Federalism Issues in Surface Transportation
Policy: Past and Present
Robert Jay Dilger
Senior Specialist in American National Government
March 22, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40431
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Federalism Issues in Surface Transportation Policy: Past and Present
Summary
American federalism, which shapes the roles, responsibilities, and interactions among and
between the federal government, the states, and local governments, is continuously evolving,
adapting to changes in American society and American political institutions. The nature of
federalism relationships in surface transportation policy has also evolved over time, with the
federal government’s role becoming increasingly influential, especially since the Federal-Aid to
Highway Act of 1956 which authorized the interstate highway system. In recent years, state and
local government officials, through their public interest groups (especially the National
Governors Association, National Conference of State Legislatures, National Association of
Counties, National League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors, and American Association of
State Highway and Transportation Officials) have lobbied for increased federal assistance for
surface transportation grants and increased flexibility in the use of those funds. They contend that
they are better able to identify surface transportation needs in their states than federal officials
and are capable of administering federal grant funds with relatively minimal federal oversight.
They also argue that states have a long history of learning from one another. In their view,
providing states flexibility in the use of federal funds results in better surface transportation
policy because it enables states to experiment with innovative solutions to surface transportation
problems and then share their experiences with other states. Others argue that the federal
government has a responsibility to ensure that federal funds are used in the most efficient and
effective manner possible to promote the national interest in expanding national economic growth
and protecting the environment. In their view, providing states increased flexibility in the use of
federal funds diminishes the federal government’s ability to ensure that national needs are met.
Still others have argued for a fundamental restructuring of federal and state government
responsibilities in surface transportation policy, with some responsibilities devolved to states and
others remaining with the federal government.
Congressional attention to federalism issues in surface transportation policy tends to increase
during reauthorizations of the federal highway and mass transit program. The current highway
and mass transit program, the $286 billion, Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient
Transportation Equity Act of 2005: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA, P.L. 109-59), after being
extended several times, is set to expire on December 31, 2010. Its reauthorization has generated
considerable legislative activity during the 111th Congress. Issues addressed by Congress include
SAFETEA’s funding level and financing, especially proposals addressing the Highway Trust
Fund’s fiscal sustainability, state funding guarantees, and congressional earmarks.
This report provides an historical perspective on contemporary federalism issues in surface
transportation policy that are likely to be addressed by Congress during the 111th Congress,
including possible devolution of programmatic responsibility to states and proposals to change
state maintenance-of-effort requirements and state cost matching requirements.
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Federalism Issues in Surface Transportation Policy: Past and Present
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Recent Proposals Affecting Federal, State, and Local Government Roles and
Responsibilities in Surface Transportation Policy ..................................................................... 2
The Federal Government’s Role in Surface Transportation Policy: 1789-1956 ............................. 4
Constitutional Limits on Congressional Options .................................................................... 5
Balancing Constitutional Concerns and Constituent Interests: The Federal-Aid Road
Act of 1916........................................................................................................................ 6
Balancing States Rights, Interstate Commerce Powers, and Constituent Interests: The
Federal Highway Act of 1921............................................................................................. 7
Expanding the Federal Role: The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944 ..................................... 9
The Interstate Highway System Redefines Federalism Relationships in Surface
Transportation Policy: The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956.......................................... 11
The Federal Government’s Role in Surface Transportation Policy: 1956-1991 ........................... 12
Debating Reimbursement Rates: The Federal-Aid to Highway Acts of 1970 and 1978......... 12
Efforts to “Sort-out” Governmental Responsibilities in Surface Transportation Policy:
Presidents Nixon’s and Reagan’s New Federalism Proposals ............................................ 14
President Reagan’s Surface Transportation Block Grant Proposals and Opposition to
Highway “Demonstration Projects”.................................................................................. 16
ACIR: The Geographic Range of Benefits Argument........................................................... 18
The Federal Government’s Role in Surface Transportation Policy: The Post-Interstate Era ........ 20
Congress Sets a New Direction for Federalism Relationships in Surface
Transportation Policy: ISTEA .......................................................................................... 20
Debating Program Devolution and Continuing the Expansion of State Programmatic
Flexibilities: TEA-21 ....................................................................................................... 23
Balancing State Program Flexibilities with the Need to Address National Interests:
SAFETEA ....................................................................................................................... 27
MOEs and The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ..................................... 29
Federal Reimbursement Rates and The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009 ................................................................................................................................ 31
Concluding Observations .......................................................................................................... 31
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 33
Congressional Research Service
Federalism Issues in Surface Transportation Policy: Past and Present
Introduction
American federalism, which shapes the roles, responsibilities, and interactions among and
between the federal government, the states, and local governments, is continuously evolving,
adapting to changes in American society and American political institutions. The nature of
federalism relationships in surface transportation policy has also evolved over time, with the
federal government’s role becoming increasingly influential, especially since the Federal-Aid to
Highway Act of 1956 which authorized the interstate highway system. In recent years, state and
local government officials, through their public interest groups (especially the National
Governors Association, National Conference of State Legislatures, National Association of
Counties, National League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors, and American Association of
State Highway and Transportation Officials) have lobbied for increased federal assistance for
surface transportation grants and increased flexibility in the use of those funds. They contend that
they are better able to identify surface transportation needs in their states than federal officials
and are capable of administering federal grant funds with relatively minimal federal oversight.
They also argue that states have a long history of learning from one another. In their view,
providing states flexibility in the use of federal funds results in better surface transportation
policy because it enables states to experiment with innovative solutions to surface transportation
problems and then share their experiences with other states. Others argue that the federal
government has a responsibility to ensure that federal funds are used in the most efficient and
effective manner possible to promote the national interest in expanding national economic growth
and protecting the environment. In their view, providing states increased flexibility in the use of
federal funds diminishes the federal government’s ability to ensure that national needs are met.
Still others have argued for a fundamental restructuring of federal and state government
responsibilities in surface transportation policy, with some responsibilities devolved to states and
others remaining with the federal government.
Congressional attention to federalism issues in surface transportation policy tends to increase
during reauthorizations of the federal highway and mass transit program. The authorization for
the current highway and mass transit program, the $286 billion, Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and
Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2005: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA, P.L. 109-59), was
set to expire on September 30, 2009, but has been extended several times. Its reauthorization is
now set to expire on December 31, 2010.1 Issues addressed by Congress during SAFETEA’s
reauthorization have included its funding level and financing, especially proposals addressing the
Highway Trust Fund’s fiscal sustainability, state funding guarantees, and congressional
earmarks.2
This report provides an historical perspective on contemporary federalism issues in surface
transportation policy that may be addressed by Congress during the 111th Congress, including
possible devolution of programmatic responsibility to states and proposals to change state
maintenance-of-effort requirements and state cost matching requirements.
1 P.L. 111-118, P.L. 111-144, and P.L. 111-147.
2 See CRS Report R40053, Surface Transportation Program Reauthorization Issues for the 111th Congress,
coordinated by John W. Fischer; and CRS Report R40451, The Donor-Donee State Issue: Funding Equity in Surface
Transportation Reauthorization, by Robert S. Kirk.
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Recent Proposals Affecting Federal, State, and Local
Government Roles and Responsibilities in Surface
Transportation Policy
During the last two Congresses, several bills have been introduced that would fundamentally
change existing federal, state, and local government roles and responsibilities in surface
transportation policy. For example, Senator Jim DeMint and Representative Jeff Flake introduced
legislation during the 109th Congress and Senator DeMint introduced legislation in the 110th
Congress (S. 2823) that would phase-out most of the federal fuel and excise taxes that support the
Highway Trust Fund over five years; preserve federal responsibility for interstate highways,
transportation facilities on public lands, national transportation research and safety programs, and
emergency transportation assistance; and devolve most other surface transportation programs to
states.3 In addition, during previous reauthorizations some congressional Members from “donor”
states (states whose highway users pay more in estimated federal highway tax revenue to the
Highway Trust Fund than that state receives from the program) advocated program devolution as
a means to achieve program efficiencies and to address what they viewed as an inequitable
distribution of federal surface transportation funds to states.4
As will be discussed, recent reauthorizations have focused a great deal of attention on resolving
disagreements among donor and donee states concerning the distribution of the program’s funds.
Because many donor states are located in the South and the Mid-West and many donee states are
located in the Northeast, Pacific Rim, and sparsely populated Western states, recent
reauthorizations have taken on a regional perspective, pitting states from one region against
another. Although most governors and state legislative leaders have been united in their advocacy
of additional federal funding with minimal restrictions on the use of those funds, the donor-donee
debates in recent reauthorizations have divided them.
In addition to legislative efforts to change federalism relationships in surface transportation
policy, two SAFETEA-mandated, non-partisan commissions (the National Surface Transportation
Policy and Revenue Study Commission and the National Surface Transportation Infrastructure
Financing Commission) issued recommendations that, if enacted, would lead to significant
changes in existing federalism relationships in surface transportation policy.
In December 2007, the National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission
released Transportation for Tomorrow, a report on the status of nation’s surface transportation
system. The Commission concluded that “the current Federal surface transportation programs
should not be “re-authorized” in their current form [emphasis in original].”5 Instead, it
3 During the 109th Congress, Senator DeMint introduced the Transportation Empowerment Act in the Senate on April 4,
2006 (S. 2512). It was referred to the Senate Committee on Finance. Rep. Flake introduced a companion bill in the
House on April 26, 2006 (H.R. 5205). It was referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means, the House
Committee on the Budget, and the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and its Subcommittee on
Highways, Transit and Pipelines. During the 110th Congress Senator DeMint introduced an updated version of the
Transportation Empowerment Act on April 7, 2008 (S. 2823). It was referred to the Senate Committee on Finance.
4 For further analysis, see CRS Report R40451, The Donor-Donee State Issue: Funding Equity in Surface
Transportation Reauthorization, by Robert S. Kirk.
5 National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission, Transportation for Tomorrow, Washington,
DC: National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission, December 2007, Volume 1, p. 9.
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recommended a “new user-financed Federal surface transportation program” that is
“performance-driven, outcome-based, generally mode-neutral, and refocused to pursue activities
of genuine national interest.”6 The Commission made numerous specific policy recommendations
to achieve these goals, including some that would fundamentally change federalism relationships
in surface transportation policy. For example, it recommended that 108 federal surface
transportation programs be consolidated into 10 programs, with each of the new programs
focused on a national goal and organized along functional categories, such as congestion relief,
rural accessibility, saving lives, environmental stewardship, and energy security, as opposed to the
current practice of organizing most programs by transportation mode. It also recommended that
the project development and selection process be streamlined, including changes to the National
Environmental Policy Act Process, and that the planning process be refocused from the current
“bottom-up” approach to a more “top-down” approach. Under this new planning approach, the
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) would work with various stakeholders to establish
“appropriate performance standards critical to serve the national interest under the targeted new
program structure.” DOT would also establish “national transportation targets ... to advance
critical national goals for condition of transportation infrastructure, efficiency and mobility,
safety, rural accessibility, environmental quality, energy conservation, access to Federal lands,
and research.”7
In February 2009, the National Surface Transportation Infrastructure Financing Commission
released, Paying Our Way: A New Framework for Transportation Finance. The report concluded
that “the federal Highway Trust Fund faces a near-term insolvency crisis, exacerbated by recent
reductions in federal motor fuel tax revenues and truck–related user fee receipts” and that
baseline revenue projections for the Highway Trust Fund fall short of anticipated transportation
needs by nearly $400 billion in 2010-2015, and about $2.3 trillion through 2035.8 It
recommended a 10 cents per gallon increase in the federal gasoline tax, a 15 cents per gallon
increase in the federal diesel tax, and “commensurate increases” in all special fuels taxes and
indexing these rates to inflation to address the Highway Trust Fund’s immediate revenue
shortfalls. For the long-term, it recommended a shift from the present reliance on federal fuel
taxes to fund federal surface transportation programs to a “federal funding system based on more
direct forms of “user pay” charges, in the form of a charge for each mile driven (commonly
referred to as a vehicle miles traveled or VMT fee system).”9
The Highway Trust Fund’s sustainability, and the means employed to retain sustainability, could
have a significant impact on federalism relationships in surface transportation policy. For
example, some have argued that states should be provided additional flexibility to use tolling and
other congestion pricing strategies to both combat traffic congestion and generate additional
revenue for surface transportation projects.10 Others have suggested that sustainability should be
achieved by having the federal government supplement Highway Trust Fund revenue with
6 Ibid., Volume 1, p. 10.
7 Ibid., Volume 1, pp. 11, 12.
8 National Surface Transportation Infrastructure Financing Commission, Paying Our Way: A New Framework for
Transportation Finance (Washington, DC: National Surface Transportation Infrastructure Financing Commission,
February 2009), pp. 3, 4.
9 Ibid., p. 7.
10 For further analysis, see CRS Report RL33995, Surface Transportation Congestion: Policy and Issues, by William J.
Mallett; and U.S. Government Accountability Office, Highway Trust Fund: Improved Solvency Mechanisms and
Communication Needed to Help Avoid Shortfalls in the Highway Account, GAO-09-316, February 6, 2009, pp. 19-21,
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09316.pdf.
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funding from the general fund account. If that took place, it could change the nature of the donor-
donee debate, as some of the donor states are donee states in terms of overall federal tax and
spending flows. Others have advocated an increase in federal fuel taxes to achieve sustainability
in the Highway Trust Fund. State officials have historically opposed federal fuel tax increases
because, as a practical matter, such increases make it more difficult for states to increase their
state fuel taxes, and in principle, they view such increases as an infringement on state
sovereignty. Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood indicated in February 2009 that he had
interest in exploring alternative means to ensure the Highway Trust Fund’s sustainability,
including the possibility of a VMT tax, but other Obama Administration officials indicated that
the President had no interest in imposing a VMT tax.11 Still others have proposed taxing oil or
transactions in oil futures and options as a means to achieve sustainability in the Highway Trust
Fund.12
Several other organizations have also advocated changes in federalism relationships in surface
transportation policy. For example, the National Conference of State Legislatures has argued that
“The Congress should not re-enact SAFETEA-LU and must look at surface transportation anew,
authorizing a new program that better meets current and future needs for interstate mobility.”13 It
argued that Congress should articulate a new national vision for surface transportation that
focuses on “legitimate federal objectives: interstate commerce and freight mobility; interstate
movement of people; national defense and homeland security; safety; environmental and air
quality preservation and improvements; and research and innovation” and heeds “the Tenth
Amendment and not intervene in or interfere with state-specific transportation priorities.”14
This will not be the first time that Congress has considered proposals to alter federalism
relationships in surface transportation policy. Congress has debated the federal role in
transportation policy since the nation’s formation in 1789. The following sections provide a
historical perspective on contemporary federalism issues in surface transportation policy,
focusing on efforts to devolve programmatic responsibility to states, change state maintenance-of-
effort requirements, and alter federal reimbursement matching rates.
The Federal Government’s Role in Surface
Transportation Policy: 1789-1956
When the nation was formed in 1789, there was considerable debate concerning whether
Congress had constitutional authority to provide direct, cash assistance for surface transportation
projects. That uncertainty created a conceptual framework that initially limited congressional
options for federal involvement in surface transportation policy. Over time, that conceptual
11 Washington Post Editorial, “Mr. LaHood’s Good Idea: The transportation chief’s mileage tax shouldn’t be a
nonstarter,” The Washington Post, February 23, 2009, p. A18.
12 H.R. 3379, the Lopsided Oil Prices Act of 2009; and U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways and Transit, The Importance of a Long-Term Surface Transportation
Authorization in Sustaining Economic Recovery, 111th Cong., 1st sess., July 16, 2009, H.Hrg. 111-50 (Washington:
GPO, 2009), p. 15.
13 National Conference of State Legislatures, “2009-2010 Policies for the Jurisdiction of the Transportation Committee
- Surface Transportation Federalism,” http://www.ncsl.org/Default.aspx?TabID=773&tabs=
855,30,674#Surface_Transportation.
14 Ibid.
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framework has evolved in response to changes in American society and in the American political
system. Today, the federal government has a prominent role in surface transportation policy,
providing about $52 billion annually for highway and mass transit grants, including $41.8 billion
for highways and $10.2 billion for mass transit.15 This spending represents about one-quarter of
total government expenditures on highways and mass transit and nearly half (45%) of
government highway and mass transit capital expenditures.16
The following section examines the evolution of the federal role in surface transportation policy
since the nation’s formation in 1789 to 1956, the year the Federal-Aid to Highway Act of 1956,
which authorized the interstate highway system’s construction, was adopted. The discussion
focuses on key provisions, and arguments presented, affecting federalism issues in surface
transportation policy in selected Federal-Aid to Highway Acts, starting with The Federal-Aid
Road Act of 1916.
Constitutional Limits on Congressional Options
Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution provides Congress authority “To establish Post
Offices and post Roads.”17 When the Constitution was ratified in 1789, the prevailing view was
that because other types of transportation projects were not listed in the Constitution that they
were excluded purposively, suggesting that other transportation projects were either meant to be a
state or local government responsibility, or outside the scope of governmental authority
altogether. Nevertheless, during the 1800s there were congressional efforts, primarily from
representatives from western states, to adopt legislation to provide federal cash assistance for
various types of transportation projects other than post roads to encourage western migration and
promote interstate commerce. Most of these efforts failed, primarily due to sectional divisions
within the Congress which, at that time, made it difficult to build coalitions large enough to adopt
programs that targeted most of its assistance to western states, opposition from Members of
Congress who viewed reducing the national debt as a higher priority, and opposition from
Members who viewed the provision of cash assistance for transportation projects, other than for
post roads, a violation of states’ rights, as articulated in the Tenth Amendment: “The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people.”18
During the 1800s, instead of authorizing cash assistance to states for internal improvements,
Congress typically authorized federal land grants to states. The federal land was subsequently
15 See CRS Report R40805, Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD):
FY2010 Appropriations, by David Randall Peterman and Maggie McCarty.
16 U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Innovative Technology Administration, Bureau of Transportation
Statistics, National Transportation Statistics, Washington, DC, June 2009, Table 3-29a, http://www.bts.gov/
publications/national_transportation_statistics/html/table_03_29a.html; U.S. Congressional Budget Office and Joint
Committee on Taxation, Subsidizing Infrastructure Investment with Tax-Preferred Bonds, Washington, DC, October
2009, p. 2, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/106xx/doc10667/10-26-TaxPreferredBonds.pdf; and Peter Orszag, Director,
Congressional Budget Office, “Testimony, Current and Future Investment in Infrastructure,” before the Committee on
the Budget and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives, May 8, 2008, p. 4,
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/91xx/doc9136/05-07-Infrastructure_Testimony.pdf.
17 Constitution of the United States, text available on the National Archives website: http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/
charters/constitution_transcript.html.
18 Constitution of the United States, text available on the National Archives website: http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/
charters/bill_of_rights_transcript.html.
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Federalism Issues in Surface Transportation Policy: Past and Present
auctioned to raise money for internal improvements. For example, in 1823 Ohio received a
federal land grant of 60,000 acres along the Maumee Road to raise revenue to improve that road.
In 1827, Ohio received another federal land grant of 31,596 acres to raise revenue for the
Columbus and Sandusky Turnpike.19
In 1841, nine states (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Alabama, Missouri, Mississippi, Louisiana,
Arkansas, and Michigan), and, with three exceptions, all subsequent newly admitted states were
designated land grant states and guaranteed at least 500,000 acres of federal land to be auctioned
to support transportation projects, including roads, railroads, bridges, canals and improvement of
water courses, that expedited the transportation of the United States mail and military personnel
and munitions.20 By 1900, over 3.2 million acres of federal land was donated to these states to
support wagon road construction. Congress also authorized the donation of another 4.5 million
acres of federal land to Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio and Wisconsin to raise revenue for canal
construction and 2.225 million acres to Alabama, Iowa and Wisconsin to improve river
navigation. In addition, states were provided 37.8 million acres for railroad improvements and 64
million acres for flood control.21 States were provided wide latitude in project selection and
federal oversight and administrative regulations were minimal.
Balancing Constitutional Concerns and Constituent Interests: The
Federal-Aid Road Act of 1916
Congressional interest in providing federal cash assistance for surface transportation increased
during the early 1900s, primarily due to the lobbying efforts of the “Good Roads” movement,
initially started by bicycle enthusiasts, that gained momentum as automobile ownership in the
United States increased rapidly, from 8,000 registered motor vehicles in 1900 to over 2 million by
1915. Often finding themselves stuck in the mud, the public’s demand for improved roads
intensified. Although most of the lobbying for public investment in roads was directed at state and
local government officials, several organizations, including the American Automobile
Association, formed in 1902, the National Grange, which advocated public investment in farm-to-
market roads, and the American Association of State Highway Officials (AASHO, renamed the
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, AASHTO, in 1973) lobbied
Congress for federal road assistance.22 In 1912, their efforts led to the establishment of the Joint
19 Thomas Aquinas Burke, “Ohio Lands – A Short History,” 8th Edition, (Columbus: Ohio: State Auditor’s Office,
September 1996),.http://freepages.history.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~maggie/ohio-lands/ohl5.html#WROTLNDS.
20 Benjamin Horace Hibbard, A History of the Public Land Policies (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924), pp.
228-233. Note: Maine and West Virginia were not eligible for the guarantee because they were formed out of other
states and Texas was ineligible because it was considered a sovereign nation when admitted to the Union. Also, five
states, Wisconsin, Alabama, Iowa, Nevada and Oregon, subsequently were permitted to use their proceeds from federal
land sales solely for public education.
21 Matthias Nordberg Orfield, Federal Land Grants to the States With Special Reference to Minnesota (Minneapolis,
MN: Bulletin of the University of Minnesota, 1915), pp. 77- 111, 115-118; Morton Grodzins, The American System
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), p. 35; Gary M. Anderson and Dolores T. Martin, “The Public Domain and Nineteenth
Century Transfer Policy,” Cato Journal 6:3 (Winter 1987): 908-910; John Bell Rae, “Federal Land Grants in Aid of
Canals,” The Journal of Economic History 4:2 (November 1944): 167, 168, and U.S. Department of Transportation,
Federal Highway Administration, America’s Highways, 1776/1976 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), 24. Note: 26 states
received federal land grants during the 1800s.
22 John B. Rae, The Road and Car in American Life (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), pp. 33-39, 49; and Robert Jay
Dilger, “Moving the Nation: Governors and the Development of American Transportation Policy,” in A Legacy of
Innovation: Governors and Public Policy, ed. Ethan G. Sribnick (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
(continued...)
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Committee on Federal Aid in the Construction of Post Roads, chaired by Senator Jonathan
Bourne, Jr., to consider proposals to expand federal assistance for post roads.
The Joint Committee’s final report, issued on November 25, 1914, did not recommend specific
legislation. However, it created the groundwork for the Federal-Aid Road Act of 1916, named by
the now defunct U.S Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) as the federal
government’s most significant intergovernmental grant program enacted prior to the New Deal
era.23
The Joint Committee argued that federal assistance for post roads was constitutional because
“federal aid to good roads will accomplish several of the objectives indicated by the Framers of
the Constitution – establish post roads, regulate commerce, provide for the common defense, and
promote the general welfare. Above all, it will promote the general welfare.”24 It also argued that
federal assistance for paved post roads would generate significant economic benefits for the
nation, as much as $504 million annually in reduced freight hauling costs alone, given the
emergence of the “auto truck” for hauling freight short distances.25
The Federal-Aid Road Act of 1916 authorized $75 million over five years to improve rural, post
roads. Funding was prohibited in communities with populations over 2,500 and was offered to
states on a 50-50 cost matching basis. Funding was limited to post roads to avoid constitutional
challenges based on the Tenth Amendment’s language concerning powers reserved to states.
State officials did not object to this federal intrusion into what was then considered one of their
domestic policy areas because the program was voluntary and funds were directed to rural areas.
At that time, state apportionment rules allocated most state legislative seats to representatives
from rural areas. Also, many farmers used rural, post roads to get their produce to market. It was
politically difficult at that time for state politicians to object to a federal subsidy for agriculture
when most constituents were farmers.26
Balancing States Rights, Interstate Commerce Powers, and
Constituent Interests: The Federal Highway Act of 1921
Constituent demand for public investment in roads and highways continued to expand as
automobile ownership increased across the nation. Motor vehicle registrations reached 10.4
million in 1921. AAA and AASHO lobbied for expanded federal assistance for road construction,
but recommended that the increased funding be used in different ways. During the reauthorization
of the Federal Aid Road Act of 1916 Congress faced the same fundamental question in 1921 that
it faces today: what role should the federal government have in surface transportation policy?
(...continued)
2008), p. 172.
23 U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Categorical Grants: Their Role and Design, A-52
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1978), p. 16.
24 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Roads, Federal Aid to Good Roads: Report of the Joint Committee on Federal
Aid in the Construction of Post Roads, 63rd Cong., 3rd sess., November 25, 1914 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1915), p.14.
25 Ibid., pp. 14-17.
26 “Postwar Highway Program,” in Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly
Press, 1965), pp. 525-527.
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At that time, AAA advocated the creation of a federal highway commission to design and oversee
the construction of a proposed 50,000-mile federal highway system.27 AASHO advocated the
continuation of the reliance on states to design and oversee program operations and the use of the
grant device to supplement state road development. AASHO argued that state officials were
better positioned than federal bureaucrats to make project selection decisions, having superior
knowledge of “its populations and its valuations, and a lot of intricate and small things that a
commission here in Washington can not know.”28 Importantly, AASHO also advocated an
expansion of grants-in-aid eligibility to roads “divided into two classes, primary or interstate
roads and secondary or intercounty roads.”29 AASHO argued that its plan had elements similar to
a federal highway system while, at the same time, “takes care of the immediate needs of the
largest number of rural communities, recognizing the fact that fully half of the wealth of this
country is rural and the modern means of transportation, the automobile and truck, are half in the
possession of the farmer.”30
In an historic decision that continues to influence congressional debate today, Congress adopted
AASHO’s state-centered approach in the Federal Highway Act of 1921. The act left project
selection in the hands of state officials and rejected the idea of creating a direct spending program
for surface transportation projects. Congress rejected AAA’s federal-centered approach primarily
because the use of the grant device was believed to be the best means to avoid constitutional
objections that could be raised in the direct provision of domestic services. Because grants are
voluntary, it was generally believed that state and local government officials were much less
likely to challenge the legality of a federal grant program than a federal direct spending
program.31
Congress also increased federal funding to $75 million annually, maintained the 50-50 cost
matching basis, and expanded grants-in-aid eligibility to non-post roads. In recognition of
constitutional concerns, eligibility was limited to a Primary System of federal-aid highways, not
to exceed 7% of all roads in the state. At least three-sevenths of this system had to consist of
roads that were interstate in character. Up to 60% of federal-aid funds could be used on interstate
routes. By retaining the federal-aid concept, the act appeased advocates of rural, farm-to-market
roads. State highway agencies could be counted on to consider local concerns when deciding the
mix of projects.32
Congress also established in the Federal Highway Act of 1921 that constitutional concerns about
states rights still constrained program eligibility, but that congressional authority to regulate
interstate commerce and promote the general welfare also had a role in determining program
eligibility. As in the past, the prevailing view was that post roads were eligible for federal
27 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads, Interstate Highway System, Hearing on S. 1355,
77th Cong., 1st sess., May 13, 1921 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1921), pp. 76-97; and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on
Post Offices and Post Roads, Interstate Highway System, Hearing on S. 1355, 77th Cong., 1st sess., June 2, 1921
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1921), pp. 536-540.
28 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads, Interstate Highway System, Hearing on S. 1355,
77th Cong., 1st sess., May 19, 1921 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1921), p. 181.
29 Ibid., p. 173.
30 Ibid., p. 175.
31 U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), Categorical Grants: Their Role and Design, A-
52 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1978), pp. 51, 52.
32 Richard F. Weingroff, “The Federal-State Partnership at Work,” Public Roads 60:1 (Summer 1996): 7,
http://www.tfhrc.gov/pubrds/summer96/p96su7.htm.
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assistance because they were mentioned as a federal responsibility in the Constitution. Now, the
prevailing view was that highways that were interstate in character and expedited the completion
of an “adequate and connected system of highways” were also eligible for federal assistance
because of their connection to Congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce and
promote the general welfare.33 Indicative of the expansion of the program’s scope, the program’s
title was changed from the Federal-Aid Road Act to the Federal Highway Act.
Expanding the Federal Role: The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944
During subsequent reauthorizations of the Federal Highway Act AASHO and the American
Municipal Association and its constituent state leagues of municipalities lobbied Congress to
increase federal funding and to expand program eligibility to include secondary and urban
highways.34 They argued that all roads were interconnected, forming a single national surface
transportation system. In their view, if any portion of that system was in disrepair or lacked
sufficient capacity to carry traffic, then the entire national surface transportation system was
affected adversely. As Frederick MacMillin, then-executive secretary of the League of Wisconsin
Municipalities, testified before the House Committee on Roads in 1944, “while rural highways
may not be all that is desired, it is generally conceded now that urban links have become the
bottleneck in our highway system.”35 They also argued that Congress should add urban road
construction to the program because urban motorists contributed more in federal gasoline and
automotive-related excise taxes than they received in funding.
Trucking organizations opposed the expansion of program eligibility to secondary and urban
highways because they worried that expanding the Federal-Aid system might result in higher
gasoline taxes and fees. Farm organizations also opposed the expansion of program eligibility
because they worried that expanding the system might result in less money for farm-to-market
roads.36
At that time, traffic congestion was not the nation’s most pressing issue. Millions of Americans
were overseas fighting in War World War II, mandatory gasoline rationing was in place, and
civilian automobile production had been halted in 1942 to allow automotive assembly plants to be
converted to producing war materials. Nevertheless, there were more than 30 million registered
motor vehicles on the nation’s roads, and federal, state, and local government officials knew that
traffic congestion, especially in and around the nation’s largest cities, would be a salient political
issue for elected officials at all levels of government once the War was over. Most highway-
related organizations, led by AAA, supported the creation of an interstate system of highways,
similar to those already present in several European countries, to relieve traffic congestion. The
idea of creating an interstate system in the United States had been discussed for several years. For
33 John B. Rae, The Road and Car in American Life (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), pp. 36-39; and Bruce E.
Seely, Building the American Highway System: Engineers as Policy Makers (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1987), pp. 72-80.
34 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Roads, Federal-Aid Road Act, Summary of Hearings on H.R. 2426, 78th Cong.,
2nd sess., 1944 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1944), pp. 3-6; and Mark H. Rose, Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1939-
1989, Revised Edition (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1990), pp. 22-28.
35 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Roads, Federal-Aid Road Act, Summary of Hearings on H.R. 2426, 78th Cong.,
2nd sess., 1944 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1944), pp. 4-6.
36 Ibid.; and Mark H. Rose, Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1939-1989, Revised Edition (Knoxville, TN: The
University of Tennessee Press, 1990), pp. 22-28.
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example, Thomas H. MacDonald, Chief of the U.S. Bureau of Public Works, advocated the
construction of a special system of direct interregional highways in 1939.37 However, there was
no consensus on how to finance it. For example, the National Governors Conference (now the
National Governors Association) opposed the use of the federal gasoline taxes to fund interstate
highways as an infringement on their sovereign taxing powers.
Although lobby organizations were divided on whether the highway program’s scope should be
expanded to include secondary and urban highways, Congress was aware that national
demographic shifts in the nation had heightened the political relevance of urban areas, as
Americans increasingly left rural America in search of employment in the nation’s cities, and
later its suburbs. At the beginning of the century, about 40% of the U.S. population lived in
metropolitan areas. By the time the twentieth century ended, that figure had doubled to about
80%. As a result of the on-going transformation of the nation from a primarily rural nation to an
urban one, both major political parties sought political advantage in gaining a political foothold in
urban America. Funding urban highways was one of the avenues Congress chose to achieve that
goal.
The three-year, $1.5 billion Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944 expanded federal surface
transportation funding eligibility by adding three new programs to the existing Federal-Aid
Highway Primary System: a Federal-Aid Highway Secondary System, comprised of principal
secondary and feeder routes, including farm-to-market roads, rural mail and public school bus
routes, local rural roads, and county and township roads, either outside of municipalities or inside
of municipalities of less than 5,000 population; urban extensions of the Federal-Aid Highway
Primary System in municipalities and other urban places having a population of 5,000 or more;
and an interstate highway network, not to exceed 40,000 miles, to be called the National System
of Interstate Highways.38
The Primary System was authorized at $225 million annually, the Secondary System at $150
million annually, and the urban extension program at $125 million annually, all on a 50-50 cost
matching basis. Routes for the National System of Interstate Highways were designated the
following year, but budgetary pressures related to World War II precluded the expenditure of
more than token amounts for the interstate system’s construction.
One of the more significant effects of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944 on federalism
relationships in surface transportation policy was Congress’s abandonment of constitutional
constraints on program eligibility. Congressional Members and hearing witnesses no longer
mentioned states rights as a factor limiting congressional options to the funding of post roads and
roads with direct influence on interstate commerce. Now, states, through AASHO and, to an
increased extent following the adoption of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, the National
Governors Association, were actively lobbying Congress for increased federal assistance. The
congressional focus was on determining the best means to expedite traffic flow and promote
economic prosperity, within the constraints of available federal resources and a federalism
framework. The result was the expansion of program eligibility, with each of the new programs
focused on the needs of specific constituencies. The Primary System focused on projects that
37 Richard F. Weingroff, “The Genie In The Bottle: The Interstate System and Urban Problems, 1939-1957,” Public
Roads 64:2 (September/October 2000), http://www.tfhrc.gov/pubrds/septoct00/urban.htm.
38 U.S. Congress, House Committee of Conference, Federal Highway Act of 1944, Conference Report to Accompany S.
2105, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., December 11, 1944, pp. 2, 3.
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addressed county transportation needs. The Secondary System focused on projects that addressed
rural America’s transportation needs. The urban highway extension program focused on projects
that addressed urban America’s transportation needs. The Interstate Highway System, given is
expansive scope, addressed transportation needs throughout the nation.
The Interstate Highway System Redefines Federalism
Relationships in Surface Transportation Policy: The Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1956
The $25 billion, 13-year Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 authorized the construction of the
then-41,000 mile National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, with a 1972 target
completion date. For the next thirty-five years, federal surface transportation policy focused on
the completion of the interstate system.
Financing the interstate system had been a key sticking point for many years. Motorist and
trucking organizations opposed tolls to finance the system. Governors and highway-related
organizations, including AAA, opposed raising federal fuel taxes to finance the system. A special
panel formed by the Eisenhower Administration in 1954, the Advisory Committee on a National
Highway Program, recommended that thirty-year bonds, financed by federal fuel taxes, be used to
finance the system. However, that proposal failed to achieve congressional approval, primarily
because Senator Harry Byrd, Chair of the Senate Committee on Finance, wanted a pay-as-you-go
financing system that avoided interest charges. The funding impasse was resolved by The
Highway Revenue Act of 1956, which created the Highway Trust Fund to finance the system. A
relatively small increase in the federal gasoline tax, from two to three cents per gallon, appeased
governors and AAA. Governors continued to oppose the federal fuel tax on principle, but
recognized that using federal fuel taxes to fund interstate highways was the only viable political
option available. One factor contributing to their support was that all Highway Trust Fund
revenue was dedicated to highways. In the past, one-third to one-half of federal gasoline revenue
had been diverted to other uses. Providing a 90% reimbursement for interstate system expenses
also played a role in attracting gubernatorial support. Prohibiting tolls on interstate highways,
with an exception for the 2,447 miles of toll roads already in operation, appeased motorist and
trucking organizations.39
The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 was a defining moment in surface transportation policy
because it expanded and solidified the federal government’s role in shaping the nation’s
transportation system. The act elevated the role of federal and state highway department officials
in determining the scope and nature of the nation’s highway system. Local government officials
and urban planners still had a role, but the overall design and location of the interstate system,
and increasingly, of primary and secondary highways, were decided by federal and state officials
whose goals of promoting national economic growth and expediting traffic flow sometimes
conflicted with those held by local government officials who were also interested in clearing
slums and other blighted areas, and promoting local economic development. In addition, federal
and state highway engineers imposed professional, uniform road construction and design
39 Robert Jay Dilger, “Moving the Nation: Governors and the Development of American Transportation Policy,” in A
Legacy of Innovation: Governors and Public Policy, ed. Ethan G. Sribnick (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2008), p. 177.
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standards throughout the nation. Some local government officials resented the imposition of these
standards because they increased construction costs and impinged on their autonomy.40
The Federal Government’s Role in Surface
Transportation Policy: 1956-1991
From 1956 to 1991, state and local government officials focused their efforts in surface
transportation policy on maximizing the provision of federal assistance and minimizing federal
involvement in how they used federal funds. Specifically, they opposed efforts to increase federal
fuel taxes to pay for the increasing cost to complete the interstate highway system on the grounds
that any such increases infringed on their sovereign authority to tax fuel by making it more
difficult for them to raise state fuel taxes. They also opposed efforts to divert federal Highway
Trust Fund revenue to other uses, including mass transit and deficit reduction; and opposed the
proliferation of intergovernmental crossover sanctions requiring states to take specific actions,
such as limiting highway speeds, removing certain highway billboards, and imposing uniform
alcohol standards for determining drunk driving, or lose a portion of federal highway assistance.
States also supported efforts to increase federal surface transportation funding levels and to
increase the federal share of non-interstate highway expenses.
Debating Reimbursement Rates: The Federal-Aid to Highway Acts
of 1970 and 1978
When the Federal-Aid Road Act of 1916 was debated, there was a general consensus that the
federal reimbursement rate for expenses would be set at 50%. At that time, a 50-50 cost sharing
arrangement was viewed as “an equitable apportionment of burdens, an automatic check upon the
demands from the States for Federal appropriation, insures the accomplishment of tangible
results, and affords a sound basis for the exercise by the Federal officials of the most searching
scrutiny and a conservative policy of approval.”41
As the federal intergovernmental grants-in-aid system matured, and federal cost sharing
requirements became more varied both across and within policy areas, academics, stakeholders,
and policymakers became increasingly interested in the impact federal cost sharing requirements
had on state and local government budgetary behavior. Critics of federal grants with state or local
government cost sharing requirements (particularly federal grants that had a 50% or higher state
and local government cost sharing requirement) argued that cost sharing requirements distort state
and local government budgetary decisions in favor of the federally assisted activity. In their view,
because state and local government officials are better positioned than federal bureaucrats to
identify and respond to state and local government needs, the distortion of state and local
government decision-making resulting from the imposition of cost matching requirements led to
the non-optimal use of public funds. They argued that lowering state cost matching requirements,
or eliminating them altogether, would result in less distortion of state and local government
40 Mark H. Rose, Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1939-1989, Revised Edition (Knoxville, TN: The University of
Tennessee Press, 1990), pp. 95-104.
41 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads, Federal Aid in the Construction of Rural Post
Roads, Report to accompany H.R. 7617, 64th Cong., 1st sess., March 10, 1916 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1916), p. 21.
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budgetary decisions and would maximize the public interest. Others argued that providing federal
funds with very low or no cost matching requirements may lure state and local governments into
programmatic activities that they could not afford if the federal assistance was later withdrawn, or
could result in spending on projects that never could have stood on their own merits. Still others
argued that the imposition of state and local government cost sharing requirements are an
appropriate means to stimulate state and local government spending in areas deemed to be in the
national interest. In their view, federal cost sharing requirements should be proportional to the
extent to which the aided activity aligns with an identified national interest. In academic terms,
“the danger of distortion and waste of resources occurs when the cost-sharing requirement is
more generous to the recipient government than is justified by the degree of spillover or national
interest characterizing the aided state or local government activity.”42
In 1970, several organizations, including AASHO and the American Road Builders Association,
joined state and local governments in advocating an increase in the federal share of expenses for
non-interstate highways. They argued that increased highway maintenance costs and “increasing
requirements for non-Federally aided state highway improvements” were making it more difficult
for states to meet the federal government’s 50% matching requirement for non-interstate
highways.43 Representatives of the National League of Cities and U.S. Conference of Mayors
argued that the focus on interstate highway construction had led the nation to neglect urban
highway systems and that the cost of improving urban highways had increased dramatically,
justifying an increase in the reimbursement rate for non-interstate highways.44 The National
Association of Counties argued that because the interstate system was nearing completion that
Congress should focus additional resources on non-interstate highways and increase the federal
share of expenses to 70% for any additions to the interstate system and for all other federally
aided highways. In their view, increasing the reimbursement rate to 70% was justified because
“many States and most local governments are finding it increasingly difficult to come up with 50
percent matching funds.”45 Congress subsequently increased the federal share of expenses for
non-interstate highways from 50% to 70% in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970.
In 1978, states advocated another increase in the federal share of expenses for non-interstate
highways, arguing that rising gasoline prices had led motors to drive less and, coupled with
improvements in automotive fuel economy, had caused state fuel tax revenue to fall, making it
more difficult for them to find state funds to meet their 30% share of expenses. The National
Association of Counties argued that some local governments were also having difficulty
participating in the program because of the required matching rate.46 Secretary of Transportation
Brock Adams indicated that the Carter Administration also supported an increase in the federal
share of expenses for non-interstate highways, arguing that “we find about 70 percent is a
breaking point, the States are simply unable to raise sufficient money to match Federal moneys
42 ACIR, Categorical Grants: Their Role and Design, A-52 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1978), p. 176.
43U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Public Works, Subcommittee on Roads, Statement of Burton F. Miller,
Executive Vice President, American Road Builders’ Association, Federal Highway Act of 1970, Part 3, hearing on S.
4055 and S. 4260, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., September 9, 1970 (Washington: GPO, 1970), p. 1224.
44 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Public Works, Subcommittee on Roads, Federal Highway Act of 1970 and
Miscellaneous Bills, Part 2, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., July 14 and 15, 1970 (Washington: GPO, 1970), pp. 603-608.
45 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Public Works, Subcommittee on Roads, Federal Highway Act of 1970 and
Miscellaneous Bills, Part 1, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., July 13 1970 (Washington: GPO, 1970), p. 512.
46 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Subcommittee on Transportation, Statement of
Milton Johnson, on behalf of the National Association of Counties, Federal Aid Highway Act of 1978, hearing on
Federal Aid Highway Act of 1978, 95th Cong., 1st sess., July 26, 1977 (Washington: GPO, 1977), p. 121.
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and then the program languishes.... we would like to establish uniformity in percentages of grants,
whether it is 75-25 or 80-20.”47 Congress subsequently increased the federal share of expenses for
non-interstate highways from 70% to 75% in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1978.48
The following sections discuss several efforts during this time period to “sort out” or devolve
federal surface transportation programs to state and local governments. This discussion is
pertinent given recent proposals to sort out federal-state responsibilities in surface transportation
policy.
Efforts to “Sort-out” Governmental Responsibilities in Surface
Transportation Policy: Presidents Nixon’s and Reagan’s New
Federalism Proposals
During the 1960s and 1970s, the number of federal grants to state and local governments,
including those provided for surface transportation, increased dramatically. The total number of
federal grants to state and local governments increased from 132 in 1960 to 387 in 1968, the year
before President Richard Nixon became President, and to 539 in 1981, when President Ronald
Reagan become President.49
The number of federal surface transportation grant programs funded by the Federal-Aid to
Highway Act also increased. There were nine surface transportation programs in the Federal
Highway Act of 1960: forest development roads and trails, forest highways, Indian Reservation
Roads and Bridges, Park Roads and Trails, Parkway, Public Land Highways, Federal Aid Primary
System, Federal Aid Secondary System and Federal-Aid Primary and Secondary Systems
Extensions in Urban Areas.50 In 1975, there were 37 programs: Interstate Highway System;
Federal-Aid Highway Primary System in Rural Areas; Federal-Aid Secondary System in Rural
Areas; Federal-Aid Urban Systems; Federal-Aid Primary and Secondary Systems Extensions in
Urban Areas; Emergency Relief; Forest Highways; Priority Primary Routes; Special Urban High
Density Traffic Program; Motor Vehicle Diagnostic Inspection Demonstration Projects; Off-
System Road Projects; Railroad Safety; Carpool Demonstration Projects in Urban Areas; Surveys,
Planning, Research and Development for Highway Programs; Public Land Highways; three grant
programs for Highway Beautification; Education and Training Program for Highway Personnel;
four grant programs for urban mass transportation; Transportation Planning in Urban Areas;
Urban Area Traffic Operations Improvements; Bridges on Federal Dams; Economic Growth
Center Development Highways; and ten grant programs for highway safety.51
47 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Subcommittee on Transportation, Statement of
Brock Adams, Secretary of Transportation, Federal Aid Highway Act of 1978, hearing on Federal Aid Highway Act of
1978, 95th Cong., 1st sess., July 26, 1977 (Washington: GPO, 1977), p. 67.
48 Ibid., 178-181.
49 Robert Jay Dilger, “The Expansion and Centralization of American Governmental Functions,” in American
Intergovernmental Relations Today: Perspectives and Controversies, ed. Robert Jay Dilger (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1986), p. 18.
50 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Public Works, Subcommittee on Public Roads, Federal-Aid Highway Act of
1960, hearing on H.R. 10495, 86th Cong., 2nd sess., June 9, 1960 (Washington: GPO, 1960), p. 2.
51 ACIR, Categorical Grants: Their Role and Design, A-52 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1978), pp. 118, 129; and ACIR, A
Catalog of Federal Grant-In-Aid Programs to State and Local Governments: Grants Funded FY 1975. A-52A
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), pp. 13-15.
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During the 1970s and 1980s, there were several attempts to change federal, state, and local
government roles in surface transportation policy. Presidents Nixon’s and Reagan’s efforts are
particularly noteworthy as both were convinced that federal grants to state and local governments
had become duplicative and wasteful, and both attempted to sort out the appropriate roles and
responsibilities of each level of government in several programmatic areas, including surface
transportation policy.52 For example, in his 1971 State of the Union speech, President Nixon
announced a plan to focus federal resources on areas of national interest by consolidating 129
federal grant programs in six functional areas, 33 in education, 26 in transportation, 12 in urban
community development, 17 in manpower training, 39 in rural community development, and 2 in
law enforcement, into six special revenue sharing programs. Unlike the categorical grants they
would replace, the proposed special revenue sharing programs had no state matching
requirements, relatively few auditing or oversight requirements, and the funds were distributed
automatically without prior federal approval of plans for their use.53
President Nixon’s proposal to consolidate 26 federal surface transportation programs into a
special revenue sharing program failed to gain congressional approval, primarily because it
generated opposition from interest groups affiliated with highway construction who worried that
the programs’ future funding would be compromised, and from state highway officials worried
about losing programmatic influence to governors.54 Nonetheless, President Nixon and his
successor, President Gerald Ford, continued to oppose further expansion in the number of federal
surface transportation programs and those numbers remained fairly stable for the remainder of the
decade. When President Ronald Reagan entered office in 1981, there were 34 federal surface
transportation programs funded by the Federal-Aid Highway Act, compared to 37 in 1975.55
President Reagan also wanted to change federal and state roles in surface transportation policy. In
1982, he proposed a $20 billion “swap” in which the federal government would return to states
full responsibility for funding Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) (now
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) and food stamps in exchange for federal assumption
of state contributions for Medicaid. He also proposed a temporary $28 billion trust fund or “super
revenue sharing program” to replace 43 other grant programs, including all non-interstate
highways, Appalachian highways and urban mass transit construction and operating grants. The
trust fund, and federal taxes supporting it, would begin phasing out after four years leaving states
the option of replacing federal tax support with their own funds to continue the programs or
allowing the programs to expire.
Both the swap proposal and the proposed devolution of 43 federal programs failed to gain
congressional approval. Both proposals were opposed by organizations who feared that if
enacted, they would result in less funding for the affected programs. For example, the National
Governors Association supported the federal take over of Medicaid, but objected to assuming the
costs for AFDC and food stamps. The economy was weakening at that time and governors
52 Claude E. Barfield, Rethinking Federalism: Block Grants and Federal, State, and Local Responsibilities
(Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981), p. 3.
53 Ibid.
54 Timothy Conlan, New Federalism: Intergovernmental Reform From Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC: The
Brookings Institution, 1988), pp. 36-38.
55 ACIR, A Catalog of Federal Grant-In-Aid Programs to State and Local Governments: Grants Funded FY 1981, M-
133 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982), pp. 26-28.
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worried that they would not have the fiscal capacity necessary to support the programs without
continued federal assistance.56
President Reagan’s Surface Transportation Block Grant Proposals
and Opposition to Highway “Demonstration Projects”
In 1983, President Reagan proposed the Federalism Block Grant Highway Act of 1983. It would
have provided states the choice of continuing to receive funds for highway programs focused on
local and state needs (Urban System, Secondary System, bridges other than Primary and high-
cost bridges, highway safety, hazard elimination and rail-highway crossings) under existing
statutory mechanisms or receiving them in the form of a block grant. The federal role in highway
programs that focused on “the federal interest” (primary and interstate highways and bridges, as
well as high-cost bridges) was to be continued.57 In 1986, he proposed the Surface Transportation
Reauthorization Act of 1986, which would have combined the Primary, Interstate reconstruction
and Interstate construction programs into a single program. It would have also created a block
grant for the remaining highway programs and mass transit. Neither proposal was approved by
Congress.58
In 1987, President Reagan vetoed the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance
Act of 1987 (STURAA), the last surface transportation authorization bill of the Interstate era. In
the first, and only, veto of a federal-aid highway bill in the 20th Century, President Reagan cited
several objections to the bill, but was especially critical of the bill’s 121 “demonstration projects”
which he considered wasteful. Members of Congress who wanted funds for a project in their state
had adopted the practice of inventing a concept it would “demonstrate” indicating that it was part
of an important research initiative. Using this idea, for example, funding for two parking lots
became a demonstration of “methods of facilitating the transfer of passengers between different
modes of transportation.”59 Congress initially sustained President Reagan’s veto by a single vote
in the Senate on April 1, 1987, but the following day one of the Senators who had voted to sustain
the veto switched his vote, and the veto was overridden.60
The inclusion of demonstration projects in STURAA, and the inclusion of increasing numbers of
congressionally earmarked projects in subsequent reauthorizations have implications for
federalism relationships in surface transportation policy. Although many Members of Congress
discuss their surface transportation earmarks with their state and local government officials prior
to making their requests for an earmark, earmarks, by definition, reduce state and local
government flexibility. The extent of congressional earmarks’ impact on state and local
government flexibility is related to how the earmarks are treated in the distribution of the
56 Timothy J. Conlan and David B. Walker, “Reagan’s New Federalism: Design, Debate and Discord,”
Intergovernmental Perspective 8:4 (Winter 1983): 6-15, 18-22; and Timothy Conlan, New Federalism:
Intergovernmental Reform From Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1988), pp. 182-198.
57 Elizabeth Parker, Major Proposals to Restructure the Highway Program,” Transportation Quarterly, 45:1 (January
1991): 55-66, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/restructure.htm.
58 Ibid.
59 Richard F. Weingroff, “President Ronald Reagan and the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance
Act of 1987,” U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/
infrastructure/rw01e.cfm.
60 Ibid. Note: Senator Terry Sanford switched his vote.
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program’s funds. For example, congressional earmarks in SAFETEA’s National Corridor
Infrastructure Improvement Program ($1.9 billion), Projects of National and Regional
Significance ($1.8 billion), Transportation Improvements ($2.5 billion), as well as discretionary
programs earmarked during the annual appropriations process are all outside the scope of
SAFETEA’s Equity Bonus (EB) program. The EB program is designed to guarantee each state at
least a 92% return on payments to the Highway Account in the Highway Trust Fund for those
programs listed in the EB program (which includes all of the core formula programs as well as
several other programs).61 Because these earmarks are outside of the EB program’s scope, they
have no direct impact on the calculations that determine the distribution of the EB program’s
funds to states. As a result, although states have little discretion concerning how those earmarked
funds are to be spent, the funds are considered additional funding, often referred to as being
“above the line.”
On the other hand, SAFETEA’s High Priority Project (HPP) earmarks (nearly $15 billion) are
included within the scope of SAFETEA’s EB program, often referred to as being “below the
line.” As a result, these earmarks are counted in the calculations that determine the distribution of
the EB program’s funds to states, reducing the amount that each state receives through the EB
program. Because EB program funding is distributed to states through the program’s core formula
programs, states receiving HPP earmarks not only have little discretion concerning how those
earmarked funds are to be spent, but also experience a reduction in the amount of formula
program funds that they would otherwise receive and rely on to implement their state
transportation improvement plans. The issue is whether congressional earmarks, if continued,
should be inside or outside the scope of the EB program. Keeping congressional earmarks
outside, as opposed to inside, the EB program would place less of a restraint on state flexibility in
regard to the funding received for the core formula programs, but it would also dilute the impact
of a rate-of-return guarantee.62
Although President Reagan’s New Federalism and block grant proposals were not adopted, he
continued to advocate further reductions in the number of surface transportation programs, and
had some success. There were 27 federal surface transportation programs funded by the Federal-
Aid Highway program at the conclusion of his second term in office, compared to 34 at the outset
of his presidency.63 Among the programmatic changes that took place during his presidency was a
reduction in mass transit operating assistance and a refocused emphasis on capital expenditures.
61 The following programs are included in SAFETEA’s EB program: Interstate Maintenance, National Highway
System, Surface Transportation Program, Bridge and Bridge Maintenance, Congestion, Mitigation, and Air Quality,
Highway Safety Improvement Program, Recreational Trails, Appalachian Development Highway System, High
Priority Projects, Metropolitan Planning, Coordinated Border Infrastructure Program, Safe Routes to School Program,
and the Rail-Highway Grade Crossing program. For further analysis, see CRS Report R40451, The Donor-Donee State
Issue: Funding Equity in Surface Transportation Reauthorization, by Robert S. Kirk; and CRS Report RL33119, Safe,
Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act - A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU or SAFETEA):
Selected Major Provisions, by John W. Fischer.
62 For further analysis, see CRS Report R40053, Surface Transportation Program Reauthorization Issues for the 111th
Congress, coordinated by John W. Fischer.
63 ACIR, Characteristics of Federal Grant-In-Aid Programs to State and Local Governments Funded FY 1991, M-182
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1992), pp. 24, 28; and ACIR, Characteristics of Federal Grant-In-Aid Programs to State and
Local Governments Funded FY 1981, M-133 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982), pp. 26-29.
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ACIR: The Geographic Range of Benefits Argument
In 1987, the now defunct U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR)
recommended that Congress “move toward the goal of repealing all highway and bridge
programs that are financed from the federal Highway Trust Fund, except for: (1) the Interstate
highway system, (2) the portion of the bridge program that serves the Interstate system, (3) the
emergency relief highway program, and (4) the federal lands highway program.”64 The
Commission also recommended that Congress “relinquish an adequate share of the federal excise
tax on gasoline” to enable states to finance the devolved programs.65
ACIR was one of the first organizations to offer specific criteria for defining areas of national
interest and determining roles for federal, state and local government officials in surface
transportation policy. ACIR conceded that all roads are physically interconnected. As noted
earlier, the highway system’s interconnectedness had been used as a rationale for expanding
federal program eligibility in surface transportation policy. ACIR argued that while all roads are
interconnected, “they differ systematically in the length of trips on them and in the travel
purposes for which they are used.”66 ACIR argued that “most trips on Interstate highways are
much longer than trips taken on the Secondary and Urban systems” and that “this fact argues that
the Interstate network provides transportation benefits over a wider geographic range than
Secondary and Urban systems.”67 ACIR went on to conclude that “This concept of the geographic
range of highway benefits is a key test to determine which unit of government should bear
responsibility for highway finance.”68
ACIR argued that “roads that serve largely local purposes – helping to make quicker trips to the
supermarket, for example – compete with financing for roads that provide truly national benefits
– for instance, facilitating the interstate commerce and economic health on which the whole
nation’s welfare depends.”69 It recommended that the approximate geographical range of benefits
associated with surface transportation programs supported the idea of incremental devolution,
where roads that provide virtually no national benefits were devolved first and others that, on
balance, provide some national benefits could be devolved later. ACIR noted that incremental
devolution was “likely to be more palatable politically than a wrenching, once-and-for-all
change.”70
ACIR also introduced the notion of interstate spillovers, or externalities, as an example of the use
of the geographic range of benefits criteria. Economists use the term spillover or externality to
describe the market imperfection that results when producers and consumers in a market either do
not bear all of the costs or do not reap all of the benefits of an economic activity. Wastewater and
air pollution treatment are often used as examples where economic spillovers occur. The primary
beneficiaries of cleaner water and air often live downstream or downwind from a pollution
source, not those who live where the effluent or polluted air is treated. Those living at the source
64 ACIR, Devolving Selected Federal-Aid Highway Programs and Revenue Bases: A Critical Appraisal, A-108
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1987), p. 2.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., 27.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., p. 28.
70 Ibid.
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of the pollution have no, or little, incentive to pay for activities that primarily benefit those living
downstream or downwind. Economists argue that services with spillover effects are not likely to
be provided at optimal levels without some form of government intervention, typically by
providing an incentive to the provider to undertake the service at optimal levels or by a mandate
to do so.71
ACIR argued that highways, especially interstate highways, are subject to spillovers and the “best
government for providing services is one with an appropriately large jurisdiction so that the
jurisdiction can encompass the externalities.”72 It argued that
an interstate spillover occurs when road benefits are not fully captured in-state, or are not
fully captured by taxes and other charges levied by the providing state. The state budgetary
process has little reason to value fully out-of-state benefits. An all too logical consequence
might be underfinancing of roads with large out-of-state benefits relative to their in-state
benefits. For example, by charging tolls on Interstate 80 (which is not currently permitted),
Pennsylvania could reap the savings of fuel and time gained by the highway’s efficient New
York to Chicago routing, with the tolls defraying maintenance costs for efficient
transportation. In this case, toll finance could internalize what would otherwise be an
interstate spillover, namely the region-wide advantages of a direct, swift, well-maintained
superhighway. However, it the hypothetical tolls on Interstate 80 were set too high in relation
to the additional cost incurred by additional use (e.g., wear or perhaps the need for extra
lanes) motorists would be overcharged. In effect, they would be paying twice, through both
tolls and taxes, and the interstate motorist would be exploited.73
ACIR also advocated the principle of fiscal equivalence to sort out surface transportation
financing. It argued that “Those who benefit from the government function should pay for it” and
that jurisdictions that pay for a function and receive its benefits have an incentive to make
“judicious fiscal choices, neither skimping on valuable public investment nor squandering other
person’s tax dollars.”74 It went on to argue that “without fiscal equivalence, highway beneficiaries
who do not pay their fair share are motivated to exaggerate their demands, if successful they
improve their services at the expense of others.”75
ACIR noted that “over time, considerable national standardization has been developed in the
highway transportation system” largely due to the efforts of “transportation officials (notably
AASHTO)” and that such standardization “most likely would continue after devolution, even if
direct, federal control were limited to the Interstate system.”76 It argued that the benefits of
standardization, such as for safety requirements, “serve both the national and local goals.”77
Applying these principles, ACIR argued that the “great preponderance of the Interstate System ...
merits continued federal support.”78 However, the “national role of the Primary system has been
71 ACIR, Categorical Grants: Their Role and Design, A-52 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1978), p. 51.
72 ACIR, Devolving Selected Federal-Aid Highway Programs and Revenue Bases: A Critical Appraisal, A-108
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1987), p 29.
73 Ibid., pp. 29, 30.
74 Ibid., p. 28.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., p. 30.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
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greatly reduced by the Interstate system,” and “with well functioning Interstate and Primary
systems, the national benefits of the federal-aid Urban system are contained, by and large, within
individual states or metropolitan areas.”79 Also, “by and large, Secondary highways are even more
appropriate for state-local financing and control than the Urban system” because “most
Secondary roads are only lightly traveled, because of shifts in population and the presence of
alternative routes that are designed to higher standards.”80
ACIR argued that it was “doubtful” that any general principle of fiscal federalism governs the
award of funds through demonstration projects” but noted that highway demonstration projects
“rarely convey important national benefits.”81 It also argued that certain bridge safety programs
serve a “coordinating as well as an operational safety function that is not appropriate for
devolution” but programs to widen bridges to remove traffic bottlenecks may be appropriate for
devolution if the bridge’s traffic is primarily local in nature.82
The Federal Government’s Role in Surface
Transportation Policy: The Post-Interstate Era
There have been three reauthorizations of the Federal-Aid Highway Act since 1987, the $151
billion, six-year, Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA, P.L. 102-
240) signed by President George H.W. Bush on December 18, 1991, the $203.4 billion, six-year
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21, P.L. 105-178), signed by President Bill
Clinton on June 9, 1998, and the $286 billion, Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient
Transportation Equity Act of 2005: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA, P.L. 109-59) signed by
President George W. Bush on August 10, 2005 and set to expire on September 30, 2009. The
following discussion examines the major federalism issues involved in each of these
reauthorizations, focusing on federalism issues that may be discussed during SAFETEA’s
reauthorization, including efforts to sort out appropriate roles for federal, state, and local
governments in surface transportation policy, change state maintenance-of-effort requirements,
and alter federal reimbursement rates.
Congress Sets a New Direction for Federalism Relationships in
Surface Transportation Policy: ISTEA
Although most lobbying organizations involved in the 1991 reauthorization of the Surface
Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 had not changed their positions on
federal surface transportation policy, circumstances had changed a great deal. From 1956 to 1991,
there had been a shared consensus among policymakers and lobbying organizations that the
highway program’s primary goal was to build the Interstate System. Now that the Interstate
system was, for all practical matters, complete, that consensus no longer existed. During
79 Ibid., pp. 30, 31.
80 Ibid., p. 31.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., pp. 31, 32.
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reauthorization, President George H. W. Bush, the House, and Senate advocated fundamentally
different approaches to structuring federalism relationships in surface transportation policy.
President George H. W. Bush shared President Reagan’s view that the intergovernmental system
had become duplicative and wasteful and targeted surface transportation policy as an area in need
of reform. On February 13, 1991, he announced a five-year, $105 billion reauthorization proposal
for the Federal-Aid Highway program, called the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (H.R.
1351, S. 610). It included a 40% increase in funding for highways ($88.5 billion) and a marginal
increase for mass transit ($16.5 billion). His proposal was guided by two fundamental principles,
that state and local government officials should have greater influence on project selection and
federal financial assistance should reflect the program’s geographic range of benefits. In his
words, “Our approach will provide States and localities with flexibility to select which highways
will receive targeted Federal dollars, and States and localities will be able to choose whether to
spend Federal dollars on transit or highway solutions. As never before, we are encouraging
creative new financing and management by the States.”83
Using the geographic range of benefits principle, he recommended that the Interstate, Primary,
Secondary and Urban Highway programs be replaced by two programs: a $43.5 billion, 150,000
mile National Highway System (NHS) consisting of highways with significance for national
defense or that carried goods and people across state lines and a $22.2 billion urban and rural
highway block grant for other federally funded roads (about 716,000 miles at that time).84
Because the block grant consisted of roads lacking national significance, he recommended that it
receive less funding than the proposed national highway system and its reimbursement rate
lowered from 75% to 60%. The federal reimbursement rate for highways in the national highway
system would remain the same, 90% for interstate highways and 75% for primary highways. He
also recommended that states be allowed to shift funds between urban and rural highways, from
urban and rural highways to mass transit and, with the exception for new mass transit starts, from
mass transit to urban and rural highways.85 Because the President believed that mass transit’s
benefits accrue primarily within state and metropolitan areas, in addition to proposing that mass
transit funding be increased only marginally, to $16.5 billion over five years, he also
recommended that the federal reimbursement rate for mass transit capital expenses be reduced
from 80% to 60%, and for new starts from 75% to 50%.
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Chair of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works’ Subcommittee on Water Resources, Transportation, and Infrastructure, led the Senate’s
reauthorization effort. The Senate bill took a fundamentally different approach to federalism
relationships in surface transportation policy than what was offered by the President.86 Senator
Moynihan had a close working relationship with the Surface Transportation Project, a coalition of
83 President George H.W. Bush, “Remarks Announcing Proposed Transportation Legislation,” Public Papers of
President George H.W. Bush, February 13, 1991, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2703&
year=1991&month=2.
84 Samuel Skinner, Secretary, Department of Transportation, Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991
– A Summary (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, 1991), http://ntl.bts.gov/DOCS/ste.html.
85 Mike Mills, “Administration Asks States to Carry the Transit Load,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, March
9, 1991, pp. 599, 600.
86 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Highway History, Richard F. Weingroff,
“National Highway System: Imagining The Future,” http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/nhsorigins.cfm. Note:
Senator Quentin Burdick, Chair, Committee on Environment and Public Works, was in failing health at the time and
allowed Senator Moynihan to take the lead.
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urban, environmental and intermodal transportation advocates, and crafted a bill, S. 965, the
Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (later incorporated into S. 1204 with the same
title), that would have shifted the focus of federal policy away from highway construction toward
maintenance, placed greater emphasis on mass transit and intermodal solutions to traffic
congestion, further decentralized programmatic authority to states and metropolitan planning
organizations in the project development process, increased public participation in the project
development process, and strengthened environmental protections. Specifically, the Senate bill
authorized funding at $123 billion, with almost half of the bill’s highway funds ($44.7 billion) for
a Surface Transportation Program, which would allow states to fund a broad range of surface
transportation projects, including construction, restoration, and operational improvements for
highways and bridges; capital and operating costs for mass transit, rail, and magnetic levitation
systems; carpool projects and parking and bicycle facilities and programs; and surface
transportation research and development programs. The bill also including $21 billion for mass
transit.87
The Senate bill rejected the geographic range of benefits argument in the determination of federal
reimbursement rates. Instead of lowering cost matching rates for transportation projects lacking a
national interest, the Senate bill would have “leveled the playing field” by setting reimbursement
rates at 80% for maintaining and improving transportation facilities, and 75% for new
construction. The financial incentive to fund new construction over maintenance was to be
eliminated by giving maintenance a higher reimbursement rate than new construction.
The Bush Administration indicated that it could not support S. 965 because it did not include its
recommended National Highway System, and did not focus federal resources on highways of
national interest. Dr. Thomas Larson, Administrator of the Federal Highway Administration,
testified before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works that “While we are
moving to the post-Interstate construction era, we are not yet ready for a post-highway
transportation economy.”88 He added that “50 strong state programs will not necessarily provide a
strong national program, and the experience in the European Community and the experience that
we’ve had in working with the 50 States in response to the House Public Works [Committee’s]
charge that we develop an illustrative national [highway] system suggests that there is a need for
Federal oversight of coordination.”89 To avoid a presidential veto, the Senate bill was amended on
the Senate floor to include funding for a National Highway System.
The House bill (H.R. 2950, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991) took
yet another approach to structuring federalism relationships in surface transportation policy,
incorporating some elements of the Administration’s proposal and some elements from the Senate
bill. It authorized $151 billion for the program, including $32 billion for mass transit. It included
funding for a National Highway System (up to 155,000 miles, plus or minus 15%, to be
designated within two years) and, although it did not go as far as the Senate bill in providing
states additional programmatic flexibility, it would have provided states added flexibility to shift
funds among existing highway programs, including for mass transit purposes. It accepted Senator
Moynihan’s “level playing field argument” and set federal reimbursement rates at 80% for most
87 S. 965, Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (Introduced in Senate) and S. 1204, Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act of 1991 (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by Senate).
88 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Pending Highway Legislation, hearing on S.
823 and S. 965, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., May 14, 1991, S. Hrg. 102-142 (Washington: GPO, 1991), p. 339.
89 Ibid., p. 282.
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programs, and 90% to 95% for interstate highways, with the higher reimbursement rate offered to
states with relatively large amounts of federal land.
The $151 billion, six-year, Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA,P.L.
102-240), subsequently adopted by Congress, represented a compromise between the House and
Senate approaches to federalism relationships in surface transportation policy. ISTEA was
authorized at the House level, $46 billion more than the President had requested, and nearly
doubled the amount the Administration requested for mass transit, providing $119 billion for
highways and $32 billion for mass transit. ISTEA replaced the Interstate, Primary, Secondary and
Urban Highway programs with two programs: a $21 billion, 155,000 mile National Highway
System (NHS), including all interstate routes, a large percentage of urban and rural principal
arterials, the defense strategic highway network, and strategic highway connectors; and a $23.9
billion Surface Transportation Program (STP) for all roads not functionally classified as local or
rural minor collector. ISTEA retained separate programs and authorizations for Interstate
Highways ($7.2 billion), Interstate Maintenance ($17 billion), Bridge Replacement and
Rehabilitation ($16.1 billion), and created a new, $6 billion Congestion Mitigation and Air
Quality Improvement Program.
ISTEA’s impact on federalism relationships in surface transportation policy was particularly
noteworthy for several reasons. First, it increased state programmatic authority to shift funds
among existing programs, allowing states to shift up to half of their NHS funds to other highway
programs and mass transit and up to 100% with the approval of the Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Transportation. Second, ISTEA enhanced the role of Metropolitan Planning
Organizations (MPOs) in project selection by requiring states to reserve approximately $9 billion
of STP funds for the use of MPOs representing urban areas with populations of 200,000 or more.
Third, ISTEA mandated a new style of performance planning for managing and monitoring
highway pavement conditions, bridge maintenance, highway safety programs, traffic congestion
mitigation, transit facility and equipment maintenance, and intermodal transportation facilities
and systems. In addition, statewide transportation improvement plans, both for the long-term and
for a shorter-term, were required for the first time, in addition to metropolitan transportation
improvement plans that had been required since 1962. Fourth, ISTEA rejected the application of
the geographic range of benefits argument in setting reimbursement rates. Instead, it “leveled the
playing field” by retaining interstate reimbursement rates at 90% for interstate construction and
maintenance (with up to 95% for states with relatively large amounts of federally owned land)
and increased reimbursement rates to 80% for most non-interstate highway and mass transit
projects. This change removed the financial incentive to fund highways over mass transit, and
new construction over maintenance.90
Debating Program Devolution and Continuing the Expansion of
State Programmatic Flexibilities: TEA-21
In 1995, there were 633 federal grants-in-aid programs, including 618 categorical grants and 15
block grants.91 There were 30 surface transportation grant programs, 28 categorical grants and 2
90 Mike Mills, “Highway and Transit Overhaul is Cleared for President,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,
November 30, 1991, pp. 3518-3522; Kirk Victor, “Skinner’s Final Act,” National Journal, December 14, 1991, pp.
3016-3019; and Bruce D. McDowell, “Reinventing Surface Transportation: New Intergovernmental Challenges,”
Intergovernmental Perspective 18:1 (Winter 1982): 6-8, 18.
91 ACIR, Characteristics of Federal Grant-in-Aid Programs to State and Local Governments: Grants Funded FY 1995,
(continued...)
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block grants. Several prominent members of President Bill Clinton’s Administration, including
Alice Rivlin, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, advocated a sorting out of
intergovernmental responsibilities to reduce expenses and improve government performance.
However, President Bill Clinton proposed more modest intergovernmental reforms. For example,
his ISTEA reauthorization proposal, the six-year, $174.5 billion, National Economic Crossroads
Transportation Efficiency Act (NEXTEA, H.R. 1268, S. 468), would have retained and increased
funding for virtually all ISTEA programs (providing $139 billion for highways and $35.5 billion
for mass transit). It also included $4.7 billion for Amtrak and would have made Amtrak eligible
for STP funding.
During ISTEA’s reauthorization, Congress addressed efforts to devolve programmatic authority to
states and to expand state authority to “flex” federal funding among existing programs, but it
focused most of its attention on resolving differences related to the program’s allocation of
resources among states. The STEP 21 Coalition, representing the “donor” states of Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin, advocated a minimum 95 cents return per dollar their highway
users contributed to the Highway Trust Fund. They also wanted to merge the interstate
maintenance program and portions of the bridge program into the national highway system and
create a Streamlined Surface Transportation Block Grant program which would receive about
60% of the program’s highway funding and could be used for all existing program activities.92
The Alliance for ISTEA Renewal (U.S. Conference of Mayors, National Association of Counties,
National League of Cities, American Public Transit Association, Association of Metropolitan
Planning Organizations and the Surface Transportation Policy Project) wanted to prevent the
redirection of federal fuel tax revenue from the Highway Trust Fund, but otherwise recommended
relatively minor changes to ISTEA. California, Ohio, South Carolina, and Michigan endorsed
efforts by Representative John Kasich in the House and Senator Connie Mack in the Senate to
devolve most non-interstate highway and mass transit programs to states. Their Surface
Transportation and Transit Empowerment Act (H.R. 3045 and S. 1497) would have returned “to
the individual States maximum discretionary authority and fiscal responsibility for all elements of
the national transportation systems that are not within the direct purview of the Federal
Government.”93
The proposed Surface Transportation and Transit Empowerment Act did not generate the level of
congressional attention provided to the state donor-donee debate. Nonetheless, the arguments
presented both for and against its adoption are relevant today given that the devolution issue may
be considered during SAFETEA’s reauthorization. However, current fiscal conditions are much
different today than in 1997 and 1998. It could be argued that the current economic fiscal crisis
may limit the states’ fiscal capacity to assume responsibility for federal surface transportation
projects if they were asked, as they were in 1997 and 1998, to increase state fuel taxes to fund
those projects.
(...continued)
M-195 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1995), p. 3.
92 For further analysis, CRS Report R40451, The Donor-Donee State Issue: Funding Equity in Surface Transportation
Reauthorization, by Robert S. Kirk.
93 Rep. John Kasich, “Building Efficient Surface Transportation And Equity Act of 1998,” House debate,
Congressional Record, vol. 144, part 4 (April 1, 1998), p. 5723.
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At a House subcommittee hearing on ISTEA’s reauthorization in 1997, Senator Mack defended
his devolution proposal, arguing that “the simple fact is that states now have the technical
capability to build their own roads and, frankly, they know better than Washington what their
transportation needs are. A continued role for the federal government is appropriate in certain
areas, such as the maintenance of the interstate highway system or limited coordination
functions.”94 He added:
current policy has been unable to keep up with our Nation’s growing infrastructure needs.
One reason for this is that we have not been getting as much out of our transportation dollars
as we used to. For instance, since 1956 Federal Highway Administration costs have grown
from 7 percent to 21 percent today. Moreover, studies suggest the elimination of Federal
mandates and restrictions would increase States’ real purchasing power for transportation
projects by 20 percent.95
Representative Kasich stated at the hearing that Ohio was one of 32 states at that time that
received less from ISTEA than its highway users paid into the Highway Trust Fund. He added
that the governors of Michigan, Ohio, California, South Carolina and Florida, all states that
received less ISTEA funding at that time than their highway users paid into the Highway Trust
Fund, had endorsed his bill. He argued that “if you let us keep our money and get rid of all the
Federal bureaucracy and all the Federal rules, we’ll be able to actually have more highway
construction.”96
On April 1, 1998, Representative Kasich offered his bill as an amendment in the nature of a
substitute to BESTEA (Building Efficient Surface Transportation and Equity Act of 1998), the
House ISTEA reauthorization bill. During floor debate, Representative E. G. “Bud” Shuster,
Chair of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, rose in opposition to the
amendment, arguing:
while this would simply turn things back to the States, ironically there is a greater need for us
to have a coordinated, tied-together national transportation system than ever. Why? Because
more people and more goods are moving interstate than ever before.97
He also argued that “Indeed, there is a greater need to have this tied together than ever before.
Our bill not only does that, but it also gives flexibilities to the States and the cities by saying that
50 percent of the funding in each category can be flexibly moved about to other categories.”98 He
added that “It is very important, also, to recognize that, of the money that comes to Washington
now, only 1 percent stays here down at the Department of Transportation for administrative
purposes, 88 percent goes back to the States to be spent, 5 percent goes to the Secretary of
Transportation to be sent back to the States for high cost discretionary projects, 5 percent goes
94 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Surface Transportation,
Reauthorization of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA): Comprehensive Reauthorization
Proposals, 105th Cong., 1st sess., February 12, 1997 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1997), p. 11.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., pp. 12, 13.
97 Rep. Bud Shuster, “Building Efficient Surface Transportation and Equity Act of 1998,” House debate, Congressional
Record, vol. 144, part 4 (April 1, 1998), p. 5728.
98 Ibid.
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back to the States through the congressional projects, and only 1 percent stays in
Washington.”99 He concluded by arguing:
Further, State regulations, which in many cases are as onerous, if not more onerous, than
Federal regulations, would obviously stay in place. Indeed, we have no assurance whatsoever
that, if we turn this back to the States, that the States would pass and increase their gas taxes.
Indeed, I am told that, on the average, each State would have to pass the State gas tax
increasing it by 15 cents per gallon. So what assurance do we have? No, this is simply
destroying what must be a national program which is to tie our country together from a
transportation point of view. For those reasons, I say we should defeat this amendment.100
Representative James Oberstar also opposed the amendment, arguing that it would:
... take us back to a time that none of us here could possibly imagine, a time when some
States started roads, others did not, they built it up to a certain point and then it stopped.
Bridges were started and then stopped. If we followed the gentleman’s logic all the way
through, we would have bridges go halfway across a river because one State would want to
build it and the other State would not or would run out of money, or we would have roads
that go up to a State’s border and the other State would say “Well, we don’t think that we
want to build a road there.” ... [the amendment] would have us in chaos. ... This is a vote for
the past, not a vote for the future. ... If we are going to be a Nation, and if my colleagues
believe in the Constitution that said a responsibility of the Congress shall be to build post
roads, that it shall have authority over interstate and foreign commerce, then it is our duty to
promote interstate and foreign commerce, and the way to do it is through transportation.101
The amendment was defeated, 98-318.102
Much of the remaining congressional debate on ISTEA’s reauthorization focused on the state
return-on-investment (state donor-donee) issue, ending the diversion of revenue generated by 4.3
cents per gallon of the gasoline tax from the Highway Trust Fund to the general revenue account
for deficit reduction (enacted in 1993), and the inclusion of congressional earmarks.
The $203.4 billion, six-year Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21, P.L. 105-
178), signed by President Clinton on June 9, 1998, effectively ended the diversion of highway
trust fund revenue for deficit reduction by authorizing $167.1 billion for highways and $36.3
billion for mass transit, roughly equivalent to the amount of revenue expected to be generated by
the Highway Trust Fund. TEA-21 also created a three-part state minimum guarantee program.
First, each state was guaranteed a percentage share (set forth in tabular form) for the apportioned
programs: Interstate Maintenance Program, National Highway System Program, Surface
Transportation Program, Highway Bridge Replacement and Rehabilitation Program, Congestion
Mitigation and Air Quality Program, Metropolitan Planning, Recreational Trails Program,
Appalachian Development Highway System Program and Minimum Guarantee, as well as High
Priority Projects. Second, each state was guaranteed at least 90.5% of the amount its highway
users paid into the Highway Trust Fund (based on the most recent year for which the data are
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Rep. James Oberstar, “Building Efficient Surface Transportation And Equity Act of 1998,” House debate,
Congressional Record, vol. 144, part 4 (April 1, 1998), p. 5730.
102 Rep. John Kasich, “Building Efficient Surface Transportation And Equity Act of 1998,” House debate,
Congressional Record, vol. 144, part 4 (April 1, 1998), pp. 5723-5734.
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available, typically from two fiscal years before). Third, each state was guaranteed that as part of
the minimum guarantee it will receive at least $1 million in minimum guarantee funds.
Although efforts to devolve surface transportation programs to states failed, TEA-21 retained
ISTEA’s programmatic flexibilities and increased them further by reducing from 16 to 7 the
number of required planning factors to be used by states and MPOs when selecting projects, and
increasing the role of local elected government officials in project selection. Congress did not
accept the President’s proposed language making Amtrak eligible for STP funding, but it did
make Amtrak eligible for Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement funding.
Balancing State Program Flexibilities with the Need to Address
National Interests: SAFETEA
On May 14, 2003, President George W. Bush announced his Administration’s TEA-21
reauthorization proposal, the six-year, $247 billion, Safe, Accountable, Flexible and Efficient
Transportation Equity Act of 2003 (SAFETEA, H.R. 2088, S. 1072). One of the bill’s stated
goals was to change federalism relationships in surface transportation policy by eliminating
“program silos” that can alter state and local government decisions based on the availability of
funds.103 The bill proposed to accomplish this by eliminating most discretionary highway grant
programs and making those funds available under the core formula highway grant programs;
creating a new Highway Safety Improvement Program, in place of the existing Surface
Transportation Program safety set-aside; and merging several highway safety programs into a
new General Performance Grant and a new Safety Belt Performance Grant. It also would have
merged mass transit grants into three main programs: an Urbanized Area Formula Grant, which
would have included the existing Urbanized Area Formula Grant and the Fixed Guideway
Modernization program; a Major Capital Investments Program, which would have included the
New Starts program and non-fixed guideway corridor improvements, such as Bus Rapid Transit;
and State-Administered Programs, which would have included the Rural, Elderly and Disabled,
Job Access and Reverse Commute, and New Freedom Initiative programs.104
Although Congress did consider proposals to change federalism relationships in surface
transportation policy during TEA-21’s reauthorization, most of its attention, once again, was
focused on resolving disagreements over funding levels and how funds were to be distributed
among states.105 Donor states, mainly those with growing populations located in the South and
Southwest, wanted TEA-21’s state minimum guarantee increased from 90.5% to 95% of the
103 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, The Administration’s Proposal for
Reauthorization of the Federal Public Transportation Program, Hearing on the Reauthorization of the Public
Transportation Title of the Transportation Equity Act For the Twenty-First Century (TEA-21), 108th Cong., 1st sess.,
June 10, 2003, S. Hrg. 108-640 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2004), pp. 17, 18.
104 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways, Transit and
Pipelines, Overview of the Administration’s Proposed Reauthorization Bill (SAFETEA), Hearing on the Safe,
Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act (SAFETEA) of 2003, 108th Cong., 1st sess., May 15,
2003, Committee Serial No. 108-26 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2003).
105 For additional information, see CRS Report RL32226, Highway and Transit Program Reauthorization Legislation
in the 2nd Session, 108th Congress, by John W. Fischer; CRS Report RL33119, Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Equity Act - A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU or SAFETEA): Selected Major Provisions, by John W.
Fischer, CRS Report RL31665, Highway and Transit Program Reauthorization, by John W. Fischer; and CRS Report
31735, Federal-Aid Highway Program: “Donor-Donee” State Issues, by Robert S. Kirk (available by request from the
author).
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amount their highway users contributed to the Highway Trust Fund. Several donor states,
including Arizona, California, Florida, North Carolina and Texas, also wanted to increase the
scope of the guarantee by increasing the range of programs included when calculating each state’s
share.
Donee states did not object to a higher minimum guarantee in principle, but only if it did not
reduce their funding. However, because the President threatened to veto any substantial funding
increase above his initial recommendation of $247 billion and Congress lacked the votes to
override his veto on this issue, it became virtually impossible to increase the state minimum
funding guarantee without reducing funding for at least some states. Unable to reach agreement,
Congress extended TEA-21 for short periods 12 times before finally passing the $286 billion
Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act - A Legacy for Users
(SAFETEA) on July 29, 2005. It was signed by President Bush on August 10, 2005. It was only
after the President removed his veto threat (partly due to a 2004 change in the tax treatment of
ethanol fuel, which was expected to generate an additional $18.9 billion for the Highway Trust
Fund) and the program’s overall funding level was increased to $286 billion that the impasse over
the minimum guarantee was resolved.
SAFETEA created an Equity Bonus (EB) program that ensures that states receive a specified
percentage of the revenue their highway users contribute to the highway account of the Highway
Trust Fund for programs listed in the EB program. The guaranteed rate was set at 91.5% for
FY2007, and 92% for FYs 2008 and 2009. SAFETEA also includes a guaranteed overall increase
for all states over the previous reauthorization bill, and a number of “hold harmless” provisions
intended to mitigate the impact on certain donee states of the shift in funding to donor states.
Meeting all of these requirements is done by providing a spending overlay across all of the
programs listed in the EB program in a way that gives spending increases to all states, but larger
increases to donor states. The EB program is the largest formula program in SAFETEA ($41
billion over five years).106 In an important concession to donor states, funds for members projects
were included in the funds that are distributed by the equity bonus formula.
Balancing its interest in ensuring that the program meets national needs with its interest in
continuing to expand state programmatic flexibility, Congress did not adopt President Bush’s
recommendation to eliminate discretionary programs and reduce the number of formula programs
in SAFETEA. Instead, SAFETEA added three new formula programs: the previously described
core formula Highway Safety Improvement Program ($7.5 billion), the Coordinated Border
Infrastructure Program, which replaced a TEA-21 discretionary program of the same name, and
the Safe Routes to School Program. Also, a new discretionary transportation improvement
program, a redefined national corridor infrastructure program (formerly part of the national
corridor planning and development and coordinated border infrastructure program), and a new
program for projects of national or regional significance were added. SAFETEA retained TEA-
21’s provisions that had expanded state authority to shift funds among core, formula-driven
highway programs and between highways and mass transit. It also included a new provision
allowing states to transfer certain discretionary program funds for administration of highway
projects and mass transit projects. It also enhanced environmental streamlining regulations,
changed clean air conformity regulations, funding for transit new starts, expanded reliance on
innovative financing and tolls and spending on congressional high priority projects.
106 For further analysis, see CRS Report R40451, The Donor-Donee State Issue: Funding Equity in Surface
Transportation Reauthorization, by Robert S. Kirk.
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MOEs and The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
The $789.5 billion American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5, signed by
President Barack Obama on February 17, 2009), included $27.5 billion for highway, bridge and
road projects, $8.4 billion for mass transit and $8.6 billion for discretionary grants to states to
help fund capital costs associated with intercity rail services, with an emphasis on developing
high-speed rail services. As a condition for the receipt of funding for these programs, the law
includes a state maintenance-of-effort (MOE) requirement that requires the Governor of each
state to certify to the Secretary of Transportation that
the State will maintain its effort with regard to State funding for the types of projects that are
funded by the appropriation. As part of this certification, the Governor shall submit to the
Secretary of Transportation a statement identifying the amount of funds the State planned to
expend from State sources as of the date of enactment of this Act during the period
beginning on the date of enactment of this Act through September 30, 2010, for the types of
projects that are funded by the appropriation.107
States are required to submit a report on their activities not later than 90 days after the act’s
enactment and an updated report not later than 180 days, one year, two years, and three years
after enactment. States that are unable to maintain the level of effort will be prohibited by the
Secretary of Transportation from receiving additional funds “pursuant to the redistribution of the
limitation on obligations for Federal-aid highway and highway safety construction programs that
occurs after August 1 for fiscal year 2011.”108
Because state budgets are fungible and nominal state revenue tends to increase over time, when
states receive federal financial assistance they typically have several budgetary options. They can
choose to not make any budgetary adjustments other than to supplement existing spending levels
with the federal assistance, or they can choose to substitute all or a portion of the federal funds
received for existing state funds and use the savings to spend in other areas, reduce taxes, or
increase their state “rainy day” funds. An examination of grants-in-aid listed in the Catalog of
Federal Domestic Assistance revealed that 33 federal grants to state and local governments have
state spending MOE requirements to prevent states from substituting federal funds for existing
state funds.
An analysis completed by the Government Accountability Office in 2004 found that “state and
local governments have used roughly half of the increases in federal highway grants since 1982 to
substitute for funding they would otherwise have spent from their own resources. In addition, our
model estimated that the rate of grant substitution increased significantly over the past two
decades, rising from about 18 cents on the dollar during the early 1980s to roughly 60 cents on
the dollar during the 1990s.”109
Because the recession has depressed state revenue growth, it could be argued that states facing a
budgetary shortfall are not likely to substitute federal funds received from the economic recovery
plan for existing state funds. Instead, it could be argued that at least some states, particularly
107 P.L. 111-5.
108 Ibid.
109 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal-Aid Highways: Trends, Effect on State Spending, and Options for
Future Program Design, GAO-04-802, August 2004, p. 3, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04802.pdf.
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those facing budgetary shortfalls, might have a difficult time finding state revenue to maintain
their previous spending levels. In either case, state MOE requirements may become an issue
during SAFETEA’s reauthorization and will be the subject of congressional interest and oversight
during the implementation of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.
States have traditionally opposed state MOE requirements as an infringement on their
sovereignty. For example, on January 15, 2008 the National Governors Association, National
Conference of State Legislatures, and State Higher Education Executive Officers sent a letter to
the chairs and ranking Members of the House Committee on Education and Labor and Senate
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions opposing a proposed MOE mandate in the
College Opportunity and Affordability Act (H.R. 4137) because they believed that it infringed on
state autonomy:
Governors, legislators, and higher education officials share your desire to help make higher
education accessible and affordable for students and families. They also share your concern
with the rising cost of higher education, and are committed to making higher education
easily accessible and affordable to all our citizens.
That said, state budgeting decisions should be made by state officials. The decision to fund a
new building or campus, expand student aid, help low-income families to access health care,
or improve high schools, must remain with the officials closest to the needs of their specific
communities.110
Opponents of state MOE requirements also argue that during prosperous times MOEs discourage
increased state spending in areas receiving federal assistance. For example, on July 31, 2008 the
National Governors Association opposed a state MOE requirement in the Higher Education
Opportunity Act (P.L. 110-315) because it would penalize states that increased spending during
good economic times and decreased them during economic downturns:
Governors must balance their budgets in both good and bad economic times. This mandate
means that states will be unable to make major increases or invest one-time surpluses in
higher education during good times because they will be penalized if forced to reduce
spending during difficult times. In the end, this will increase the cost of college for students
and their families.111
Advocates of state MOE requirements argue that states should not be allowed to substitute federal
assistance for existing state and local government spending. In their view, federal assistance
should either supplement current state spending in the functional area receiving federal assistance
110 Letter from Raymond C. Scheppach, Executive Director, National Governors Association, Paul E. Lingenfelter ,
President, State Higher Education Executive Officers, and William T. Pound, Executive Director, National Conference
of State Legislatures, to The Honorable Edward “Ted” M. Kennedy, Chairman, Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
Committee, The Honorable Michael B. Enzi, Ranking Member, Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee,
The Honorable George Miller, Chairman, Committee on Education and Labor, and The Honorable Howard P. “Buck”
McKeon, Ranking Member, Committee on Education and Labor, January 15, 2008, http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/
menuitem.cb6e7818b34088d18a278110501010a0/?vgnextoid=4a33ae4748977110VgnVCM1000001a01010aRCRD&
vgnextchannel=4b18f074f0d9ff00VgnVCM1000001a01010aRCRD.
111 National Governors Association, “NGA Statement on Higher Education Bill,” Press release, July 31, 2008,
http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/menuitem.6c9a8a9ebc6ae07eee28aca9501010a0/?vgnextoid=
9d9608b7bda7b110VgnVCM1000001a01010aRCRD&vgnextchannel=
759b8f2005361010VgnVCM1000001a01010aRCRD.
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or encourage states to increase their current level of spending in that area. For example, in 1978
the now-defunct U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) argued that
Maintenance-of-effort requirements and matching ratios should be considered together.
Without an effective maintenance-of-effort requirement, a categorical grant with no
matching requirements likely will result in reduced spending from recipients’ own funds for
the aided function.112
Federal Reimbursement Rates and The American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) set federal reimbursement rates for
funding received from the act for several programs, including highway, bridge and road projects,
transit capital assistance, fixed guideway infrastructure investment, and capital assistance for high
speed rail corridors and intercity passenger rail service, at up to 100%. It remains to be seen if
ARRA’s up to 100% reimbursement rate will be viewed as a precedent for re-opening discussions
of SAFETEA’s reimbursement rates, or it will be viewed as an aberration designed to meet a
special economic circumstance. One possibility is that the states’ ability or inability to meet
ARRA’s transportation MOE requirements may have an effect on congressional views
concerning any proposals to increase the federal share of expenses in SAFETEA’s programs or to
waive, as Senator Bernard Sanders’ and Representative Peter Welch’s legislation (S. 198, H.R.
491) proposed to do for FY2009, “any requirement that would otherwise require a state or local
government to contribute non-federal funds toward the cost of a covered transportation program
or activity authorized by SAFTETEA or an amendment made by that Act.”113
Concluding Observations
Congress has debated the federal role in surface transportation policy since the nation’s formation
in 1789. A review of the historical record suggests that the debate over the federal role in surface
transportation policy has been influenced by factors both internal and external to the institution.
Internally, the background, personalities, and ideological preferences of congressional leaders
such as Senator Harry Byrd, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Representative E. G. “Bud”
Shuster have had a profound impact on the development of federal-state-local government
relationships in surface transportation policy over time. The norms, customs, and traditions of the
House and Senate have also had an influence. For example, the decentralized nature of decision-
making in both the House and the Senate has compartmentalized decisions into more manageable
pieces, but, arguably, has made it more difficult for Congress to develop broad-based policies that
cut across committee jurisdictions or to enact proposals to consolidate programs or devolve
programmatic authority to states as these actions might upset existing power relationships and
require the consent of several committees and committee chairs. For example, in the House of
Representatives, programmatic and funding distribution issues are under the jurisdiction of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, but tax and Highway Trust Fund issues are
under the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means. In the Senate, most programmatic
112 U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Categorical Grants: Their Role and Design
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1978), p. 174.
113 H.R. 491.
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and funding distribution issues are under the jurisdiction of the Committee on Environment and
Public Works for highways and other aspects of Title 23, but are under the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs for transit. Tax and Highway Trust Fund issues are under
the jurisdiction of the Committee on Finance. In the Senate, most safety issues are under the
jurisdiction of either the Committee on Environment and Public Works or the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation. The size of the 75-member House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure may also have an impact on federal-state-local relationships in
surface transportation policy as each Member has a natural tendency to attempt to maximize
surface transportation resources for their home district. Arguably, the committee’s unusually large
size could make it more difficult to eliminate congressional earmarks or to achieve committee
approval for program consolidations or devolution of programmatic authority because such
changes are often viewed as jeopardizing existing funding streams and the ability of Members to
claim and receive credit for helping their constituents.114
Externally, interest groups representing both the private and public sectors have historically been
united in their advocacy of additional federal funding, but have been divided over how program
funds should be allocated, both among states and among transportation modes. Congress has
tended to arbitrate the differences among these varied interests by balancing the need to promote
the national interest with the recognition that, for the most part, state and local government
officials have proven over time to be relatively capable administrators of surface transportation
programs. As a result, Congress has rejected efforts to devolve programmatic authority to states.
Instead, it has adopted policies that have expanded state programmatic flexibility while, at the
same time, promote the national interest by requiring state and local governments to adhere to
federal guidelines for managing the project development process and monitoring highway and
bridge conditions, highway safety programs, traffic congestion mitigation programs, transit
facility and equipment maintenance programs, as well as intermodal transportation facilities and
systems.
Presidents, perhaps reflecting their role in representing the national interest as a whole and,
perhaps, at least in part, because several Presidents had formerly served as governors, have
tended to be more supportive of program consolidation and devolution of programmatic authority
in surface transportation policy than Congress. This has been especially the case when the
President’s ideology favored smaller government. Typically, presidential efforts to consolidate
surface transportation programs have faced strong opposition from private sector interest groups
worried that program consolidation will result in less funding for the consolidated programs over
time, and from Members worried that consolidation could lead to less funding for specific
programs that are important to them.
Perhaps the most difficult factor to account for in the development of federalism relationships in
surface transportation policy over time has been the changing nature of American society and
expectations concerning personal mobility. Once a rural society with relatively limited
expectations concerning personal mobility, America is now a primarily urban/suburban society
where automobile ownership and the personal mobility that automobile ownership brings is not
only a powerful social status symbol but also a necessity. Obtaining a drivers’ license is now a
major life-altering event, signifying for millions of American teenagers each year the transition
from childhood to adulthood. Because the American bond with the automobile is strong, moving
away from a primary focus on building and constructing highways towards a “more balanced”
114 David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 52-61.
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intermodal transportation approach has been made more difficult for policymakers at all levels of
government. Moreover, given the public’s relatively high expectations concerning personal
mobility, Congress has been reluctant to consolidate or devolve surface transportation programs
to states, at least in part, because some Members worry that if states are provided additional
authority and fail to meet public expectations, that they might be held accountable for that failure
on election day. In their view, a more prudent, risk-adverse approach is to provide states
additional programmatic flexibility, but retain a federal presence through both program oversight
and the imposition of federal guidelines to ensure that states do not stray too far from national
objectives.
It remains to be seen how all of these factors will play out during SAFETEA’s reauthorization.
One certainty is that Congress will play the key role in determining the future of federalism
relationships in surface transportation policy. Another is that those relationships will continue to
evolve over time, adopting to changes in American society and in Congress.
Author Contact Information
Robert Jay Dilger
Senior Specialist in American National Government
rdilger@crs.loc.gov, 7-3110
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