Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements:
Status, Content, and Implications
Raymond J. Ahearn
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
March 22, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41143
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

Summary
Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) comprise a variety of arrangements that favor member
parties over non-members by extending tariff and other non-tariff preferences. PTAs, particularly
free trade agreements (FTAs), have proliferated in recent years. In the post-war period, the
European Union (EU), which is a PTA itself, has developed the largest network of PTAs in the
world. The main findings of this report are as follows:
• Historically, Europe’s PTAs have differed among its partners in terms of provisions and
commitments and they have been characterized by relatively modest ambition in terms of
market-opening. In comparison, the U.S. approach has been more standardized in terms
of its provisions and more focused on achieving reciprocal market access. These
differences in approaches, however, have significantly narrowed since the EU adopted its
more commercially oriented Global Europe strategy in 2006.
• EU PTAs cover nearly twice as much trade (exports) in percentage terms (70% versus
40%) and seven times as much in value terms ($3.4 trillion versus $0.52 trillion) than
U.S. PTAs. These numbers can be used to support the argument that U.S. firms may face
more discrimination and possibly reduced sales than EU firms. At the same time, the data
may overstate the degree of discrimination because the amount of trade covered by PTAs
is not the same as the amount of trade conducted on a preferential (duty-free) basis.
• Concerns about trade discrimination have been a factor in U.S. and EU efforts to
negotiate and implement separate but similar PTAs with five trading partners (Israel,
Mexico, Morocco, Chile, and Jordan). Based on market share data analyzed, neither side
appears to have gained a competitive advantage from having negotiated a PTA. This,
however, does not mean that individual firms and workers have not benefitted or that
exports have not risen at faster rates after the PTA became effective.
• In the past, Europe’s PTA program has not been a major factor affecting U.S. FTA policy,
which currently is in flux. However, Europe’s recently negotiated FTA with South Korea
raises the concern that U.S. exports will be disadvantaged due to the duty-free price
advantage European-based producers will gain in the Korean market. The United States
has also negotiated an FTA with Korea, but congressional approval currently is uncertain.
• Ongoing negotiations between the EU and Canada over an ambitious and comprehensive
FTA could also affect the U.S. FTA debate. If a robust agreement is reached, the EU and
the United States would then both have FTAs with Canada and Mexico, making the
absence of a FTA between the United States and EU all the more glaring after years of
discussion.
• It is not clear where Europe’s PTA policy is headed. There are only a few remaining
major developed countries that fall outside the EU’s network of PTAs, including the
United States, China, Japan, and Australia. While PTA negotiations with these countries
could yield large economic benefits and provide a big impact (for good or ill) on the
world trading system, some of these countries would likely demand liberalization of
European agriculture and services, areas where there is widespread opposition in Europe.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
Congressional Research Service

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Status and Primary Motivations of Europe’s PTAs....................................................................... 3
Agreements with Future EU Members or Close Neighbors .................................................... 4
Acceding Countries......................................................................................................... 4
European Free Trade Association (EFTA)........................................................................ 4
Western Balkans ............................................................................................................. 5
Other European Agreements............................................................................................ 5
Agreements with Bordering or Near-Bordering Countries...................................................... 6
Mediterranean Countries ................................................................................................. 6
Gulf States ...................................................................................................................... 6
Ukraine........................................................................................................................... 7
Agreements with Developing Countries ................................................................................ 7
ACP Countries ................................................................................................................ 8
Generalized System of Preferences.................................................................................. 8
Agreements with Distant Countries and Regions ................................................................... 8
Regional Agreements ...................................................................................................... 9
Bilateral Agreements..................................................................................................... 10
Comparing U.S. and EU PTAs .................................................................................................. 13
Overall Approaches............................................................................................................. 14
WTO-Plus Provisions.......................................................................................................... 15
WTO-Extra Provisions ........................................................................................................ 17
Trade Coverage................................................................................................................... 19
Trade Competition .............................................................................................................. 23
Implications for the Multilateral Trading System and U.S. Trade Policy .................................... 28
Multilateral Trading System ................................................................................................ 28
No Impact ..................................................................................................................... 28
Positive Impact ............................................................................................................. 29
Negative Impact............................................................................................................ 30
U.S. Trade Policy ................................................................................................................ 30
FTA Controversy........................................................................................................... 30
Impact of EU-Korea and EU-Canada FTAs ................................................................... 31
Conclusion................................................................................................................................ 32

Figures
Figure 1. U.S. and EU Shares of Israel’s Imports, 1982-2008..................................................... 24
Figure 2. U.S. and EU Shares of Mexico’s Imports, 1990-2008 ................................................. 25
Figure 3. U.S. and EU Shares of Jordan’s Imports, 1997-2008................................................... 26
Figure 4. U.S. and EU Shares of Chile’s Imports, 1997-2008..................................................... 27
Figure 5. U.S. and EU Shares of Morocco’s Imports, 1998-2008 ............................................... 28

Congressional Research Service

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

Tables
Table 1. Description of WTO-Plus Provisions............................................................................ 15
Table 2. Description of Selective WTO-Extra Provisions........................................................... 18
Table 3. EU27 Trade (Exports) Covered by PTAs, 2008 ............................................................ 20
Table 4. U.S. Trade (Exports) Covered by PTAs, 2008............................................................... 22
Table A-1. EU PTAs with Members and Close Neighbors.......................................................... 34
Table A-2. EU PTAs with Bordering or Near-Bordering Countries ............................................ 35
Table A-3. EU PTA’s with Developing Countries....................................................................... 36
Table A-4. EU PTAs with Distant Countries and Regions .......................................................... 37

Appendixes
Appendix. EU PTAs.................................................................................................................. 34

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 38
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 38

Congressional Research Service

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

Introduction
Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) comprise a variety of unilateral, bilateral, or regional
arrangements which favor member parties over non-members by extending tariff and other non-
tariff preferences. The most prevalent PTA today is a free trade agreement (FTA), such as the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the U.S.-Australian FTA.1 PTAs are excepted
under certain circumstances from the non-discrimination clause of the multilateral world trading
system. The World Trade Organization (WTO) permits countries to enter into PTAs under certain
conditions, but the criteria are very elastic, and the examination by the WTO as to their
consistency with WTO rules has not been rigorous.2
The main dispute is whether PTAs serve as a building block or a stumbling block for further
multilateral trade liberalization.3 If PTAs, on balance, create more trade (by allowing production
to shift to the more competitive producers in the agreement) than they divert (by shifting trade
from lower-cost non-PTA members to higher-cost members because of tariff preferences extended
to members), they are said to be a building block or complement for the world trading system. On
the other hand, if the converse is true, PTAs are considered to be a stumbling block for the
multilateral trading system. However, it is very difficult to determine quantitatively whether trade
creation or trade diversion dominates in any particular PTA. This is because the effects of the
agreements on the patterns of trade and investment can depend on the content of the PTA as well
as the size and magnitude of the barriers being reduced.4
What is not disputed is that PTAs have grown and become the centerpiece of world trade
diplomacy as countries seek to improve access to foreign markets for their exporters and
investors. With weakening momentum for multilateral trade liberalization, PTAs, particularly
FTAs, have proliferated markedly in recent years. The annual average number of PTA
notifications since the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established in 1995 has been 20,
compared to less than 3 per year during the 1948-1995 period under the GATT. Many more
bilateral and regional agreements are being negotiated—an estimated 60 PTAs in Asia alone—in
all parts of the world. The share of world trade now covered by PTAs is estimated to be around
50%.5
In the post-war period, the European Union (EU) has been central to the proliferation of PTAs.
The EU itself, initially established in 1957 as the European Economic Community, is the world’s

1 Under an FTA, two or more countries minimally agree to eliminate tariffs, quotas, and preferences on most traded
goods. Most FTAs today also seek to liberalize trade in services, investment, and numerous other regulated areas of
economic activity. At the same time, members of an FTA maintain their own tariffs, quotas, and other non-tariff
barriers vis-à-vis non-members.
2 The specific conditions for satisfying consistency with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO
rules are contained in Article XXIV.of the GATT (now part of the WTO), or Article V of GATT’s agreement that
covers services (the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).) Apart from requesting the PTA to
encompass “substantially all trade” between its members, and not to raise the overall level of protection vis-a-vis the
rest of the WTO membership, these provisions oblige WTO members wishing to enter into a PTA to show that they
have complied with the relevant multilateral rules.
3 Multilateral trade liberalization generally is deemed preferable to preferential trade agreements on both economic and
political grounds because it generates greater economy-wide benefits and is non-discriminatory.
4 Jacob Viner, a Canadian economist, did the original work on trade diversion in his book, The Customs Union Issue,
Anderson Kramer Associates, 1961.
5 Kenneth Heydon and Stephen Woolcock, The Rise of Bilateralism, United Nations University Press, 2009, pp. 9-10.
Congressional Research Service
1

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

largest preferential agreement.6 Of the 199 PTAs in force and notified to the WTO by December
2008, or to its predecessor organization, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 35
involved the EU, making the EU’s network of PTAs the largest in the world.7
As a result of its widespread PTAs (including unilateral preference programs), the EU trades with
only 10 WTO members where the most-favored-nation (MFN) regime applies in its entirety.
These 10 WTO members (Australia, Canada, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, China, Japan, Republic
of Korea, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United States) accounted for 43.9% of the EU’s total
merchandise imports in 2009, up from 40.4% in 2008.8
After imposing a moratorium on negotiating new PTAs from 1999-2006, the EU in 2007 began
negotiating a new generation of more ambitious or comprehensive FTAs.9 These agreements are
intended to obtain greater commercial and trade benefits than previous FTAs, as well as to be
comprehensive in scope and “WTO-Plus” (going beyond current WTO commitments). If the
EU’s new FTAs follow this template, they are likely to be more similar to the FTAs negotiated in
recent years by the United States—FTAs which are often referred to as state-of-the art or “gold
standard” agreements.
As outlined in its 2006 Global Europe strategy, the EU targeted a number of larger countries and
regions for negotiations, including South Korea, India, Canada, and the Association of South East
Asian Nations (ASEAN).10 Whether the EU will be successful with a more ambitious and
comprehensive agenda of FTAs remains to be seen.11
Coincidentally, the EU change in FTA strategy has come at a time when the U.S. FTA policy has
moved toward a “holding pattern” or “pause.” Legislation granting the President authority to
negotiate FTAs expired in July 2007 and has not been renewed by Congress. Of the four FTAs
negotiated or under negotiation in 2007—South Korea, Panama, Columbia, and Peru—only one
(Peru) has been approved and implemented to date. With the Democratic party divided about the
economic and social effects of FTAs, as well as their content, the Obama Administration’s major
trade initiative has been to engage in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement
negotiations.12 In the meantime, calls from the U.S. business community sector have increased for

6 The now 27 members of the EU (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) comprise the largest market in the
world, with a GDP of $18 trillion (2008) and a population around 500 million.
7 WTO, Regional Trade Agreements database.
8 CRS calculations based on data from World Trade Atlas. With the expected entry into force of the EU-Korea FTA in
2010, this percentage can be estimated to drop by 2-3 percentage points.
9 The EU moratorium, which was not a formal policy decision, was instituted in order to focus greater political
attention on negotiating a comprehensive WTO Doha Development Round agreement. Continuing lack of progress in
the Doha negotiations was an important consideration in the EU’s decision to lift the moratorium. Other factors
included pressures from European businesses to match what others, in particular the United States, were doing to
negotiate FTAs and pressures to insert a number of EU “issues” into FTAs, such as competition and investment policy,
that are not part of the Doha Round.
10 Global Europe: Competing in the World : A Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy, European
Commission Staff Working Document, [Com(2006)567 final], October 4, 2006. The Commission places its new FTA
initiative in the context of Europe’s increasing concern about global competitiveness.
11 Heydon and Woolcock, The Rise of Bilateralism, pp. 165, 170. To some, the EU arguably has succeeded in
negotiating only one FTA—the EU-Korea—that is comprehensive and ambitious.
12 CRS Report R40502, The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, by Ian F. Fergusson and Bruce
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
2

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

a more activist U.S. FTA policy, much out of fear of losing export sales and market share to EU
competitors who may be gaining more favorable access to larger foreign markets as a result of
new PTAs.13 Given the need for the U.S. economy to rely on an increase in exports for faster
growth, these concerns have also resonated in Congress and the Obama Administration.
This report explores these intersecting issues in three parts. The first section discusses the status
and primary motivations of the EU’s PTAs currently in place or under negotiation. The second
compares the content and trade coverage of Europe’s PTAs to U.S. PTAs. A third section assesses
the implications of the EU’s PTA program for the multilateral trading system and U.S. trade
policy. A concluding section evaluates future directions for Europe’s PTA policy. This report will
be updated as events warrant.
Status and Primary Motivations of Europe’s PTAs
Europe’s PTA’s can be grouped into four categories according to their primary motives. First,
there are agreements for geographically close neighbors for which the EU is prepared to offer
accession or some slightly looser relationship. A second category of agreements is designed
primarily to foster stability around the EU borders. A third category of PTAs has a historical and
development focus and comprises agreements with 71 small and mostly poor developing
countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (the ACP countries). A fourth category involves
more distant countries and regions where the primary EU objective is to neutralize potential
discrimination against EU exports and investments resulting from FTAs between third countries
or to secure commercial benefits via preferential access to foreign markets.14
Unlike the United States, the EU has not used a standard model for its PTAs. The EU’s web of
PTAs is characterized by different trade liberalization agendas and trading rules. All agreements
appear to be negotiated in a flexible manner to suit the EU and its partners in each specific case.15
The EU’s PTAs are also negotiated under a range of different kinds of agreements. The most
typical is an Association Agreement (AA), which creates a framework for cooperation on a range
of political, security, economic, trade, and human rights issues. The trade portion of the AA is
often a free trade agreement between the EU and a third country. Given that Association
Agreements are treaties, they have to be ratified by all the EU member states.
A short elaboration of the agreements reached or negotiations underway for each category
follows. This summary is intended to provide a snapshot of EU preferential agreements currently
in place or under negotiation. It does not provide a history of the evolution of many of these
agreements.

(...continued)
Vaughn, December 7, 2009.
13 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Trade Action—or Inaction: The Cost for American Workers and Companies,
September 15, 2009.
14 L. Alan Winters, “EU’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Objectives and Outcomes,” in The External Economic
Dimensions of the European Union, edited by Pitou van Dijck and Gerrit Faber, Kluwer Law International, 2000, pp.
195-223.
15 Stephen Woolcock, “European Union Policy Towards Free Trade Agreements,’ ECIPE Working Paper, No. 3/2007,
p.4.
Congressional Research Service
3

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

Agreements with Future EU Members or Close Neighbors
For close neighbors in Europe, the EU is prepared to contemplate accession or, if partners wish,
some looser relationship. This is the area over which the acquis communautaire potentially
extends.16 As listed in Table A-1, this grouping includes three members of the European
Economic Area (EEA)—Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway—and Switzerland. It also includes
those Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) that have not yet joined the EU, along with
the countries of the Western Balkans and Turkey.
Acceding Countries
The various countries that have acceded to the EU over the past years signed Europe Agreements
and Association Agreements prior to accession.17 These agreements introduced free trade in
almost all industrial products, but provided more limited liberalization in agriculture. As part of
their EU obligations, new members had to terminate their bilateral trade agreements with foreign
countries.
Over the past 15 years, 15 countries have gone through this process, expanding the EU from 12
member states to 27. In 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden entered the EU to increase the
membership to 15 states (EU15); in 2004, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined to increase membership to 25 states
(EU25); and in 2007, Bulgaria and Romania acceded, increasing membership to its current 27
states (EU27). The enlarged EU membership extends the geographical coverage of the EU’s own
trade agreements, thereby increasing market access to EU’s preferential partners. As a result, third
countries without such preferential market access arguably find it more difficult to compete in the
EU market.18
European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
The EU’s free trade agreements with individual members of EFTA were negotiated in the 1970s.19
FTAs remain in force for Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. The creation of the
European Economic Area (EEA) in 1994 extended the EU’s internal market to Iceland,
Liechtenstein, and Norway.20 The EEA allows its members to participate in the internal market
without assuming the full responsibilities of EU membership. The Agreement covers all four
pillars of the internal market: freedom of movement of goods (but not agriculture and fisheries),

16 The term acquis communautaire is used in EU law to refer to the total body of EU law accumulated thus far.
Countries hoping to accede to the EU are required to approximate their legislation with that of the EU in a full range of
economic and regulatory areas. The depth of policy harmonization required is much less for countries not intending to
join the EU.
17 Europe Agreements recognize that the ultimate objective of a bilateral association agreement is accession to the EU.
18 World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review of the European Communities, WT/TPR/S/136, June 23, 2004, pp.
27-30.
19 EFTA was established in 1960 by Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom. Its membership was reduced by accession to the EU of Denmark and the United Kingdom in 1973, Portugal
in 1986, and Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995.
20 Switzerland decided not to participate and the other EFTA members—Austria, Finland, and Sweden—joined the EU
in 1995.
Congressional Research Service
4

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

persons, services, and capital.21 Thus, the EEA is intended to deliver the economic benefits of a
single market without the political ties associated with EU membership. These three countries see
themselves as structurally distinct from the EU to warrant this arms-length association.22
Switzerland elected not to participate in the EEA after a referendum in 1995. Relations between
the EU and Switzerland are currently governed by the EC-Switzerland Agreement of 1972, which
established free trade in goods, plus a total of 16 bilateral agreements. The bilateral agreements,
covering such areas as the free movement of people, trade in agricultural products, and public
procurement, have resulted in considerable market liberalization between the two partners.23
Western Balkans
Since the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, EU relations with the Western Balkans have been
governed by the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). The purpose of the SAP is to
establish special relations between the countries of the Western Balkans in exchange for reforms
that will align their legislation more closely with that of the EU. These countries are considered
either as “candidate countries” or “potential candidate countries” for accession to the EU.
Two stabilization and association agreements (SAAs) are in place with Croatia and the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and both countries have been granted candidate
status. Accession negotiations with both countries have been going on since 2005.24
SAAs have also been signed with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro.
These states currently are recognized as “potential candidate countries” for EU membership. As
part of the broader SAA, FTAs have entered into force with Albania, Montenegro, and Bosnia and
Herzegovina. These FTAs place particular emphasis on liberalizing trade in goods, aligning rules
with EU practice and protecting intellectual property.25 The EU has also granted the Western
Balkan countries non-reciprocal duty-free access for most all goods to the EU market until the
end of 2010.26 At the multilateral level, the European Commission supports the accession of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia to the WTO.27
Other European Agreements
The EU opened accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005. The current principles and
conditions for Turkey’s accession are provided in a Council decision on February 2008. In the
meantime, trade relations continue under the EU-Turkey Customs Union established in 1995. The
customs union covers industrial goods and processed agricultural items.28 There is no timetable
for integration of agriculture into the customs union. The customs union arrangement also makes

21 WTO, Trade Policy Review of the European Communities, WT/TPR/S/214, 2009, p. 23.
22 L. Alan Winters, “EU’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Objectives and Outcomes,” p. 203.
23 WTO, Trade Policy Review of the European Communities, 2009, p. 24.
24 The SSAs are similar in principle to the Europe Agreements signed with the Central and Eastern European countries
in the 1990s and to the Association Agreement signed with Turkey in 1995.
25 WTO, Trade Policy Review of the European Communities, 2009, p. 18.
26 Ibid. p. 24.
27 Ibid. p. 24.
28 A customs union combines a free trade area with a common external tariff.
Congressional Research Service
5

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

use of the pan-Euro-Mediterranean system of cumulation of origin, and covers technical barriers
to trade, competition policies, and protection of intellectual property rights. Turkey also
participates in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (see below).29
The EU also has customs union agreements with Andorra and San Marino, and a free trade
agreement with the Faeroe Islands. In the working of free trade agreements between the EU and
third countries, products originating in Andorra or San Marino normally benefit from the
preferences granted to the EU.
Agreements with Bordering or Near-Bordering Countries
The second category of PTAs involves countries that border the EU broadly defined. A primary
motivation of these agreements is to promote economic prosperity and, thus, political stability on
the EU’s doorstep or around the EU’s borders. The primary concern is to insure against disruptive
social or economic conditions that could spill-over and adversely affect EU member states.30 This
category of agreements (see Table A-2) applies most closely to Euro-Med countries, the Gulf
States, and Ukraine.
Mediterranean Countries
Trade relations between the EU and the Mediterranean countries are governed by the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (or Barcelona Process).31 Launched in 1995, the partnership is a broad
framework of political, economic, and social relations between member states of the EU and
countries of the Southern Mediterranean.
One important objective of the partnership is the creation of a Mediterranean free trade area by
2010. The free trade area is being established through the conclusion of both Euro-Med
Association Agreements between the EU and individual Med countries and through the
conclusion of FTAs between the Med partners themselves. To date the EU has concluded
Association Agreements with all its Med partners except Syria. Associated countries enjoy duty
free access to the EU market for manufactured goods and preferential treatment for exports of
agricultural and fisheries products. Tariffs will gradually be reduced for EU exports to the Med
region. These agreements replace non-reciprocal Cooperation Agreements signed in the 1970s.32
Gulf States
Negotiations on an FTA between the EU and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have been going
on, albeit with a number of suspensions, for two decades.33 Negotiations started in 1990 and were
suspended while the GCC finalized plans for the creation of a GCC customs union. The

29 WTO, Trade Policy Review of the European Communities, 2009, p. 20.
30 Alan Winters, “EU’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Objectives and Outcomes,” p.202.
31 The Mediterranean partners are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria,
Tunisia, and Turkey. Libya has observer status.
32 World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review of the European Communities, 2004, p.31, and World Trade
Organization, Trade Policy Review of the European Communities, 2009, p.26.
33 The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) is a regional organization comprising Bahrain,
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
Congressional Research Service
6

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

negotiations resumed in 2002 following the adoption of new wider negotiation directive from
both sides and a commitment on behalf of the GCC to establish a customs union, which entered
into force in 2003 with the GCC adopting a unified customs tariff of 5%. The proposed FTA is to
foster economic integration between the two regions and provide for progressive and reciprocal
liberalization of trade in goods and services. The negotiations also cover government
procurement, intellectual property rights, competition policy, dispute settlement, and rules of
origin, as well as political issues such as human rights, immigration, and the fight against
terrorism.34
The negotiations were most recently suspended in December 2008, but discussions on restarting
the talks are ongoing.35 Sticking points have included the GCC’s opposition to EU demands for
political and human rights reforms and the EU’s imposition of a heavy carbon tax on oil and its
derivatives, as well as on petrochemicals. The GCC member states hold a large share of the
world’s energy reserves while climate-related carbon issues are of growing importance on the EU
policy agenda.36
Ukraine
In March 2007, the EU and Ukraine launched bilateral negotiations on a new Association
Agreement. The agreement, if completed, will replace a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
that dates back to 1998. A comprehensive FTA will be embedded in the Association Agreement
alongside provisions dealing with political, social, and sectoral cooperation. There have been nine
rounds of negotiations held to date. The next two rounds are scheduled to take place in March and
May 2010.37
The FTA will form part of the New Enhanced Agreement which aims for closer economic and
political cooperation between neighboring countries. The EU has Cooperation Agreements with
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Krygyzstan, Moldova, and Uzbekistan and is
considering negotiating FTAs with Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova.38
Ukraine, unlike the above mentioned former Soviet states, aspires to be considered as an EU
candidate. Ukraine’s prospects for eventual EU membership remains subject to debate within
Europe.39
Agreements with Developing Countries
This category of agreements has a historical and development rationale, and comprises mainly
agreements with 71 small and mostly poor developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the
Pacific (the ACP countries). Nearly all of the ACP countries were formerly colonies of one of the

34 World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review of the European Communities, 2009, p. 29.
35 Plus News Pakistan, “New Push for GCC-EU free trade pact,” November 27, 2009.
36 Saudi Economic Survey, “GCC, EU trade talks to resume,” January 27, 2010.
37 Ukrainian News, “Ukraine and EU To Hold Ninth Round on Creation of Free Trade Zone in Kyiv From December 7
to 1,” October 12, 2009.
38 World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review of the European Communities, 2009, p.19.
39 CRS Report RL33460, Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, by Steven Woehrel, March 2, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
7

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

EU’s member states. Concern for development and poverty alleviation also lie behind the EU’s
unilateral trade preferences under its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).
ACP Countries
The EU and the ACP countries have been negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)
since the expiration on the Contonou trade preferences in December 2007. The EPAs aim to
create an FTA between the EU and groups of ACP countries, enhance cooperation in all areas
related to trade, and support development and poverty eradication in all ACP countries. Due to the
WTO incompatibility of previous preferential arrangements, the EPAs seek to remove all trade
barriers between the EU and ACP partners on a non-discriminatory and reciprocal basis.
Negotiations were concluded with the former Caribbean colonies in December 2007 for a
comprehensive or full EPA and the agreement was signed in October 2008. As shown in Table A-
3, negotiations toward full EPAs with the other groupings in Africa and the Pacific are ongoing.40
Generalized System of Preferences
For developing countries who do not have a trade agreement with the EU, the EU’s GSP offers
duty-free access to 176 developing countries and territories to the EU’s market on a non-
reciprocal basis. The EU GSP program was last renewed in 2008 and extended until December
31, 2011.41
Agreements with Distant Countries and Regions
This category involves commercially oriented PTAs with more distant countries and regions
where the primary EU objective often is to neutralize potential discrimination against EU exports
and investments resulting from FTAs between third countries. These agreements help to secure
commercial benefits for EU exporters and investors via agreements that provide preferential
access to foreign markets. In contrast to the PTAs with European countries, near neighbors, or
developing countries, these PTAs, particularly those negotiated after Global Europe (2006), are
intended to contain provisions that are deeper, wider, and more reciprocal than previous PTAs.
This category includes agreements and negotiations with regional groupings and individual
countries (see Table A-4 for a full listing). Regional agreements/negotiations include ASEAN, the
Andean Community, Central America, and Mercosur. Bilateral agreements/negotiations include
Canada, Chile, India, Mexico, South Africa, and the Republic of Korea. As a result of slow
progress in regional negotiations with the Andean Community and ASEAN, the EU has
negotiated FTAs with Peru and Colombia and has commenced bilateral FTA negotiations with
Singapore and Vietnam.

40 World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review of the European Communities, 2009, p.19.
41 Ibid., p.19.
Congressional Research Service
8

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

Regional Agreements
In the past, the EU has preferred in principle to negotiate region-to-region agreements. Given its
own experience with regional economic integration, many member states and stakeholders view it
as natural to promote such integration elsewhere. The promotion of a distinctive European
approach to integration is also seen as a major element of EU foreign policy. This policy
approach, however, is highly dependent upon the ability of regional partners to make progress
toward regional integration.42
Andean Community and Central America
The EU opened negotiations for a region-to-region Association Agreement with the Andean
Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru) and with Central American countries (Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) in June 2007. The agreements are
intended to comprise three components: political dialogue, cooperation, and a WTO-compatible
free trade area.
The Andean negotiations were disrupted by Bolivia’s withdrawal in 2008 due to disagreement
with the targeted objectives and by Ecuador’s disagreement over the EU’s intellectual property
demands and the EU’s banana quota regime. Bilateral free trade agreement negotiations with
Colombia and Peru progressed, however, and on March 1, 2010, culminated in the signing of
comprehensive free trade agreements. The EU still hopes to include Bolivia and Ecuador in a
region-to-region association agreement at a later date.43
Negotiations with Central America have progressed, with seven rounds completed as of July
2009. The eighth round was postponed following political uncertainty in Honduras. Negotiations
resumed in February 2010, in Brussels. EU trade officials hope an agreement can be reached this
year, but key challenges remain on liberalization of sensitive products and the overall ambition of
the Central American countries in the areas of services, investment, and public procurement.44
ASEAN
The EU launched FTA negotiations with ASEAN in June 2007.45 Progress in negotiating a
comprehensive agreement was limited. An initial controversy involved Burma (Myanmar). EU
member states refused to negotiate with the military dictatorship, while most Southeast Asian
members stood by the junta in the name of ASEAN solidarity. Economic differences within the
region were also a concern for the EU, which decided to exclude the least developed members,
namely Laos and Cambodia. Given that the talks were not progressing, the two sides at the end of
2008 agreed to take a “pause” in the regional negotiations. In the meantime, the EU began
informal talks with several individual ASEAN members (Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) to
assess the possibility of commencing separate FTA negotiations. This approach proved
controversial since the EU had always been officially a strong supporter of regional integration.

42 Heydon and Woolcock, The Rise of Bilateralism, p. 164.
43 International Trade Reporter, “EU, Peru, Colombia Conclude Free Trade Agreement Talks,” March 3, 2010.
44 Philippines News Agency, “EU still committed to signing free trade accord with C. America,” January 19, 2010.
45 The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is made up of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Congressional Research Service
9

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

Some ASEAN officials accused the EU of pursuing a divide and rule strategy, but the EU
continues to insist that it was still interested in a regional framework if feasible.46
In the meantime, the EU in March 2010 formally launched negotiations with Singapore for a
bilateral FTA. Vietnam has also agreed to start bilateral negotiations with the EU this year.47
MERCOSUR
The EU first began negotiating a region-to-region Association Agreement with the four Mercosur
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) in 2001. The process of strengthening trade
ties between the two sides was viewed by many as a reaction to Mercosur’s possible participation
in the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), a proposal advanced by the United States a
decade ago for creating a free trade zone stretching from Alaska to Argentina.48
EU-Mercosur negotiations were placed on hold in October 2004 when both parties recognized
that support for concluding a comprehensive and ambitious agreement, going beyond their
respective WTO obligations, was weak. The main sticking point was that Mercosur members
demanded reductions in EU farm subsidies and quotas that constrain their exports of grains,
beans, and beef, while European producers wanted Mercosur to lower its tariffs on industrial
goods and to provide better patent protection and improved access for financial and other
services. Agriculture makes up more than a third of all Mercosur exports to the EU. 49
While no new negotiating rounds are scheduled, the two sides on November 30, 2009, agreed to
resume contacts at the technical level. Spain, which holds the rotating Presidency of the EU in the
first half of 2010, is particularly supportive of injecting new life into the negotiations.50
Bilateral Agreements
While the stated EU preference is to negotiate regional agreements, the EU also negotiates
bilateral preferential agreements with individual countries. Given that the EU offers preferential
access to its huge single market, it wants to receive equivalent market opportunities in return.
While this is sometimes difficult for smaller countries to provide, the object of overcoming
possible trade diversion caused by U.S. PTAs also motivates the EU to negotiate bilateral
agreements.
Canada
Negotiations on an EU-Canadian Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) began
in October 2009 in Ottawa. A second round of CETA negotiations took place in Brussels in
January 2010, and subsequent rounds have been scheduled this year for April, July, and October.

46 Europolitics, EU/ASEAN: FTA Talks with Singapore Scheduled for March,” January 15, 2010.
47 The Saigon Times Daily, “EU Keen on FTA Negotiations with Vietnam,” January 19, 2010, and International Trade
Reporter, “EU to Launch Bilateral FTA Talks with Vietnam, Singapore,” March 3, 2010.
48 Dow Jones Business News, “EU, Mercosur, Chile Agree to Launch Free Trade Talks,” June 28, 1999.
49 International Trade Reporter, “Mercosur Makes Free Trade with European Union Top Priority,” 26 ITR 1708,
December 9, 2009.
50 Agence Europe, “Spain wants to relaunch negotiations for EU-Mercosur FTA,” December 5, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
10

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

The negotiations are intended to be comprehensive, covering trade in goods and services,
investment, public procurement, the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights,
and commitments on the social and environmental aspects of trade and sustainable development.
Both sides hope to finalize an agreement in 2011.51
Canada is currently the EU’s 11th most important trading partner, accounting for 1.7% of the EU’s
total external trade. The EU is Canada’s second most important trading partner, after the United
States, with a 10% share of its total external trade. EU-Canada trade is dominated by high-value
goods such as machinery, transport equipment, and chemicals. Around 15% of trade consists of
agricultural or energy-related trade. Trade in services, particularly travel and transportation, is an
important area of the trade relationship. Foreign direct investment is also an important areas of
the relationship, with the EU ranking as the second largest investor in Canada, and Canada as the
fourth largest investor in the EU.52
Chile
The EU and Chile concluded an Association Agreement in 2000, which included an FTA that
entered into force in February 2003. The agreement provides for progressive and reciprocal
liberalization of trade in goods over a 10-year period. It is expected that 100% of industrial goods,
81% of agricultural products, and 91% of fish products will be duty-free by 2013. The agreement
also provides for the reciprocal liberalization of services, government procurement, investment
and capital flows. It also provides for greater protection of intellectual property rights, and a
dispute settlement mechanism.53
The EU-Chile FTA foresees that both sides will undertake further efforts to liberalize trade in
agriculture and services in the future. Discussions on the protection of geographical indicators
will also be a part of future negotiations.54
India
FTA negotiations between the EU and India were launched in June 2007. Eight rounds have been
held through January 2010, with much of the discussion focused on content and modalities.
Negotiations are reported to be moving slowly. India is opposed to tariff liberalization of a large
number of agricultural products and insists that government procurement not be included in the
negotiations. India is reported to be resisting EU demands on intellectual property protection,
including data exclusivity, patent-term extension, and enforcement. India is also opposed to
inclusion of any non-trade issues such as child labor and human rights violations in the
agreement. (At the same time, the EU’s new trade commissioner Karel de Gucht has stated that
all trade agreements must be linked to human right concerns, an issue which the European
Parliament, with its greater trade powers under the Lisbon Treaty, concurs.) India is also resisting

51 European Commission website: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/indes.cfm?id=135&serie=130&langId=en.
52 European Commission website: http://europa.eu/treade/creating -opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/Canada.

53 WTO Trade Policy Review of the European Communities, 2004, pp.30-31.
54 European Commission, DG-Trade Snapshot of Chile/Bilateral Relations, February 1, 2008.
Congressional Research Service
11

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

WTO-plus liberalization of assorted regulatory barriers in services and investment, affecting
sectors such as retail, banking, legal services, and insurance.55
From the European side, there is resistance to India’s core negotiating demand, to gain better
access for Indian investors and service suppliers. Given India’s lower labor costs and large
population of well-qualified professionals including engineers, accountants, and software
programmers, there is ample European resistance to allowing greater mobility of the Indian labor
force to accept jobs in Europe.56
Despite the obstacles, trade negotiators on both sides remain optimistic a deal can be reached.
India’s Commerce and Industry Minister, Anand Sharma, asserted after the recently concluded
eighth round of talks that he expected an agreement to be reached by the end of 2010.57
Mexico
Negotiations for a free trade agreement between Mexico and the EU began in October 1996. An
agreement, formally called the Economic Partnership Political Co-ordination and Co-operation
Agreement, was signed in March 2000 and came into force on July 1, 2000.58 An FTA was part of
the overall cooperation agreement, which equally promotes political dialogue and other
cooperative activities between the two sides.
The EU-Mexico FTA covers trade in goods and services, public procurement, competition policy,
intellectual property rights, investment, and dispute settlement. The FTA called for the EU to
phase out all duties on non-agricultural imports from Mexico by 2003, and for Mexico to lift all
duties on non-agricultural imports from the EU by 2007. The average duty of EU-Mexican non-
agricultural products stood at around 12% prior to implementation of the duty cuts. The phasing
out of duties in agricultural and fishery trade was subject to a gradual and longer liberalization
process. On services and government procurement, Mexico granted the EU treatment that was
essentially equivalent to the treatment Mexico accorded the United States and Canada under
NAFTA. The agreement also includes chapters in which the two sides agree to increase
cooperation in a number of areas, including mining, energy, transportation, tourism, statistics, and
science and technology.59
For Mexico, the FTA was intended to help it lessen its heavy dependence on the United States for
its exports and to attract more foreign direct investment from Europe. For the EU, the FTA was
seen as a way to help its firms compete on more equal terms with U.S. and Canadian companies
who had enjoyed tariff and other non-tariff advantages since NAFTA was implemented in 1994.60

55 Factiva, India Reluctant to Relent on Greater Market Access to the EU, HNMINT, February 4, 2010.
56 Business Standard, “India, EU to resume FTA talks next week,” January 22, 2010.
57 Factiva, Accord Fintech, “Government Optimistic on Clinching FTA with EU by 2010-end,” February 5, 2010.
58 CRS Report R40784, Mexico’s Free Trade Agreements, by M. Angeles Villarreal, August 27, 2009, p. 6.
59 World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review of European Communities,2009, p. 26.
60 Joel Millman, “EU and Mexico Reach Free Trade Deal,” Wall Street Journal, November 26, 1999.
Congressional Research Service
12

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

Republic of Korea
The EU completed the negotiation of a comprehensive FTA with South Korea in October 2009.
Assuming the agreement is approved by EU member states and the European Parliament, the FTA
could become effective in 2010.
The main elements of the agreement include liberalization of tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and
services, plus new disciplines in the areas of competition policy, intellectual property rights,
labor, and the environment. Industrial tariffs will be eliminated on over 96% of traded items over
a five-year period. Some agricultural items, including rice, are excepted. Under the FTA, Korea
will consider as equivalent many European standards, and recognize European certificates, thus
eliminating bureaucratic barriers to trade. Notably, the FTA addresses non-tariff barriers in the
auto sector by committing Korea to recognize EU standards as equivalent. Liberalization of
services is focused on four sectors: telecommunications, legal, environmental, and financial. The
FTA will offer a high level of protection for EU geographical indicators such as Champagne, Feta
Cheese, and Scotch whiskey.61
South Africa
Trade relations between the EU and South Africa are governed by a Trade, Development, and
Cooperation Agreement (TDCA), which was signed in October 1999 and which came into force
in May 2004. The TDCA contains provisions on economic cooperation, cultural and social ties,
and EU financial assistance to South Africa. The TCDA also aims to establish an FTA by 2012
that would cover 90% of bilateral trade. The agreement provided for asymmetrical liberalization
in favor of South African goods and services so that by the end of a 12-year transition period
South Africa will provide duty-free status to 86% of its imports from the EU and the EU will
provide 95% of South African exports similar treatment. While the agreement applies to all
products, some 300 sensitive agricultural products, including fruits, milk, corn, tomatoes, and
rice, are excluded. The EU is South African’s top trading partner.62
FTA negotiations were stalemated for a period of time over concerns relating to wine and spirits,
particularly port and sherry. These products are closely guarded by southern European countries,
such as Spain and Portugal. A final compromise allowed for the sale of South African wine (8.2
million gallons) in return for a South African commitment to stop using its own “port” and
“sherry” names on export wines to third countries within five years, and in its own domestic
market within 12 years.63
Comparing U.S. and EU PTAs
Most PTAs contain a dozen chapters or more and run hundreds and sometimes thousands of pages
of highly technical text. Not surprisingly, only a few studies have attempted to compare and

61 Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Press Release: “USTR Releases Preliminary Analysis of Korea-
EU Free Trade Agreement, October 21, 2009.
62 Agence France-Presse, “Highlights of EU-South Africa free trade agreement,” October 1, 1999.
63 Economist Intelligence Unit –Views Wire, “South African Economy–Free Trade agreement with EU signed,”
October 210, 1999.
Congressional Research Service
13

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

contrast the agreements negotiated and implemented by the United States and European Union.
Two studies, however, have undertaken such a comparison, albeit based on a different universe of
PTAs.64 This section draws from these two studies, one by researchers associated with the London
School of Economics (LSE) and the other by researchers affiliated with the Bruegel Institute in
Brussels, to illustrate differences in overall approaches and the extent to which provisions in the
respective sets of agreements are either “WTO-plus” or “WTO-extra.” The significance of these
latter two criteria are explained below. In addition, EU and U.S. PTAs are compared in terms of
trade coverage and competition.
Overall Approaches
The U.S. approach to FTAs is based on an evolving version of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). The scope of U.S. PTAs, thus, tends to be structurally standardized and the
content of the provisions fairly uniform. U.S. FTAs also tend to be symmetrical and reciprocal.
As suggested by the LSE study, “the objective of obtaining reciprocal market access drives the
[U.S.] process and there is little scope for asymmetry of commitments.”65
Until completion of its recent FTA with South Korea, Europe’s PTAs have been characterized by
differentiation, flexibility, and relatively modest ambition in terms of market-opening.66 The EU
has differentiated among its partners in terms of provisions and commitments. The content of EU
agreements has varied depending on a number of factors, including the level of development of
its partners, how important they are for European security, and in which sectors they constitute a
competitive challenge. For example, near neighbors and potential accession states were expected
to sign up to the full acquis communanutaire.67 Euro-Med partners were offered free trade in
industrial goods, but were provided exclusions for sensitive agricultural products. Agreements
with the ACP states provided preferential access to the EU market, long transition periods, and
financial assistance.68 On the other hand, agreements with emerging markets tend to match what
the United States or other countries have achieved through PTAs.69
The EU PTA policy tendency for incorporating asymmetric provisions can favor either the EU’s
PTA partner or itself. On a range of issues, the EU, for example, has been willing to accept
modest commitments on the part of its developing country PTA partners. In other instances, such
as the EU-Chile FTA, the EU has liberalized less than its partner in specific areas.70

64 Heydon and Woolcock, The Rise of Bilateralism: Comparing American, European and Asian Approaches to
Preferential Trade Agreements, United Nations University Press, 2009 [hereafter referred to as the LSE or London
School of Economics after the affiliation of its authors]; and Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis, and Andre Sapir,
“Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and US preferential trade agreements,” Bruegel Blueprint Series, Volume VII,
2009 [hereafter referred to as the Bruegel study].
65 Heydon and Woolcock, The Rise of Bilateralism, p. 239.
66 The EU-Korea FTA is much more comparable to U.S. FTAs than previous EU agreements. Whether the EU-Korea
FTA will herald a new approach for all future EU FTAs remains to be seen.
67 As explained previously, this is the full body of EU law.
68 The new EPAs being negotiated by the EU with developing countries embody a shift toward reciprocity in the
undertaking of commitments. According to Heydon and Woolcock, they are prompting significant trade diversion as
ACP states shift their imports of beef, beverages, and clothing from low-cost suppliers to the EU. See Heydon and
Woolcock, The Rise of Bilateralism, p. 241.
69 Heydon and Woolcock, The Rise of Bilateralism, pp. 169, 241-242.
70 Ibid., pp. 25, 169.
Congressional Research Service
14

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

WTO-Plus Provisions
WTO-plus provisions can be defined as provisions of PTAs that come under the current
obligations and rules of the WTO, where the parties undertake commitments that build on or
deepen commitments they have already made at the multilateral level. The most prominent
example is a reduction of tariffs on industrial and agricultural products going beyond what is
already committed to in the WTO context. Examples of other provisions that can be WTO-plus
include obligations concerning customs administration, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)
measures, technical barriers to trade (TBT), trade remedies (countervailing duty and
antidumping), services (obligations covered by the General Agreement on Trade in Services or
GATS), government procurement, state trading enterprises, state aid, and intellectual property
rights (IPR) that fall under the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement.71
Table 1 provides a list and description of 14 such WTO-plus provisions that have been
incorporated into U.S. and EU PTAs.
Table 1. Description of WTO-Plus Provisions
Provision Content
FTA industrial goods
Tariff liberalization; elimination of non-tariff barriers
FTA agricultural goods
Tariff liberalization; elimination of non-tariff barriers
Customs administration
Provision of information; publication on the internet of new
laws and regulations; training
Export taxes
Elimination of export taxes
Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures
Affirmation of rights and obligations under the SPS agreement;
harmonization of SPS measures
Technical barriers to trade (TBT)
Affirmation of rights and obligations under the TBT agreement;
harmonization of regulations; mutual recognition agreements
State trading enterprises (STE)
Establishment or maintenance of an independent competition
authority; non-discrimination regarding production and
marketing conditions; affirmation of Article XVII GATT
provisions
Antidumping (AD)
Retention of AD rights and obligations under WTO agreement
Countervailing duty measures (CVD)
Retention of CVD rights and obligations under the WTO
agreement
State aids
Assessment of anti-competitive behavior; annual reporting on
the value and distribution of state aids provided; provision of
information
Public procurement
Progressive liberalization; national treatment and/or non-
discrimination principle; publication of laws and regulations on
the internet; specification of public procurement regime
Trade-related investment measures (TRIMs)
Provisions concerning requirements for local content and
export performance on foreign direct investment
Trade in services agreement (GATS)
Liberalization of trade in services
Trade-related intel ectual property rights (TRIPs)
Harmonization of standards; enforcement; national treatment
and most-favored nation treatment
Source: “Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and US preferential trade agreements,” Bruegel Blueprint
Series VII, 2009, p. 14.

71 Henrick Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis, and Andre Sapir, “Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and US Preferential
Trade Agreements, Bruegel Blueprint 7, 2009, p.12.
Congressional Research Service
15

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

The Bruegel analysis of WTO-plus provisions contained in 28 different agreements (14 U.S.
PTAs and 14 EU PTAs) found a “fairly high degree of similarity” of coverage in the two sets of
agreements. Both sets of agreements contained obligations covering substantially the same areas.
Differences in terms of coverage related mainly to services, trade-related investment measures,
and the enforceability of the provisions. Trade-related services obligations were included in all
U.S. agreements, but in only four EU agreements. Most U.S. agreements included trade-related
investment obligations, but none of the EU agreements did.72 The U.S. agreements also had
substantially more legally enforceable obligations concerning trade-related investment measures,
technical barriers to trade, and services, while the EU agreements contained significantly more
obligations of this kind concerning state trading enterprises.73
The LSE analysis, based on a smaller sampling of PTAs, focused more on substantive differences
in WTO-plus provisions. On the central issue of tariffs, the U.S. FTAs provided for almost 100%
elimination of U.S. tariffs by the end of a transition period for industrial products.74 While this
was very nearly the case for agricultural products, there remained some U.S. tariff-rate quotas.75
In return, the U.S. PTA partners agreed to a gradual elimination of all tariff lines. U.S. PTA
partners, however, make use of more extensive transition times to protect sensitive industries.76
Compared to the United States, according to the LSE analysis, the EU’s tariff cuts also approach
nearly 100% coverage of industrial products, but they exclude relatively more agricultural lines.
Significant parts of EU agricultural products such as beef, poultry, dairy, olive oil, rice, barley,
wheat, rye, sugar, and wine are often excluded from tariff reductions or liberalization. The EU-
South Africa PTA, for example, excluded over 280 agricultural tariff lines.77 Coverage also varies
from PTA partner to PTA partner, reflecting potential competition for EU agriculture.78 The EU
agreements also tend to be more flexible towards partner countries, including provision for the
PTA partner to reintroduce tariffs if they are needed as part of an infant industry strategy.79
According to the LSE analysis, U.S. PTAs tend to be significantly WTO-plus in the coverage of
services and IPR. In terms of services, U.S agreements are judged to go beyond the GATS
obligations in both financial services and telecommunications services. U.S. sector coverage of
services is also based on the more liberalizing “negative” list approach compared to the GATS
approach of a combination of positive and negative lists. Regarding IPR protection, U.S. PTA’s
are also seen as WTO-plus, progressively extending the 50-year terms of copyright to 75 years

72 EU FTAs lack investment provisions because Member States (up until passage of the Lisbon Treaty) have
competence over investment issues. In addition, many Member States have negotiated bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) with FTA partners.
73 Heydon and Woolcock, The Rise of Bilateralism, pp. 20, 23.
74 Tariff preferences are WTO-plus in the sense that they reduce tariffs to the level of the MFN-bound rate in the WTO.
75 This standard appears to have slipped with in the FTAs with Australia and South Korea.
76 Heydon and Woolcock, The Rise of Bilateralism, p. 23..
77 Stephen Woolcock, “European Union Policy Towards Free Trade Agreements,” p. 6.
78 According to the LSE analysis, the EU has provided greater coverage of agriculture in recent agreements. The EU-
Korea agreement, for example, offers almost complete coverage of agricultural tariff lines. Because Korea is not
considered a competitive threat to EU agriculture, it is uncertain whether future negotiations with countries that have
greater agricultural exporting capabilities, such as Canada, will include extensive liberalization .
79 Heydon and Woolcock, The Rise of Bilateralism, pp. 24, 242.
Congressional Research Service
16

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

required by the TRIPS Agreement and the minimum term of trademark protection from 7 to 10
years.80
The EU treatment of services and IPR, according to the LSE study, is less ambitious than the U.S.
approach. On services provisions, the EU uses a positive-list approach that provides the flexibility
to exclude sensitive sectors both for itself and its trading partners. On IPR provisions, the EU
tends to stress compliance with existing international standards of protection for IPR, rather than
pressing for provisions that go beyond specific WTO-plus obligations (i.e.TRIPs.) The EU also,
according to the LSE report, seeks to use PTAs to promote its case for TRIPs-plus protection for
geographical indicators, a policy initiative that has faced considerable opposition from the United
States and other trading partners.81
In some provisions, the LSE study determined that both the U.S. and EU PTAs have remained
WTO-consistent and not WTO-plus. This is generally the case for trade remedies such as
countervailing duty and antidumping measures where neither side allows PTAs to impose any
additional disciplines on these procedures. At the same time, U.S. PTAs have consistently applied
time limitations on the use of safeguard actions that are tighter than those found in the WTO.82
In one area involving SPS measures, the LSE study considered the EU approach to be WTO-
minus. This was because the EU agreements call for an interpretation of the WTO SPS agreement
that allows for social as well as science-based risk assessment and risk management (i.e., an
interpretation of WTO SPS agreement that is less science focused). By taking non-scientific
considerations into account, particularly in its interpretation of the “precautionary” principle, the
EU approach arguably could be used to more easily restrict trade on public-health and safety
grounds.
WTO-Extra Provisions
A WTO-extra provision, as defined by the Bruegel study, refers to commitments in policy areas
not currently covered or regulated by the WTO. For instance, there are no current WTO
undertakings with regard to environmental protection, labor laws, human rights, or movements of
capital. Table 2 provides a partial list and description of 15 such WTO-extra provisions that have
been incorporated into U.S. and EU PTAs.83
The Bruegel analysis determined that EU PTAs extend much more frequently beyond current
WTO obligations and rules than the U.S. agreements. Of the 28 agreements analyzed, the Bruegel
study determined that the 14 EU agreements contain almost four times as many instances of
WTO-extra provisions as do the 14 U.S. agreements. The study also judged that there has been an
increasing tendency to this effect as more recent EU agreements have incorporated an even
greater number of WTO-extra provisions.84

80 Ibid., pp. 239-240.
81 Ibid., p. 242.
82 Ibid.
83 Henrick Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis, and Andre Sapir, “Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and US Preferential
Trade Agreements,” p. 13.
84 Ibid., pp. 6, 40.
Congressional Research Service
17

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

Table 2. Description of Selective WTO-Extra Provisions
Provision Content
Anti-corruption
Regulations affecting criminal measures relating to
international trade and investment
Competition policy
Harmonization of competition laws; establishment or
maintenance of an independent competition authority
Consumer protection
Harmonization of consumer protection laws; exchange of
information and experts
Data protection
Exchange of information and experts; joint projects
Environmental laws
Development of environmental standards; enforcement of
national environmental laws; establishment of sanctions for
violation of environmental laws
Investment
Development of legal frameworks; harmonization and
simplification of procedures; establishment of mechanisms
for settlement of disputes
Movement of capital
Liberalization of capital movements; prohibition of new
restrictions
Labor market conditions
Regulation of the national labor market; affirmation of
International Labor Organization (ILO) core commitments
Intellectual property rights (IPR)
Accession to international treaties not referenced in the
TRIPs Agreement
Human rights
Respect for human rights
Illicit drugs
Joint projects on reduction of supply and demand
Money laundering
Harmonization of standards; technical and administrative
assistance
Social matters
Coordination of social security systems; non-discrimination
regarding working conditions
Terrorism
Exchange of information and experience; joint research and
studies
Visa and asylum
Exchange of information; drafting legislation; training
Source: “Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and US preferential trade agreements,” Bruegel Blueprint
Series VII, 2009, p. 15.
Notes: Other WTO-extra provisions described in the Bruegel study covered agriculture, approximation of
legislation, audio visual, civil protection, innovation policies, cultural cooperation, economic policy dialogues,
education and training, energy, financial assistance, health, illegal immigration, industrial cooperation, information
society, mining,, nuclear safety, political dialogue, public administration, regional cooperation, research and
technology, small and medium enterprise, statistics, and taxation.
The Bruegel study also found that only 8 of the 38 WTO-extra provisions included in either U.S.
or EU PTAs involved legally enforceable obligations. Three of these eight areas are included in
both U.S. and EU agreements: intellectual property rights, investment, and movement of capital.
Three areas concern mostly or solely U.S. agreements: anti-corruption, environment, and labor.
Two areas involve EU agreements only: competition policy and social matters. Provisions
Congressional Research Service
18

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

relating to terrorism, illegal immigration, visa and immigration, and illegal drugs appear in only
some EU agreements.85
Although both sets of agreements contain a significant number of WTO-extra provisions, the
number of legally enforceable WTO-extra provisions contained in either the U.S. or EU PTAs is
quite small. Provisions that can be regarded as breaking new ground compared to existing WTO
agreements, according to the Bruegel study, are limited to the environment and labor standards
for the U.S. agreements and competition policy for the EU agreements. These provisions all deal
with regulatory issues, many of which have been the subject of previous U.S. and EU attempts to
incorporate into the WTO rules, often against the wishes of developing countries. Based on the
fact that the new, legally enforceable WTO-extra provisions all deal with regulatory issues, the
Bruegel study concludes that EU and U.S. agreements effectively serve as a means for the two
sides to export their own regulatory regimes to their FTA partners.86
Trade Coverage
To compare the scope and coverage of U.S. and EU PTAs in force, trade flows are presented in
Table 3 and Table 4. The list of PTAs compared is based on the WTO’s Regional Trade
Agreements database.87 Table 3 shows that the EU’s 26 agreements notified to the WTO (rows 2-
27) were valued at $511 billion in exports in 2008 (row 28), representing 27% of the EU’s exports
to the world. Including the PTAs (Korea, India, Ukraine, and Canada) for which the EU has made
an early announcement to the WTO, these numbers (row 34) increase to $669 billion and 36% of
EU27 exports to the world.88
Given that the EU itself is a preferential trade agreement that has been reported to the WTO,
inclusion of intra-EU27 trade provides a more complete presentation of trade covered by the EU’s
PTAs.89 Due to the fact that intra-EU exports are much larger (by a factor of 148% in 2008) than
extra-EU trade, the total trade covered by EU PTAs is quite extensive.90 As shown in Table 3
(row 37), $3.4 trillion in trade is covered by a combination of intra-EU27 and extra-EU27
exports, accounting for 70% of total EU exports (intra-EU and extra-EU). In addition, if the four
negotiations that the EU has provided early notification are included in these calculations, these
numbers increase to a 74% share of total exports valued at $3.5 trillion (row 38).

85 Ibid., p. 28.
86 Ibid., p. 43.
87This database includes trade agreements (mostly customs unions and FTAs) notified to the WTO and in force, plus a
list of other PTAs for which an early announcement has been made. The list does not include PTAs with non-WTO
members or preference programs such as the EU’s EPAs or the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences. It is unclear
why the WTO uses the term “regional trade agreement” instead of preferential trade agreement.
88 Extra EU27 exports are goods exported from EU member states to non-member states and is the figure often referred
to as EU27 exports to the world. This figure, in turn, is most commonly compared to U.S. exports to the world.
89 Intra-EU trade refers to member states exports to one another (e.g. German exports to France).
90 Intra-EU27 exports totaled $2.86 trillion in 2008 compared to extra-EU 27 exports valued at $1.92 trillion.
Congressional Research Service
19

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

Table 3. EU27 Trade (Exports) Covered by PTAs, 2008
Partner/Type
Share of Exports (%)
Value (billions of dollars)
1. Extra EU27
100.00
1,924.00
Agreements Notified to WTO


2. Albania
0.15
0.86
3. Algeria
1.16
22.42
4. Andorra
0.09
1.67
5. Bosnia & Herzegovina
0.28
5.45
6. Cameroon
0.09
1.72
7. Cariforum states (Antigua and
Barbuda, Belize, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Grenada,
Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Lucia,
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
Saint Christopher and Nevis,
Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago)
0.27 5.19
8. Chile
0.38
7.36
9. Cote d’Ivoire
0.11
2.18
10. Croatia
1.09
20.95
11. Egypt
0.96
18.50
12.Faroe Islands
0.03
0.64
13. Iceland
0.17
3.32
14. Israel
1.06
20.48
15. Jordan
0.22
4.29
16. Lebanon
0.30
5.72
17. Mexico
1.66
31.89
18. Macedonia
0.19
3.69
19. Montenegro
0.07
1.28
20. Morocco
1.10
21.17
21. Norway
3.30
63.50
22. San Marino
0.02
0.39
23. South Africa
1.52
29.26
24. Switzerland-Liechtenstein
7.57
143.80
25. Syria
0.26
5.08
26.Tunisia 0.76
14.56
27. Turkey
4.13
79.44
28. Sum of Rows 2-27
27.26
511.12
Early Announcements to WTO


29. Korea, Republic of
1.95
37.4
30. India
2.40
46.1
Congressional Research Service
20

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

Partner/Type
Share of Exports (%)
Value (billions of dollars)
31. Ukraine
1.92
36.90
32. Canada
1.97
37.91
Extra-EU27 Trade
33. Sum of rows 29-32
8.24
158.30
34. Sum of rows 28 and 33
35.5
669.42
EC 27 Enlargement


35. Intra-EU trade
59.7
2,855.00
36. Intra EU 27 exports plus extra
EU 27 exports
100.00
4,779.00
37. Rows 28 plus 35 divided by
row 36
70.43
3,366.11
38. Rows 37 plus 33 divided by
row 36
73.74
3,524.41
Source: World Trade Atlas and Eurostat, External and intra-European Union trade, 2009 edition.
Notes: Data in rows 1-34 comprise extra-EU 27 exports and rows 35-38 include intra-EU 27 exports. Share
data for rows 35-38 represent percentages of total EU trade—intra-EU27 exports plus extra-EU27 exports.
Data for row 38 reflects shares that could be reached if agreements with Korea, India, Ukraine, and Canada are
implemented.
As shown in Table 4 (row 18), U.S. PTAs account for 40% of U.S. total trade (exports) that were
valued at $520 billion in 2008. This compares to, on the one hand, 27% of Extra EU-27 exports
valued at $511 billion, and, on the other hand, 70% of total EU exports (extra plus intra EU-27
exports) valued at $3.4 trillion.
If the three additional agreements (Korea, Colombia, and Panama) that the United States has been
notified to the WTO are included (row 23), 44% of total U.S. exports are covered by PTAs with
trade valued at $571 billion. These figures, in turn, compare to, on the one hand, 36% of Extra
EU-27 exports valued at $36 billion, and, on the other hand, 74% of total EU exports (extra plus
intra EU-27) valued at $3.5 trillion.91
These numbers can be used to evaluate two arguments that are commonly made about the
proliferation of U.S. and EU PTAs: (1) that U.S. firms may face more discrimination and possibly
reduced sales than EU firms due to the EU’s larger participation in PTAs, and (2) that the EU’s
larger participation in PTAs may allow it to gain more control over the international trade agenda
via extension of its own regulatory regime and standards to its PTA partners. Any evaluation
depends heavily on whether one uses as a basis of comparison the EU’s exports to the world
(Extra-EU27 trade) or the EU’s total exports (Extra-EU27 trade plus Intra-EU 27 trade).
Concerning the first argument that U.S. firms are falling behind, a case can be made that the EU’s
total trade (Extra plus Intra- EU27 exports) is an appropriate measure. This is because the EU
itself is a PTA that discriminates against U.S. exporters as well as all non-members. Thus, it is
possible to maintain that the EU’s PTAs cover nearly twice as much exports in percentage terms

91 Including the agreements both sides have notified to the WTO but not yet concluded, the EU to U.S. comparison is
74% to 44% and $3.5 trillion to $0.6 trillion. See row 38 in Table 3 and row 23 in Table 4.
Congressional Research Service
21

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

(70% versus 40%) and seven times as much in value terms ($3.4 trillion versus $0.52 trillion)
than U.S. PTAs. At the same time, this argument may be overstated because the data are upwardly
biased due to the fact that the amount of trade covered by preferential agreements is not the same
as the amount of trade that is conducted on a preferential basis.92
Concerning the second argument that the EU’s participation in PTAs may allow it to gain more
control of the international trade agenda, a case can be made that EU exports to the world (Extra-
EU 27 trade) is the more appropriate measure. This is because both the EU and United States are
free to set their own regulatory standards, and the fact that the EU is a PTA provides no
discriminatory advantage. Thus, it is possible to maintain that EU exports to the world are the
most appropriate measure. Under this situation, the regulatory extension argument is basically a
wash given that the U.S. and EU share of exports covered by existing PTAs are nearly identical in
value terms ($520 billion for the U.S. and $511 billion for the EU).
Table 4. U.S. Trade (Exports) Covered by PTAs, 2008
Partner
Share of Exports (%)
Value (billions US $)
1. World
100
1,287.00
Agreements Notified to WTO


2. Canada (NAFTA)
20.28
261.15
3. Mexico (NAFTA)
11.75
151.22
4. Dominican Republic (DR-
CAFTA)
0.51 6.59
5. Costa Rica (DR-CAFTA)
0.44
5.68
6. El Salvador (DR-CAFTA)
0.19
2.46
7. Honduras (DR-CAFTA)
0.38
4.85
8. Nicaragua (DR-CAFTA)
0.08
1.09
9. Australia
1.73
22.22
10. Bahrain
0.06
0.83
11. Chile
0.92
11.86
12. Jordan
0.07
0.94
13. Morocco
0.11
1.43
14. Oman
0.11
1.38
15. Peru
0.48
6.18
16. Singapore
2.16
27.85
17. Israel
1.13
14.49
18. Sum of Rows 2-17
40.40
520.22
Early Announcements to WTO


19. Korea, Republic of
2.69
34.67
20. Colombia
0.89
11.44
21. Panama
0.38
4.89
22. Sum of Rows 19-21
3.96
51.00
23. Sum of Rows 18 & 22
44.36
571.22
Source: World Trade Atlas.
Notes: List of U.S. PTA partners is based on the WTO Regional Trade Agreements database. Rows 2-17 are
PTAs notified to the WTO and currently in force and rows 19-20 comprise PTAs for which an early
announcement has been made.

92 This is due to the fact that a significant amount of trade today is valued at zero duties or at very low tariff rates.
Congressional Research Service
22

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

Trade Competition
Concerns about falling behind and avoiding trade diversion have arguably been a factor in the
two trading partners efforts to negotiate and implement separate but similar PTAs with five
trading partners (Israel, Mexico, Morocco, Chile, and Jordan). The share of total U.S. and EU
exports covered by these competing initiatives varies greatly (33% of total U.S. exports but only
4% of EU exports), but the trade shares do not necessarily capture the importance of these PTAs
in terms of opening markets for specific industries and firms, boosting foreign direct investment
flows, or pushing the envelope of economic reforms in areas such as services and investment.
Figures 1-5 provide data illustrating the extent to which either side has appeared to have gained
market share as a result of the implementation of a PTA. In general, the data point to a lack of
demonstrable success in improving market shares in four of the five FTAs. This does not mean
individual companies and workers have not benefitted or that exports have not risen at faster rates
as a result of these PTAs, but that in the aggregate many other factors other than PTAs may be
determining how well each side does overall in supplying a trading partner with its imports.
These factors may include historical ties, commodity composition of trade, general
macroeconomic conditions such as growth and exchange rates, PTAs negotiated with other
countries in an attempt to diversify from traditional suppliers, and the rise of new competitors,
such as China.
The earliest trade agreements are with Israel, with the U.S.-Israeli FTA having entered into force
in August 1985 and the EU-Israeli FTA in June 2000. As shown in Figure 1, neither trading
partner has gained a larger share of Israel’s market since its FTA became effective. In the case of
the United States, its share of Israel’s imports averaged 16.5% in the four years (1982-1985) prior
to implementation of the agreement and 15.75% in the four years (1986-1989) after
implementation. Over the 1990s (1990-1999), the U.S. share of Israel’s market averaged 17.4%
(nearly a percentage point higher than the four-year period prior to the agreement), but dropped to
an average of 15% from 2000 to 2008. Over the most recent four-year period (2005-2008), the
U.S. market share has averaged only 12.5%, four percentage points lower than the four years
prior to the onset of the agreement.
Congressional Research Service
23

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

Figure 1. U.S. and EU Shares of Israel’s Imports, 1982-2008
(percent)

Source: CRS calculations based on data from the International Monetary Fund Directions of Trade Yearbooks.
The EU similarly has not experienced a rise in its share of Israel’s market since its FTA went into
effect in June 2000. For 19 years (1982-1999) prior to the FTA, the EU’s market share averaged
46.7%, but this share dropped nearly four percentage points since the agreement came into force
(based on a 42.3% market share from 2001-2008).
The free trade agreement with Mexico is the largest of the overlapping agreements. As shown in
Figure 2, while the U.S. share of Mexico’s imports rose from 72.0% in 1994 (the year the
agreement went into force) to an average of 74.5% during the following six years (1995-2000),
the U.S. import share has declined dramatically in recent years. During the past eight years (2001-
2008), the United States import share averaged 56.5%, a drop of 18 percentage points from the
immediate post-NAFTA period (1995-2000). The EU, on the other hand, has gained a minuscule
amount of market share of less than 1% based on an average market share of 10.4% from the
eight years (1993-2000) prior to the agreement and an average market share of 11.0% in the eight
years (2001-2008) after the agreement went into effect. A comparison, however, based on the full
decade of the 1990s (1990-1999), shows that the EU has lost a little over 1% market share since
its agreement went into force in June 2000.
Congressional Research Service
24

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

Figure 2. U.S. and EU Shares of Mexico’s Imports, 1990-2008
(percent)

Source: CRS calculations based on data from the International Monetary Fund Directions of Trade Yearbooks.
Implementation of the FTAs with Jordan has also coincided with a decline in import market share
for both the United States and the EU. As shown in Figure 3, the U.S. share of Jordan’s imports
has declined from an average of 9.2% (1997-2001) prior to the December 2001 implementation
date to a post-implementation (2002-2008) average market share of 6.1%. Similarly, the EU share
of Jordan’s market has dropped post-FTA implementation, going from an average of 31.0%
during 1997-2001 to an average of 25.2% during 2002-2008.
Congressional Research Service
25

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

Figure 3. U.S. and EU Shares of Jordan’s Imports, 1997-2008
(percent)

Source: CRS calculations based on data from the International Monetary Fund Directions of Trade Yearbooks.
In the case of Chile (Figure 4), both the United States and EU have also lost market share since
the implementation of their respective free trade agreements. For the United States, the drop in
market share has been about 1%-2% depending on the time periods compared. For the five years
after the FTA became effective in January 2004, the U.S. market share averaged 15% compared
to a 16.2% average share from 1999-2003 and a 17.4% average share from 1997-2003. For the
EU, the drop has been about 3%-4% depending on the time frame compared. For the almost four
years the FTA has been in effect since March 2005, the EU market share averaged 13.3%
compared to 16.2% for the previous five years and 17.3% for the previous eight years.
Congressional Research Service
26

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

Figure 4. U.S. and EU Shares of Chile’s Imports, 1997-2008
(percent)

Source: CRS calculations based on data from International Monetary Fund Directions of Trade Yearbooks.
Morocco is the one country where implementation of an FTA has coincided with a small rise in
market share for both the United States and EU. As shown in Figure 5, the United States has
gained one half of one percent average market share since the FTA was implemented in
December 2001, rising from an average market share of 4.5% from 1998-2005 to an average
market share of 5.0% from 2006-2008. The EU gained about 1.5% market share post FTA
implementation in March 2000, going from a 54.5% market share over 1998-2000 to an average
market share of 56.0% from 2001-2008.
Congressional Research Service
27

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

Figure 5. U.S. and EU Shares of Morocco’s Imports, 1998-2008
(percent)

Source: CRS calculations based on data from IMF Directions of Trade Yearbook.
Implications for the Multilateral Trading System
and U.S. Trade Policy
Europe’s PTA program has implications for the multilateral trading system and for U.S. trade
policy. These impacts are discussed below.
Multilateral Trading System
There are a variety of criteria for assessing how Europe’s network of PTAs support or hinder the
multilateral trading system. Depending on the criteria employed, various assessments that are
neutral, positive, or negative can be derived.
No Impact
One school of thought maintains that PTA’s can boost multilateral activity by serving as a prod
(usually through trade diversion) for multilateral negotiations. Proponents of this perspective hold
that some PTAs in the past have boosted multilateral activity through competitive liberalization.93
For example, the conclusion of NAFTA, along with the EU’s progress toward a single market in
1994, is said by many to have helped push the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations
to a successful conclusion. It is argued that these regional efforts, in which both the EU and

93 Competitive liberalization envisages bilateral and regional FTAs as mutually reinforcing steps that will drive
countries to strengthen multilateral disciplines as well.
Congressional Research Service
28

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

United States were involved, helped other countries see the benefits of a multilateral agreement
particularly because they would be disadvantaged by NAFTA and Europe’s single market if
overall tariff levels remained the same. 94
To date, many analysts maintain that Europe’s PTAs have not provided a push for competitive
liberalization or served as a prod for ending the stalemate in the Doha Round of multilateral trade
negotiations.95 An important reason could be that Europe’s PTAs for the most part have not
liberalized substantial amounts of trade.96 Compared with the EU itself, most PTA partners have
been individually small, accounting for a small share of EU exports and providing the EU with
small markets. Whether potential FTAs with larger trading partners, such as Korea or Canada,
could generate more trade diversion and thereby serve as a prod for other countries to liberalize,
remains to be seen.
Positive Impact
A second school of thought holds that PTAs can be compatible with multilateral activity by
developing new rules and obligations that will entice others to join. EU officials in fact have
stated that to have a positive impact, future EU PTAs need to be comprehensive in scope, provide
for the liberalization of substantially all trade (as “required” by the WTO), and go beyond current
WTO rules with deeper obligations than currently exist. These commitments, if fulfilled, would
increase the chances that future FTAs would be compatible and supportive of the multilateral
trading system.97
Since its Global Europe policy shift in 2006, the EU has finalized only one agreement—the EU-
Korea FTA—that appears to match the comprehensive in scope and WTO-plus criteria.98
Expected to be implemented by both sides in 2010, the EU-Korea FTA broadly parallels the U.S.-
Korea FTA in terms of comprehensiveness, trade coverage, and WTO-plus provisions, with
certain differences. With respect to tariff commitments for industrial goods, the Korea-EU FTA
appears to be comparable in ambition and comprehensiveness with respect to tariff commitments
on industrial goods, albeit with key differences for motor vehicles. The EU-Korea FTA also
appears to broadly match commitments in services made in KORUS, but lacks an investment
chapter (until passage of the Lisbon Treaty, competency for investment matters rested with
individual EU Member States).99
While a case can be made that the EU-Korea agreement appears to provide much of the deeper
integration required to be supportive of multilateralism, the EU faces steep hurdles in negotiating
comprehensive and deep PTAs with its other targeted trading partners. Efforts, for example, to

94 European Centre for International Political Economy, “A Modern Trade Policy for the European Union: A Report to
the New European Commission and Parliament from the EU Trade Policy Study Group,” January 2010, p. 22.
95 The same argument can be made about U.S. FTAs as well.
96 The proliferation of production supply chains in many different countries may also be a factor in explaining why
FTAs today could be having a more limited impact on trading patterns. See Erixon and Pehnot.
97 European Commission Staff Working Document, Global Europe: Competing in the World [Com(2006)567 final],
October 4, 2006.
98 Recently concluded FTAs with Peru and Columbia may also match this criteria.
99 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Press Release. “USTR Releases Preliminary Analysis of Korea-EU
Free Trade Agreement,” October 21, 2009. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the European Commission will gradually assume
greater competence over foreign investment.
Congressional Research Service
29

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

finish longstanding PTA negotiations with Mercosur and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
have not been successful, and attempts to start new PTA negotiations with India and ASEAN have
proceeded slowly or been abandoned. Whether its FTA negotiation with Canada can materialize
into a strong, comprehensive, WTO-plus FTA remains to be seen.
Negative Impact
A third school of thought views PTAs as having an unfavorable impact on multilateral trade for a
variety of reasons. One is that the discriminatory aspect of these agreements, combined with the
necessity of incorporating more complicated rules of origin, makes business more complicated
and uncertain with competition and efficiency suffering at the expense of trade diversion. A
related concern is that PTAs may result mostly in the spread of competing regulatory structures
with little discernible impact on trade liberalization.100
To the extent that a major aspect of Europe’s PTAs in the past has been about extending its rules
and regulations (e.g., promoting the adoption of EU standards on product safety, the environment,
corporate governance and other issues), as much if not more than opening closed sectors to trade,
some analysts see this tendency as a threat to the multilateral trading system. This concern is
amplified because the United States is also trying to extend its rules, resulting in a U.S.-EU
competition that lacks any grand scheme or blueprint for strengthening the multilateral trading
system.101
U.S. Trade Policy
In the past, Europe’s preferential trade agreements have had only a small impact on the direction
of U.S. trade policy, particularly U.S. FTA policy. But in an environment where U.S. FTA policy
has become stalemated, the EU’s new FTA with Korea and proposed FTA with Canada could play
a greater role in the U.S. FTA debate.
FTA Controversy
A decade ago, the U.S. had two free trade agreements in place and three FTA partners (Israel,
Canada, and Mexico). The two agreements covered about one-third of U.S. trade (exports). From
2000 through 2007, the U.S. added nine more FTAs comprising 14 countries (Australia, Bahrain,
Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jordan, Morocco,
Nicaragua, Oman, Peru, and Singapore). These agreements added preferential coverage to around
8% of U.S. trade (exports). Three additional FTAs have been signed since 2007 (Colombia,
Korea, and Panama), but the Obama Administration has not to date arranged with Congress for
the consideration of implementing legislation.102

100 Jagdish Bhagwati, Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements Undermine Free Trade, Oxford
University Press, 2008
101 Razeen Sally, “Looking East, The European Union’s New FTA Negotiations in Asia,” October 2007, European
Centre for International Political Economy, Jan Tulir Essays, No 3. Accessed at http://www.ecipe.org.
102 CRS Report RL31356, Free Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy, by
William H. Cooper.
Congressional Research Service
30

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

Lack of movement from the Obama Administration and the congressional leadership in
considering these three FTAs reflects both specific concerns about each agreement (violence
against labor union representatives in Colombia, treatment of trade in automobiles and beef in
Korea, and labor and tax laws in Panama), as well as growing debate over the impact that FTAs
have on the United States. The U.S. business community broadly supports FTAs as promoters of
U.S. exports, jobs, and stronger political ties. But U.S. labor unions and some NGOs oppose them
on grounds of unfair competition or their alleged adverse impact on workers and development in
poor countries.103
Impact of EU-Korea and EU-Canada FTAs
Europe’s PTA program to date, as previously noted, has not been a major factor in the U.S. debate
over FTAs. While some U.S. interests have long worried that the EU used its PTAs to encourage
adoption of international standards that emulate its own practices and policy objectives, there has
been less concern that the EU’s PTA agreements have been robust in terms of opening markets,
thereby adversely affecting U.S.-based production and workers. This is primarily due to the fact
that the majority of Europe’s PTAs have been with countries that have small markets or with
countries such as Mexico and Chile that already have an FTA in force with the United States.
Additionally, U.S. multinational corporations are heavily invested in Europe and stand ready to
benefit from preferential trade openings negotiated by the EU. However, the recently negotiated
and initialed EU-Korea FTA, and the possibility of an EU-Canada FTA, coming into force could
alter the shape of the discussion.
An important concern that the EU-Korea FTA raises is that U.S. exporters, particularly
manufacturers, will be put at risk due to the duty-free price advantage European-based producers
will gain in the Korean market. One analysis suggests the implementation of the Korea-EU FTA,
while the U.S.-Korea FTA remains on hold, would disadvantage U.S. exports in a range of
sectors, including chemicals, electrical and non-electrical machinery.104 A second study estimates
these adverse effects on U.S. exports and employment would total over $30 billion dollars and
lead to a loss of over 200,000 jobs.105 A third analysis estimates the impact of the EU-South
Korea FTA on U.S. exports (again assuming the U.S.-Korean FTA is not implemented) at $1.1
billion in lost exports.106 Accordingly, these FTA proponents argue that rapid implementation of
the U.S.-Korea FTA is necessary to neutralize any real or perceived disadvantage the agreement
places on U.S. exporters and investors.
EU negotiations with Canada over an ambitious and comprehensive FTA could also affect the
U.S. FTA debate. A full range of issues including tariffs, services, non-tariff barriers, intellectual
property protection, and government procurement are on the table. Hopes of success have been
bolstered by the presence of Canada’s provinces, which in the past have not been supportive of
FTAs or participants in the negotiations. Their involvement is considered crucial since they

103 Ed Gresser, “More Growth, Less Gridlock: Toward A New Trade Agenda,” The New Democratic Leadership
Council, July 2009.
104 Ernest H. Preeg, “A New Trade Strategy: From Here to Multilateral Free Trade,” Manufacturers Alliance Policy
Review, February 2009.
105 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “Trade Action – or Inaction: The Cost for American Workers and Companies,”
September 15, 2009.
106 Committee on Ways and Means, Republican Staff from technical assistance provided by the U.S. International
Trade Commission, September 15, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
31

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

undertake the bulk of public procurement and have jurisdiction over selected investment
opportunities, including natural resources, key negotiating objectives of the EU. Canadian
provinces also have wide competencies in the labor market, thereby allowing a CETA to go
beyond NAFTA in scope.107 The EU is also pushing to get increased patent protection for
pharmaceutical companies, heightened support for famous trademarks, and new rules for
industrial designs.108 For Canada, a major priority of an FTA is to increase access to the EU
market for agricultural products and other sectors such as aerospace, chemicals, wood products,
fish, and automotive vehicles and parts.109
Assuming a robust EU-Canada FTA was agreed to, the EU and the United States would then both
have a FTA with Canada and Mexico, making the absence of an FTA between the United States
and Europe all the more glaring after many years of discussion. This concept was first proposed
in the 1990s but encountered numerous objections. Whether a EU-Canadian FTA would alter
these longstanding arguments remains to be seen.
A U.S.-EU FTA, with ambitious coverage in all sectors and that clearly goes beyond WTO
commitments in non-tariff barriers, could generate significant effects on trade and welfare. It
would also have strong effects on the multilateral system. Some say such an FTA could spur other
countries to raise ambitions and offers in the Doha Round while others fear it would prove too
threatening to most members of the WTO and undermine current multilateral trade liberalization
efforts.110
Conclusion
It is not clear what direction Europe’s PTA policy will head in the future. Under its Global Europe
policy, the EU intended to negotiate commercially relevant and WTO-compliant PTAs by
targeting middle-sized economies with some significant barriers such as Korea, India, and
eventually Canada. According to some European observers, by pursuing this strategy, the EU
hoped to gain better access to foreign markets without having to concede significant reductions in
its own agricultural and services barriers. The underlying premise may have been that smaller
countries or regions would be willing to deliver cuts in their own protective barriers on a non-
reciprocal basis because the EU offered a much bigger market that would facilitate increases in
export volume.111
To move forward, these same observers maintain that the EU should examine the idea of targeting
bigger economies for bilateral negotiations. These would be the handful of remaining countries
that fall outside the EU’s network of PTAs, namely the United States, China, Japan, and Australia.
PTA negotiations with these countries, it is argued, could yield significant economic benefits and
provide the biggest impact (for good or ill) on the world trading system. Bigger trade partners

107Vogel, Toby, European Voice, “Talks to Start on Trade Deal with Canada,” October 15, 2009.
108 Ottawa Citizen, “Low-key EU trade talks could dramatically reshape Canadian IP law,” December 22, 2009.
109 Agence France-Presse, Canada, EU head into Round 2 of trade talks, January 19, 2020.
110 Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Transatlantic Economic Challenge, September 2009, p. 10.
111 European Centre for International Political Economy, A Modern Trade Policy for the European Union, p. 24.
Congressional Research Service
32

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

such as the United States and China, however, would likely demand openings in agriculture and
services, sectors where there is widespread opposition to liberalization.112
From a different perspective, some European economists maintain that the competitiveness of EU
firms has more to do with internal EU market conditions (domestic trade policy) than with
opening export markets through PTA negotiations. Rejecting the notion that opening export
markets will strengthen the competitiveness of European companies, these observers advocate
placing greater emphasis on unilateral liberalization of protected sectors and domestic market
reforms. In addition to reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy, these economists propose
completing a single market for services by ending barriers that member states still impose against
suppliers from other member states on the grounds of regulatory differences. They argue that the
absence of a more dynamic European-wide services sector raise the prices of services relative to
goods, and prevents the EU from trading off its agricultural protectionism for better access for its
industrial and services firms. If Europe is not prepared to extend improved market access to
exports of services and agriculture, foreign countries are likely to maintain barriers against
Europe’s industrial and services firms.113
If public support in the EU is lacking for undertaking significant agricultural reforms and services
liberalization to position itself to negotiate an FTA with the largest economies, European
policymakers could explore a number of alternative approaches to trade liberalization both with
the United States and with other big economies such as China. For the United States the
possibilities include intensified regulatory cooperation with the goal of developing common
standards, sector specific initiatives to remove barriers to trade, or the elimination of all tariffs on
manufactured goods.114 For China, where negotiations with the EU currently take place under the
rubric of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA), an improved PCA is put forth by
some observers as an alternative way (from a multilateral agreement or a FTA) of dealing with
bilateral trade tensions and negotiating better market access for European companies.115
In considering alternative trade liberalization approaches, many stakeholders in Europe no doubt
will emphasize a need to place renewed emphasis and priority on concluding multilateral
agreements. EU trading interests, just as U.S. interests, are worldwide and a strong multilateral
trading system that ensures that trade flows smoothly, predictably, and as freely as possible will
likely remain a top priority.

112 Simon Evenett, “EU Commercial Policy in a Multipolar Trading System, The Center for International Governance
Innovation, Working Paper No. 23, April 2007, p. 31-32.
113 Razeen Salley, p.9 and European Centre for International Political Economy, A Modern Trade Policy, p. 30.
114 Fredrik Erixon and Gernot Pehnelt, “A New Trade Agenda for Transatlantic Economic Cooperation,” European
Centre for International Political Economy, ECIPE Working Paper No 9, September 2009, p.16.
115 Fredrik Erixon and Razeen Sally, “Defensiveness and Fragmentation in EU Trade Policy,” Published in the EU in a
World of Transition: Fit for what purpose?” in November 2009 by Policy Network. Downloadable at
http://www.policy-network.net/uploadedFiles/Publications/Publications/A%20World%20in%20transition.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
33

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

Appendix. EU PTAs
Table A-1. EU PTAs with Members and Close Neighbors
Date of Entry into
Partner
Nature of Agreement
Force Comments
EC Member States
Treaty of Rome
January 1, 1958

(EC12)
EC – Accession of
January
1,
1995

Austria, Finland, and
Sweden (EC-15)
EC- Accession of

May 1, 2004

Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
Slovakia, Slovenia
(EC25)
EC- Accession of
January
1,
2007

Bulgaria and Romania
(EC27)
Iceland, Liechtenstein,
European Economic Area
January 1, 1994
EEA replaces previous FTA
Norway
agreements with these
countries
Andorra
Customs Union
July 7, 1991
Exchange of letters
Turkey
Customs Union
December 31, 1995
Decision 1/95 of the EC-
Turkey Association Council
San Marino
Customs Union
December 1, 1992

Faroe Islands
Free Trade Agreement
January 1, 1997
Replace 1991 trade
agreement
The former Yugoslav
Stabilisation and
May 1, 2004

Republic
Association Agreements
Croatia Stabilisation
and
February 2, 2005
Provisions first applied
Association Agreements
under interim agreement
Albania Stabilisation
and
December 1, 2006
Provisions first applied
Association Agreements
under Interim Agreement
Montenegro Stabilisation
and January 1, 2008
Interim agreement, pending
Association Agreements
entry into force of SSA
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Stabilisation and
July 1, 2008
Interim agreement, pending
Association Agreements
entry into force of SAA
Serbia
Interim Agreement on
February 1, 2010

trade and trade-related
matters
Source: European Commission, Overview of Regional Trade Agreements, February 5, 2010.

Congressional Research Service
34

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

Table A-2. EU PTAs with Bordering or Near-Bordering Countries
Date of Entry into
Partner
Nature of Agreement
Force
Comments
Algeria
Association Agreement
September 1, 1995
Euro-Med agreement
replaces cooperation
agreement
Egypt
Association Agreement
June 1, 2004
Euro-Med agreement
replaces cooperation
agreement
Israel
Association Agreement
June 1, 2000
Euro-Med agreement; trade
provisions initially applied
under (1995) Interim
Agreement
Jordan
Association Agreement
May 1, 2002
Euro-Med Agreement,
signed November 24, 1997
Lebanon
Interim Agreement
May 1, 2002
Euro-Med Agreement
signed on June 16, 2002;
replaces cooperation
agreement
Morocco
Association Agreement
March 1, 2000

Palestinian Authority
Association Agreement
July 1, 1997
Interim Euro-Med
agreement
Syria
Co-operation Agreement
July 1, 1977
Euro-Med Agreement
signed in October 2004,
but not yet entered into
force
Tunisia
Association Agreement
March 1, 1998
Euro-Med Agreement
Gulf Cooperation
None

Negotiations on an FTA
Council (Bahrain,
expected to re-start in
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
2010
Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates)
Russia
Partnership and
1997
Negotiations on a new
Cooperation Agreement
framework agreement
commenced in 2008
Ukraine Partnership
and
1998
Negotiations launched in
Cooperation Agreement
March 2007 on a new
Association Agreement




Source: European Commission: Overview of Regional Trade Agreements, updated February 5, 2010, and
European Commission: Overview of FTA and Other Trade Negotiations, November 4, 2009.



Congressional Research Service
35

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

Table A-3. EU PTA’s with Developing Countries
Date of Entry into
Partner
Nature of Agreement
Force
Comments
CARIFFORUM States
Economic Partnership
Pending
Date of signature: October
(Antigua and Barbuda,
Agreement (EPA)
15, 2008 (Haiti signed on
Bahamas, Barbados,
December 11, 2009)
Belize, Dominica, the
Dominican Republic,
Grenada, Guyana, Haiti,
Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint
Vincent and the
Grenadines, Saint
Christopher and Nevis,
Suriname, Trinidad and
Tobago)
EAC (Burundi, Kenya,
Interim Economic

Negotiations on a more
Rwanda, Tanzania,
Partnership Agreement
comprehensive EPA
Uganda)
ongoing
ESA (Comoros,
Interim Economic
Signed on August 29 2009
Negotiations on a more
Madagascar, Mauritius,
Partnership Agreement
by Mauritius, Sychelles,
comprehensive EPA
Seychelles, Zambia,
Zimbabwe, and Madagascar ongoing.
Zimbabwe)
Pacific (Papua New
Interim Economic
Papua New Guinea signed
Negotiations on a more
Guinea, Fiji)
Partnership Agreement
on July 30 2009 and Fiji
comprehensive EPA
signed on December 11,
ongoing
2009
SADC (Botswana,
Interim Economic
Botswana, Lesotho,
Negotiations on a more
Lesotho, Namibia,
Partnership Agreement
Swaziland and Mozambique
comprehensive EPA on-
Mozambique, Swaziland)
signed in June 2009
going
West Africa (Ghana)
Interim Economic

Negotiations on a more
Partnership Agreement
comprehensive EPA on-
going
Source: European Commission, Overview of Regional Trade Agreements, February 5, 2010.








Congressional Research Service
36

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

Table A-4. EU PTAs with Distant Countries and Regions
Date of Entry into
Partner
Nature of Agreement
Force
Comments
ASEAN (Brunei,
FTA
Negotiations
were
Cambodia, Indonesia,
launched in June 2007, but
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar,
suspended in December
Philippines, Singapore,
2008. Subsequently, the EU
Thailand, and Vietnam)
announced that bilateral
negotiations with Singapore
and Vietnam would
commence in 2010
Andean Community
Association Agreement

Regional negotiations
(Bolivia, Colombia,
suspended in 2008.
Ecuador, and Peru)
Bilateral agreements with
Colombia and Peru
reached on March 1, 2010
Central America (Costa Association Agreement

Negotiations ongoing
Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras,
and Nicaragua)
Mercosur (Argentina,
Association Agreement

Negotiations suspended
Brazil, Paraguay, and
since 2004, but discussions
Uruguay)
to resume are ongoing
Chile Association
Agreement
February 3, 2004
Full implementation of FTA
which included an FTA
expected by 2013
Mexico
Economic Partnership,
July 1, 2000

Political Coordination and
Cooperation Agreement
which included an FTA
South Africa
Trade, Development, and
January 1, 2000
TCDA aims to establish an
Co-operation Agreement
FTA by 2012
(TCDA)
Republic of South Korea
FTA

Both sides still need to
ratify the agreement which
was reached in October
2009
India FTA

Negotiations
were
launched in June 2007 and
are ongoing
Canada
Comprehensive Economic
Negotiations
were
and Trade Agreement
launched in October 2009
and are ongoing
Singapore FTA

Negotiations
to
commence
in 2010
Vietnam FTA

Negotiations
to
commence
in 2010
Source: European Commission, Overview of FTA and Other Trade Negotiations, November 4, 2009.

Congressional Research Service
37

---

Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications

Author Contact Information

Raymond J. Ahearn

Specialist in International Trade and Finance
rahearn@crs.loc.gov, 7-7629


Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank J. Michael Donnelly and Lisa Mages, Research Information Specialists, KSG,
for invaluable assistance in providing trade data and bibliographic sources.

Congressional Research Service
38

---