Foreign Assistance to North Korea
Mark E. Manyin
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Mary Beth Nikitin
Specialist in Nonproliferation
June 11, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40095
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Foreign Assistance to North Korea
Summary
Between 1995 and 2008, the United States provided North Korea with over $1.3 billion in
assistance: slightly more than 50% for food aid and about 40% for energy assistance. Since early
2009, the United States has provided virtually no aid to North Korea, though episodically there
have been discussions about resuming large-scale food aid. Additionally, the Obama
Administration officials have said that they would be willing to consider other types of aid if
North Korea takes steps indicating that it will dismantle its nuclear program. However, barring
an unexpected breakthrough, there appears little likelihood the Obama Administration will
provide large-scale assistance of any type to North Korea in the near future. In February 2013,
North Korea announced it had conducted its third test of a nuclear device, a move that came
weeks after its apparently successful launch of a long-range missile. Members of Congress have
a number of tools they could use to influence the development and implementation of aid
programs with North Korea.
Food Aid. North Korea has suffered from chronic, massive food shortages since the mid-1990s.
Food aid—largely from China, South Korea, and the United States—has been essential in filling
the gap. As of mid-2013, according to many observers, it appears that while North Korea’s
continued food shortages are not severe enough to create a crisis situation, they are causing
chronic malnutrition and stunting in vulnerable populations in certain regions. Many analysts
think the Obama Administration will be reluctant to provide large-scale aid after the breakdown
of a February 2012 deal, in which the United States announced it would provide North Korea
with large-scale food aid in return for concessions by Pyongyang on its nuclear and missile
programs. The deal unraveled in April 2012 after North Korea launched a long-range rocket in
defiance of United Nations sanctions. Since then, the United States and North Korea have not
reached any agreements, including on food aid. In June 2012, the Senate voted to prohibit food
aid to North Korea.
Providing food to North Korea poses a number of dilemmas. Pyongyang has resisted reforms that
would allow the equitable distribution of food and help pay for food imports. The North Korean
government restricts the ability of donors to operate in the country. Additionally, multiple sources
have asserted that some of the food assistance is routinely diverted for resale in private markets or
other uses. However, it is likely that food aid has helped feed millions of North Koreans, at times
possibly staving off a repeat of the famine conditions that existed in North Korea in the mid-late
1990s, when 5%-10% of the population died. South Korean President Park Geun-hye’s
government has indicated that they would be willing to offer North Korea food aid as part of her
plan to foster a “new era” in inter-Korean relations.
Energy Assistance. Between 1995 and 2009, the United States provided around $600 million in
energy assistance to North Korea. The aid was given over two time periods—1995-2003 and
2007-2009—in exchange for North Korea freezing its plutonium-based nuclear facilities. In 2008
and 2009, North Korea also took steps to disable these facilities. However, no additional energy
assistance has been provided since 2009, when Pyongyang withdrew from the Six-Party Talks—
involving North Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia—over North Korea’s nuclear
program. The move followed condemnation and sanctions by the U.N. Security Council for North
Korea’s April 2009 launch of a suspected long-range missile and May 2009 test of a nuclear
device.
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Foreign Assistance to North Korea
In 2007 and 2008, the United States also provided technical assistance to help in North Korea’s
nuclear disablement process. In 2008, Congress took steps to legally enable the President to give
expanded assistance for this purpose. However, following North Korea’s actions in the spring of
2009, Congress rejected the Obama Administration’s requests for funds to supplement existing
resources in the event of a breakthrough. Congress did approve monies for the State Department’s
general emergency nonproliferation fund that the Administration could use in North Korea.
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Foreign Assistance to North Korea
Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
A Brief History of U.S. Aid to North Korea .............................................................................. 1
Energy and Denuclearization Assistance ............................................................................ 1
Food and Other Humanitarian Aid ...................................................................................... 2
U.S. Energy Assistance .................................................................................................................... 4
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) ............................................... 4
Assistance Related to the Six-Party Talks ................................................................................. 4
Heavy Fuel Oil Shipments .................................................................................................. 5
Congress and Energy Assistance ............................................................................................... 6
U.S. Denuclearization Assistance .................................................................................................... 7
Nuclear Disablement Expenditures ........................................................................................... 7
“Glenn Amendment” Restrictions ....................................................................................... 7
Cooperative Threat Reduction Funds .................................................................................. 8
Assistance to the IAEA ....................................................................................................... 8
Congress and Denuclearization Assistance ............................................................................... 9
U.S. Food Assistance ....................................................................................................................... 9
Congress and Food Assistance ................................................................................................ 11
U.S. Food Aid Policy ............................................................................................................... 12
The Food Aid Dilemma ........................................................................................................... 12
The Ebbs and Flows of U.S. Food Aid to North Korea, 2006-2010 ........................................ 14
North Korea’s 2006 Restrictions and the Decline in the WFP’s Program......................... 14
The U.S. Resumes Food Aid in 2008 ................................................................................ 14
Cessation of the 2008-2009 Program ................................................................................ 15
WFP Programs from 2010-2013 ....................................................................................... 16
Options and Considerations for Future Food Aid to North Korea ........................................... 16
Other Forms of U.S. Assistance ..................................................................................................... 18
Medical Assistance .................................................................................................................. 18
Figures
Figure 1. Total Estimated Food Aid to North Korea, 1995-2009................................................... 10
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to North Korea, 1995-2011 ...................................................................... 2
Table 2. Six-Party Talks-Related Energy Assistance to North Korea .............................................. 6
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 19
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Foreign Assistance to North Korea
Introduction
A Brief History of U.S. Aid to North Korea
For four decades after the end of the Korean War in 1953, U.S. strategy toward the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, commonly referred to as North Korea) was relatively simple:
deter an attack on South Korea. This included a freeze on virtually all forms of economic contact
between the United States and North Korea in an attempt to weaken and delegitimize the North
Korean government. In the 1990s, two developments led the United States to rethink its
relationship with the DPRK: North Korea’s progress in its nuclear weapons and missile programs
and the onset of massive, chronic food shortages there. In response, the United States in 1995
began providing the DPRK with foreign assistance, which to date has totaled over $1.2 billion.
This aid has consisted of energy assistance, food aid, and a small amount of medical supplies.
(See Table 1.) The Obama Administration, like the George W. Bush Administration, has said that
it would be willing to provide “significant” energy and economic assistance to North Korea if
Pyongyang takes steps to irreversibly dismantle its nuclear program.1 However, due to the
deterioration in U.S.-North Korea relations, at the time of this writing there is little likelihood the
Obama Administration will provide assistance to North Korea in the near future.
Energy and Denuclearization Assistance
In 1994, the United States and North Korea negotiated an Agreed Framework, under which
Pyongyang agreed to shut down its nuclear program in exchange for two light water nuclear
reactors (LWRs) and heavy fuel oil (HFO). Between 1995 and 2003, the United States provided
over $400 million in HFO, which was channeled through the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO), the organization established to implement the Agreed
Framework. The George W. Bush Administration halted energy assistance in the fall of 2002,
following North Korea’s reported admission that it had secretly been developing a uranium-based
nuclear program.2
The Bush Administration resumed energy assistance to North Korea in 2007. In July of that year,
progress was made in multilateral negotiations, called the Six-Party Talks, over North Korea’s
nuclear programs. As a result, the United States and other countries once again began providing
HFO in return for Pyongyang freezing and disabling its plutonium-based nuclear facilities in
Yongbyon.3 By December 2008, the United States had shipped its promised 200,000 tons of HFO.
From July 2007 to April 2009, the United States provided technical assistance to North Korea to
help in the nuclear disablement process. North Korea’s May 2009 nuclear test effectively halted
discussion of U.S. energy assistance to North Korea in the near term.
1 State Department Press Release, “Remarks at the ASEAN Regional Forum by Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of
State,” Laguna Phuket, Thailand, July 23, 2009.
2 See also CRS Report RL34256, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, by Mary Beth Nikitin. For its
part, Pyongyang had expressed frustration at the slow pace of constructing the light-water nuclear reactor (LWR) that it
had been promised under the Agreed Framework. LWRs do not produce weapons-grade nuclear materials, unlike the
plutonium production reactor that North Korea had been operating.
3 The Six–Party Talks involve North Korea, the United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. See also CRS
Report R41259, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation, by Emma Chanlett-Avery
and Ian E. Rinehart.
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Table 1. U.S. Assistance to North Korea, 1995-2011
(As of December 2011)
6-Party Talks-Related
Assistance
Food Aid (per FY)
KEDO
(per FY; $ million)
Medical
Assistance
Supplies &
Calendar
Commodity
(per
Other (per
or Fiscal
Value
calendar yr;
Nuclear
FY; $
Total
Year (FY) Metric Tons
($ million) $ million)
Fuel Oil Disablement
million)
($ million)
1995
0
0.00
$9.50
—
—
0.20
9.70
1996
19,500
8.30
22.00
—
—
0.00
30.30
1997
177,000
52.40
25.00
—
—
5.00
82.40
1998
200,000
72.90
50.00
—
—
0.00
122.90
1999
695,194
222.10
65.10
—
—
0.00
287.20
2000
265,000
74.30
64.40
—
—
0.00
138.70
2001
350,000
58.07
74.90
—
—
0.00
132.97
2002
207,000
50.40
90.50
—
—
0.00
140.90
2003
40,200
25.48
2.30
—
—
0.00
27.78
2004
110,000
36.30
0.00
—
—
0.10
36.40
2005
25,000
5.70
—
—
—
—
5.70
2006
0
0.00
—
—
—
0.00
0.00
2007
0
0.00
—
25.00
20.00
0.10
45.10
2008
148,270
93.70
—
106.00
25.00
0.00
224.70
2009
21,000
5.60
—
15.00
—
4.00
24.60
2010 — 2.90a
—
—
—
0.60
3.50
2011 — —
—
—
— 0.90
0.90
2012 — —
—
—
—
—
—
Total
2,258,164
708.15
403.70
146.00
45.00
10.90
1,313.75
Source: Compiled by CRS from USAID; US Department of Agriculture; State Department; KEDO (Korean
Peninsula Energy Development Organization).
Note: For the purposes of this report, U.S. government democracy promotion and refugee support programs
are not included as forms of assistance to North Korea.
a. $2.9 million in FY2010 represents a budgetary adjustment for contributions provided in FY2008.
Food and Other Humanitarian Aid
Since the 1980s, North Korea has experienced massive food shortages of varying degrees of
severity. For a decade after DPRK authorities’ 1995 appeal for outside help, the United States was
one of the largest providers of food assistance. The request was unprecedented; by choice, North
Korea was and still remains one of the world’s most reclusive countries. U.S. and United Nations
aid officials have continuously wrestled with DPRK authorities over how much freedom foreign
workers should be allowed to distribute and monitor food assistance. The regime’s restrictions
have ebbed and flowed, usually in accordance with the government’s desperation for outside
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Foreign Assistance to North Korea
food. Twice since 1995 Pyongyang has significantly tightened restrictions. In both periods—
FY2006-FY2007 and from the beginning of FY2010 until the time this report was being
written—the United States responded by providing virtually no food aid. In February 2012, the
Obama Administration agreed to resume large-scale food assistance in return for North Korean
promises to take certain steps on its nuclear and long-range missile programs. As described in the
text box below, however, the agreement unraveled less than a month after it was reached. As
discussed in the U.S. Food Assistance section below, Members of Congress have a number of
tools they could use to influence the implementation of future aid programs with North Korea.
The 2012 “Leap Day” Agreement
For much of 2011 and in the first months of 2012, it appeared likely that the 112th Congress would confront the issue
of whether to support or reject proposals for resuming food assistance programs to North Korea, as the Obama
Administration studied and debated how to respond to North Korean requests for large-scale food donations. On
February 29, 2012, the Obama Administration and North Korea announced they had reached two related
agreements. In the first, North Korea announced it would abide by a moratorium on testing and allow international
monitoring of key parts of its nuclear program. The second was a U.S. announcement that it would provide North
Korea with 240,000 metric tons (MT) of food aid—termed “nutritional assistance.” North Korea also agreed in
principle to accept tougher conditions on monitoring and that the food assistance would take the form of food
products (such as corn-soy blends) that are less likely to be diverted from their intended recipients, namely pregnant
women and young children. The agreement appears to have been largely worked out in bilateral meetings in 2011.
The December 2011 death of Kim Jong-il, North Korea’s former supreme leader, halted the talks for a few months.
However, the movement toward a restart of U.S.-North Korean diplomacy was halted less than three weeks after
the “Leap Day deal” was reached. On March 16, 2012, North Korea announced that it would launch an “earth
observation satellite” in April. During their discussions with North Korea in 2011, U.S. officials reportedly warned
their North Korean counterparts that the United States would regard a satellite launch as a violation of the
agreement the two sides were negotiating. Such a launch would defy a number of United Nations resolutions, which
demand North Korea refrain from “any launch using ballistic missile technology.” After North Korea proceeded with
the launch on April 13, the United States suspended its portion of the Leap Day arrangement. Thereafter, North
Korea followed suit.
South Korean Food Aid
One development Members of Congress may want to monitor is the food aid policy adopted by
the government of South Korean President Park Geun-hye, who came into office in February
2013. Park has called for creating a “new era” on the Korean Peninsula by adopting modest
confidence-building measures with Pyongyang that presumably would be unveiled if and when
inter-Korean tensions decline. In a variety of settings, President Obama and other senior
Administration officials have indicated their support for Park’s general approach toward North
Korea, which she has called “trustpolitik.”4 Among other items, her government has indicated it
plans to delink humanitarian assistance from other diplomatic developments. In private
conversations with CRS analysts and U.S. government officials in the spring of 2013, South
Korean government officials have said that their plan is to offer North Korea a “small” amount of
food aid.
4 For instance, a May 7, 2013, U.S.-ROK joint statement, issued in conjunction with President Obama and Park’s first
summit meeting in Washington, stated that “the United States and the Republic of Korea will continue to work ... to
bring North Korea in to compliance with its international obligations and promote peace and prosperity on the Korean
Peninsula, including through the trust-building process initiated by President Park.” (emphasis added) The White
House Office of the Press Secretary, “2013 Official Joint Declaration,” May 7, 2013.
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Medical Assistance
From time to time, the United States also has provided small amounts of medical assistance to
North Korea. In 2008, for instance, the Bush Administration allocated $4 million in assistance to
U.S. NGOs to help several North Korean rural and provincial hospitals by improving their
electrical supplies and by providing medical equipment and training. More recently, following
localized floods in North Korea in the summer of 2010, the Obama Administration spent about
$600,000 on the provision of relief items, such as medicine, to North Korea.
U.S. Energy Assistance
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)
From 1995 to 2002, the United States provided over $400 million in energy assistance to North
Korea under the terms of the U.S.-North Korean 1994 Agreed Framework, in which the DPRK
agreed to halt its existing plutonium-based nuclear program in exchange for energy aid from the
United States and other countries.5 After Washington and Pyongyang reached their agreement, the
United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea formed an international consortium, the Korean
Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), to manage the assistance.6 The planned
aid consisted of the construction of two light-water nuclear reactors (LWRs) and the provision of
500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil annually while the reactors were being built.7 U.S.
contributions covered only heavy fuel oil shipments and KEDO administrative costs.
In October 2002, KEDO board members decided to halt fuel oil shipments following a dispute
over North Korea’s alleged clandestine uranium enrichment program. In December, North Korea
expelled inspectors from its Yongbyon nuclear site, withdrew from the Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty (NPT), and resumed operations at Yongbyon. The Bush Administration thereafter sought
to permanently end the KEDO program.8 In 2003 and 2004, KEDO’s Executive Board (the
United States, South Korea, Japan, and the European Union) decided to suspend construction on
the LWRs for one-year periods. In the fall of 2005, the KEDO program was formally terminated.
In January 2006, the last foreign KEDO workers left the LWR construction site at Kumho, North
Korea.
Assistance Related to the Six-Party Talks
After the collapse of the Agreed Framework arrangement in 2002, the Bush Administration and
the Chinese government worked to create a multilateral forum of the six major countries in
Northeast Asia to discuss and resolve the North Korean nuclear problem. As with KEDO, the
5 See “Total Financial Support by Country: March 1995 to December 2005,” Table B, Appendix 1, KEDO 2005
Annual Report. http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/KEDO_AR_2005.pdf.
6 Membership in KEDO expanded to include additional states and international organizations that contributed funds,
goods or services: Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, the European Union (as an executive board
member), Indonesia, New Zealand, Poland, and Uzbekistan. KEDO also received material and financial support from
nineteen other nonmember states. Details at http://www.kedo.org/au_history.asp.
7 Full text of the KEDO-DPRK supply agreement at http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/SupplyAgreement.pdf.
8 State Department Daily Press Briefing by Adam Ereli, Deputy Spokesman, November 5, 2003.
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Bush Administration and other members of the Six-Party Talks—South Korea, Japan, China, and
Russia—promised energy assistance to North Korea as an inducement to end its nuclear program.
In September 2005, the six parties issued a joint statement agreeing to “promote economic
cooperation in the fields of energy, trade and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally.” The
United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia also stated their “willingness to provide
energy assistance to the DPRK.” The agreement said that the parties would discuss the provision
of a light water nuclear power reactor to North Korea “at the appropriate time.” This document
serves as the foundation for subsequent agreements.9
Talks were stalled after North Korea tested a nuclear device in October 2006. After a return to
talks, a Denuclearization Action Plan was reached in February 2007. It called for a first phase to
include the shut-down of key nuclear facilities and initial provision of 50,000 metric tons of
heavy fuel oil to North Korea. In the second phase, the parties agreed to provide North Korea
with “economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of 1 million tons of
heavy fuel oil, including the initial shipment of 50,000 tons of heavy oil.”
Heavy Fuel Oil Shipments
The shipments of fuel oil or equivalent (e.g., steel products to renovate aging power plants)
assistance were to happen on an “action for action” basis, as North Korea made progress on
denuclearization.10 The shipments of 1 million MT of heavy fuel oil or equivalent were to be
divided equally by the five parties (i.e., 200,000 MT each). HFO shipments were delivered in a
start-and-stop manner, slowed primarily by disagreements between Pyongyang and Washington
over how and whether to verify North Korea’s disablement, and over whether the United States
would remove North Korea from its State Sponsors of Terrorism list. Before the Six Party Talks
broke down in March 2009, the DPRK had received 500,000 MT of heavy fuel oil and equipment
and 245,110 MT of fuel equivalent assistance.11
9 Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing, September 19, 2005. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/ps/2005/53490.htm.
10 These commitments were reaffirmed in the October 3, 2007 Agreement on “Second-Phase Actions for the
Implementation of the Joint Statement.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/93223.htm.
11 Japan said it would not provide its share of energy assistance to Pyongyang until North Korea had satisfactorily
resolved the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea. For more on this topic, see CRS Report RS22845,
North Korea’s Abduction of Japanese Citizens and the Six-Party Talks, by Emma Chanlett-Avery. In 2008, press
reports said that the United States was arranging for other countries such as Australia, New Zealand, and European
states to provide Japan’s portion of HFO aid. Australia and New Zealand had each reportedly agreed to donate $10
million, approximately equal to 30,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil. See “Japan mulls funding N. Korea
denuclearization, others to give oil aid,” Japan Economic Newswire, October 21, 2008. Japan also reportedly was
considering the contribution of technical assistance related to North Korea’s nuclear dismantlement in the amount of
200,000 metric tons of HFO (approximately 16 billion yen or $164 million). See “Japan may pay cash for North
Korea’s denuclearization, says report,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, October 22, 2008.
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Table 2. Six-Party Talks-Related Energy Assistance to North Korea
(July 2007-March 2009)
Amount of HFO
Amount of HFO (MT)
Equivalent (MT)
Amount Left to be
Donor Country
Delivered
Delivered
Delivered
China 50,000
150,000
0
Japan 0
0
200,000
Russia 200,000
0
0
South Korea
50,000
95,110
55,000 HFO equivalent
United States
200,000
0
0
Total 500,000
245,110
310,000
Source: Compiled by the Congressional Research Service.
Notes: Japan has stated it will not deliver energy assistance to North Korea until the issue of abductions of
Japanese citizens by North Korea is resolved. MT = metric tons.
Congress and Energy Assistance
Over time, Congress has influenced administration policy by placing conditions on aid to North
Korea. From 1998 until the United States halted funding for KEDO in FY2003, Congress
included in each Foreign Operations Appropriation requirements that the President certify
progress in nuclear and missile negotiations with North Korea before allocating money to KEDO
operations. To support the Six-Party Talks, Congress provided funds for energy assistance in the
FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-252). This act also gave the President
authority to waive Arms Export Control Act sanctions on Pyongyang for the purpose of providing
aid in connection with denuclearization (see ““Glenn Amendment” Restrictions” below).
However, this waiver was not used, and was no longer in effect following the May 2009 North
Korean nuclear test. Congress has supported funding for the denuclearization of North Korea, for
example in the FY2008 Defense Authorization Act (see “U.S. Denuclearization Assistance”
section below).
No energy assistance for North Korea was proposed in the Administration’s FY2011, FY2012,
FY2013, or FY2014 budget requests. Previously, in its FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations
budget request, the Obama Administration sought over $150 million for North Korea-related
energy and denuclearization assistance to use in the event of a breakthrough with North Korea.12
In separate committee actions, House and Senate appropriators rejected these requests, in large
part due to North Korea’s withdrawal from the Six-Party process and subsequent missile and
nuclear tests in the spring of 2009.13 Since the 2009 tests, Congress has specifically prohibited
energy assistance to North Korea. Section 8042 of the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act
(P.L. 113-6) says that “None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available in this Act
12 The funds included $95 million under the Economic Support Funds (ESF) to potentially pay for heavy fuel oil (HFO)
and $81.5 million to be available to potentially pay for the dismantlement of nuclear facilities and other
denuclearization work in North Korea (for details, see “Heavy Fuel Oil Shipments” and “U.S. Denuclearization
Assistance” below).
13 As in the past, funds from the State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund may be used in North
Korea.
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may be obligated or expended for assistance to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea unless
specifically appropriated for that purpose.”
U.S. Denuclearization Assistance
Nuclear Disablement Expenditures
As part of Phase Two under the Six-Party agreements, the Departments of State and Energy
worked on disabling the nuclear facilities at the Yongbyon complex in North Korea until April
2009.14 This effort was funded through the State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament
Fund (NDF). The State Department paid the North Korean government for the labor costs of
disablement activities, and related equipment and fuel. Approximately $20 million in FY2007 and
$25 million in FY2008 was approved for this purpose. NDF funds may be used “notwithstanding
any other provision of law,” and are available until expended.
The Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) was
contributing its personnel as technical advisors to the U.S. Six-Party delegation and as technical
teams on the ground at Yongbyon overseeing disablement measures. Although disablement has
been suspended, DOE programs continue preparatory work for future verification or
denuclearization activities in North Korea.15 NNSA estimated that it spent approximately $15
million by July 2008 in support of Phase Two (Yongbyon disablement) implementation.16 NNSA
estimated that disablement costs could have totaled up to $360 million if North Korea had agreed
to the packaging and disposition of separated plutonium and spent fuel at Yongbyon. The
Congressional Budget Office estimated that full nuclear dismantlement in North Korea would
cost approximately $575 million and take about four years to complete.17
“Glenn Amendment” Restrictions
North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test triggered sanctions under Section 102 (b) (the “Glenn
Amendment” 22 U.S.C. 2799aa-1) of the Arms Export Control Act, which prohibits assistance to
a non-nuclear weapon state under the NPT that has detonated a nuclear explosive device. Due to
this restriction, DOE funds could not be spent in North Korea without a waiver. Congress passed
language in the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-252) that would have
allowed the President to waive the Glenn Amendment restrictions and that stipulates that funds
may only be used for the purpose of eliminating North Korea’s WMD and missile-related
14 Nuclear disablement should be distinguished from nuclear dismantlement, the former referring to a process that
could be reversed. For discussion of what was accomplished, see Table 2 in CRS Report RL34256, North Korea’s
Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, by Mary Beth Nikitin.
15 For example, the NNSA’s Nonproliferation and International Security and Nuclear Noncompliance Verification
(NNV) programs. See FY2011 Department of Energy Congressional Budget Justification.
16 Statement of William H. Tobey, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, to the Senate
Committee on Armed Services, July 31, 2008.
17 The CBO’s cost estimate takes into account the dismantling of the reactor and three associated plants at Yongbyon as
well as the transport and reprocessing of the spent fuel outside North Korea. Congressional Budget Office, “Cost
Estimate: S. 3001 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009,” June 13, 2008. http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/93xx/doc9390/s3001.pdf.
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programs.18 The waiver’s purpose was to allow DOE “to procure, ship to North Korea, and use
equipment required to support the full range of disablement, dismantlement, verification, and
material packaging and removal activities that Phase Three will likely entail.”19 The Bush
Administration notified Congress of its intent to waive these sanctions for the purpose of
denuclearization aid on November 14, 2008, but did not exercise the waiver authority. Because
North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test on May 25, 2009, the waiver may no longer
be issued under P.L. 110-252. The law stipulates that a nuclear test after the date of enactment
would nullify the waiver authority.20
Cooperative Threat Reduction Funds
In 2008, Senator Richard Lugar proposed that the Department of Defense’s Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) program be granted “notwithstanding authority”21 for denuclearization work in
North Korea. Authorization was given for CTR funds to be used globally for the first time in the
FY2008 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-181, see §1305), which expressly encourages
“activities relating to the denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” The
FY2010 Defense Authorization bill (P.L. 111-84) gave the CTR program notwithstanding
authority for a limited amount of funds to be used globally in response to urgent proliferation
threats, which could include work in North Korea.
Assistance to the IAEA
The United States provided $1.8 million in 2007 and $1.5 million in 2008 to the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for its monitoring activities at Yongbyon. Japan has provided the
agency with $500,000 for this purpose.22 The European Union in 2008 contributed approximately
$1.6 million (1.025 million euros) to the IAEA for Yongbyon monitoring and verification
activities. North Korea expelled the IAEA inspectors in April 2009. North Korea had initially
invited the IAEA to monitor the moratorium of enrichment activities at Yongbyon as part of the
February 29, 2012, agreement with the United States. If IAEA verification is required in the
future, the agency might need extrabudgetary contributions for this work.
18 Similar language appeared in the Senate version of the FY2009 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act
(P.L. 110-417), but was not included in the House version. The final act includes it under “legislative provisions not
adopted” under Title XII, since the waiver authority was passed earlier in the FY2008 Supplemental. See joint
explanatory note: http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/fy09ndaa/FY09conf/
FY2009NDAAJointExplanatoryStatement.pdf.
19 Tobey testimony, ibid.
20 In P.L. 110-252 §1405 (b)(3), there is an exception for activities described in Subparas A or B of §102(b)1 of AECA.
This includes “transfers to a non-nuclear weapon state a nuclear explosive device,” and “is a non-nuclear-weapon state
and either (i) receives a nuclear explosive device, or (ii) detonates a nuclear explosive device.”
21 So that funds may be used “notwithstanding any other provision of law.” Senator Richard Lugar, Remarks to
National Defense University, October 2, 2008. http://lugar.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=304026&&.
22 Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary for Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Testimony before House
Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment and Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Washington, DC, October 25, 2007.
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Congress and Denuclearization Assistance
The Obama Administration’s FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Request asked for $47
million for the State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) “to support
dismantlement of nuclear facilities in North Korea.” The House Appropriations Committee
halved the NDF request to $23.5 million, but did not exclude the use of these funds in North
Korea. The Senate Appropriations Committee report also does not specifically mention North
Korea in its description of NDF funding, but does not exclude it. The committee approved $77
million for the NDF, of which $50 million is for border security in Gaza.23 The NDF could choose
to use other funds in North Korea. Since then, the funding requests for NDF have not referenced
North Korea.
The Administration requested $34.5 million for Department of Energy (DOE) denuclearization
work in North Korea as part of the FY2009 Supplemental, including $25 million for the Global
Threat Reduction Initiative to “complete disablement tasks and to initiate spent fuel disposition
and other denuclearization efforts” in North Korea, and $9.5 million for the Nonproliferation and
International Security Program’s “disablement and dismantlement support” in the DPRK. The
House and Senate Appropriations Committees deleted all the DOE monies for North Korea,
saying in reports that should North Korea reverse its policies, then denuclearization assistance
could be considered.
The FY2011, FY2012, FY2013, and FY2014 budget requests did not provide specifically for any
denuclearization funding for North Korea. The 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-
117) and the continuing appropriations for FY2011 did not address denuclearization assistance to
North Korea since the process was stalled. Sections 8042 of the FY2013, FY2012, FY2011, and
FY2010 appropriations bills say that, “None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made
available in this Act may be obligated or expended for assistance to the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea unless specifically appropriated for that purpose.”
U.S. Food Assistance
Since 1995, the international community has donated over 12 million MT of food aid to North
Korea to help North Korea alleviate chronic, massive food shortages that began in the early
1990s. A severe famine in the mid-1990s killed an estimated 600,000 to 3 million North
Koreans.24 As Figure 1 shows, the amount of food aid has varied from year to year, but in
general, Pyongyang has successfully ensured a significant inflow; except for 2006 and 2008, food
aid has exceeded 400,000 MT. Since 1996, the United States has sent over 2.2 million MT of food
assistance worth nearly $800 million to North Korea. Over 90% of U.S. food assistance to
Pyongyang has been channeled through the U.N. World Food Programme (WFP). The United
States has been by far the largest cumulative contributor to the WFP’s North Korea appeals.
23 U.S. Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee, 111th Cong., May 14, 2009, S.Rept. 111-20.
24 For a short review of the estimates of the famine’s death toll, see Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Famine in
North Korea. Markets, Aid, and Reform, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 73-76.
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Figure 1. Total Estimated Food Aid to North Korea, 1995-2009
1,600,000
1,400,000
1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
ric Tons
Met
600,000
400,000
200,000
-
5
6
7
8
9
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
199
199
199
199
199
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
WFP
Non-WFP
Source: World Food Program’s International Food Aid Information System (INTERFAIS) database.
Four countries, China, South Korea, the United States, and Japan, have dominated the provision
of food aid, contributing over 75% of the total since 1995. North Korea has been adept at turning
from one donor to another, opportunistically seeking out the least stringent terms.25
For instance, unlike the WFP, Beijing and Seoul historically have made few requests for access
and monitoring. When both countries increased their food contributions to North Korea in the
mid-2000s, this arguably allowed North Korea’s central government authorities to roll back the
highly intrusive (from North Korea’s perspective) WFP in the mid-2000s (see “North Korea’s
2006 Restrictions and the Decline in the WFP’s Program” below). Conversely, in 2008, when
inter-Korean relations began to sour and humanitarian assistance from South Korea dried up,
25 For more, see Haggard and Noland, Famine in North Korea, Chapter 6.
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North Korea turned back to the United States for food aid and accepted Washington’s demands
for expanded access and improved monitoring conditions.
Congress and Food Assistance
Over the years some Members of Congress have supported continued donations to help the North
Korean people, on humanitarian grounds, regardless of the actions of the North Korean regime.
Other Members have voiced their opposition to food aid to the DPRK. In the 112th Congress, the
Housepassed an amendment by voice vote (H.Amdt. 453) in June 2011 that in effect would have
prohibited the U.S. government from providing food assistance to North Korea. The amendment
was included in the House version of H.R. 2112, the FY2012 Agriculture Appropriations Act. The
Senate version of the bill, passed on November 1, contained no such measure. Participants in the
House-Senate conference committee decided to strip the amendment’s tougher restrictions,
replacing it with language (§741) that food assistance may only be provided if “adequate
monitoring and controls” exist. President Obama signed H.R. 2112 (P.L. 112-55) into law on
November 18, 2011.
In 2012, the Senate passed by a vote of 59-40 an amendment to S. 3240, the Agriculture Reform,
Food, and Jobs Act of 2012 (the “farm bill”), that prohibited federal food aid to North Korea
(amendment no. 2454, roll call vote 144). The amendment, incorporated into the bill as Section
3015, would allow the President to waive the prohibition if he finds that providing food aid to
North Korea is in the “national interest.” The same day, by a vote of 43-56, the Senate rejected a
similar amendment that lacked waiver authority (amendment no. 2354, roll call vote 145). The
House version of the farm bill, the Federal Agriculture Reform and Risk Management Act of
2012 (H.R. 6083) contained no provisions related to food aid to North Korea. The 112th Congress
ended without the House-reported bill ever being brought to the floor of the House for a vote.
Over the past decade, many Members have called for food assistance to be conditioned upon
North Korean cooperation on monitoring and access. The 111th Congress included in the FY2010
omnibus appropriations act (P.L. 111-117) language that called for the State Department to
determine how much Pyongyang “owes” the United States for the approximately 21,000 MT in
U.S. food aid that the North Korean government had distributed after it had halted a U.S. food
assistance program being implemented by a consortium of U.S. nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs).26 The act also required the State Department to reduce any aid to North Korea by this
amount unless it was found that the North Korean government provided the food to the intended
recipients (generally, vulnerable women and children in the northwestern parts of the country).27
If the Obama Administration resumes food aid to North Korea, two options would be to use
FY2011 food aid that has not been committed or to tap the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust. The
latter, which was used for the original 2008 program, is a financial reserve that may be used when
26 See §7071(f)(6)) of P.S. 111-117, The FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act.
27 Other examples of Congressional attention on the monitoring issue include the following: The North Korean Human
Rights Act (P.L. 108-333) included nonbinding language calling for “significant increases” above current levels of U.S.
support for humanitarian assistance to be conditioned upon “substantial improvements” in transparency, monitoring,
and access. The reauthorized act (P.L. 110-346) does not include this language, and drops the extensive discussion of
humanitarian assistance that was included in P.L. 108-333. Both the original and the reauthorized act require annual
reports to Congress on U.S. humanitarian assistance to North Korea. See CRS Report RS22973, Congress and U.S.
Policy on North Korean Human Rights and Refugees: Recent Legislation and Implementation, by Emma Chanlett-
Avery.
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the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator makes a
determination that other statutory sources of aid are unavailable. While the Administrator is not
required by law to notify Congress of such a determination, he very likely would consult with
House and Senate agriculture and foreign affairs committees as this decision is made.28
U.S. Food Aid Policy
Officially, U.S. policy de-links food and humanitarian aid from strategic interests. Although
diplomatic factors have always affected decisions over aid to North Korea, the degree to which
they have been linked has varied over time. It has been well documented that the Clinton
Administration used food aid to secure North Korea’s participation and increased cooperation in a
variety of security-related negotiations.29 The George W. Bush Administration arguably weakened
the linkage and made improved monitoring and access one of three explicit conditions for
providing food aid to North Korea. The other two were the need in North Korea and competing
needs for U.S. food assistance.30 Although Obama Administration officials say that these three
criteria remains their policy, diplomatic factors appear to be rising in importance alongside
humanitarian considerations. In the eyes of many observers, the Obama Administration’s
February 2012 understanding with North Korea on the resumption of food assistance appears to
have been directly linked to the concessions that North Korea was expected to make on the
nuclear issue before the death of supreme leader Kim Jong-il.
The Food Aid Dilemma
Providing food to North Korea poses a number of moral and policy dilemmas for the United
States. Pyongyang has resisted making economic reforms that would help pay for food imports or
increase domestic production, as well as the political reforms that would allow for a more
equitable distribution of food. Additionally, the North Korean government restricts the ability of
donors to monitor shipments of aid. Multiple sources have asserted that a sizeable amount of the
food assistance going to North Korea is routinely diverted for resale in private markets or other
28 For more, see CRS Report R41072, International Food Aid Programs: Background and Issues, by Charles E.
Hanrahan. Historically, P.L. 480 has been the main vehicle for providing U.S. agricultural commodities as food aid
overseas, and from FY2003-FY2005 was the program that funded nearly all of the U.S. food commitments to North
Korea. When commodities or cash are released from the Emerson Trust, they are provided under the authority of P.L.
480 Title II. The Emerson Trust statute essentially authorizes the use of commodities or cash in the Trust to be used as
a backup to Title II when there are unanticipated humanitarian needs. Congress directly appropriates P.L. 480 aid, and
therefore could, although it rarely does, direct how the food should or should not be disbursed.
29 Andrew Natsios, The Great North Korean Famine. Famine, Politics, and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: United
States Institute of Peace Press), Chapter 7; Marcus Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse. The Future of the Two Koreas
(Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics), 182-91.
30 USAID Press Release, June 7, 2002. In practice, some have argued that the timing for U.S. pledges from 2001-2005
sometimes appeared to be motivated also by a desire to influence talks over North Korea’s nuclear program, and that
the linkage between U.S. donations and improvements in North Korea’s cooperation with the WFP occasionally has
been tenuous. As discussed below, events in 2008, when the Bush Administration resumed food assistance, appear to
indicate a tighter link to issues of access and monitoring of food shipments. In late 2008, when Bush Administration
officials felt North Korea was violating its agreement with the WFP, they halted food shipments through the WFP but
continued sending food through the consortium of NGOs that were handling one-fifth of the United States’ 500,000
MT pledge. Mark Noland, “Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas,” Peterson Institute of
International Economics, June 2000, pp. 159, 186, 189. Stephen Haggard, Marcus Noland, and Erik Weeks “Markets
and Famine in North Korea,” Global Asia, Vol. 3, No.2, August 2008.
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uses. 31 Although there has been much public concern about diversion to the North Korean
military, WFP officials and other experts said they have seen little to no evidence that the military
is systemically diverting U.N. food donations, and further, that the North Korean military has no
need for WFP food, since it receives the first cut of North Korea’s national harvest. Moreover, the
assistance is fungible, in that funds that the government otherwise would have spent on food can
be spent on other items. Compounding the problem, China, currently believed to be North
Korea’s largest source of food aid, has no known monitoring systems in place.
The North Korean government’s desire to maintain control over the country is inextricably linked
to the food crisis and its chronic reliance on food aid. Residency in North Korea is tightly
controlled and highly politicized, with the elite permitted to live in or around Pyongyang, where
food shortages are less acute than in the country’s more remote areas, where politically less
desirable families live. For this reason, the United States generally has shipped its food aid to the
northern provinces. Additionally, North Korea is believed to expend little of its foreign currency
to import food, relying instead upon the international community. Moreover, since 2007, the
government has taken many steps to reimpose state controls over farmers and markets.32
However, it is likely that food aid has helped feed millions of North Koreans, possibly staving off
a repeat of the famine conditions that existed in North Korea in the mid- to late 1990s, when 5%-
10% of the population died due to food shortages. A number of observers argue that the North
Korean people should not be unduly punished for their government’s behavior, that diversion to
markets helps ordinary North Koreans by lowering food prices, and that measures can be taken to
limit the Kim Jong-il regime’s abuses of food aid. For instance, Obama Administration officials
said in late 2011 that if they decided to resume food aid, the shipments would be “nutritional”
products such as high-protein biscuits that are less likely to be diverted than traditional food
staples.33
Additionally, some contend that a well-designed food aid program can facilitate the expansion of
markets, which over time will erode the Kim regime’s hold over the country, while helping to
reduce food prices in North Korea’s most vulnerable provinces.34 Providing food aid also can be
used to serve larger diplomatic goals, though many experts caution against explicitly linking food
to concessions in the security arena, such as in the Six-Party Talks over North Korea’s nuclear
programs.
31 See, for instance, Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, “Hunger and Human Rights: The Politics of Famine in
North Korea” (Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2005), in which the authors argue
that up to half of the WFP’s aid deliveries did not reach their intended recipients.
32 Stephen Haggard, Marcus Noland, and Erik Weeks, “Markets and Famine in North Korea,” Global Asia, Vol. 3,
No.2, August 2008.
33 State Department Daily Press Briefing by Spokesperson Victoria Nuland, December 13 and December 14, 2011.
34 Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Witness to Transformation. Refugee Insights into North Korea (Peterson
Institute for International Economics: Washington, DC, 2011).
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The Ebbs and Flows of U.S. Food Aid to North Korea, 2006-2010
North Korea’s 2006 Restrictions and the Decline in the WFP’s Program
After peaking at over 900,000 MT in 2001, assistance provided by the WFP fell dramatically over
the following years until 2008, when a large U.S. contribution brought up the WFP total. There
were two primary reasons for the decline in WFP assistance. The first was “donor fatigue,” as
contributing nations objected to the North Korean government’s continued development of its
nuclear and missile programs as well as tightened restrictions on donor agencies’ monitoring of
shipments to ensure that food is received by the neediest. The emergence of other emergency food
situations around the globe also stretched the food aid resources of the United States and other
donors. Whatever the causes, the WFP was unable to fill its goal of 150,000 MT for the 2006-
2008 period. During this time, increased bilateral assistance—outside the WFP’s program—that
China and South Korea shipped directly to North Korea, as well as improved harvests in North
Korea, appear to have made up much of the gap, which generally is estimated to be in the range
of 1 million MT per year.
In 2006, the WFP drastically scaled down its program after the North Korean government
imposed new restrictions, constraining the organization’s size and ability to distribute and
monitor its shipments. The WFP and Pyongyang then negotiated a new agreement that would
feed 1.9 million people, less than a third of the 6.4 million people the WFP previously had
targeted. North Korea’s total population is approximately 22 million. In the deal, the WFP
expatriate staff was cut by 75%, to 10 people, all of whom were based in Pyongyang. Before
2006, the WFP had over 40 expatriate staff and six offices around the country conducting
thousands of monitoring trips every year.35 The North Korean government did not allow any
Korean speakers to serve on the WFP’s in-country staff.
The U.S. Resumes Food Aid in 2008
In 2008, the WFP warned that food shortages and hunger had worsened to levels not seen since
the late 1990s, because of decades of poor agricultural planning, large-scale floods in 2007, and
also the significant decline of aid from the two largest bilateral food providers, China and South
Korea. North Korea began seeking a new outside source of food. In May 2008, the United States
Agency for International Development announced that the United States would resume food
assistance to North Korea by providing 500,000 MT for one year beginning in June 2008. Of this
amount, 400,000 MT was to be channeled through the WFP. Approximately 100,000 tons would
be funneled through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including World Vision, Mercy
Corps, Samaritan’s Purse, Global Resource Services and Christian Friends of Korea. The
announcement stated that the resumption was made possible by an agreement reached with
Pyongyang that allowed for “substantial improvement in monitoring and access in order to allow
for confirmation of receipt by the intended recipients.”36 The U.S. move came not long after a
breakthrough was reached in the Six-Party Talks. Bush Administration officials repeatedly stated
their policy that decisions on food assistance were unrelated to the nuclear negotiations.
35 WFP Press Release, “WFP Set to Resume Operations in North Korea,” 11 May 2006; undated WFP document,
Projected 2007 Needs for WFP Projects and Operations, Korea, DPR.
36 USAID Press Release, “Resumption of U.S. Food Assistance to the North Korean People,” May 16, 2008.
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In June 2008, the WFP signed an agreement with Pyongyang that stipulated terms for increased
WFP personnel and access for monitoring the delivery of the food aid. It allowed WFP to expand
its operations into 131 counties, versus an earlier 50, in regions at particular risk of famine.37 The
agreement also expanded the WFP’s rights and ability to monitor the shipments of food aid, in
order to better ensure that the food was not diverted from its target recipients. Following the
agreement, the WFP issued a new emergency appeal for over 600,000 MT for 6.2 million North
Koreans. The NGO consortium, which targeted around 900,000 people, operated in the country’s
two northwestern provinces.38
Cessation of the 2008-2009 Program
The WFP Component
Beginning in the late summer of 2008, operating conditions for the WFP appear to have
worsened. The North Korean government reportedly did not allow the U.N. agency to fully
implement parts of its WFP agreement. In particular, the Bush Administration disagreed with
Pyongyang over the number of Korean speakers and Americans allowed in the country. Due in
part to these difficulties, after August 2008 the United States halted shipments of food to the
WFP’s North Korea appeal. In March 2009 the WFP announced it was scaling back its program
to “a core minimum” that would allow the organization to rapidly expand its operations if it
receives more donations in the future. The announcement stated that the WFP was feeding
incomplete rations to only 2 million of the 6.2 million people it had originally targeted.39
Ultimately, donors provided the WFP with less than 25% of the target for its 2008-2010
emergency appeal.40 There have been reports that the WFP program suffered from lapses in the
management of the North Korea office’s finances and commodities.41 The charges followed
incidents of misuse and diversion of funds during the mid-2000s by the North Korea offices of
another U.N. agency, the U.N. Development Program (UNDP).
The NGO Component
According to U.S. officials and representatives of the NGO consortium, the NGO portion of the
U.S. program continued to proceed smoothly, with marked improvements in cooperation between
the aid providers and their North Korean counterparts. For this reason, throughout the winter of
2008-2009, the United States continued to send shipments via the consortium. However, in March
2009, North Korea asked the United States and the NGOs to shut down their portion of the U.S.
program by the end of the month. The program had been scheduled to run until May 2009. Many
37 WFP, “Operational Priorities, September 2008, D.P.R. Korea,” EMOP 10757.0–Emergency Assistance to Population
Groups Affected by Floods and Rising Food and Fuel Prices. In 2005, the WFP had access to 158 of 203 counties and
districts, representing approximately 83% of the population. USAID, Report on U.S. Humanitarian Assistance to North
Koreans, April 25, 2005; March and April 2005 e-mail exchanges and phone conversations with WFP and USAID.
38 “Aid Agencies Send Fourth U.S. Food Shipment to North Korea,” Mercy Corps and World Vision press release,
October 16, 2008.
39 “WFP does what little it can for North Koreans,” WFP Press Release, March 5, 2009.
40 WFP, “Resource Situation” February 3, 2011, Recipient Country: Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of, Project
Number 107570.
41 George Russell, “EXCLUSIVE: U.N. Audit Finds ‘Lapses’ in Managing Food Program Aid to N. Korea,”
FoxNews.com, September 28, 2010.
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speculated that North Korea had closed the program in part due to the overall deterioration in
relations with the United States and South Korea. The consortium delivered 71,000 MT of food
during its 10-month tenure, reaching more than 900,000 people.42
WFP Programs from 2010-2013
In 2010, the WFP began a new food aid operation in North Korea to help vulnerable populations
deal with North Korea’s chronic food gap. Several months later, however, reports began emerging
from North Korea that the food situation was worsening considerably. North Korea then began
asking outside donors—including the United States and South Korea—for additional aid. A
number of groups operating inside North Korea reported that the prices for staples in semi-official
markets, which are the main source of food for those outside the cadre of elite, were soaring due
to a severe winter and drops in commercial food imports and bilateral food donations. Some
observers speculated that the North Korean government was also motivated by a desire to
stockpile food in preparation for celebrations in 2012 to celebrate the 100th birthday of the late
founder of the country, Kim Il-sung (the grandfather of the current leader, Kim Jong-un). While
the Obama Administration, as well as many Members of Congress, began debating whether to
resume U.S. food aid to North Korea, the WFP in April 2011 launched a new, one-year
emergency appeal for over 300,000 MT to feed over 3.5 million vulnerable people. The WFP
negotiated a new agreement with its North Korean counterpart that was similar to the 2008
agreement between the two sides in terms of access and monitoring.43 However, due to a lack of
support from donors, the WFP provided approximately 100,000 MT, less than one third the
original target.44
After the one-year emergency operation concluded in 2012, the WFP resumed its 2010 operation,
targeting about 2.4 million women and children. In early June 2013, three weeks before the
program’s expiration date, the WFP reported that it was 40% short of its funding goals for the
North Korea appeal.45 On June 8, the WFP decided to launch a new two-year operation in North
Korea. Its goal is to help 2.9 million people with just over 200,000 MT of food.
Options and Considerations for Future Food Aid to North Korea
Along the spectrum of continuing the status quo (i.e., no food aid) and providing food without
any conditions, the Administration and Congress face a number of options and considerations
when deciding whether and how to resume food aid to North Korea, including the following:
• Establish explicit “diplomatic” linkages by conditioning food aid on progress
in security-related talks, such as negotiations regarding the North’s nuclear
programs. As mentioned above, this appears to be the direction the Obama
42 “Statement of NGO Partners on Cessation of Food Aid Program in the Democratic People’s Republic Of Korea
(DPRK),” Mercy Corps, Samaritan’s Purse, World Vision, March 19, 2009.
43 For a detailed analysis of the agreement, see the May 17, 2011, “Monitoring Aid” entry to the Witness to
Transformation blog, by Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, available at http://www.piie.com/blogs/nk/?p=1329.
44 WFP, Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266. Delivering Food Assistance in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, undated document, available at http://www.wfp.org/content/performance-assessment-
wfps-emergency-operation-200266-dpr-korea.
45 WFP, “Resource Situation,” June 5, 2013, Recipient Country: Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of, Project
Number 200114.
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Administration was following until the breakdown of the Leap Day deal,
although officials insist the linkage was made by North Korea, not the United
States. In the past, emphasizing geostrategic concerns as a condition for food aid
has led to some short-term successes, such as persuading North Korea to return to
the bargaining table. However, in nearly all of these cases, it is not clear that the
provision of food has induced significant changes in North Korea’s long-term
behavior on security issues. Additionally, this approach runs the risk of
encouraging the North Korean government to believe that concessions on other
issues, such as the denuclearization talks, are more important to the United States
than demands for improved monitoring of the delivery of food aid. Yet another
variant of this approach would be to link food aid to North Korean concessions in
the human rights sphere, such as releasing political prisoners.46
• Set explicit “humanitarian” linkages by conditioning future food aid on
improvements in access and monitoring.47 For instance, after several years where
the United States did not provide food to North Korea, the 2008 program was
initiated after Pyongyang and Washington reached an agreement on improved
monitoring that provided greater confidence that the food was being received by
the intended recipients, women and young children. The U.S. program also
shipped only to North Korea’s historically poorer and politically marginalized
northern provinces, to help ensure that even if diversion did occur, food would be
diverted to markets likely to be used by the most vulnerable, rather than to
markets in the wealthier and politically connected locations of Pyongyang and its
surroundings. The Administration could also insist that Pyongyang abide by
concessions made in 2008, but apparently not fully implemented, such as
granting relief workers the ability to bring emergency communications
equipment into the country.
• Decide on whether and how to harmonize policy with Seoul. U.S. and South
Korean approaches on food aid to North Korea have not always been in harmony.
The Park Geun-hye government appears more willing
• For much of the 2000s, attempts to convince North Korean authorities to
conform to international aid standards were often undermined by large-scale,
largely unconditional food aid from Seoul (as well as from Beijing). In contrast,
the former South Korean government of Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013) made
tougher humanitarian demands on North Korea. It also asked North Korea to
make improvements in North-South relations before it would consider providing
large amounts of food and fertilizer, a demand that has become firmer in the
aftermath of North Korea’s November 2010 shelling of a South Korean island
that killed four South Koreans. Testifying before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee in June 2011, Ambassador King said that South Korea would prefer
that the United States not provide food aid to North Korea.48 Lee government
officials are concerned that large-scale U.S. aid would reinforce the view among
46 Chol-hwan Kang, “Unconditional Aid to N.Korea Is Poison for its People,” English.chosun.com, April 27, 2011.
47 For one argument in this vein, see Nicholas Eberstadt, “Outside Aid Has Failed. Only an ‘Intrusive Aid’ Approach
Will Work,” Global Asia, September 2011, http://www.globalasia.org/.
48 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing, Religious Freedom, Democracy, Human Rights in
Asia, Status of Implementation of the Tibetan Policy Act, Block Burmese JADE Act, and North Korean Human Rights
Act, 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 2, 2011.
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many South Koreans that they are being unduly rigid in their North Korea policy.
Some observers have argued that the United States should not provide food in
part because it might create a rift with South Korea, while others contend that
U.S.-South Korea cooperation on North Korea is sufficiently strong to sustain
different approaches. In November and December 2011, the South Korean
government announced it would make humanitarian donations to North Korea,
including over $12 million through the World Health Organization (WHO) and
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).49 This move likely has made it
diplomatically easier for the Obama Administration to move forward with a
significant food aid package to North Korea.
• Should China be pressured on food aid? U.S. officials could publically and/or
privately urge China to insist on some monitoring for its food aid, a topic that
does not appear to have been on either the Obama or Bush Administration’s
crowded list of talking points with China. A fallback position with Beijing could
be to call for a continuation of its current policy, which appears to be to provide
food assistance only at a subsistence level needed to maintain stability in North
Korea. Since at least 2007, China does not yet appear to have provided North
Korea with the massive amounts of grain that would be needed to alleviate
hunger and/or build up stores for 2012.
• Select the mix between the WFP and NGO Channels. If the Obama
Administration decides to resume food aid to North KOrea, about 30,000 MT
will remain from the 2008 program’s NGO component and 300,000 from the
WFP component. U.S. officials may wish to change this allocation. Since 1995,
more than 90% of the 2.2 million MT of food aid the U.S. has provided to North
Korea has been shipped via donations to the WFP. One reason the Bush
Administration decided to channel one-fifth of the 2008 aid package through
NGOs was because several of these private groups appear to have had more
success than the WFP in monitoring their assistance, particularly in gaining
access to aid recipients and using their own Korean-speaking staff. The smaller
operations of these NGOs allow them to deal principally with local North Korean
officials, who often have greater incentives to be more cooperative than the
central government. The WFP operates nationally and targets millions more.
Other Forms of U.S. Assistance
Medical Assistance
From time to time, the United States has responded to humanitarian disasters in North Korea by
sending medicines and other emergency equipment. For instance, after floods struck parts of
North Korea in the summer of 2010, the Obama Administration sent North Korea about $600,000
worth of pharmaceuticals and other assistance. The aid was channelled through two U.S. NGOs:
Samaritan’s Purse and Mercy Corps. The aforementioned 2011 $900,000 flood relief package was
49 Earlier in 2011, North Korea had rejected South Korea’s offer of 5 billion won (over $4 million) in flood relief,
demanding that South Korea provide a larger package that included rice and construction equipment.
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Foreign Assistance to North Korea
distributed by Samaritan’s Purse, which along with other NGOs paid for the costs of transporting
the assistance.
In an example of a broader aid program, in 2008, the Bush Administration allocated $4 million in
assistance to U.S. NGOs to help several North Korean rural and provincial hospitals by
improving their electrical supplies and by providing medical equipment and training. The four
recipient NGOs are Mercy Corps, the Eugene Bell Foundation, Global Resource Services, and
Samaritan’s Purse.50 Development Assistance
During the Bush Administration, various officials, including the President, issued vague pledges
of more extensive U.S. assistance that might be forthcoming if North Korea dismantled its
nuclear programs and satisfied other U.S. security concerns dealing with missiles and the
deployment of conventional forces.51 The Obama Administration has indicated a
“comprehensive” aid package would be forthcoming if North Korea takes positive steps on the
nuclear front.
With regard to U.S. development assistance programs, in the near term, the President has
considerable flexibility to offer some forms of development assistance. The Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, for instance, allows the President annually to provide up to $50 million per country
for any purpose.52 Longer-term initiatives, however, would likely require changes in U.S. law and
thereby require congressional action. For instance, the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act
specifically bans many forms of direct aid to North Korea, along with several other countries.53
Many health and emergency disaster relief aid programs are exempt from such legislative
restrictions because they have “notwithstanding” clauses in their enacting legislation.
Additionally, if the Administration were to designate North Korea as a country involved in drug
production and trafficking—as some have advocated—then by law North Korea would be
ineligible for receiving most forms of U.S. development assistance.54
Author Contact Information
Mark E. Manyin
Mary Beth Nikitin
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Specialist in Nonproliferation
mmanyin@crs.loc.gov, 7-7653
mnikitin@crs.loc.gov, 7-7745
50 “U.S. Spends $4 Million On Medical Aid For N.Korea In 2008,” Korea Herald, December 21, 2008; December 2008
communication with U.S. State Department.
51 Testimony of Richard Armitage, State Department Deputy Secretary, before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, February 4, 2003.
52 §614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, P.L. 87-195.
53 §607 of P.L. 110-161, the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, which also bans direct aid to Cuba, Iran, and
Syria.
54 See CRS Report RL32167, Drug Trafficking and North Korea: Issues for U.S. Policy, by Raphael F. Perl.
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