H.R. 2272 would also extend nondiscriminatory trade
treatment to Cuba. H.R. 1737 (Moran) would focus on ways to facilitate U.S. agricultural exports
to Cuba. The measure would amend TSRA to clarify the definition of payment of cash in advance
so that payments do not have to be made before the goods are shipped from U.S. ports, and would
allow direct transfers between U.S. and Cuban financial institutions to pay for U.S. agricultural
exports. Similar but not identical bills H.R. 1531 (Rangel) and S. 1089 (Baucus) include the same
provisions as in H.R. 1737, but would also establish a U.S. agricultural export promotion program
that would be funded by a $1 increase in the airport ticket tax for U.S.-Cuba air travel. Both
measures would also lift overall restrictions on travel to Cuba. Finally, identical bills H.R. 4645
(Peterson) and S. 3112 (Klobuchar) would amend TSRA to clarify the definition of payment of
cash in advance, authorize direct transfer between Cuban and U.S. financial institutions for sales
under TSRA, and prohibit restrictions on travel to Cuba.
Trademark Sanction74
For over a decade, the United States has imposed a sanction that denies protection for trademarks
connected with businesses confiscated from their owners by the Cuban government. A provision
in the FY1999 omnibus appropriations measure (Section 211 of Division A, Title II, P.L. 105-277,
signed into law October 21, 1998) prevents the United States from accepting payment for
trademark registrations and renewals from Cuban or foreign nationals that were used in
connection with a business or assets in Cuba that were confiscated, unless the original owner of
the trademark has consented. The provision prohibits U.S. courts from recognizing such

73 “New Law Lets Cuba Pay U.S. Suppliers Directly,” CubaNews, December 2009; Rosella Brevetti, “Agriculture:
Senate OKs Provision Facilitating U.S. Agricultural Exports to Cuba,” International Trade Reporter, December 17,
2009.
74 For additional information, see CRS Report RS21764, Restricting Trademark Rights of Cubans: WTO Decision and
Congressional Response, by Margaret Mikyung Lee.
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trademarks without the consent of the original owner. The measure was enacted because of a
dispute between the French spirits company, Pernod Ricard, and the Bermuda-based Bacardi Ltd.
Pernod Ricard entered into a joint venture in 1993 with the Cuban government to produce and
export Havana Club rum. Bacardi maintains that it holds the right to the Havana Club name
because in 1995 it entered into an agreement for the Havana Club trademark with the Arechabala
family, who had originally produced the rum until its assets and property were confiscated by the
Cuban government in 1960. Although Pernod Ricard cannot market Havana Club in the United
States because of the trade embargo, it wants to protect its future distribution rights should the
embargo be lifted.
The European Union initiated World Trade Organization dispute settlement proceedings in June
2000, maintaining that the U.S. law violates the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS). In January 2002, the WTO ultimately found that the trademark
sanction violated WTO provisions on national treatment and most-favored-nation obligations in
the TRIPS Agreement.
On March 28, 2002, the United States agreed that it would come into compliance with the WTO
ruling through legislative action by January 3, 2003.75 That deadline was extended several times
since no legislative action had been taken to bring Section 211 into compliance with the WTO
ruling. On July 1, 2005, however, in an EU-U.S. bilateral agreement, the EU agreed that it would
not request authorization to retaliate at that time, but reserved the right to do so at a future date,
and the United States agreed not to block a future EU request.76 On August 3, 2006, the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office announced that Cuba’s Havana Club trademark registration was
“cancelled/expired,” a week after OFAC had denied a Cuban government company the license
that it needed to renew the registration of the trademark.77
Two different approaches have been advocated to bring Section 211 into compliance with the
WTO ruling. Some want a narrow fix in which Section 211 would be amended so that it also
applies to U.S. companies instead of being limited to foreign companies. Advocates of this
approach argue that it would affirm that the United States “will not give effect to a claim or right
to U.S. property if that claim is based on a foreign compensation.”78 Others want Section 211
repealed altogether. They argue that the law endangers over 5,000 trademarks of over 500 U.S.
companies registered in Cuba.79
The House Committee on the Judiciary held a March 2, 2010, hearing on the “Domestic and
International Trademark Implications of HAVANA CLUB and Section 211 of the Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 2009.” (See http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_100303.html.)
Several legislative initiatives were introduced during the 110th Congress reflecting these two
approaches to bring Section 211 into compliance with the WTO ruling, but no action was taken
on these measures. To date in the 111th Congress, identical bills H.R. 1103 (Wexler) and S. 1234

75 “U.S., EU Agree on Deadline for Complying with Section 211 WTO Finding,” Inside U.S. Trade, April 12, 2002.
76 “Japan, EU Suspend WTO Retaliation Against U.S. in Two Cases,” Inside U.S. Trade, July 15, 2005.
77 “PTO Cancels Cuban ‘Havana Club’ Mark; Bacardi Set to Sell Rum Under Same Mark,” International Trade Daily,
August 10, 2006.
78 Brian Lehman, testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, hearing on “An Examination of Section 211
of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998,” July 13, 2004.
79 “USA-Engage Joins Cuba Fight,” Cuba Trader, April 1, 2002.
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(Lieberman) would amend Section 211 with a narrow fix to bring it into compliance with the
WTO ruling, while several measures , H.R. 188 (Serrano), H.R. 1530 (Rangel), H.R. 1531
(Rangel), H.R. 2272 (Rush), and S. 1089 would repeal Section 211 altogether. The July 2005 EU-
U.S. bilateral agreement, in which the EU agreed not to retaliate against the United States, but
reserved the right to do so at a later date, has reduced pressure on Congress to take action to
comply with the WTO ruling.
Offshore Oil and Natural Gas Development
The issue of Cuba’s development of its deepwater offshore oil reserves in the Gulf of Mexico has
been a concern among some Members of Congress. According to the U.S. Energy Information
Administration, industry analysts maintain that there could be at least 1.6 billion barrels of crude
oil reserves in Cuba’s offshore sector; the U.S. Geological Survey estimated a mean of 4.6 billion
barrels of undiscovered oil and 9.8 trillion cubic feet of undiscovered natural gas reserves.80 In
October 2008, an official of Cuba’s state oil company, Cubapetroleo (Cupet), maintained there
may be more than 20 billion barrels of oil in Cuba’s deepwaters, but energy analysts expressed
skepticism for such a claim.81
To date, Cuba has signed agreements for eight concessions involving nine foreign oil companies
for the exploration of offshore oil and gas. Repsol (Spain), Norsk-Hydro (Norway), and ONGC
(India) are partners in a joint project, while Sherritt International (Canada), ONGC (India),
PdVSA (Venezuela), Petronas (Malaysia), PetroVietnam, Petrobras (Brazil), and Zarubezhneft
(Russia) also have additional concessions. In February 2008, Petrobras signed a wide-ranging
agreement for potential exploration and production cooperation with Cuba’s state oil company,
Cupet. This ultimately led to an oil exploration agreement between Petrobras and Cupet signed in
late October 2008. Russia’s state-owned Zarubezhneft oil company signed an agreement with
Cupet in November 2009 for joint exploration and development of two offshore blocks (as well
as two onshore blocks). Some Members of Congress have expressed concern about oil
development so close to the United States and about potential environmental damage to the
Florida coast. The Repsol project had plans to drill a second well in August 2009 (the first was
drilled in 2004), but this has been postponed.
Although there have been some claims that China is drilling in Cuba’s offshore deepwater oil
sector, to date its involvement in Cuba’s oil sector has been focused on exploring onshore/close
coastal oil extraction in Piñar del Rio province through its state-run China Petroleum and
Chemical Corporation (Sinopec).82 China does not have a concession in Cuba’s offshore oil sector
in the deepwaters of the Gulf of Mexico.83

80 U.S. Energy Information Administration , “Country Analysis Briefs: Caribbean,” October 2008; U.S. Geological
Survey, “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the North Cuban Basin, Cuba, 2004,” Fact Sheet
2005-3009, February 2005.
81 Jeff Franks, “Cuba Oil Claims Raise Eyebrows in Energy World,” October 24, 2008; and Larry Luxner, “Cuba May
have 20 Billion Barrels of Oil But Cash Crunch Threatens Investment,” CubaNews, November 2008.
82 Domingo Amuchastegui, “Cuban Again Invites U.S. Oil Giants to Invest in Oil Sector,” CubaNews, May 2007.
83 Lesley Clark and Erika Bolstad, “China-Cuba Rumors Fuel Renewed Offshore Drilling Debate, Rumors of China
Drilling in Cuban Waters Are Rallying Support for Drilling off Florida’s Coast, But Experts Say They’re Untrue,”
Miami Herald, June 12, 2008.
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In the 111th Congress, three measures have been introduced that would allow for U.S.
involvement in Cuba’s offshore oil sector. S. 774 (Dorgan), H.R. 1918 (Flake), and S. 1517
(Murkowski) would authorize U.S. companies to work with Cuba for the exploration and
extraction of oil, and to export without license all necessary equipment. The bills would amend
the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 to provide for a general license
for travel by persons engaging in hydrocarbon exploration and extraction activities. H.R. 1918
would also allow for the importation of such hydrocarbon resources from Cuba.
Drug Interdiction Cooperation
Cuba is not a major producer or consumer of illicit drugs, but its numerous small keys, extensive
shoreline, and geographic location make it susceptible to narcotics smuggling operations. Drugs
that enter the Cuban market are largely the result of onshore wash-ups from smuggling by high-
speed boats moving drugs from Jamaica to the Bahamas, Haiti, and the United States or by small
aircraft from clandestine airfields in Jamaica. For a number of years, Cuban officials have
expressed concerns over the use of their waters and airspace for drug transit and about increased
domestic drug use. The Cuban government has taken a number of measures to deal with the drug
problem, including legislation to stiffen penalties for traffickers, increased training for
counternarcotics personnel, and cooperation with a number of countries on anti-drug efforts.
According to the State Department’s March 2010 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
(INCSR), Cuba maintains that it has some 56 judicial assistance agreements and two memoranda
of understanding with other countries related to anti-drug cooperation. For a decade, Cuba’s
Operation Hatchet has focused on maritime and air interdiction and the recovery of narcotics
washed up on Cuban shores. Since 2003, Cuba has aggressively pursued an internal enforcement
and investigation program against its incipient drug market with an effective nationwide drug
prevention and awareness campaign, Operation Popular Shield.
Over the years, there have been varying levels of U.S.-Cuban cooperation on anti-drug efforts. In
1996, Cuban authorities cooperated with the United States in the seizure of 6.6 tons of cocaine
aboard the Miami-bound Limerick, a Honduran-flag ship. Cuba turned over the cocaine to the
United States and cooperated fully in the investigation and subsequent prosecution of two
defendants in the case in the United States. Cooperation has increased since 1999 when U.S. and
Cuban officials met in Havana to discuss ways of improving anti-drug cooperation. Cuba
accepted an upgrading of the communications link between the Cuban Border Guard and the U.S.
Coast Guard as well as the stationing of a U.S. Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Specialist (DIS) at
the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. The Coast Guard official was posted to the U.S. Interests
Section in September 2000, and since that time, coordination has increased.
In the March 2010 INCSR, the State Department reported that some of Cuba’s anti-drug
operations were undertaken in coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard DIS at the U.S. Interests
Section in Havana. It maintained that Cuban authorities have provided the DIS continued access
to Cuban counternarcotics efforts, including providing investigative criminal information, such as
the names of suspects and vessels; debriefings on drug trafficking cases; visits to the Cuban
national canine training center and antidoping laboratory in Havana; tours of Cuban Border
Guard facilities and container x-ray equipment at the Port of Havana; and opportunities to meet
with the Chiefs of Cuba’s INTERPOL and Customs offices.
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Cuba maintains that it wants to cooperate with the United States to combat drug trafficking, and
on various occasions has called for a bilateral anti-drug cooperation agreement with the United
States.84 In January 2002, Cuba deported to the United States Jesse James Bell, a U.S. fugitive
wanted on drug charges, and in early March 2002, Cuba arrested a convicted Colombian drug
trafficker, Rafael Bustamante, who escaped from jail in Alabama in 1992. At the time, then Drug
Enforcement Administration head Asa Hutchison expressed appreciation for Cuba’s actions, but
indicated that cooperation would continue on a case-by-case basis, not through a bilateral
agreement.85 In February 2007, Cuba extradited drug trafficker Luis Hernando Gómez
Bustamante to Colombia, an action that drew praise from U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Anne Patterson.86 Gómez Bustamante was
subsequently extradited to the United States in July 2007 to face drug trafficking charges.
In April 2008, John Walters, Director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy,
lauded U.S. anti-drug cooperation with Cuba as a good example of how cooperation has been
achieved despite overall political differences between the two countries.87
In early January 2009, then Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Tom
Shannon maintained in an interview with Spain’s El País newspaper that a drug trafficking accord
with Cuba would be logical, although he could not anticipate what the next Administration would
do.88
In its March 2010 INCSR, the State Department stated that “both nations may gain by pressing
forward with expanded cooperation, especially considering Cuba’s location in the Caribbean, and
the potential for the island and its territorial seas to be utilized for drug transshipments to the
United States.”
Legislative Initiatives
Over the past several years, House and Senate versions of Foreign Operations appropriations bills
have contained contrasting provisions related to funding for cooperation with Cuba on
counternarcotics efforts. House bills have generally prohibited funds for such efforts, while
Senate versions would have funded such efforts. Ultimately, none of these provisions were
included in enacted measures.
In the second session of the 110th Congress, the Senate Appropriations Committee version of the
FY2009 State, Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, S.

84 On March 12, 2002, Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Cuban Interests Section in Washington delivered
three diplomatic notes to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana and the State Department in Washington proposing
agreements on drug interdiction, terrorism, and migration issues. See “Statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
Prominent Drug Trafficker Arrested in our Country,” Information Office, Cuban Interests Section, March 17, 2002;
“Cuba Offers to Sign Anti-Drug Pact,” Miami Herald, April 8, 2006.
85 Anthony Boadle, “U.S. Thanks Cuba, But Declines Anti-Drug Accord,” Reuters, March 19, 2002.
86 U.S. Department of State, Release of the 2007 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Anne W. Patterson,
Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, On-The-Record Briefing, March
1, 2007.
87 “White House Office of National Drug Control Policy Director Waters Holds News Briefing on Emerging
Transatlantic Drug Threats at the Foreign Press Center,” Newsmakers Transcripts, CQ.com, April 28, 2008.
88 José Manuel Calvo, “Thomas Shannon Secretario de Estado adjunto para Latinoamérica: “Sería un acuerdo contra el
narcotráfico entre Cuba y EE UU,” El País, January 11, 2009.
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3288, contained a provision (section 779) that would have provided for $1 million for preliminary
work by the Department of State, or other entity designated by the Secretary of State, to establish
cooperation with appropriate Cuban agencies on counternarcotics matters. No action was taken
on the measure, and no such provision was ultimately included in the FY2009 Omnibus
Appropriations Act, (P.L. 111-8) in the 111th Congress.
For FY2010, the Senate Appropriations Committee-reported version of S. 1434, the State
Department, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2010, contained a
provision in section 7092 that would have provided $1 million in International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance for preliminary work by the State Department or other
entity designated by the Secretary of State to establish cooperation with appropriate agencies of
the government of Cuba on counternarcotics matters, including matters relating to cooperation,
coordination, and mutual assistance in the interdiction of illicit drugs being transported through
Cuban airspace or over Cuba waters. The amount would not have been available if the Secretary
of State certified that Cuba did not have in place appropriate procedures to protect against the loss
of innocent life in the air and on the ground in connection with the interdiction of illegal drugs,
and that there was credible evidence of involvement of the government of Cuba in drug
trafficking during the preceding 10 years. The House-passed version of the appropriations
measure, H.R. 3081, did not have a similar provision, and ultimately the final enacted FY2010
omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 111-117) did not include the Senate committee provision.
Cuban Spies in the United States
Over the past decade, a number of individuals, including three U.S. government officials, have
been convicted in the United States on charges involving spying for Cuba. Most recently in June
2009, the FBI arrested a retired State Department employee and his wife, Walter Kendall Myers
and Gwendolyn Steingraber Myers, for spying for Cuba for three decades. The two were accused
of acting as agents of the Cuban government and of passing classified information to the Cuban
government. In November 2009, the Myerses pled guilty to the spying charges, with Kendall
facing a mandatory life sentence and his wife receiving from 6 to 7 ½ years in prison.89
In 2006, Florida International University (FIU) professor Carlos Alvarez pled guilty to conspiring
to be an unregistered agent who has informed on the Cuban exile community, while his wife Elsa
Prieto Alvarez, an FIU counselor, pled guilty to being aware of and failing to disclose her
husband’s activities. Carlos Alvarez received a five-year sentence, while his wife received three
years.
In May 2003, the Bush Administration ordered the expulsion of 14 Cuban diplomats (seven from
New York and seven from Washington, DC), maintaining that they were involved in monitoring
and surveillance activities.
On September 21, 2001, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst Ana Montes was arrested on
charges of spying for the Cuban government. Montes reportedly supplied Cuba with classified
information about U.S. military exercises and other sensitive operations.90 Montes ultimately pled

89 Del Quentin Wilber, “Former U.S. Official, Wife Admit to 30 Years of Spying for Cuba,” Washington Post,
November 21, 2009.
90 Bill Miller and Walter Pincus, “Defense Analyst Accused of Spying for Cuba,” Woman Passed Classified
Information on Military Exercises, FBI Says,” Washington Post, September 22, 2001.
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guilty to spying for the Cuban government for 16 years, during which she divulged the names of
four U.S. government intelligence agents working in Cuba and information about a “special
access program” related to U.S. national defense. She was sentenced in October 2002 to 25 years
in prison in exchange for her cooperation with prosecutors as part of a plea bargain. In response
to the espionage case, the State Department ordered the expulsion of four Cuban diplomats (two
from Cuba’s UN Mission in New York and two from the Cuban Interests Section in Washington,
DC) in November 2002.
In June 2001, five members of the so-called “Wasp Network” who were originally arrested in
September 1998, were convicted on espionage charges by a U.S. Federal Court in Miami.
Sentences handed down for the so-called “Cuban five” in December 2001 ranged from 15 years
to life in prison for three of the five. (In addition to the five, a married couple in the so-called
“Wasp Network” was sentenced in January 2002 to prison terms of seven years and three and
one-half years for their participation in the spy network.) The group of five Cuban intelligence
agents penetrated Cuban exile groups and targeted U.S. military bases. The Cuban government
vowed to work for the return of the “Cuban five” who have been dubbed “Heroes of the
Republic” by Cuba’s National Assembly. In December 2008, Cuban President Raúl Castro
offered to exchange some imprisoned Cuban political dissidents for the “Cuban five,” an offer
that was rejected by the State Department, which maintained that the dissidents should be
released immediately without any conditions.91 On June 15, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court chose
not to hear an appeal of the case of the “Cuban five” in which their lawyers were asking for a new
trial outside Miami before an unbiased jury. However, in 2009, sentences for three of the five
were reduced; in October, one defendant with a life sentence had his sentence reduced to 20
years, while in December a second defendant facing a life sentence had his sentenced reduced to
30 years and another facing 19 years had his sentence slightly reduced sentence to 18 years. 92
In February 2000, an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) official from Miami, Mariano
Faget, was arrested and ultimately convicted in May 2000 for passing classified information to a
friend with ties to Cuba. He was sentenced to five years in prison in June 2001. The case led to
the State Department’s expulsion of a Cuban diplomat working in Washington D.C.
Cuba and Terrorism93
Cuba was added to the State Department’s list of states sponsoring international terrorism in 1982
(pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979) because of its alleged ties to
international terrorism and support for terrorist groups in Latin America, and has remained on the
list since that time. Cuba had a long history of supporting revolutionary movements and
governments in Latin America and Africa, but in 1992, Fidel Castro said that his country’s
support for insurgents abroad was a thing of the past. Cuba’s change in policy was in large part
due to the breakup of the Soviet Union, which resulted in the loss of billions of dollars in annual
subsidies to Cuba, and led to substantial Cuban economic decline.

91 Marco Sibaja, “Raul Castro Offers To Free Dissidents in Exchange for Alleged Cuban Spies Jailed in U.S.,”
Associated Press Newswires, December 18, 2008.
92 Ian Urbina, “Judge Reduces Sentence for One of Cuban Five,” New York Times, October 14, 2009; and Jay Weaver,
“Cuban Spy’s Life Sentence Reduced to 30 Years,” Miami Herald, December 9, 2009.
93 For further information, see CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, by Mark P.
Sullivan.
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Critics of retaining Cuba on the terrorism list maintain that it is a holdover from the Cold War.
They argue that domestic political considerations keep Cuba on the terrorism list and maintain
that Cuba’s presence on the list diverts U.S. attention from struggles against serious terrorist
threats. Those who support keeping Cuba on the terrorism list argue that there is ample evidence
that Cuba supports terrorism. They point to the government’s history of supporting terrorist acts
and armed insurgencies in Latin America and Africa. They point to the government’s continued
hosting of members of foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice.
The language in the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2008 report (issued April
30, 2009) is much more tempered than in past versions of the annual report. It begins by noting
that “Cuba no longer actively supports armed struggle in Latin America and other parts of the
world.” While the report maintains that the Cuban government continued to provide safe haven to
several terrorists, such as members of the Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA ) and Colombia’s
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), it
notes that some were in Cuba in connection with peace negotiations with the governments of
Spain and Colombia. The report states that Cuba continued to publicly defend the FARC, but also
notes that in July 2008 Fidel Castro called on the FARC to release the hostages they were holding
without preconditions, and condemned the FARC’s mistreatment of captives and of their
abduction of civilian politicians who had no role in the armed conflict.
The 2008 report also notes that Cuba continued to permit U.S. fugitives from justice to live
legally in Cuba, including members of such militant groups as the Boricua Popular or
Macheteros, and the Black Liberation Army, but the report also assets that the Cuban government
has not provided safe haven to any new U.S. fugitives wanted for terrorism since 2006. Most of
the fugitives living in Cuba entered the country in the 1970s, and are accused of hijacking or
committing violent actions in the United States.
Both the President and Congress have powers to take a country off the state sponsors of terrorism
list. As set forth in Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, a country’s retention on the list
may be rescinded in two ways. The first option is for the President to submit a report to Congress
certifying that there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the
government and that the government is not supporting acts of international terrorism and is
providing assurances that it will not support such acts in the future. The second option is for the
President to submit a report to Congress, at least 45 days in advance justifying the rescission and
certifying that the government has not provided any support for international terrorism during the
preceding six-months, and has provided assurances that it will not support such acts in the future.
If Congress disagrees with the President’s decision to remove a country from the list, it could
seek to block the rescission through legislation.
Congress also has the power on its own to remove a country from the terrorism list. For example,
legislation introduced on Cuba in the 111th Congress, H.R. 2272 (Rush), includes a provision that
would rescind the Secretary of State’s determination that Cuba “has repeatedly provided support
for acts of international terrorism.”
Cuban officials have criticized the United States for including Cuba on its list of countries
requiring extra screening for Cuban citizens flying into the United States, an action taken by the
Obama Administration on January 4, 2010, in the aftermath of the attempted bombing of a U.S.
flight from Amsterdam on Christmas Day. Cuba was included on the extra screening list because
of its retention on the State Department’s state sponsors of terrorism list. Cuban officials maintain
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that the Cuba’s inclusion on the terrorism list is unfounded, and that Cuba has never been used to
organize, finance, or execute terrorist acts against the United States.94
Cuba as the Victim of Terrorism
Cuba has been the target of various terrorist incidents over the years. In 1976, a Cuban plane was
bombed, killing 73 people. In 1997, there were almost a dozen bombings in the tourist sector in
Havana and in the Varadero beach area in which an Italian businessman was killed and several
others were injured. Two Salvadorans were convicted and sentenced to death for the bombings in
March 1999, and three Guatemalans were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 10-15 years in
January 2002. Cuban officials maintain that Cuban exiles funded the bombings.
In November 2000, four anti-Castro activists were arrested in Panama for a plot to kill Fidel
Castro. One of the accused, Luis Posada Carriles, was also allegedly involved in the 1976 Cuban
airline bombing noted above.95 The four stood trial in March 2004 and were sentenced on
weapons charges in the case to prison terms ranging from seven to eight years. In late August
2004, Panamanian President Mireya Moscoso pardoned the four men before the end of her
presidential term. Three of the men are U.S. citizens and traveled to Florida, where they received
strong support from some in the Cuban American community, while Posada reportedly traveled to
another country.
On April 13, 2005, Posada’s lawyer said that his client, reportedly in the United States after
entering the country illegally, would seek asylum in the United States because he has a “well-
founded fear of persecution” for his opposition to Fidel Castro.96 Posada, a Venezuelan citizen,
had been imprisoned in Venezuela for the bombing of the Cuban airliner in 1976, but reportedly
was allowed to “escape” from prison in 1985 after his supporters paid a bribe to the prison
warden.97 He had been acquitted for the bombing but remained in prison pending a prosecutorial
appeal.98 Posada also reportedly admitted, but later denied, involvement in the string of bombings
in Havana in 1997, one of which killed an Italian tourist.99 Posada subsequently withdrew his
application for asylum on May 17, 2005. Later that day, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) arrested Posada, and subsequently charged him with illegally entering the
United States. A Department of Homeland Security press release indicated that ICE does not
generally deport people to Cuba or countries believed to be acting on Cuba’s behalf.100 Venezuela
requested Posada’s extradition and pledged that it would not hand Posada over to Cuba. On
September 26, 2005, however, a U.S. immigration judge ruled that Posada likely faced torture in

94 “Cuba Rejects Inclusion on U.S. Terrorism Black List,” EFE News Service, January 5, 2010; and Paul Haven, “AP
Interview: Cuba Summons Top U.S. Diplomat to Protest Extra Screening for Air Travelers,” AP Newswire, January 6,
2010.
95 Frances Robles, “An Old Foe of Castro Looks Back on His Fight,” Miami Herald, September 4, 2003.
96 Alfonso Chardy and Nancy San Martin, “Lawyer Expects Posada to Show Soon,” Miami Herald, April 14, 2005.
97 Ann Louise Bardach, “Our Man’s in Miami. Patriot or Terrorist?,” Washington Post, April 17, 2005.
98 Although Posada was acquitted by a military court, a higher court ordered a new civilian trial. Reportedly a first set
of prosecutors recommended against charging Posada, but a second set of prosecutors took the case to trial, and Posada
escaped during that time in 1985. See Oscar Corral, “Debate Focuses on Escape,” Miami Herald, June 19, 2005.
99 Oscar Corral and Alfonso Chardy, “Victim’s Kin Oppose Posada Bid for Asylum,” Miami Herald, May 7, 2005.
100 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Public Affairs, Statement, May 17, 2005.
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Venezuela and could not be deported in keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention
Against Torture.101
ICE reviewed the case and determined on March 22, 2006, that Posada would not be freed from a
federal immigration facility in El Paso, Texas.102 In November 2006, however, a U.S. federal
judge, who was considering Posada’s plea that he be released, ordered the government to supply
evidence, by February 1, 2007, justifying his continued detention. On January 11, 2007, a federal
grand jury in Texas indicted Posada on seven counts for lying about how he entered the United
States illegally in March 2005, whereupon he was transferred from immigration detention in El
Paso to a county prison in New Mexico near the Texas border. The Cuban government responded
by maintaining that Posada needs to be charged with terrorism, not just lying about how he
entered the United States.
Posada was released from jail in New Mexico on April 19, 2007, and allowed to return to Miami
under house arrest to await an upcoming trial on immigration fraud charges, but on May 9, 2007 a
federal judge in Texas dismissed the charges. The judge maintained that the U.S. government
mistranslated testimony from Posada and manipulated evidence.103 On June 5, 2007, Justice
Department prosecutors filed a notice of appeal with the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New
Orleans and on November 6, 2007, federal prosecutors filed a brief requesting that the court
reverse the lower court’s decision.104 On June 4, 2008, the appeals court heard arguments from
both sides in the case; a ruling reportedly could take several months.105 Both Cuba and Venezuela
strongly denounced Posada’s release, contending that he is a terrorist.
In a new turn of events, Posada was again indicted by a federal grand jury in Texas on April 8,
2009. In the ten-count indictment, Posada was accused, among other things, of lying during
immigration proceedings regarding his involvement in bombings in Havana in 1997. Originally a
federal trial was set to begin in August 2009, but has been rescheduled twice until at least May
2010.
U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights
Since 1996, the United States has provided assistance—primarily through the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), but also through the State Department and the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED)—to increase the flow of information on democracy, human
rights, and free enterprise to Cuba.
USAID’s Cuba program has supported a variety of U.S.-based non-governmental organizations
with the goals of promoting a rapid, peaceful transition to democracy, helping develop civil
society, and building solidarity with Cuba’s human rights activists.106 These efforts are largely

101 Alicia Caldwell, “Judge Says Cuban Militant Can’t Be Deported to Venezuela,” Associated Press, September 28,
2005.
102 Oscar Corral, “Cuban Exile Militant Luis Posada Denied Release,” Miami Herald, March 22, 2006.
103 Carol J. Williams, “Pressure Grows to Prosecute Cuban Exile,” Los Angeles Times, May 10, 2007.
104 The federal prosecutors’ brief is available at http://media.miamiherald.com/smedia/2007/11/06/20/Posada_5CA_07-
50737_electronic_copy.source.prod_affiliate.56.pdf.
105 Michael Kunzelman, “Appeals Court Hears Cuban Militant’s Immigration Case,” Associated Press, June 4, 2008.
106See USAID’s Cuba program website: http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/country/cuba/.
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funded through Economic Support Funds (ESF) in the annual foreign operations appropriations
bill. From FY2001-FY2010, Congress appropriated almost $157 million in funding for Cuba
democracy efforts. This included $45.3 million for FY2008, $20 million for FY2009, and $20
million for FY2010.
For FY2009, Congress fully funded the Administration’s $20 million request in ESF to continue
to implement the program recommendations of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba.
According to the request, the funding was aimed at assisting human rights activists, independent
journalists, Afro-Cubans, and women, youth, and student activists. The report to the Senate
Appropriations Committee version of the FY2009 State Department, Foreign Operations, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, S, 3288 (S.Rept. 110-425), recommended fully funding the
Administration’s request for Cuba, but also called for the State Department and USAID to
conduct regular evaluations to ensure the cost effectiveness of the programs. No final action on
the appropriations measure was taken in the 110th Congress, but in the 111th Congress, the
FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8) funded overall foreign operations funding,
including the $20 million for Cuba democracy funding.
For FY2010, Congress once again fully funded the Administration’s $20 million ESF request for
Cuba democracy programs in the conference report (H.Rept. 111-366) to the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2010 (H.R. 3288/P.L. 111-117). According to the State Department’s FY2010
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, U.S. assistance programs focus on
providing humanitarian assistance to victims of repression, strengthening civil society, weakening
the information blockade, and helping Cubans to create space for dialogue about democratic
change and reconciliation. Both House-passed H.R. 3081 and Senate Appropriations Committee-
reported S. 1434, the FY2010 State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, recommended full funding of the Administration’s $20 million request.
For FY2011, the Administration once again requested $20 million in ESF to support democracy
and human rights projects. According to the Administration’s request, the assistance focuses on
providing humanitarian assistance to prisoners of conscience and their families, strengthening
civil society, supporting issue-based civic action movements and coalitions, and promoting
fundamental freedoms, especially freedom of expression and freedom of the press.
Until FY2008, NED’s democratization assistance for Cuba had been funded largely through the
annual Commerce, Justice, and State (CJS) appropriations measure, but is now funded through
the State Department, Foreign Operations and Related Agencies appropriations measure. NED
funding for Cuba has steadily increased over the past several years: $765,000 in FY2001;
$841,000 in FY2002; $1.14 million in FY2003; and $1.15 million in FY2004. For FY2005, NED
funded 17 Cuba projects with $2.4 million. For FY2006, NED funded 13 projects with almost
$1.5 million, including $0.4 million from State Department ESF. For FY2007, NED funded 12
projects with almost $1.5 million, which included almost $1.4 million funded by the State
Department. For FY2008, NED funded 11 projects with over $1.4 million.
Oversight of U.S. Democracy Assistance to Cuba
In November 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report examining U.S.
democracy assistance for Cuba from 1996-2005, and concluded that the U.S. program had
significant problems and needed better management and oversight. According to GAO, internal
controls, for both the awarding of Cuba program grants and oversight of grantees, “do not provide
adequate assurance that the funds are being used properly and that grantees are in compliance
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with applicable law and regulations.”107 Investigative news reports on the program maintained
that high shipping costs and lax oversight have diminished its effectiveness.108 Representative
William Delahunt, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on
International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, had requested the GAO study along
with Representative Jeff Flake.
In March 2008, a White House aide to President Bush, Felipe Sixto, resigned because of alleged
misuse of funds when he worked for the Center for a Free Cuba, which has been a major recipient
of U.S. democracy funding.109 On December 19, 2008, Sixto pled guilty to stealing nearly
$600,000, and was sentenced to two and one-half years in prison in March 2009.110 Another
group, Grupo de Apoyo a la Democracia (Group in Support of Democracy), has also been under
investigation by USAID for misuse of funds. Historically these two groups have been the two
largest recipients of U.S. democracy funding for Cuba.111
GAO issued a second report examining USAID’s Cuba democracy program on November 24,
2008.112 The report lauded the steps that USAID had taken since 2006 to address problems with
its Cuba program and improve oversight of the assistance. These included awarding all grants
competitively since 2006, hiring more staff for the program office since January 2008, and
contracting for financial services in April 2008 to enhance oversight of grantees. The GAO report
also noted that USAID had worked to strengthen program oversight through pre-award and
follow-up reviews, improving grantee internal controls and implementation plans, and providing
guidance and monitoring about permitted types of assistance and cost sharing.
The GAO report also maintained, however, that USAID had not staffed the Cuba program to the
level needed for effective grant oversight. GAO also noted the difficulty of assessing USAID’s
action to improve its Cuba program because most of its actions to improve the program were only
taken recently. Procurement reviews completed in August 2008 by the new financial services
contractor identified internal control, financial management, and procurement weaknesses at three
grantees. GAO recommended that USAID: (1) ensure that its Cuba program office is staffed at
the level that is needed to fully implement planned monitoring activities; and (2) periodically
assess the Cuba program’s overall efforts to address and reduce grantee risks, especially regarding
internal controls, procurement practices, expenditures, and compliance with laws and regulations.
The Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) released a report in May 2008 maintaining
that a majority of the assistance for Cuba has been spent in operating expenses by U.S.-based
grantees, transition studies, and U.S.-based activities. Among the recommendations in its report,
the CANF called for USAID grantees to spend a minimum of 75% of government funds in direct

107 U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Democracy Assistance for Cuba Needs Better Management and
Oversight, GAO-07-147, November 2006.
108 Oscar Corral, “Federal Program to Help Democracy in Cuba Falls Short of Mark,” Miami Herald, November 14,
2006, and “Is U.S. Aid Reaching Castro Foes?” Miami Herald, November 15, 2006.
109 Alfonso Chardy and Pablo Bachelet, “Cuban Exile Activist Felt ‘Betrayal’ by Employees,” Miami Herald, April 24,
2008; William Gibson, “Ex-Bush Aide Imprisoned for Stealing Cuba Democracy Funds,” South Florida Sun-Sentinel,
March 18, 2009.
110 Jesse J. Holland, “Former Bush Aide Pleads Guilty to Stealing from Anti-Castro Cuban Democracy Advocates,”
Associated Press Newswires, December 19, 2008.
111 Frances Robles, “Hold on Funds for Cuba Democracy Project Lifted,” Miami Herald, July 23, 2008.
112 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Foreign Assistance: Continued Efforts Needed to Strengthen USAID’s
Oversight of U.S. Democracy Assistance for Cuba, GAO-09-165, November 2008.
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aid to Cuban civil society. It also called for the assistance program to provide direct cash aid to
independent civil society groups, dissidents, and families of political prisoners.113
December 2009 Detainment of American Subcontractor
On December 4, 2009, Cuban authorities arrested an American subcontractor, Alan Gross,
working for Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI), a Bethesda-based company that had received a
contract from USAID to help support Cuban civil society organizations. Gross was arrested at
Jose Martí International Airport in Havana when he was planning to leave the country. Gross’s
identity had not been made public until January 13, 2010, when various press reports cited his
name. He reportedly was distributing communications equipment in Cuba such as cell phones and
laptop computers to Jewish organizations in Cuba.114
High-ranking Cuban official Ricardo Alarcon, the head of Cuba’s National Assembly, asserted on
January 6, 2010, that the contractor was working for American intelligence, but U.S. officials
strongly denied the accusation.115 A State Department spokesman maintained that the contractor
“is not associated with our intelligence services” and noted that “Cuba has a history of
mischaracterizing what Americans and NGOs in Cuba are doing.”116 According to a statement by
DAI, “the detained subcontractor was not working for any intelligence service … he was working
with a peaceful, non-dissident civic group – a religious and cultural group recognized by the
Cuban government – to improve its ability to communicate with its members across the island
and overseas.”117
U.S. officials raised the case at the semi-annual migration talks held in February in Havana,
calling for his release. Some 40 House Members called for Mr. Gross’s release in a letter to the
Cuban government, warning that improved relations between the United States and Cuba will not
be possible until he is released.118 The letter maintained that Mr. Gross’s work in Cuba with the
Jewish community “emanated from his desire to make a positive impact for others of faith on the
island.” It expressed concern for Mr. Gross’s health and the deteriorating health of his elderly
mother. A number of other Members and Senators have also called for Mr. Gross’s immediate
release.

113 Alfonso Chardy, “Exile Group: Not Enough Money Getting to Cuban Dissidents,” Miami Herald, May 15, 2008;
Cuban American National Foundation, “Findings and Recommendations on the Most Effective Use of USAID-CUBA
Funds Authorized by Section 109(a) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Helms-Burton) Act of 1996,”
March 2008.
114 William Booth and Mary Beth Sheridan, “Cuba Detains Contractor for U.S. Government; American Was Handing
Out Mobile Phones, Laptops to Activists,” Washington Post, December 12, 2009; Ginger Thompson and Marc Lacey,
“Contractor Jailed in Cuba Was Aiding Religious Groups,” New York Times, January 13, 2010; and Mary Beth
Sheridan and William Booth, “U.S. Detainee Was Aiding Jewish Groups in Cuba,” Washington Post, January 13, 2010.
115 William Booth, “Contractor is U.S. Secret Agent, Cuban Legislator Says,” Washington Post, January 7, 2010.
116 “State Department Holds Regular News Briefing,” CQ Newsmaker Transcripts, January 7, 2010.
117 Frances Robles, “U.S. Says Contractor Arrested in Cuba is No Spy,” Miami Herald, January 8, 2010; and
Development Alternatives Inc. “Updated Statement from DAI President and CEO Dr. James Boomgard Regarding
Detainee in Cuba,” January 7, 2010.
118 “Congressmen urge Cuba to Release Jailed U.S. Aid Worker Who Helped Jewish Community,” States News
Service, March 24, 2010.
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Radio and TV Marti
U.S.-government sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba—Radio and TV Martí—
began in 1985 and 1990 respectively. According to the Broadcasting Board of Governors FY2011
Budget Request, Radio and TV Martí are dedicated to providing a reliable source of news and
information that is accurate, objective, and credible. The request maintains that the two programs
support the right of the Cuban people to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through
any media, regardless of frontiers.
Until October 1999, U.S.-government funded international broadcasting programs had been a
primary function of the United States Information Agency (USIA). When USIA was abolished
and its functions were merged into the Department of State at the beginning of FY2000, the
Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) became an independent agency that included such
entities as the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free
Asia, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB), which manages Radio and TV Marti. OCB is
headquartered in Miami, Florida, and operates under the BBG’s International Broadcasting
Bureau (IBB). Legislation in the 104th Congress (P.L. 104-134) required the relocation of OCB
from Washington D.C. to south Florida. The move began in 1996 and was completed in 1998.
Radio Martí broadcasts on short and medium wave (AM) channels for 24 hours six days per
week, and for18 hours one day per week utilizing transmission facilities in Marathon, Florida and
Greenville, North Carolina, according to the BBG. It also transmits to Cuba 24 hours daily
through Hispasat satellite television and the internet.
TV Martí programming has been broadcast through multiple transmission methods over the
years. From its beginning in 1990 until July 2005, it was broadcast via an aerostat (blimp) from
facilities in Cudjoe Key, Florida for four and one-half hours daily, but the aerostat was destroyed
by Hurricane Dennis. Currently TV Martí is broadcast via the internet, satellite television –
Hispasat and DirecTV, and by an airborne platform – AeroMartí.
In December 2006, the OCB contracted with two private U.S. commercial stations to transmit
Radio and TV Martí.119 It provided a six-month contract with Radio Mambí (710 AM) in Florida,
at a cost of $182,500, to broadcast one hour of Radio Martí programming five days a week from
midnight to 1:00 am. Radio Mambí is a popular station in south Florida, with a 50,000 watt
capacity, that is well-known for its strong anti-Castro stance. A second six-month OCB contract
with WPMF (Channel 38) in Miami, known as TV Azteca, at a cost of $195,000, provided for
two 30-minute TV Martí newscasts at 6 pm and 11:30 pm weekdays, along with one-minute news
updates hourly over a 12 hour period weekdays. OCB chose the station because it is offered on
DirecTV and because it has only a small audience in Miami. In June 2007, the two contracts were
extended for an additional six months with similar terms. The contract with Radio Mambí
subsequently expired in early 2008, whereas TV Martí continues to be shown on Channel 38.
From mid-2004 until 2006, TV Martí programming was transmitted for several hours once a
week via an airborne platform known as Commando Solo operated by the Department of Defense
utilizing a C-130 aircraft. In August 2006, OCB began to use contracted private aircraft to
transmit pre-recorded TV Martí broadcasts six days weekly, and by late October 2006 the OCB
inaugurated an aircraft-broadcasting platform known as AeroMartí with the capability of

119 Christina Hoag, “Radio, TV Martí To Be Aired Locally,” Miami Herald, December 19, 2006.
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transmitting live broadcasts. OCB uses two privately contracted airplanes for AeroMartí to
transmit broadcasts four and one-half hours daily from Monday to Saturday during the evening.
Beginning in June 2010, this will be cut to two and one-half hours for five days weekly,
according to the BBG’s FY2011 budget request.
Controversies
Both Radio and TV Martí have at times been the focus of controversies, including questions
about adherence to broadcast standards. There have been various attempts over the years to cut
funding for the programs, especially for TV Martí, which has not had much of an audience
because of Cuban jamming efforts. In December 2006, press reports alleged significant problems
in the OCB’s operations, with claims of cronyism, patronage, and bias in its coverage.120 In
February 2007, the former director of TV Martí programming pled guilty in U.S. federal court to
receiving more than $100,000 in kickbacks over a three-year period from a vendor receiving
OCB contracts.121
Over the years, there have been various government studies and audits of the OCB, including
investigations by the GAO, by a 1994 congressionally-established Advisory Panel on Radio and
TV Martí, by the State Department Office Inspector General (OIG) in 1999, and by the combined
State Department/BBG Office Inspector General in 2003 and 2007.122 In July 2008, GAO issued a
report that criticized the IBB’s and OCB’s practices in awarding the two contracts to Radio
Mambí and TV Azteca as lacking discipline required to ensure transparency and accountability.
According to GAO, the approach for awarding the Radio Mambí and TV Azteca contracts did not
reflect sound business practices.123
The most recent State Department/BBG Office of Inspector General (OIG) report, issued in June
2007, maintained that OCB had significantly improved its operations under its current director,
Pedro Roig, with an organizational realignment that streamlined operations and helped improve
the quality of broadcasts. According to the report, “IBB quality reviews show that radio and
television broadcasts have markedly improved over the past two years in production quality and
content,” although the report also called for greater emphasis on internal quality control to ensure
that editorial standards are followed. The report lauded the introduction of new technology
allowing OCB to broadcast television signals live into Cuba using airborne platforms, and

120 Oscar Corral, “Radio, TV Martí Face Another Government Audit,” Miami Herald, December 18, 2006, and
“Problems Dog Broadcaster,” Miami Herald, December 19, 2006.
121 Jay Weaver, “TV Martí Executive Admits Taking Kickbacks,” Miami Herald, February 14, 2007.
122 See the following reports and audits: U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Broadcasts to Cuba, TV Marti
Surveys are Flawed, GAO/NSIAD-90-252, August 1990; U.S. GAO, TV Marti, Costs and Compliance with Broadcast
Standards and International Agreements, GAO/NSIAD-92-199, May 1992; U.S. GAO, Letter to Hon. Howard L.
Berman and Hon. John F. Kerry regarding Radio Marti broadcast standards, GAO/NSIAD-93-126R, February 17,
1993; Advisory Panel on Radio and TV Marti, Report of the Advisory Panel on Radio and TV Marti, Three Volumes,
March 1994; U.S. GAO, Radio Marti, Program Review Processes Need Strengthening, GAO/NSIAD-94-265,
September 1994; U.S. GAO, U.S. Information Agency, Issues Related to Reinvention Planning in the Office of Cuba
Broadcasting, GAO/NSIAD-96-110, May 1996; U.S. Department of State, Office of the Inspector General, Review of
Polices and Procedures for Ensuring that Radio Marti Broadcasts Adhere to Applicable Requirements, 99-IB-010,
June 1999; U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General, Review of
the Effectiveness and Implementation of Office of Cuba Broadcasting’s New Program Initiatives, Report No. IBO-A-
03-01, January 2003, and Report of Inspection, Office of Cuba Broadcasting, Report No. ISP-IB 07-35, June 2007.
123 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Broadcasting to Cuba, Weaknesses in Contracting Practices Reduced
Visibility into Selected Award Decisions,” GAO-08-764, July 2008.
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maintained that there are indications that more Cubans are watching TV Martí broadcasts. It
recommended that the BBG’s International Broadcasting Bureau should review and assess the
leases with Radio Mambí and TV Azteca at the end of the lease period to determine whether they
provide additional listeners and viewers and are worth the cost, or whether they could be replaced
with lease options for other stations. Looking ahead, the report maintained that OCB needs a
“long-term strategic plan that anticipates the future needs of the Cuban audience, provides a
template on how to compete with commercial broadcasters, and addresses what to do with OCB
and its broadcasting facilities if and when uncensored broadcasting is allowed inside a democratic
Cuba.”124
One of the most controversial aspects of the OIG report, and one that has often been at the center
of past congressional debate over TV Martí, is the extent to which TV Martí can be viewed in
Cuba. The report maintained that there was anecdotal evidence that the AeroMartí airborne
transmissions had increased viewership. The report referred to a January 2007 survey of Cuban
arrivals—commissioned by Spanish Radio Productions with the cooperation of Miami Dade
College—that found listening rates for Radio and TV Martí within Cuba were significantly higher
than previously reported, especially for TV Martí. Although specific survey figures were not cited
in the OIG report, OCB officials maintained that the survey showed that 17% of recent Cuban
arrivals had watched TV Martí.125 The OIG report also pointed to a February 2007 survey by the
U.S. Interests Section (USINT) in Havana that reflected increased viewership. According to the
BBG, that survey was completed by 500 Cuban visitors to the USINT (where TV Martí can be
viewed) in January and February 2007, with 10% of the visitors indicating that they could watch
TV Martí via UHF for brief periods.
At the same time as the release of the OIG report in 2007, other observers contended that TV
Martí could hardly be viewed in Cuba because of the government’s jamming efforts. John
Nichols, a Pennsylvania State University communications professor, visited Cuba in late June
2007 on a fact-finding mission sponsored by the Center for International Policy (a group that
opposes current U.S. policy toward Cuba), and concluded “that the signal from the plane is
essentially unusable” and that there was “no evidence of significant viewership of TV Martí.”126
In interviews with the Associated Press, more than two dozen Cuban immigrants to Florida
contended that while Radio Martí can be heard throughout Cuba, TV Martí can rarely be seen.127
Prior BBG commissioned phone surveys in Cuba from 2003, 2005, and November 2006
estimated past week TV Martí viewership between 0.1% and 0.3% of those surveyed and past
month viewership of almost 0.5%. The November 2006 survey, reportedly designed to show the
early effects of the AeroMartí transmissions that began in late October, showed no statistically
significant change from the 2003 and 2005 surveys. In the same surveys, Radio Martí had
listenership of between 1% to 2% in the past week and 4% to 5% in the past month.
More recently, in January 2009, GAO issued a report asserting that the best available research
suggests that Radio and TV Martí’s audience is small, and cited telephone surveys since 2003

124 The State Department originally issued a two-page summary of the report on its website on June 5, 2007, and
pointed out that the full report received only “limited official distribution.” On July 31, 2007, the State Department
issued the entire 43-page report on its website, with certain sections redacted. That version is available at
http://oig.state.gov/lbry/.
125 Pablo Bachelet, “Martí Extending Its Reach, U.S. Says,” Miami Herald, June 20, 2007.
126 Vanessa Bauza, “TV Martí Signal Weak in Cuba, Broadcast Specialist Says,” South Florida Sun-Sentinel, July 31,
2007.
127 Laura Wides-Muñoz, “Despite Expenditures, TV Martí Still Tough to See in Cuba,” Associated Press, July 30, 2007
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showing that less than 2% of respondents reported tuning in to Radio or TV Martí during the past
week. With regard to TV Martí viewership, according to the report, all of the IBB’s telephone
surveys since 2003 show that less than 1% of respondents said that they had watched TV Martí
during the past week. According to the GAO report, the IBB surveys show that there was no
increase in reported TV Martí viewership following the beginning of AeroMartí and DirecTV
satellite broadcasting in 2006.The GAO report also cited concerns with adherence to relevant
domestic laws and international standards, including the domestic dissemination of OCB
programming, inappropriate advertisements during OCB programming, and TV Martí’s
interference with Cuban broadcasts.128 GAO testified on its report in a hearing held by the House
Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs on June 17, 2009.
Funding for Cuba Broadcasting
From FY1984 through FY2009, about $629 million has been spent for broadcasting to Cuba. In
recent years, funding amounted to $33.9 million in FY2007, $33.4 million in FY2008, and an
estimated $34.8 million in FY2009. Until FY2005, the Administration provided funding
information for Cuba broadcasting with a breakdown of the amounts spent for Radio versus TV
Martí. Since FY2005, however, the Broadcasting Board of Governors has not made such a
distinction in its annual budget request.
FY2009. The BBG requested, and Congress fully funded, $34.4 million for broadcasting to Cuba
in FY2009, slightly more than provided by Congress in FY2008. The requested amount included
funding for the airborne platform that the Office of Cuba Broadcasting uses to broadcast Radio
and TV Martí. The report to the Senate Appropriations Committee version of the FY2009 State
Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, S. 3288 (S.Rept. 110-
425), recommended fully funding the Administration’s request for Cuba broadcasting. The 110th
Congress did not finalize FY2009 appropriations, although it did approve the Consolidated
Appropriations Act for FY2009 (P.L. 110-329) that provided funding until March 6, 2009. In the
111th Congress, the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, (P.L. 111-8) provided funding for Cuba
broadcasting under the Broadcasting Board of Governors’ International Broadcasting Operations
account, which fully funded the Administration’s request for Cuba broadcasting.
FY2010. The BBG requested $32.47 million in FY2010, about $2.3 million less than provided in
FY2009, and ultimately Congress appropriated $30.474 million. The BBG proposed to change
the news format for TV Martí by replacing the two evening news programs with news updates on
the half hour, and to convert Radio Martí to an all news format. The proposed changes would
eliminate 35 jobs from the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, representing a staffing cut of about 20%
from 171 to 136 positions. Some press reports maintain that the change appears to be in part a
way for the BBG to deal with criticism of political bias and propaganda at the station, while BBG
officials maintain that the cut is an effort to streamline programming and to respond to feedback
from audience research.129

128 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Broadcasting to Cuba, Actions Are Needed to Improve Strategy and
Operations, GAO-09-127, January 2009.
129 David Adams, “$2.4M Cut May Hit Broadcasts to Cuba; Radio and TV Martí Faces 20 Percent Layoffs,” St.
Petersburg Times, May 14, 2009; and Frances Robles, “Radio and TV Martí Changing Formats,” Miami Herald, May
13, 2009.
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In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (H.R. 3288/P.L. 111-117) enacted in December
2009, Congress provided $30.474 million for Cuba broadcasting in FY2010, with not more than
$5.5 million for non-salary and benefits expenses for TV Martí. This was almost $2 million less
than the Administration’s request of $32.47 million. Prior to the approval of the omnibus
appropriations measure, House-passed H.R. 3081 would have fully funded the Administration’s
request while the Senate Appropriations Committee-reported version, S. 1434, would have
provided $15 million less than requested and prohibit funding for TV Martí broadcasts
The conference report to the bill (H.Rept. 111-366) also required two reports for the Committees
on Appropriations: the first from the BBG within 90 days providing a multi-year strategic plan for
broadcasting to Cuba; and the second from the GAO within 90 days of the submission of the
BBG report, providing an assessment of the strategic plan.
As set forth in the conference report, the BBG strategic plan is required to include (1) an analysis
of the current situation in Cuba and an allocation of resources consistent with the relative priority
of broadcasting to Cuba as determined by the annual Language Service Review and other factors,
including input form the Secretary of State on the relative U.S. interest of broadcasting to Cuba;
(2) the estimated audience sizes in Cuba for Radio and TV Martí and the sources and relative
reliability of the data on which such estimates are based; (3) the annual operating cost (and total
cost over the life of the contract) of any and all types of TV transmission and the effectiveness of
each in increasing such audience size; (4) the principal obstacles to increasing such audience size;
(5) an analysis of other options for disseminating news and information to Cuba, including
DVDs, the Internet, and cell phones and other handheld electronic devices and a report on the
cost effectiveness of each; and (6) an analysis of the program efficiencies and effectiveness that
can be achieved through shared resources and cost saving opportunities in radio and television
production between Radio and TV Martí and the Voice of America.
FY2011. The BBG is requesting $29.179 million for Cuba broadcasting in FY2011, about $1
million less than that appropriated in FY2010. Staffing would remain the same at 136 positions.
Migration Issues
1994 and 1995 Migration Accords
Cuba and the United States reached two migration accords in 1994 and 1995 designed to stem the
mass exodus of Cubans attempting to reach the United States by boat. On the minds of U.S.
policymakers was the 1980 Mariel boatlift in which 125,000 Cubans fled to the United States
with the approval of Cuban officials. In response to Castro’s threat to unleash another Mariel,
U.S. officials reiterated U.S. resolve not to allow another exodus. Amid escalating numbers of
fleeing Cubans, on August 19, 1994, President Clinton abruptly changed U.S. migration policy,
under which Cubans attempting to flee their homeland were allowed into the United States, and
announced that the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy would take Cubans rescued at sea to the U.S.
naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Despite the change in policy, Cubans continued fleeing in
large numbers.
As a result, in early September 1994, Cuba and the United States began talks that culminated in a
September 9, 1994 bilateral agreement to stem the flow of Cubans fleeing to the United States by
boat. In the agreement, the United States and Cuba agreed to facilitate safe, legal, and orderly
Cuban migration to the United States, consistent with a 1984 migration agreement. The United
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States agreed to ensure that total legal Cuban migration to the United States would be a minimum
of 20,000 each year, not including immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. In a change of policy, the
United States agreed to discontinue the practice of granting parole to all Cuban migrants who
reach the United States, while Cuba agreed to take measures to prevent unsafe departures from
Cuba.
In May 1995, the United States reached another accord with Cuba under which the United States
would parole the more than 30,000 Cubans housed at Guantanamo into the United States, but
would intercept future Cuban migrants attempting to enter the United States by sea and would
return them to Cuba. The two countries would cooperate jointly in the effort. Both countries also
pledged to ensure that no action would be taken against those migrants returned to Cuba as a
consequence of their attempt to immigrate illegally. On January 31, 1996, the Department of
Defense announced that the last of some 32,000 Cubans intercepted at sea and housed at
Guantanamo had left the U.S. Naval Station, most having been paroled into the United States.
Coast Guard Interdictions
Since the 1995 migration accord, the U.S. Coast Guard has interdicted thousands of Cubans at sea
and returned them to their country, while those deemed at risk for persecution have been
transferred to Guantanamo and then found asylum in a third country or eventually the United
States. Those Cubans who reach shore are allowed to apply for permanent resident status in one
year, pursuant to the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-732). This so-called “wet foot/dry
foot” policy has been criticized by some as encouraging Cubans to risk their lives in order to
make it to the United States and as encouraging alien smuggling. Others maintain that U.S. policy
should welcome those migrants fleeing communist Cuba whether or not they are able to make it
to land.
In recent years, the number of Cubans interdicted at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard rose from 666 in
FY2002 to a high of 2,868 in FY2007. Subsequently, sea interdictions declined to 2,199 in
FY2008 and to 799 in FY2009. In FY2010, just 119 Cubans were interdicted at sea through
March 23, 2010.130 Increasing numbers of Cuban migrants attempting to reach the United States
have been intercepted in Mexico in recent years, but Mexico and Cuba negotiated a migration
accord in October 2008 in an attempt to curb the irregular flow of migrants through Mexico.131
U.S. prosecution against migrant smugglers in Florida has increased in recent years with
numerous convictions. There have been several violent incidents in which Cuban migrants have
brandished weapons or in which Coast Guard officials have used force to prevent Cubans from
reaching shore. In late December 2007, a Coast Guard official in Florida called on the local
Cuban American community to denounce the smuggling and stop financing the trips that are
leading to more deaths at sea.132 The Cuban government also has taken forceful action against
individuals engaging in alien smuggling. Prison sentences of up to three years may be imposed
against those engaging in alien smuggling.

130 U.S. Coast Guard, Alien Migrant Interdiction, Coast Guard Office of Law Enforcement, “Total Interdictions, Fiscal
Year 1982 to Present,” March 23, 2010.
131 Diego Cevallos, “Migration: More and More Cubans Entering U.S. Through Mexico,” Inter Press Service News
Agency, June 17, 2008.
132 Laura Morales, “Exiles Urged to Stem Tide of Cubans,” Miami Herald, December 29, 2007.
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In the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s July 2006, announcement that he was temporarily ceding
political power to his brother, Department of Homeland Security officials announced several
measures to discourage Cubans from risking their lives on the open seas. On August 11, 2006,
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Deputy Secretary Michael P. Jackson urged “the Cuban
people to stay on the island” and discouraged “anyone from risking their life in the open seas in
order to travel to the United States.” At the same time, DHS announced additional measures to
discourage Cubans from turning to alien smuggling as a way to enter the United States. The
measures support family reunification by increasing the numbers of Cuban migrants admitted to
the United States each year who have family members in the United States, although the overall
number of Cubans admitted to the United States annually will remain at about 21,000. Cubans
who attempt to enter the United States illegally will be deemed ineligible to enter under this new
family reunification procedure. In another change of policy, Cuban medical personnel currently
conscripted by the Cuban government to work in third countries are now allowed to enter the
United States; their families in Cuba are also allowed to enter the United States.133
Migration Talks
Semi-annual U.S.-Cuban talks alternating between Cuba and the United States had been held
regularly on the implementation of the 1994 and 1995 migration accords, but the State
Department cancelled the 20th round of talks scheduled for January 2004. At the time, the State
Department maintained that Cuba refused to discuss five issues identified by the United States:
(1) Cuba’s issuance of exit permits for all qualified migrants; (2) Cuba’s cooperation in holding a
new registration for an immigrant lottery; (3) the need for a deeper Cuban port used by the U.S.
Coast Guard for the repatriation of Cubans interdicted at sea; (4) Cuba’s responsibility to permit
U.S. diplomats to travel to monitor returned migrants; and (5) Cuba’s obligation to accept the
return of Cuban nationals determined to be inadmissible to the United States.134 In response to the
cancellation of the talks, Cuban officials maintained that the U.S. decision was irresponsible and
that Cuba was prepared to discuss all of the issues raised by the United States.135
Under the Obama Administration, Cuba and the United States agreed to restart the biannual
migration talks (in addition to talks on direct mail service). The State Department took the first
step to restart the talks when it sent a diplomatic note to the Cuban Interests Section on May 22,
2009. A State Department spokesman maintained that the talks would be used “to reaffirm both
sides’ commitment to safe, legal and orderly migration” as well as “to improve operational
relations with Cuba on migration issues.”136 Cuba responded on May 30, 2009, and the State
Department subsequently announced that the two countries would restart the talks.
The first resumed talks were held on July 14, 2009 in New York City. The U.S. team was led by
State Department official Craig Kelly, a principal deputy assistant secretary for Western
Hemisphere affairs, with participation from the Department of Homeland Security, the
Department of Justice, and the U.S. Coast Guard. The Cuban delegation was led by Deputy

133 Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Announces Additional Measures to Combat Alien Smuggling of Cubans,”
and “USCIS Will Further Strengthen Measures that Support the Reunification of Families Separated by the Castro
Regime,” Press Releases, August 11, 2006; Pablo Bachelet, “U.S. Program for Defecting Cuban Doctors a Success,”
Miami Herald, March 12, 2007.
134 U.S. Department of State. State Department Regular Briefing, Richard Boucher. January 7, 2004.
135 “Migration Talks Cancelled,” Miami Herald, January 8, 2004.
136 Lesley Clark, “U.S. Wants To Resume Migration Talks with Cuba,” Miami Herald, May 22, 2009
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Foreign Minister Dagoberto Rodriguez. The State Department outlined its four objectives in the
talks: ensuring that the U.S. Interests Section in Havana is able to operate effectively; gaining
access to a deep-water port for the safe return of Cuban migrants picked up at sea; ensuring that
U.S. diplomats are able to monitor the welfare of those Cubans who are sent back to the island;
and gaining Cuban government acceptance of Cubans who are excluded from the United States
because they have committed crimes.137 Cuba reportedly proposed a new immigration agreement
and more effective cooperation to combat alien smuggling, and also made known its opposition to
the so-called “wet foot/dry foot policy.” The next set of talks were supposed to take place in
Havana in December 2009, but were postponed until early 2010, reportedly in February.138
The second round of resumed migration talks were held on February 19, 2010, in Havana.
According to the Department of State, “engaging in these talks underscores our interest in
pursuing constructive discussions with the government of Cuba to advance U.S. interests of
mutual concern.” It maintained that the United States views the talks “as an avenue to achieve
practical, positive results that contribute to the full implementation of the [Migration] Accords
and to the safety of citizens of both countries.”139 Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained
that the meeting took place in an atmosphere of respect and included discussion of some aspects
of a new draft migration accord proposed by Cuba at the in the July 2009 round of talks.140 Cuba
also reportedly raised the issue of improving and expanding the Cuban Interests Section in
Washington.141 During the talks, U.S. officials urged Cuban officials to provide political prisoner
Orlando Zapata Tamayo all necessary medical care, and also raised the case of U.S. citizen Alan
Gross detained in Cuba since early December 2009 and called for his release. No date has been
set for the next round of talks.
For additional information on migration issues, see CRS Report R40566, Cuban Migration to the
United States: Policy and Trends, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
Guantanamo Naval Base
The 45-square mile U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, has been a U.S. base since
1903, and under a 1934 treaty that remains in force, the U.S. presence can only be terminated by
mutual agreement or by abandonment by the United States. When Fidel Castro assumed power in
the 1959 Cuban revolution, the new government gave assurances that it would respect all its
treaty commitments, including the 1934 treaty covering the Guantanamo base. Subsequently,
however, as U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated, the Cuban government opposed the presence as
illegal.
The mission of the base has changed over time. During the Cold War, the base was viewed as a
good location for controlling Caribbean sea lanes, as a deterrent to the Soviet presence in the
Caribbean, and as a location for supporting potential military operations in the region. In 1994-
1995, the base was used to house thousands of Cubans and Haitians fleeing their homeland, but
by 1996 the last of the refugees had departed, with most Cubans paroled into the United States,

137 William Gibson, “U.S. to Cuba: Take Back Criminals,” South Florida Sun-Sentinel, July 15, 2009.
138 “Migration Talks with Cuba Put Off to February,” Washington Post, December 4, 2009.
139 U.S. Department of State, “Cuba Migration Talks,” February 19, 2010.
140 “Statement by the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” IPR Strategic Information Database, February 22, 2010.
141 “Cuba, U.S. Hold New Round of
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pursuant to a May 1995 U.S.-Cuban migration accord. Since the 1995 accord, the U.S. Coast
Guard has interdicted thousands of Cubans at sea and returned them to Cuba, while a much
smaller number, those deemed at risk for persecution, have been taken to Guantanamo and then
granted asylum in a third country.
Another mission for the Guantanamo base emerged with the U.S.-led global campaign against
terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States. With
the U.S. war in Afghanistan in 2001, the United States decided to send some captured Taliban and
Al Qaeda fighters to be imprisoned in Guantanamo. Although the Cuban government has objected
to the U.S. presence at Guantanamo, it did not initially oppose the new mission of housing
detainees. Then Defense Minister Raúl Castro noted that, in the unlikely event that a prisoner
would escape into Cuban territory, Cuba would capture the prisoner and return him to the base.142
The Cuban government, however, has expressed concerns about the treatment of prisoners at the
U.S. base and has said it will keep pressing the international community to investigate the
treatment of terrorist suspects.143 In January 2005, it denounced what it described as “atrocities”
committed at the Guantanamo base.144
President Obama issued Executive Order 13492 on January 22, 2009 that requires the closure of
the Guantanamo detention facility (not the base itself) as soon as practicable, but no later than one
year. Some Members of Congress also have called for the closure of the detention facility and
have introduced legislation in the 111th Congress. Other measures have been introduced to
prohibit the transfer of the enemy combatants detained at Guantanamo from being transferred to
various military prisons in the United States. (For information on legislative initiatives related to
the closing of the detention center, see CRS Report R40139, Closing the Guantanamo Detention
Center: Legal Issues, by Michael John Garcia et al, and CRS Report R40754, Guantanamo
Detention Center: Legislative Activity in the 111th Congress, by Anna C. Henning.
With regard to the future of the Guantanamo base overall, a provision in the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114, Section 210) states that once a democratically
elected Cuban government is in place, U.S. policy is to be prepared to enter into negotiations
either to return the base to Cuba or to renegotiate the present agreement under mutually agreeable
terms.
Cuba and the Organization of American States
As noted above, the OAS voted in 1962 to exclude Cuba from participation in the regional
organization because of its identification with Marxism-Leninism, but in early June 2009, the
OAS overturned the 1962 resolution in a move that could eventually lead to Cuba’s reentry into
the regional organization. While Cuban government welcomed the OAS vote to overturn the 1962

142 “Cuba Would Hand Over Escapees, Raúl Castro Says,” Miami Herald, January 20, 2002.
143 For information on terrorist suspects held at Guantanamo, see CRS Report RL31367, Treatment of “Battlefield
Detainees” in the War on Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea; and CRS Report RS22173, Detainees at Guantanamo Bay,
by Jennifer K. Elsea.
144 Ana Radelat, “Cuba Turns Up Rhetoric on Guantanamo as UN Condemns Human Rights Abuses,” CubaNews,
April 2005.
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resolution, it asserted that it would not return to the OAS because of its domination by the United
States and because the organization promotes “neoliberal and egotistical capitalism.”145
Background on Cuba’s Exclusion from the OAS in 1962
In January 1962, the OAS approved a resolution that excluded the government of Cuba from
participation in the OAS because of its self-identification as a Marxist-Leninist government. The
resolution was approved by the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
that had been requested by Colombia in November 1961 pursuant to the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance (Río Treaty). Colombia’s official request for the meeting contained no
specific reference to Cuba or the Soviet Union. Instead, Colombia requested the meeting of
foreign ministers to consider “threats to the peace and political independence of the American
states that might arise from the intervention of extracontinental powers directed toward breaking
American solidarity.”146 It was clear, however, that Colombia’s request referred to the potential
threat from Cuba and the Soviet Union.
In October 1961, Peru had also made a request for a meeting of consultation under the Río Treaty
to discuss Cuba, and emphasized the Cuban government’s “repression of the rights of the Cuban
people” and its “use of diplomatic missions and secret agents to carry out communist infiltration
in other countries of the hemisphere.”147 Peru’s request ultimately was referred to the Inter-
American Peace Committee, which provided a report on Cuba to the Eighth Meeting of
Consultation of Foreign Ministers that helped inform the foreign ministers as they deliberated on
Cuba. The report asserted that Cuba’s connections with the Sino-Soviet bloc of countries were
incompatible with the principles and standards that govern the regional system, and particularly
with the collective security established by the charter of the OAS and the Río Treaty.148
Ultimately, the resolution that excluded Cuba from OAS participation had three main provisions:
• “That adherence by any member of the Organization of American States to
Marxism-Leninism is incompatible with the inter-American system and the
alignment of such a government with the communist bloc breaks the unity and
solidarity of the hemisphere.” It was approved by a vote of 20-1, with Cuba
voting against.149
• “That the present Government of Cuba, which has officially identified itself as a
Marxist-Leninist government, is incompatible with the principles and objectives
of the inter-American system.” It was approved by a vote of 20-1, with Cuba
voting against.

145 Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Declaration of the Revolutionary Government,” June 8, 2009.
146 OAS, “Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, January 22-31, 1962, Final Act,”
(OEA/Ser.C/II.8), p. 1.
147 As quoted in: Edward Alden Jamison, “Cuba and the Inter-American System: Exclusion of the Castro Regime from
the Organization of American States,” The Americas, Vol. 36, No. 3, January 1980, p. 327.
148 The report was cited in: OAS, “Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, January 22-31,
1962, Final Act,” Resolution VI, p. 13.
149 Votes on the parts of the resolution and the overall resolution are drawn from: “Organización de los Estados
Americanos, “Octava Reunión de Consulta de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores Para Servir de Organo de Consulta,
Aplicación del Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Reciproca,” Punta del Este, Uruguay, 31 enero 1962 (Doc. 72).
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• “That this incompatibility excludes the present Government of Cuba from
participation in the inter-American system.” It was approved by a vote of 14-1,
with Cuba voting against, and 6 abstentions – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Ecuador, and Mexico.
It is noteworthy that the operative provision of the resolution excluding Cuba from participation
in the OAS received, by just one vote, the required two-thirds vote. The countries abstaining from
the operative provision justified their votes on juridical rather than political considerations,
maintaining that the exclusion of an OAS member was not legally possible unless the OAS
Charter itself was amended.150
Efforts to Reinstate Cuba’s Participation in the OAS
In 2009, Cuba’s reinstatement into the inter-American system has become an issue taken up by a
number of Latin American countries. In a public statement before the Fifth Summit of the
Americas was held in mid-April 2009, OAS Secretary General José Miguel Insulza maintained
that the 1962 resolution was outdated and that the upcoming OAS General Assembly meeting
would be the appropriate forum to debate repealing or overturning it. Insulza explained, however,
that repealing the resolution would not mean that Cuba would automatically be readmitted to the
OAS. The Secretary General maintained that full reintegration of Cuba to the OAS is a decision
for Cuba itself and for all OAS members to make, and is a decision that would have to be debated
after the repeal of the 1962 resolution.151 In a press interview, Insulza said that the resolution “was
a bad idea in the first place,” and maintained that he wants “Cuba back in the Inter-American
system.” Insulza also maintained that the Inter-American Democratic Charter does not prevent
Cuba from rejoining the organization.152
As the June 2-3, 2009 OAS General Assembly in Honduras approached, a number of countries
offered resolutions on the Cuba issue. At a meeting of the OAS Permanent Council on May 27,
2009, three countries – Honduras, Nicaragua, and the United States – offered draft resolutions on
Cuba for consideration by the OAS General Assembly, but since none of the resolutions received
enough support, the Permanent Council agreed to create a Working Group to attempt to find a
consensus text for a resolution on Cuba.153
As originally proposed, the draft resolutions by Honduras and Nicaragua were similar in that both
would overturn the 1962 resolution. However, while the Honduran resolution would have simply
revoked the 1962 resolution, the Nicaraguan resolution would have characterized the rescinding
of the resolution “as an act of justice and historical redress toward Cuba and the peoples of the
hemisphere.” Moreover, the Nicaraguan resolution would also have stated that the “exclusion of
the Republic of Cuba from the inter-American system violates the Charter of the OAS and
international law and constitutes an injustice and an unacceptable act of discrimination to the

150 Ibid, and Jamison, “Cuba and the Inter-American System: Exclusion of the Castro Regime from the Organization of
American States,” op. cit., p. 344.
151 OAS, “OAS General Assembly Is the Only Forum to Debate Abolishing 1962 Resolution on Cuba, Says Secretary
General Insulza,” Press Release, April 17, 2009.
152 Frances Robles, “Organization of American States Chief Says It’s Time Reactivate Cuba,” Miami Herald, April 18,
2009.
153 OAS, “Working Group at the OAS Will Look for Consensus For a Resolution on Cuba,” Press Release, May 27,
2009.
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sovereignty of states and the right to self-determination of peoples.” The draft Honduran
resolution also had a provision stating that future relations between Cuba and the OAS would
depend on the express will of the Cuban Government and the relevant bodies of the OAS.
The draft U.S. resolution would not have explicitly repealed the 1962 resolution, but would have
noted that “some of the circumstances since Cuba’s suspension from full participation in the
Organization of American States may have changed.” The resolution would have supported “the
eventual reintegration of Cuba into the Inter-American system,” but “consistent with
commitments, principles, and values of the OAS Charter,154 the Inter-American Democratic
Charter,155 and other instruments.” It would have instructed the OAS Permanent Council “to
initiate a dialogue” with the government of Cuba regarding its “eventual reintegration into the
inter-American system, consistent with the principles of sovereignty, independence, non-
intervention, democracy, and full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as
enshrined in the OAS Charter, the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and other OAS
instruments.”
After the first day of the OAS General Assembly on June 2, 2009, it appeared that OAS members
were having difficulty reaching consensus on any of the resolutions, while press reports indicated
that there was a possibility that there could be enough votes to readmit Cuba into the OAS
without the conditions offered by the United States in its resolution.156
Ultimately, however, a consensus resolution was agreed to on June 3, 2009, with the support of
all OAS members. The resolution overturns the 1962 resolution, and also states that Cuba’s
participation in the OAS “will be the result of a process of dialogue initiated at the request of the
Government of Cuba, and in accordance with the practices, purposes, and principles of the OAS.”
The resolution does not have specific reference to the Inter-American Democratic Charter that
had been included in the U.S. resolution, but it does link Cuba’s re-admittance to the purposes
and principles of the OAS. Moreover, an introductory provision of the resolution stated that the
General Assembly’s action was “guided by the purposes and principles of the Organization of
American States embodied in the Charter of the Organization and its other fundamental
instruments related to security, democracy, self determination, non-intervention, human rights,
and development.”

154 The OAS Charter was originally signed in 1948, but has been amended several times, most recently in 1993. Article
2 of the Charter proclaims as one of the essential purposes of the OAS is to “promote and consolidate representative
democracy, with due respect for the principle of nonintervention.” Article 3 sets forth as an OAS principle that “every
State has the right to choose, without external interference, its political, economic, and social system and to organize
itself in the way best suited to it, and has the duty to abstain from intervening in the affairs of another State. Subject to
the foregoing, the American States shall cooperate fully among themselves, independently of the nature of their
political, economic, and social systems.”
155 The Inter-American Democratic Charter was approved by OAS states on September 11, 2001, at the OAS General
Assembly meeting in Lima, Peru, as an instrument to strengthen democracy in the region. It defines essential elements
of democracy and states how states might respond to threats to democracy. Article 2 of the charter states that “the
effective exercise of representative democracy is the basis for the rule of law and of the constitutional regimes of the
member states of the Organization of American States.” Article 23 states that “member states are responsible for
organizing, conducting, and ensuring free and fair electoral processes.”
156 Mark Landler, “Undercurrents Run Through Nations’ Debate on Cuba,” New York Times, June 3, 2009; Mary Beth
Sheridan, “Clinton Faces Pressure Over Cuba Policy; At Meeting, Latin American Countries Push Hard to Readmit
Island to OAS,” Washington Post, June 3, 2009.
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U.S. officials portrayed the consensus resolution as a diplomatic success because it averted the
passage of a resolution that would have simply overturned the 1962 resolution, and allowed Cuba
to immediately participate in the OAS. Instead, according to Dan Restrepo, Senior Director for
Western Hemisphere Affairs at the National Security Council, “we have a result that lays out a
process that specifically refers to the fundamental instruments of this organization of democracy,
human rights, self-determination and other enumerated rights are precisely the rights that this
Administration is working to advance and defend in Cuba and throughout the Americas.”157
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton lauded the passage of the resolution, stating that the member
nations of the OAS showed flexibility and openness today, and as a result we reached a consensus
that focuses on the future instead of the past.” She expressed satisfaction that there was agreement
“that Cuba cannot simply take its seat and that we must put Cuba’s participation to a
determination down the road if it ever chooses to seek reentry.” She asserted that “if and when the
day comes to make that determination, the United States will continue to defend the principles of
the Inter-American Democratic Charter and other fundamental tenets of the organization.”158
Critics of the consensus resolution maintain that there should have been more stringent
enforceable conditions regarding Cuba’s reentry into the OAS, and that it ignores Cuba’s denial
of basic freedoms and the repression of its people. Some Members of Congress immediately
criticized the consensus resolution for not more strongly linking Cuba’s reentry to the principles
of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and contend that the resolution represents a setback
for human rights activists in Cuba. Some threatened to withhold U.S. funding to the OAS if Cuba
is readmitted as a member.159 For example, in the House, H.R. 2687 (Mack) would withhold U.S.
assessed and voluntary contributions to the OAS if Cuba is allowed full membership or
participation in the OAS unless the President certifies that Cuba has satisfied certain conditions.
Supporters of the resolution maintain that it removes an irritant in U.S.-Latin American relations,
while at the same time offers an avenue for the OAS to start a dialogue with Cuba on a range of
issues, including democratic principles.160 Many Latin American nations lauded the consensus
resolution as an important step toward integrating Latin America into the Inter-American system.
Argentina’s Foreign Minister maintained that the action was an indication of the Obama
Administration’s move to restore the “values and principles of multilateralism.”161 Honduran
President Manuel Zelaya asserted that “the Cold War has ended this day in San Pedro Sula.”162

157 U.S. Department of State, “The OAS Ministerial in Honduras, Thomas A. Shannon Jr., Assistant Secretary of State
for Western Hemisphere Affairs; and Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs, National Security Council Dan
Restrepo,” Briefing Via Teleconference, June 3, 2009.
158 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “OAS Resolution,” Press Statement, June 3,
2009.
159 Lesley Clark and Frances Robles, “OAS’ Cuba Move Touches off Outcry; A Decision to Retract the Organization
of American States’ 1962 Suspension of Cuba Was Met with Swift Calls by Some Lawmakers to Cut Off Funding,”
Miami Herald, June 4, 2009; and “Menendez Statement On OAS’s Cuba Resolution,” Targeted News Service, June 3,
2009.
160 Nestor Ikeda, “OAS Ends Cuba Suspension After 47 Years, Marking Shift in U.S. Relations with Region,” AP
Newswire, June 4, 2009.
161 “Argentine Minister Welcomes OAS’s “Historic Resolution” on Cuba,” BBC Monitoring Americas, June 4, 2009.
162 Nestor Ikeda, “OAS Overturns Cold War Ouster of Cuba, But Cubans Say Don’t Want to Return,” AP Newswire,
June 3, 2009.
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Before the passage of the resolution, Cuba had not expressed any interest in rejoining the OAS. In
a recent visit to Caracas, Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez asserted that Cuba was proud
to be outside of the OAS, which he characterized as being an instrument of the United States.163
In an essay published the day of the OAS vote on the resolution, Fidel Castro referred to the OAS
as an organization that opened the gates to the Trojan horse (the United States) that backed
“neoliberalism, drug trafficking, military bases, and economic crises” in the region.164 As noted
above, in the aftermath of the OAS vote, Cuba indicated that it would not return to the OAS,
largely because it maintains that the organization is dominated by the United States.
Legislative Initiatives in the 111th Congress
Approved and Considered Measures
P.L. 111-8 (H.R. 1105). Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009. Introduced February 23, 2009;
House passed (245-178) February 25, 2009; Senate passed (voice vote) March 10, 2009; signed
into law March 11, 2009. Division D, Financial Services and General Government Appropriations
Act, 2009, has three provisions intended to ease U.S. sanctions on Cuba. These three provisions,
explained below, were identical to provisions in the S. 3260, the Senate version of the Financial
Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2009, in the 110th Congress. In addition,
the Joint Explanatory Statement to the bill requires the Department of the Treasury to prepare a
report within 90 days on the steps that it is taking to assess the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s
allocation of resources for investigating and penalizing violations of the Cuba embargo with
respect to the numerous other sanctions programs it administers. As part of the report, the
Treasury Department is directed to provide detailed information on OFAC’s Cuba-related
licensing on its enforcement of the Cuba embargo.
Section 620 of Division D amends the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of
2000 (TSRA) to require the Secretary of the Treasury to issue regulations for travel to, from, or
within Cuba under a general license for the marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods,
meaning that there would be no requirement to obtain special permission from OFAC. Such travel
currently requires a specific license from OFAC, issued on a case by case basis.
Section 621 of Division D prohibits funds from being used to administer, implement, or enforce
family travel restrictions that were imposed by the Bush Administration in June 2004. Those 2004
restrictions allowed family travel only to visit immediate family (grandparents, grandchildren,
parents, siblings, spouses, and children) once every three years for a period not to exceed 14 days.
Under the 2004 restrictions, a specific license was required from OFAC for such travel, and the
authorized amount that family travelers could spend while in Cuba was limited to $50 a day.
Section 622 of Division D prohibits funds in the Act from being used to administer, implement, or
enforce an amendment to the Cuban embargo regulations on February 25, 2005 requiring that
U.S. agricultural exporters using the “payment of cash in advance’” payment mechanism for
selling their goods to Cuba must be paid in cash for their goods before the goods leave U.S. ports.
Prior to the February 2005 change, the practice was for U.S. agricultural exporters to be paid in

163 “Cuba is Proud to Be Outside of the OAS,” Granma Internacional, May 26, 2009.
164 “Reflections of Fidel, The Trojan Horse,” (June 2, 2009), as published in Granma Internacional, June 3, 2009.
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cash for their goods (as required under the TSRA), but before the actual delivery of the goods to
Cuba.
Division H (Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
2009) has two provisions related to Cuba. Section 7005 prohibits foreign assistance to the
government of Cuba. Section 7015(f) provides that no funds appropriated for foreign assistance
shall be obligated or expended for Cuba except as provided through the regular notification
procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.
P.L. 111-117 (H.R. 3288). Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010. Introduced July 22, 2009 as
the Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
2010. House passed July 23, 2009. Senate passed with an amendment September 17, 2009. The
conference report to the measure, H.Rept. 111-366 filed December 8, 2009, became the vehicle
for the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, which consisted of six appropriations bills. The
House agreed to the conference on December 10, 2009, while the Senate agreed on December 13,
2009. The President signed the measure into law on December 16, 2009.
As signed into law, the measure has several Cuba provisions. Division C, Financial Services and
General Government Appropriations Act, 2010, has a clarifying provision in section 619 relating
to the issue of “payment of cash in advance” for U.S. exports to Cuba during FY2010 under the
Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000. The provision defines the term to
mean “payment before the transfer of title to, and control of, the exported items to the Cuban
purchaser.”
Division F, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
2010, has several Cuba provisions. Section 7007 continues the general prohibition against foreign
assistance to the government of Cuba. Section 7015(f) continues the requirement that no funds for
foreign assistance shall be obligated or expended for Cuba except as provided through the regular
notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations. With regard to Cuba broadcasting,
the conference report provides $30.474 million for Radio and TV Martí (almost $2 million less
than the Administration’s request) with not more than $5.5 million for non-salary and benefits
expenses for TV Martí. The conference report also has two reporting requirements on Cuba
broadcasting: the first from the BBG within 90 days providing a multi-year strategic plan for
broadcasting to Cuba; and the second, from the GAO within 90 days of the submission of the
BBG report, providing an assessment of the strategic plan. With regard to Cuba democracy
programs, the conference report fully funds the Administration’s request for $20 million in ESF.
S.Res. 149 (Martinez). Expresses solidarity with the writers, journalists, and librarians of Cuba
on World Press Freedom Day and calling for the immediate release of citizens of Cuba
imprisoned for exercising rights associated with freedom of the press. Introduced and approved
by Unanimous Consent on May 14, 2009.
S.Con.Res. 54 (Nelson, Bill). Recognizes the life of Orlando Zapata Tamayo, who died on
February 23, 2010, in the custody of the Cuban government, and calls for a continued focus on
the promotion of internationally recognized human rights in Cuba. Introduced March 10, 2010.
S.Amdt. 3552 (Nelson, Bill), which noted that the Department of State reports that the Cuban
government has not granted prison visits to the International Committee of the Red Cross,
Amnesty International, or Human Rights Watch since 1988, was agreed to by Unanimous
Consent on March 18, 2010. S.Con.Res. 54 subsequently agreed to by Unanimous Consent on
March 18, 2010.
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H.R. 2410 (Berman). Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2010 and FY2011. Introduced
May 14, 2009. Reported by House Committee on Foreign Affairs June 4, 2009 (H.Rept. 111-136).
House passed (235-187) June 10, 2009. Authorizes funding for radio and television broadcasting
to Cuba within the International Broadcasting Operations account. During June 10, 2009 floor
consideration, the House defeated H.Amdt. 182 (Ros-Lehtinen) by a vote of 205-224 that would
have required the Secretary of State to withhold funds from the U.S. contribution to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) an amount equal to nuclear technical cooperation
provided by the IAEA in 2007 to Iran, Syria, Sudan, and Cuba.
H.R. 2647 (Skelton)/S. 1390 (Levin). National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010. House
passed June 25, 2009. Senate passed July 23, 2009, with an amendment substituting the language
of S. 1390. During July 22, 2009 consideration of S. 1390, the Senate approved S.Amdt. 1535
(Martinez), which required a report from the Director of National Intelligence on potential Cuban
activities related to drug trafficking, clandestine activities in the United States, research and
development for biological weapons production, and Cuba’s relations with Iran, North Korea,
Venezuela and several other countries. That provision became Section 1222 of the Senate version
of H.R. 2647. The House version of the bill did not include a similar provision, and the provision
was not included in the conference report (H.Rept. 111-288) filed on October 7, 2009.
H.R. 3081 (Lowey)/S. 1434 (Leahy). FY2010 State Department, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs Appropriations. H.R. 3081 Introduced and reported (H.Rept. 111-187) June 26,
2009. House approved July 9, 2009 by a vote of 318-106. S. 1434 introduced and reported
(S.Rept. 111-44) July 9, 2009. In both bills, section 7007 would continue the prohibition against
direct funding for the government of Cuba, and section 7015(f) would continue the requirement
that no assistance shall be obligated or expended for assistance for Cuba except as provided
through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations. The reports to
both bills would also fully fund the Administration’s request of $20 million in ESF for Cuba
democracy programs.
With regard to Cuba broadcasting, H.R. 3081 would fully fund the Administration’s request for
$32.474 million, while S. 1434 would prohibit funding for TV Martí broadcasts to Cuba and
provide just $17.474 million for Cuba broadcasting, $15 million less than the request. The Senate
bill, in section 7092(c), would require a report from the Secretary of State within 90 days on
various aspects of Cuba broadcasting.
With regard to anti-drug cooperation with Cuba, S. 1434 would, in section 7092, provide $1
million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance for
preliminary work by the State Department or other entity designated by the Secretary of State to
establish cooperation with appropriate agencies of the government of Cuba on counternarcotics
matters, including matters relating to cooperation, coordination, and mutual assistance in the
interdiction of illicit drugs being transported through Cuban airspace or over Cuba waters. The
amount shall not be available if the Secretary of State certifies that Cuba does not have in place
appropriate procedures to protect against the loss of innocent life in the air and on the ground in
connection with the interdiction of illegal drugs, and there is credible evidence of involvement of
the government of Cuba in drug trafficking during the preceding 10 years. H.R. 3081 does not
have a similar provision.
For final action, see Division F of P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010,
described above, which included provisions on foreign aid, Cuba broadcasting, and Cuba
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democracy funding. The omnibus measure did not include any language on drug cooperation with
Cuba.
H.R. 3170 (Serrano)/S. 1432 (Durbin). FY2010 Financial Services and General Government
Appropriations. H.R. 3170 introduced and reported (H.Rept. 111-202) July 10, 2009. House
approved (219-208) July 16, 2009. S. 1432 introduced and reported (S.Rept. 111-43) July 9,
2009. Both bills have a provision (section 618 in the House bill and section 617 in the Senate bill)
that provides that the term “payment of cash in advance” as used in the Trade Sanctions Reform
and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 shall be interpreted as payment before the transfer of title
to, and control of, the exported items to the Cuban purchaser.
For final action, see Division C of P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010,
described above, which included the “payment of cash in advance” provision in section 619.
Other Introduced Measures
H.Con.Res. 132 (Tiahrt). Expresses the sense of Congress that with respect to the totalitarian
government of Cuba, the United States should pursue a policy that insists upon freedom,
democracy, and human rights, including the release of all political prisoners, the legalization of
political parties, free speech and a free press, and supervised elections, before increasing U.S.
trade and tourism to Cuba. Introduced May 20, 2009; referred to the Committee on Foreign
Affairs.
H.Con.Res. 251 (McGovern) and H.Con.Res. 252 (Ros-Lehtinen). Recognizes the life of
Orlando Zapata Tamayo, who died on February 23, 2010, in the custody of the Cuban
government, and calls for a continued focus on the promotion of internationally recognized
human rights in Cuba. H.Con.Res. 251 and 252 were both introduced March 11, 2010, and
referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 187 (Serrano). Waives certain prohibitions with respect to nationals of Cuba coming to the
United States to play organized professional baseball. Introduced January 6, 2009; referred to the
Committees on Foreign Affairs and Judiciary.
H.R. 188 (Serrano). Lifts the trade embargo on Cuba by repealing and amending various laws.
Introduced January 6, 2009; referred to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Ways and Means,
Energy and Commerce, Judiciary, Financial Services, Oversight and Government Reform, and
Agriculture.
H.R. 332 (Lee). Provides that no funds made available to the Department of the Treasury may be
used to implement, administer, or enforce regulations to require specific licenses for travel-related
transactions directly related to educational activities in Cuba. Introduced January 8, 2009;
referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 375 (Ros-Lehtinen). Section 209 of the bill sets forth restrictions on nuclear cooperation
with countries assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba or transferring advanced
conventional weapons to Venezuela or Cuba. Introduced January 9, 2009; referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 874 (Delahunt)/ S. 428 (Dorgan). Identical bills would prohibit the President from
regulating or prohibiting, directly or indirectly, travel to or from Cuba by U.S. citizens or legal
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residents, or any of the transactions incident to such travel. H.R. 874 was introduced February 4,
2009, and referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. S. 428 was introduced February
12, 2009, and referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 1103 (Wexler)/ S. 1234 (Lieberman). Modifies the prohibition on recognition by U.S.
courts of certain rights relating to certain marks, trade names, or commercial names. Introduced
February 13, 2009; referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
H.R. 1528 (Rangel). Allows travel between the United States and Cuba. Introduced March 16,
2009; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
H.R. 1530 (Rangel). Lifts the trade embargo on Cuba by repealing and amending various laws.
Introduced March 16, 2009; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the
Committees on Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, the Judiciary, Financial Services,
Oversight and Government Reform, and Agriculture.
H.R. 1531 (Rangel)/S. 1089 (Baucus). Promoting American Agricultural and Medical Exports to
Cuba Act of 2009. Similar, although not identical, bills facilitate the export of U.S. agricultural
products to Cuba as authorized by the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of
2000, remove impediments to the export to Cuba of medical devices and medicines, allow travel
to Cuba by U.S. legal residents, establish an agricultural export promotion program with respect
to Cuba, and repeal the Section 211 trademark sanction. H.R. 1531 introduced March 16, 2009;
referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Ways and Means, Judiciary, Agriculture, and
Financial Services. S. 1089 introduced May 20, 1989; referred to the Senate Committee on
Finance.
H.R. 1737 (Moran, Jerry). Agricultural Export Facilitation Act of 2009. Amends the Trade
Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA) to provide that the term
“payment of cash in advance” means that the payment by the purchaser of an agricultural
commodity or product and the receipt of such payment by the seller occurs prior to 1) the transfer
of such commodity or product to the purchaser, and 2) the release of control of such commodity
or product to the purchaser. Provides that the President may not restrict direct transfer from a
Cuban financial institution to a U.S. financial institution in payment for a product authorized for
sale under TSRA. Also amends TSRA to require the Secretary of the Treasury to issue regulations
under which, at a minimum, travel-related transactions may be authorized by specific license or
general license for travel to, from, or within Cuba in connection with commercial export sales,
transportation, and sales and marketing activities of agricultural commodities, medicine, and
medical devices pursuant to TSRA. Introduced March 26, 2009; referred to the Committees on
Foreign Affairs, Judiciary, Financial Services, and Agriculture.
H.R. 1918 (Flake). Permits U.S. companies to participate in the exploration for and the
extraction of hyrdrocarbon resources from any portion of a foreign maritime exclusive economic
zone that is contiguous to the exclusive economic zone of the United States. Also amends the
Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 to provide for general license
authority for travel to Cuba by persons engaging in hydrocarbon exploration and extraction
activities. Introduced April 2, 2009; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 2005 (King). Amends the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 to require
that, in order to determine that a democratically elected government exists in Cuba, the
government extradite to the United State convicted felon William Morales and all other
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individuals who are living in Cuba in order to escape prosecution or confinement for criminal
offense committed in the United States. Introduced April 21, 2009; referred to the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 2272 (Rush). United States-Cuba Trade Normalization Act of 2009. Lifts the trade embargo
on Cuba by amending and repealing various laws. Extends nondiscriminatory trade treatment to
Cuba. Removes Cuba from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List. Introduced May 6, 2009;
referred to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce,
Judiciary, Financial Services, Oversight and Government Reform, and Agriculture.
H.R. 2475 (Ros-Lehtinen). Foreign Relations Authorization and Reform Act, FY2010 and
FY2011. Introduced May 19, 2009; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Section 501 of
the bill would fully fund the Administration’s $32.5 million request for Cuba broadcasting for
FY2010, and would authorize funds as needed for FY2011. Section 728 of the bill consists of
language contained in H.R. 375 that sets forth restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries
assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba or transferring advanced conventional
weapons to Venezuela or Cuba.
H.R. 2687 (Mack). Withholds U.S. assessed and voluntary contributions to the Organization of
American States if Cuba is allowed full membership or participation in the OAS unless the
President certifies that Cuba has satisfied certain conditions. Introduced June 3, 2009; referred to
the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 4645 (Peterson)/S. 3112 (Klobuchar). Travel Restriction Reform and Export Enhancement
Act. Removes obstacles to legal sales of U.S. agricultural commodities to Cuba and ends travel
restrictions on all Americans to Cuba. H.R. 4645 introduced February 23, 2010; referred to
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Agriculture and Financial
Services. S. 3112 introduced March 15, 2010; referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
S. 774 (Dorgan), National Energy Security At of 2009. Section 371 authorizes United States
persons to engage in any transaction necessary for the exploration for and extraction of
hydrocarbon resources from any portion of any foreign exclusive economic zone that is
contiguous to the exclusive economic zone of the United States, and to export without license
authority all equipment necessary for the exploration for or extraction of these hydrocarbon
resources. Section 372 would amend the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of
2000 to provide for general license authority for travel by persons engaging in hydrocarbon
exploration and extraction activities. Introduced April 1, 2009; referred to the Committee on
Finance.
S. 1517 (Murkowski). Domestic Energy Security Act of 2009. Section 6 authorizes United States
persons to engage in transactions for the exploration for and extraction of hydrocarbon resources
from any portion of any foreign exclusive economic zone that is contiguous to the exclusive
economic zone of the United States, and to export without license all equipment necessary for
these activities. Section 7 would amend the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act
of 2000 to provide for general license authority for travel by persons engaging in hydrocarbon
exploration and extraction activities. Introduced July 24, 2009; referred to the Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources.
S. 1808 (Feingold). Control Spending Now Act. Section 6012 would eliminate Radio and TV
Martí by repealing the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act (P.L. 98-111) and the Television
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Broadcasting to Cuba Act (Title II, Part D of P.L. 101-246). Introduced October 20, 2009;
referred to Committee on Finance.
Legislation in the 110th Congress
Approved Measures
P.L. 110-161 (H.R. 2764). FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act. H.R. 2764 was originally
introduced and reported by the House Committee on Appropriations (H.Rept. 110-197) on June
18, 2007 as the FY2008 State, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. The
House passed (241-178) the measure on June 22, 2007. The Senate Appropriations Committee
reported the bill on July 10, 2007 (S.Rept. 110-128), and the Senate passed (81-12) it on
September 6, 2007. On December 17, 2007, H.R. 2764 subsequently became the vehicle for the
FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, which included 11 FY2008 appropriations measures.
President Bush signed the measure into law on December 26, 2007.
As signed into law, Division J of the Consolidated Appropriations Act covers State Department,
Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies appropriations. The law has the following Cuba
provisions:
• Similar to previous years, Section 607 of Division J prohibits direct funding for
Cuba. This provision had been included in both the House and Senate versions of
the bill.
• Section 620 of Division J adds Cuba to the list of countries requiring a special
notification to the Appropriations Committees for funds obligated or expended
under the act. This provision had been included in the Senate version of the bill.
• Section 691(b) of Division J provides that Cubans who supported an anti-Castro
guerrilla group in the 1960s known as the Alzados are eligible for U.S. refugee
status. The Senate version of the bill had included this provision.
• As set forth in the joint explanatory statement, the measure provides $45.7
million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs as requested by the Administration.
Both the House- and Senate-passed versions of H.R. 2764 fully funded the
Administration’s request for $45.7 million in ESF for Cuba democracy programs.
The House committee-reported bill would have provided $9 million in ESF for
such programs, but during June 21, 2007, floor consideration, the House
approved H.Amdt. 351 (Diaz-Balart) by a vote of 254-170 that increased ESF by
$36.7 million in order to fully fund the Administration’s request. The Senate
Appropriations Committee report to the bill would have provided $15 million in
ESF for Cuba democracy programs, but during September 6, 2007, floor
consideration, the Senate approved S.Amdt. 2694 (Martinez) by voice vote that
increased funding for Cuba democracy programs by $30.7 million to fully fund
the Administration’s request.
• As set forth in the joint explanatory statement, the measure provides $33.681
million for Radio and TV Marti broadcasting to Cuba, $5.019 million below the
Administration’s request of $38.7 million and identical to the amount provided
for FY2007. Both the House and Senate committee reports to the bill had
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recommended $33.681 million for Cuba broadcasting. S.Amdt. 2695 (Martinez),
which was withdrawn from consideration on September 6, 2007, would have
increased funding by $5.019 million to fully fund the Administration’s request.
• The measure does not include contrasting provisions related to counternarcotics
assistance for Cuba that were included in the House and Senate versions of the
bill. Section 673 of the House bill would have specifically prohibited
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance to the
Cuban government. Section 696 of the Senate bill would have provided $1
million in INCLE assistance for preliminary work by the Department of State, or
such other entity as the Secretary of State may designate, to establish cooperation
with the Cuban government on counternarcotics matters.
The final enacted measure does not include provisions easing Cuba sanctions that had been
included in the House and Senate-committee versions of the FY2008 Financial Services and
General Government Appropriations Act or the Senate committee-reported version of the FY2008
Agriculture Appropriations bill.
P.L. 110-96 (S. 1612). International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act. Introduced
and reported by the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on June 13, 2007
(S.Rept. 110-82). Senate approved, amended, by unanimous consent on June 26, 2007. House
approved by voice vote October 2, 2007. As approved, the bill amends the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to increase the potential civil penalty imposed on any
person who commits an unlawful act under the act to not exceed the greater of $250,000 (from
$50,000) or an amount that is twice the amount of the transaction. The bill also increases a
criminal penalty to not more than $1 million and/or 20 years imprisonment.
S.Res. 573 (Martinez). Celebrates Cuba Solidarity Day, recognizes the injustices faced by the
Cuban people, and stands in solidarity with the Cuban people as they continue to work towards
democratic changes in their homeland. Introduced and passed by the Senate on May 21, 2008, by
unanimous consent.
Additional Considered Measures with Cuba Provisions
The following measures that received consideration contained various provisions on Cuba that
would have eased U.S. sanctions, but none of these provisions made it into final enacted
measures. For a complete listing of additional legislative initiatives on Cuba in the 110th
Congress, see CRS Report RL33819, Cuba: Issues for the 110th Congress.
H.R. 2419 (Peterson). Farm, Nutrition, and Bioenergy Act of 2007. Introduced May 22, 2007;
House passed July 27, 2007. Senate passed December 14, 2007. During House floor
consideration on July 27, 2007, the House rejected (182-245) H.Amdt. 707 Rangel, that would
have clarified the meaning of “payment of cash in advance” for the sale of agricultural
commodities to Cuba; authorized direct transfer between U.S. and Cuban financial institutions for
a product authorized for sale under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of
2000; and would have authorized the issuance of U.S. visas for Cubans to conduct activities,
including phytosanitary inspections, related to the export of U.S. agricultural goods to Cuba.
In the Senate, S.Amdt. 3660 (Baucus), which would have eased restrictions on U.S. agricultural
sales to Cuba, was proposed on December 11, 2007, but subsequently withdrawn the same day.
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Several amendments regarding Cuba were submitted, but never proposed: S.Amdt. 3668
(Baucus), would have eased restrictions on U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba; S.Amdt. 3796
(Nelson, Bill), would have required a certification of certain human rights conditions in Cuba
before restrictions on U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba would be eased; S.Amdt. 3792 (Martinez),
would have expressed the sense of the Senate regarding the human rights situation in Cuba; and
S.Amdt. 3793 (Martinez), would have prevented the easing of restrictions on U.S. agricultural
exports to Cuba as long as the country is identified by the Secretary of State as a “state sponsor of
terror.”
H.R. 2829 (Serrano). FY2008 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act.
Introduced and reported by House Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 110-207) June 22, 2007.
Reported by Senate Appropriations Committee July 13, 2007 (S.Rept. 110-129). House passed
(240-179) June 28, 2007. As approved by the House, Section 903 would have prevented Treasury
Department funds from being used to implement a February 2005 regulation that requires the
payment of cash in advance prior to the shipment of U.S. agricultural goods to Cuba. The House
adopted the provision during June 28, 2007 floor consideration when it approved H.Amdt. 467
(Moran, Kansas) by voice vote. The Senate Appropriations Committee version had a similar
provision in Section 619, as well as another provision in Section 620 that would have allowed for
travel to Cuba under a general license for the marketing and sale of agricultural and medical
goods. The Cuba provisions of both the House and Senate versions of the bill were not included
in the final enacted version of the measure, which was included as Division D of the FY2008
Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161, H.R. 2764).
H.R. 3161 (DeLauro)/ S. 1859 (Kohl). FY2008 Agricultural, Rural Development, Food and
Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. H.R. 3161 introduced and
reported by House Appropriations Committee July 24, 2007; House passed August 2, 2007. S.
1859 introduced and reported by Senate Appropriations Committee July 24, 2007 (S.Rept. 110-
134). Section 741 of the Senate bill would authorize travel to Cuba under a general license for the
marketing and sale of agricultural and medical goods to Cuba. The Cuba provision in the Senate
version was not included in the final enacted version of the measure, which was included as
Division A of the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161, H.R. 2764).
H.R. 7323 (Serrano). FY2009 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations bill.
Introduced and reported by the House Appropriations Committee on December 10, 2008 (H.Rept.
110-920). The committee had approved a draft version of the bill on June 25, 2008. The bill has
several provisions that would have eased Cuba sanctions. Section 621 would have prohibited
funds in the Act from being used to administer, implement, or enforce new language in the Cuban
embargo regulations added on February 25, 2005 (31CFR Part 515.533) that requires that U.S.
agricultural exports to Cuba must be paid for before they leave U.S. ports. Section 622 would
have allowed for family travel once a year (instead of the current restriction of once every three
years). Section 623 would have expanded family travel to visit an aunt, uncle, niece, nephew, or
first cousin (instead of the current restriction limiting such travel to visit a spouse, child,
grandchild, parent, grandparent, or sibling.) The report to the bill would require the Treasury
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to provide detailed information on
OFAC’s Cuba-related licensing and enforcement actions. None of these provisions were included
in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2009 (P.L. 110-329) that provided funding until
March 6, 2009.
S. 3001(Levin). Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009. S.Amdt. 5581
(Dodd), submitted on September 15, 2008, would, for a 180-day period: allow unrestricted family
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travel; ease restrictions on remittances by removing the limit and allowing any American to send
remittances to Cuba; expand the list of allowable items that may be included in gift parcels; and
allow for unrestricted U.S. cash sales of food, medicines, and relief supplies to Cuba. The
amendment was not considered and therefore not included in the final bill.
S. 3260 (Durbin). Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2009.
Introduced and reported by Senate Appropriations Committee (S.Rept. 110-417) on July 14,
2008. Includes provisions easing restrictions on payment terms for the sale of agricultural goods
to Cuba (section 618), travel relating to the commercial sale of agricultural and medical goods
(section 619), and family travel (section 620). None of these provisions were included in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2009 (P.L. 110-329) that provided funding until March 6,
2009.
S. 3288 (Leahy). Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 2009. Introduced and reported by Senate Appropriations Committee (S.Rept. 110-425) July
18, 2008. Includes several Cuba provisions: section 706 continues a prohibition on assistance to
Cuba, unless the President determines that it is in the national interest of the United States;
section 719 continues the provision from FY2008 that requires that any assistance for Cuba go
through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations; section 779
provides for $1 million for preliminary work by the Department of State, or other entity
designated by the Secretary of State, to establish cooperation with appropriate Cuban agencies on
counternarcotics matters, although the money would not be available if the Secretary certifies that
Cuba (1) does not have in place procedures to protect against the loss of innocent life in the air
and on the ground in connection with the interdiction of illegal drugs; and (2) there is credible
evidence of involvement of the government of Cuba in drug trafficking during the preceding 10
years. The Senate Appropriations Committee report to the bill recommended full funding for the
Administration’s requests of $34.392 million for Cuba broadcasting and $20 million in ESF for
Cuba democracy programs, and called for the State Department and USAID to conduct regular
evaluations to ensure the cost effectiveness of the programs.
S. 3289 (Kohl). Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2008. Introduced and reported by Senate Appropriations
Committee (S.Rept. 110-426) July 21, 2008. Includes a provision (section 737) that would ease
restrictions on travel to Cuba for the sale of agricultural and medical goods. This provision was
not included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2009 (P.L. 110-329) that provided
funding until March 6, 2009.
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Appendix A. Developments in 2009-2010
For more recent entries, see “Recent Developments” above.
On February 23, 2010, Cuban political prisoner Orlando Zapata Tamayo died after being on a
hunger strike for more than 83 days. Zapata originally was arrested in March 2003 and sentenced
in 2004 to three years in prison, but he was subsequently tried on further charges and was serving
a total sentence of 36 years. U.S. officials maintained that Zapata’s death highlighted the injustice
of Cuba’s holding of more than 200 political prisoners and called for their immediate release.
On February 19, 2010, U.S. and Cuban officials met in Havana to discuss implementation of the
1994 and 1995 migration accords. This was the second round of migration talks since they were
resumed in mid-2009. During the talks, U.S. officials had urged Cuban officials to provide
political prisoner Orlando Zapata Tamayo all necessary medical care, and also raised the case of
U.S. citizen Alan Gross detained in Cuba since early December 2009, calling for his release.
On December 16, 2009, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2010 (P.L. 111-117), with several Cuba provisions. These included defining the term “payment of
cash in advance” for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba; providing $30.374 million for Cuba
broadcasting (about $2 million less than the request); and fully funding the Administration’s
request for $20 million in Cuba democracy funding.
On December 4, 2009, Cuban authorities arrested an American contractor working for
Development Alternatives Inc., a Bethesda-based company that had received a contract from the
U.S. Agency for International Development to help support Cuban civil society organizations.
After repeated requests, U.S. consular officials were allowed to visit the American on December
28. (For more, see “December 2009 Detainment of American Subcontractor” above.)
On November 19, 2009, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing on U.S.
restrictions on travel to Cuba entitled “Is it Time to Lift the Ban on Travel to Cuba?” that featured
former U.S. government officials and other private witnesses.
On November 18, 2009, Human Rights Watch issued a report criticizing Cuba’s human rights
record under the government of Raúl Castro. According to the report, Raúl’s government has kept
Cuba’s repressive machinery in place, with scores of political prisoners languishing in jail and the
use of “draconian laws and sham trials to incarcerate scores more who have dared to exercise
their fundamental freedoms.” (The full report is available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/
11/18/new-castro-same-cuba)
On November 6, 2009, Cuban Internet bloggers Yoaní Sánchez, Orlando Luis Pardo, and Claudia
Cadelo were intercepted by state security agents while walking to participate in a march against
violence. Sánchez and Pardo were beaten in the assault. The Department of State issued a
statement deploring the attack, and expressed its deep concern to the Cuban government for the
incident.
On October 20, 2009, the Cuban government released Nelson Alberto Aguiar Ramírez from
prison following a visit to Cuba by Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos. Aguiar
Ramírez was a member of the “group of 75” imprisoned in Cuba’s 2003 crackdown; with his
release, 53 of the original 75 remain imprisoned.
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On September 17, 2009, the United States and Cuba held talks in Havana on resuming direct mail
service between the two countries. The Department of State expressed satisfaction with the talks,
which included discussion on issues related to the transportation, quality, and security of mail
service. According to the State Department, both sides agreed that they would meet again after
consultations with their governments.
On September 17, 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report on the
U.S. embargo on Cuba that outlined recent Administration changes to the embargo and discussed
presidential and congressional authorities to ease the embargo. (U.S. GAO, “U.S. Embargo on
Cuba: Recent Regulatory Changes and Potential Presidential or Congressional Action,” GAO-09-
951R, September 17, 2009, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09951r.pdf)
On September 3, 2009, both the Treasury and Commerce Department amended the Cuba embargo
regulations to implement President Obama’s April 13, 2009 initiative to lift restrictions on family
travel and remittances and to increase telecommunications links with Cuba. (See the Treasury
Department’s fact sheet on the new regulations issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control,
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg273.htm, and the Commerce Department’s
press release on new regulations issued by the Bureau of Industry and Security, available at
http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2009/bis_press09032009.htm)
On July 31, 2009, Cuba’s Communist Party (PCC) indefinitely postponed plans to hold its sixth
congress (the last was held in 1997), which was supposed to take place at the end of 2009. Some
observers maintain that Cuba’s poor economic situation prompted the postponement of the
congress, which was supposed to deal with potential economic changes.
On July 27, 2009, the State Department acknowledged in its daily press briefing that in June it
had turned off the electronic billboard at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana that had been had
been set up in 2006 and had featured news and pro-democracy messages that irked the Cuban
government. The Cuban government had taken down anti-U.S. billboards around the U.S.
mission earlier this year.
On July 26, 2009, President Raúl Castro delivered a Revolutionary Day speech in which he
exhorted Cubans to work idle land that is being distributed in order to increase food production
and reduce Cuban food imports.
On July 22, 2009, the Senate approved S.Amdt. 1535 (Martinez) to the Senate version of the
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010, S. 1390 (Levin). The amendment added a
provision to the bill requiring a report from the Director of National Intelligence on potential
Cuban activities related to drug trafficking, clandestine activities in the United States, research
and development for biological weapons production, and Cuba’s relations with Iran, North Korea,
Venezuela and several other countries. The provision became Section 1222 of the Senate version
of H.R. 2647 (Skelton), which the Senate approved on July 23, substituting the language of S.
1390 as amended. Note: the House bill did not include a similar provision, and the provision was
not included in the conference report on the measure.
On July 16, 2009, the House approved H.R. 3170, the FY2010 Financial Services and General
Government Appropriations Act, with a provision in section 618 that provides that the term
“payment of cash in advance” as used in the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement
Act of 2000 “shall be interpreted as payment before the transfer of title to, and control of, the
exported items to the Cuban purchaser.” The Senate version of the bill, S. 1432, reported out of
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committee on July 10, 2009 (S.Rept. 111-43), has an identical provision. Note: the provision
ultimately was included in Division C (section 619) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010
(P.L. 111-117) enacted in December 2009.
On July 16, 2009, about 150 U.S. and Cuban military and civilian personnel took part in an
emergency response drill on both sides of the perimeter of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. The annual exercises dates back to 1999.
On July 14, 2009, the first U.S.-Cuban migration talks since 2003 were held in New York.
On July 9, 2009, the House approved H.R. 3081, the FY2010 State Department, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, with several Cuba provisions. On the same
day, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported out its version of the appropriations measure,
S. 1434 (S.Rept. 111-44). Both bills would continue a prohibition against direct funding for the
government of Cuba, require that any funding for Cuba go through the regular notification
procedures of the Committees on Appropriations, and fully fund the Administration’s $20 million
request for Cuba democracy projects. The House bill would fully fund the Administration’s
$32.474 million for Cuba broadcasting while the Senate bill would provide $17.474 million,
prohibit funding for TV Martí broadcasts to Cuba, and require a report from the Secretary of State
on various aspects of Cuba broadcasting. The Senate bill would also provide $1 million for
preliminary work on counternarcotics cooperation with Cuba while the House bill does not have a
comparable provision. Note: final action was completed in Division F of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117) enacted in December 2009. That law provided $30.474
million for Cuba broadcasting, $20 million for Cuban democracy projects, continued the general
prohibition against direct funding for the government of Cuba, and continued the requirement that
any assistance for Cuba go through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on
Appropriations.
On June 17, 2009, the House Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and
Oversight of the Committee on Foreign Affairs held an oversight hearing on TV Martí.
On June 10, 2009, the House approved H.R. 2410, the FY2010 and FY2011 Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, which would continue to authorize funding for radio and television
broadcasting to Cuba within the International Broadcasting Operations account. During floor
consideration, the House defeated H.Amdt. 182 that would have required the Secretary of State to
withhold funds from the U.S. contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) an
amount equal to nuclear technical cooperation provided by the IAEA in 2007 to Iran, Syria,
Sudan, and Cuba.
On June 4, 2009, the FBI arrested a retired State Department employee and his wife, Walter
Kendall Myers and Gwendolyn Steingraber Myers, for allegedly spying for Cuba for more than
two decades.
On June 3, 2009, the Organization of America States (OAS) approved a consensus resolution that
overturned the 1962 resolution excluding Cuba from participating in the OAS, and stated that
Cuba’s participation in the OAS “will be the result of a process of dialogue initiated at the request
of the Government of Cuba, and in accordance with the practices, purposes, and principles of the
OAS.” Cuba subsequently stated that it does not want to rejoin the OAS.
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In late May 2009, Cuba and the United States agreed to restart the semi-annual migration talks
that had been suspended by the United States in 2004 as well as talks on direct postal service
between the two countries.
On May 14, 2009, the Senate approved S.Res. 149 (Martinez) calling for the immediate release of
Cuban citizens imprisoned for exercising rights associated with freedom of the press.
On April 29, 2009, the House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform held a hearing on the “National Security
Implications of U.S. Policy Toward Cuba.”
On April 27, 2009, the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection of
the Energy and Commerce Committee held a hearing on “Examining the Status of U.S. Trade
with Cuba and Its Impact on Economic Growth.”
On April 13, 2009, the Obama Administration announced several significant measures to ease
U.S. sanctions on Cuba. Fulfilling a campaign pledge, President Barack Obama directed that all
restrictions on family travel and on remittances to family members in Cuba be lifted. The
Administration also announced measures to increase telecommunications links with Cuba and to
expand the scope of eligible humanitarian donations through gift parcels. (For additional details,
see the White House fact sheet available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Fact-
Sheet-Reaching-out-to-the-Cuban-people/)
On March 11, 2009, President Obama signed into law the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009
(H.R. 1105, P.L. 111-8), which has three provisions intended to ease U.S. sanctions on Cuba for
family travel (Section 621 of Division D), travel related to the marketing and sale of agricultural
and medical exports (Section 620 of Division D), and payment terms for U.S. agricultural exports
to Cuba (Section 622 of Division D).
On March 2, 2009, President Raúl Castro orchestrated a government shake-up, ousting a dozen
high-ranking officials, including Foreign Minister Felipe Pérez Roque and Cabinet Secretary
Carlos Lage.
On February 27, 2009, the State Department issued its 2009 International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report (INCSR), which maintained that U.S.-Cuban counter-narcotics cooperation
continued in 2008. (See the full INCSR report, available at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/
2009/index.htm)
On February 25, 2009, the State Department issued its 2008 human rights report on Cuba, which
maintained that the Cuban government “continued to deny its citizens their basic human rights
and committed numerous, serious abuses.” (See the report, available at http://www.state.gov/g/
drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/wha/119155.htm)
On February 2, 2009, the independent Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National
Reconciliation (CCDHRN) documented at least 205 political prisoners in Cuba, down from 234
in January 2008. The Commission maintains that the government has resorted to short-term
arbitrary detentions to target suspected dissidents, with more than 1,500 such detentions in 2008.
On January 22, 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report citing
concerns with Radio and TV Martí’s adherence to relevant laws and standards, and maintaining
that its audience is small despite its broadcasts to Cuba through multiple methods. (U.S. GAO,
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“Broadcasting to Cuba, Actions Are Needed to Improve Strategy and Operations, GAO-09-127.
January 22, 2009, available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-127)
On January 22, 2009, Fidel Castro stated that he had reduced the number of his published essays
(“Reflections of the Commander”) so as not to interfere with the authority of party or government
officials, and insisted that they should not feel bound by his occasional essays or even his state of
health or death. Castro also maintained that he does not expect to be in such a position to meditate
and write about events when Obama’s first term has ended. (“Text of Fidel Castro’s Online
Essay,” Associated Press Newswires, January 22, 2009)
On January 15, 2009, during her Senate Foreign Relations Committee confirmation hearing for
Secretary of State, Senator Hillary Clinton reiterated President-elect Obama’s pledge to lift
restrictions on family travel and remittances as well as his position that it is not time to lift the
embargo since it provides an important source of leverage for further change in Cuba. Clinton
also responded to written questions for the record that the new Administration expected to
undertake a review of U.S. policy toward Cuba.
On January 15, 2009, Cuba released Varela Project activist Reynaldo Labrada Peña from prison
following the completion of his six-year sentence. Peña was one of the “group of 75” political
prisoners who have been incarcerated since 2003. Overall, there are more than 200 political
prisoners in Cuba.
On January 1, 2009, Cuba celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Cuban Revolution.
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Appendix B. For Additional Reading
Active CRS Reports
CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report R40566, Cuban Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends, by Ruth Ellen
Wasem.
CRS Report R40139, Closing the Guantanamo Detention Center: Legal Issues, by Michael John
Garcia et al.
CRS Report R40754, Guantanamo Detention Center: Legislative Activity in the 111th Congress,
by Anna C. Henning
CRS Report R40801, Financial Services and General Government (FSGG): FY2010
Appropriations, coordinated by Garrett Hatch
CRS Report RL34523, Financial Services and General Government (FSGG): FY2009
Appropriations, coordinated by Garrett Hatch.
CRS Report RL32826, The Medical Device Approval Process and Related Legislative Issues, by
Erin D. Williams.
CRS Report RL32014, WTO Dispute Settlement: Status of U.S. Compliance in Pending Cases, by
Jeanne J. Grimmett.
Archived CRS Reports
CRS Report RS20450, The Case of Elian Gonzalez: Legal Basics, by Larry M. Eig.
CRS Report RL33622, Cuba’s Future Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy Approaches, by Mark
P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RS22742, Cuba’s Political Succession: From Fidel to Raúl Castro, by Mark P.
Sullivan.
CRS Report RL32251, Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, by Mark P. Sullivan
CRS Report RL33819, Cuba: Issues for the 110th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RL32730, Cuba: Issues for the 109th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RL31740, Cuba: Issues for the 108th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RL30806, Cuba: Issues for the 107th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan and Maureen
Taft-Morales.
CRS Report RL30628, Cuba: Issues and Legislation In the 106th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan
and Maureen Taft-Morales.
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CRS Report RL30386, Cuba-U.S. Relations: Chronology of Key Events 1959-1999, by Mark P.
Sullivan.
CRS Report RL33499, Exempting Food and Agriculture Products from U.S. Economic Sanctions:
Status and Implementation, by Remy Jurenas.
CRS Report RS22094, Lawsuits Against State Supporters of Terrorism: An Overview, by Jennifer
K. Elsea.
CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by Jennifer K.
Elsea.
CRS Report 94-636, Radio and Television Broadcasting to Cuba: Background and Issues
Through 1994, by Susan B. Epstein and Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RS21764, Restricting Trademark Rights of Cubans: WTO Decision and
Congressional Response, by Margaret Mikyung Lee.

Author Contact Information

Mark P. Sullivan

Specialist in Latin American Affairs
msullivan@crs.loc.gov, 7-7689


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